[Senate Hearing 117-311]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-311
REINVIGORATING U.S.-COLOMBIA RELATIONS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 16, 2022
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
48-086 PDF WASHINGTON : 2022
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut MITT ROMNEY, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
Damian Murphy, Staff Director
Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey.............. 1
Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho.................... 3
Nichols, Hon. Brian A. Assistant Secretary of State for Western
Hemisphere, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC........... 4
Prepared Statement........................................... 6
Robinson, Hon. Todd D., Assistant Secretary of State for
International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of
State, Washington, DC.......................................... 7
Prepared Statement........................................... 8
Escobari, Hon. Marcela, Assistant Administrator for Latin America
and the Caribbean, U.S. Agency for International Development,
Washington, DC................................................. 10
Prepared Statement........................................... 11
Restrepo, Dan, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress,
Washington, DC................................................. 28
Prepared Statement........................................... 29
Realuyo, Celina B., Adjunct Professor, the George Washington
University School of International Affairs, Washington, DC..... 33
Prepared Statement........................................... 35
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Mr. Brian Nichols to Questions Submitted by Senator
Jim Risch...................................................... 46
Responses of Mr. Todd Robinson to Questions Submitted by Senator
Jim Risch...................................................... 46
Responses of Ms. Marcela Escobari to Questions Submitted by
Senator Jim Risch.............................................. 47
Responses of Mr. Brian Nichols to Questions Submitted by Senator
Marco Rubio.................................................... 47
Responses of Mr. Todd Robinson to Questions Submitted by Senator
Marco Rubio.................................................... 50
Responses of Mr. Brian Nichols to Questions Submitted by Senator
John Barrasso.................................................. 52
Responses of Mr. Todd Robinson to Questions Submitted by Senator
John Barrasso.................................................. 54
Responses of Mr. Brian Nichols to Questions Submitted by Senator
Ted Cruz....................................................... 54
Responses of Mr. Todd Robinson to Questions Submitted by Senator
Ted Cruz....................................................... 56
Responses of Ms. Marcela Escobari to Questions Submitted by
Senator Ted Cruz............................................... 56
(iii)
REINVIGORATING U.S.-COLOMBIA RELATIONS
----------
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 2022
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m., in
room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, and via Webex,
Hon. Robert Menendez, chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Shaheen, Coons,
Booker, Van Hollen, Risch, Rubio, Johnson, Young, Cruz, and
Hagerty.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee will come to order. Our hearing today is
Reinvigorating the U.S.-Colombia Relations.
As the world braces for Russia's assault against the
Ukrainian people in defiance of a peaceful world order and in
rejection of democratic values, it is imperative that we renew
efforts to strengthen our alliances and closest partnerships,
particular those close to home. We have long championed the
United States' relationship with Colombia as one of our most
important in South America and one of the greatest foreign
policy successes globally. Indeed, together we have disrupted
massive criminal networks and built an economic relationship
worth nearly $50 billion.
Thanks to the countless sacrifices of the Colombian people
and our decades-long partnership, Colombia was able to end the
world's longest civil war. Today, Colombia exports its
expertise to help other nations combat drug trafficking and
terrorism. Massive security improvements opened Colombia's
doors to the world while also enabling Colombians to discover
their own homeland.
In a welcome first, we even have a Disney movie about
Colombia, enabling a generational shift in global perceptions
about the country. Personally, I am thrilled that Colombian-
American children in New Jersey will be more likely to hear
their peers singing about Bruno rather than recycling the tired
tropes about Colombia drug wars of the eighties and nineties.
It is transformational on many levels.
Of course, significant challenges still exist. The pandemic
strained Colombia's national budgets and poverty increased, the
government's presence in rural areas of the country diminished,
illicit coca cultivation continued to proliferate, and armed
criminal groups have returned to open conflict and are
terrorizing local communities. Additionally, last year the
world watched as an ill-fated tax reform proposal sparked
country-wide protests and brought violence to Colombia's
cities, unseen in decades, and Colombia has also shouldered an
already generous response to Venezuela's protracted refugee
crisis, a crisis that rivals the tragedy in Syria in size and
impact.
That said, I believe that the complexity of the world today
demands that we embrace the opportunity to address different
challenges, challenges like social and economic inequality,
environmental deterioration, human rights and the creeping
influences of extra-regional actors like Russia and China.
These issues may not affect the lives of Americans as directly
as drug trafficking, but they are critical to the strength of
our democracy in our hemisphere and to the region's overall
health and resilience. In today's world, they must be a
priority.
It is long past time that we modernize our relationship
with Colombia to focus on the realities of the present rather
than the ghosts of the past, and to elevate our partnership to
reflect Colombia's growing leadership on the world stage. We
cannot afford to rest on our laurels.
As we saw, former President Trump was a wrecking ball to
U.S.-Colombia relations, going so far as to say that Colombian
President Duque had, ``done nothing to work with the United
States,'' an insult that is untethered from reality.
That is why, with our country celebrating 200 years of
diplomatic relations this year, I am announcing the most
expansive legislative initiative to date to reinvigorate U.S.-
Colombia relations. The U.S.-Colombia Strategic Alliance Act
will formally designate Colombia as a major non-NATO ally of
the United States. It will strengthen our partnership on
international security and defense issues, as well as human
rights and labor rights. It will also create a new enterprise
fund to catalyze investments in Colombian businesses as they
recover from the pandemic, and promote efforts to diversity
U.S. supply chains away from a reliance on China.
My bipartisan legislation will facilitate new opportunities
for women entrepreneurs and members of Afro-Colombian and
indigenous communities. Importantly, it will also propose
actions to bolster Colombia's efforts to address the
hemisphere's historic refugee and migration challenges and to
support conservation of Colombia's truly privileged
biodiversity. The bill reinforces the United States' support
for the full implementation of the 2016 Peace Accord, which
continues to be the best, albeit imperfect, tool to build peace
and democratic governance in Colombia.
I will close by nothing that bipartisan support for
Colombia has directly contributed to the success of the U.S.
approach. I look forward to working with my Senate colleagues
on this new legislation. I welcome the views of our esteemed
panelists on how we can modernize and strengthen our
relationship in light of the new opportunities and challenges
we face.
With that let me turn to the distinguished ranking member
for his opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The United States
has an enduring interest in a prosperous, democratic, and
stable Western Hemisphere. Strong relations with Colombia are
important to attain these goals. This year we proudly celebrate
200 years of diplomatic relations, the 20th anniversary of Plan
Colombia, and the 10th anniversary of our bilateral trade
promotion agreement. Our partnership has contributed to
widespread economic growth and development as well as safer and
more secure communities, both in Colombia and the hemisphere at
large.
At the same time, Colombia's home-grown democratic
institutions have demonstrated extraordinary resilience in the
face of multiple and simultaneous crises. Colombia's internal
security is under pressure due to flaws in the 2016 deal with
the FARC and the ongoing security and humanitarian crisis
created by the Maduro regime in Venezuela. Our Colombian allies
need our support in confronting transnational criminal and
terrorist organizations and maintaining a credible deterrence
against the rising security threats in the region.
Equally concerning is the negative influence of malign
state actors such as Russia and China. Russian disinformation
campaigns and its export of sophisticated weapons and
repressive practices to the Maduro regime are a growing threat
to the security of Colombia and the stability of northern South
America. China has shown growing interest in the region, and
Colombia's neighbors have already suffered the consequences of
China's predatory practices. The United States should work with
credible regional institutions, such as the Inter-American
Development Bank to unleash private sector solutions to fulfill
the Colombian people's growing expectations.
Given its strategic location straddling the Pacific Ocean
and the Caribbean Sea, Colombia can be a powerful ally in the
race to secure critical supply chains. The Biden administration
should get serious about our partnership with Colombia or risk
squandering the strategic gains of the last few decades.
I welcome our witnesses today and look forward to hearing
from you about these issues.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch. We have a great
panel of Administration witnesses to start off. It is my
privilege to welcome back to the committee Assistant Secretary
for the Western Hemisphere Brian Nichols. Assistant Secretary
Nichols has been an outspoken advocate for peace and prosperity
in Colombia and regional security in our hemisphere.
Prior to assuming his role as Assistant Secretary he served
two ambassadorships in the Republic of Zimbabwe and in Peru. He
served as the Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in
Colombia, where he managed U.S. diplomatic activities and
oversaw over $500 million in annual assistance. Welcome back,
Mr. Secretary.
We also welcome Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Todd
Robinson to the committee. He has played a critical role in
strengthening the U.S.-Colombia bilateral relationship in the
areas of governance, anti-narcotics strategies and security.
Ambassador Robinson has served as Special Advisor for Central
America in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. Ambassador
Robinson was also previously charge d'affaires in Caracas,
Venezuela. He served as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of
Guatemala from 2014 to 2017. Welcome back to you as well.
Finally, it is a pleasure to have the Honorable Marcela
Escobari, Assistant Administrator of USAID's Bureau for Latin
America and the Caribbean as a witness for today's hearing. Her
leadership within USAID Latin America and the Caribbean
portfolio has been critical for supporting efforts that advance
economic opportunity and peace in Colombia.
While serving in the Obama-Biden administration as
Assistant Administrator of USAID's Bureau for Latin America and
the Caribbean, she reinforced U.S. support for Peace Colombia
and prepared a proactive strategy to confront the humanitarian
crisis in Venezuela.
So with the thanks of the committee to all of you for
attending, we will start off with you, Secretary Nichols. We
ask that you keep your statements to about 5 minutes so the
committee can have a conversation with you. Your full
statements will be included in the record, without objection.
Secretary Nichols, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BRIAN A. NICHOLS, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Nichols. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch,
distinguished members of the committee, I find it fitting that
we take the opportunity to discuss Colombia now. As you noted,
2022 marks the bicentennial of bilateral relations between our
two countries. The United States and Colombia stood shoulder to
shoulder through some of the toughest tests of the 19th, 20th,
and 21st centuries, and today we are closer partners than ever.
We share a deep commitment to democratic governance,
prosperity, and opportunity, the rule of law, and respect for
human rights. We share a determination to ensure Colombia has a
lasting peace, counters terrorism and narcotics, expands state
services and protection throughout its territory, and finds
rich strength in its diversity. We join forces to uphold these
values in our countries as well as others, and we do not
refrain from calling out and holding accountable those who
trespass upon the standards we hold dear. In the face of
terrorist violence and a brutal dictatorship in neighboring
Venezuela that provides shelter and encouragement to both
terrorist and criminal groups and caused the exodus of
millions, Colombia's resolve has not waned.
We continue to seek ways to improve security and prosperity
for citizens in both our countries, and we continue to support
comprehensive implementation of the historic 2016 Peace Accord
with the former FARC, which will be critical to ensure
Colombia's transition from 50 years of conflict to a just,
inclusive, and durable peace.
Over the past year, the United States supported Colombia's
impressive efforts to build back from the global pandemic. We
donated more than $117 million to response and recovery
efforts--including surge healthcare personnel, critical
supplies, and equipment--to curb the COVID-19 pandemic. The
United States also donated 6 million safe, effective COVID-19
vaccine doses and helped distribute them in hard-to-reach
areas.
Last week in Colombia, I witnessed the commitment of the
Colombian Government to further professionalize its security
forces and increase state presence and resources in remote
areas. During my visit, I underscored our shared commitment to
human rights with civil society leaders and encouraged U.S.
businesses in Colombia to create new economic opportunities.
For all that we have accomplished together, there remains
more to do.
The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the precarious state
of Colombia's most vulnerable populations. Colombia cannot
achieve lasting peace without addressing the systematic
inequities that have contributed to persistent violence.
Expanding efforts to improve respect for human rights and
accountability for past offenses remains essential. I will
strengthen our work with Colombia to ensure historically
disadvantaged communities of Afro-descendant and indigenous
peoples benefit from the same opportunities as the broader
population. I will continue prioritizing policies and programs
that provide opportunities for women, minority ethnic
communities, victims of violence, and other groups that remain
disenfranchised in society today.
The vulnerable populations in Colombia include almost 2
million Venezuelans displaced by the poverty, kleptocracy, and
brutality of the Maduro regime next door. With its historic
offer of 10-year temporary protection, Colombia generously
welcomed Venezuelan refugees within its borders and provides
short-term access to food, services, and medical attention to
nearly 6 million Venezuelans living in border communities, all
at a time when resources have been stretched even thinner due
to the pandemic.
Colombia has also assumed an outsized leadership position
in the hemisphere in addressing irregular migration, including
by co-hosting a hemisphere-wide ministerial on migration with
Secretary Blinken last October.
An acute priority is collaborating with Colombia to fend
off the malign activities of state and non-state actors, who
increasingly seek opportunities to erode the hemispheric
consensus on the importance of the rule of law and democratic
governance. Those actors helped Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Cuba
turn away from this consensus, and enable the autocratic
leaders of those countries to hold onto power by suppressing
their own people.
Colombia's leaders recognize that protecting democracy from
external threats is essential. With elections on the horizon,
the United States provides funding and technical support to
help Colombia counter malign actors seeking to sow confusion
and mistrust in the institutions Colombia and the United States
worked so tirelessly to strengthen. We also continue to support
Colombia's security efforts to ensure every citizen can
exercise their right to vote safely.
We will seek progress on our bilateral and regional goals
throughout the end of the Duque administration, and we will
engage with Colombia's next administration with the shared goal
that governments must not only be elected democratically, but
also govern democratically to improve the lives of all
citizens. I am confident that this productive, democratic
partnership will continue to deliver for Colombians and
Americans for years to come.
Thank you for this opportunity and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Nichols follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. Brian A. Nichols
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished members of
the Committee, I find it fitting that we take the opportunity to
discuss Colombia now, as 2022 marks the bicentennial of bilateral
relations between our two countries. The United States and Colombia
stood shoulder-to-shoulder through some of the toughest tests of the
19th, 20th and 21st centuries, and today, we are closer partners than
ever.
We share a deep commitment to democratic governance, prosperity and
opportunity, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. We share a
determination to ensure Colombia has a lasting peace, counters
terrorism and narcotics, expands state services and protection
throughout its territory, protects the environment, and finds strength
in its rich diversity. We join forces to uphold these values in our
countries as well as others, and we do not refrain from calling out and
holding accountable those who trespass upon the standards we hold dear.
In the face of terrorist violence and a brutal dictatorship in
neighboring Venezuela that provides shelter and encouragement to both
terrorist and criminal groups and caused the exodus of millions,
Colombia's resolve has not waned.
We continue to seek ways to improve security and prosperity for
citizens in both our countries. And we continue to support
comprehensive implementation of the historic 2016 Peace Accord with the
former FARC, which will be critical to ensure Colombia's transition
from 50 years of conflict to a just, inclusive, and durable peace.
Over the past year, the United States supported Colombia's
impressive efforts to build back from the global pandemic. We donated
more than $117 million to response and recovery efforts--including
surge healthcare personnel, critical supplies, and equipment--to curb
the COVID-19 pandemic. The United States also donated 6 million safe,
effective COVID-19 vaccine doses and helped distribute them in hard-to-
reach areas.
Last week in Colombia, I witnessed the commitment of the Colombian
Government to further professionalize its security forces and increase
state presence and resources in remote areas. During my visit, I
underscored our shared commitment to human rights with civil society
leaders and encouraged U.S. businesses in Colombia to create new
economic opportunities.
For all that we have accomplished together, there remains more to
do.
The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the precarious state of
Colombia's most vulnerable populations. Colombia cannot achieve lasting
peace without addressing the systematic inequities that have
contributed to persistent violence. Expanding efforts to improve
respect for human rights and accountability for past offenses remains
essential. I will strengthen our work with Colombia to ensure
historically disadvantaged communities of Afro-descendant and
Indigenous peoples benefit from the same opportunities as the broader
population. I will continue prioritizing policies and programs that
provide opportunities for women, minority ethnic communities, victims
of violence, and other groups that remain disenfranchised in society
today.
The vulnerable populations in Colombia include almost 2 million
Venezuelans displaced by the poverty, kleptocracy and brutality of the
Maduro regime next door. With its historic offer of 10-year temporary
protection, Colombia generously welcomed Venezuelan refugees within its
borders and provides short-term access to food, services, and medical
attention to nearly 6 million Venezuelans living in border
communities--all at a time when resources have been stretched even
thinner due to the pandemic.
Colombia has also assumed an outsized leadership position in the
hemisphere in addressing irregular migration, including by co-hosting a
hemisphere-wide ministerial on migration with Secretary Blinken last
October.
An acute priority is collaborating with Colombia to fend off the
malign activities of state and non-state actors, who increasingly seek
opportunities to erode the hemispheric consensus on the importance of
the rule of law and democratic governance. Those actors helped
Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Cuba turn away from this consensus--and
enable the autocratic leaders of those countries to hold on to power by
suppressing their own people.
Colombia's leaders recognize that protecting democracy from
external threats is essential. With elections on the horizon, the
United States provides funding and technical support to help Colombia
counter malign actors seeking to sow confusion and mistrust in the
institutions Colombia and the United States worked so tirelessly to
strengthen. We also continue to support Colombia's security efforts to
ensure every citizen can exercise their right to vote safely.
We will seek progress on our bilateral and regional goals
throughout the end of the Duque administration, and we will engage with
Colombia's next administration with the shared goal that governments
must not only be elected democratically, but also govern democratically
to improve the lives of all citizens. I am confident that this
productive, democratic partnership will continue to deliver for
Colombians and Americans for years to come.
Thank you for this opportunity and I look forward to your
questions.
The Chairman. Thank you. Secretary Robinson.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TODD D. ROBINSON, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW
ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Robinson. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today regarding INL's efforts in
Colombia. If I may, thank you for passage of State's
authorization bill and your leadership in that which will help
strengthen the Department and reaffirms this body's commitment
to the role of the Bureau of INL and other bureaus in the
Department.
Together, with longstanding support for Congress, we have
built one of the deepest bilateral partnerships in the
Americas. Colombia's security affects the security and welfare
of all of our citizens. A stronger, more stable Colombia is not
just a better partner, but provides regional leadership on our
shared priorities, including countering transnational crime,
enhancing regional security, and training security forces
throughout the region.
Colombia has made significant progress over the last 20
years, transforming into a stable democracy and economy. To
sustain Colombia's progress we must continue to support
Colombia's institutions and their capacity to expand state
presence in rural areas, invest in counternarcotics efforts,
protect human rights, and combat environmental crime.
The Duque administration has dedicated significant
resources and personnel to meet ambitious counternarcotics
targets despite enormous challenges. While our combined efforts
have helped slow years of explosive coca growth, the now
historic levels of coca cultivation show more work is needed,
which is why the U.S. and Colombian governments developed a new
counternarcotics strategy.
Last October, we committed to a comprehensive, holistic
strategy to link state presence, development, rule of law, and
environmental protection with reducing cocaine production. Our
approach focuses on three pillars: integrated supply reduction,
comprehensive rural development and security, and environmental
protection. The strategy will define broader measures of
success. Eradication will remain crucial, but we broadened our
work to also focus on environmental crimes as narcotics
traffickers also destroy the environment.
Under the integrated supply reduction pillar, INL is
addressing cocaine production and related illicit finances. INL
will continue to help Colombia eradicate coca, interdict
cocaine and precursors, and improve the government's ability to
disrupt criminal financial networks. We also support police
effectiveness by improving training, deployment cycles, and
human rights practices.
Under the rural development and security pillar we hope to
extend state presence to expand economic opportunity, advance
the accords, and improve security, justice, and social services
critical to people's needs. Our efforts with USAID protect
community leaders, make licit crops more competitive, formalize
land ownership, and pursue environmental crimes. Our programs
help reverse environmental degradation by enhancing detection,
assisting Colombian efforts to pursue environmental criminals,
and reforestation.
Our new strategy brings together U.S. and Colombian public
stakeholders in an integrated, sequenced fashion with broader
metrics to produce sustainable results in three targeted areas
to gauge their efficacy. For example, in Caceres, Antioquia, we
sequenced programs to increase police presence, strengthen
community police relations, remove land mines, formalize land
ownership, improve infrastructure, provide agricultural
training, train prosecutors, enforce environmental crimes, and
improve local government services.
To achieve this strategy, we recognize that Colombian
people's confidence in their police and institutions must
improve. We are therefore supporting the Colombian-led plan to
increase police accountability, transparency, and protection of
human rights. We support the Colombian Government's focus on
transparency and accountability, its intent to fully
investigate allegations of police misconduct, and its statement
of zero tolerance for officials acting outside the law.
Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, we have worked closely
with the Duque administration to implement vital police
reforms, achieve impressive counternarcotics results,
strengthen rural security, and disrupt criminal networks. We
cannot and should not underestimate the challenges we face in
Colombia. Armed groups are resilient, adaptive, and well
resourced. Improving rural security in Colombia, an urbanized
country almost twice the size of Texas, is a significant
challenge. We look forward to working with the next Colombian
presidential administration and believe our new whole-of-
government strategy can accommodate whoever wins the next
Colombian elections.
Our work and success in Colombia are made possible by
strong bipartisan congressional support. Thank you, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Robinson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. Todd Robinson
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished Members of
the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
today regarding INL's efforts to advance the United States' priorities
in Colombia. Together, with longstanding support from Congress, we have
built one of the deepest bilateral partnerships in the Americas.
Colombia's security directly affects the security and welfare of
our citizens. A stronger, more stable Colombia is not just a better
partner but also provides regional leadership on our shared priorities,
including countering transnational crime, enhancing regional security,
and training security forces throughout the region.
Colombia has made significant progress over the last 20 years,
transforming into a stable democracy and economy. It has become more
secure and prosperous, with a dramatic drop in violent crime statistics
and a more than tripling of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Gross
National Income (GNI) per capita.
To sustain Colombia's progress, we must continue to support
Colombia's institutions and their capacity to expand state presence
into rural areas, invest in counternarcotics efforts, protect human
rights, combat environmental crime, mitigate climate change, and manage
the Venezuelan migrant crisis.
Despite COVID-19-related challenges, the Duque administration has
dedicated significant resources and personnel to meeting ambitious
counternarcotics targets. In 2021, the Colombian Government captured
alias Otoniel, the most significant blow to Clan del Golfo in many
years; interdicted or assisted in the interdiction of 758 tons of
cocaine and cocaine base, the most in Colombia's history; and manually
eradicated 103,000 hectares of coca, the second most manual eradication
in Colombia's history. While our combined efforts have helped slow
years of explosive coca growth, the now historic levels of coca
cultivation show a new approach was needed to reduce overall drug
production in Colombia, particularly as transnational criminal
organizations find new drug markets and improve production techniques.
With the historic cultivation numbers in mind, the U.S. and Colombian
governments developed a new strategy to redesign our counternarcotics
efforts.
Last October, we committed to a comprehensive, holistic, whole-of-
government strategy to link state presence, security, development, rule
of law, and environmental protection to reduce coca and cocaine
production in Colombia significantly and sustainably. The new approach
focuses on three pillars: integrated supply reduction; comprehensive
rural development and security; and environmental protection.
The strategy will enable us to define broader measures of success
for counternarcotics in rural communities. Eradication will remain
crucial and is essential to create the space for long-term solutions,
but we have also broadened our interventions to include a focus on
environmental crimes as criminal organizations responsible for
narcotrafficking are often responsible for environmental destruction
such as deforestation, soil and water pollution, and illegal mining. By
aggressively pursuing environmental crimes, we will both protect the
environment and apply pressure on these criminal organizations.
Under the integrated supply reduction pillar, INL seeks to address
the nature of the cocaine supply and counter the growing trend in coca
cultivation and related illicit financial flows. INL will continue to
help Colombia eradicate coca, interdict cocaine and precursor
materials, and improve police and prosecutor's ability to disrupt the
financial networks that sustain and support these groups. We are also
supporting the police to improve their long-term training, deployment,
and human rights practices to make them more effective.
Under the rural security, development, and justice pillar, the
United States works with our Colombian partners to extend state
presence to rural communities to provide greater security, expand
economic opportunity, and improve justice and other social services,
which are critical to people's needs and to advance the accords.
Together with USAID, our efforts include protecting community leaders;
making licit crops more profitable and competitive; and amplifying land
formalization.
We have launched programming to reverse the negative impact of the
narcotics trade on the environment by enhancing detection, supporting
reforestation, and assisting Colombian military and police efforts to
pursue the perpetrators of environmental crimes.
Our new strategy brings together U.S. and Colombian public
stakeholders in an integrated, sequenced fashion to produce optimal,
sustainable results in three targeted geographic areas to gauge their
efficacy. INL, in particular, is collaborating closely with USAID. For
example, in Caceres, Antioquia, we sequenced programming to increase
police presence, strengthen community-police relations, remove
landmines, formalize land ownership, improve infrastructure, provide
agriculture training, train prosecutors, enforce environmental crimes,
and improve local government services.
To achieve this strategy, we recognize the Colombian people's
confidence in their police and institutions must improve. We are,
therefore, also supporting the Colombian-led plan to increase police
accountability, transparency, and protection of human rights. We
support the Colombian Government's focus on transparency,
accountability, its intent to fully investigate allegations of police
misconduct, and its statements of zero tolerance for officials acting
outside the law.
Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, we have worked closely with the
Duque administration to implement vital police reforms, achieve
impressive counternarcotics results, strengthen rural security, and
disrupt criminal networks. We cannot and should not underestimate the
challenges we face in Colombia--armed groups are resilient, adaptive,
and incredibly well-resourced--and improving rural security in
Colombia, a highly urbanized country that is almost twice the size of
Texas, is a significant challenge. We look forward to continuing to
work with the Duque administration in these next few months, and to
working with the next Colombian presidential administration. We believe
our new whole-of-government strategy is sufficiently flexible that it
can accommodate whoever is the eventual winner of Colombia's
presidency. Strong and sustained bipartisan support from Congress is an
integral component of our shared success with Colombia. Thank you, and
I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and thank you for
recognizing the State authorization that Senator Risch and I,
along with other members of the committee, were able to
achieve, something that has not been achieved in a couple
decades, and we hope to build upon that in the future.
Administrator Escobari.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARCELA ESCOBARI, ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATOR FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, U.S. AGENCY
FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Escobari. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and
distinguished members of this committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today.
Colombia remains one of the United States' closest and most
steadfast partners in the hemisphere. Despite daunting
challenges, the country's people and successive governments
have demonstrated the will and the capacity to end decades of
civil conflict and build a more peaceful, prosperous, and just
society.
Today Colombia is facing severe shocks: COVID-19, the
Venezuelan migration crisis, and a rise in coca cultivation.
These shocks threaten progress made toward peace and inclusive
development, and USAID is helping Colombia address these issues
head on. USAID adjusted fast to support Colombia's COVID
response. Aside from emergency assistance, we made adjustments
throughout our programs to mitigate the impacts of the virus.
Our support has helped get shots in arms, helped schools shift
to virtual learning, protected women from gender-based
violence, and provided food to those that lost their
livelihoods. We are now focused on the future, getting
Colombia's youth back to school and supporting a robust
economic recovery.
We remain committed to supporting Colombia in protecting
human rights. As the FARC demobilized and stepped away from the
battlefield, criminal gangs have entered into violent
competition to control territory and the illegal narcotics
trade. Social and environmental leaders who are fighting back
have become even more vulnerable to violent attacks, and USAID
has deepened its efforts to support them. We helped the
National Protection Unit to make more effective use of
collective protection for ethnic groups. We helped the Attorney
General secure 88 sentences in human rights defender homicide
cases to date. There is a lot more work to do, but these are
positive steps toward greater accountability.
Coca's rapid expansion also greatly complicates rural
development. Last October, the White House announced the
implementation of a more integrated and holistic approach to
counter narcotics in Colombia. USAID supports this strategy to
integrate and sequence assets in each municipality, in tight
coordination with the Colombian Government and our interagency
partners. Together we bring expanded access to state services,
land reform, rule of law to guarantee basic rights, and income
for licit producers. Together, this brings an expanded state
presence that gives alternative sources of income over coca a
real chance.
One promising strategy has been providing land titles.
USAID piloted the first municipal-wide titling sweep in a
municipality, emblematic of the armed conflict, Colombia's
Montes de Maria area. These efforts are showing positive
results, and USAID hopes to scale this pilot program in other
coca-growing municipalities.
In addition, we recently launched the agency's largest
award dedicated to ethnic inclusion, and we are advancing
localization efforts through direct grants to four local Afro-
Colombian and indigenous organizations.
Another massive challenge is the Venezuelan migration
crisis. In an act of remarkable generosity, Colombia welcomed
nearly 2 million Venezuelan migrants and refugees with open
arms, and USAID quickly adjusted its programs to provide
assistance. In addition to immediate relief, including food,
medicine, and shelter, U.S. investments have helped Colombia
ramp up registration of Venezuelans under their TPS programs,
helping Venezuelans access basic services and employment
opportunities. Colombia's response is a promising model for the
region, and USAID will continue to support Colombia's
integration efforts.
Lastly, and similarly to migration, Colombia has responded
to its environmental challenges with innovation and leadership.
USAID's mission in Colombia oversees the agency's largest
natural environment investment in the hemisphere, focused on
tropical forests and biodiversity conservation, as well as
addressing environmental crimes.
The challenges I have outlined may seem daunting, but it is
our task to make peace irreversible. It will be a long-term
endeavor, but the trust and progress we have forged with the
Colombian people will continue to provide a strong foundation
for the future.
Allow me to close with the words of Luis Fernando Arias, a
leading voice of Colombia's indigenous movement and a close
USAID partner, who a year ago this week died from COVID. He
reminded us, ``We have to continue working for a country that
is more humane, peaceful, equitable, and inclusive. We are here
because Colombia cannot have one more victim.'' May his words
be our call to action today?
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Escobari follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ms. Marcela Escobari
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and distinguished members
of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on USAID's
work in Colombia and discuss our vision for the future.
Colombia remains one of the United States' closest and most
steadfast partners in the hemisphere. Despite daunting challenges, the
country's people and successive governments have demonstrated the will
and the capacity to end a 52 year civil conflict and build a more
peaceful, prosperous, and just society.
The achievement of the 2016 Peace Accord between the state and the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) rests squarely with
Colombia. The United States is proud to have been the country's closest
partner in advancing the transition from five decades of conflict to
greater peace and security.
There are few parallels to what Colombia has achieved in the
relatively short time span of about two decades. Once a nearly failed
state, the country has come back from the brink to establish itself as
a stable democracy, Latin America's fourth largest economy and a close
U.S. partner and ally. From 2000 to 2019, the gross domestic product
more than doubled; the percent of Colombians living in poverty was
nearly cut in half (from 54 percent to 29 percent); and violence fell
dramatically.
The historic 2016 Peace Accord brought important progress. It
disarmed and demobilized 13,000 FARC combatants, with 11,000 still
committed to the peace process; advanced justice and reparations for
around 9 million victims; and spurred unprecedented levels of public
investment in the country's far-flung and historically neglected rural
areas. USAID has been Colombia's most valued partner in advancing
implementation of the Accord.
The Accord is not perfect, and implementation is uneven. Overall,
it has helped the country transition to a new, more hopeful chapter
while creating new opportunities for development investment. Its
survival itself is notable, given that 50 percent of similar peace
accords across the globe collapse during the first 5 years. We note the
important progress that Colombia has won through its choice to
negotiate an exit from conflict, even if implementation remains a
formidable challenge.
usaid's support of the peace process
USAID's support to peace implementation has been vital. Our
assistance is closely aligned with the Accord's Rural Development,
Transitional Justice, and Ethnic Inclusion chapters. With regard to the
Rural Development Chapter, USAID has made implementation of Colombia's
own Territorially-Focused Development Programs the centerpiece of our
support under the firm belief that addressing the rural-urban divide is
the best path for Colombia out of violent conflict.
USAID assistance for land titling, financial inclusion, expansion
of the Colombian State, and rapid response community development
projects directly supports the Rural Development Chapter and is
bringing tangible benefits to conflict-affected communities throughout
rural Colombia. USAID's more nimble and flexible programs help pave the
way for, and mobilize, much larger Colombian Government investments in
the municipalities selected for peace resources.
Notably, we have increased our assistance to the transitional
justice system agreed to in the accords. A truth and justice response
seen as successful and legitimate will help Colombia move decisively
forward to reconcile and come to terms with the violent past. USAID's
assistance seeks to help Colombia reconcile and move beyond past
atrocities and establish consequences for transgressions committed on
all sides during the state's conflict with the FARC. Last year, the
Special Jurisdiction for Peace (or JEP) issued 34 indictments for war
crimes and crimes against humanity in two major cases. USAID assistance
has helped accelerate JEP cases and better protect witnesses. USAID
also has helped the Unit for the Search of Disappeared Persons and the
Truth Commission reach victims all over the country.
With regard to the Ethnic Inclusion Chapter, the Accord recognizes
that the full economic, political, and social participation of Afro-
Colombians and Indigenous peoples is key to a lasting peace. USAID is
profoundly committed to this goal. USAID recently launched the Agency's
largest award wholly dedicated to ethnic inclusion. Moreover, and to
advance Administrator Power's focus on aid localization, USAID is proud
to have direct grants with four local Afro-Colombian and Indigenous
organizations that advance self-determined development, COVID-19
recovery, peacebuilding, and environmental conservation. Hand-in-hand
with those organizations, representing some of the country's most
prominent ethnic leaders, we are advancing implementation of the Ethnic
Inclusion Chapter, building the leadership skills of young people, and
protecting five new indigenous community conservation areas--totaling
772 square miles of protected territories.
USAID's comprehensive support is a recognition of the strategic
possibilities the Accord offers to address the root causes of violence
while expanding equity, economic opportunities, and justice throughout
Colombia's historically neglected rural areas.
While significant progress has been made, Colombia today faces
severe and unanticipated shocks, including the COVID-19 pandemic, the
migration crisis from Venezuela, and the continued rise in coca
cultivation--which has fueled violence against human rights defenders,
social leaders and environmental defenders. These shocks have widened
the gap between Colombia's fortunate and struggling classes and
exacerbated long-standing grievances, resulting in widespread national
protests. These shocks threaten progress made in Colombia's transition
from conflict to an inclusive peace and USAID is working to help
Colombia address these issues head on.
covid-19 pandemic response
The COVID-19 pandemic has made peace implementation and integrated
rural development more difficult. Colombia implemented one of the
longest, and most strict quarantines in the world. The effects were
similarly devastating across Latin America--loss of livelihoods from a
paralyzed economy, learning losses among the youth and a marked
increase in gender-based violence as victims were trapped with their
aggressors. The COVID-19 pandemic also enabled illegal groups in
Colombia's rural areas to assert territorial control and terrorize
communities.
USAID adjusted fast to support Colombia's COVID-19 response across
our health, humanitarian, livelihoods, peacebuilding, and governance
programming. We've provided food assistance and bolstered health
capacities in rural and underserved urban areas. As the pandemic hit
ethnic communities particularly hard, we provided over 70,000 Afro-
Colombian and Indigenous peoples from La Guajira, Choco, Amazonas and
elsewhere with life-saving food, water, and non-medical supplies. We
helped schools shift to virtual learning, engaging thousands of
children at risk of falling behind or being recruited by illegal armed
groups. The United States is also helping Colombia with COVID
vaccinations. To date, the United States has donated 6 million
vaccines, with USAID providing complementary technical assistance in
support of Colombia's efforts to turn the vaccines into vaccinations.
We're now focused on the future, getting Colombia's youth back to
school and supporting inclusive, and sustainable economic recovery,
including income generation and job opportunities for vulnerable
populations.
addressing coca cultivation
Coca's rapid expansion across the peace geography also greatly
complicates rural development. As the demobilized FARC stepped away
from the battlefield, this created a void in the control of the
lucrative narcotics trade. In vying for control of the enterprise,
armed groups have increased violence and innocent civilians,
particularly social leaders, are caught in the crossfire. While this
was predicted when the Accord was being negotiated, the situation only
underscores the need to continue efforts to bring democratic
governance, institutional presence, security, and licit development to
coca growing regions.
Last October, the White House announced the Biden-Harris
Administration's implementation of a more integrated and holistic
approach to counter-narcotics in Colombia. This bilateral strategy--
which USAID works closely to implement with our State Department
colleagues--aims to make eradication gains more sustainable by better
integrating expanded state presence, licit economic opportunities, and
strengthening the social fabric of communities weakened by decades of
conflict. The strategy links counter-narcotics progress to peace, as
there is close geographic overlap between drug crops and Peace Accord
implementation. USAID works closely with Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and others across the
interagency to assist Colombia in the pursuit of the goals of this
strategy that better balances a range of complementary interventions
including access to state services, institutional presence, rule of law
to guarantee basic constitutional rights, income for licit producers,
eradication of coca, and permanent territorial control.
An example of this integrated approach is our amplified focus on
land formalization, including titling, as an important precondition to
licit development. USAID is betting heavily on the power of land
ownership as the best determinant of how that land is used into the
future. Formal title to land opens access to credit and allows the
titleholder the security to make long-term investments in their plot.
It also creates iron-clad incentives to stay legal by giving the
government the power to sanction the owner with confiscation. Land
titling promises important coca reduction benefits, given estimates
that recidivism rates for coca cultivation without a land title is 70
to 75 percent, whereas it is 20 percent with a land title. USAID has
piloted municipal-wide titling sweeps in areas emblematic of armed
conflict, like Colombia's Montes de Maria area, which was victimized by
successive waves of FARC and paramilitary abuses.
Having partnered with the Colombian Government to deliver over
2,500 rural titles in just one municipality in this area--the first
massive land titling initiative in Colombia's history--USAID's approach
takes these processes to areas where our conflict, coca, and peace
goals coincide. The Agency is intensively mapping and collecting
household data to process land titles in the first of three priority
municipalities that were agreed to during last October's High Level
Dialogue with Colombia. USAID anticipates using this as a test case for
success in other coca growing municipalities. We know that land is at
the heart of Colombia's conflict and are convinced that it must be
central to the solution.
protecting human rights
Coca cultivation is closely linked to violence and human rights
violations. As the FARC laid down its arms under the Peace Accord,
criminal gangs have entered into violent competition to control
territory and illegal economies. Social and environmental leaders--the
voice of peaceful advocacy for the democratic rights of rural
communities--have become even more vulnerable to violent attack.
What is clear is that if you are a Colombian environmental
defender, your life may be directly at risk. If you organize to promote
victims' rights or repossession of stolen land, you can expect to be a
target. If you promote a vision of your territory that is less
dependent on coca or illegal mining, you expose yourself to real
danger. And if you are a child, vulnerable while out of school and with
your family facing increased socio-economic hardship, you are at
increased risk of forceful recruitment by illegal armed groups. In line
with historic trends, violence disproportionately affects diverse
ethnic communities.
In the face of the chilling rise in threats and murders of social
leaders, USAID has deepened efforts to support human rights defenders
and environmental leaders. We helped the National Protection Unit--a
government entity USAID was instrumental in establishing--to tailor
life-saving protection plans for women, Afro-Colombian, and indigenous
leaders, resulting in more effective use of collective protection.
Increasing accountability for crimes committed against human rights
defenders is a top priority and one that is shared across the United
States Government. Through USAID's partnership with the U.N. Office of
the High Commissioner for Human Rights, we helped the Attorney General
secure 88 sentences in human rights defender homicide cases to date. We
know there is more work to do, but are encouraged by these positive
steps toward greater accountability. It is more important than ever
that the United States stand beside these courageous partners.
venezuelan migrant crisis
The crisis in Venezuela--the greatest migratory crisis in this
hemisphere's history--has diverted focus and resources away from peace
implementation. Colombia now hosts nearly 2 million Venezuelan migrants
and refugees, all seeking a better life. Colombia welcomed them with
open arms, and USAID quickly adjusted to help Colombia meet this
unforeseen challenge.
The United States helped provide a humanitarian lifeline through
food, medicine, and shelter.
Colombia has launched Temporary Protected Status (TPS) programs for
Venezuelans and is just one example of Colombian generosity to the
Venezuelan people. TPS is Colombian-led, but assistance from the United
States has catalyzed its launch and implementation. Modest U.S.
investments, in the form of additional staff and equipment, enabled
Colombia to move decisively to register Venezuelans, thus allowing them
to access basic services and seek employment.
Colombia's response to the crisis has contributed to hemispheric
stability; positively improves the lives of millions of vulnerable
migrants; and helps migrants contribute productively to Colombia.
Colombia's example offers a promising migration management model for
the region. USAID is maximizing limited resources by working with the
Colombian Government and the private sector to help with the socio and
economic integration of migrants.
mitigating climate change
Colombia's peace and climate change agendas are closely linked.
Similarly to migration, Colombia has responded to its environmental
challenges with innovation and leadership. The country's Paris
Agreement commitments set an example through their ambitious targets of
a 51 percent reduction over baseline by 2030, net zero deforestation by
2030, and carbon neutrality by 2050.
Moreover, President Duque has identified the natural environment as
one of Colombia's most strategic assets. Protecting environmental
assets, particularly tropical forests, carbon sinks, and the country's
rich biodiversity in order to achieve climate change goals will require
innovative development investments in many of the same municipalities
where the Peace Accord is being implemented.
USAID's Mission in Colombia oversees the Agency's largest natural
environment investment in the hemisphere--fitting for the second most
biodiverse country in the world. Much of our environmental work,
particularly that related to tropical forests and biodiversity
conservation, as well as addressing illegal gold mining, is centered in
conflict-affected areas. We undertake this work in close collaboration
with Afro-Colombian and Indigenous communities, empowering them to
balance development with conservation. For example, our work assisting
Afro Colombian and Indigenous communities to conserve tropical forests
and then sell carbon credits from the standing forests to firms seeking
to offset their carbon footprints is generating an important income
stream for badly needed social and economic investment in these
communities.
Our investments in the environment reinforce our peace and security
goals. The same organized criminal elements who profit from coca also
seek to capitalize on illegal logging, deforestation, illegal mining,
and other environmental crimes, all which have increased in recent
years. USAID's environmental protection activities work in concert with
INL's efforts to assist Colombian law enforcement to prosecute these
crimes and place added pressure on these organizations, while denying
them safe havens in protected areas such as national parks and forest
reserves.
conclusion
USAID is proud to be a partner with Colombia on the path away from
decades of conflict towards peace and prosperity. Our task now is to
make that peace irreversible in the face of continuing challenges.
The Accord's implementation, while on pace with international
norms, has been slower than many would like. Yet it remains a long-
term, Colombian-led framework for stability, security,
counternarcotics, and economic development.
The Colombian track record of self-improvement is undeniable. Much
has been accomplished in a short amount of time. USAID has used our
resources to support innovative government programs, mobilize
Colombia's own human and financial capital, and support the resilience
and bravery of Colombian civil society. The trust and progress built in
this relationship will continue to provide a strong foundation for our
future investments.
In closing, in the words of USAID partner Luis Fernando Arias, a
leading voice of Colombia's indigenous movement and a champion of the
Accord's Ethnic Inclusion Chapter: ``We have to continue working for a
country that is more humane, peaceful, equitable, and inclusive . . ..
We are here because Colombia cannot have one more victim.'' Luis
Fernando tragically died as a result of COVID-19 last year. We honor
his memory and may his words be our call to action today.
The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you all for your testimony.
We will start our round of 5 minutes.
Secretary Nichols, the United States has designated 15
countries as major non-NATO allies, including two in the
Western Hemisphere: Argentina and Brazil. This special status
elevates our closest partners and provides special benefits and
security cooperation. Given the expansive security partnership
between our countries, my new legislation would formally
designate Colombia as a major non-NATO ally.
It is also important to note that the ties between NATO and
Colombia have grown over the last decade. In 2017, Colombia
became the first country in Latin America to achieve the status
of NATO global partner, underscoring the nation's leadership on
security matters, not just in the Western Hemisphere but
globally. President Biden has said that Colombia is, ``the
keystone of U.S. policy towards Latin America.'' I fully agree
and believe it is time we formalize Colombia's role.
So Secretary Nichols, given the United States' close
bilateral and multilateral security partnership with Colombia,
what is your assessment of formally designating Colombia as a
major non-NATO ally?
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would certainly
welcome the initiative and the framework that your bill brings
to bear, and major non-NATO ally status is something that I
believe sends a positive signal, given the tremendous progress
in the relationship that we have with Colombia. Typically, the
process for designating a country has been with the
recommendation of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of
Defense to the President. I do not want to jump over that
process, but I know I cannot think of any country that better
fits that role.
The Chairman. Well, I appreciate that. I think it is long
overdue, personally, and I hope that this jump-starts a
conversation within the Administration to come to that
conclusion.
Let me ask you one other question. In recent weeks Putin,
as part of a desperate effort to distract from the imminent
assault of the Ukrainian people, has sought to expand support
for this hemisphere's dictators. In an apparent attempt to
intimidate our closest partner, Russia's military advisors are
accompanying Venezuelan military personnel near the Colombia
border.
Frankly, Russia's support for the region's dictators have
already destabilized Latin America. Upwards of 6 million
Venezuelans have fled their homeland as a result of Russia
coaching the Maduro regime. The instrumentalization of
vulnerable refugees is part of the Russian playbook to provide
crises, overwhelm governments, deepen divisions.
As has been testified here, nearly 2 million Venezuelans
have sought refuge in Colombia, challenging the government's
efforts to respond to long-term issues related to social and
economic inequality, internal displacement, the pandemic.
When Russia is not launching all-out attacks against
countries it is intimidating, extorting, and sowing mis- and
disinformation, all of which aim to shake the foundations of
democracy around the world.
How should we interpret Russia's presence in the region?
What are the security implications for Colombia?
Mr. Nichols. Russia seeks to destabilize our region, to
inject conflict intention from other parts of the world to the
Western Hemisphere. I had the opportunity to discuss these
issues with our Colombian counterparts last week in a
delegation led by Under Secretary for Political Affairs Nuland.
We remain vigilant about the Russian activities, both along the
border with Colombia, but more broadly in our region. We also
seek to prop up the tinpot dictators that they support in our
hemisphere.
The Chairman. Well, and that to me is another reason why
this deepening of relationship with Colombia is important
within the hemisphere as a whole.
Administrator Escobari, Colombia's longstanding challenges
with social and economic inequality reached an apex last year
when the combined effects of the pandemic and the tax reform
proposal--which, by the way, I called ill-fated, but in large
part in response to the IMF and the IMF pressures on countries
like Colombia. It is a broader question for another time, but
it seems to me the IMF needs to have a smoothing period for
these countries, not to walk away from their responsibilities.
If you are going to require some rather dramatic financial
challenges in the midst of a pandemic--and we have seen what we
have had to do as a nation to try to meet that challenge, not
every country has the wherewithal to do that--it needs to have
a smoothing period, but that tax reform proposal led to mass
protests, blockades, deeply concerning images of police
violence.
It was clear to me then and now that we have not done
enough to work with our Colombian partners to facilitate the
conditions for inclusive economic growth. The pandemic actually
plunged three million Colombians into poverty. It is critically
important that we engage, both politically and
programmatically, to minimize these gaps and help level the
playing field for all Colombians, including underrepresented
communities such as Afro-Colombian and indigenous people.
So I heard what you said that we are doing, but I want to
challenge you and say, how do we best use our programming to
promote and support an inclusive economic growth in Colombia,
and how are we engaging on the issue of trying to foster
greater engagement by the private sector as part of our
solution to meet that economic need?
Ms. Escobari. Thank you, Senator. There is no doubt that
Colombia has made tremendous progress and has huge growth
potential, right, but this growth potential needs to--we need
to make sure that it is inclusive and that is reaches these
neglected rural areas, and more so as Colombia tries to recover
from COVID-19 and tries to integrate the Venezuelan migrants.
I think there are huge opportunities for the
diversification of the economy. It has huge opportunities in
the agricultural sector and to modernize an entrepreneurial
class, but what we need to do, and what we have done as USAID
is make sure that that modern, robust, 21st century Colombia
reaches the rural areas. We did it with financial inclusion
where we helped mobilize over $1 billion through Colombian
banks, to SMEs and micro-entrepreneurs in rural areas, and I
think a lot more can be done to help these farmers link to
supply chains, elicit development, and export their products
abroad.
The Chairman. All right. Thank you. Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Nichols,
in March of 2020, almost 2 years ago now, the U.S. and Colombia
announced a joint plan to reduce coca cultivation and cocaine
production by 50 percent by the end of 2023. We know it is
going in the wrong direction and does not seem to be turning
around. Do you believe that Colombia can meet these goals
without conducting aerial eradication?
Mr. Nichols. I believe that manual eradication,
comprehensive alternative development programming, efforts to
improve rural livelihoods can significantly improve Colombia's
ability to address illicit coca cultivation. Bringing better
rural governance to the country, fully implementing the
chapters of the Peace Accord that deal with improving rural
livelihood will all help achieve that goal.
I served in both Colombia and Peru. Peru has never had
aerial eradication programming, and made substantial gains in
addressing illicit coca cultivation.
Senator Risch. Well, you would agree with me, though, that
aerial eradication is significantly more robust than the other
methods, hand removal and those kinds of things. Do you agree
with that?
Mr. Nichols. I think it is a choice for each country.
Colombia is a sovereign country and should they choose to
pursue aerial eradication, that will be their decision, but
whatever they determine we seek to work with them to address
the threat of coca cultivation and trafficking.
Senator Risch. Well, that was not really the question. The
question was do you not agree that aerial eradication is the,
by far, most robust and the most efficient way to do
eradication?
Mr. Nichols. I feel like I am taking away from my
distinguished colleague from INL. However, I note that there
can be ancillary effects from aerial eradication that diminish
rural livelihoods and raise concerns. So I do not think you can
just look at the amount of hectares that have been eradicated
without looking at the full impact of the policy.
I think it can be very effective, but it requires a
thorough analysis, and it is a sovereign decision for the
Columbians.
Senator Risch. What is the U.S. policy in regard to that?
Do we not have one?
Mr. Nichols. Our policy is that it is a decision for
Colombia to make, and if Colombia decides to pursue aerial
eradication we will support that.
Senator Risch. We do not encourage them either way. Is that
what you are saying?
Mr. Nichols. We encourage them to decide what is best for
them.
Senator Risch. We do not encourage them, as far as which of
these methods of eradication to choose, they should choose.
Mr. Nichols. We are not pushing them one way or the other.
Senator Risch. Thank you. Secretary Robinson, it is
estimated that the FARC has only delivered about $12.9 million
of the $291 million it pledged to surrender by the end of 2020,
for reparations to their victims. What is FARC doing--well,
first of all, why has FARC not surrendered those funds?
Mr. Robinson. I think that is probably a question for my
distinguished colleague from the Western Hemisphere. I am not
familiar with the FARC having to deliver this money, but I can
get an answer and find out for you.
Senator Risch. Well, thank you very much.
Secretary Nichols, I guess he threw you under the bus. Can
you answer the question?
Mr. Nichols. I am happy to be under the bus.
Senator Risch. It is not a good place to be.
Mr. Nichols. The FARC has many steps that it needs to
undertake to comply with the Peace Accord. Among that is
reparations and implementing decisions from the Justice and
Peace Courts. They have cited a lack of resources as part of
their inability to provide reparations to victims, but it is an
ongoing process.
Senator Risch. Do you believe that to be true, that they
lack resources?
Mr. Nichols. I find that difficult to believe, given the
experience that I had with the peace process in El Salvador
when I served there.
Senator Risch. Do you know what they are doing with those
funds instead of surrendering them?
Mr. Nichols. Well, I do not know what they would be doing
with those funds, but I imagine that some funds are buried
underground, some funds are in foreign bank accounts, some
funds are with the individual FARC members who decided not to
demobilize, would be my guess, but I cannot say for certain.
Senator Risch. Thank you. My time is up. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
each of our witnesses for being here today.
Assistant Secretary Robinson, I want to begin with you and
pick up a little bit on the questioning that Senator Risch had
with respect to our policies working with the Colombian
Government to address domestic cultivation and production of
opioids, or opiates, because coming from a state that has had a
real challenge with opioids, we would like to see fewer drugs
getting across the border from South America and into the
United States.
So recognizing that we do not tell the Colombian Government
that they should do aerial eradication, what are we doing to
try and address the illicit production of drugs in the country?
Mr. Robinson. Thank you very much for that question. We
have a very robust relationship with the Colombian Government,
and my bureau in particular, with the Colombian National
Police. For a number of years we have worked very closely
training and equipping the National Police and making sure that
they have the tools necessary to go after these networks. As I
mentioned in my statement, in October we agreed on a new
strategy which will broaden that effort, helping them to reduce
the supply side by continuing with eradication, investigations,
and targeting networks, by extending the state out to rural
areas, both on the security side, but also on the development
side, and by adding a new twist, helping them investigate
environmental crimes.
We know that what these criminals are doing is negatively
affecting the environment, and this is another way that we
think we can be successful in going after these networks.
Senator Shaheen. Do we have data that shows that we are
succeeding in those efforts? The last time--and it has been
several years ago now, but the last time I saw a report on the
drugs that were being produced in Colombia, the production had
actually gone up, because of the decline in aerial eradication.
Not gone down. So do you have any data to support the
effectiveness of the policies?
Mr. Robinson. Well I think, frankly, the data is mixed. We
know that production is going down, but the cultivation is
increasing. That is why we are working as closely as we can
with the Colombian National Police to go to those areas. We
continue to do eradication. We continue to do manual
eradication, but frankly what we need to do is a better job--
what the Colombians need to do, with our help, is a better job
of going after their finances. We are working with them on
that. My colleagues at DHS are also working with them on that.
Senator Shaheen. Good. I look forward to hearing what more
we can do to address that.
Assistant Secretary Nichols, the 2016 Peace Accords
provided for groundbreaking and comprehensive gender
priorities, and yet the Kroc Institute for International Peace
Studies, which is monitoring the implementation of the Peace
Accord has reported that implementation of the gender
commitments of that accord is not advancing as rapidly as the
general accord implementation. In fact, according to their
latest report released in November, the gender commitments have
only reached 12 percent implementation while the general accord
implementation is considered to be 30 percent complete.
So it has been over 5 years now. What is the State
Department and USAID doing to ensure that the gender-related
commitments are implemented?
Mr. Nichols. Thank you very much. I wholeheartedly agree
with your question and concern. Women and girls
disproportionately suffered under the conflict and continue to
be disadvantaged as Colombia seeks to emerge from the COVID-19
pandemic and economic dislocation.
We are working comprehensively to provide support to women
and girls through things like entrepreneurship program, small
and micro finance programming, training, providing support to
Colombian institutions to implement the 2016 Peace Accord. I
can go deeper if you would like, but I want to make sure my
colleague also has a chance.
Ms. Escobari. Sure, no, thank you, Senator, for your focus
on this issue. In responding to this reality, Colombia has one
of USAID's largest standalone gender programs anywhere in the
world, and dedicated staff in the field mission to focus on
this problem. It actually launched this last October, a $35
million program dealing with issues of gender equity, changing
societal attitudes, gender-related policies, and protecting
human rights of women and girls. We are linking with the
Colombian Vice President, who is also very committed to these
issues, and make sure that gender cuts through all of our
programming. So when we are working with land titles, 50
percent of those land titles went to women. So we want to make
sure that gender cuts through everything that we do.
Senator Shaheen. Good. Thank you. I am pleased to hear that
and look forward to seeing the ongoing studies that show how
the implementation is working
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Van Hollen.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank
all of you for your testimony today. I have been concerned by
reports of increasing violence in Colombia's rural regions,
especially near the Venezuelan border. I understand that these
attacks are being perpetrated primarily by FARC dissidents as
well as the ELN, the National Liberation Army, an even more
violent group. I especially concerned of the toll this is
taking on civilian populations, on indigenous groups, and on
human rights defenders, all of whom have been targeted.
Assistant Secretary Nichols, what is the Colombian
Government plan to address these issues, and how can we help
them?
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator. The Segunda Marquetalia, a
FARC dissident group, and the ELN have launched attacks against
Colombian Government installations, against airports, against
military facilities, using safe haven from Venezuela to help
them achieve those attacks. Last week we met with a variety of
senior Colombian officials to talk about a comprehensive
approach under the high-level strategic security dialogue to
our cooperation.
Among the things that we are looking at are strengthening
our cooperation in intelligence sharing, training, mobility,
cybersecurity, all those areas, police and law enforcement
strengthening, to help them deal with the threats posed by the
FARC dissident groups and ELN.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. Do you have any concerns at
this point that that violence could lead to any unraveling of
the Peace Accord, or are you confident that it can be
addressed?
Mr. Nichols. I believe it can be addressed. I believe that
the Colombian military, and security forces broadly and broader
government, have the capacity and training to deal with those
threats, and I believe that those FARC members who have the
original FARC that demobilized as part of the 2016 agreement
remain committed to that agreement.
Senator Van Hollen. Let me turn to some of the issues
regarding human rights abuses among the Colombian police. As
you know, Plan Colombia and other U.S. assistance has been very
successful at helping Colombia consolidate its democracy, to
improve the economic situation, but despite billions of dollars
that we have provided, the Colombia security forces continue to
be involved in serious human rights violations, including the
killings of dozens of civilians during mass protests in 2021.
As you know, Under Secretary Nuland just announced last week
another $8 million in assistance.
What mechanisms do we have in place to prevent our funds,
our help, from being implicated in any way in these kinds of
human rights abuses?
Mr. Nichols. Well, the $8 million that was announced last
week is precisely to support the Colombian National Police's
human rights respect and response. It goes to vetting police
officers, providing training for officers, providing greater
investigatory capability when there is an accusation of human
rights violations, and I think those are all very important
steps. I will note that President Duque himself has repeatedly
said that he has a zero-tolerance policy for human rights
violations.
The protests that took place, there have been
investigations into police actions, both internally within the
police as well as the Colombian attorney general, and there has
been some accountability, but more remains to be done.
Senator Van Hollen. Well, in keeping with the stated zero-
tolerance policy, what actions have we done to cut off any
assistance that may have gone to units who committed the
abuses, like the anti-riot police who killed protesters in
2021? Have we made clear that none of our funds should go to
that unit?
Mr. Nichols. So we cannot provide funds to any unit that
violates human rights, under the Leahy amendment. That is part
of our legal commitment.
Senator Van Hollen. So, Mr. Secretary, I see my time is
running out, so is your answer that none of our funds are going
to that unit?
Mr. Nichols. I will defer to my colleague from INL.
Mr. Robinson. Yes, no. We have not funded and we are not
funding any of the units that were involved in the human rights
abuses.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. I do not have any other members
presently.
Senator Risch. Mr. Chairman, Senator Cruz has indicated
that he is on the way.
The Chairman. Oh, I will want to wait forever for Senator
Cruz. I should wait. I will ask another question.
I am sure our panel would be thrilled to wait for that
question. Let me ask you this. I heard you, Senator Robinson,
say, you touched upon combating financial crimes. There are two
elements as we deal with the drug trafficking--well, three
elements. One, we have to reduce our demand in the United
States. That is something that we need to work on. Two, is that
we have to hit them where it hurts, and that is on the
financial side, and three, if you have a poor Colombian farmer
and you do not give them an alternative to a sustainable
development opportunity they are going to grow coca, or
cultivate it, as you noted that the cultivation is growing
higher than production.
So with reference to the first part, hitting them hard
where it hurts, you touched upon it. How are we focusing our
attention with the Colombians in terms of combatting financial
crimes associated with the drug trade? What additional steps
are we taking to strengthen anti-money laundering initiatives?
Then, finally, for Administrator Escobari, how are we
specifically targeting some of our programs to deal with those
poor farmers who we need to give an alternative with one that
actually helps them sustain their families instead of
cultivating or actively engaging in the drug trade?
So let us start off with you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Robinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have, for a
number of years now, been working very closely with
Colombia's--I always forget the name of this--the financial
investigative unit, and we have experts working with them to
target the financial networks of these criminals. We have been
doing that. We expect to enhance that relationship with our new
strategy. That is number one.
As I mentioned earlier, we are working closely with the
Department of Homeland Security HSI to go after illegal
activity at the ports. We have experts on the ground at the
ports, working on security, investigations, and also tracking
illicit finance.
So those are two ways, two things that we are going to do
to enhance going after the money laundering aspect of this side
of the criminal activity.
The Chairman. Administrator.
Ms. Escobari. To answer your question on alternative licit
livelihoods, you know, we are very optimistic with this new
holistic and sequencing approach, where USAID complements
eradication and interdiction, where we provide licit crops,
land titling, local government strengthening, access to rule of
law, and options for youth empowerment. This really
dramatically increases the chances of success, because when you
take this holistic approach, and this very place-based
approach, it really gives people an option out of coca.
Senator Shaheen had asked for data, and in one of these
experiments or pilots that we are running on land titling, we
have seen that without a land title about three-quarters of
coca growers replant after eradication, but with a title,
replanting drops to 20 percent.
So I think this holistic approach would really make a
different. I have seen it. I traveled to Caceres. I thought
that it was naive to believe that people would give up this
profitable trade, but really, people hate living under the
thumb of these thugs and being subject to violence. So I think
if we create the opportunities, people will take it.
The Chairman. All right. Senator Cruz.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Nichols, welcome
back.
As we discussed the last time you appeared before this
committee, I am deeply concerned about the Biden
administration's decision in November to dismantle terrorism
sanctions against the FARC and against FARC members. The FARC
is an organization of Marxist, Leninist, and narco-terrorists.
For decades, they have killed and kidnapped and extorted
Colombians. They have murdered and seized American citizens.
They continue to pose an acute threat to Colombian security and
to American interests across the region.
The last time we spoke the decision to dismantle terrorism
sanctions had just been announced. Since then, presumably, you
have had some time to evaluate the effects. I want to ask you
some questions about that.
One of the reasons publicly cited for the removal of the
FTL listing was to provide certain types of U.S. assistance to
FARC for reintegration into Colombian society. I believe that
justification is deeply flawed, but it was at least a reason
that the Administration cited for dismantling the sanctions.
So have you distributed any such aid, and if so, what
checks were in place to ensure funding was not used for
terrorists?
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator. It is a pleasure to see
you again. The decision to designate the FARC EP and the
Segunda Marquetalia as the current groups engaged in terror
activity in Colombia was one fully concordant with the process
of implementing the Peace Accords. We have continued our
efforts to provide broad assistance to rural areas in
Colombia----
Senator Cruz. Mr. Nichols, if I could ask you to answer the
specific question I asked, which is have you distributed any
such aid to the FARC or members of the FARC?
Mr. Nichols. I would have to defer to my colleague from
USAID on the specifics of their program.
Ms. Escobari. We do not work or support terrorists. We do
not give any funds. They are not eligible to receive funds from
USAID, and we actually have----
Senator Cruz. So your testimony is that the Biden
administration has not given any funds to FARC or members of
the FARC.
Ms. Escobari. Right. They have not.
Senator Cruz. Okay. Good.
Ms. Escobari. --deserters and people who have laid down
their arms.
Senator Cruz. So alongside removing terrorism sanctions on
FARC, you also removed terrorist sanctions on individual FARC
members. The press release that the Biden administration
published listed literally hundreds of entities. A few weeks
later, on December 11, Colombia's Special Jurisdiction for
Peace, an independent entity tasked with implementing the Peace
Accords, issued summons for 47 FARC members because they had
been involved in the forced recruitment of children for the
conflict and for child trafficking. Five of these individuals
had been sanctioned by the United States for their roles until
you removed them a few weeks earlier.
Did the State Department consult with the Colombians about
these individuals before lifting sanctions, and did you
reimpose sanctions after the announcement of their involvement
with child traffickers?
Mr. Nichols. So the process of delisting the FARC and
listing FARC EP and Segunda Marquetalia was done in
consultation with the government of Colombia. The FARC, as the
organization that signed the 2016 peace agreement, is not
listed as a terror organization in Colombia. U.S. immigration
law prevent the entry of any of the members of the FARC who
took up arms.
Senator Cruz. So was the Biden State Department aware of
the work and impending decision of Colombia's Special
Jurisdiction for Peace at the time you lifted the sanctions on
these individuals?
Mr. Nichols. They do not consult their decisions with the
United States Government before----
Senator Cruz. So you were not aware of it?
Mr. Nichols. Not to my knowledge.
Senator Cruz. Okay. I want to shift, in my remaining time,
to Mexico. Mr. Nichols, as you know and we have discussed, I am
deeply concerned about deepening civil unrest in Mexico and the
breakdown there of civil society. The breakdown of the rule of
law across our southern border poses acute national security
challenges and dangers to the United States, on issues ranging
from counternarcotics to illegal immigration.
The current climate faced by politicians and journalists in
Mexico is the deadliest ever. In 2020, more journalists were
killed in Mexico than in any other country in the world. It
alone accounted for almost a third of the journalists killed.
Since the start of the electoral process in September 2020,
over 80 politicians were assassinated by criminal
organizations, and more than 60 candidates suspended their
campaigns under duress.
President Lopez Obrador seems intent on making all of these
trends worse. On Friday, he used his morning press conference
to intimidate one of Mexico's highest profile journalists,
Carlos Loret de Mola. He waved around private financial
information and asked authorities to investigate it. He seems
to be indulging in abusing power, no matter the effect on
Mexico or the U.S.-Mexico relations.
What steps is the Biden administration taking to convey to
the Mexican Government that their behavior is undermining the
rule of law and that is, in turn, endangering American security
and the U.S.-Mexico relationship?
Mr. Nichols. We have a deep and comprehensive relationship
with Mexico on security issues. My colleague from INL and I
were in Mexico last year to discuss these issues, and our
embassy continues to be engaged on the full range of security
questions.
Senator Cruz. What have you expressed about the murder of
journalists, politicians, and the intimidation of journalists?
Mr. Nichols. We have said that we believe that the murder
of journalists and the murder of civil society members is a
tremendous problem and a stain for all of us. We need to take
actions to protect those important members of Mexican society.
It is crucial for us to redouble our efforts to protect
politicians, journalists, civil society members. It is vital,
and we talk about that with our Mexican colleagues all the
time.
Senator Cruz. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Hagerty.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to follow
up on Senator Cruz's questioning regarding Mexico. I, too, am
very concerned about the situation there. I was also in Mexico
last year. I met with government officials, but also members of
the private sector there in Mexico and with American interests
that are present in Mexico, where we have significant
investments.
We have trade agreements with Mexico that are not being
honored properly. I am very concerned about the lack of the
rule of law that Senator Cruz mentioned, and I would like to
get your assessment of where we are today versus where we were,
say, a year and a half ago.
Mr. Nichols. I think we have a very positive, constructive,
frank relationship with the Mexican Government. I think we
agree on a great many things, and there are a great many issues
that we need to work with them to move forward on.
You talk about issues that are of great import to us.
Working to forge a cohesive North American energy policy that
is green, that is respectful of the rights of the private
sector----
Senator Hagerty. Does that include confiscation of American
investments in Mexico? Are you for that?
Mr. Nichols. I am against that.
Senator Hagerty. I think you should be. This would take a
lot more time than we have.
I would like to turn our conversation now, though, to
Colombia. If you think about the activity of the Chinese
Communist Party, around the world Colombia is one of the areas
that I am most concerned about. Back in 2019, Xi Jinping hosted
President Duque from Colombia and they agreed on a number of
bilateral projects. They are now developing--the Chinese are
now developing the Bogota Metro, the Bogota Regional Railway.
They are doing the 4G and 5G systems around many parts of
Colombia and infrastructure projects.
I want to talk now and turn our attention to the U.S.-
Colombia Growth Initiative. That was a significant investment
to try to help strengthen Colombia's economic and rural
development. The DFC committed some $1 billion to 30 projects
there in sectors ranging from critical infrastructure to
financial services.
Could you give me an update of where we are on that
commitment, where those projects stand today?
Mr. Nichols. So DFC continues to work to develop projects
in Colombia. I met with Pro Columbia, their government
investment arm last week to discuss the projects. There are six
projects that were in various stages when I met. One of our
priorities is through DFC and other mechanisms to increase
investment through Build Back Better World in Colombia. That is
something that we believe can be transformative. Colombia and
the United States have a $30 billion trade relationship, and we
would like to see even greater investment there.
I met with the American Chamber of Commerce to talk about
the obstacles that American companies face when investing in
Colombia, and we agreed to continue our efforts to support the
U.S. investment.
Senator Hagerty. Can I come back to what you just said? You
said that there are six projects underway. Does that mean that
24 of the 30 that were agreed to have not yet commenced?
Mr. Nichols. So I am not aware of those projects that
occurred during the prior Administration so I do not know
specifically----
Senator Hagerty. This is a significant investment, and our
economic security and our ties there are going to be critical
to our national security. So I would like to ask you if you
could get back to me and to this committee with an update on
where we stand with respect to those 30 projects that were
committed by the DFC under the previous Administration, and
what the plan is to see those executed. Again, I think those
are going to be critical to our prosperity.
[Editor's note.--The requested information referred to above
follows:]
The U.S. relationship with Colombia remains strong, and the United
States continues to support a wide array of initiatives to boost
economic growth in the country. DFC supports highly developmental
projects in Colombia and constantly considers new private sector
proposals. I referenced six new projects in my previous testimony that
were approved in 2021. More broadly, DFC has 34 portfolio projects in
Colombia that amount to more than $1.2 billion in exposure. DFC has
supported investments that promote rural financial inclusion,
affordable housing, infrastructure, and forestry. DFC has about $55
million in exposure through regional funds that cover Colombia,
including $3.4 million in small, high-impact funds. Approximately 88
percent of this exposure focuses on housing and commercial buildings,
and the remaining 12 percent focuses on industrial and financial
technologies. For quick reference, all of DFC's active projects are
available on DFC's website, which can be filtered by region, financing
type, commitment level, and year: https://www.dfc.gov/our-impact/all-
active-projects.
DFC's current portfolio prioritizes promotion of affordable housing
and increasing lending to vulnerable populations, such as Venezuela
migrant receptor communities, rural areas, and those worst-affected by
COVID-19. Financial inclusion in rural and conflict-affected Colombia
aims to promote a legal economy as alternative to illicit activities
(coca, illegal mining, armed groups). DFC supports inclusive rural
economic growth by attracting private investment into areas which have
been affected by conflict and where investors have been reluctant to
make financial commitments. DFC enhances economic opportunity by
increasing access to affordable housing in conflict-affected
communities and helping small farmers and landowners improve food
security by strengthening producer associations, cooperatives,
microcredit organizations, and agricultural value chains and business
opportunities. By supporting bankable projects in Venezuela migrant
receptor communities, DFC increases inclusion, strengthens resilience,
and addresses the root causes of further migration.
Senator Hagerty. I would like to come now to the digital
economy and the infrastructure that is being built there in
Colombia. Are we doing anything to make certain that the
infrastructure that is being built out for the next generation
of Colombia telecommunications, 4G, 5G, is protected from the
Chinese Communist Party or malign actors like Huawei?
Mr. Nichols. We have had multiple discussions with the
Colombian Government about that. We are in conversations about
alternative technologies and opportunities that do not use
Chinese technology. Telecommunications companies in Colombia
are private companies so this will also involve working with
them, but there is a key regulatory component, and we believe
that we can structure this in a way that is good for Colombian
consumers and avoids Chinese technology.
Senator Hagerty. I think there is certainly a way. I would
encourage you to look at what I did with the government of
Japan when I served as ambassador there, because there are four
private infrastructure telecommunications companies there, but
I worked with the government of Japan to make sure that those
remained clean. That is possible, and I encourage you to work
on a way to do that as well in Colombia. I think that is
important for our national security and theirs.
Mr. Nichols. I agree.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. All right. I hope that this
discussion has stimulated the State Department and the
Administration to think about how we reinvigorate our
relationship with Colombia, how we deepen it on this 200th
anniversary. We welcome the Department's remarks to the
legislation we will be introducing and any insights. We would
appreciate it, and with the thanks of the committee this panel
is excused.
As we have our first panel depart let me begin to introduce
our second panel. We are joined by Mr. Dan Restrepo, a senior
fellow at the Center for American Progress, with expansive
expertise on Colombia. Mr. Restrepo served as the principal
advisor to President Obama on issues related to Latin America,
the Caribbean, and Canada as Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs at the
National Security Council. Previously he served on the
professional staff of the House of Representatives' Committee
on Foreign Affairs as well as a law clerk on the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.
The committee will also hear from Celina Realuyo, an
adjunct professor at The George Washington University Elliott
School of International Affairs. Professor Realuyo's work
focuses on U.S. national security, illicit networks,
transnational organized crime, counterterrorism, and economic
sanctions issues. She has previously served as a U.S. diplomat,
international banker with Goldman Sachs, and State Department
Director of Counterterrorism Finance Programs. She has spoken
and written regularly in English and Spanish about
transnational crime, drug trafficking, and corruption in the
Americas.
So our thanks to both of you. We invite you to make your
statements, around 5 minutes or so. Your full statements will
be included in the record, and we will start with you, Mr.
Restrepo.
STATEMENT OF DAN RESTREPO, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR AMERICAN
PROGRESS, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Restrepo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Risch. Thank you for this opportunity to discuss the U.S.-
Colombia relationship.
Chairman Menendez, allow me to take this moment to commend
you for holding this hearing and for authoring the U.S.-
Colombia Strategic Alliance Act, both important signals of the
abiding U.S. commitment to the people of Colombia at a critical
juncture.
Colombia is today a like-minded democracy in the heart of
Latin America, through the sacrifice of generations of
Colombians with steadfast U.S. support. Advancing core U.S.
national interests demands continued and reinforced commitment.
Even aside from the pandemic and its fallout, Colombia faces
notable challenges. Implementation of the 2016 Peace Accords
lags, illicit economies are flourishing, and insecurity is on
the rise. Venezuela's descent into kleptocracy, criminality,
and chaos continues to put pressure on Colombia. Much-needed
fiscal, labor, and pension reforms and expanded investment in
human capital have proven elusive.
Colombia's political class continues to struggle to define
a post-Peace Accord north star, and not coincidentally, in
light of all of the above, Colombia has experienced one of the
region's most pronounced declines of faith in democracy in
recent years.
At the same time, Colombia is a critical leader on some of
the central issues facing the Americas and the world, including
migration, climate, citizen security, and fostering innovation.
Understanding that successful migration management must extend
far beyond border measures, the Colombian Government, across
two administrations, and the Colombian people have stepped up
to help their neighbors in need.
President Ivan Duque's decision to grant Venezuelans legal
status for 10 years was one of the most commendable acts of
leadership in the Americas in recent memory. It is an example
to be followed as President Biden did when he granted TPS to
Venezuelans.
Colombia's unparalleled biodiversity makes it a wellspring
of hope for our planet and a critical player in responding to
the climate crisis and leading the energy transition in the
Americas, especially at a time when countries like Brazil
imperil our planet through anti-science denialism.
Colombia is also home to modern entrepreneurs like Rappi,
among Latin America's burgeoning tech unicorns, and others hot
on its heels as well as cities like Medellin that strive to
embrace the power of technology to better connect Colombians to
21st century global value chains.
The country is also, despite and in some cases
paradoxically because of the challenges it faces, a vital
security and citizen security partner. A new strategic alliance
between the United States and Colombia can help address
Colombia's challenges, consolidate its leadership, and as it
has done repeatedly throughout history, advance key U.S.
national interests across the hemisphere, as it did during the
era of the Good Neighbor Policy, World War II, the birth of the
Inter-American System, and the Alliance for Progress, to cite
but a few examples. It is no accident that every U.S. President
since Ronald Reagan, except President Trump, visited Colombia
while in office.
Against this backdrop, as you look to the next chapter in
this storied relationship, I urge you to advance U.S. interests
by continuing to support implementation of the Peace Accords;
investing in a region-wide approach to mitigate, manage, and
order irregular migration; finding ways U.S. development
assistance financing can be catalytic in the transformation of
the Colombian economy; leveraging Colombian climate leadership,
supporting comprehensive efforts to roll back illicit
economies; and respecting Colombian democracy.
In closing, allow me to elaborate on this final point. With
Colombians headed to the polls, everything possible must be
done to safeguard these critical elections so they accurately
reflect the will of the Colombian people, free from outside
interference and mis- and disinformation. It is imperative that
the U.S. Government and other U.S. political actors defer to
Colombian voters, as we rightly except Colombians and others to
defer to U.S. voters, free from influence. We should stand in
unyielding support for Colombia's democratic process and
institutions, not for or against particular candidates.
Going forward, U.S. interests will best be served by a
Colombia that vigilantly respects democracy and builds a more
inclusive capitalism. We should trust our friends and allies in
Colombia to choose leaders across their democratic institutions
who will lead along such a path. We should stand ready to work
with those leaders as we have done across the past two
centuries to advance shared values and interests.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Restrepo follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. Daniel Restrepo\1\
It has become almost cliche to laude the strength and depth of the
relationship between the United States and Colombia. As that
relationship nears its 200th anniversary, it is important to move
beyond the trite and take a step back to examine its history, its
status today, and its promise into the future. In that spirit, I
commend Chairman Menendez for holding this hearing and for authoring
the U.S.-Colombia Strategic Alliance Act. The legislation is an
important signal of the abiding U.S. commitment to the people of
Colombia and comes at a critical juncture for Colombia and for U.S.
relationships throughout the Americas. The broad range of topics I
understand is encompassed within the legislation is also a testament to
the complexity of the U.S.-Colombia relationship which profoundly
impacts a series of U.S. strategic interests in the Americas and well
beyond--as it has throughout the past 200 years.
As one examines the U.S.-Colombia relationship it is vital to
appreciate that it long predates what many consider its high-water mark
and which still others treat as its de facto starting point--Plan
Colombia. The recency bias of a Plan Colombia-centric way of
understanding the U.S.-Colombia relationship is understandable even if
unhelpful. One is hard pressed to find a more successful recent
investment of U.S. time, energy, and resources abroad than the role the
United States played in Colombia during the past two decades. Colombian
democracy thrives today because of the sacrifice of countless
Colombians and the unwavering support of the United States. First, as
Colombia sought to project the power of the state to the entirety of
the Colombian territory for the first time in the country's history and
then as it executed a textbook application of counterinsurgency
doctrine to bring an end to the hemisphere's longest-running internal
armed conflict through political means.
As Colombia moves forward, the Strategic Alliance Act gets it
exactly right that we must shore up those investments and consolidate a
cycle of success. The pursuit of core U.S. national interests does not
afford us the luxury of walking away from Colombia thinking our work is
done. Now is the time to deepen the relationship, not turn our backs on
it.
This is in part true because Colombia continues to face notable
challenges. Recognizing the Colombian state has never managed to be
fully present across the entirety of Colombia, implementation of the
2016 peace accords, which at its core seeks that elusive goal, lags the
pace we would all like to see.\2\ The need for continued support for
the constitutionally required implementation of Colombia's peace
agreement is one of the reasons the U.S. commitment must not waiver.
Colombia also continues to be plagued by flourishing illicit
economies. Coca cultivation and cocaine production are at or above
historic highs.\3\ According to ONDCP's latest report, coca cultivation
reached 245,000 hectares in 2020 and potential cocaine production 1,010
metric tons.\4\ Illegal mining devastates Colombia's environment and
fuels illegal armed groups in Colombia--and in Venezuela--putting
further pressure on communities living in Colombia's long-neglected
periphery. Today, revenue from illegal gold mining is said to outpace
income from cocaine production in Colombia.\5\ As concluded by the
bipartisan, congressionally mandated Western Hemisphere Drug Policy
Commission, on which I had the privilege of serving, the United States
must partner with Colombia to take an integrated approach to creating
the conditions needed to reduce the size and negative impact of these
illicit activities.\6\
The country continues to labor under the negative effects of the
implosion of its closest neighbor and historical partner--Venezuela.
Since 2015, more than 6 million Venezuelans have been forced to flee
the chaos of their country's descent into kleptocracy and criminality,
with approximately 2 million putting down roots in Colombia. Even
before this exodus placed enormous strain on Colombia, the economic
trainwreck imposed by failed chavista policies eliminated one of
Colombia's historically most important and most reliable economic
partners.
Colombia's economy has also regularly failed to deliver
sufficiently for broad swaths of the Colombian people. Inequality
remains a structural reality of Colombian society.\7\ A pre-existing
condition only made worse by the pandemic despite a significant fiscal
commitment--5 percent of GDP--by the Colombian Government in an attempt
to protect Colombia's most vulnerable. Intervention that has been
credited with softening COVID's impact on Colombia's economy and
opening way to a stronger than expected 2021 recovery.\8\
Colombia, like too many of our neighbors throughout the Americas,
is burdened by stiflingly high levels of informality and the economic
distortions that flow from it. Throughout the decade leading into the
pandemic, for example, informality stayed stubbornly above 60
percent.\9\ It is a country in need of fiscal, labor, and pension
reforms and expanded investment in human capital to position its
economy for success into the 21st Century. Reforms needed to fully
maximize the talent and transformative capacity of Colombia's modern
entrepreneurs embodied in success stories like Rappi--among Latin
America's burgeoning tech unicorns--as well as in the embrace of the
Fourth Industrial Revolution by cities like Medellin, in a way that
addresses ongoing concerns with the gig economy and lifts the labor
force. Sadly, such reforms have proven politically elusive in recent
years.
Colombia also finds itself at a crossroads in the wake of its peace
agreement with the FARC. The past years have seen a country--and
particularly its political class--struggling to find a path forward, to
define a new north star and avoid lapsing into traditional divisions,
albeit with new labels, that throughout its history have dragged
Colombia from one internal conflict to the next.
Although the hard work of defining and pursuing that new north star
rests with the Colombian people and their leaders, a new strategic
alliance between the United States and Colombia can help break that
cycle. It can both serve as a catalyst for a more just Colombia and
advance key U.S. national interests by anchoring U.S. policy in the
Americas writ large.
It would not be the first time the U.S.-Colombia relationship
played an outsized role in advancing U.S. interests and shaping U.S.
policy in the Americas. Shortly after laying out his ``Good Neighbor''
policy, President Franklin Roosevelt became the first sitting U.S.
President to visit South America when he toured Cartagena in the
company of Colombian President Enrique Olaya Herrera.\10\ During World
War II, Colombia joined the United States in declaring war against the
Axis Powers; Colombian naval assets helped hunt German U-boats in the
Caribbean; and the U.S. Navy prepared for its Pacific Campaign off
Colombia's west coast.\11\
After World War II, Colombia was instrumental in establishing the
world's oldest regional international system--the Inter-American
System. The Organization of American States was born from the Pacto de
Bogota, negotiated and signed in Colombia's capital city in 1948.\12\
The Organization's first Secretary General would be Colombia's once-
and future-president Alberto Lleras Camargo. It was no accident that
when President Kennedy visited Latin America to see the first programs
launched under the Alliance for Progress, he visited then-President
Lleras Camargo in Bogota in 1961.\13\ Every U.S. President since Ronald
Reagan, with the exception of the last occupant of the Oval Office, has
visited Colombia.\14\ And have done so in effective pursuit of U.S.
national interests and in bolstering a like-minded liberal democracy in
the heart of Latin America. In short, the U.S.-Colombia relationship
has long, vibrant, and consequential roots, and has benefited both
countries.
A robust partnership with Colombia is essential for the United
States moving forward given the central challenges facing the Americas
today, including migration, the climate crisis, citizen insecurity, and
democratic backsliding.
As members of the Committee know, the Americas are experiencing
unprecedented levels of migration. In the past 7 years, irregular
migration has accelerated as millions have been dislocated throughout
the region. Understanding that successful migration management must
extend far beyond border measures, the Colombian Government--and, as
importantly, the Colombian people--have stepped up to help their
neighbors in need. President Ivan Duque's decision to grant Venezuelans
in Colombia legal status for 10 years was one of the most commendable
acts of leadership by any leader in the Western hemisphere in recent
memory. Through its policies, Colombia has encouraged rootedness of
otherwise irregular migrants, contributing to stability amid multiple
regional crises. It has also set an example to be followed as President
Biden did when he granted TPS to Venezuelans who have sought shelter in
the United States in recent years.
Colombia--together with Panama, Costa Rica, Mexico, the United
States, and Canada--is critical to shaping and implementing much-needed
hemisphere-wide efforts to mitigate, manage, and order migration with a
focus on supporting migrant-receiving communities throughout the
region. To that end, Colombia's regularization efforts together with
international backing like the November 2021 $800 million loan from the
World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank to Colombia
conditioned on integration efforts need to be replicated and refined to
local circumstances throughout the hemisphere.
Colombia is also a critical player in responding to the climate
crisis and leading the energy transformation in the Americas.
Colombia's unparalleled biodiversity is a wellspring of hope and
opportunity for our planet. One the United States should work to
protect and preserve. As an Amazonian country, Colombia is an important
partner in climate diplomacy at a time when countries like Brazil
imperil our planet through anti-science denialism. Despite an
unsustainable-over-time reliance on hydrocarbon exports, Colombia's
domestic energy matrix is one of the hemisphere's cleanest with more
than 70 percent of the country's electricity coming from hydro. And
thanks to a rapid acceleration of installed renewable capacity--it is
in the midst of an expansion from 50 MW in installed capacity in 2018
to 2,500 MW by the end of this year--it is growing more sustainable by
the day.\15\
Citizen insecurity remains a profound challenge in Colombia,
although the nature of the security threat has changed in recent
decades. As a result of enormous sacrifice by Colombians--and yes, the
catalytic support of the United States, in the form of Plan Colombia--
Colombia no longer faces an existential threat to the state from
illegal armed groups. It does however continue to face a significant
challenge. Homicide rates in 2021 were at a 7-year high and far too
many community leaders are falling victim to the power vacuums created
in the wake of the peace agreement in a tragic replay of some of the
darkest periods in Colombia's modern history.\16\ The country's
security structures have been slow to adapt to Colombia's new reality
and struggle to maintain the ability to project state authority
throughout Colombia's territory and safeguard citizen security on a
day-to-day basis. Other critical rule of law institutions have not yet
achieved the operational capacity needed to ensure access to effective
justice at all levels of Colombian society. Despite these challenges--
and in some cases paradoxically because of them--Colombia has been and
should remain an important U.S. security and citizen security partner.
Democracy is under enormous pressure throughout the Americas. In
fact, in its 2021 report, The Economist's Intelligence Unit found that
Latin America's democracy index score not only dropped for the sixth
consecutive year but also experienced the most dramatic decline of any
region in any year since the Democracy Index debuted in 2006.\17\ As
governments, even before the pandemic, struggled to meet the needs and
expectations of their populations and public policy struggled to rise
to the challenges posed by the accelerating effects of technology on
traditional work, space has opened across the Americas for corrosive
populism of every ideology.
Colombia has not been immune to these dynamics as disaffection with
democracy is on the rise and popular unrest has manifest in sustained
protests--both before and during the pandemic. According to the
benchmark Latinobarometro public opinion survey, for example, Colombia
experienced one of the region's most pronounced declines in faith in
democracy--11 points between 2018 and 2020.\18\ With only a brief lapse
in the mid-20th Century, Colombia has been a steadfast defender of
democracy throughout the hemisphere. Continued U.S. support for
Colombia and the Colombian people is an important bulwark against
potential democratic backsliding. It is why the Biden administration's
provision of 6 million vaccine doses to Colombia should be understood
for what it was--important support for the vibrancy of Colombia's
democracy. Fueled in part by those donations, Colombia's vaccine
program was more successful than anticipated and helped make possible a
surprisingly robust economic recovery in 2021. In short, it helped
Colombian democracy deliver.
It did so at a critical juncture because as we all know, Colombians
will soon go to the polls. First on March 13 to elect a new Congress
and select candidates from several coalitions to face off in Colombia's
presidential election at the end of May. A first round likely to lead
to a runoff between the top two vote getters in June. It is of critical
importance that everything possible be done by Colombian authorities,
candidates, and their supporters, in cooperation with the international
community, including the United States, to safeguard these critical
elections so they accurately and transparently reflect the will of the
Colombian people free from outside interference and mis- and
disinformation-driven distortions that have affected so many electoral
processes across the hemisphere in recent years.
Against this backdrop and as this Committee and this Congress look
toward the next chapter in the storied U.S.-Colombia relationship, I
urge you to seek to advance U.S. interests by:
Continuing to support implementation of the peace accords
through expanding the effective presence of the Colombia state
throughout the country's territory;
Investing in a region-wide approach to mitigating, managing,
and ordering irregular migration by supporting Colombia's
efforts at regularization and integration of Venezuelan
migrants--and efforts like it throughout the hemisphere;
Finding those ways that U.S. development financing can be
catalytic in the transformation of the Colombian economy to
best prepare it to deliver for the Colombian people into the
21st Century;
Leveraging Colombian climate leadership in deepening
hemispheric and global cooperation, including driving
modernization in green financing across all of the hemisphere's
multilateral development banks, for confronting the climate
crisis;
Supporting comprehensive efforts to rollback illicit
economies understanding that even as the negative effects of
illicit drugs in the U.S. are less tied to Colombia given the
intensifying opioid crisis in the United States, the threat
posed to Colombian democracy is real and consequential for the
United States; and
Respecting Colombia's democratic processes and institutions.
On this final point, while it is unquestionably true that U.S.
interests have been well served by a succession of leaders in Colombia
with an abiding commitment to democracy as well as market-driven
economics, the most important thing the United States can do to
continue shoring up democracy in Colombia in the coming months is place
its trust in the people of Colombia. It is imperative that the United
States and political actors in the United States respect the sovereign
will of the Colombian people as we rightly expect Colombians and other
members of the international community to respect the sovereign will of
U.S. voters in our own elections.
We should stand in unyielding support for Colombia's democratic
process and institutions, not for or against particular candidates in
the upcoming elections. Going forward, U.S. interests will be best
served by a Colombia that vigilantly respects democracy and builds a
more inclusive capitalism that meets the basic needs and expectations
of the Colombian people and fosters the conditions for innovation and
competition needed for Colombia and the U.S.-Colombia relationship to
thrive into its third century. We should trust our friends and allies
in Colombia to choose leaders across their democratic institutions who
will lead along such a path. And we should stand ready to work with
those leaders as we have done across the past two centuries to advance
shared values and interests.
----------------
Notes
\1\ The views reflected in this testimony are my personal views and
do not represent the views of any institution with which I am or have
been affiliated.
\2\ Matrix, Peace Accords, and Kroc Institute for International
Peace Studies. ``Five Years of Peace Agreement Implementation in
Colombia: Achievements, Challenges and Opportunities to Increase
Implementation Levels, December 2016-October 2021.'' 3 Dec. 2021
available at https://curate.nd.edu/show/0c483j36025.
\3\ Reuter, ``Colombia coca crop area expanded to 245,000 hectares
in 2020--report,'' June 25, 2021 available at https://www.reuters.com/
world/americas/colombia-coca-crop-area-expanded-245000-hectares-2020-
report-2021-06-26/.
\4\ The White House, ``UPDATED: ONDCP Releases Data on Coca
Cultivation and Potential Cocaine Production in the Andean Region,''
July 16, 2021 available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/briefing-
room/2021/07/16/ondcp-releases-data-on-coca-cultivation-and-potential-
cocaine-production-in-the-andean-region/.
\5\ Ryan Berg & Henry Ziemer, ``A Closer Look at Colombia's
Illegal, Artisanal, and Small-Scale Mining,'' CSIS, December 20, 2021
available at https://www.csis.org/analysis/closer-look-colombias-
illegal-artisanal-and-small-scale-mining.
\6\ Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission, ``Charting a New
Path Forward,'' December 2020 available at https://whdpc.org/images/
report/2021%2001.21%20WHDPC%20FINAL
%20REPORT.pdf.
\7\ World Bank Group, ``Building an Equitable Society in
Colombia,'' 2021 available at https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/
en/686821635218586591/pdf/Main-Report.pdf.
\8\ OECD, ``OECD Survey: Colombia 2022,'' February 10, 2022
available at https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/oecd-economic-
surveys-colombia-2022_04bf9377-en.
\9\ Statistica, ``Informal employment as percentage of total
employment in Colombia 2010-2019,'' October 21, 2021 available at
https://www.statista.com/statistics/1039930/informal-employment-share-
colombia/.
\10\ Andrew Glass, ``FDR Visits Colombia, July 10, 1934,''
Politico, July 10, 2018 available at https://www.politico.com/story/
2018/07/10/this-day-in-politics-july-10-1934-702135.
\11\ Leonard, Thomas M.; John F. Bratzel, Latin America during
World War II, Rowman & Littlefield (2007).
\12\ Organization of American States, ``Who We Are,'' available at
https://www.oas.org/en/about/who--we--are.asp.
\13\ John F. Kennedy, ``Address at Dinner at the San Carlos Palace
in Bogota,'' December 17, 1961 available at https://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-dinner-the-san-carlos-palace-
bogota.
\14\ U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian,
``Presidential Travel Abroad: Colombia,'' available at https://
history.state.gov/departmenthistory/travels/president/colombia.
\15\ Sandra Velandria and Sergio Gomez, ``Colombia: A renewable
energy powerhouse?,'' Global Americans, November 10, 2021 available at
https://theglobalamericans.org/2021/11/colombia-a-renewable-energy-
powerhouse/.
\16\ InSight Crime, ``InSight Crime's 2021 Homicide Round-Up,''
InSight Crime, February 1, 2022 available at https://insightcrime.org/
news/insight-crimes-2021-homicide-round-up/.
\17\ Economist Intelligence Unit, ``Democracy Index: less than half
the world lives in a democracy,'' February 10, 2022 available at
https://www.eiu.com/n/democracy-index-2021-less-than-half-the-world-
lives-in-a-democracy/.
\18\ Latinobarometro, ``Informe 2021: Adios a Macondo,'' available
at https://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp?Idioma=0.
The Chairman. Thank you. Ms. Realuyo.
STATEMENT OF CELINA B. REALUYO, ADJUNCT PROFESSOR, THE GEORGE
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Realuyo. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member
Risch, and members of the committee for the opportunity to
testify before you on the challenges facing Colombia and the
need for a deeper U.S. engagement.
I have had the privilege of covering Colombia and
counternarcotics issues since I was a junior officer at U.S.
Embassy Panama in the 1990's, and then implementing Plan
Colombia at the State Department Counterterrorism Office, and
more recently specializing on illicit networks in the Americas
as an academic. In fact, in 10 days I will head to Bogota to
conduct a national threats and emerging threats seminar with
the Colombian National War College.
This year, as you know, Colombia and the United States
celebrate 200 years of bilateral relations and enjoy a strong
partnership promoting security and prosperity in Latin America.
Colombia has transformed itself from a nearly failed state,
threated by counter-insurgency, into a sound democracy, with
the support from Plan Colombia combatting cocaine trade and
arms groups like the FARC and ELN over the past 20 years.
Currently, Colombia is experiencing multiple crises that
threaten stability ahead of its presidential elections. Massive
anti-government protests, rising violence, human rights abuses,
increased cocaine trade, frustrations with the pandemic, and
instability spilling over from Venezuela have made President
Duque's government very unpopular. The COVID-19 pandemic has
become a force multiplier for pre-existing socioeconomic
grievances and have emboldened President Duque's opponents.
External actors like Venezuela, China, and Russia have
increased their activities in Colombia, compounding these
domestic crises. The Maduro regime has exported instability to
Colombia by supporting the FARC rebels and the ELN who are
engaged in an illicit economy that is ever expanding, and
spurred the mass migration of some 6 million Venezuelans, of
which 2 million are in Colombia.
As Colombia's second-largest trading partner after the
United States, China is aggressively and strategically
investing in major infrastructure and technology projects. It
is also engaged in vaccine diplomacy to pressure the Duque
government to allow China's telecom company, Huawei, to
participate in the upcoming 5G spectrum auction.
Meanwhile, Russian intelligence services have been active
in Colombia in recent years, and Russia has close ties to
Venezuela, selling some $11 billion in arms to Colombia's
neighbor since 2005. This month, Colombian Defense Minister
Molano reported that Venezuela was moving troops to the border
region with the assistance from Russia and Iran, where there is
fierce fighting currently between the ELN and former FARC
rebels, who tried to control the drug trade. Russia has also
capitalized on Latin American distrust of traditional media and
official messaging to impact and shape public opinion and
perceptions against incumbent governments and democratic
institutions.
With all these crises there are fears that new violent
protests, disinformation campaigns, and election meddling might
destabilize Colombia. Therefore, the U.S. must redouble its
efforts to support Colombia to defend its democracy and market
economy and sovereignty and to ensure free, fair, and
transparent elections this year.
To deepen our partnership with Colombia at this challenging
time, I advise the Biden administration and Congress to
increase security assistance to Colombia in support of their
security services to counter armed groups and the lucrative
drug trade and expand and reinforce state presence in areas
vulnerable to transnational organized crime. Also it should
expand the use of financial intelligence to combat, prosecute,
dismantle, and defund these illicit networks.
We should also be assisting with the professionalization of
Colombia's military and police, to include more human rights
and rule-of-law training. We should also help Colombia in its
efforts to ensure cybersecurity of its critical infrastructure,
including sensitive data and communications.
With regard to external actors, the U.S. should boost
counterintelligence capabilities to monitor what these external
actors are doing to try to destabilize Colombia and the rest of
Latin America. We should continue our collaborative efforts
with the aspiration of bringing security, stability, and
democracy back to Venezuela.
We should also try to help civil society groups in Colombia
address issues of misinformation and fake news, and more
importantly, counter those efforts by hostile internal and
foreign actors.
On the economic side, we should promote U.S. investment in
Colombian infrastructure projects in order to counter China's
Belt and Road Initiative and 5G technological aspirations.
Finally, as we look from the lessons of the pandemic, we need
to think about increasing bilateral trade in a part of our
attempt to near-source and provide more resilience for our
supply chains within the Western Hemisphere.
Thank you so much for your attention. I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Realuyo follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ms. Celina B. Realuyo\1\
introduction
Thank you Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and members of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for the opportunity to appear
before you today to testify on the current security and economic
challenges facing Colombia and the need to deepen U.S. engagement.
Colombia is one of the closest partners of the U.S. in Latin America,
sharing democratic values, free-market capitalism, and mutual security
interests. Colombia is facing a triple crisis of mass social protests,
increased insecurity and serious fiscal and economic challenges from
the pandemic. These internal crises along with external actors like
Venezuela, China and Russia and an expanding illicit economy are
destabilizing the political, economic, social, and security aspects of
Colombia ahead of their presidential elections. The U.S. must redouble
its efforts to strengthen its partnership with Colombia to assist the
country confront the formidable challenges to security, democracy and
post-pandemic economic fallout and realize free and fair elections this
year.
the u.s.-colombia strategic partnership
This year, Colombia and the United States commemorate 200 years of
bilateral relations between two of the oldest democracies in the
Western Hemisphere. Colombia is one of the U.S.'s closest partners in
Latin America with a strong record of promoting democracy, capitalism,
and security in the region. With the support of the United States,
Colombia has transformed itself over the past 20 years from a nearly
failed state threatened by a narco-insurgency into a sound democracy
with a thriving market economy. The two countries have been
instrumental in promoting prosperity and security in Latin America.
The U.S. is Colombia's largest trade and investment partner, due in
part to the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA) that was
implemented in 2012, with a two-way goods trade of $29 billion and a
services trade of $11.7 billion in 2019 alone. Meanwhile, Colombia is
the U.S.' third-largest trade partner in Latin America, with two-way
trade in goods and services totaling $29.9 billion in 2020. U.S.-owned
affiliates account for more than 90,000 jobs in Colombia.\2\ As the
U.S. looks for near-sourcing opportunities to decrease supply chain
dependency on Asia that made it so vulnerable during the pandemic,
Colombia is a logical counterpart to expand bilateral trade in Latin
America.
For the past 20 years, Colombia has been a steadfast U.S. ally in
the ``war on drugs'' and security cooperation. For over five decades,
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (FARC-EP)
threatened to overthrow the established order in Colombia and replace
it with a socialist dictatorship. The FARC sustained itself through the
cocaine trade for years. In its attempts to destabilize the government,
the FARC carried out bombings, extortions, selective assassinations,
kidnappings and armed confrontations with Colombian police and military
forces. In 2000, the U.S. launched a partnership called ``Plan
Colombia'' to provide security and economic development assistance to
help combat the spread of narcotics, train military and law
enforcement, and promote economic growth. Through ``Plan Colombia,''
the U.S. and Colombia have built a strong counterterrorism and counter-
narcotics partnership to combat the cocaine trade and armed groups like
the FARC and ELN. Since 2000, the U.S. Government has provided about
$12 billion in bilateral aid to help implement ``Plan Colombia'' and
its successor strategies.\3\ Further afield, Colombia has also provided
security expertise across Latin America, training thousands of military
and police personnel in Central and South America. This included
Colombia's participation in the ``Merida Initiative'' in Mexico, ``Plan
Colombia's'' Mexican cousin, which became critical to security and
counternarcotics operations within Mexico and at the U.S. southern
border.\4\
colombia's history of armed groups and the farc peace accord
With a population of approximately 50 million, Colombia has
experienced high levels of violence and citizen insecurity due to
internal armed conflict and narco-insurgency. Fifty years of violence
with guerilla groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) have resulted in over
220,000 deaths, 81 percent of them civilians and almost made Colombia a
failed state.\5\ More than 9 million Colombians, or roughly 17 percent
of the population, have registered as conflict victims.\6\ Colombia's
insurgent and other armed groups have been sustained by the shadow,
illicit economy through the lucrative cocaine trade, as well as illegal
gold- mining and oil-smuggling operations. Colombian organized criminal
groups, such as drug trafficking mafias and paramilitary groups, are
well armed and dangerous. The economic impact of conflict, terrorism,
homicides and sexual assaults in Colombia was over $275 billion, 34 per
cent of the country's GDP, in 2017. This figure also includes the costs
of containing violence as well as the consequences of violence on the
economy. Colombia was ranked 10th (out of 11 countries) in South
America and 144th overall on the 2021 Global Peace Index. The country
recorded a deterioration in its overall score as a result of increases
in violence violent demonstrations and political terror.\7\
In 2016, President Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018) brokered an
historic peace accord with the FARC, the country's largest leftist
guerrilla organization at the time. That peace agreement, ratified by
Colombia's Congress, included an immediate cease-fire, disarmament and
demobilization process, the creation of a transitional justice system
and the recognition of the FARC as a legitimate political party with 10
guaranteed seats in Congress until 2026.\8\ During a U.N.-monitored
demobilization in 2017, some 13,300 FARC members disarmed. The FARC
later transformed from a leftist guerrilla army into a political party
known as Comunes. Neither the government nor the FARC have upheld all
their commitments under the agreement. Although the FARC has formally
demobilized, its leadership has not yet been subject to the Colombian
justice system, and FARC dissident groups continue to engage in
violence and illicit activities in Colombia and Venezuela. In early
December 2021, on the fifth anniversary of the signing of the peace
accord, the U.S. Government removed the FARC from its list of foreign
terrorist organizations (FTOs) and designated two FARC dissident
groups, Segundo Marquetalia and FARC-EP, as FTOs.\9\ According to one
estimate, some 90 armed groups remain active in Colombia--including
some former FARC and rightwing paramilitaries that continued criminal
activities after their respective disarmaments.\10\
The National Liberation Army (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional--ELN)
is another violent guerrilla group with left-wing political ideologies
operating in Colombia. Initially a Marxist-Leninist nationalist
movement, it is more focused on kidnapping, extortion and attacks on
economic infrastructure and increasingly linked to the narcotics trade.
The group has prospered since the demobilization of the FARC. In 2016,
when the FARC was abandoning much of its territory, the ELN moved in to
take over drug trafficking and contraband activities, especially in
Catatumbo, Norte de Santander and in the northwestern department of
Choco. This greatly increased the ELN's criminal profits and expanded
its manpower and territorial control.\11\
President Juan Manuel Santos tried to reach a peace deal similar to
one with the FARC in 2016. In September 2017, the two sides signed a
ceasefire which ran from October 1 to January 9, 2018, but no similar
ceasefire has been signed since. President Ivan Duque (2018-Present)
campaigned as a critic of the FARC peace accords and suspended existing
talks with the ELN upon assuming office. He cited the ELN's continued
violence and failure to comply with agreements made during the Santos
administration. The ELN is currently considered the most powerful
criminal group in Colombia and Venezuela, dominating much of the
criminal economies along the border. It controls vast areas of coca
crops, cocaine production and distribution routes and is actively
involved in illegal gold mining. Well supported by the Maduro regime in
Venezuela in exchange for a cut of criminal profits, the ELN has become
a truly transnational criminal organization.\12\
Recent clashes between the FARC dissidents and ELN has resulted
increased violence along the Colombian-Venezuelan border as the groups
battle over control of the lucrative narcotics and illegal gold trade.
On January 7, 2022, Colombia's Attorney General warned that the fight
between the FARC dissidents and ELN was expanding in three border
areas, Norte de Santander, Arauca and Casanare. He also noted that ex-
FARC forces after taking on multiple enemies on Venezuelan soil were
moving from their stronghold in Norte de Santander to attack the ELN in
Arauca, a Colombian department on the border with Venezuela.\13\
the role of external actors in colombia
External state actors are becoming increasingly active in Colombia.
Colombia and greater Latin America serve as an expanded theater for
great power competition. The growing influence of China, Russia and
Venezuela in Colombia is a direct challenge to the U.S.-Colombian
partnership and has profound implications for regional security.
Venezuela: The criminalized state in Venezuela under the Maduro
regime is threatening Colombia's security and sovereignty and has
created the largest humanitarian crisis in Latin America with some 6
million migrants fleeing Venezuela. Colombia is a key U.S. partner in
ongoing efforts to help Venezuela return to democracy and economic
prosperity. Colombia has been essential in coordinating regional
support for Interim President Juan Guaido, as well as condemning
Maduro's authoritarian regime. Colombia has welcomed over 1.8 million
Venezuelans fleeing the Maduro regime and providing assistance to its
Latin American neighbors. In early 2021, President Ivan Duque reported
that Venezuelans residing in Colombia comprised nearly 40 percent of
the Venezuelan exodus. The U.S. Government has committed more than $700
million to help Colombia address the Venezuelan crisis and support the
Venezuelan refugees that Colombia hosts.\14\
Since it assumed power in August 2018, the Duque government has
been dealing with increased provocation by the Maduro regime. Colombia
has been the primary target of Venezuela's national security strategy
since the dawn of the Bolivarian revolution in 1999.\15\ Due to
Colombia's geostrategic location and its close ties to the U.S.,
Venezuela's Chavista regime and other malign external actors have an
asymmetric strategy to exploit illicit networks and illicit economies
to destabilize Colombia.\16\
The Maduro regime relies on close ties with U.S. rivals like Cuba,
China, Iran, Nicaragua and Russia to support their economy and
circumvent harsh economic sanctions. It also has proven ties with
Colombian illicit armed groups including the ELN and FARC-D. In
Venezuela's collapse, the ELN has found safe haven and opportunities to
set up bases throughout rural Venezuela. While there has certainly been
some friction, and at least one deadly skirmish, between the ELN and
the Venezuelan military, the two more often cooperate with one another
than fight each other. The Colombian military believes the Venezuelan
armed forces are now actively training the ELN to use sophisticated
weaponry.\17\
China: China's diplomatic, commercial and technological interests
in Colombia have grown in recent years. China is now Colombia's second
most important trading partner after the U.S., with average annual
exports between 2011 and 2020 of $3.4 billion per year almost seven
times as large as those in the prior decade. Imports of $9.9 billion
now represent almost a quarter of Colombia's total imports. Backed by
Beijing with state financial support, Chinese companies have been
winning major infrastructure projects, including the long-awaited
Bogota metro, the Bogota regional railway, many Colombian 4G and 5G
infrastructure projects and a major new gold mine in Antioquia. Many of
these projects resulted after President Ivan Duque's visit to Beijing
in 2019, when he promoted Chinese investment in Colombia. Seeking
closer ties, he has hinted that Colombia may formally join the Belt and
Road Initiative before he leaves office in 2022.\18\
Another asymmetric weapon in Beijing's arsenal is vaccine
diplomacy. China's woefully inadequate, but readily available, Sinovac
coronavirus vaccine was used as leverage in Colombia to pressure the
Duque government to allow China's telecommunications company (and
direct conduit to Chinese military intelligence), Huawei, to
participate in the 5G spectrum auction in Colombia sometime in 2022--a
dual-track diplomatic effort that China also initiated in Brazil.\19\
Although Colombia has been the largest recipient of vaccine donations
from the U.S., receiving 6 million doses out of the 38 million donated
by the U.S. Government, the early arrival of Sinovac vaccines during
February and March 2021 ``saved the day'' by preventing thousands of
deaths among the elderly. Indeed, by the end of March 2021, Colombia
had received 3.5 million doses, of which 2.5 million came from China.
In this sense, U.S. vaccine diplomacy to Colombia was generous, but
China came first when it most mattered.\20\
Russia: According to Colombian security officials, the Russian
military intelligence services have been active in Colombia in recent
years. In December 2020, Colombia tracked unusual movements of
diplomatic personnel from the Russian embassy in Bogota, leading to the
expulsion of at least two ``diplomats'' in December of last year--a
first in Colombia-Russia relations.\21\ This was followed by a Russian
military aircraft violating Colombian airspace just days before the
uproar of social protests began in April 2021. While the Colombian
Government protested the incident, repeated violations of Colombian
airspace by Russian-manufactured Venezuelan military drones has added
to the complexity of the conflict on the Colombia-Venezuela border. In
May 2021, Colombian Defense Minister Diego Molano accused Russia of
conducting cyberattacks against the Colombian Army and Senate
infrastructure, that Russia denied.\22\
Russia is a close partner of the Maduro regime and has sold more
than $11 billion worth of armament to Venezuela since 2005. The
presence of Russian military advisers and contractors has become
routine in Venezuela. In December 2021, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister
Sergei Ryabkov said he would not rule out Moscow deploying forces to
allies Venezuela or Cuba if diplomacy failed with the United States
over Ukraine, where Moscow has massed tens of thousands of troops. In
February 2022, Russia promised Colombia's Foreign Minister and Vice
President Marta Lucia Ramirez that military equipment given to
Venezuela would not be used to attack Colombia, destabilize Latin
America or end up in the hands of illegal armed groups. Colombia's
Defense Minister Molano reported that Venezuela was moving troops to
the countries' border with technical assistance from Russia and Iran
and called the possible deployment ``foreign interference.'' Molano,
citing intelligence sources, said there were troop movements opposite
Colombia's Arauca province, which has seen fierce fighting between
National Liberation Army (ELN) guerillas and former FARC rebels for
control of the drugs trade.\23\
In recent years, Russia has leveraged its sophisticated propaganda
capability to impact public opinion and perceptions across Latin
America. Such efforts include overt Russian media such as Sputnik and
Russia Today, as well as social media efforts through platforms such as
Twitter, Facebook, and WhatsApp. The high level of distrust in the
region toward government discourse and traditional media has made Latin
America and the Caribbean particularly vulnerable to such initiatives.
Russia has used that capability not so much to create opinion favorable
toward Russia, but rather, to foment instability and undermine regimes
aligned with the West. Both the Colombian and Chilean governments have
accused Russian social media agents of contributing to the
radicalization of protests and destabilization in their countries.\24\
Colombia has become the focal point for top U.S. adversaries in
this era of great-power competition. Abandoning or reducing support to
Colombia does not come without unintended consequences, of which the
most detrimental to U.S. national security is the likely expansion of
Russian and Chinese influence from Venezuela to Colombia.
current challenges facing colombia
President Ivan Duque's popularity has declined over the past year
as his government has struggled to address serious political, economic
and security challenges in Colombia. These include mass anti-government
protests, spikes in coca cultivation and cocaine production,
frustration with pandemic response, violence against human rights and
other social activists and instability spilling over from Venezuela.
Without a doubt, the COVID-19 pandemic has negatively impacted health,
economic security, and democratic indicators in Colombia and countries
around the world. Colombia has been particularly hard hit by the
pandemic with one of the highest rates of COVID-19 infections and
deaths in Latin America \25\ and with a gross domestic product (GDP)
contraction of ^6.8 percent in 2020 due to strict national lockdown
policies.\26\ The pandemic became a catalyst and force-multiplier for
the explosion of pre-existing socio-economic grievances and the
emboldening of political opponents of both the Duque administration and
democratic institutions, resulting in mass protests that paralyzed
Colombian cities.
Nationwide protests broke out over an unpopular government-proposed
tax increase in mid-2021. The national strike lasted for nearly 8 weeks
as diverse sectors protested about a host of grievances, including
economic inequality, crime, police brutality against demonstrators, and
unaddressed corruption. Colombia's large social protests, labor
strikes, and violent clashes with police made international news in
April 2021, but had already been underway in November 2019, well before
the COVID-19 pandemic. These protests were similar to the social and
political unrest witnessed in Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador and Peru since
2019. In Colombia, the protests were fueled by social and economic
grievances due to long-standing inequalities and high youth and female
unemployment. Unfortunately, Colombia still faces high levels of
poverty. According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC), 37.5 percent of Colombians lived below the poverty
line at the end of 2020. More than two-thirds of Colombian households
make less than $600 USD in total monthly income.\27\
There were allegations of agitators and fake news fueling the
protests via social media and human rights abuses by Colombian security
forces. Colombian Defense Minister Diego Molano reported on May 3, 2021
that at least six criminal groups, including FARC dissidents (FARC-D),
the ELN, and the Blue and Black Shields of the M-19 youth movement were
behind the acts of violence and vandalism during Colombia's protests in
2021.\28\ The crippling blockades across Colombia and vandalism
resulted in an estimated $3 billion of damage.
From April 28 to July 31, 2021, the United Nations Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia received more than 60
allegations of deaths in the context of the mass protests. So far, it
has verified the deaths of 46 people: 44 civilians and two police
officers; most of the documented deaths, 76 percent, were from gunshot
wounds. The UN office in Colombia conducted more than 620 interviews
with victims and witnesses, and examined 83 videos, including mobile
phone footage of the protests and related incidents. Based on this
analysis, there are reasonable grounds to believe police officers were
responsible for at least 28 of the deaths with members of the National
Police's Mobile Anti-Riot Squad (ESMAD) involved in at least 10 cases.
Non- state actors are believed to have killed 10 people, while there is
insufficient information to determine the likely perpetrators of eight
other deaths. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
called on Colombia to urgently reform how it polices protests in the
wake of demonstrations in 2021 in which several people were killed or
injured.\29\ In response, the Colombian Government has embarked on a
broad reform of its police to include respect for human rights and just
received $8 million of U.S. assistance for human rights training for
the police on February 8, 2022.\30\
The security situation in Colombia has been deteriorating
significantly and will be a key issue in the upcoming presidential and
legislative elections. In September 2021, Colombia's Military Commander
General Luis Fernando Navarro stated that about 1,900 fighters
belonging to Colombian rebel and crime groups are operating from
Venezuela, where they plan attacks and engage in drug trafficking. The
Colombian Government has long said Venezuela's leadership grants safe
harbor to Colombian armed groups, allowing trafficking of cocaine in
exchange for a cut of the profits. One FARC dissident group has taken
responsibility for a car bombing at a military base in the border city
of Cucuta which injured 44 in June and the June 25, 2021 failed
assassination attempt against President Ivan Duque, the shooting of a
helicopter transporting him.\31\
According to InSight Crime, murders in Colombia rose to a level not
seen in 7 years a turnaround for the Andean nation, which had made
great strides in reducing killings. According to the National Police,
the country tallied 13,709 homicides in 2021, pushing its homicide rate
up from a low of 23.8 per 100,000 people in 2020, to 26.8 last year.
Last year's total killings, however, rose eight percent when compared
with 2019, and 2021 was the first year since 2013 that Colombia
surpassed 13,000 murders. Violence, meanwhile, surged in the country's
lawless Colombia-Venezuela border. The northeastern jungle region of
Catatumbo, home to an abundance of coca crops, came under siege in a
war between a dissident front of the demobilized FARC and the National
Liberation Army (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional--ELN), Colombia's
largest guerrilla group. On the other side of the country, the
southwestern departments of Cauca and Valle de Cauca recorded nearly
100 people killed in 26 massacres. Both departments are critical for
moving drugs out of the Pacific or to Ecuador and are a hot spot for
criminal actors, including three dissident FARC fronts, the ELN and the
Urabenos drug gang, also known as the Gulf Clan (Clan del Golfo). In
the central Antioquia department, 52 people were murdered in 14
massacres.\32\ This increase in violence is linked to the lucrative
illicit economy and is destabilizing parts of Colombia.
Anti-government protests, frustrations over the pandemic response,
increasing insecurity, economic concerns and instability in Venezuela
will be on Colombians' minds at the March 13 parliamentary and May 29
presidential elections this year. Discontent with the current
administration has President Duque at record low approval ratings. If
the elections were conducted today, left-leaning candidate Gustavo
Petro, former M19 guerrilla and mayor of Bogota would likely win the
presidency. He was a presidential candidate in 2018 who finished second
with over 8 million votes (43 percent) in the second round against Ivan
Duque. There are fears that new violent protests, disinformation
campaigns and election meddling might occur and attempt to destabilize
Colombia.
measures to deepen u.s.-colombian cooperation
The U.S. must redouble its efforts to support Colombia, its closest
democratic partner in Latin America as it faces mass social protests,
increasing insecurity, external actors and serious economic challenges
from the pandemic. Colombia needs assistance to defend its democratic
institutions, open economy and sovereignty and ensure free and fair
elections in 2022. To deepen U.S. partnership with Colombia at this
challenging time, the Biden Administration and Congress should:
1. Increase security assistance to Colombia to support the police
and the military to counter armed groups and the lucrative drug
trade. Security assistance should focus on the growing
instability and illicit economy along the shared border with
Venezuela and the Pacific Ocean ports.
2. Expand the use of financial intelligence by supporting the
Center for Combatting Illicit Finances (CFI) and the creation
of an interagency group to counter money laundering led by
Colombia's Attorney General to combat, prosecute and dismantle
illicit networks.
3. Assist with the professionalization and reform of Colombia's
military and police forces and include more human rights and
rule of law training.
4. Continue collaborative efforts towards bringing security,
stability and democracy back to Venezuela.
5. Support Colombia's broad cybersecurity efforts to safeguard its
sensitive data and communications and other critical
infrastructure.
6. Boost Colombia's counterintelligence capabilities to closely
monitor the growing activities of external actors like China,
Russia and Venezuela in Colombia.
7. Identify and assist legitimate civil society groups in Colombia
to address disinformation and misinformation efforts by
internal and hostile foreign actors.
8. Promote U.S. investment in Colombian infrastructure projects,
especially in areas that are economically isolated and
vulnerable to organized crime, to counter China's Belt and Road
Initiative and 5G technology aspirations.
9. Facilitate more bilateral trade between the U.S. and Colombia as
part of a U.S. near-sourcing and supply chain resilience
strategy.
10. Continue to work closely with Colombians in their pandemic
recovery efforts through both public and private sector
coordination.
----------------
Notes
\1\ The views expressed in this testimony are that of the author
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the William J. Perry Center
for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University, or the
Department of Defense. Testimony is drawn from the author's recent
publication, ``America's Longtime Friend, Colombia, Needs U.S. Help''
with James M. Roberts, Mateo Haydar, and Joseph M. Humire found here:
https://www.heritage.org/americas/report/americas-longtime-friend-
colombia-needs-us-help
\2\ State Department Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, U.S. Relations
with Colombia, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, July 19, 2021,
https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-colombia/
\3\ Congressional Research Service, Colombia: Challenges for U.S.
Policymakers in 2021, September 22, 2021, https://
crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11631/4
\4\ Diego Felipe Vera, ``Cooperacion Internacional de Seguridad: El
Caso de Colombia (International Cooperation and Security: The Case of
Colombia),'' p. 44, https://esdeguelibros.edu.co/index.php/editorial/
catalog/download/28/24/404?inline=1
\5\ Basta Ya! Colombia: Memorias de Guerra y Dignidad, Center for
Historical Memory, at http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/
micrositios/informeGeneral/
\6\ Government of Colombia, Victims Unit, at https://
www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/es
\7\ Institute for Economics and Peace, ``Global Peace Index 2021:
measuring peace in a complex world'' Sydney, June 2021.
\8\ Council on Foreign Relations, U.S.-Colombia Relations 1903-
2021, https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-colombia-relations
\9\ ``U.S. Revokes Terrorist Designation for Colombia's FARC,''
Reuters, November 30, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/us-revokes-
terrorist-designation-colombias-farc-2021-11-30/
\10\ Congressional Research Service, Colombia: Background and U.S.
Relations, December 16, 2021, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R43813.pdf
\11\ InSight Crime, Colombia ELN Backgrounder, October 27, 2020,
https://insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/eln-profile/
\12\ Ibid.
\13\ Juan Diego Posada, ``Ex-FARC Mafia vs. ELN: a Fight Too Far at
Colombia-Venezuela Border?,'' InSight Crime, January 11, 2022,https://
insightcrime.org/news/is-the-ex-farc-mafia-betting-all-its-chips-on-
the-colombian-venezuelan-border/
\14\ U.S. Embassy in Colombia, Colombia and the United States:
Strengthening our Partnership, October 9, 2019, https://
co.usembassy.gov/colombia-and-the-united-states-strengthening-our-
partnership/
\15\ Max Manwaring, Venezuela as an Exporter of 4th Generation
Warfare Instability, U.S. Army War College Press, December 2012
\16\ Joseph M. Humire, ``Assymetric Assault on Colombia,'' Secure
and Free Society, May 17, 2021, https://www.securefreesociety.org/
research/asymmetric-assault-on-colombia/
\17\ Francisco Toro, Venezuela's implosion is becoming Colombia's
security nightmare,'' Washington Post, July 5, 2019, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/07/05/venezuelas-implosion-is-
becoming-colombias-security-nightmare/
\18\ John Padilla and Sergio Guzman, ``As China Eyes Colombia, the
United States Is AWOL,'' Foreign Policy, January 25, 2022, https://
foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/25/colombia-china-latin-america-belt-road-
biden/
\19\ James M. Roberts, Mateo Haydar, Joseph M. Humire and Celina
Realuyo, ``America's Longtime Friend, Colombia, Needs U.S. Help,''
Heritage Foundation, December 2021, https://www.heritage.org/americas/
report/americas-longtime-friend-colombia-needs-us-help
\20\ Luis Fernando Mejia Colombia, ``Washington's ``Closest Ally,''
Looks to Beijing,'' Americas Quarterly, October 27, 2021, https://
www.americasquarterly.org/article/colombia-washingtons-closest-ally-
looks-to-beijing/
\21\ ``Colombia Confirms Exit of Russian Officials, Local Media
Alleges Spying,'' Reuters, December 22, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-colombia-russia/colombia-confirms-exit-of-russian-officials-
local-media-alleges-spying-idUSKBN28W2A5
\22\ Guido L. Torres, ``Nonlinear Warfare: Is Russia Waging a
Silent War in Latin America?,'' Small Wars Journal, January 24, 2022,
https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/nonlinear-warfare-russia-waging-
silent-war-latin-america
\23\ ``Russia says military aid to Venezuela will not be used to
attack Colombia,'' Reuters, February 8, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/
world/americas/russia-says-military-aid-venezuela-will-not-be-used-
attack-colombia-2022-02-08/
\24\ R. Evan Ellis, ``Russia's Latest Return to Latin America,''
Global Americans, January 19, 2022, https://theglobalamericans.org/
2022/01/russia-return-latin-america/
\25\ Congressional Research Service, ``Latin America and the
Caribbean: Impact of COVID-19,'' October 15, 2021, https://sgp.fas.org/
crs/row/IF11581.pdf
\26\ World Bank, ``The World Bank in Colombia: Overview,'' March
24, 2021, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/colombia/overview
\27\ Veronica Uribe-Kessler, ``Guest View: Colombia's Struggle
Against Poverty,'' Reuters, May 11, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/
breakingviews/guest-view-colombias-struggle-against-poverty-2021-05-11/
\28\ Luis Jaime Acosta, ``Colombia Blames Armed Groups for Protest
Violence, Death Toll Still Unclear,'' Reuters, May 3, 2021, https://
www.reuters.com/world/americas/colombia-blames-armed-groups-protest-
violence-death-toll-still-unclear-2021-05-03/
\29\ OHCHR, UN rights office urges Colombia to reform policing of
protests, December 15, 2021, https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/12/
1107992
\30\ EE. UU. anuncia una donacion de 8 millones de dolares a la
Policia de Colombia, El Espectador, February 8, 2022, https://
www.elespectador.com/mundo/america/estados-unidos-donara-8-millones-de-
dolares-a-la-policia-de-colombia/
\31\ Luis Jaime Acosta, ``Some 1,900 Colombian guerrillas operating
from Venezuela, says Colombia military chief,'' Reuters, September 30,
2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/exclusive-some-1900-
colombian-guerrillas-operating-venezuela-says-colombia-2021-09-30/
\32\ InSight Crime's 2021 Homicide Round-Up, February 1, 2022,
https://insightcrime.org/news/insight-crimes-2021-homicide-round-up/
The Chairman. Thank you both. We will start a series of 5-
minute questions.
Listening to the previous panel and some of your insights,
one of our challenges is that if we do not want countries to
use Huawei, if we do not want China to be investing in their
infrastructure and ports, not only do we want to make it clear
to those countries that we do not want to see that, but we have
to compete with China. We have to offer an alternative to
Huawei. We have to offer an alternative in investments into a
country. Otherwise, we just say no, do not do that, but then
leave you with nothing.
So that is something that I think we have to focus on. That
is why I think the IDB is a great opportunity, and I hope we
can get a capital investment increase to be a leader in helping
us to fashion responses to some of these economic and
development questions where American businesses are actually
engaged. The IDB was used previously by China. IDB was
conducting trade shows for China. I am glad that its new
leadership ended that, and it is focused in a different
direction.
It just comes to me, as I listen to various testimony, that
this is a critical thing that we have to address. Yes, we do
not Huawei. We do not want its security challenges to our
telecommunications infrastructure, but we certainly have to
have an alternative.
Mr. Restrepo, for years numerous American officials have
repeatedly referred to Colombia as a U.S. ally, yet we have
never taken the step of making that formal designation. Would
you agree that we are long overdue in formalizing the United
States strategic alliance with Colombia?
Mr. Restrepo. Absolutely. They are a strategic partner and
ally and have been not just since Plan Colombia. I think there
is a recency bias in our analysis often. As I noted, in World
War II Colombia played a critical role in hunting U-boats in
the Caribbean and allowing the U.S. Navy to prepare for its
Pacific campaign off Colombia's Pacific coast, deployed troops
to Korea during the Korean conflict, was fundamental in
establishing the Inter-American System, was a fundamental
partner in the Alliance for Progress.
This is a longstanding relationship that deeply benefits
and advances U.S. national interests and should be recognized
formally as such.
The Chairman. Let me ask you, throughout Plan Colombia the
United States continuously recalibrated our foreign assistance
to advance our strategic objectives of helping Colombia and the
world's longest-running internal conflict, combat narcotics
trafficking, and strengthen peace, democratic governance, and
human rights. As we look to reinvigorate the U.S.-Colombia
relations how do we--and set our sights, I should say, on
addressing the opportunities and challenges of the future, not
just deal with the ghosts of the past--what lessons can we draw
from Plan Colombia to inform the future of our cooperation with
Colombia and ensure that we are maximizing the impact of
engagement on economic, social, environmental, and security
issues, as well as addressing the emerging threats and
challenges?
Mr. Restrepo. So I think the fundamental lesson from Plan
Colombia, and there are many, is where can the United States be
catalytic? Where does the United States have a comparative
advantage where we can help Colombia in a way distinct from
what is on offer within Colombia or otherwise in the
international community?
At the onset of Plan Colombia that was air mobility and the
ability to project the Colombian state and Colombian lethal
reach to all of Colombia society, and at the same time human
rights and the professionalization of its security forces.
Today, I think that goes to the need to help Colombia
become a much more innovative economy and a much more
technologically advanced economy. Through the IDB, as you
mentioned, the United States should be present in IDB Invest,
the private sector arm, in a way that it is not today. They
should be part of any recapitalization of the IDB. The DFC
should be looking to put risk capital at play, to burgeon the
kind of technological advances that economies like Colombia's
needs to be sustainable and equitable into the 21st century.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Realuyo, what
kind of security assistance should the U.S. be emphasizing to
more effectively help Colombia address the security environment
that they face today?
Ms. Realuyo. Well, as a result of the many years that we
have invested in security assistance on all aspects, also it is
important to understand it has not only been at the national
level, but actually at the more local level, where we are
seeing the heightened violence and the rate of homicides rising
quite dramatically.
We have actually got a lot of what I call the building
blocks in place. The question is how do you make them more
sophisticated and more nimble, in terms of taking a look at
this?
So as you know, I have been following the money trail of
terrorist groups and criminal organizations for the past 20
years, and it is great sign that we are now really starting to
invest in cultivating and harvesting what we call financial
intelligence. These groups that have now abandoned their
political aspirations, like the FARC dissidents and the ELN, of
overthrowing the central government of Colombia, they are all
in it for the money, because the cocaine trade is so lucrative
and the illegal gold mining, which we did not really mention
during the hearing today. They are all about securing the
supply chain, and then more importantly, the transit routes in
order to get these illicit products to market.
So one piece, with our military assistance, is how to help
the Colombians reestablish control in what were ungoverned or
vulnerable spaces, and that is primarily right now where you
are seeing the violence, that border region between Colombia
and Venezuela. Sadly too, the Venezuelans regime of Maduro has
actually given safe haven, ample safe haven and direct
assistance to groups like the ELN, the FARC to enrich
themselves.
So that is an area where we are starting to now incorporate
different types of intelligence at an operational level. So
that is actually taking also signals intelligence, to actually
listen to their communications, with who the money runners are.
Then now it is quite interesting, in my research I am looking
at what is called the digitalization of the illicit economy.
How are they starting to use cyberspace to secure, for example,
precursor chemicals, which we did not really talk about as
well, that are needed in the labs to transform the coca into
refined cocaine, which sadly is becoming even purer and more
impactful, and it is starting to come back into the United
States.
So this is an area where we have seen more comprehensive
approach to security as opposed to these silos that existed in
our government in the United States as well as others. So we
are looking at what we call more that kind of inter-
departmental or interagency, we would call it in the United
States, this training of prosecutors and the financial
intelligence units as well as the military and the police to
actually execute a more comprehensive attack against these
illicit armed groups.
Senator Risch. Thanks for that. It is pretty common
knowledge that Russia has got a growing military and
intelligence activity in both Venezuela and Colombia. How can
the U.S. help Colombia in safeguarding sensitive communications
and mitigate the risks that are presented by Russia?
Ms. Realuyo. In our bilateral academic meetings with our
counterparts in Colombia there is tremendous demand for
training and. more importantly, understanding what we call the
cyber domain. So this is part of SCADA units and then, more
importantly, the whole platform in taking a look at how to not
just secure the installations that we have now in both
countries--and we share a lot of lessons learned--but more
importantly looking at how you train the next generation to be
able to anticipate. This is where we are using concepts such as
strategic foresight to kind of game out how there might be
vulnerabilities in existing systems.
Then the bigger challenge that we have seen throughout
Latin America, and in Colombia, is that interoperability. So,
for example, police units and military units still struggle in
sharing real-time what we call actionable intelligence, and
then, more importantly, how to protect. Also, we raise
awareness about, sadly, the infiltration of corrupt actors
inside the security services, which is a challenge in many
countries around the world.
Senator Risch. Thank you very much. I appreciate that. My
time is up, almost, anyway, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. I have one last question for both
of you. I mentioned Colombia's tax decision which created a
revolt as a result of it, but that tax decision was spurred by
requirements of the IMF to meet certain fiscal obligations, in
the midst of a pandemic. This is not unique to Colombia. There
are several countries in the hemisphere and beyond where these
requirements, stringent requirements of the IMF, without the
flexibility for what I call a smoothing period, but call it
whatever you want.
Not to move away from the obligation but ultimately to have
the time to meet the obligation in a responsible way that does
not create societal disruption is something I would be
interested in your thoughts on.
Mr. Restrepo. Senator, you are entirely correct, and this
is a problem throughout Latin America and actually throughout
many emerging markets at the moment. Countries are frankly out
of fiscal space as a result of attempts to protect the most
vulnerable populations during the pandemic. That is true in
Colombia, where a significant percentage of GDP was reallocated
or directed towards the most vulnerable portions of the
population. Effort was stood up to reach folks in an economy
that is deeply informal. The Colombian economy informality
ranges in the 60 to 65 percent, which is one of the challenges
that the economy faces.
International financial institutions, starting with the
IMF, right now should be providing more fiscal space for
countries, rather than demanding quick corrections, if you
will, as we emerge from the effects of the pandemic.
It is one of the reasons--and we have been a little remiss
in not focusing, I think, the Columbian response on migration.
One of the things that Colombia has done is launch an
unprecedented regularization program. In November of last year,
the World Bank and the IDB, with U.S. support, allocated $800
million in financing to Colombia to support that integration
and regularization program, in direct budget support
conditioned on these programs. That is the sort of thing that
these institutions should be doing throughout the Americas
today to help deal with a massive movement of people, and a
historic movement of people that has been exacerbated by the
pandemic itself.
So yes, the IMF should be engaging in these smoothing
periods, as you named them, and the international financial
institutions should be using their balance sheets to help
countries both deal with the effects of the pandemic and
communities of reception throughout the region for vulnerable
populations that have been dislocated over the course of the
last 7 years.
The Chairman. Ms. Realuyo, any observations?
Ms. Realuyo. If we take a look at the IFF's, they also have
their own requirements and their own constituencies and
stakeholders, and it is unfortunate that President Duque
decided to raise, and more importantly proposed the tax that
would hit the middle class, that actually served as a catalyst
for these mass protests that had never been seen before in the
streets of Colombia.
This also actually underscores the spirit of the hearing
today about the importance of--reinvigorating, as you titled
the hearing, the bilateral, economic, and trade ties with
Colombia and the United States. Because all these countries
that have suffered so much from the pandemic--and as you know,
Colombia contracted its GDP by 6 percent in 2020, and was one
of the hardest hit countries due to the COVID-19 pandemic--they
have to grow their economy, and thankfully, Colombia has not
just the natural resources, but the human and financial
resources that position them very well for a quick recovery,
and that recovery is directly linked to the U.S. economy.
That is where we see these concepts of the strategy of
near-sourcing, realigning global supply chains, to rebuild, if
not reinforce the U.S. ties with our Latin American partners,
not just in Latin America, but the Caribbean, is a way out, and
I think as we look at what is going to grow and then, more
importantly, not just the goods, but the services industry, I
see a very promising future in U.S.-Colombian bilateral
economic relations.
We spoke a lot today about security. You cannot have
prosperity without security, but you also cannot fund
prosperity without actually having security to attract
investments, and looking at alternatives.
You had asked and mentioned earlier at a point about trying
to counter China's aggressive advances, and the real issue, as
well, is to offer goods and services that meet the needs of the
Colombian people and the economy. I think that the U.S. is very
well positioned to do that, and I look forward to seeing the
passage of your bill to really reinforce, and then, more
importantly, codify the relationship between Colombia and
United States.
The Chairman. Well, thank you. I think one of the
challenges for countries like Colombia is when you have such a
large informal economy, when you try to make it formal there is
always a reluctance to have to pay your way to the state at the
end of the day. So that will be challenging for whoever comes
next, but I appreciate your insights.
With that, thank you both for helping us think about this
more deeply. We appreciate your participation here today.
This hearing's record will remain open until the close of
business tomorrow, and with the thanks of the committee this
hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:22 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Mr. Brian Nichols to Questions
Submitted by Senator Jim Risch
Question. In August 2020, the U.S. International Development
Finance Corporation (DFC) announced the launch of the U.S.-Colombia
Growth Initiative with over $1 billion invested in more than 30
projects across Colombia. However, during your testimony, you indicated
only six projects were currently being implemented. Can you please
provide a status updated on the 30 projects in question?
Answer. The U.S. relationship with Colombia remains strong, and the
United States continues to support a wide array of initiatives to boost
economic growth in the country. DFC supports highly developmental
projects in Colombia and constantly considers new private sector
proposals. I referenced six new projects in my previous testimony that
were approved in 2021. More broadly, DFC has 34 portfolio projects in
Colombia that amount to more than $1.2 billion in exposure. DFC has
supported investments that promote rural financial inclusion,
affordable housing, infrastructure, and forestry. DFC has about $55
million in exposure through regional funds that cover Colombia,
including $3.4 million in small, high-impact funds. Approximately 88
percent of this exposure focuses on housing and commercial buildings,
and the remaining 12 percent focuses on industrial and financial
technologies. For quick reference, all of DFC's active projects are
available on DFC's website, which can be filtered by region, financing
type, commitment level, and year: https://www.dfc.gov/our-impact/all-
active-projects.
DFC's current portfolio prioritizes promotion of affordable housing
and increasing lending to vulnerable populations, such as Venezuela
migrant receptor communities, rural areas, and those worst-affected by
COVID-19. Financial inclusion in rural and conflict-affected Colombia
aims to promote a legal economy as an alternative to illicit activities
(coca, illegal mining, armed groups). DFC supports inclusive rural
economic growth by attracting private investment into areas which have
been affected by conflict and where investors have been reluctant to
make financial commitments. DFC enhances economic opportunity by
increasing access to affordable housing in conflict-affected
communities and helping small farmers and landowners improve food
security by strengthening producer associations, cooperatives,
microcredit organizations, and agricultural value chains and business
opportunities. By supporting bankable projects in Venezuela migrant
receptor communities, DFC increases inclusion, strengthens resilience,
and addresses the root causes of further migration.
______
Responses of Mr. Todd Robinson to Questions
Submitted by Senator Jim Risch
Question. Your testimony seemed to have indicated that cocaine
``production is going down but cultivation is increasing'' in Colombia.
As you may know, a July 2021 report by the White House's Office of
National Drug Control Policy indicated a dramatic increase in both,
coca cultivation and cocaine production in Colombia. Specifically, the
ONDCP estimated that coca cultivation had reached a record 245,000
hectares and cocaine production stood at 1,010 metric tons--a roughly
30 percent increase from production levels at the time of the signing
of the Peace Accords in 2016.
Can you clarify the record on your understanding of cocaine
production levels in Colombia, and whether they represent a decrease or
increase from previous years?
Answer. Both coca cultivation and cocaine production potential
increased in 2020 compared to the year prior, according to U.S.
Government estimates.
Question. How has the failure to conduct aerial spraying impacted
this trend?
Answer. Several factors, including the limited number of hectares
available for aerial eradication, suspension of aerial eradication
itself, varying levels of manual eradication, perverse incentives in
the national crop substitution program, and an expansion of the global
cocaine market have all contributed to the growth in coca cultivation
since 2012. The complex problems posed by narcotics trafficking require
a similarly broad set of interventions, and eradication in whatever
legally available form is a core element of our strategy. The choice to
resume aerial eradication remains for Colombia to decide. To date,
various legal rulings in Colombia have prevented the program's launch.
______
Responses of Ms. Marcela Escobari to Questions
Submitted by Senator Jim Risch
Question. What funds from the USAID Latin America bureau, the USAID
mission in Colombia, or USAID's Center for Democracy, Human Rights, and
Governance will be used to assist elections in Colombia in 2022?
Answer. USAID supports government and citizen efforts in Colombia
to promote economic prosperity through the licit economy; improve the
living conditions of victims of violence and vulnerable groups,
including Afro-Colombians and indigenous peoples; promote respect for
human rights and rule of law; and address climate change and
environmental issues in one of the most ecologically diverse countries
in the world. As part of furthering those priorities, USAID programming
supports advancing Colombia's transition from violent conflict to an
inclusive peace. USAID does not have direct programming related to
election observation in Colombia. However, USAID's priority in the
upcoming elections is to support victims of armed conflict to
participate as candidates and voters in the upcoming Congressional
elections, which include elections for 16 seats for victims of the
armed conflict. USAID will use ESF and DA funding to provide support
for those elections, focused on ensuring that victims' organizations
have the knowledge and tools to actively participate in their
democracy.
Question. Will USAID use the CEPPS mechanism and/or the Rapid
Response Mechanism to support an electoral observation team during the
upcoming legislative and presidential elections?
Answer. At this time, USAID does not intend to use CEPPS or related
mechanisms to support an electoral observation team during the upcoming
elections. USAID does not have direct programming related to election
observation in Colombia. Such programming ended in 2019 as USAID
shifted its focus to furthering the Peace Accord implementation under
USAID's Country Development Cooperation Strategy (2020-2025). As we
approach the elections, USAID will continue to be engaged in robust
interagency discussions on the most appropriate support the USG can
provide to Colombia.
______
Responses of Mr. Brian Nichols to Questions
Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. It's come to my attention that the Colombian-American
community in Florida is very concerned with the constant delays
experienced by Colombians applying for visas to visit the United
States. In many cases, these are for family members trying to make it
to a funeral, wedding or other family event. While this may not seem a
big deal at first, furthering people-to-people ties are critical in
supporting the bilateral relationship with Colombia.
Are you aware of the consular services backlog at the Embassy in
Bogota?
Answer. Yes, I am aware there is a backlog of appointments for
consular services at the U.S. Embassy in Bogota, as there is at many of
our Embassies worldwide.
Question. Can you explain why there is a backlog in providing visas
to Colombians and what actions are underway to address the backlog?
Answer. The COVID-19 pandemic has created a backlog of visa
applications around the world. As worldwide restrictions due to the
pandemic begin to ease, and in line with the President's proclamation
regarding the safe resumption of international travel, the Bureau of
Consular Affairs (CA) is focusing on reducing wait times for all
consular services at U.S. Embassy Bogota and all of our embassies and
consulates overseas while also protecting the health and safety of our
staff and applicants. In order to achieve this, the Consular Affairs
Bureau has focused on reducing the number of people that need to
schedule appointments and come into waiting rooms through expanded
interview waiver authorities. Working with interagency colleagues, and
always focused on protecting national security, we are finding ways to
process visa applications more efficiently within statutory mandates.
Question. As you know, Colombia is scheduled to hold congressional
elections on March 13, with presidential elections to follow in May. I
am concerned, and have raised this previously, that Cuba, Russia, China
and Maduro's regime in Venezuela have a great interest in Colombia
electing a new leader sympathetic to them. There's no doubt that these
actors will try to influence the elections to their benefit.
What are the Biden administration's top priorities in ensuring the
integrity and legitimacy of Colombia's electoral process and what has
the Administration done, to date, to help Colombia prepare for these
elections?
Answer. Colombia remains a leading example in the region of a
successful, vibrant democracy, and we have a high level of confidence
in Colombia's democratic institutions. We will continue to support
Colombia's strong democratic institutions and look forward to
Colombia's upcoming free and fair elections. The Colombian Government
has expressed concerns about potential disruptive influence,
misinformation, and disinformation campaigns in the lead-up to their
elections and requested U.S. support to ensure electoral integrity free
from outside influence. The U.S. Government interagency continues to
work with the Government of Colombia to provide targeted assistance to
counter mal-, mis-, and disinformation and bolster Colombia's
cybersecurity capacity to detect and deter cyber threats and
intrusions.
Question. Is the Administration planning to support a large-scale
independent election observation in Colombia?
Answer. Independent election observation demonstrates our long-
standing support of peace and democracy in Colombia. Embassy Bogota
will field observation teams throughout Colombia for the presidential
election, in coordination with teams from the EU, UN, and OAS.
Question. In the first Summit of the Americas, held in Miami in
1994, Cuba's dictator, Fidel Castro--was not invited. This year, the
United States will host the Summit of the Americas, and three Western
Hemisphere nations--Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela--will not meet the
basic conditions of democratic governance. This is a clear indication
that democracy is in decline in the Western Hemisphere. Does the United
States plan on extending invitations to the Diaz-Canel, Ortega, and
Maduro regimes to attend the Summit of the Americas?
Answer. The White House will decide which leaders to invite to Los
Angeles. The White House will consider the commitment to democracy that
countries made at the Third Summit of the Americas in Quebec City in
2001 as one factor to inform its decisions on invitations. We expect
the White House to extend invitations to leaders in the region closer
to the date of the Summit.
The Summit serves as the region's highest-level forum to further
foster effective and accountable democracies in the region that deliver
for their people. Building on the Summit for Democracy, the Ninth
Summit will focus governments, civil society, and the private sector on
taking concrete actions to deliver democracy, bolster transparent and
accountable governance, and promote and protect human rights, rule of
law, diversity, social inclusion, and gender, racial, and ethnic equity
in order to build hope and opportunities for all the people of the
Americas.
Question. Is the Administration inviting Interim President of
Venezuela Juan Guaido?
Answer. The United States continues to recognize the authority of
the 2015 National Assembly as the last democratically elected
institution and of Juan Guaido as the interim president of Venezuela.
As host of the Ninth Summit of the Americas, the United States has
discretion over which heads of state and government to invite to the
Summit. We expect the White House to extend invitations to the region's
leaders closer to the date of the Summit.
Question. What about other countries in the hemisphere that have
experienced a noticeable decline in their respect for democratic
norms--like Argentina, Mexico, or El Salvador?
Answer. The White House will consider the commitment to democracy
that countries made at the Third Summit of the Americas in Quebec City
in 2001 as one factor to inform its decisions on which leaders to
invite to the Summit.
Question. Mr. Nichols, in a recent communication, you wrote to the
Senate that the State Department looks forward to working with Congress
to organize the Summit and that this American-led process reinforces a
commitment to defending democracy, address migration and promote growth
in the region. As the Summit is soon approaching, can you provide this
committee with an update on the process?
Answer. The Ninth Summit of the Americas will focus on ``Building a
Sustainable, Resilient, and Equitable Future'' --a shared vision we
developed in consultation with the region's governments, civil society,
and private sector, and the 13 international organizations that
comprise the Joint Summit Working Group and support the Summit process.
People, institutions, and governments across our hemisphere have shared
with us their priorities and concerns, and these include the COVID-19
pandemic and the fault lines it exposed in health, economic,
educational, and social systems. They include threats to democracy; the
climate crisis; and a lack of equitable access to economic, social, and
political opportunities that places a heavy burden on the most
vulnerable and underrepresented among us.
We recognize this as an opportunity, as Summit chair and host, to
build consensus among the leaders of our hemisphere on concrete actions
that we can take, together, to address challenges that all too often
serve as root causes of irregular migration.
The official Summit agenda will include the leaders' events as well
as three stakeholder forums--the CEO Summit of the Americas, the Civil
Society Forum, and the Young Americas Forum--to facilitate meaningful
dialogue among governments, civil society, the private sector, and
youth representatives and ensure our leaders' commitments at the Summit
respond to the most pressing needs of the people of our hemisphere.
Since the White House announced the dates and location for the
Ninth Summit, preparatory work has accelerated, within the U.S.
Government and with external partners. We have introduced our proposed
multilateral commitments to the Summit governments and stakeholders,
and they responded positively to our ideas on health, climate change,
clean energy, digital transformation, and democratic governance. We
will continue to engage closely with Summit governments and
stakeholders, as well as Members of Congress, to further refine these
ideas in the months ahead, as we develop bold, actionable commitments
for our leaders to endorse at the Ninth Summit.
Question. Can you confirm the countries that will not be
participating at the summit?
Answer. The White House has not yet sent out formal invitations and
will not do so until closer to the Summit date, but we anticipate keen
interest from many leaders and stakeholders to attend the Summit in
person in Los Angeles.
Question. When will I, and the members of this committee, receive a
briefing on the upcoming summit?
Answer. The Department looks forward to briefing you, members of
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and other interested Members
of Congress in the near future at a mutually convenient time.
Question. On February 16, the United States held a high-level
meeting with European and Indo-Pacific allies on Venezuela. While I'm
glad that the Administration is encouraging allies to take a united
stance on the Maduro regime, I'm puzzled by the fact that the
government of Venezuela led by Interim President Juan Guaido was not
included, especially when the participants affirmed their commitment to
a ``Venezuelan-led process.''
If the U.S. supports a Venezuelan-led process, why were there no
representatives from the Interim President of Venezuela at a meeting
about Venezuela?
Answer. The United States continues to recognize the authority of
the democratically elected 2015 National Assembly as the last remaining
democratic institution and Juan Guaido as Venezuela's interim
president.
Consistent with the Verdad Act, we continue to support the
Venezuelan-led negotiations between the Unitary Platform and the Maduro
regime. We believe negotiations, undertaken in good faith, represent
the best path toward restoring democracy and rule of law in Venezuela.
The meeting included significant participation from Venezuelan
representatives. Mr. Gerardo Blyde and Ms. Claudia Nikken, the
coordinators of the Unitary Platform negotiation delegation, presented
on the status of the negotiations and participated in a question and
answer session with attendees.
Question. Can you clarify for the committee, which entity was the
Department referring to when it mentioned a ``Venezuelan-led process''?
Was the Department referring to the Guaido government or the Maduro
regime, which has spent the better part of a decade inflicting
unspeakable suffering on the Venezuelan people?
Answer. A Venezuela-led process includes the democratically elected
representatives of the Venezuelan people, including President Guaido
and the National Assembly, the Unitary Platform, as well as civil
society and other Venezuelans committed to the return of democracy. The
United States engages with Venezuelan pro-democracy partners, such as
the Guaido-led interim government and the Unitary Platform, and
international allies to urge Maduro to return to the negotiation table
and support talks that help place the country on a democratic path out
of the Maduro-created crises.
Question. Did the involvement of Spain in the meeting result in the
readout of not including a single mention of the interim government or
Venezuelan opposition?
Answer. The U.S.-led high level coordination conference, in which
the coordinators of the Unitary Platform's negotiation team
participated, encompassed high level representatives from 20 countries
and the European Union.
This conference marked an important step in United States efforts
to expand and strengthen the group of international partners that share
the objective of helping Venezuelans transition their nation away from
its current regime-created crises towards a stable, prosperous, and
democratic future.
Partners left the conference more united and committed to
supporting the negotiations and presenting a united front to the regime
to drive Maduro back to the table. All also strongly supported the
essential role of the opposition and other democratic actors in
Venezuela's efforts to return to democracy.
Question. The U.S. Government's unwillingness to support a
comprehensive general capital increase for the Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB) in 2010 and for its private sector arm in 2015
opened the doors to China to increase its involvement in the IDB and,
as a result, in the whole region. The Summit of the Americas is a great
opportunity for the U.S. to highlight its support for the region
through a comprehensive approach for the IDB, as Senators of this
committee have championed in a bipartisan fashion.
Are you planning to take advantage of this opportunity to support
an IDB general capital increase this year, or will the United States
continue to lose opportunities to China?
Answer. U.S. support for the IDB remains strong, and the Biden-
Harris administration engages actively with IDB management as it works
to complete an in-depth report of financial conditions, the bank's use
of resources and how that relates to the region's challenges, and the
IDB's role within the hemisphere's larger financing and policy
landscape. Following the release of this report, mandated by IDB
Governors at the IDB Group's March 2021 annual meeting in Barranquilla,
Colombia, the Department of State will review the report in
collaboration with the Department of the Treasury and other U.S.
Government agencies to ensure efficient use of IDB resources to support
the region as it emerges from the multiple crises it faces. Discussions
on the IDB's resources should take into account the views of all
shareholders and we should not preempt such discussions, now in their
early stages. We know that the United States must offer our hemisphere
a positive vision of democratic prosperity that contrasts clearly with
the promise of short-term gains offered by the People's Republic of
China, but only in return for political favors, an approach that often
exacerbates corruption and other underlying problems. We recognize that
the IDB must play a central part in our efforts to do so.
______
Responses of Mr. Todd Robinson to Questions
Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. On November 30, the Biden administration delisted the
FARC from its list of foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) while
adding two FARC dissident groups to the list. The last time you and
Secretary Nichols appeared before this committee, I questioned this
move. Especially because the timing of this decision seemed to revolve
more around announcing this on the anniversary of the peace accords and
not because of developments on the ground in Colombia. In January, we
saw intense violence erupt along Colombia's border with Venezuela tied
to the drug trade that supports these armed groups.
In your view, do you believe this [FARC delisting] was the right
decision taken by the Biden administration?
Answer. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Department
is required to review FTO designations every 5 years, and the Secretary
must revoke an FTO designation if the circumstances that were the basis
for an organization's designation have changed in such a manner as to
warrant revocation. The FARC FTO designation was last reviewed in 2015.
Following the 2016 Peace Accord with the Colombian Government, the FARC
formally dissolved and disarmed, and no longer exists as a unified
organization that engages in terrorism or terrorist activity or has the
capability or intent to do so. Since then, there is no reliable
information indicating that the FARC has conducted attacks or otherwise
engaged in terrorism or terrorist activity since the signing of the
Peace Accord. New terrorist groups have emerged since the 2016 Peace
Accord. The November 30 designations are directed at those who refused
to demobilize and are engaged in terrorist activity.
Question. FARC: On November 30, the Biden administration delisted
the FARC from its list of foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) while
adding two FARC dissident groups to the list. The last time you and
Secretary Nichols appeared before this committee, I questioned this
move. Especially because the timing of this decision seemed to revolve
more around announcing this on the anniversary of the peace accords and
not because of developments on the ground in Colombia. In January, we
saw intense violence erupt along Colombia's border with Venezuela tied
to the drug trade that supports these armed groups.
Did the Administration consider the impact of the FARC de-listing
on Colombia as it prepares for upcoming elections?
Answer. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), requires that
the Department review Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designations
every 5 years and the Secretary must revoke an FTO designation if the
circumstances that formed the basis for an organization's designation
have changed in such a manner as to warrant revocation. Following the
2016 Peace Accord with the Colombian Government, the FARC formally
dissolved and disarmed, and no longer existed as a unified organization
that engaged in terrorism or terrorist activity or had the capability
or intent to do so. Consistent with the INA, in 2020, the U.S.
Government began its periodic 5-year review of the FARC's presence on
the FTO list and determined there was no credible information
indicating that the FARC conducted attacks or otherwise engaged in
terrorism or terrorist activity since the signing of the Peace Accord.
Question. Which U.S.-supported commitments, if any, will be
affected by the de-listing changes, and how?
Answer. The decision to delist the FARC allows USAID and other
elements of the U.S. Embassy in Bogota to work with the Colombian
Government on Peace Accord implementation, now, without risking the
violation of U.S. law, in areas of the country in which demobilized
members of the former FARC are also located. The victims of Colombia's
decades-long conflict remain the focus of our work. This step aligns
U.S. policy with the Colombian Government's policies and programs.
Question. Are members of the FARC (even if they adhere to the peace
process) currently allowed to enter the U.S. or receive funding from
any U.S. agency?
Answer. Even when the FTO designation is revoked, those who had
active ties to the FARC when it was a designated FTO, including those
who provided material support to the group, may continue to be
inadmissible on terrorism-related grounds under the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA).
Question. One of the U.S.' largest programs to assist law
enforcement is in providing assistance to Colombia's law enforcement
agencies so that they have the capacity to investigate and eliminate
drug trafficking rings that cause untold damage to both Colombians and
Americans. During last year's protests in Colombia, many voices here
criticized these agencies' role in removing roadblocks that blocked
Colombians' access to food and medicine. Some critics even accused the
government of supporting human rights abuses. Unlike many of the
repressive autocratic regimes in the hemisphere, the Colombian
Government responded to these criticisms and the Colombian Congress
passed the Police Disciplinary Statute in December and then also passed
the Police Career Statute in January. Both of these laws create new
institutions and rules to ensure the employees of Colombian National
Police respect human rights and are punished for human rights
violations.
In your view, do these two laws represent tangible steps in
modernizing and improving the Colombian police force?
Answer. Both laws are tangible steps in Colombia's police
modernization, reform, and transformation plan. INL has assisted, and
will continue to assist, the Colombian Government in implementing these
new laws and other relevant police reform plans. On February 8, the
Department announced it would provide $8 million to help Colombia:
incorporate human rights principles into police education and
practices; require officers to complete human rights and use-of-force
programs; develop a human rights plan with inputs from civil society;
strengthen the capacity of the new Human Rights Commissioner's Office;
accelerate police Office of the Inspector General investigation
processes; and carry out procedural justice and relational policing
training.
Question. Is it advisable to require a human rights certification
before providing counternarcotics assistance to Colombia?
Answer. The Department is concerned increased conditionality could
delay INL's ability to deliver assistance to address security and human
rights priorities in Colombia, which are key to U.S. national security
interests. An additional human rights certification requirement could
also send the wrong message and undermine the efforts of our Colombian
partners, who are diligently working with the United States to improve
their human rights practices. INL remains committed to robust Leahy
vetting and prioritizing human rights across our programming and
believes flexibility is needed to ensure programs can be adapted to
changing conditions on the ground.
Question. If funding is withheld from Colombia, could this lead to
an increase in the supply of cocaine flowing into Colombian and
American communities?
Answer. Yes, absent a certification, withholding INCLE funding from
Colombia could lead to an increase in the supply of cocaine flowing
into American communities. In 2021, INCLE assistance helped Colombia
eradicate over 255,000 acres of coca and interdict more than 757 metric
tons of cocaine and cocaine base. Withholding funding could contribute
to increased instability and criminality within Colombia by limiting
the Colombian police's ability to eradicate coca and interdict cocaine
bound for the United States.
Question. What steps will the Department take to ensure that
Colombia is adequately supported to crack down on drug trafficking
rings?
Answer. The Department is working closely with the Colombian
Government to dismantle narcotrafficking rings. For example, in 2021,
Colombia made huge strides towards dismantling the Clan del Golfo,
Colombia's largest narcotrafficking group. Working through the INL-
funded programs implemented by the Department of Justice, INL mentors,
trains, and advises the prosecutors managing investigations and
prosecutions to dismantle these trafficking rings.
______
Responses of Mr. Brian Nichols to Questions
Submitted by Senator John Barrasso
china in colombia
As part of its Belt and Road Initiative, China offers countries the
ability to borrow a lot of money for infrastructure projects. The
problem is that these countries are accumulating an indebtedness to
China that they often are unable to pay back. As financially strapped
countries negotiate with China to escape the massive debt, China is
demanding serious concessions, like equity in strategically important
assets. Chinese companies have been playing a major role in Colombian
infrastructure projects. Chinese investments include the Bogota metro,
the Bogota regional railway, Colombian 4G and 5G infrastructure
projects, and a major new gold mine in Antioquia.
Question. What efforts is the United States taking to counter
Chinese influence in Colombia?
Answer. Colombia remains one of our most vital partners in the
region, with the United States as Colombia's largest trade and
investment partner. We stand committed to Colombia's sustainable
recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, including through the U.S.
donation of 6 million vaccines--our second highest donation in the
region. We support Colombia in developing the structures and processes
to ensure foreign investment, including in its development of a 5G
network, does not harm its national security. We work with allies and
partners to offer alternatives to problematic PRC investment in
critical infrastructure and other sensitive sectors.
Question. How effective has China's debt diplomacy been in
achieving its political, economic and strategic goals in Latin America?
Answer. Countries in the region increasingly feel the impact of
problematic PRC influence and coercive actions. As we discuss with
partners, PRC projects often reflect inadequate labor and environmental
standards, which undermine workers' rights under domestic law and fall
short of international labor standards. Countries also have concerns
about the importation of PRC labor and equipment to complete projects;
a general lack of transparency and a disregard for the rule of law;
opaque and often unsustainable loan terms; and impact on corruption.
This knowledge helps local populations discern the sources of
disinformation and PRC attempts to gain access to critical
infrastructure and sensitive sectors. We continue to raise problematic
PRC influence with partners and recommend alternatives to partners such
as investing in people-to-people relationships, including programs in
education, entrepreneurship, English language, and professional
exchanges.
farc
On December 1, 2021, the Biden administration delisted the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) from the State
Department's Foreign Terrorist Organization list. Following a 2016
Peace Accord with the Colombian Government, the FARC formally dissolved
and disarmed. There are still former FARC leaders designated as a
Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT).
Question. What are the current terrorist organizations in Colombia?
Answer. Designated terrorist organizations operating in Colombia
include Segunda Marquetalia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia--People's Army (FARC-EP), and the National Liberation Army
(ELN). Hizballah supporters and members also exist in Colombia.
Question. Was the Colombian Government in favor or against the
delisting of FARC?
Answer. The Department engaged the Government of Colombia when
gathering facts as we conducted the legally mandated 5-year review of
the FARC's designation. During the Counterterrorism Ministerial in
January 2020, Colombia took steps to impose sanctions on those on
Treasury's List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons,
but specifically excluded the FARC from its own list. That same month,
Colombia officially requested the United States designate ``FARC
dissidents'' as FTOs. We pre-notified the Colombian Government in
advance of the public announcement.
Question. What were the reactions and results of the U.S. delisting
the FARC?
Answer. The revocation, consistent with U.S. law, aligned U.S.
Government policy with the Colombian Government's own decision to
delist the expired organization as part of the 2016 Peace Accord. The
Colombian Constitution incorporates elements of that accord. The
revocation also supports the Colombian Government's policies and
programs to sustain the vast demobilization of former FARC combatants
and helps prevent the 11,000 former FARC combatants committed to the
peace process from returning to criminality. The FTO revocation does
not remove the visa inadmissibility grounds to which specific former
FARC leaders were and remain subject under the Immigration and
Nationality Act. We remain committed to robust security partnership
with the Colombian Government as it works to counter the ELN, Segunda
Marquetalia, and FARC-EP, as well as other terrorist groups. These
designation actions allow us to target more precisely and dismantle the
active terrorist groups that represent clear and present dangers to
Colombian and U.S. interests.
Question. With the delisting of the FARC, does the Department of
State plan to change its funding in Colombia with regard to the
demobilized FARC soldiers? If so, how?
Answer. The decision to delist the FARC would allow USAID and other
elements of the U.S. Embassy in Bogota to work with the Colombian
Government on Peace Accord implementation without the risk of violating
U.S. law, in areas of the country in which demobilized members of the
former FARC are also located. The victims of Colombia's decades-long
conflict remain the focus of our work. This step aligns U.S. policy
with the Colombian Government's policies and programs.
Question. How many FARC members demobilized and disarmed as part of
the 2016 peace deal?
Answer. Roughly 13,000 FARC ex-combatants have demobilized and
participated in the reintegration process based on the 2016 Peace
Accord.
Question. How many FARC fighters have refused to demobilize or
rearmed?
Answer. The designations of FARC-EP and Segunda Marquetalia are
directed at those who refused to demobilize or have rearmed and those
who are engaged in terrorism or terrorist activity. Segunda Marquetalia
is estimated to have 750 to 1,500 members, and FARC-EP is estimated to
have 2,700 to 3,000 members.
______
Responses of Mr. Todd Robinson to Questions
Submitted by Senator John Barrasso
law enforcement and crime
Over the years, the United States has provided U.S. assistance to
help improve, professionalize and expand the Colombian security forces.
In February, the U.S. announced $8 million in U.S. assistance going to
the national police force of Colombia. The funds seek to promote within
the institution, ``accountability of those who violate human rights,
investigate abuses, as well as the prosecution of corruption.''
Question. What specific types of U.S. training and police
assistance will be provided under the recent announcement?
Answer. The Department's newly announced programming, funded and
implemented by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs, includes efforts to help Colombia to: incorporate
human rights principles into police education and practices; require
officers to complete human rights and use-of-force programs; develop a
human rights plan with inputs from civil society; strengthen the
capacity of the police's new Human Rights Commissioner's Office; and
carry out procedural justice and relational policing training.
Question. What is the status of last year's announcement by the
Colombian Government to implement a comprehensive transformation of the
police?
Answer. President Duque signed two laws to reform the police. In
January 2022, he approved a law that includes additional sanctions for
police who violate human rights; improves Office of Inspector General
(OIG) investigations; establishes a position to investigate alleged
human rights violations linked to social protests; requires the police
to report annually the status of investigations; increases
transparency; and mandates specialized training for OIG personnel and
disciplinary judges. In December 2021, Duque enacted a law mandating
human rights be a focus in police training and implemented recruitment
and retention mechanisms. Both laws are part of a larger reform effort
announced in 2021, which INL supports programmatically.
Question. Colombia has played a critical role in the global fight
against drug trafficking, money laundering, and organized crime. What
is your assessment of the Colombian police's institutional capacity to
counter narcotrafficking, money laundering and organized crime?
Answer. With INL's assistance, the Colombian police have increased
their capacity to counter narcotrafficking, money laundering, and
organized crime; however, much work remains. Our new bilateral strategy
will further strengthen Colombia's s capacity through holistic and
better sequenced assistance. In addition, Colombia exports its
expertise on anti-money laundering to other countries in the region
through the U.S.-Colombia Action Plan on Regional Security Cooperation,
which trains police forces on a range of issues including anti-money
laundering.
Question. Colombia has played a critical role in the global fight
against drug trafficking, money laundering, and organized crime. What
are the biggest challenges to disrupting the production and trafficking
of cocaine in Colombia?
Answer. Two major challenges to disrupting the production and
trafficking of cocaine in Colombia are insecurity and impunity in
neighboring Venezuela and a lack of consistent governmental presence in
rural areas of Colombia. The Department is working to address both
through its diplomatic and foreign assistance tools.
______
Responses of Mr. Brian Nichols to Questions
Submitted by Senator Ted Cruz
colombia / farc general
Question. On Nov. 30, the Department of State announced that it was
revoking the designations of the Revolutionary Forces of Colombia
(FARC) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA), and as a Specially Designated Global
Terrorist (SDGT) pursuant to Executive order (EO) 13224. Among the
reasons publicly cited for these moves, Administration officials
suggested that the delistings would facilitate providing certain types
of U.S. assistance to FARC for reintegration into Colombian society.
Have you distributed any such aid and if so, what checks were in
place to ensure the funding was not used for terrorism? Did you consult
with Congress before doing so?
Answer. We have distributed no such aid. The revocation of the FARC
designation supports the Colombian Government's policies and programs
to sustain the vast demobilization of former FARC combatants.
Question. Do you believe that the decision to delist the FARC has
stabilized the climate in Colombia? And if so, please describe in what
ways that you believe it has.
Answer. The delisting lays the groundwork for the Colombian
Government to promote greater stability, particularly in rural areas.
The revocation aligns with the Colombian Government's own decision to
delist the expired organization as part of the 2016 Peace Accord.
Colombia's Constitution now incorporates elements of that accord. The
revocation also supports the Colombian Government's policies and
programs to sustain the vast demobilization of former FARC combatants
and prevent the 11,000 former FARC combatants committed to the peace
process from returning to criminality.
Question. Alongside removing the FTO and SDGT designations on the
FARC, the Administration also announced that it was delisting hundreds
of entities originally sanctioned for links to the FARC. Among those
entities were five individuals who on January 11 were summoned by
Colombia's Special Jurisdiction for Peace (SJP) for their roles in the
forced recruitment of children for the conflict and for child
trafficking.
Did the State Department consult with the Colombians about these
individuals before removing sanctions on them?
Answer. No individuals were delisted from CT authorities as a
result of the State Department's revocation of the FARC's FTO and SDGT
designations. We defer to Treasury regarding any individuals that were
delisted as a result of changes to the FARC's designation under
Treasury authorities.
Question. Was the State Dept. aware of the work and impending
decision of the SJP when the decision to lift terrorism sanctions was
made?
Answer. Revocation of the FARC's FTO designation does not impact
prior law enforcement actions related to the FARC's past terrorist
activities, or FARC's treatment as a terrorist organization for
immigration purposes during the period in which it was engaged in
terrorist activity, or if it resumed engaging in terrorist activity.
The lifting of terrorism sanctions against members of the FARC does not
impact the ongoing work of the SJP or efforts to hold members of the
FARC accountable for atrocities and abuses under the law.
Question. The current climate faced by politicians and journalists
in Mexico is the deadliest ever. In 2020 more journalists were killed
in Mexico than in any other country in the world. It alone accounted
for almost a third of journalists killed around the world. Since the
start of the electoral process in September 2020, over 80 politicians
(including at least 48 candidates for office) were assassinated by
criminal organizations and more than 60 candidates suspended their
campaigns under duress. Things are if anything getting worse. In
January, three journalists were shot dead within 10 days.
Mexican President Lopez Obrador has recently taken several steps
aimed at intimidating journalists. In February, he publicly revealed
the financial information of one of Mexico's highest profile
journalists, Carlos Loret de Mola, in an attempt to intimidate him.
These actions come amid an increasingly deadly climate for politicians
and journalists in Mexico, including the murder of three journalists in
January.
What steps are we taking to convey to the Mexican Government that
their behavior is undermining the rule of law, and that in turn is
endangering American security and the U.S.-Mexican relationship?
Answer. The Department of State prioritizes cooperation with Mexico
to increase transparency and accountability for the murder of
journalists and politicians and will continue to urge at the highest
levels increased action to respect human rights and ensure necessary
protections for public figures. Under the newly established U.S.-Mexico
Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and Safe
Communities, Mexico and the United States pledged to broadly work
together to protect our people, prevent transborder crime, and pursue
criminal networks. The Mexican Government places a priority on the
investigation of violence against journalists, civil society members
and politicians, which we seek to support.
______
Responses of Mr. Todd Robinson to Questions
Submitted by Senator Ted Cruz
Question. In 2019, FBI Deputy Assistant Director Thompson testified
in front of the Western Hemisphere subcommittee of this Committee that
``The last decade has seen a boom in illicit mining operations in the
Western Hemisphere'' and that large amounts of illegally mined gold are
used by criminal organization and--quote--``especially those involved
in drug-trafficking'' to move vast sums of money.
What steps is INL taking to deter the illicit mining of gold and
ensure U.S. assistance is being used in an effective manner to counter
these operations?
Answer. INL funds the Organization of American States to strengthen
systems to combat illegal mining financial structures in South America.
Through training financial intelligence units, customs and immigration
authorities, and agencies responsible for seizing and confiscating
assets, we have enhanced regional understanding of money laundering
methodologies using illicit gold and worked with these countries to
increase their oversight of these illicit operation.
In Colombia, INL provides equipment and logistical support to anti-
illegal mining units within the army and police. INL, through the U.S.
Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, also mentors and trains
prosecutors and investigators on illegal mining financing.
______
Responses of Ms. Marcela Escobari to Questions
Submitted by Senator Ted Cruz
Question. USAID has a range of equities, responsibilities, and
projects aimed at promoting health development in Latin American and
Caribbean (LAC), including: (1) near-term pandemic response and
recovery, (2) long-term regional health security and health systems
resilience, and (3) addressing the secondary economic impacts of health
crises. Meanwhile the issue of vaccines and so-called `vaccine
diplomacy' has become an increasingly acute one in the context of
development assistance. USAID will require flexibility for post-
pandemic health systems strengthening.
Congress has an essential role to play as a partner in crafting
strategies, and in authorizing and appropriating funding. Please
describe:
Additional authorities or resources USAID requires to meet
demands for COVID-19 testing, surveillance, diagnostics, and
treatments in LAC countries.
A description of current and future efforts to address
remaining gaps in providing adequate COVID-19 vaccine supply
for all eligible populations in LAC countries.
Additional challenges that USAID faces in promoting `vaccine
diplomacy' in LAC countries.
Answer. Throughout the pandemic, USAID has been able to quickly
allocate and program funding to continue to strengthen and promote
resilience in LAC health systems to respond to new COVID-19 variants
and expand access to health services. USAID has rapidly obligated
COVID-19 supplemental resources generously provided by Congress to the
agency to support health and humanitarian responses related to the
pandemic to 29 countries in LAC. USAID expects to fully obligate
virtually all the funds Congress provided through supplemental and
emergency appropriations, including the American Rescue Plan Act, over
the next several months. Going forward USAID must also consider the
continued need for resources to strengthen health systems (including a
reliable, adequate oxygen supply) to address new COVID-19 variant
surges; and to incorporate training and commodities needed to implement
``test and treat'' strategies that can reduce hospitalization and death
in people with COVID-19 and risk factors for severe disease.
To date, the United States has provided approximately 60 million
COVID-19 doses to the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region with
more on the way. This is more doses donated than any other country in
the world. In addition to the President's commitment to turn the United
States into the world's arsenal for vaccines, USAID is committed to the
whole-of-government effort through the Initiative for Global Vaccine
Access (Global VAX) to accelerate global efforts to get COVID-19 shots
into arms and rapidly overcome access barriers to save lives now. Under
the auspices of Global VAX, USAID has supported efforts in LAC
countries to prepare countries to receive, distribute, and administer
COVID-19 vaccines. USAID is helping countries implement national
vaccination plans, including by supporting health ministries with
distribution plans, training vaccinators, establishing vaccination
sites, cold chain management, communication strategies, and data
strengthening.
For example, the United States has donated 6 million vaccines to
Colombia, with USAID supporting the Ministry of Health (MOH) and
subnational authorities to improve planning, monitoring, demand
generation, and supply chain capacity, including providing cold chain
equipment, to effectively distribute COVID-19 vaccines and the overall
rollout of the National Vaccination Plan. USAID supports the
implementation of Colombia's National Vaccination Plan in 19
Departments (Districts), also with a focus on low income, marginalized,
and uninsured populations.
We have donated more COVID-19 vaccines than any other country, and
each vaccine is free with no strings attached. USAID, beginning with
Administrator Power and extending to USAID field missions at Embassies
throughout the region, has aggressively messaged these donations and
complementary technical assistance to ensure that citizens in partner
nations are aware of generous United States support. USAID closely
coordinates this messaging with the State Department and is committed
to continuing these forceful communications campaigns to ensure robust
vaccine diplomacy.
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