[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
PREVENTING PANDEMICS THROUGH
U.S. WILDLIFE-BORNE DISEASE
SURVEILLANCE
=======================================================================
OVERSIGHT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
Thursday, April 28, 2022
__________
Serial No. 117-20
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Natural Resources
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
or
Committee address: http://naturalresources.house.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
47-453 PDF WASHINGTON : 2022
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COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES
RAUL M. GRIJALVA, AZ, Chair
JESUS G. ``CHUY'' GARCIA, IL, Vice Chair
GREGORIO KILILI CAMACHO SABLAN, CNMI, Vice Chair, Insular Affairs
BRUCE WESTERMAN, AR, Ranking Member
Grace F. Napolitano, CA Louie Gohmert, TX
Jim Costa, CA Doug Lamborn, CO
Gregorio Kilili Camacho Sablan, Robert J. Wittman, VA
CNMI Tom McClintock, CA
Jared Huffman, CA Garret Graves, LA
Alan S. Lowenthal, CA Jody B. Hice, GA
Ruben Gallego, AZ Aumua Amata Coleman Radewagen, AS
Joe Neguse, CO Daniel Webster, FL
Mike Levin, CA Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon, PR
Katie Porter, CA Russ Fulcher, ID
Teresa Leger Fernandez, NM Pete Stauber, MN
Melanie A. Stansbury, NM Thomas P. Tiffany, WI
Nydia M. Velazquez, NY Jerry L. Carl, AL
Diana DeGette, CO Matthew M. Rosendale, Sr., MT
Julia Brownley, CA Blake D. Moore, UT
Debbie Dingell, MI Yvette Herrell, NM
A. Donald McEachin, VA Lauren Boebert, CO
Darren Soto, FL Jay Obernolte, CA
Michael F. Q. San Nicolas, GU Cliff Bentz, OR
Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia, IL Vacancy
Ed Case, HI Vacancy
Betty McCollum, MN
Steve Cohen, TN
Paul Tonko, NY
Rashida Tlaib, MI
Lori Trahan, MA
David Watkins, Staff Director
Luis Urbina, Chief Counsel
Vivian Moeglein, Republican Staff Director
http://naturalresources.house.gov
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
KATIE PORTER, CA, Chair
BLAKE D. MOORE, UT, Ranking Member
Nydia M. Velazquez, NY Louie Gohmert, TX
Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia, IL Jody B. Hice, GA
Steve Cohen, TN Vacancy
Jared Huffman, CA Bruce Westerman, AR, ex officio
Raul M. Grijalva, AZ, ex officio
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CONTENTS
----------
Page
Hearing held on Thursday, April 28, 2022......................... 1
Statement of Members:
Moore, Hon. Blake D., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Utah.............................................. 4
Porter, Hon. Katie, a Representative in Congress from the
State of California........................................ 2
Prepared statement of.................................... 3
Statement of Witnesses:
Panel 1
Kinsinger, Anne, Associate Director for Ecosystems, U.S.
Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia........................ 6
Prepared statement of.................................... 7
Questions submitted for the record....................... 10
Panel 2
Carlson, Colin, Assistant Research Professor, Center for
Global Health Science and Security, Georgetown University
Medical Center, Washington, DC............................. 23
Prepared statement of.................................... 24
Questions submitted for the record....................... 28
Semcer, Catherine, Research Fellow, Property and Environment
Research Center, Chevy Chase, Maryland..................... 37
Prepared statement of.................................... 39
Stallknecht, David, Director, Southeastern Cooperative
Wildlife Disease Study, Professor in Wildlife Health,
College of Veterinary Medicine, University of Georgia,
Athens, Georgia............................................ 31
Prepared statement of.................................... 32
Questions submitted for the record....................... 35
Thorstenson, Julie, Executive Director, Native American Fish
and Wildlife Society, Northglenn, Colorado................. 42
Prepared statement of.................................... 44
Questions submitted for the record....................... 45
Additional Materials Submitted for the Record:
Association of Fish & Wildlife Agencies, Statement for the
Record..................................................... 57
Preventing Pandemics at the Source and the U.S. Wildlife and
Health Alliance, Joint Statement for the Record, dated May
11, 2022................................................... 59
List of documents submitted for the record retained in the
Committee's official files................................. 59
OVERSIGHT HEARING ON PREVENTING PANDEMICS THROUGH U.S. WILDLIFE-BORNE
DISEASE SURVEILLANCE
----------
Thursday, April 28, 2022
U.S. House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Committee on Natural Resources
Washington, DC
----------
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in
room 1334, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Katie Porter
[Chair of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Porter, Cohen, Huffman; Moore, and
Hice.
Also present: Representatives Soto, Dingell, Axne, and
Quigley.
Ms. Porter. The Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations will come to order. The Subcommittee is meeting
today to hear testimony on preventing pandemics through U.S.
wildlife-borne disease surveillance.
Under Committee Rule 4(f), any oral opening statements at
hearings are limited to the Chair and the Ranking Minority
Member, or their designees. This will allow us to hear from our
witnesses sooner and help Members keep to their schedules.
Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that all other Members'
opening statements be made part of the hearing record if they
are submitted to the Clerk by 5 p.m. today, or the close of the
hearing, whichever comes first.
Hearing no objection, so ordered.
I ask unanimous consent that the following Members be
permitted to ask questions of the witnesses at today's hearing:
the Member from Florida, Representative Soto; the Member from
Iowa, Representative Axne; the Member from Illinois,
Representative Quigley; and the Member from Michigan,
Representative Dingell.
Without objection, the Chair may also declare a recess,
subject to the call of the Chair.
As described in the notice, statements, documents, or
motions must be submitted to the electronic repository at
[email protected]. Members physically present should
provide a hard copy for staff to distribute by e-mail.
Please note that Members are responsible for their own
microphones. As with our fully in-person meetings, Members can
be muted by staff only to avoid inadvertent background noise.
Finally, Members or witnesses experiencing technical
problems should inform Committee staff immediately.
We will begin with my opening statement, and then I will
turn to Ranking Member Moore.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. KATIE PORTER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Ms. Porter. We are here today to discuss a topic with
consequences we all know too well: the threat of wildlife-borne
diseases becoming pandemics. Scientists believe that COVID-19
likely originated from a virus that jumped from wildlife to
humans. We have, unfortunately, all learned that late detection
can cost lives.
The virus that causes COVID-19 occurs in 29 species that we
know of, likely more. And it is not just COVID-19. Sixty
percent of emerging infectious diseases in humans come from
animals. Although most of those diseases come from animals in
the wild, Congress provides far less funding for the Department
of the Interior to monitor diseases in wildlife than it does
for the Department of Agriculture to monitor diseases in
domesticated animals. That is a use of taxpayer dollars that we
need to correct.
Recent scientific discoveries have made clear that wildlife
continue to play a role in the pandemic. A study last month
found that new variants of the coronavirus were created in
Canada after being circulated in wild deer. The same study
showed that deer have likely spread COVID-19 to humans. With an
estimated 30 million deer in the United States, that means
there is no shortage of opportunities for the virus to mutate
and then be passed back to people.
Researchers conducting a study of deer in Iowa found that
they were infected with the coronavirus at a rate as high as 80
percent. The study was only possible because the state of Iowa
had been tracking deer for a different wildlife-borne disease:
chronic wasting disease. The researchers use the state's
archived samples and had to break through many barriers to test
them. While this example shows how a little surveillance can go
a long way, it also shows that we need to be more intentional
about monitoring the health threats in our own backyards.
These outbreaks of wildlife-borne diseases shouldn't come
as a surprise. Experts have been warning about them for years.
Those same experts are now telling us that two of the biggest
drivers of risk from wildlife-borne diseases are climate change
and the frequency of interactions between wildlife and people.
Both of those drivers are accelerating, which means we should
expect more risk in the future, not less.
Even wildlife-borne diseases we know well, such as the
bubonic plague, need to be tracked so we can prevent them from
causing catastrophic harm. Scientists, including Dr. Carlson,
who is testifying here today, have found that the risk of
bubonic plague is increasing and spreading to new areas in the
West due to climate change. Experts warn that if we don't
monitor the risk of bubonic plague closely, response times will
be slower and outbreaks will be deadlier.
The good news is that when we commit to systematic
surveillance and rapid response, we can contain outbreaks of
wildlife-borne diseases. Through regular monitoring of
migratory birds, the source of highly pathogenic avian flu in
the United States, we have managed the risk of bird flu. If
that spread had been unchecked, it would have posed a
significant risk to human health, been economically devastating
to commercial poultry operations, and resulted in the deaths of
an unimaginable number of animals.
I am proud that this Committee provided $45 million in the
American Rescue Plan for states and tribes to improve
surveillance of wildlife-borne diseases and rapid response
efforts. This funding has already helped states prepare better
for potential public health crises.
But this one-time funding doesn't address the fragmented
nature of surveillance in the United States right now, and much
more is necessary to meet the need. Wildlife-borne diseases do
not know state boundaries, so we need Federal coordination and
funding to address this problem. If we want to control
outbreaks of wildlife-borne disease, we have to be able to see
them.
Tracking wildlife-borne disease helps us identify the
source of an outbreak and predict where the next viral
spillover into people will be. It could also help us stop the
creation of new variants of a disease and prevent a pathogen
from establishing itself in a species, as the coronavirus has
in deer.
There is already a well-funded, highly organized effort to
track wildlife-borne diseases overseas, but we have no such
effort here at home. I plan to change that with the help of
experts like the ones testifying today.
Thank you for appearing before this Committee, and I look
forward to your testimony.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Porter follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Hon. Katie Porter, a Representative in
Congress from the State of California
We are here today to discuss a topic with consequences we all know
too well: the threat of wildlife-borne diseases becoming pandemics.
Scientists believe that COVID-19 likely originated from a virus that
jumped from wildlife to humans. We've unfortunately all learned that
late detection can cost lives.
The virus that causes COVID-19 occurs in 29 species that we know
of--likely more. And it's not just COVID-19. Sixty percent of emerging
infectious diseases in humans come from animals. Although most of those
diseases come from animals in the wild, Congress provides far less
funding for the Department of the Interior to monitor diseases in
wildlife than it does for the Department of Agriculture to monitor
diseases in domesticated animals. This is a poor use of taxpayer
dollars that we need to correct.
Recent scientific discoveries have made clear that wildlife
continue to play a role in the pandemic. A study last month found that
new variants of the coronavirus were created in Canada after being
circulated among wild deer. The same study showed that deer have likely
spread COVID-19 to humans. With an estimated 30 million deer in the
United States, that means there is no shortage of opportunities for the
virus to mutate, and then be passed back to people.
Researchers conducting a study of deer in Iowa found that they were
infected with the coronavirus at a rate as high as 80 percent. The
study was only possible because the state of Iowa had been tracking
deer for a different wildlife-borne disease--Chronic Wasting Disease.
The researchers used the state's archived samples, and had to break
through many barriers to test them. While this example shows how a
little surveillance can go a long way, it also shows that we need to be
more intentional about monitoring the health threats in our own
backyards.
These outbreaks of wildlife-borne diseases shouldn't come as a
surprise. Experts have been warning about them for years. Those same
experts are now telling us that two of the biggest drivers of risk to
people from wildlife-borne diseases are climate change, and the
frequency of interactions between wildlife and people. Both of those
drivers are accelerating, which means we should expect more risk in the
future, not less.
Even wildlife-borne diseases we know well, such as the bubonic
plague, need to be tracked so that we can prevent them from causing
catastrophic harm. Scientists, including Dr. Carlson, who is testifying
here today, have found that the risk of bubonic plague is increasing
and spreading to new areas throughout the West due to climate change.
Experts warn that if we don't monitor the spread of bubonic plague
closely, response times will be slower and outbreaks will be deadlier.
The good news is that when we commit to systematic surveillance and
rapid response, we can contain outbreaks of wildlife-borne diseases.
Through regular monitoring of migratory birds, the source of Highly
Pathogenic Avian Flu in the United States, we have managed the risks of
bird flu. If the spread had been unchecked, it would have posed a
significant risk to human health, been economically devastating to
commercial poultry operations, and resulted in the deaths of an
unimaginable number of animals.
I am proud that this Committee provided $45 million in the American
Rescue Plan for states and tribes to improve surveillance of wildlife-
borne diseases and rapid response efforts. This funding has already
helped states better prepare for potential public health crises. But
this one-time funding doesn't address the fragmented nature of
surveillance in the United States right now, and much more is necessary
to meet the need. Wildlife-borne diseases do not know state boundaries,
so we need Federal coordination and funding to address this problem.
If we want to control outbreaks of wildlife-borne disease, we have
to be able to see them. Tracking wildlife borne diseases helps us
identify the source of an outbreak and predict where the next viral
spillover into people will be. It could also help us stop the creation
of new variants of a disease and prevent a pathogen from establishing
itself in a species, as the coronavirus has in deer.
There is already a well-funded, highly organized effort to track
wildlife-borne diseases overseas. But we have no such effort here at
home. I plan to change that, with the help of experts like the ones
testifying today. Thank you for appearing before this Committee, I look
forward to your testimony.
______
Ms. Porter. I now recognize Ranking Member Moore for his
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. BLAKE D. MOORE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF UTAH
Mr. Moore. Thank you, Chair Porter. We are facing several
crises in America today.
Whether it is a health crisis, a border crisis, or an
energy crisis, the work of this Subcommittee should prioritize
the most pressing issues at hand. As Americans face
skyrocketing inflation and rising gas prices, we seem to spend
time on hearings about almost anything other than addressing
President Biden's ongoing energy crisis, most relevant to this
Committee's jurisdiction.
The Biden administration continues to push policies that
stifle domestic energy production and leaves us dependent on
adversarial nations for energy. From canceling the Keystone
pipeline, to refusing to hold statutorily mandated lease sales
for over a year, the Biden administration hamstrings American
energy production at every possible turn.
The Interior Department should be answering for the delays
they have caused in the permitting and leasing process for
energy production on Federal lands, which is why I introduced
the Protecting Energy Independence and Transparency Act.
Despite an even greater need for American energy, thousands of
permits to drill and rights-of-ways are languishing before the
Interior Department waiting for approval, and we would like to
know why. The Administration must be held accountable for its
counterproductive announcement on onshore lease sales earlier
this month.
The Administration is raising royalty rates and only
offering a small fraction of the acreage nominated for leasing.
In my home state of Utah, the BLM is offering one parcel for
sale--one. Requiring higher royalty rates on these parcels will
only drive up the cost of production at a time when Americans
are paying record prices for gas.
With rising energy costs and global insecurity threatening
supply, now is the time to unleash American production. Yet,
the Majority elected to present a narrow topic for today's
hearing: the prevention of pandemics through disease
surveillance in the United States. The Majority's first and
only government witness is from the U.S. Geological Survey, the
USGS, to testify.
As American families are forced to make their dollars
stretch at home, I look forward to seeing if the USGS is
appropriately stewarding taxpayer dollars and avoiding
duplicative work, just as one of the many Federal agencies that
conduct wildlife surveillance.
While we can all agree preventing the next pandemic is
important, we cannot simply limit our discussion to wildlife
surveillance in this country. We know pandemics have global
implications. Therefore, common sense dictates that combating
the next pandemic will require international strategies to
address these disease outbreaks and coordination among
countries' surveillance efforts. Today, Ms. Catherine Semcer
will share her vast expertise, highlighting the importance of
responsible management of ecosystems on the international
stage.
I look forward to discussing how conservation efforts
eliminating illegal wildlife trafficking and accountability for
bad actors all play a role in reducing the risk of the next
pandemic. Ms. Semcer's research on wildlife trafficking,
environmental security, and the geopolitical implications of
conservation will highlight the international ties woven into
the pandemic prevention efforts.
Responsible environmental management plays a crucial role
in reducing the risk of disease spillover between species. When
ecosystems are destroyed, species lose their habitats and are
then crowded together. The close proximity of animals increases
the chances of disease transformation between different
species. For example, China's Belt and Road Initiative and the
resulting practices of Chinese logging companies in Africa
highlight this risk.
As companies' activities result in deforestation with the
Congo Basin, ecosystems are destroyed and animals lose their
home. The continuation of irresponsible logging practices will
lead to greater habitat destruction. Ultimately, effective
pandemic prevention is tied to responsible management and
development of our natural resources.
Equally as important to pandemic prevention is combating
illegal wildlife trafficking. This illicit practice heightens
the risk of disease spread between species. Traffickers evade
health inspections and crowd animals together as they transport
them, increasing disease spillover.
China is recognized as a leading consumer of wildlife
products, including illegally trafficked products. Rather than
relying on the Chinese Government to change their laws, we
should assess steps the United States and other international
allies can take to curtail illegal wildlife trafficking. These
efforts to curb illegal wildlife trafficking, however, should
not focus on blanket wildlife trade bans, but instead on
targeted enforcement that is coordinated with local
governments.
If we are serious about preventing the next pandemic, bad
actors must be held accountable. Until we successfully counter
China's and other bad actors' dangerous practices, we will
continue to face increased risks of wildlife-borne pandemics.
With that I yield back. Thank you.
Ms. Porter. Thank you very much, Ranking Member Moore. Now
I would like to turn to our first panel and introduce our
Government witness.
Ms. Anne Kinsinger is the Associate Director for Ecosystems
at the U.S. Geological Survey.
Let me remind the witnesses that under Committee Rules,
they must limit their oral statements to 5 minutes, but their
entire statement will appear in the hearing record.
When you begin, the timer will begin, and it will turn
orange when you have 1 minute remaining. I recommend that
Members and witnesses joining virtually pin the timer so that
it remains visible.
After your testimony is complete, please remember to mute
yourself to avoid any inadvertent background noise.
The Chair is now happy to recognize Ms. Kinsinger to
testify.
STATEMENT OF ANNE KINSINGER, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR ECOSYSTEMS,
U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, RESTON, VIRGINIA
Ms. Kinsinger. Good morning. Chair Porter, Ranking Member
Moore, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear today to testify on wildlife diseases,
especially zoonoses, which are pathogens that spread between
humans and animals.
As Chair Porter has already noted, this is a critically
important issue, and a review of emerging human infectious
diseases going back to the 1949s found, as she said, that
approximately 60 percent of human diseases were zoonotic in
nature and, of those, more than 70 percent of them originated
in wildlife.
USGS conducts disease surveillance and research, supporting
the Federal response to zoonotic diseases that circulate in
wildlife and in the environment. Our efforts to support a One
Health approach that calls for close collaboration between the
human health, domesticated animal, and wildlife sectors. In
particular, it supports improved biosurveillance of wildlife
diseases.
As with many complex challenges, a whole-of-government
approach is needed, and USGS scientists are working closely
with other Federal and State agencies, including the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service, National Park Service, USDA, the Centers
for Disease Control, and the Association of Fish and Wildlife
Agencies.
For example, we and our partners are developing a network
that encompasses all aspects of wildlife disease surveillance,
including incident reporting, prediction of threats, assessment
of impacts, and selection of management options. This will
strengthen the capabilities of all network partners: Federal
agencies, States, Tribes, academia, and our international
partners to predict, assess, and respond to disease threats
quickly and effectively.
Enhanced capabilities and additional science could better
ensure that our stakeholders, such as resource managers,
emergency responders, and the public health community receive
early warning and actionable science to inform disease response
efforts. We are already moving forward on this endeavor by
working with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to begin
development of a National Wildlife Disease Database to provide
early warning of wildlife diseases. This was funded under the
American Rescue Plan.
In addition, DOI funding provided by the CARES Act was used
by USGS to initiate biosurveillance of coronaviruses in
wildlife, in the environment, and municipal wastewater. This
includes integrating SARS-CoV-2 surveillance into wildlife
cause-of-death investigations and active field surveillance,
such as sampling around mink farms to support a USDA response.
The USGS also incorporated SARS-CoV-2 sample collection
into existing bat surveillance studies to ensure rapid
detection should infections occur.
Funds were also used to partner with the CDC National
Wastewater Surveillance System to provide local public health
agencies with tests for community-level infections during a
COVID-19 surge.
The USGS can be nimble and responsive to these requests due
to the capacity that has been built over decades to support the
Federal response to zoonotic diseases and to inform mitigation
strategies which help protect both wildlife and the public
health. The USGS maintains several important labs across the
country, including the National Wildlife Health Center in
Madison, Wisconsin, which is the only Federal biosafety-level
three lab dedicated to wildlife health.
We also support two aquatic labs that study disease: our
Western Fisheries Research Center in Seattle, Washington; and
our Eastern Ecological Science Center in Kearneysville, West
Virginia.
Our labs, along with USGS wildlife disease experts located
across the United States, are supporting our partners with
research, technology, and tools to tackle current and ongoing
zoonotic diseases found on land and in water environments.
These include coronaviruses, avian influenza, chronic wasting
disease, rabies, sylvatic plague, brucellosis, rabbit
hemorrhagic disease, salmonellosis, Lyme disease, avian
malaria, and many others.
In conclusion, the USGS, along with our partners, is
leading research on wildlife disease and spearheading
monitoring efforts that address diverse stakeholder needs. As
the One Health approach implies, understanding wildlife disease
is a crucial step in protecting the public from known and
emergent diseases. That idea of studying the natural world to
benefit all people is very much within the USGS tradition.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify today, and I am
happy to answer any questions that you may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Kinsinger follows:]
Prepared Statement of Anne Kinsinger, Associate Director for
Ecosystems, U.S. Geological Survey, Department of the Interior
Chairman Porter, Ranking Member Moore, and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today to testify
on wildlife diseases, including zoonoses, which are pathogens that
spread between humans and animals. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)
conducts wildlife disease surveillance and research, supporting the
Federal response to zoonotic diseases that circulate in wildlife and
the environment. As the science agency of the Department of the
Interior (DOI), USGS research supports other bureaus, including the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) and National Park Service (NPS),
to protect the health of wildlife and the health of both employees and
visitors to our public lands. Furthermore, the USGS fills a unique role
in supporting national zoonotic disease efforts led by the Department
of Agriculture (USDA) and the Department of Health and Human Services.
A review of emerging human infectious diseases going back to the
1940s found that approximately sixty percent were zoonotic, and more
than seventy percent of those originated in wildlife.\1\ Because of
this, USGS wildlife disease surveillance and research support a One
Health approach to national zoonotic disease response. The Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) defines One Health as ``a
collaborative, multisectoral, and transdisciplinary approach--working
at the local, regional, national, and global levels--with the goal of
achieving optimal health outcomes recognizing the interconnection
between people, animals, plants, and their shared environment.'' \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Jones K., Patel, N., Levy, M. et al. Global trends in emerging
infectious diseases. Nature 451, 990-993 (2008). https://doi.org/
10.1038/nature06536.
\2\ One Health Zoonotic Disease Prioritization Workshop Report.
December 2017. www.cdc.gov/onehealth/pdfs/us-ohzdp-report-508.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One Health recommends that the Nation improve biosurveillance of
wildlife diseases, including zoonoses. The USGS is working with
partners to develop a network that encompasses all aspects of wildlife
disease biosurveillance including prediction of threats, assessment of
their impacts, and selection of management options to apply scientific
findings more quickly. This effort is being undertaken in collaboration
with the USFWS, the Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies, and
other partners who have also identified expanded biosurveillance needs
as a priority. As with many complex challenges, a whole-of-government
approach is ideal. Most of the examples we will discuss today
illustrate that enhanced capabilities and additional science could
better ensure stakeholders receive early warning and sound data to
inform disease response efforts. The national wildlife disease
biosurveillance network envisioned by USGS would be adaptively refined
as scientific gaps are identified. This will strengthen the
capabilities of all network partners, Federal agencies, States, Tribes,
academia, and our international partners, to predict, assess, and
respond to disease threats quickly and effectively.
The USGS has taken the first steps toward developing this network.
Through an interagency agreement with USFWS, the USGS has begun
development of a national wildlife disease database as called for under
the American Rescue Plan Act. The database will include two components:
first, the enhancement of the Wildlife Health Information Sharing
Partnership-Event Reporting System (WHISPers) database, and second,
development of the new Aquatic Disease and Pathogen database
(AquaDePTH). In addition to the situational awareness provided by
AquaDePTH and WHISPers, there are also collaborative tools for Federal,
State, and Tribal partners to share information, and we are working to
increase participation in those databases. Using the national wildlife
disease database, the USGS will be able to provide an early warning for
wildlife diseases, including those species that serve as sentinels for
ecosystem health. The USFWS added a requirement to its upcoming
zoonotic disease grant program that agencies receiving funding utilize
the WHISPers platform, further enhancing the national wildlife disease
database. The USFWS also maintains the National Wild Fish Health
Survey, which partners with natural resource managers to assist in
inspections, diagnoses, and publishing results of aquatic diseases.
DOI funding provided by the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic
Security Act (CARES Act) was used to initiate biosurveillance of
coronavirus in wildlife and the environment. This included integrating
SARS-CoV-2 surveillance into USGS cause-of-death investigations as well
as active field surveillance, including sampling wildlife around mink
farms to support USDA's response. USGS took advantage of bat ecology
research that includes white-nose syndrome surveillance to also collect
samples for SARS-CoV-2 surveillance.
These are recent examples of the role the USGS plays, providing
scientific information to resource managers and planners, emergency
response officials, and the public. Over the decades, USGS science has
supported federal responses by detecting zoonoses, improving our
understanding of their ecological dynamics, and informing mitigation
strategies which help protect both wildlife and public health.
To do this, the USGS and the USFWS maintain several important labs
across the country. The National Wildlife Health Center (NWHC) in
Madison, Wisconsin, which was established in 1975, is the only Federal
biosafety-level three (BSL-3) lab dedicated to wildlife health, and it
is an affiliate lab in several national and international networks. The
USGS also has two aquatic high-containment laboratories, the Eastern
Ecological Science Center (EESC), in Kearneysville, West Virginia, and
the Western Fisheries Research Center, in Seattle, Washington. The
USFWS has six fully functional Fish Health Centers conducting regular
inspections, diagnostics, and cutting-edge research to actively manage
diseases in captivity and the wild.
In addition to these facilities, the USGS and the USFWS develops
innovative technologies and methods to support response to zoonoses. A
well-known example is our development of capabilities to detect and
track wildlife species and pathogens using environmental DNA, or eDNA.
This is an example of investments we have made in new methods for
monitoring invasive species, which can spread zoonoses. Our research on
toxins and contaminants and their spread through the environment
includes pathogens, and we maintain a variety of remote sensing
capabilities to monitor environmental conditions that inform
assessments of zoonotic disease spread. We have even helped design
better citizen science campaigns to improve the collection of data.
Also, the USFWS hosts a Genetics Community of Practice well known for
advancing new technologies and applying them to actively managed fish
and wildlife populations. Their expertise in eDNA protocol development,
applied to fish and wildlife management and detection of aquatic
invasive species, will play a critical role in future disease
surveillance.
The NWHC has made significant contributions to national zoonotic
disease surveillance efforts in wildlife including SARS-CoV-2, avian
influenza, and West Nile virus. For example, the USDA confirmed NWHC
preliminary positives for the first U.S. detections of West Nile virus
and highly pathogenic avian influenza in wild birds. Following the
first detections of those diseases in the U.S., the USGS has
collaborated with the USDA and the CDC on surveillance of these
zoonoses in wildlife. Notably, experimental research demonstrated that
West Nile virus could be transmitted from crow to crow when it was
previously thought that it could only be spread by mosquitoes.
Additional research and surveillance capacity would be needed to
investigate the role of wildlife in other vector-borne diseases.
Wildlife vector-borne disease surveillance and research can also
enhance management of wildlife diseases like avian malaria, which is
the leading driver of population declines and extinctions in Hawaiian
forest birds. Five years before the first U.S. detection of highly
pathogenic avian influenza, USGS experimental research found that
infected native raptors could develop neurological disease and die,
providing early warning for the need to monitor raptors in addition to
waterfowl. Further research is needed to enhance avian disease risk
prediction, mapping, and forecasting tools to inform wild bird
management decisions.
USGS disease ecology research provides insight into how zoonoses
behave in the environment and affect wildlife. For more than twenty
years, we have collaborated with the USDA to support management of
bovine brucellosis, a zoonotic disease that circulates in bison and elk
as well as domestic cattle, especially in the Greater Yellowstone
Ecosystem. The USGS has shown how elk are a key host of this disease
and that it affects their reproduction. The spread of the disease can
be influenced by the length of the elk supplemental feeding season and
elk migratory movements that are linked to greening-up in the spring.
USGS science has also shown that maintaining scavenger populations
(such as coyotes, foxes, or eagles) can help reduce the spread of
brucellosis.
Another example is USGS research into avian influenza ecology. It
has provided insights on the genomics of viral lineages that circulate
in migratory birds, which informs USDA poultry outbreak traceback
investigations and surveillance strategies. USGS waterfowl telemetry
and modeling have demonstrated the interface between wild birds and
poultry, enhancing situational awareness and risk assessments. USGS
research has also confirmed the persistence of infectious avian
influenza viruses in surface waters in northern wetlands and determined
that diving ducks can play a role in the dynamics of this disease.
USGS science that supports the mitigation of zoonoses can also help
protect public health. For example, sylvatic plague is a zoonotic
bacterial disease that affects pets, like cats and dogs; wildlife, such
as prairie dogs and the endangered black-footed ferret; and also causes
several human deaths each year. In addition to improving our
understanding of plague ecology, the USGS has developed innovative
tools to mitigate this disease in wildlife. The NWHC developed and
tested a plague vaccine given to prairie dogs through a peanut-butter
flavored oral bait. The license to produce this vaccine was awarded to
a U.S. company, Colorado Serum, with a conditional license from the
USDA. The USGS also collaborated with the CDC to identify flea
resistance to deltamethrin dust, an insecticide and a long-standing
plague management tool. We are investigating other options, such as
fipronil pellets, for reducing flea abundance in prairie dog burrows.
In another example of vaccine development, the USGS and our partners
developed a rabies vaccine that has been shown in the lab to be
effective in big brown bats, providing a proof-of-concept for a white-
nose syndrome vaccine, which is now in field trials.
These and other examples of USGS research contribute to public
health and inform our understanding of impacts humans have on wildlife.
For example, the USGS published an online tool \3\ to provide rapid
SARS-CoV-2 risk assessments for human-to-bat transmission (i.e.,
reverse zoonosis) to guide decision-making for bat biologists, wildlife
rehabilitators, and animal control operators who regularly work with
bats. In the case of the Zika virus, the USGS provided science to guide
management actions that reduce risk to non-target species, like
pollinators, but allow for control of insect vectors, such as mosquitos
and ticks. We have also helped integrate mathematical models and
statistical tools based in natural resource management for COVID-19
public health mitigation planning.
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\3\ www.usgs.gov/apps/SARSCOV2BATRISKCALC/.
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Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is a good example of a One Health
approach. CWD is a fatal neurological disease of deer, elk, and moose
caused by infectious prions. While CWD has not been shown to affect
humans, variants of other animal prion diseases do, such as Creutzfeld-
Jakob disease. The USGS has worked with the NPS, the USFWS, USDA,
States, and Tribes for many years to enhance the understanding of CWD
dynamics in deer and elk and develop tools for monitoring the spread of
CWD and making management decisions. Our work has focused on mitigating
the spread of CWD in wild cervid populations, including reducing
environmental prion contamination, and developing customizable
surveillance and mitigation planning tools for States and Tribes.
Currently, the science community is hopeful that a test will soon be
deployed that can be used to detect small numbers of prions, that is
achieve early detection, in live cervids rather than the current
testing standard that uses post-mortem tissues. All of this requires
collaboration across all levels of government and robust public
outreach efforts--and it all needs to be done not just for known
diseases but also for novel, emerging pathogens yet to be discovered.
The USGS, along with our partners, is leading research on wildlife
disease and spearheading monitoring efforts that address diverse
stakeholders needs. As the One Health approach implies, understanding
wildlife disease is a crucial step in protecting the public from known
and emergent diseases. That idea, of studying the natural world to
benefit all people, is very much within our tradition. Thank you for
this opportunity to testify today. I would be happy to answer any
questions you may have.
______
Questions Submitted for the Record to Ms. Anne Kinsinger, Associate
Director for Ecosystems, U.S. Geological Survey
Questions Submitted by Representative Moore
Question 1. In the passage of ``America's Conservation
Enhancement'' Act, the U.S. Geological Survey was instructed to work
with the Agriculture Department, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the
National Academies of Science to conduct an interagency study on
Chronic Wasting Disease.
(a) Can you provide us an update on the progress of that study?
(b) When do you anticipate that study will be complete?
Answer. The Department of the Interior Chronic Wasting Disease
(CWD) Task Force, which was set up prior to enactment of the America's
Conservation Enhancement Act (Act), has been collaborating with the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to work with the National
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine to develop a CWD
transmission study, as called for in the Act. A statement of task has
been completed for the first Phase. The U.S. Geological Survey, U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service, and USDA are each contributing $200,000 for
this Phase I study. We anticipate the Phase I study will be completed
by FY2024.
______
Ms. Porter. Thank you very much for your testimony.
Reminding Members that Committee Rule 3(d) imposes a 5-
minute limit on questions, the Chair will now recognize Members
for any questions they may wish to ask the witness.
Mr. Soto, if you are ready, I will recognize you first and
will delay my questioning to make sure we can keep Members on
their schedule. I am glad to have you here.
Mr. Soto. Thank you, Chair Porter.
And I appreciate you being here, Ms. Kinsinger.
Just as a preliminary discussion of how we have gotten this
right over the years, in 2016, we had a screw worm outbreak
among Key deer in Florida that would have been a huge issue for
our cattle ranches throughout Florida. Yet, because of the good
work of U.S. Fish and Wildlife, we were able to get that under
control. Sadly, 135 deer had to be killed to be able to bring
that under control, but it shows that good work can be done to
help out.
But we did see a more troubling menace in the Zika
outbreak, which we saw starting in places like South America,
and eventually getting to my family's native island of Puerto
Rico.
Ms. Kinsinger, in your testimony, you mentioned that the
USGS provided guidance to the Puerto Rico Government about how
to do mosquito control without killing off pollinators during
the Zika outbreak, which is an important balance to strike. Can
you tell me more about the specifics of that guidance, and why
were pollinators at risk?
Ms. Kinsinger. Yes. We have some limited research in the
Zika virus, not only what you were talking about, but also in
understanding the disease--the ecology of mosquitoes, which, of
course, are what cause Zika.
We have a role in understanding the ecology of species,
including pollinators, throughout the United States, in
understanding the ecological pathways of disease. So, our work
here was to try to understand the unintended consequences of
chemical applications to control mosquitoes.
Mr. Soto. I know this Committee released a report in 2016
showing that forced budget cuts in Puerto Rico compromised the
island's own ability to protect itself from the Zika virus,
something that threatened our great state of Florida, as well.
That outbreak was devastating for Puerto Rico.
The kind of expertise and experience that you describe
strikes me as something the Puerto Rico Government could not be
expected to provide under those circumstances. So, having the
assistance of USGS in a situation like that is essential.
Does USGS continue to provide assistance to the island on
Zika, chikungunya, or other wildlife-borne diseases? And, if
so, what kind of assistance?
Ms. Kinsinger. I don't believe we have any active Zika
projects at the moment.
Mr. Soto. Is there any other wildlife-borne disease that
you are assisting with down in Puerto Rico?
Ms. Kinsinger. I will have to get back to you on the record
on that. I don't know.
Mr. Soto. And what are some other examples of services that
USGS provides the states and territories to help them manage
wildlife-borne diseases?
Ms. Kinsinger. I did mention biosurveillance, which is key,
and we are developing, with our partners, a number of tools,
including genetic tools like the measuring genetic components
in environmental DNA and RNA. And we continue to do that sort
of horizon scanning to see when emergent diseases are detected.
We also do investigations of outbreaks at our National
Wildlife Health Center that I mentioned earlier in my oral
testimony.
And then, again, ecological research is a key piece of
this, as we understand both the vectors and the species that
are at risk, understanding their distribution, changes in their
migratory patterns perhaps due to climate change, and other
factors such as that.
Mr. Soto. And Ms. Kinsinger, big picture, with a warming
climate in states like Florida and territories like Puerto Rico
and Virgin Islands getting warmer weather, what does that mean,
ultimately, for the threat of vector-borne diseases, and how
can we help you all address them?
Ms. Kinsinger. In our Fiscal Year 2023 budget, we do have
an increased proposal to look at the effects of climate on
wildlife diseases. We have a couple of instances in the United
States where we have been working on this, precisely the types
of areas I have already outlined.
One is in the Northeast, looking at the distribution and
movement of ticks that cause, of course, Lyme disease, deer
ticks, and looking at the effects of climate on the tick
distribution, and ultimately on wildlife health, such as moose
in the Northeast.
Going far across the country to the West, we have worked in
Hawaii with our partners in Fish and Wildlife Service, National
Park Service, and others, looking at the spread of avian
malaria in critically endangered Hawaiian forest birds. And
what we are doing there is we are seeing that the mosquitoes
are spreading up as climate warms and changes. They are moving
up the mountains that are the last refugia for these critically
endangered birds. So, we are in a multi-agency effort to look
at both the ecological conditions and potential control
technologies to stop that further spread.
Mr. Soto. Thank you, and I yield back.
Ms. Porter. Thank you very much. We now turn to Ranking
Member Moore for his 5 minutes of questioning.
Mr. Moore. Thank you, Chair.
Thanks for being here, thanks for joining us today,
Associate Director Kinsinger.
I would like to start today by getting a better
understanding of how the U.S. Geological Survey works with
other Federal agencies to meet our wildlife surveillance goals.
I am going to ask questions about coordination, how you work
where there is duplicative nature. Let me just say on the front
end, this frustration of mine predates today. It predates my
time in Congress. I have served in Federal agencies before, and
this is a problem across our entire government.
But we are going to focus on specifically your area today.
This is something we have to get better. We just have to do
this better, because we are wasting taxpayers' dollars every
single day by having way too much duplicative work and making
it too difficult for us to get to the root of the problem.
In your testimony, you highlighted the U.S. Geological
Survey's collaboration with several agencies which also conduct
wildlife surveillance. For example, the Fish and Wildlife
Service just announced $9 million in grants focused on
addressing zoonotic outbreaks, and the Agriculture Department
received $6 million to study COVID-19, a specific zoonotic
disease, in deer.
Please describe the relationship between your agency and
others conducting wildlife surveillance, including the Ag.
Department and the Fish and Wildlife Service. How often do you
communicate with each other? Please provide some context here.
Ms. Kinsinger. OK, thank you. As I noted in my oral
testimony, such collaboration is absolutely critical, and we do
work very closely with the agencies that I named and many
others.
The niche for the U.S. Geological Survey is in the study of
wildlife diseases and the ecological condition that leads to
spread of diseases, and we do work very closely with USDA. The
example I would give you there is an avian influenza. When we
do outbreak investigations at our National Wildlife Health
Center to detect avian influenza, we then send those samples to
the USDA for verification, and we have a closely coordinated
communication strategy in which the USDA does make those
announcements.
So, again, the focus of USDA is on domesticated animals,
and our focus is on wildlife disease in free-ranging animals in
the wild.
Another example would be chronic wasting disease. I sit
with USDA on the Chronic Wasting Disease Task Force that is
managed out of the Department of the Interior. It has USDA
APHIS, the Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies, and many
sister DOI bureaus in which we discuss new findings of chronic
wasting disease detection, priorities, spread of the disease,
mapping, and so on. So, we do share information, I think quite
well, when it comes to chronic wasting disease.
Mr. Moore. And could you share also steps you take to make
sure this work is not duplicative in nature?
Ms. Kinsinger. It is through those coordination meetings.
Again, I think we have a special niche that deals with
wildlife disease, and both the human health community and the
agricultural community do look to us for that specialized
expertise.
Mr. Moore. With respect to a cross-cut budget analysis, to
your knowledge has the DOI, the Department of the Interior,
conducted a cross-budget analysis of all the Department's
wildlife surveillance programs?
Ms. Kinsinger. I don't know, so I will get back to you on
that.
Mr. Moore. OK. Yes, without that type of budget--please do
get back to us. If there is one, we would love to be able to
have a copy of it and dig into it with some of my staff.
But without that, can you be confident the taxpayer dollars
are being efficiently used if there is no assessment of how
money is being spent through separate agencies working toward
the same goal?
Ms. Kinsinger. I think that analysis could be useful, but I
am confident, because of the degree of coordination and
collaboration and communication that we have, that we are
spending taxpayer dollars wisely.
Mr. Moore. Professor Carlson, a witness on the next panel
noted in his testimony that because wildlife disease
surveillance is ``fragmented across these institutions,'' that
it could take a researcher months or years to find the data
necessary to answer one question--kind of my prelude here when
I started this questioning, the issue that I have. It is
unacceptable.
Your testimony noted that your agency had begun developing
a National Wildlife Disease Database. How will you prioritize
addressing the problem highlighted here by Professor Carlson as
you create this database?
Ms. Kinsinger. Thank you for that question. The National
Wildlife Disease Database is built on a current system that we
have called WHISPers, Wildlife Incident Reporting System, at
our National Wildlife Health Center. It already serves as a
centralized place where incidents can be reported and
additional information be included.
So, we are building from that outward to a system that will
be accessible to all, where incidents can be reported, but also
where we can combine ecological and environmental information
and work with the community to develop risk assessments, look
at adaptive management strategies, and generally just help
managers bring the science together to address these concerns.
Mr. Moore. Yes, thank you.
Thank you, Chair.
Ms. Porter. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
California, Mr. Huffman.
Mr. Huffman. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Kinsinger, I appreciate you being here. And I noted you
made a passing reference in your testimony to mink farming and
to some surveillance work the USGS is doing. I think, if we are
going to try to get our heads around this subject of animal
wildlife-borne diseases in the context of this current
pandemic, we need to talk about mink a little bit more.
I am told that even though there are some anecdotes about
cats and big cats getting COVID, mink are really the species
where we know it has gone back and forth between humans, and
actually mutated within mink populations, and then come back to
us. Meanwhile, we produce millions of minks in mink farms in
the United States for export, I am told, mainly to China.
So, I wonder if you could tell us a little more about the
level of concern we should have about these mink farms as a
vector for the spreading of COVID, and potentially creating a
mutation laboratory almost here in the United States, simply so
that we can sell furs to China.
Ms. Kinsinger. Yes, I do think it is a serious concern, as
it is with other animals, both domesticated and wild, that not
only are affected by COV-2, but also can serve as reservoirs
for potential transmission back to humans and also to other
wildlife.
The USGS role in the mink farm surveillance really did
focus on wildlife surrounding the mink farms. And we did test a
large number of animals--I think the number was 365--and it did
show quite a lot of presence of the SARS-CoV-2 virus in those
animals.
Mr. Huffman. So, what are you doing about that?
We are continuing to raise and export these minks, as I
understand it, back and forth to China of all places, in the
middle of this pandemic. Isn't this something that we should be
sounding the alarm about, looking into taking action?
Ms. Kinsinger. Well, I think, as I say, the USGS role
really is in looking at the wild animals. We work closely with
those who do make those sorts of management and policy
decisions, but I wouldn't want to speak for them.
Mr. Huffman. So, you are purely looking at the wildlife in
the area around the mink farms. Do I understand that correctly?
Ms. Kinsinger. That is correct, yes. And that response is
being led by USDA. So, our information has been given to USDA
to help in their very difficult management decisions.
Mr. Huffman. And, I think, in your words, you said you were
finding quite a bit of COVID just in that surrounding wildlife
tracking that you are doing. Is it fair to assume that the
level of COVID within the mink farm itself, where these animals
are confined and presumably don't even have a lot of
interaction with the surrounding environment, wouldn't it be
fair to assume that we might have an even bigger problem within
the mink farms?
Ms. Kinsinger. Well, it is definitely true that animals
that congregate do have higher levels of transmission. Yes.
Mr. Huffman. OK. I am a little surprised, frankly, that we
are not hearing more from you about that, but maybe that is
just a function of USGS and jurisdictional lines that constrain
you. So, maybe there are other witnesses that can speak to
this, but are there other authorities or resources that you
would want to do more about what seems like a pretty clear and
present danger posed by these mink farms?
Ms. Kinsinger. Well, I think, as I mentioned, in the 2023
budget we do have some ample funding to look at wildlife
diseases in the wild. We did receive some specific increases in
our 2022 omnibus bill, as well. But there is always room to
expand our capacity.
And as I said, these are decisions that are informed by the
science of USGS, but there are a lot of factors that go into
making those decisions.
Mr. Huffman. All right. Well, I appreciate your testimony,
and I understand the limitations that you are under there.
But my understanding is that, of all the animals that we
might concern ourselves with, mink should be perhaps at the top
of the list in terms of the known transmission of this virus
back and forth between minks and humans, and the known
mutations that have already arisen from that, and the volume of
mink farming, and the trade back between the United States and
China. I mean, these are all huge red flags.
Madam Chairman, thanks so much. I yield back.
Ms. Porter. Thank you very much. The Chair now recognizes
the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Hice.
Dr. Hice. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. The USGS
collaborates with numerous other partners to conduct wildlife
surveillance. I would like to go there, if we can, for a few
moments.
What type of metrics do you have in place to assess the
value of these partnerships?
Ms. Kinsinger. That is a really good question. I don't
think we have been using specific quantitative metrics.
Certainly, I think it can be measured by the rapidity of our
response to detected outbreaks, to the ability to communicate
quickly and effectively with those who do have to make
difficult public health and agricultural sector decisions. But
I am not aware of any particular metrics that we have been
using to measure our success.
Dr. Hice. So, you just kind of play it by ear and determine
the whole?
Ms. Kinsinger. Well, I don't know if we are playing it by
ear, because we do have plans such as the avian influenza
response plan, and many other plans in place that are----
Dr. Hice. But there are no metrics to determine the overall
value?
Ms. Kinsinger. Not to my knowledge.
Dr. Hice. What about on the funding side of things? What
kind of tracking mechanisms are in place to monitor funds that
are awarded to partners for wildlife surveillance?
Ms. Kinsinger. I think that is a question better put to the
granting agencies.
We were involved, for example, in the criteria that were
developed for the Fish and Wildlife Service grants to states
and tribes to look at wildlife disease. And we did ask that
those measures include information being put into the National
Wildlife Disease Database I mentioned.
But I am not familiar with what metrics they are using for
success----
Dr. Hice. So, again, there is no real tracking of the
funding of it all, either.
Ms. Kinsinger. No, I believe there is tracking. I am just
not familiar with it because they aren't----
Dr. Hice. OK. Well, if we could get that information----
Ms. Kinsinger. I would be happy to do that.
Dr. Hice. It has come up with others about duplicate-type
scenarios here. How do you prevent partners from duplicating
wildlife surveillance work?
Ms. Kinsinger. Well, as I mentioned in my oral testimony, I
think we are doing a better and better job. I wouldn't say we
are where we need to be, but a better and better job of a
national coordinated biosurveillance effort.
As one example, the Association of Fish and Wildlife
Agencies, which represents state fish and wildlife agencies
across the country, passed a resolution in support of
biosurveillance of disease. I sit on their National Fish and
Wildlife Health Steering Committee. I sit on their Steering
Committee for the National Wildlife Health Initiative, and we
have been working closely on making sure that we bring our
information together and that the Federal agencies, which don't
manage a lot of these species, serve as a support function for
the state agencies in doing things like risk assessments, and
doing things like----
Dr. Hice. Well, that is good. If I may, because I don't
have much time, that is good that you are doing that. But the
question is, how do you prevent duplicating? You are not really
answering that question. How is that prevented?
Ms. Kinsinger. I believe it is prevented through the
regular meetings and collaborations we have.
Dr. Hice. OK. Are there any metrics to determine the
effectiveness of those meetings to make sure duplicative work
is not occurring?
Ms. Kinsinger. Again, I am not aware of any quantitative
metrics. I think the quality of our response is probably the
best way to look at that.
Dr. Hice. Do you think it would be a good idea to have some
metrics?
Ms. Kinsinger. I could definitely take that back to our
community and get back to you on that.
Dr. Hice. OK. I think that would probably be a good idea.
I would like to transition, if I can, about how your agency
provides information to the CDC. Can you kind of walk us
through that process from USGS--when you detect a disease to
when your agency alerts the CDC of the findings? What is the
process there?
Ms. Kinsinger. So, there are different processes, depending
on the disease. As I mentioned with avian influenza, our
primary partner there is the USDA. But for other diseases, we
have a vast network of collaborators that we share our results
with all the time.
We also release what we call technical bulletins from our
National Wildlife Health Center that goes out to all the key
decision makers in multiple Federal and state agencies.
Dr. Hice. What kind of steps are taken to verify your
findings before initiating the process?
How do you know that you know what you are doing?
Ms. Kinsinger. We certainly try to design our research so
it is replicable, and we do multiple tests when we do them. And
in some cases, we do have independent labs like the USDA verify
our results.
Dr. Hice. OK, thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Porter. Thank you very much. The Chair now recognizes
the gentlelady from Michigan, Mrs. Dingell, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Dingell. Thank you, Madam Chair. I really want to
thank you and Ranking Member Moore for convening this important
and timely hearing on wildlife-borne disease surveillance.
It is important to note that, in addition to COVID-19, we
have to be mindful of spillovers of other zoonotic diseases
that could pose significant public health risks to Americans.
In fact, even prior to the current pandemic, there was a
historic outbreak of eastern equine encephalitis in Michigan in
2019 that infected 10 people, killing 6, and leaving at least
one survivor with permanent disabilities. For comparison, in an
average year there are seven cases of this disease in the
entire United States.
So, we have to take seriously this potential threat to
America's public health and ensure that there are appropriate
systems in place for surveillance and detection of these types
of diseases.
Ms. Kinsinger, in your testimony, you speak about how
experimental research discovered the potential for previously
unknown wildlife-to-wildlife transmission in the West Nile
virus, another mosquito-borne disease. Could more wildlife
disease research help warn us about the new risks to human
health, and how?
Ms. Kinsinger. Yes, I believe greater surveillance could
help in warning about the risk.
And, specifically, I mentioned the use of genetic
capabilities. So, not a disease example, but, for example,
learning to detect Asian carp in the Great Lakes, we developed
these field tests where samples could be analyzed on the spot
to detect for the presence of Asian carp. And I think tools and
technologies like that would be a significant boost to our
national network of biosurveillance.
Mrs. Dingell. So, building on that, in your testimony you
talk about the development of a test for eDNA. Is that the same
eDNA that has been essential in tracking invasive carp near the
Great Lakes?
Ms. Kinsinger. Yes.
Mrs. Dingell. How has that technology changed the way we
manage invasive carp?
Ms. Kinsinger. Yes, that is the technology I was referring
to. Environmental DNA is when you search for DNA in waters,
soils, and plants, and the like.
And I think that is essential for early detection because
if you wait for--well, in the case of chronic wasting disease,
for example, animals don't appear to be sick, don't show
symptoms for months at a time. So, it is really important to
detect these disease agents early on, either in the live
animals or in the environment.
Mrs. Dingell. But then how does that technology help us
manage it better? Yes, detect, but how does it help manage?
What do we do?
Ms. Kinsinger. So, a couple of examples: (1) the key is,
particularly as I mentioned, combining our ecological research
which understands how animals move, where they go--we have done
work in avian influenza, for example, to look at the overlap
between wild and domesticated birds and certainly human
interactions. So, all of those factors where these diseases
might occur before they get there, and then we can put in place
the biosecurity measures to prevent that spread.
Mrs. Dingell. Last question: Can you discuss USGS's
WHISPers Database? How does this help track the sorts of public
health concerns we have discussed today?
Ms. Kinsinger. The WHISPers Database is a wildlife incident
reporting system. It is housed at our National Wildlife Health
Center. And what it does is serve as a central place for
reports of incidents of wildlife disease that occur throughout
the nation. So, it is a widely used database right now for
people to scan and do this sort of horizon scanning to detect
incidences as they occur in real time.
We are also building on that WHISPers Database for our
National Wildlife Disease Database to add in additional
information, ecological information, environmental information,
and the capacity to employ even more predictive tools and
technologies.
Mrs. Dingell. Thanks for the work that you are doing and,
Madam Chair, for having this hearing. Michigan has been a place
that we saw the transmission of COVID, as well, from mink, and
we care a lot about this.
I yield back the balance of my 7 seconds. Thanks, Madam
Chair.
Ms. Porter. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Tennessee, Mr. Cohen, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for having this
hearing. We had three committees going concurrently, so we
thank you for your efforts in this important panel.
Approximately 25 months ago, we learned about coronavirus,
and it was a scary, worldwide health issue, and it was
estimated that maybe 400,000 or so people might die around the
world. Well, now we have seen already a million people die.
That virus has told us a lot about pathogens and how they can
infect humans, as well as animals. We have had over 80 million
confirmed cases in the United States, with almost a million
deaths. Worldwide it is more like 6.2 million.
We need to ensure that the United States understands how
the interaction with climate change, wildlife, and humans can
have an impact on diseases and potential future pandemics.
Ms. Kinsinger, you may be aware--I hope you are--of an
unknown pathogen that has killed at least 85 horses at the
Bureau of Land Management's Canyon City Wild Horse and Burro
Facility in Colorado since Saturday, April 23. I attended a
meeting of individuals, quite a few in Washington, for a
national conference on horse management and wild burros, and
they brought this up, brought this to my attention.
The infected horses are initially identified with
respiratory difficulties, and then they suffer neurological
effects. The Bureau of Land Management has reported that
Federal and private veterinarians are working to determine the
cause, but they haven't figured it out yet.
The facility currently holds 2,500 horses. Now it is down
to approximately 2,400. So, 3.5 percent of the horses in that
confinement have died in the last week. Bob Baffert has not
been seen around those horses. These horses are kept in close
quarters. If they were not penned, it is entirely possible the
pathogen would have not spread nearly as quickly.
Are these types of outbreaks that the USGS ecosystem
program typically studies?
Ms. Kinsinger. We do study disease outbreaks, and I am
aware of this outbreak in wild horses, although that is not
something that we have been involved in. I did put out a
request to our National Wildlife Health Center to see if they
had been involved, and they have not to date. But we have a
very close working relationship with the Bureau of Land
Management. We have done other non-disease-related work on wild
horses, so I would be happy to keep the Committee apprised of
any additional information that comes out of that.
Mr. Cohen. If you would, the disease and the death is
certainly disturbing, and that is the subject of this hearing.
But I am concerned about the horses and the burros in general.
So, if you could keep us informed on that, I would appreciate
it.
And we know they could affect, other than the horses, we
don't know. And the Bureau of Land Management has certainly not
been very effective in this process.
The ranchers like to use that land out there, which they
pay ridiculously low fees for, $1 per cow a month, which hasn't
been changed, that fee, for a couple of decades. And the cows
are about twice as large now, so they eat a lot more. But it
should be more like $20, based on 20 years and the size of the
cows. But we subsidize it. You've heard the expression, there
is no such thing as a free lunch? Well, when the Bureau of Land
Management is involved with cattle ranchers, it seems like
there is such a thing as a free lunch.
And then they move the horses away because they say the
horses are eating the raw materials there, and the horses get
penned up and taken, and sometimes they end up being shipped
off to Mexico. However, people buy them--at least not supposed
to. But the horses, the burros are at risk. The programs they
have had--we will be looking into having a hearing on this to
see that this is done in a humane fashion, and that the burros
and the horses are looked upon with--they should have rights on
those lands to graze. They are an American treasure.
Do you have any other information or knowledge of the BLM
and their horse-burro policy?
Ms. Kinsinger. I can't speak to their specific policies.
But as I said, USGS has worked with BLM on a couple of things.
One is in helping to improve their monitoring protocols so that
we understand how many horses are out there in the wild, and
then looking at reproductive capacities, reproductive
techniques for slowing the reproduction of the horses.
Mr. Cohen. Well, thank you very much. On behalf of Trigger
and all the other horses of past and present, I appreciate your
looking into that.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. Porter. Thank you very much. The Chair now will
recognize herself for her questions.
Ms. Kinsinger, you said earlier that there is always room
to expand capacity, and you made a kind of general statement
that there is the potential to improve.
I agree with my Republican colleague, Mr. Moore. Taxpayers
deserve to know that their money is being spent effectively.
And public health is an investment. It can save money.
Pandemics are devastatingly expensive, which is something that
I think we can find bipartisan agreement about. It is fiscally
responsible to give USGS the necessary funding and to hold it
to account on how it uses that funding. So, I want to invite
Mr. Moore to work with me in a bipartisan way on legislation to
try to improve coordination, save resources, and be able to do
a better job with the funding that we are giving to prevent
future pandemics.
I want to ask you to be as specific as you can be with the
Committee. If we were to give you more funding, what would you
do differently? How would it protect the American economy and
the American public?
Ms. Kinsinger. I will take that last piece first. We often
talk about the direct effects of pandemics. For example, the
billions of dollars in poultry that have to be destroyed during
an avian influenza outbreak. But there is also a huge cost
associated with preparing for pandemics and preparing to
respond to pandemics. It is probably an even larger price tag
than folks realize.
In terms of what we would do with additional capacity, that
would be on several fronts. One would be to expand on our
outbreak investigations, to be there at the table immediately,
for example, when a wild bird is found dead, to be able to test
it immediately for any disease. We would do tests on a suite of
diseases. The other, as I have mentioned several times, is in
the biosurveillance realm, the ability to develop these rapid
markers for detecting disease.
And, by the way, this is also very useful in invasive
species, as well, which are a $1 billion cost to the economy.
And then also continue to invest in ecological research,
because it is critically important to understand how animals
move, how they interact with domesticated animals and humans.
And just to give one example of that, we have been studying
migratory birds for decades now, started with the hunting
community, and making sure that we could work with state
managers on their harvest strategies. But when the avian
influenza appeared in 2006, USGS was right there with the
worldwide maps of migratory patterns. We were able to quickly
see the areas of migratory bird layovers and areas that had
avian influenza outbreaks were critical sources for avian
influenza entering the United States.
We established a monitoring program in Alaska with the Fish
and Wildlife Service so that we could test birds coming in on
that flyway, the Pacific Flyway, to try to rapidly detect AI.
So, I think there is a lot that can be done in the
ecological research, as well.
Ms. Porter. I hear you say develop rapid markers,
ecological research, which I think you did a terrific job of
explaining. Our next panel is going to talk, I think, a lot
about data. So, I wanted to ask you specifically about central
repositories of data, about WHISPers, the database. If you
could explain that to the Committee and talk about how we could
improve that.
And then, specifically, I would invite you to respond in
more detail to what Mr. Moore raised about the Department of
Agriculture and coordination across departments, because I hear
a strong willingness to coordinate. I would like to know, if we
gave you more resources, could you coordinate better, and what
would that look like?
Ms. Kinsinger. I will answer the last first, and I may have
to ask you to repeat the first.
We have significantly ramped up our coordination with
Agriculture, and I think I have talked about that. I think the
most important mechanisms are to have specific pathways for
sharing information. We have some really specific protocols in
place, as I mentioned, for avian influenza. We can do that with
multiple diseases in early detection. We have, as I say, as
part of that strategy, a joint communication strategy. We
understand who conducts the first test, who validates that, and
then, most importantly, who communicates that and how. And that
has, particularly with diseases that have significant economic
impacts, we have to be very thoughtful about how we communicate
those diseases.
And with apologies, could you repeat the first question?
Ms. Porter. Yes, the first question was about WHISPers and
centralized data.
Ms. Kinsinger. Yes, yes. So, it is really important to have
a central source of data. I think that that is a huge cost
alone, just to have researchers out there looking for where
they can find collaborators and information. The WHISPers
Database has been in place for some time at the National
Wildlife Health Center. The WHISPer stands for Wildlife
Incident Reporting System. And we already are used by many,
many partners who not only input data on the incidence of
disease, but also use it to conduct health assessments, risk
assessments, and the like.
With the ARPA funding, which $45 million went to the Fish
and Wildlife Service. Of that, $6.5 million came from Fish and
Wildlife to USGS to expand that system into a National Wildlife
Disease Database.
So, we will build on the incident reporting capacity that
we already have in place in WHISPers, but become even more of a
decision support tool by incorporating environmental data,
ecological data, and, most importantly, some web-based tools so
that folks can get in there, see the incident, conduct risk
assessments, and use that information to make their on-the-
ground management decisions.
Ms. Porter. Thank you very much. I think we are now, unless
there are any other Members who wish to question on this panel,
I think we are ready to transition to our second panel. Thank
you very much, Ms. Kinsinger, for your testimony.
We will now pause while we reset for the second panel.
[Pause.]
Ms. Porter. All right, we are now going to go ahead with
the second panel.
Before introducing our witnesses, I want to remind non-
Administration witnesses that they are encouraged to
participate in the Witness Diversity Survey created by the
Congressional Office of Diversity and Inclusion. Witnesses may
refer to their hearing invitation for further information.
Now, I am going to introduce our witnesses. We have Dr.
Colin Carlson. He is an Assistant Research Professor at the
Center for Global Health Science and Security at the Georgetown
University Medical Center.
We have--I am going to get this one wrong--Dr. David
Stallknecht. There you go. Dr. David Stallknecht is the
Director of the Southeastern Cooperative Wildlife Disease Study
and a Professor in Wildlife Health at the College of Veterinary
Medicine at the University of Georgia.
Ms. Catherine Semcer is a Research Fellow at the Property
and Environment Research Center.
And Dr. Julie Thorstenson is the Executive Director of the
Native American Fish and Wildlife Society.
As with the first panel, oral statements will be limited to
5 minutes, but your entire statement will be made part of the
hearing record.
When you begin, the timer will start. It will turn orange
when you have 1 minute remaining, and red when your time has
expired.
After the witnesses have testified, Members will be given
the opportunity to ask questions. We are going to start now
with Dr. Carlson. The Chair recognizes you for your testimony.
STATEMENT OF COLIN CARLSON, ASSISTANT RESEARCH PROFESSOR,
CENTER FOR GLOBAL HEALTH SCIENCE AND SECURITY, GEORGETOWN
UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Carlson. Good morning. Thank you, Chair Porter, Ranking
Member Moore, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee,
for the opportunity to testify in today's hearing.
My name is Colin Carlson. I am an Assistant Professor at
Georgetown University. I am an author on the most recent report
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. And I am the
Director of Verena, a scientific research team working to
predict and prevent viral emergence. I want to share three
conclusions with you today that I have drawn about how we can
better monitor for disease emergence within the borders of our
nation.
First, the United States faces a substantial threat, both
from zoonotic disease and from complacency about the domestic
risk it poses. It is easy to imagine pandemics are someone
else's problem. The risk of disease emergence is higher in
tropical countries with more biodiversity, weaker health
systems, and high-risk interfaces like wildlife markets that
allow viruses to jump from animals to humans.
But risk only goes so far when you are planning for a once-
in-a-generation event. We live alongside wildlife and alongside
zoonosis, even here in the nation's capital. In March, the CDC
reported that, in 2018, our local rat problem was responsible
for two cases of hemorrhagic fever called Seoul hantavirus.
Only a few weeks later, a rabid fox bit Representative Bera
just outside this building. Thanks to the miracle of vaccines,
the Congressman is safe, healthy, and back at work. But the
stakes of these encounters can be much higher and deadlier.
In fact, the deadliest pandemic in recent history started
within our borders. Though it is often called Spanish flu, the
1918 pandemic of influenza was first detected on a military
base in Kansas and is believed to have originated on a nearby
farm. This could happen again today. The pandemic can start
anywhere.
Second, the risk posed by zoonotic disease is growing
rapidly. One reason in particular stands out. One of the
Subcommittee's mandates is to investigate the sources and
impacts of climate change, the single biggest issue that
affects every aspect of the Committee's work. A growing body of
evidence now suggests that climate change could also become the
single biggest issue for pandemic prevention and preparedness.
In a study published only a few hours ago today in the
journal Nature, our team reports that as mammal species are
forced to track warming temperatures toward the Arctic and up
mountainsides, zoonotic diseases will arrive at new places and
encounter new animals, some of which will serve as a stepping
stone to reach a human host. Every simulation we conducted was
unambiguous: climate change is creating innumerable hotspots of
future pandemic risk right in our backyard.
We also believe this process is well underway. In 2004, a
virus closely related to measles called phocine distemper virus
was first reported in Alaskan sea otters. Working with State
and Federal agencies, a team of researchers has spent the last
15 years monitoring wildlife health throughout the northern
Pacific. They found that melting Arctic sea ice appears to have
removed barriers to animal movement, allowing the virus to
spread between otters, seals, and sea lions.
Now, phocine distemper virus is unlikely to ever pose a
threat to human health. But as we spotlight in our study, the
same process will happen to the hosts of Ebola virus, and
coronaviruses, and any other zoonotic disease, even here at
home in the United States.
Third, to face that growing risk, the most urgent priority
is surveillance. Our country leads the world in zoonotic
disease research, but modernizing our surveillance system,
sharing data more openly, and increasing connections among
State and Federal agencies would do immeasurable good.
For example, in a recent study, we found that since 1950,
climate change has increased the risk of bubonic plague in the
western United States by up to 40 percent in some areas. We
were only able to detect that thanks to decades of both human
case surveillance by public health agencies and the wildlife
data collected by the USDA's National Wildlife Disease Program.
However, data also accounts for our study's biggest
limitation. The California Department of Public Health has long
curated its own independent surveillance system for plague, and
the absence of that data creates a noticeable hole in our risk
maps.
Any steps we take toward more comprehensive, connected, and
open zoonotic surveillance will massively benefit scientific
efforts to predict and prevent the next pandemic. It is easy to
miss in all the other pandemic science, but our field is
currently headed into something of a scientific revolution. We
can do things today we couldn't do a decade ago, like identify
animal viruses with zoonotic potential only hours after we have
sequenced their genome. We are headed in leaps and bounds
toward true prediction.
All of that exists by the grace of scientific data and the
patchwork of programs the Federal Government funds consolidate,
collect, and immortalize that data. Building a more centralized
infrastructure for zoonotic disease surveillance could easily
be the lowest-cost, highest-return way to make our country more
prepared, not just for pandemics, but for climate change.
I look forward to discussing this with you further and will
gladly answer any questions the Committee may have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Carlson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Prof. Colin J. Carlson, PhD Assistant Research
Professor, Center for Global Health Science and Security,
Department of Microbiology & Immunology, Georgetown University
Medical Center
Introduction
Good morning. Thank you, Chair Porter, Ranking Member Moore, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee for the opportunity to
testify in today's hearing. My name is Colin Carlson, and I am an
assistant professor at Georgetown University's Center for Global Health
Science and Security, as well as the director of Verena
(viralemergence.org), a National Science Foundation-funded scientific
research team working to predict and prevent future viral emergence.
Today I want to share three conclusions about how we can better monitor
for disease emergence within the borders of our nation.
Zoonotic risk in the United States
First, the United States faces a substantial threat both from
animal infections that can be transmitted to humans (zoonotic
diseases), and from complacency about the domestic risk that they pose.
Historically, the United States has handled pandemics in a paradigm
that treats the risk of emergence within our borders as comparatively
low. The risk of disease emergence is generally believed to be higher
in tropical countries with more animal biodiversity (1), weaker health
systems (2), and high-risk interfaces like wildlife markets (3) that
allow viruses to jump from animals to humans. But risk only goes so far
while planning for a once-in-a-generation event.
We live alongside wildlife, and alongside zoonosis, even here in
the nation's capital. In March, the CDC reported that in 2018, our
local rat problem was responsible for two cases of a haemorrhagic fever
called Seoul hantavirus (4). Only a few weeks later, a rabid fox bit
Representative Ami Bera just outside this building. Thanks to the
miracle of vaccines, the Congressman is safe, healthy, and back at
work. However, the stakes of these encounters can be much higher. In
fact, the deadliest pandemic in recent history started within our
borders. Though it's often called ``Spanish flu,'' the 1918 pandemic of
influenza was first detected on a military base in Kansas, and is
believed to have originated on a nearby farm. As one 2004 historical
account wrote: ``If the virus did cross into man in a sparsely
populated region of Kansas, and not in a densely populated region of
Asia, then such an animal-to-man cross-over can happen anywhere.'' (5)
This remains true today; a pandemic can start anywhere. It might start
here next time.
As the country with by far and away the greatest total number of
poultry chickens, it remains entirely possible another influenza
pandemic could start in the United States. A recent surge of domestic
cases of high pathogenicity avian influenza in poultry, particularly in
the Midwest, speaks to this possibility--but also to the strength of
existing outbreak surveillance and transparent reporting in the
agricultural sector.
On the other hand, the domestic emergence risk of wildlife viruses
is considered less often. Coronaviruses are generally thought of as a
low risk for emergence in the United States, because the lineage of
viruses related to SARS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2 are not currently known to
circulate in bats in the Americas; however, another lineage that
includes viruses like the Middle Eastern Respiratory Syndrome
coronavirus (MERS-CoV) has been detected in bats in Mexico (6), and
other species of bats throughout the Americas are suspected to possibly
host similar viruses (3, 7). It is likely that further zoonotic
surveillance throughout North America will uncover similar viruses in
coming years. Similarly, a high number of rodent species are known to
be reservoirs of zoonotic diseases in the United States, including
respiratory and haemorrhagic pathogens like hantaviruses (8, 9); a 2015
study predicted that the global hotspot of undiscovered reservoirs
might be in Kansas and Nebraska (10). Overall, the Americas are
believed to have a large number of undiscovered mammal viruses (11)--a
pattern driven by gaps in zoonotic surveillance that are, in turn,
driven by lower perceived urgency of zoonotic risk. (For example, the
USAID PREDICT project's work sampling for wildlife viruses and building
a surveillance workforce in Latin America was mostly concluded several
years before the main program ended in Africa and Asia.)
Further risks exist in terms of the possibility of importation
immediately before or after spillover takes place at the animal-human
interface. Wildlife trade, and the pet trade in particular, poses a
major risk, underscored by the 2003 outbreak of monkeypox to the United
States originating in imported African rodents. These risks were also
recently discussed in a Senate hearing (``Stopping the Spread:
Examining the Increased Risk of Zoonotic Disease from Illegal Wildlife
Trafficking''; July 22, 2020). Pathogens also cross borders with
humans: a recent study reported that several medical professionals had
traveled to Haiti in 2017 to assist in Zika virus outbreak response,
and returned with an unknown illness. Both the outbreak and its cause--
canine coronavirus, a well-known virus not generally believed to infect
humans until last year--were essentially unknown to the world until
reported in an October 2021 study. It remains possible that the next
coronavirus pandemic could be the United States' to prevent.
Climate change and zoonotic risk
Second, the risk posed by zoonotic disease is growing rapidly. One
reason in particular stands out: one of the Subcommittee's mandates is
to ``investigate the sources and impacts of climate change, the single
biggest issue that affects every aspect of the Committee's work.'' A
growing body of evidence now suggests that climate change could also
become a global crisis for pandemic prevention.
In a study published only a few hours ago today in the journal
Nature, our team reports that, as mammal species are forced to track
warming temperatures toward the Arctic and up mountainsides, zoonotic
diseases will arrive in new places, and encounter new animals, some of
which will likely serve as a stepping stone to reach a human host.
Every simulation we conducted was unambiguous: climate change is
creating innumerable hotspots of future zoonotic risk right in our
backyard.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7453.001
.epsFigure 1. Climate change makes zoonotic disease emergence a
global problem. As a result of climate change, by 2070, predicted
hotspots of viral host jumps among mammal species (red) will sometimes
coincide with human settlements (blue), including in several parts of
the United States (purple). (From Carlson et al., ``Climate change
increases cross-species viral transmission risk'', Nature, 2022)
We also believe this process is already likely underway in some
ecosystems. In 2004, a virus closely related to measles called phocine
distemper virus was first reported in Alaskan sea otters. Working with
several state and federal agencies, a team of researchers spent the
next 15 years monitoring wildlife health throughout the northern
Pacific (12). They found that melting Arctic sea ice appears to have
removed barriers to animal movement, allowing the virus to spread
between otters, seals, and sea lions. Phocine distemper virus is
unlikely to ever pose a threat to human health, but as we spotlight in
our study, the same process will happen to the hosts of Ebola virus,
and coronaviruses, and any other zoonotic disease--even here at home,
in the United States.
Benefits of strengthening and integrating domestic surveillance systems
Third, to face that growing risk, the most urgent priority is
surveillance. Our country leads the world in zoonotic disease research,
but modernizing our surveillance system, sharing data more openly, and
increasing connections among state and federal agencies would do
immeasurable good.
For example, in a recent study, my colleagues and I found that,
since 1950, climate change has increased environmental suitability for
bubonic plague in the western United States by up to 40% in some areas
(13). We were only able to detect that signal thanks to decades of both
human case surveillance by public health agencies and the wildlife data
collected by the USDA's National Wildlife Disease Program. However,
data also accounts for our study's biggest limitation: the California
Department of Public Health has long curated its own independent
surveillance system for plague, and the absence of that data creates a
noticeable hole in our risk maps. Other studies have also used these
data to assess potential consequences of climate change for plague
transmission in California (14), leading to a fragmented picture of
total impacts.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7453.002
.epsFigure 2. Gaps in zoonotic disease surveillance create gaps in
preparedness. A map of plague reservoirs based on wildlife antibody
data (green) misses key at-risk areas in California, which are
identifiable from county-level human case surveillance (purple).
California maintains its own system of wildlife plague surveillance
separate from USDA. (From Carlson et al., ``Plague risk in the western
United States over seven decades of environmental change'', Global
Change Biology, 2022)
Any steps we take toward more comprehensive, connected, and open
zoonotic surveillance will massively benefit scientific efforts to
predict and prevent the next pandemic. It's easy to miss in all the
other pandemic science, but our field is currently headed into
something of a scientific revolution. We can do things today we
couldn't do a decade ago, like use artificial intelligence to identify
animal viruses with zoonotic potential only a few hours after we've
sequenced their genome (15). Teams like Verena are working toward
further advances in what we can do with machine learning, particularly
when we harness the genomic revolution, big data, and private sector
advances in technology. We're headed in leaps and bounds toward true
prediction: knowing which viruses pose a threat, and which animals we
need to test; building early warning systems that predict disease
spillover like the weather; and using that information to develop and
deploy countermeasures like universal vaccines that can stop an
outbreak in its tracks. That vision offers renewed hope the Covid-19
pandemic could, in fact, be the last one.
All of that exists by the grace of scientific data, and the
patchwork of programs the federal government funds to collect,
consolidate, and immortalize that data. Many of the most important
programs the United States funds are the cornerstone of open scientific
research not just here but around the world: particularly notable is
the National Center for Biotechnology Information, where a small core
staff works tirelessly to maintain GenBank, the scientific database of
record for all genetic and genomic data around the world. Programs like
these foster transparency in scientific research, and the data they
store have an incalculably high return on investment, not just to
prevent outbreaks but during outbreak response as well.
The same can be said of the immense value of disease surveillance
conducted by several federal agencies, including CDC, USDA, USGS, and
USFWS; other federal agencies and agencies in every state and
territory; and by NIH- and NSF-funded scientists in the academic
sector. However, the mandate of domestic surveillance for zoonotic
disease is fragmented across these institutions, and as a result,
researchers might nevertheless be forced to spend months or years
hunting for the data they need to answer one scientific question.
Building a more centralized infrastructure for zoonotic disease
surveillance could easily be the lowest-cost, highest-return way to
make our country more prepared for both the pandemic era and the health
hazards of a warming world.
I look forward to discussing this with you further, and will gladly
answer any questions that the Committee may have.
Citations
1. T. Allen, K.A. Murray, C. Zambrana-Torrelio, et al. Global hotspots
and correlates of emerging zoonotic diseases. Nat. Commun. 8, 1124
(2017).
2. D.M. Pigott, A. Deshpande, I. Letourneau, et al. Local, national,
and regional viral haemorrhagic fever pandemic potential in Africa: a
multistage analysis. Lancet. 390, 2662-2672 (2017).
3. S.J. Anthony, C.K. Johnson, D.J. Greig, et al. Global patterns in
coronavirus diversity. Virus Evol. 3, vex012 (2017).
4. N. Ravi-Caldwell, P. Iyengar, J. Davies-Cole. Notes from the Field:
First Reports of Locally Transmitted Seoul Hantavirus Infection--
District of Columbia, May 2018-December 2018. MMWR Surveill. Summ. 71,
359-360 (2022).
5. J.M. Barry. The site of origin of the 1918 influenza pandemic and
its public health implications. J. Transl. Med. 2, 3 (2004).
6. S.J. Anthony, R. Ojeda-Flores, O. Rico-Chavez, et al. Coronaviruses
in bats from Mexico. J. Gen. Virol. 94, 1028-1038 (2013).
7. D.J. Becker, G.F. Albery, A.R. Sjodin, et al. Optimising predictive
models to prioritise viral discovery in zoonotic reservoirs. Lancet
Microbe (2022), doi:10.1016/S2666-5247(21)00245-7.
8. N. Mull, R. Jackson, T. Sironen, K. M. Forbes. Ecology of Neglected
Rodent-Borne American Orthohantaviruses. Pathogens. 9 (2020), p. 325.
9. N. Mull, C.J. Carlson, K.M. Forbes, D.J. Becker. Virus isolation
data improve host predictions for New World rodent orthohantaviruses.
J. Anim. Ecol. (2022), doi:10.1111/1365-2656.13694.
10. B.A. Han, J.P. Schmidt, S.E. Bowden, J.M. Drake. Rodent reservoirs
of future zoonotic diseases. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 112, 7039-
7044 (2015).
11. K.J. Olival, P.R. Hosseini, C. Zambrana-Torrelio, et al. Host and
viral traits predict zoonotic spillover from mammals. Nature. 546, 646-
650 (2017).
12. E. VanWormer, J.A.K. Mazet, A. Hall, et al. Viral emergence in
marine mammals in the North Pacific may be linked to Arctic sea ice
reduction. Sci. Rep. 9, 15569 (2019).
13. C.J. Carlson, S.N. Bevins, B.V. Schmid. Plague risk in the western
United States over seven decades of environmental change. Glob. Chang.
Biol. 28, 753-769 (2022).
14. A.C. Holt, D.J. Salkeld, C.L. Fritz, et al. Spatial analysis of
plague in California: niche modeling predictions of the current
distribution and potential response to climate change. Int. J. Health
Geogr. 8, 38 (2009).
15. N. Mollentze, S.A. Babayan, D.G. Streicker. Identifying and
prioritizing potential human-infecting viruses from their genome
sequences. PLoS Biol. 19, e3001390 (2021).
______
Questions Submitted for the Record to Colin J. Carlson, Ph.D., Center
for Global Health Science & Security, Georgetown University Medical
Center
Questions Submitted by Representative Porter
Question 1. In your testimony, you said that ``Building a more
centralized infrastructure for zoonotic disease surveillance could
easily be the lowest-cost, highest-return way to make our country more
prepared for both the pandemic era and the health hazards of a warming
world.'' Could you elaborate on the kind of infrastructure and data-
sharing needed? Will the expansion of the U.S. Geological Survey's
Wildlife Incident Reporting System fill this gap, or is more needed?
Answer. Through the planned expansion, the Wildlife Health
Information Sharing Partnership (WHISPers) system takes an important
step toward consolidating wildlife disease surveillance in the United
States. The WHISPers database is relatively unique as a public
scientific repository, and stores infectious disease data in a format
compatible with other important causes of animal mortality (e.g.,
poisonings, accidents, or unknown causes). For wildlife health
professionals, this is critical infrastructure. WHISPers also offers
several important features that are critical for government work--in
particular, the ability to share data with partial confidentiality
(e.g., precise locations). At present, WHISPers is used unevenly across
pathogens, hosts, and regions, but has been particularly useful so far
for tracking panzootics that threaten wildlife conservation (i.e.,
white-nose syndrome in bats; chytrid fungi in amphibians) and avian
influenza die-offs in wild birds. To date, it has been used less for
zoonotic surveillance, perhaps both because a mortality-focused
resource may not be immediately applicable to some zoonotic reservoirs
(which often tolerate diseases that are deadly in humans), and because
its availability as a resource has been underpublicized in the zoonotic
disease research community.
The expansion of WHISPers will be an important step toward
integrated disease surveillance in the United States--even just by
bridging the gap between the U.S. Geological Survey and the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service--and offers a key opportunity to connect state
agencies not just with federal infrastructure but also with each other.
Expanding inputs into WHISPers will empower the partnered federal
agencies in their mission, and the availability of more data in a
standardized location will empower the broader research community.
WHISPers' user base in academic research is currently much smaller than
it could be; establishing the database as the definitive data hub for
wildlife mortality data in the United States would go a long way to
also identifying the USGS-FWS partnership as the coordinating federal
authority on these issues. Outreach to academics is important to
complement adoption by current and future USGS partners, and--for
maximum efficacy--USGS would benefit from additional dedicated support
for the community building and outreach dimension of its mission with
the database. To bring more scientists' attention to this resource,
agencies might also consider digitizing and sharing existing data
sources through WHISPers that have historically been restricted in
their sharing, such as various long-term surveillance projects by the
USDA's National Wildlife Disease Program.
At the same time, these changes are only a first step toward a
truly coordinated national infrastructure for disease surveillance. The
simple fact is that data sharing infrastructure is only as valuable as
the investments made to generate data itself that can then be shared,
stored, reanalyzed, and used to spot trends and risks. Perhaps the most
important step forward would be to allocate more dedicated funding to
scientific research on disease transmission in wild animals within the
United States, with a focus on (1) known zoonotic pathogens, and more
broadly, key systems that introduce high-risk respiratory pathogens
into human populations (e.g., influenza and the interface among wild
birds, poultry, and swine; coronaviruses and bats; hantaviruses and
rodents); (2) climate change, land degradation, and urbanization as key
drivers of zoonotic risk within the United States; (3) collection of
new field data that monitors for geographic shifts in pathogen
intensity (rather than perpetual re-analysis of existing data, which
has finite value for real-time monitoring); and, perhaps most
challenging, (4) integration of wildlife disease surveillance with
efforts to monitor for outbreaks in human populations. Funding for the
wildlife and human aspects of these problems are fragmented by a
conventional divide between the mandate of the U.S. National Science
Foundation (which funds most wildlife research) and the U.S. National
Institutes of Health (which traditionally handles more research that
directly relates to human health). Recent efforts like the recent NSF
Pandemic Intelligence for Pandemic Prevention program, or the long-
standing NSF/NIH/USDA Ecology and Evolution of Infectious Diseases
program, have been an important step toward bridging that divide, and
are useful models for future funding programs.
In conjunction with an expansion of scientific research, data
sharing requirements (as appropriate) would be an important step to
ensure federal investments lead to a greater baseline of available
disease surveillance data. Encouraging researchers to deposit data in
WHISPers could be very valuable if acute outbreaks are detected in the
course of routine federally-funded wildlife research. Other databases
also address other key dimensions of surveillance: for example, genetic
sequence data generated by federally-funded research is already
regularly deposited in NCBI's GenBank repository. Enhancement of NCBI's
resources might also be considered, given that the core team
maintaining these resources has historically been very small, relative
to their indisputably global role in keeping scientific research
afloat.
Question 2. Is there any additional information about your views on
domestic U.S. surveillance of wildlife-borne diseases for future
pandemic prevention that you would like to share for the record?
Answer. Thanks kindly for the opportunity to answer this question.
One of the biggest threats to domestic health security is the delayed
notification, reporting, or publication of key information about
zoonotic disease--not just in animals, but also in humans. Several
recent instances speak to the need not just to share more information,
but to share information faster:
In 2018, two unconnected patients in Washington, D.C. both
tested positive for Seoul hantavirus, an uncommon
haemorrhagic fever not previously known to be a risk in the
region. The findings remained unpublished until 2022.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Ravi-Caldwell, N., Iyengar, P. and Davies-Cole, J., 2022. Notes
from the Field: First Reports of Locally Transmitted Seoul Hantavirus
Infection--District of Columbia, May 2018-December 2018. Morbidity and
Mortality Weekly Report, 71(9), pp.359-360.
Between May 2017 and April 2018, researchers screened
samples from patients in North Kivu Province, Democratic
Republic of the Congo, for various diseases. They found
that several had antibodies to Ebola virus, despite the
fact that spillover had not previously been observed in
this region. In July 2018, a devastating epidemic of Ebola
virus disease started in Kivu, and would continue until
July 2020. The scientists' results were finally published
in November 2020.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Goldstein, T., Belaganahalli, M.N., Syaluha, E.K., et al.,
2020. Spillover of ebolaviruses into people in eastern Democratic
Republic of Congo prior to the 2018 Ebola virus disease outbreak. One
Health Outlook, 2(1), pp.1-10.
In 2017, multiple medical professionals returning to
Florida from Haiti, where they had been engaged in Zika
outbreak response, presented with a mild but unusual
illness. After ruling out Zika and other likely
explanations, scientists identified the presence of an
unknown coronavirus, but waited to publish research until
confident in its specific identity (a recombinant canine
coronavirus); the description of the viral spillover was
published in 2021.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Lednicky, J.A., Tagliamonte, M.S., White, S.K., et al., 2021.
Isolation of a novel recombinant canine coronavirus from a visitor to
Haiti: further evidence of transmission of coronaviruses of zoonotic
origin to humans. Clinical Infectious Diseases, available online.
Each instance reflects the painstaking work scientists must
undertake to identify and trace zoonotic spillover with confidence, but
the broader picture speaks to how academic publishing is insufficient
for rapid information sharing with the U.S. government and the global
public. These delays increase the risk of another pandemic, and have
ripple effects that limit the ability of animal surveillance to keep
pace with shifting priorities: scientists have only recently learned
they should be monitoring for hantaviruses in D.C.'s rats, or for
recombinant canine coronaviruses in domestic and wild animals
worldwide.
These delays reflect several intersecting challenges: broad effects
of funding scarcity on publishing speed; the limitations of for-profit
journals, and the under-incentivization of transparency processes like
preprints; and, perhaps most notably, the fact that the vital work of
epidemiology and zoonotic spillover detection often falls on academic
scientists, instead of the severely under-resourced federal agencies,
like the CDC, that should be better empowered to lead this
surveillance. A distributed network of well-trained academic
epidemiologists and veterinarians across the country has much greater
total capacity than, for example, CDC's Epidemic Intelligence Service
or USDA's National Wildlife Disease Program--but has fewer formal
reporting channels available, and less ability to mobilize resources if
an event that threatens public health is detected. Greater investment
in federal capacity for both wildlife and human disease surveillance,
and increased opportunities for government-academic partnerships in One
Health outbreak investigations, would be key to solving this problem.
These delays also speak to another challenge: the need to promptly
and transparently share information about domestic zoonotic
surveillance and outbreaks with the rest of the world. In light of
growing evidence that spillover risk is increasing worldwide--and after
multiple years of extensive scrutiny on China's early outbreak
response--it seems obvious that the United States must lead the world
in transparent reporting of human and wildlife disease surveillance,
including notifications to the World Health Organization (WHO) and
World Animal Health Organization (OIE) about key events. The current
international system for disease outbreak notifications is severely
limited, and is designed to only set a response in motion after an
emergency starts--rather than earlier, in the key moments when an
emergency might be prevented. A promising opportunity for reform exists
in discussions of a Pandemic Treaty or similar multilateral agreement
with the goal of preventing and preparing for future pandemics. This
instrument will likely address several important issues, among them:
curbing human drivers of zoonotic emergence; tracking pre-emergence
pandemic pathogens in animals, and detecting spillover into humans
earlier; building better emergency response plans and supply
stockpiles; and otherwise fixing the unforced errors that made the
Covid-19 pandemic a disaster. Negotiations have already begun on this
treaty, and are being discussed in the coming weeks at the World Health
Assembly.
For transparent and effective surveillance of wildlife-borne
disease, a Pandemic Treaty offers a chance to redefine obligations that
include data sharing outside of acute emergencies, and connect our
disease surveillance infrastructure to other surveillance systems
around the world. It is vital that the United States be a full Party to
such a Treaty, and that the final agreement includes provisions that
address wildlife and human disease surveillance data sharing. The
United States owes the world the same that we ask of other nations:
rapid and transparent sharing of information about zoonotic disease, a
threat that is fundamentally transboundary in nature.
______
Ms. Porter. Thank you very much, Dr. Carlson.
The Chair will now recognize Dr. David Stallknecht to
testify.
STATEMENT OF DAVID STALLKNECHT, DIRECTOR, SOUTHEASTERN
COOPERATIVE WILDLIFE DISEASE STUDY, PROFESSOR IN WILDLIFE
HEALTH, COLLEGE OF VETERINARY MEDICINE, UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA,
ATHENS, GEORGIA
Dr. Stallknecht. Thank you for the opportunity to testify
for the Subcommittee. I am currently employed by the University
of Georgia as a Professor and Director of the Southeastern
Cooperative Wildlife Disease Study.
I am giving this testimony today not as a representative of
UGA or SCWDS, but as an individual with over 40 years of
experience conducting surveillance and research related to
diseases affecting wildlife, domestic animals, and human
health. Much of this work has centered on zoonotic pathogens
that were not present in North America or known to exist when I
began my career.
Discussions related to wildlife and pandemic prevention
require perspective. To provide this, I will address three
questions.
Can pandemics be prevented? I have lived through at least
five pandemics in my lifetime, and all of them have involved
viruses that originated from wildlife. These included three
influenza pandemics: 1957, H2N2; 1968, H3N2; 2009 pandemic,
H1N1, originating from wild birds and domestic animals; and HIV
in 1981, from old world primates; and COVID-19 in 2019,
presumed to originate from bats. None of these were predicted.
With known pathogens and defined drivers of pathogen
emergence, however, prevention may be possible. But with an
unknown inventory of perhaps millions of potential and ever-
changing pathogens in nature and in human-impacted ecosystems,
pandemic prevention might be as futile as attempting to prevent
a hurricane. However, like a hurricane, there is much that can
be accomplished with preparedness to better protect the public
and reduce impacts. Prevention should be the ultimate goal, but
preparedness is probably a more realistic and practical
approach in the near future.
How can wildlife health professionals and improved
infrastructure contribute to pandemic prevention and
preparedness? The involvement and inclusion of wildlife health
professionals is needed for many reasons. Zoonotic diseases and
impacts are shared between wildlife, domestic animals, and
humans. Pandemic prevention and preparedness are dependent on a
comprehensive understanding of the natural history of these
pathogens in wildlife reservoirs and understanding the
potential for human and interspecies infection.
Knowledge and expertise in basic wildlife biology, wildlife
health, and an understanding of the human wildlife interactions
are needed to fully understand these complex interactions.
Laboratory and diagnostic capabilities specifically directed at
wildlife also offer unique challenges, and these capabilities
need to be in place and work-ready.
Finally, wildlife health professionals are on the front
line related to disease detection and identification of
problems associated with wildlife-human interactions.
What are the current gaps related to building pandemic
prevention and preparedness capabilities? A broader wildlife
health perspective is needed. It is important not to
compartmentalize our efforts and capabilities into diseases
only affecting wildlife--diseases affecting wildlife and
domestic animals and zoonotic diseases. There is significant
overlap in the necessary skills, training, and field and
laboratory infrastructure needed to understand diseases in
wildlife populations are the same, regardless of the host at
risk.
Support for both surveillance and research are needed.
Surveillance approaches, capabilities, and effectiveness cannot
be improved or even understood or developed without a basic
understanding of infection, disease, or transmission processes.
Sustainable funding is needed, and recognition that success
most often requires a long-haul approach.
Goals related to pandemic prevention and preparedness
cannot be achieved through a boom-and-bust funding trajectory
based on a short-term response to the current crisis.
And, finally, within-state wildlife health infrastructure
and professional resources need to be better supported. This is
perhaps the biggest gap. State wildlife health professionals
are the frontline troops and are the critical part of our
national wildlife disease network. But with few exceptions in-
state capabilities are not even close to being adequate.
Thank you for your attention.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Stallknecht follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. David E. Stallknecht, Southeastern
Cooperative Wildlife Disease Study, College of Veterinary Medicine,
University of Georgia
Preventing Pandemics through US Wildlife-borne Disease Surveillance
Thank you, Chair Porter and the subcommittee for calling this
hearing an inviting me to testify. I am currently employed by the
University of Georgia (UGA) as a professor and Director of the
Southeastern Cooperative Wildlife Disease Study (SCWDS). I am giving
this testimony not as a representative or UGA or SCWDS but as an
individual with over 40 years of experience conducting surveillance and
research related to diseases affecting wildlife, domestic animal and
human health. Much of this work has centered on zoonotic pathogens
(Lyme Disease, West-Nile virus, SARS-Cov-2, Eurasian highly pathogenic
H5 influenza A virus) that were not present in North America or known
to exist when I began my career. All of these involve wildlife.
Wildlife are important reservoirs for zoonotic diseases. This holds
for both endemic and emerging zoonoses as well as zoonotic diseases
with pandemic potential. It is also important from a natural-resources
perspective to recognize that wildlife populations can also be
adversely affected by these same diseases. Discussions related to
wildlife and pandemic prevention require perspective. To provide this,
I will address three questions: Can pandemics be prevented? How can
wildlife health professionals and infrastructure contribute to pandemic
prevention and preparedness? What is needed to improve our existing
wildlife health infrastructure related to pandemic prevention and
preparedness.
Can pandemics be prevented? I have lived through at least five
pandemics in my lifetime and all of them have involved viruses that
originated from wildlife. These include three influenza pandemics
(1957-H2N2; 1968-H3N2, 2009-pH1N1) originating from wild birds and
domestic animals, HIV (1981) from old-world primates, and Covid-19
(2019) presumed to originate from bats. There have also been two
possible near misses, Ebola (2014-2016) from bats and SARS (2003) from
bats. Unfortunately, while we know that such events will continue, our
current predictive abilities and capabilities to react are not
sufficient to assure prevention. Prevention is dependent on eliminating
human exposure to known or potential zoonotic agents, eliminating or
reducing risk factors that lead to infection or increased virulence,
early detection of human cases, and actions designed to break
transmission cycles. With known human pathogens and defined drivers of
disease emergence, pandemic prevention can be possible. Influenza and
Ebola are examples. However, with an unknown inventory of perhaps
millions of potential and ever-changing pathogens that are present in
nature and in human-impacted ecosystems, pandemic prevention in many
cases might be as futile as attempting to prevent a hurricane. However,
like a hurricane, there is much that can be accomplished with
preparedness to better protect the public and reduce impacts.
Prevention should be the ultimate goal, but preparedness is probably a
more realistic and practical approach for the near future.
How can wildlife health professionals and infrastructure contribute
to pandemic prevention and preparedness? Currently, a basic
infrastructure to conduct surveillance and supporting research related
to the role of wildlife species in zoonotic diseases is in place;
however, there are significant gaps that need to be filled related to
building more effective, inclusive, and comprehensive capacity. The
existing and basic infrastructure includes a loose network of Federal,
State, and academic professionals and laboratories. On the Federal
side, the USDA and USGS carry much of the responsibility with diseases
that involve wildlife. However, state involvement in this network
includes state veterinary diagnostic labs, state Fish and Wildlife
Agencies, and regional wildlife disease labs such as ours (SCWDS) that
provides wildlife disease expertise to multiple state and Federal
agencies. Collaborative expertise and resource support also are often
provided by others agencies and institutions such as USFWS, Centers for
Disease Control, National Institutes for Health, state departments of
agriculture, public health, and natural resources, and public and
private academic institutions. The involvement and inclusion of this
vast array of expertise and jurisdictions are justified and needed for
many reasons; wildlife and wildlife disease professionals play an
important part in this team effort. Zoonotic diseases and impacts are
shared between wildlife, domestic animals, and humans and prevention
needs to be addressed at all of these levels. Pandemic prevention and
preparedness are dependent on a comprehensive understanding of wildlife
reservoirs, vectors, and risk factors that provide an avenue for
potential human or interspecies infection. Understanding basic wildlife
biology and the human/wildlife interactions that may enhance zoonotic
pathogen transmission are critical components of zoonotic disease
prevention and both fall within the expertise and jurisdiction of
wildlife-health professionals. Effective surveillance and research for
zoonotic diseases also require a specialized and high level of
technical and scientific skills that needs to be in place when needed.
These skill sets not only relate to the collection of relevant data but
also to providing a comprehensive and realistic interpretation of these
data and the development of practical mitigation practices or policies.
Finally, laboratory and diagnostic capabilities needed to conduct
wildlife-related zoonotic disease surveillance and research also need
to be in place when needed not after a problem is encountered. In
emergency situations, these diagnostic capabilities can easily be
redirected to other new or emerging problems. Wildlife health
professionals are on the front line related to discovery of new
pathogens and diseases in wildlife and provide invaluable expertise
related to understanding these potential pathogens in these populations
and at the human/wildlife interface.
What is needed to improve our existing wildlife health infrastructure
to contribute to zoonotic and pandemic preparedness?
A broader wildlife health perspective is needed: We tend to
compartmentalize wildlife disease to those that affect wildlife,
diseases that are maintained in wildlife but can spillover from
wildlife to domestic animals, and to those affecting humans. These can
be further compartmentalized to diseases that are established and well
known, diseases that are ``new'', and diseases and potential pathogens
yet to be discovered. Those of us involved in wildlife health recognize
these different perspectives, but also recognize that extensive overlap
between these ``compartments'' occurs. For example, West Nile Virus
(WNV) was a well-known zoonotic pathogen originally described in
Africa. It gained ``new status'' when introduced into North America in
1999. It was initially recognized as something new when it affected
American crows. Although not considered a pandemic its global range
expanded rapidly and included the entire Western Hemisphere in 4-5
years. This is a zoonotic disease, a domestic animal disease and a
disease responsible for significant wildlife mortality. Federal
investment for WNV surveillance was primarily justified by this virus's
zoonotic potential but the information gained also was applicable to
domestic animal and wildlife health. Effective national WNV
surveillance was made possible by including a network of human,
domestic animal and wildlife health laboratories. Our lab was involved
in these efforts and very quickly mobilized to provide WNV diagnostic
support related to detecting infections in wilds bird and mosquitos for
Georgia and several southeastern states; we are still doing some of
this work today. The information gained not only helped to inform
public health, but also informed wildlife health and domestic health
professionals as related to wild bird mortality and equine disease. It
also resulted in the local detection of other viruses such as equine
encephalitis and other vector-borne zoonotic viruses. In addition,
isolates of WNV were shared with other labs to provide research
material to understand how the virus was evolving and potentially
changing. With proper planning and creativity, the value of
surveillance can far exceed any immediate objectives. SARS-CoV-2 and
Eurasian HP H5N1 both are examples of viruses with known or potential
pandemic capabilities where impacts to wildlife, domestic animals, and
humans are shared and where an efficient response includes all of these
perspectives and expertise. It is important to understand that many of
the processes that allow a pathogen or diseases to emerge are similar
between diseases affecting wildlife and those that can expand their
host range to domestic animals and humans. Knowledge can often be
translatable related to disease epidemiology regardless of host
populations and such existing knowledge can be invaluable in quickly
addressing ``new'' problems. For example, our abilities to identify new
pathogens and to quickly develop and validate diagnostic tools are
greatly enhanced by the wealth of genetic sequences and biological
collections of both pathogenic and non-pathogenic viruses and
microorganisms from wildlife species.
Support for both surveillance and research is needed; problems
cannot be understood or solved without both: Effective surveillance
needs to be science based and should always be improved with time,
additional data, and a better understanding of the epidemiology of the
target pathogen or disease. It is important that surveillance efforts
be supported by state-of-the-art diagnostics. These technologies are
rapidly changing and require research to develop and validate.
Surveillance technologies also should not stagnate and goals and
approaches need to be constantly modified and improved relative to new
information and increased understanding provided by supportive
research. Wild bird surveillance for WNV provides a relevant example.
One year after the detection of WNV, an improved understanding of
pathogenesis provided a scientific basis to support a more streamline
and safe wild bird sampling and testing protocol. After four years of
wild bird surveillance in Georgia, a very consistent and predictable
pattern of when WNV transmission occurred was identified. Based on
this, the ``early warning'' provided by testing birds was no longer
needed and preventive measures by public health could be safely and
less expensively be scheduled on a calendar year. Though supportive
research, we and others identified specific avian and mosquito species
that were important amplifying hosts for this virus. This allowed for
develop of efficient and better targeted surveillance and field
research designs to better understand local risk factors, mitigate
risk, and determine the effectiveness of preventive measures. With
influenza, basic knowledge on the epidemiology of our North American
low pathogenic influenza a viruses (IAV) is providing a foundation to
better understanding the impacts, risk factors, and prevention and
mitigation possibilities associated with the current Eurasian HP H5N1
outbreak in the United States.
Sustainable funding and recognition that success often requires a
long-haul approach are needed: Funding for wildlife health often
follows a ``boom and bust'' trajectory, however, pandemics may take
years to evolve. Short-term funding to build infrastructure and
capacity can certainly be used effectively to reinforce our ability to
detect, understand, and respond to zoonotic disease treats. Such
funding also is needed in emergency situations such as outbreaks and
pandemics. However, we all recognize that these threats and the
discovery of future threats are often unpredictable and require
continuous vigilance. In addition, an effective response to a disease
emergency requires work-ready facilities, equipment, and most
importantly skilled people. Our regional lab is very fortunate to have
a business model that includes reliable annual support from state fish
and wildlife agencies. This is something that we have benefited from
for more than 60 years and our member states willingness to support us
over these decades speaks loudly relative to the success of this model.
It is important to note that this invaluable base support ($750K/year)
is modest considering that it provides wildlife disease detection
capabilities and support for 17 states. The advantages provided by such
base funding are significant not only in relation to completing our
day-to-day work but also by providing a foundation for a rapid response
to address the next disease issue and to fill gaps and maintain a
workforce of skilled biologist and scientists during unpredictable
funding cycles. It also promotes discovery-based science as new
clinical syndromes can be investigated immediately and not be dependent
on obtaining new funding for every new pathogen, disease, or problem
encountered.
Within state infrastructure and professional resources are vital to
functional network: Surveillance is dependent on professional ground
troops, and with wildlife, these are the wildlife biologist and
wildlife veterinarians that work in our fifty states, tribal lands, and
Federal lands. These professionals are the ones who initially detect
wildlife disease problems, who gather the samples and data needed to
support surveillance, who submit the data, who provide the biological
and local expertise to understand the natural history of these
pathogens in wildlife populations, who understand and can identify
local risks, who are responsible for developing and implementing
response plans, who understand what research is needed to deal with
local situations, who provide field and collaborative support for
research, and who are the ones who communicate face to face with the
public and deal with any local issues that occur. Unfortunately, the
level of wildlife expertise within individual states is highly
variable, but even under the best circumstances is probably grossly
inadequate to meet current needs. Dealing with chronic wasting disease
which is at present only a potential zoonotic issue is a timely example
of the intense personnel and financial demands that a disease may
create. Personnel support for wildlife health professionals is needed,
and infrastructure support to develop even simple field laboratories
are essential to developing an effective network. Almost all of our
work at SCWDS is done in collaboration with state wildlife health
professionals who are the ones who detect and submit all of our
clinical cases from which we diagnose zoonotic pathogens such as
rabies, tularemia, Salmonella, zoonotic helminths, assorted
encephalitis related viruses, and antimicrobial resistant bacteria.
Finally, our surveillance and research with such potential and existing
zoonotic and pandemic pathogens such as influenza and SARS-CoV-2
viruses are dependent on support, samples, and data provided by our
state partners.
In summary, zoonotic prevention and preparedness require a network
of skilled scientists, laboratories, and health practitioners across
many disciplines. Wildlife health professionals can and are
contributing to these efforts and are a necessary and valuable part of
this network. However, improvements need to be made to more sustainably
support these efforts, especially at the state level. From a ``One
Health'' perspective, investment will not only improve our capabilities
related to zoonotic and pandemic diseases prevention and preparedness
but also will serve to improve our overall capabilities related to
wildlife and domestic animal health.
______
Questions Submitted for the Record to David E. Stallknecht
Questions Submitted by Representative Porter
Question 1. During the hearing, you mentioned how the highly
pathogenic avian influenza is harming bald eagle populations. In your
experience, are there sufficient resources available for research
focused on disease in wildlife themselves? Do research organizations
like yours or the states you work with have any issues accessing
funding for purely wildlife-focused disease surveillance?
Answer. This is the area that I am concerned about because funding
for this type of work falls often between the cracks. NIH funding needs
a human health connection. USDA funding needs a domestic animal health
connection with relatively low competitive funding levels and limited
opportunity. NSF does not fund basic disease-related studies that cover
many of the types of research that are needed (such as understanding
pathogenesis or developing diagnostics). Likewise, funding provided to
USDA Wildlife Services for influenza, Covid-19, and feral swine disease
surveillance are magnitudes higher that anything available for research
and surveillance directed at pathogens known to affect wildlife health,
some of which (white-nose syndrome) have threatened entire species.
This leaves USGS and the States. Both partner with labs such as ours
but funding levels are relatively low and often cannot be sustained. I
really worry about the level and reliability of funding when the
primary concern is wildlife health. I cannot speak for the states but
from a personal standpoint we (SCWDS) do not see a lot of Federal
funding opportunities in this area. As I mentioned in my response to
Representative Cohen, discussions related to revising the ``National
Fish and Wildlife Health Initiative'' though AFWA may provide some
potential and perhaps innovative paths to address this problem.
Question 2. Is there any additional information about your views on
domestic U.S. surveillance of wildlife-borne diseases for future
pandemic prevention that you would like to share for the record?
Answer. One of the things we struggle with when justifying funding
and work related to wildlife diseases in the context of pandemic
prevention or preparedness, is that we cannot promise deliverables that
provide immediate or even timely solutions. It is possible that
surveillance and research ``may'' provide key information to predict
the next pandemic. We ``may'' be able to prevent the next pandemic,
human or domestic animal disease, or the next wildlife disease if we
know what potential pathogens are out there and what the drivers for
emergence are. We ``may'' be able to even mitigate disease impacts in
the event of a new disease. We can honestly only present these as
``potential'' deliverables. What we can guarantee, however, is that
without additional knowledge provided by research, and additional field
intelligence provided by surveillance, we ``will not'' be able to
accomplish any of them.
Questions Submitted by Representative Cohen
Question 1. How does having ecologists and wildlife experts--boots
on the ground--involved in planning and implementing U.S. surveillance
of animal diseases improve how we respond to disease outbreaks?
Answer. Surveillance is dependent upon gathering relevant data and
the collection and testing of samples. The interpretation of
surveillance data also is dependent on local, biological, and technical
knowledge. We spend a lot of time thinking about the need for big data
and national labs dedicated to animal disease diagnostics and
surveillance but an equal consideration needs to be dedicated to the
acquisition of the samples and data that effective and comprehensive
surveillance programs depend on. The goals of surveillance are to
detect and understand the epidemiology of diseases not only to prevent
diseases events but also appropriately respond to them. Diseases are
the product of interactions between three things: the agent, the host,
and the environment. This is a basic epidemiological concept. With
diseases involving wildlife, who better than a wildlife biologist or
ecologist to provide needed information on host and the environments
where these agents and wildlife hosts interact. On a more practical
side, wildlife biologists are the ones who know how to effectively
collect samples, how to obtain supportive population metadata needed to
understand disease interactions in wildlife populations, who manage
wildlife populations and habitats, and who work daily at the human/
wildlife interface. They also provide a ``local'' presence that
provides needed perspective to understand community risks, guide
surveillance objectives and approaches, and provide a community based
professional to interact and communicate with the public. It is
important to always remember that any success related to surveillance
or response is dependent on community understanding and support. In my
testimony I centered on States, but this also applies to Tribal
jurisdictions.
Question 2. What are the biggest areas of need when it comes to
improving surveillance?
Answer. There are several:
State infrastructure related to meeting wildlife disease
surveillance and research needs and capacity need to be
improved in all states. These needs vary considerably
between states. This is a funding issue at both State and
Federal levels.
Surveillance efforts should be ongoing and provide both
general (new diseases or syndromes) and targeted (specific
problems such as influenza, rabies) objectives. Both are
important. With targeted surveillance, clear objectives
need to be in place. More general surveillance is dependent
on sustainable funding.
Discussions are needed related to building a more
effective Federal/State/Academic/Tribal network. There is
no ``one size fits all'' model, but perhaps some new
approaches should be discussed such as the development of
regional labs or improved funding models. Fortunately, this
is starting to be addressed through an American Fish and
Wildlife Agencies attempt to revise the ``National Fish and
Wildlife Health Initiative''. The steering committee for
that initiative include Federal, State, Academic, and
Tribal representatives and hopefully will provide some
guidance and possibilities.
As per question 1, there needs to be more State/Tribal
involvement in prioritizing, planning, and implementing
wildlife disease surveillance and research initiatives.
______
Ms. Porter. Thank you very much.
The Chair now recognizes Ms. Catherine Semcer to testify.
STATEMENT OF CATHERINE SEMCER, RESEARCH FELLOW, PROPERTY AND
ENVIRONMENT RESEARCH CENTER, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND
Ms. Semcer. Good morning, Chair Porter, Ranking Member
Moore, and members of the Committee. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify today.
The annual threat assessment by the U.S. Director of
National Intelligence has identified pandemic disease as one of
the pre-eminent threats to the security of the United States.
The assessment has also identified the degradation of
ecosystems as a contributing factor to this threat. This threat
is embodied in the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.
While the exact origins of the pandemic are still unknown,
the majority of U.S. intelligence agencies and a large body of
peer-reviewed literature has expressed confidence that those
origins are likely natural, with a genesis in wildlife.
The global tragedy we are witnessing indicates how
permeable the line is between our civilization and those parts
of the world we deem wild. Wildlife-borne pathogens, capable of
incapacitating millions and shutting down the global economy,
have shown themselves to already be inside our door. Scientists
warn that diseases capable of far more reaching destruction may
await us in the planet's remaining wild lands, areas our
civilization has increasing contact with via the pathways
created by unsustainable development.
Disturbances to wild landscapes, such as road building and
land clearing like that often pursued by Chinese interests in
Africa, increase the chance of viral spillover occurring
because they increase opportunities for human contact with
wildlife-hosting diseases or disease variants that pose a risk
to public health. These disturbances can also increase the
density of wildlife, more likely to be considered a high risk
for disease transmission and spillover, such as bats, by
altering the habitat to one more favorable to these species.
For example, recent outbreaks of the Ebola virus, which is
carried by bats in Central and West Africa, have shown a strong
correlation with deforestation events. For this reason, the
maintenance of intact, healthy ecosystems is considered a first
line of defense against future pandemics. By keeping remote
areas remote, the likelihood of people coming into contact with
wildlife carrying pathogens that present a risk to public
health is reduced, and the stated objective of the current U.S.
National Security Strategy to contain bio-threats at their
source is advanced.
A proven way to maintain intact, healthy ecosystems is with
incentives provided by the legal trade in wildlife and wildlife
products. Economic and livelihood benefits provided by wildlife
trade can encourage people to avoid the kinds of intrusions and
land clearing that can impair the ecosystems the traded species
rely on for their survival. A prominent example of this is the
international trade in hunting trophies from African countries.
This trade involves the sale and transport of tens of thousands
of hides and horns around the world annually, with revenues
from their sale accruing to landowners, communities, and
national conservation authorities. This trade has been credited
with providing the economic incentive to conserve more than 344
million acres of remote areas, including those in countries
considered to be hotspots of emerging wildlife-borne diseases.
Unlike black markets, regulated legal trade provides the
opportunity to have checkpoints to ensure disease is not being
spread. To ensure that African hunting trophies are not a
pathway by which wildlife-borne diseases spillover into the
human population, the United States requires that unfinished
hides and feathers be processed by an establishment approved by
USDA to ensure that any pathogens which may be present are
destroyed.
This requirement is one reason why there is no documented
case of African hunting trophies contributing to the spread of
wildlife-borne diseases. It also demonstrates that we can put
into place policies and programs that limit the likelihood of
future pandemics that ``save lives, protect livelihoods, and
safeguard nature,'' as the Intergovernmental Science Policy
Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services has
recommended.
USDA-approved facilities handling hunting trophies are
potentially important nodes in the information network
contributing to disease surveillance. With the right tools and
relationships, these facilities can document the presence and
trends of pathogens that may be present in specific species or
from specific areas. This information can then be used to alert
wildlife and public health officials to potential problem areas
and emerging threats.
Working with African nations to fully engage these
facilities as partners in disease surveillance programs should
be a priority. And these partnerships should then be looked to
as a potential model for how to marry legal, sustainable
wildlife trade with disease surveillance.
The threat of pandemics stemming from wildlife-borne
diseases is ever present. Conserving intact, healthy ecosystems
at home and abroad is our first line of defense against this
threat. The example of African hunting trophies demonstrates
that legal trade in wildlife can enable ecosystem conservation
and can be managed to ensure its safety. The regulatory
structure of this trade also provides opportunities for
expanded disease surveillance partnerships that could serve as
a model for other forms of trade in wildlife and wildlife
products. These opportunities should be explored further to
reduce the likelihood of future pandemics. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Semcer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Catherine E. Semcer, Research Fellow, Property
and Environment Research Center
Main Points
The spillover of wildlife-borne diseases and related
potential for pandemic is a national security threat to the
United States.
The conservation of intact, healthy ecosystems is the
first line of defense against the spillover of zoonotic
diseases.
Regulated and legal trade in wildlife and wildlife
products is a proven, incentive-driven, means to encourage
the conservation of intact, healthy ecosystems.
Regulated, legal, wildlife trade allows for the
institution of safeguards and monitoring that can reduce
the risk of wildlife-borne diseases spilling over.
Wildlife-borne disease surveillance is important to
ensuring confidence in the safety and sustainability of
regulated trade in wildlife and wildlife products, and
ensuring trade's continued ability to contribute to
ecosystem conservation.
Surveillance programs should be seen as a compliment to
ecosystem conservation efforts, not a substitute, and be
carried out in ways that do not unnecessarily discourage or
impair the regulated and legal trade in wildlife and
wildlife products that encourages ecosystem conservation.
Introduction
Good morning Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and members of the
committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. My name is
Catherine Semcer and I am a research fellow with the Property and
Environment Research Center based in Bozeman, Montana and the African
Wildlife Economy Institute at Stellenbosch University in South Africa.
I am also a member of the Sustainable Use and Livelihoods Specialist
Group of the International Union for Conservation of Nature.
My testimony today will discuss the value of legal, regulated,
trade in wildlife and wildlife products and how they enable emerging
markets to conserve intact healthy ecosystems, thereby increasing the
likelihood that biothreats remain close to their points of origin, and
how this trade does and can enable the surveillance of wildlife-borne
diseases.
Discussion
In 2022, the Annual Threat Assessment by the U.S. Director of
National Intelligence identified pandemic disease as one of the
preeminent threats to the security of the United States. The same
assessment also identified the degradation of ecosystems as a
contributing factor to this threat, as well as threat in-and-of
itself.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Office of the Director of National Intelligence. February,
2022. Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community. Office
of the Director of National Intelligence. Washington, DC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This threat is embodied in the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic, which has
claimed 988,000 American lives, made 80 million sick,\2\ and which the
Congressional Budget Office projects will cost our economy upwards of
$7.9 trillion over the next decade.\3\ While the exact origins of the
pandemic are still unknown, a majority of U.S. intelligence agencies
have expressed confidence that those origins are likely natural,\4\ an
assessment \5\ supported by published, peer-reviewed literature
strongly suggesting a genesis in wildlife.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ US Centers for Disease Control. 2022. Coronavirus Disease 2019.
Cases and deaths in the US. Accessed April 25, 2022 at https://
www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/us-cases-deaths.html.
\3\ Ziv, S. June 2, 2020. Coronavirus Pandemic Will Cost The US
Economy $8 Trillion. Forbes.
\4\ Office of the Director of National Intelligence. April 30,
2020. Intelligence Community Statement on the Origins of Covid-19. ODNI
News Release No. 11-20.
\5\ Calisher, C., et al. 2020. Statement in Support of the
Scientists, Public Health Professionals, and Medical Professionals of
China Combatting Covid-19. The Lancet. 395 e42-e43.
\6\ Lau, S.K.P., et al. July 2020. Possible Bat Origin of Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus-2. Emerging Infectious Diseases
Journal. 26 (7). US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
Atlanta, GA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The global tragedy we are witnessing indicates how permeable the
line is between our civilization and those parts of the world we deem
wild. It also draws into clear focus the inseparability of ecological
sustainability and national security. Wildlife-borne pathogens capable
of incapacitating millions and shutting down the global economy have
shown themselves to already be inside our door. Scientists warn that
diseases capable of more far reaching destruction, a ``Disease, X'' may
await us \7\ in the planet's remaining wildlands,\8\ areas our
civilization has increasing contact with via the pathways created by
unsustainable development.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ World Health Organization. 2018 Annual Review of Disease
Prioritized Under the Research and Development Blueprint. Informal
Consultation. 6-7 February. Geneva, Switzerland. Meeting Report.
\8\ Vidal, J. March 18, 2020. Destroyed Habitat Creates the Perfect
Conditions for Coronavirus to Emerge: Covid-19 May be Just the
Beginning of Mass Pandemics. Scientific American. Ensia.
\9\ Faust, C., et al. 2018. Pathogen Spillover During Land
Conversion. Ecology Letters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disturbances to wild landscapes such as road building and land
clearing can increase the likelihood of viral spillover occurring
because they increase opportunities for human contact with wildlife
hosting diseases or disease variants that are novel or otherwise pose a
risk to public health.\10\ These disturbances also have the potential
to increase the density of wildlife more likely to be considered a high
risk for disease transmission and spillover, such as bats, but altering
the habitat to one more favorable to these species,\11\ by reducing the
total amount of habitat available and concentrating wildlife population
in smaller areas. For example, recent outbreaks of Ebola Virus, which
is carried by bats, in Central and West Africa have shown a strong
correlation with deforestation events.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Johnson, C.K. April 8, 2020. Global Shifts in Mammalian
Population Trends Reveal Key Predictors of Virus Spillover Risk.
Proceedings of the Royal Society B.
\11\ Rogalski, M.A., et al. 2017. Human Drivers of Ecological and
Evolutionary Dynamics in Emerging and Disappearing Infectious Disease
Systems. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society. 372(1712).
\12\ Olivero, J., et al. 2017. Recent Loss of Closed Forests is
Associated With Ebola Virus Disease Outbreaks. Scientific Reports. 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For this reason, the maintenance of intact, healthy, ecosystems is
considered a first line of defense against future pandemics.\13\ By
keeping remote areas remote, the likelihood of people coming into
contact with wildlife carrying new diseases, new disease variants, or
pathogens that present a risk to public health is reduced and the
stated objective of the current US National Security Strategy, which
precedes the pandemic, to ``contain biothreats at their source'' is
advanced.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ IPBES (2020) Workshop Report on Biodiversity and Pandemics of
the Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services.
Daszak, P., et al. IPBES secretariat, Bonn, Germany, DOI: 10.5281/
zenodo.4147317.
\14\ The White House. December 2017. National Security Strategy of
the United States of America. Washington, DC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A proven way to maintain intact, healthy ecosystems is with
incentives provided by the sustainable use and legal trade in wildlife
and wildlife products. Economic and livelihood benefits provided by
wildlife trade can encourage individuals, communities, and nations to
avoid the kinds of intrusions and land clearing that can impair the
ecosystems the traded species rely on for their survival.
A prominent example of this is the international trade in hunting
trophies from African countries. This trade involves the sale and
transport of tens-of-thousands of hides, horns, tusks, hooves, and
bones around the world annually, with revenues from their sale accruing
to private landowners, rural communities, and national conservation
authorities. This form of wildlife trade has been credited with
providing the economic incentive to conserve more than 344 million
acres of remote areas, including those in countries considered to be
hotspots of emerging wildlife-borne diseases (Fig 1).\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Lindsey, P., Roulet, P. and S. Romanach. 2007. Economic and
Conservation Significance of the Trophy Hunting Industry in Sub-Saharan
Africa. Biological Conservation 134: 455-469.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regulated, legal trade also provides the opportunity to have
checkpoints to ensure disease is not being spread, [unlike unregulated
black markets that emerge in the absence of legal trade opportunities].
To ensure that African hunting trophies are not a pathway by which
wildlife-borne diseases spillover into the human population the United
States requires that unfinished hides and feathers be processed by an
establishment, in the country of origin, that is approved by the USDA
Animal Plant Health Inspection Service, to ensure that any pathogens
which may be present are destroyed before entering the US.\16\ This
requirement is one reason why there are no documented cases of African
hunting trophies contributing to the spread of wildlife-borne diseases,
which might not be the case were the trade to be outlawed and driven
underground. It also demonstrates that we can put into place policies
and programs to limit the likelihood of future pandemics that ``save
lives, protect livelihoods, and safeguard nature'' as the
Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem
Services (IPBES) has recommended.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ USDA-APHIS. June 2018. The Approved Establishment Program:
Guidance for Hunters. Info Sheet. Accessible at https://
www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/downloads/infosheets/
guidanceforhunters.pdf.
\17\ IPBES (2020). IPBES Guest Article: COVID-19 Stimulus Measures
Must Save Lives, Protect Livelihoods, and Safeguard Nature to Reduce
the Risk of Future Pandemics. Available online at: https://ipbes.net/
covid19stimulus.
FIGURE 1 \18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Allen, T., Murray, K.A., Zambrana-Torrelio, C. et al. 2017.
Global hotspots and correlates of emerging zoonotic diseases. Nat
Commun 8, 1124.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Global Hotspots and Correlates of Emerging Zoonotic Diseases
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7453.003
.epsOverseas USDA-APHIS approved facilities that handle hunting
trophies are potentially important nodes in the information network
contributing to surveillance of wildlife-borne diseases. With the right
tools and relationships, these facilities can document the presence and
trends of pathogens that may be present in specific species or from
specific areas prior to those pathogens being destroyed. This
information can then be used to alert wildlife and public health
officials to potential problem areas and emerging threats. Working with
African nations to fully engage these facilities as partners in disease
surveillance programs should be given increased priority by the United
States. These partnerships should then be looked to as a potential
model for how to marry legal, sustainable, wildlife trade with disease
surveillance.
The threat of pandemics stemming from wildlife-borne diseases is
ever present. Conserving intact, healthy ecosystems at home and abroad
is our first line of defense against this threat. The example of
African hunting trophies demonstrates that legal trade in wildlife can
enable ecosystem conservation at large scales and this trade can be
managed and regulated to ensure it is not a pathway for wildlife-borne
diseases to enter the human population. The regulatory structure of
this trade also provides opportunities for expanded disease
surveillance partnerships that could serve as a model for other forms
of trade in wildlife and wildlife products. These opportunities should
be explored further to reduce the likelihood of future pandemics.
Thank you.
______
Ms. Porter. Thank you very much.
The Chair now recognizes Dr. Julie Thorstenson to testify.
STATEMENT OF JULIE THORSTENSON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIVE
AMERICAN FISH AND WILDLIFE SOCIETY, NORTHGLENN, COLORADO
Dr. Thorstenson. [Speaking Lakota language] Good morning.
My name is Julie Thorstenson. My Lakota name is [Speaking
Lakota language]. I am Lakota and a citizen of the Cheyenne
River Sioux Nation in North Central South Dakota. I am glad to
be here as Executive Director of the Native American Fish and
Wildlife Society, a 501(c)(3) non-profit with a mission to
assist Native American and Alaska Native tribes with the
preservation, conservation, and enhancement of their fish and
wildlife resources. Thank you for the opportunity to speak
today on the importance of including tribes in the prevention
of pandemics through U.S. wildlife-borne disease surveillance.
I personally have a unique perspective on this topic,
having begun my career as a wildlife biologist for my tribe and
also having served as their Health Department CEO.
Unfortunately, many times, I found myself in a state of
reaction in both jobs due to severe underfunding and lack of
capacity for tribes.
Today, I am going to focus on the threats to tribes and the
importance of including them in every stage, from prevention
and planning, to implementation and monitoring.
The COVID-19 pandemic had devastating impacts to Indian
Country, with the CDC and Indian Health Service reporting
higher levels of infections, hospitalizations, and deaths as a
result of COVID-19 among American Indian and Alaska Native
persons compared to non-Hispanic White persons. Nearly 9,000
deaths of American Indian and Alaska Native individuals were
attributed to the novel coronavirus in the United States at the
end of December 2021. While the number of deaths is
overwhelming, what cannot be truly quantified is the amount of
knowledge we have lost: the language speakers, the cultural
experts, and unknown amounts of traditional ecological
knowledge they held.
Tribes are dedicated to the health of their people, lands,
fish and wildlife relatives, while preserving their language
and culture, but face many challenges. At the Native American
Fish and Wildlife Society, several zoonotic diseases are on our
radar as we work to provide technical assistance and overall
awareness to the 574 federally recognized tribes in the United
States.
The recent reports of SARS-CoV-2 in white tailed deer are
especially alarming, as many tribal citizens maintain a
subsistence lifestyle and are at a higher risk through
increased interaction with wildlife.
This amplifies the concerns chronic wasting disease already
presents for tribal citizens. For example, there are tribal
citizens that use the brain of deer and other big game for hide
tanning, presenting a risk of exposure to the prions found
primarily in the central nervous system of an infected animal.
Tribal fish and wildlife professionals must balance the
need to educate on risk and safety precautions without impeding
important cultural practices.
The highly pathogenic avian influenza is currently
spreading across the country. Tribes must consider protecting
the wildlife, the backyard poultry flocks necessary for food
sovereignty and security, while decreasing exposure risk for
hunters. Avian influenza also poses an economic hardship to
tribes, with lost revenue from hunting licenses due to concerns
with exposing hunters to known diseases and other tribal
economic losses from lodging and food purchases.
Avian influenza is impacting eagle populations, as well. In
some instances, eagle carcasses are not being collected or are
being incinerated due to the threat of possible exposure to
avian influenza. These eagle carcasses are lost important
resources for tribes that need them for ceremonies and other
cultural practices, a resource that is already extremely
limited with the National Eagle Repository reporting long wait
times, up to 10 years for a whole immature golden eagle, for
tribal citizens.
One of our most common requests for technical assistance at
NAFWS is to help tribes identify funding sources. The inequity
in funding for tribal fish and wildlife programs is perhaps one
of the most obvious but least known issues in conservation
work. We often see one person responsible for multiple complex
issues in tribal fish and wildlife programs. We cannot expect
one person to be an expert in everything that threatens and
impacts our fish and wildlife relatives.
Wildlife do not respect our political boundaries. Tribes
most actively engage in every level of surveillance without
compromising tribal sovereignty. To actively participate in
surveillance, tribes need funding, and not only grant funding.
Grants are incapable of providing a rapid response necessary
for disease management. You cannot quickly respond with grant-
dependent funding nor fund the long-term monitoring necessary.
Many tribes also lack the capacity to apply for grant funding
and the reporting and compliance that goes with it. Adequate
funding for tribes will help build capacity through staffing,
training, sampling, and testing, while ensuring tribes maintain
data sovereignty.
Without tribes involved, there can be pockets of unknowns
or outbreaks in the 56.2 million acres of tribal lands. The
very complicated jurisdiction also must be navigated. For
example, if zoonotic disease originates within a tribal
reservation, what happens? Who becomes the lead? Tribes may be
hesitant to report to a state veterinarian because of threats
to tribal sovereignty and negative public perception of disease
origination.
Adequate funding will allow tribes to develop plans,
instead of reacting to situations as they arise. It will allow
for these plans to be built in cooperation with Federal, state,
and local agencies.
In closing, tribes must be included in preventing pandemics
through wildlife-borne disease surveillance. This requires
dedicated, long-term programmatic funding for tribes to build
capacity and the quick response necessary for disease
management.
[Speaking Native language.] Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Thorstenson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Julie Thorstenson, PhD
Good Morning. My name is Julie Thorstenson. I am Lakota and a
citizen of the Cheyenne River Sioux Nation in Northcentral South
Dakota. I am glad to be here. I am the Executive Director of the Native
American Fish and Wildlife Society, a 501c3 nonprofit with the mission
to assist Native American and Alaska Native Tribes with the
preservation, conservation and enhancement of their fish and wildlife
resources.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak today on the importance of
including Tribes in prevention of pandemics through US Wildlife-borne
Disease Surveillance. I personally have a unique perspective on this
topic having begun my career as Wildlife Biologist for my Tribe and
also having served as their Health Department CEO. Unfortunately, many
times, I found myself in a state of reaction in both jobs due to severe
underfunding and lack of capacity for Tribes.
I'm sure my fellow panelists will speak to the science of wildlife-
borne disease and the impacts it has on wildlife. I'm going to focus on
the threats to Tribes and the importance of including them in every
stage, from prevention and planning to implementation and monitoring.
The Covid-19 Pandemic had devastating impacts to Indian Country. A
recent study published by JAMA Network Open (2022) found, ``Indigenous
populations are believed to be one of the worst affected in the nation.
As of November 22, 2021, American Indian and Alaska Native persons were
1.6 times more likely to have SARS-CoV-2 infection, 3.3 times more
likely to be hospitalized, and 2.2 times more likely to die as a result
of COVID-19 than non-Hispanic White persons.\1\ As of December 15,
2021, a reported 296 967 infections and 8983 deaths of American Indian
and Alaska Native individuals were attributed to the novel coronavirus
in the US.'' While the number of deaths is overwhelming, what cannot
truly be quantified is the amount of knowledge we have lost, the
language speakers and culture experts and unknown amounts of
traditional ecological knowledge. On my home on the Cheyenne River
Sioux Reservation, we lost 57 people to Covid-19, many were our
cultural leaders and fluent Lakota language speakers. Tribes are
dedicated to the health of their people, lands, and fish and wildlife
relatives, while preserving language and culture but face many unseen
challenges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Musshafen, L.A. et al. 2022. In-Hospital Mortality Disparities
Among American Indian and Alaska Native, Black, and White Patients with
COVID-19. JAMA Network Open. 2022;5(3):e224822. doi:10.1001/
jamanetworkopen.2022.4822
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the Native American Fish and Wildlife Society several zoonotic
diseases are on our radar as we try to provide technical assistance and
overall awareness to the 574 federally recognized Tribes in the US. The
recent reports of SARS-CoV-2 in white-tailed deer are especially
alarming as many Tribal citizens maintain a subsistence lifestyle and
are at higher risks through increased interaction with wildlife. This
amplifies the concerns Chronic Wasting Disease already presents for
tribal citizens. For example, there are Tribal citizens that use the
brain of deer and other big game for hide tanning, presenting a risk of
exposure to the prions found primarily in the central nervous system of
an infected animal. Tribal Fish and Wildlife professionals must balance
the need to educate on risks and safety precautions without impeding
important cultural practices.
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) is currently spreading
across the country. Tribes must consider protecting the wildlife, the
backyard poultry flocks necessary for food sovereignty/security and
decreasing exposure risks for hunters. Not being able to sell hunting
licenses due to concerns with exposing hunters to known diseases has an
adverse impact on the limited tribal revenue and can cause other tribal
economic losses from lodging and food purchases at tribal
establishments. We are seeing HPAI deaths in eagle populations as well.
In some instances, eagle carcasses are not being collected or are being
incinerated due to the threat of possible exposure to HPAI. These eagle
carcasses are lost important resources for Tribes that need them for
ceremonies and other cultural practices. A resource that is already
extremely limited with the National Eagle Repository reporting long
wait times, up to 10 years for a whole immature golden eagle, for
Tribal citizens.
Black-footed Ferrets (Mustela nigripes) are the most endangered
mammal in North America with around 350-400 animals in the wild
population. Tribes have been key to Black-footed ferret recovery
efforts; serving as some of the most successful reintroduction sites
over the years. That is until sylvatic plague decimated thousands of
acres of prairie dog towns that serve as the critical habitat for
black-footed ferrets. Blackfooted ferret recovery relies on a captive
breeding program. As SARS-CoV-2 virus spread there were known cases in
mustelids, including farm-raised mink and domestic ferrets (USGS, 2021)
\2\ adding yet another risk for black-footed ferret recovery. Tribes
often take on the role of endangered species recovery without any
funding. The increasing number of zoonotic disease threats to black-
footed ferret recovery adds additional financial and personnel strains
to Tribal programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ National Wildlife Health Center. 2021. Development of SARS-CoV-
2 vaccine to support black-footed ferret conservation. https://
www.usgs.gov/centers/nwhc/science/development-sars-cov-2-vaccine-
support-black-footed-ferret-conservation
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One of our most common requests for technical assistance at NAFWS
is to help Tribes identify funding sources. The inequity in funding for
Tribal fish and wildlife programs is perhaps one of the most obvious
but least known issues in conservation work. We often see one person
responsible for multiple complex issues in Tribal fish and wildlife
programs. We cannot expect one person to be an expert in everything
that threatens and impacts our fish and wildlife relatives.
Wildlife do not respect our political boundaries. Tribes must be
actively engaged in every level of surveillance without compromising
Tribal sovereignty. To actively participate in surveillance, Tribes
need FUNDING and not grant funding. Grants are incapable of providing a
rapid response necessary for disease management, you cannot quickly
respond with grant dependent funding nor fund the long-term monitoring
necessary from sustained funding. Many Tribes also lack the capacity to
apply for grant funding and the reporting and compliance that goes with
it.
Adequate funding for Tribes will help build capacity through
staffing, training, sampling and testing while ensuring Tribes maintain
data sovereignty. Without Tribes involved, there can be pockets of
unknowns or outbreaks in the 56.2 Million acres of Tribal lands. The
very complicated jurisdiction also must be navigated. For example, if a
zoonotic disease originates within a Tribal Reservation, what happens?
Who becomes the lead? Tribes may be hesitant to report to a state
veterinarian because of threats to Tribal Sovereignty and negative
public perception of the disease origination. Adequate funding will
allow Tribes to develop plans instead of reacting to situations as they
arise. It will allow for these plans to be built in cooperation with
Federal, State and local agencies.
In closing, Tribes must be included in preventing pandemics through
wildlife-borne disease surveillance. This requires dedicated, long-
term, programmatic funding for Tribes to build capacity and the quick
response necessary for disease management.
______
Questions Submitted for the Record to Dr. Julie Thorstenson, PhD
Questions Submitted by Representative Porter
Question 1. What is the Native American Fish and Wildlife Society
able to do with the funding it is getting through the American Rescue
Plan and how will it help with wildlife-borne disease management?
Answer. Tribes have recognized the interconnectedness between
people, animals, plants and their shared environments for time
immemorial, the very definition of the One Health approach, yet the
Tribal voice is often missing. Tribal fish and wildlife professionals'
participation in the One Health effort is critical. However, Tribes
often lack the capacity or accessibility to resources to participate or
provide input. Tribes have identified the need for training and access
to wildlife veterinarians or zoonotic disease specialists as barriers
and threats to human health and natural resources.
The NAFWS has entered a PL93-638 self-determination contract with
the USFWS, one of the first self-determination contracts with the
USFWS. Included in this contract is an objective to provide technical
assistance to NAFWS member Tribes and individual members on zoonotic
diseases through a dedicated Tribal Wildlife Disease Coordinator. The
funds for this objective are from the American Rescue Plan section
6003. NAFWS contracted with Native Healing, LLC and Dr. Tolani
Francisco, DVM and citizen of Pueblo of Laguna. Dr. Francisco will
serve as the lead consultant providing the following:
A working phone number for Tribes to contact with
questions related to zoonotic diseases and overall wildlife
disease.
Four (4) informational articles to be included in the
NAFWS newsletter ``From the Eagles' Nest'
Review, comment and suggest content for the NAFWS 2022
National Initiative ``Wildlife Health'' webpage
Present at the National NAFWS Conference and Regional
conference/events.
Tribes have expressed a need for a person to contact for wildlife
health and disease questions. Dr. Francisco is a respected professional
in Indian Country and will help serve a valuable needed service to
Tribes. This is also comparative to a service the USFWS has been
funding for years through AFWA.
Question 2. Is there any additional information about your views on
domestic U.S. surveillance of wildlife-borne diseases for future
pandemic prevention that you would like to share for the record?
Answer. Wildlife and wildlife disease do NOT respect political
boundaries, therefore all entities must be part of surveillance to
protect the health and welfare of all. There are 574 federally
recognized Tribes in the U.S. as of 2022 and each are unique sovereign
nations. Tribes also hold a unique status as sovereign nations within
the United States with a trust responsibility from the Federal
Government. Time is needed to develop relationships and understand the
unique needs of each Tribe. Tribes will need consistent, sustainable
funding to build capacity to be able to participate in the
conversations around wildlife-borne diseases.
Questions Submitted by Representative Cohen
Question 1. You testified about impacts that zoonotic diseases are
having on tribal cultures, from Covid to chronic wasting disease to
highly pathogenic avian influenza. How would having Tribes better
represented in the planning and implementation of wildlife disease
monitoring and response help address some of these cultural impacts?
Answer. Tribes have a different way of knowing and co-existing with
their environment. They bring important perspectives to wildlife and
ecosystem management that extend to wildlife disease response planning,
including the impacts to culture, medicinal plants, and spiritual
wellbeing. In a conversation with a State Agency on chronic wasting
disease, our team demonstrated the need for Tribally focused education
materials due to increased exposure risk for Tribal citizens who use
the brain of big game to tan hides. The State's response was ``tell
them to stop.''
At NAFWS, we provide resources and technical assistance that
supports self-determination and allows for incorporation of Tribal
priorities, cultures, and uniqueness. Tribes are best suited to provide
the direction to protect and preserve their lands and culture. Asking
Tribes to stop practicing their lifeways is neither effective
management nor meaningful engagement. Tribes must be involved in the
conversations to raise awareness of these risks and help mitigate the
ways that supports cultural preservation. In the case of chronic
wasting disease, this could mean the utilization of protective
equipment rather than the loss of a cultural practice.
The State interests, scientific, academic, economical, and health
issues are all represented well within the planning conversations, the
Tribal voice is missing. Tribes own or manage nearly 140 million acres
of lands in the United States, without Tribes, the plan is not
complete.
Question 2. Why do you think Tribes are not better represented in
the planning of wildlife borne disease monitoring and response?
Answer. The short answer is a lack of funding and capacity. Tribes
do not have consistent, stable base funding for fish and wildlife
management. What we see is one person responsible for multitudes of
duties. Tribes piecemeal their programs together, often relying on
grant funding. This further limits capacity with Tribal fish and
wildlife staff spending a large about of their time on planning,
writing, implementing and monitoring grants, just to keep staff
employed. There is also a lack of understanding of the importance of
engaging Tribes and the appropriate avenues to do. Official nation to
nation tribal consultation is an important and needed component,
however, conversations between managers is also needed to build
relationships. Relationship building must be more than a checked box.
Even if Tribes are not living on the lands, they still may have a
connection to them as traditional homelands and cultural use areas.
Tribes MUST be part of all parts of wildlife borne disease programming.
However, they may need assistance to being involved.
______
Ms. Porter. I thank the panel for its testimony. Reminding
Members that Committee Rule 3(d) imposes a 5-minute limit on
questions, the Chair will now recognize Members for any
questions that they wish to ask the witnesses.
We are going to begin with recognizing the gentleman from
California, Mr. Huffman, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Huffman. Thank you, Madam Chair. I want to continue my
line of questioning on mink farming, and I realize that our
window of jurisdiction is about wildlife and the habitat that
sustains wildlife, and many of the witnesses are appropriately
focused on that, but when our oversight authority in that space
identifies a problem with much broader implications, I think it
is OK to talk about that, too.
So, I guess I would bring my question back to Mr.
Stallknecht. Should we be concerned that USGS is finding
elevated levels of COVID in wildlife surrounding mink farms?
And while we think about the wildlife and environmental
implications of that, should we also be concerned about the
broader implications of millions of these animals concentrated
into these facilities, where they are known to contract COVID
pretty easily, to spread it, and to have mutations that can go
back and forth between humans and mink?
Dr. Stallknecht. As far as spillover from mink farms to the
surrounding wildlife, I think there is an area of concern. I
don't think we really know what the implications of that are
right now, to be quite honest about it, but it is certainly
something that should be monitored. We will leave it at that.
Mr. Huffman. OK.
Dr. Stallknecht. As far as mink farms go, any time you
concentrate a large number of susceptible animals together
under artificial conditions, especially wildlife, you present a
potential problem. It is far beyond me.
Mr. Huffman. And I appreciate the fact that we are doing
the surveillance work in the surrounding area. But I guess what
I am wondering is, if someone can tell me, are we surveilling
the mink farms themselves?
Because it seems like that is a far greater concern, in
terms of this pandemic. The worst thing that could possibly
happen as we try to emerge from this pandemic, of course, is a
mutation that throws a monkey wrench at us. So, if we are not
doing that same kind of surveillance in the mink farms
themselves, surveillance being maybe the first step, maybe
more--I mean, Denmark euthanized, I think, 17 million of these
animals because of a massive COVID outbreak in one of their
mink farming operations.
So, do you know of any surveillance within the industry
itself in these farms?
Dr. Stallknecht. I guess that is directed to me. I do not.
This is an area that we do not work in, so----
Mr. Huffman. I am sorry to put you on the spot there, but
let me just ask, if any of the other witnesses want to add to
what you have said, or speak to the concerns that I am raising,
because I find it, frankly, quite alarming.
[Pause.]
Mr. Huffman. All right. Well, crickets, then, in terms of--
and I may need to just take up these concerns with some other
folks that, hopefully, are on the case and out there in these
facilities doing surveillance and considering interventions
that may be appropriate. But I appreciate your testimony, Mr.
Stallknecht, and the other witnesses.
Madam Chair, I will yield back.
Ms. Porter. Thank you very much. The Chair now recognizes
Mr. Hice, the gentleman from Georgia.
Dr. Hice. Thank you so much, Madam Chair. In each of our
witnesses, we appreciate you being here a great deal.
Dr. Stallknecht, I would like to begin with you. And I will
begin by saying, ``Go Dawgs--Welcome, UGA.'' Glad you are here
with us today.
In your testimony, you stated that there have been five
pandemics and two near misses in your lifetime. And I would
like, if you could, to expound upon which country each of these
viruses originated in. Could you do that?
Dr. Stallknecht. I will give you more of a region than a
country.
As far as the two influenza pandemics, 1957--H2N2 and the
H3N2, our best guess is these originated from Asia.
Pandemic H1N1 was actually a real surprise, and that
actually originated in the Western Hemisphere. The exact
location, we don't know. But it really resulted from some re-
combination, re-assortment of events with swine influenza
viruses.
HIV, Africa; and SARS coronavirus from Asia. Ebola, the new
near misses--Ebola, Africa; and then SARS, the original SARS,
virus from Asia.
Dr. Hice. OK, thank you very much. So, we have multiple
different places around the world, a couple from Africa, three
from China. We have Hong Kong, we have Mexico.
Ms. Semcer, let me come to you with this. Can you
describe--and I will just use this one as a specific--can you
describe how China's Belt and Road Initiative has negatively
impacted Africa's defense against these viruses?
Ms. Semcer. Thank you for that question. The Belt and Road
Initiative is primarily an infrastructure initiative. But more
than that, it is also a cultural exchange initiative.
And one thing that is occurring within the context of Belt
and Road is the promotion and expansion of traditional Chinese
medicine along the Belt and Road. China is actively promoting
traditional Chinese medicine as an alternative to Western
medicine. And, as part of this, we are starting to see more
promotion of what we deem to be high-risk species as cures,
including for things like COVID.
For example, the Chinese Communist Party was promoting
pangolin scales for some time as a potential cure for COVID. We
know that this is quack medicine, of course. We also know that
it increases the risk of wildlife-borne diseases being
transferred into the human population, since pangolins are a
species of particular high risk for spillover.
Dr. Hice. So, has it negatively impacted Africa's defense,
would you say yes or no with that.
Ms. Semcer. I would say that there is an increased demand
for high-risk wildlife as a result of this promotion of TCM,
yes.
Dr. Hice. OK. So, I guess the big question here that I have
in my mind is, if we spend more money in the United States,
will that lead to more accountability for countries like China?
Ms. Semcer. I am not certain it is an either/or situation.
I think that we need to shore up our defenses in the homeland
for sure, but we also do need to hold bad actors accountable
internationally.
Wildlife-borne pandemics are a potential existential threat
to humanity. We have already seen what COVID-19 has done. We
have nearly a million dead Americans, 80 million sick, and that
is just in this country. We have a global economy that has been
severely impacted by the pandemic. We can't do this alone. This
has to be an international effort.
Dr. Hice. Yes, and that is the problem. That is the
problem. It is an issue that involves the international
community. So, just simply the United States spending more
money does not mean this fixes the issue in China or in other
countries. Is that correct?
Ms. Semcer. It doesn't fix the issue in those countries,
but it will make it easier for us to defend ourselves should
they fall and not do what is expected of them.
Dr. Hice. Yes, and I get that. But we have to do both. We
have to defend our country, and our people, and so forth. But
at the same time, others have to be held accountable. And
simply us spending more money does not produce accountability
elsewhere. And that issue, I believe, must be on the table.
Ms. Semcer. I agree.
Dr. Hice. Thank you very much. I yield back.
Ms. Porter. Thank you. The Chair will now recognize herself
for 5 minutes.
Dr. Thorstenson, what would it mean for the tribes that you
work with to have dedicated, consistent funding?
Dr. Thorstenson. Well, I will tell you that, for the most
part, tribes operate in a piecemeal-type project for tribal
fish and wildlife programs. There is no base funding for tribal
fish and wildlife programs.
So, having dedicated funding that they can rely on, that
will help to build sustainable, long-term programing, instead
of having someone that is focused mostly on reporting and
securing their job through grant funding. I think it would
definitely help to bring tribes to a different level and be at
the table that they have been left out of for so long.
Ms. Porter. Do you see it as potentially helping to improve
coordination between the work--sustain the work that the tribes
are trying to do, but then also bring that information and
learning and connect it to the Federal researchers and state
researchers working on this?
Dr. Thorstenson. Yes, absolutely. I think it is not that
tribes aren't doing the work. It is not that they don't want to
be involved. It is that they simply don't have the capacity to
be there.
And they get a lot of asks to be in attendance, or to be a
part of something. But like I mentioned, we have several
departments that are one person, and they are dealing with
everything from food sovereignty to fish and wildlife
management to diseases, cultural practices. All of this is on
their plate. So, every ask is just an additional task for one
person for our understaffed departments.
Ms. Porter. Thank you for that.
Dr. Carlson, I want to turn to you. I want to understand
what we know about the transmission of coronavirus from animals
to people.
I am aware of four probable cases of spillover into people
from mink in Michigan that were recently disclosed, and all
four have the same variant as the minks on the mink farm. Two
of the cases were workers on the farm. I think we can
understand how they might have gotten it. But the other two
cases were a married couple with no connection to the farm at
all.
In your opinion, is it possible that the variant spread
from the mink on the farm ultimately to the couple through
community transmission?
Dr. Carlson. Thank you for the question. Yes, I think, the
strength of genomic epidemiology is that we are able to make
these connections, right?
When we see a connection like that, there must be something
we haven't caught. So, we can piece together that there may be
a connection, most likely, person to person, that has not been
observed.
Now, I will say my first training as an epidemiologist is
not to weigh in on outbreaks I have not been pulled into. But,
yes, I think we know this is a very transmissible virus. We
know that it was very transmissible after it went from animals
to humans the first time. It is likely that it continues to be
transmissible, human to human, after spillback and
reintroduction into human populations. I don't think it would
be any surprise to see variants that originate in mink, or
deer, or any other species have onward transmission.
Ms. Porter. And I think one of the concerns is, without the
kind of work that you are doing, without digging into that
research, we can't accurately count how many wildlife-related
cases there are, because we sometimes undercount, and those go
into the community transmission pile instead of the wildlife
pile. And it can really, I think, suggest that this is less of
a problem and less of a source of disease than it actually is.
I wanted to ask you--I read with great interest the article
about your work in The New York Times, and I believe also maybe
in Nature. Can you talk a little bit and share with us? How can
artificial intelligence be used to make predictions about
wildlife-borne diseases?
How can we leverage that to get the most benefit out of the
investments that we do make in monitoring?
Dr. Carlson. Absolutely. Artificial intelligence is a big,
scary phrase, but it is really just statistics running on a
nice computer. It is a way for us to make sense of big,
complicated data, right?
So, we are able to do things like look at the genomic
sequences of viruses that infect humans and learn general rules
about what a virus that could affect us looks like. Training
the computer to do that lets us work with large sources of data
that are hard for us to kind of get in there and handle
ourselves, like genomes, where there are maybe hundreds of
thousands or millions of data points contained in one record.
So, artificial intelligence has a huge possibility to
inform public health, to inform One Health surveillance, but it
can only do that if we have sufficient data to power it.
Ms. Porter. I am so glad you mentioned that, because my
last question for you is: Is there any reason, legitimate, that
I should accept as to why California, for example, doesn't
share its data?
Dr. Carlson. There are challenges that arise around, I
think, not just data sovereignty, but accountability for how we
use data.
I can't speak for California, but I know that often, when
we see data withheld by agencies or made difficult to obtain
it, it comes from the fact that because research is so
underfunded, because surveillance is so underfunded, there are
often concerns that if data are not protected, they might not
be acknowledged at all from where they came from. So, this is,
I think, largely symptomatic of how under-resourced the
institutions that collect the data are.
Now, whether or not that is legitimate is not mine to speak
for. I do not work for the government. It is not mine to decide
what happens with government data. But I will say that, for
researchers, the best thing that we can do is have funded
systems that are just flowing with data and there are no
concerns about scarcity.
Ms. Porter. I really appreciate that. I mean, I think,
luckily for you, I am a government leader. And I do think that
when we, as taxpayers, invest in data, that it ought to be
shared as much as possible.
And I was a professor before I came to Congress. I have
seen this scarcity mindset that leads to a lack of sharing. But
as you point out in your testimony, the lack of data sharing
can create noticeable holes in risk mapping and in risk
prediction.
So, as we think about how to strengthen our disease
surveillance system and how to make these investments, I think
one of the commitments has to be that with those stable streams
of funding comes expectations of robust data-sharing and robust
cooperation across agencies, including the works that tribes
are doing.
With that, I will now recognize Mr. Moore for his
questioning.
Mr. Moore. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I share your
frustration or push to be able to share data. We saw,
completely out of this context, the 911 Commission. The key
finding from the 911 Commission was that intelligence agencies
weren't sharing data for reasons of bravado or just sheer
silos. Other than that, it was pointless. And we have seen
better collaboration going forward. So, we know that our
government can actually improve in this capacity. It has been a
common thread through today's conversation.
Ms. Semcer, I want to just thank you for helping to provide
a more international perspective. And as Congress is about to
embark on the conferencing of the two different China bills
that existed from the House and the Senate--I get to be a part
of that conference process--I can't underscore the importance
of the impact that China will have on the entire world.
We don't--we want to talk climate change all we want, but
if we don't get China under control, there is nothing that we
can do about the effect that they have, the outsized effect
that China has in a negative way across so many different
factors.
Your focus today, particularly with spread and pandemic, is
key to this conversation. So, thank you again for being here.
Can you just jump into how illegal activities like wildlife
trafficking create environments that increase the risk of
disease spillover between species.
Ms. Semcer. In the context of wildlife trafficking, what we
often find is that trafficked wildlife is crammed together. You
have suitcases full of birds or turtles. You have shipping
containers full of any number of different species. And as the
other witnesses have discussed, when wildlife is crammed
together in close, close confinement, the risk of spillover
from one species to another and mutation is increased.
This is a consequence of illegal trade because the fact
that it is a black market means that no one is doing any type
of disease monitoring for these species.
Mr. Moore. Give us a sense for the increased risk with this
spillover impact, the likelihood of future pandemics,
specifically with this issue and how it will ultimately affect
future pandemics.
Ms. Semcer. Well, I can't assign a number to it. I don't
have the data to be able to do that.
But unless we get a handle on illegal wildlife trafficking,
we are likely going to see the risk of pandemic disease
increase. Since the COVID-19 pandemic has broken out, there has
been a lot of talk about increasing the global response to
illicit wildlife trafficking, but we haven't seen much deployed
on the ground.
I am on the Advisory Board of the Game Rangers Association
of Africa, which is the largest professional association of
conservation and law enforcement officers on the continent.
Frankly, a lot of our members are struggling for resources.
These guys are the first line of defense in wildlife
trafficking. These are the ones who are going to stop that
pangolin, or stop that civet, from getting into that shipping
container. They are the ones who are going to potentially keep
the bio-threat close to the source of origin. But the resources
are just not there. And the pandemic, frankly, has made it
worse, because many of them were dependent on revenue from
tourism, which, obviously, has declined in the wake of the
global tourism shutdown.
Mr. Moore. And continuing with that in Africa, outside of
just the containers and the supply chain issues, how have
Chinese investments, whether it be the Belt and Road
Initiative, led to unsustainable natural resource extraction
projects?
Ms. Semcer. Well, when we talk about Chinese investments,
that is not a monolithic area. McKinsey and Company says there
are about 10,000 small- to medium-sized enterprises that are
owned by Chinese nationals operating on the African continent.
And many of these are perfectly legitimate businesses. However,
unfortunately, a significant number of them are engaged in
activities that are reliant on criminal activity or government
corruption to produce what it is they are seeking to produce.
And this is particularly prevalent in the forestry sector,
where we see Chinese companies engaging in illegal logging,
exporting raw logs off of the African continent to China to be
finished.
Of course, this deforestation, as I mentioned in my opening
statement, contributes to the increased risk of viral
spillover. Now, what happens to these raw logs once they reach
China? Well, very often they are made into furniture that we
then purchase.
So, there is a very troubling loop occurring here that
unifies our two countries, and also puts us in a position to
hold China accountable to make sure that its nationals are not
engaging in this illegal activity, not enabling corruption on
the African continent, and are enforcing their own laws to make
sure that pandemic risk is not increased.
Mr. Moore. And it is easy to complain about this. I find
myself doing it quite a bit. It is easy to point the finger at
what China is doing, both in their own country and in their
investment opportunities across the world.
I welcome your input and expertise in helping us drive
toward solutions, and we will always be open to those ideas and
collaborations. So, thank you.
I yield back.
Ms. Porter. Thank you very much. The Chair now recognizes
the gentlelady from Iowa, Mrs. Axne, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Axne. Thank you, Chairwoman Porter, for allowing me to
waive on to this important Subcommittee hearing. I am glad to
be here.
Dr. Stallknecht, my great state of Iowa is the nation's
leading egg producer and a major turkey producer, as well. So,
the current outbreak of highly pathogenic avian flu is of great
concern to us, of course. Thirteen million chickens and turkeys
have had to be depopulated in Iowa as a result of this current
avian flu outbreak. So, understanding how we can better predict
and protect against these wildlife outbreaks is going to be
incredibly important as we continue with the issues we face in
Iowa.
I understand that about 50 million birds died as a result
of the highly pathogenic avian flu outbreak in 2015, most of
which were commercial poultry operations, and that the economic
impact of that outbreak was in the neighborhood of about $4
billion. Does that sound correct to you?
Dr. Stallknecht. Yes, it does.
Mrs. Axne. Thank you. And the current avian flu outbreak in
the United States has already inflicted some major damage. I
hear about it far too often, quite honestly. About 31 million
birds in the United States have been confirmed to be near
active infection.
Is it true that the vast majority of them, most of which
are in commercial poultry farms, will also have to be
depopulated?
Dr. Stallknecht. Yes.
Mrs. Axne. OK, and for folks who might not know what that
word means, that just means disposed of. That just means
killed, correct?
Dr. Stallknecht. Correct.
Mrs. Axne. Thank you. Which way is that outbreak trending,
and is it accelerating or is it slowing down?
Dr. Stallknecht. At present, it is probably accelerating.
Whether it will continue to accelerate is unknown. And that is
one of the kind of areas that we are working in.
The one thing we don't know is if this virus will persist
in the wild bird population. And hopefully it won't, because,
hopefully, if it doesn't persist, we won't have this threat
year after year after year.
And that is sort of our approach to this. We really are not
going to get this virus out of wild birds. There is nothing we
can do. We can maybe manage a little differently to reduce the
risk, but it is basically early warning, and basically
informing the poultry industry that, look, in August and July
there may be a peak prevalence, be prepared. And I know that is
not what poultry producers want to hear, but that is probably
the reality of the situation.
Mrs. Axne. Well, thank you. I appreciate that forewarning
here. And listen, it might not be what we want to hear, but we
should always know what is coming up. And I appreciate what you
are doing to stay on top of this.
But to be clear, I just want to make sure we address this.
We found no evidence of spillover into people in the United
States from this particular outbreak. Still, the National
Academies have said that the outbreak of this type of virus
could, in a worst case scenario, cause anywhere from 71 to up
to 260 million deaths in people. And while I understand that
our monitoring of the outbreak is better coordinated and better
funded than many others, and I am so grateful for that, what
can we be doing? Is there more that we could be doing to help
reduce the damage from this bird flu outbreak?
And the other question I have is: What are we doing well in
response to the bird flu?
Dr. Stallknecht. I think what we are doing well, what we
did well this year, is probably the early detection from wild
birds. And it was caught, and that was good. And it actually
was quite fortunate, because the surveillance was greatly
reduced this year and it was actually going on in only two
flyways, and I was not included in any of those flyways. So, I
think that is one thing we did well, but we need to beef it all
up.
The one thing that we also, I think, really did well is we
also did a really quick shift into the Mississippi Flyway when
we found it on the Atlantic Flyway. And that was a lot of
improvisation, actually, working without funding, and hoping
that the funding would come.
This is really a tough one. And basically, as far as
reducing--the poultry industry is really going to have to take
care of themselves as far as biosecurity, as far as shoring
things up to prevent transmission. Early warning helps them do
that. And that is about all I can say.
Mrs. Axne. OK. So, better early warning, a continuance of
the early warning, but if I am hearing you correctly, the best
we can do at this point is just be prepared as well as
possible.
Dr. Stallknecht. And know what is going on out there in the
wild.
Mrs. Axne. OK. Well, it is why this hearing is so
important, so that, hopefully, in the future we can figure out
a way to have less of these risks that we have to mitigate.
Thank you so much for allowing me on the Committee,
Chairwoman Porter.
Ms. Porter. Thank you very much. And I believe that
concludes our Member questioning
With the cooperation of Ranking Member Moore, I would like
to offer each witness the chance to make a minute or so of
remarks, sharing with us anything else that you believe this
panel would benefit from knowing. We will just go in the same
order that we went for the questioning, as best as I can
remember it. So, we will start with you, Dr. Carlson.
Dr. Carlson. Sure. I think, just to respond to some of the
things that have come up today, I think it is important to note
that the landscape of risk is changing very rapidly for disease
emergence.
We are used to a world where there are three big drivers
upstream, right? There is wildlife trade, there is agriculture,
and there is deforestation. Today, we have talked a lot about
wildlife trade, particularly illegal wildlife trade. Now, this
is a major risk to the United States. We are a major importer
in particular of exotic pets. But a 2015 study by researchers
at UC Davis showed that, out of more than 100 zoonotic viruses
they looked at, I believe at least 90 percent could not be
connected at all to wildlife trade or wildlife hunting. If we
focus on only one solution, if we focus on only one country, we
will not stop outbreaks.
And the future is a different place than the present. There
is more climate change. There is more deforestation. We need to
be able to move nimbly and pivot to that.
Ms. Porter. Thank you.
Dr. Stallknecht?
Dr. Stallknecht. I would like to just make two really quick
points.
A lot of the diseases that we are talking about today also
have pretty severe wildlife impacts, and this is important for
a natural resources committee to understand. This outbreak of
highly pathogenic influenza is also really having impacts on
bald eagle populations. In Georgia, we have seen close to a 40
percent reduction in productivity on our coastal nesting
populations.
And the second thing I would really want to sort of
address, there has been a lot of talk on interagency
cooperation and how we work together. With influenza we are--
SCWDS is also a part of the NIH Centers of Excellence for
Influenza Research and Response. And everything that we get
from the wild, from a wild bird, we are actually submitting to
NIH researchers to do the assessments to really understand the
potential for human disease. And this is just another important
sort of side product that we get by just actually getting these
isolates from the field.
And I also would like to just sort of build on what was
said about tribal preparedness and the lack of people. The
states are suffering from the same thing. There are many states
in our cooperative that have one person dedicated to wildlife
disease throughout the entire state. And we are talking about a
lot of species here. Thank you.
Ms. Porter. Thank you very much.
Ms. Semcer?
Ms. Semcer. Thank you. I would echo some of what Dr.
Carlson said. There is no one-size-fits-all approach to this.
There is no magic bullet. And we do have to appreciate that
this is a threat facing us as severe, if not more severe, than
the terrorist attacks of September 11th that Ranking Member
Moore mentioned.
To that end, we do need to work internationally. We need to
work across borders. At the same time, we need to lead our
international partners by example so that we can engage with
this threat effectively and reduce its ability to harm us.
Ms. Porter. Thank you.
Dr. Thorstenson?
Dr. Thorstenson. Thank you. I think one thing is tribes
have recognized the interconnectedness between people, animals,
plants, and their shared environments from time immemorial, the
very definition of One Health. However, tribal voices have been
missing.
And tribes add a different perspective. They bring the
cultural impacts that people might not regularly think about
with zoonotic diseases.
Also, we were very happy to see the new funding through the
American Recovery Plan for zoonotic diseases and see tribes
included in that. However, grants--oftentimes we have to write
to the grant priorities, and it undermines tribal sovereignty.
It limits tribes to be able to write to their own and set their
own priorities.
And, also, it pits tribes against each other where there is
a small pot of money, where 574 federally recognized tribes
have to compete. And it undermines, and it is hard to
collaborate when you might have a neighboring tribe and you are
after the same pieces of funding.
Also, having tribes at the table, they will bring up the
unknown barriers that might be to funding, such as matches, new
and complicated grant application platforms.
And I would just really, really urge you to consider self-
determination, rather than grant processes, in the future for
tribes. There are lots of authorities to the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act that already exist
that can help tribes to receive funding that would be more
sustainable, dedicated, and less burdensome to them. Thank you.
Ms. Porter. Thank you very much for offering those
concluding thoughts. That was very helpful.
Before and during this hearing, experts have warned us that
surveillance of wildlife-borne diseases is inadequate in the
United States, and that we may miss signs of outbreaks that
could cause significant harm to human health, to wildlife, and
to the economy.
You, as experts, have told us that if we want better
tracking, we need to provide consistent funding that doesn't
pit stakeholders against each other. We need to invest in the
infrastructure and the people who are already doing this
important work. And we need to bring together people from
different sectors with diverse expertise to talk to each other
and coordinate their efforts.
I will be putting together a bill to make sure that our
nation is prepared to address these potentially serious risks,
and I invite Ranking Member Moore and his colleagues to
cooperate and collaborate on this process.
I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the
Members for their questions.
The members of this Committee may have some additional
questions for the witnesses, and we will ask you to respond to
those in writing. Under Committee Rule 3(o), members of the
Committee must submit witness questions within 3 business days
following the hearing, and the hearing record will be held open
for 10 business days for these responses.
With that, the Committee is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
[ADDITIONAL MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD]
Statement for the Record
Tony Wasley, President
Association of Fish & Wildlife Agencies
Washington, DC
The Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies (``Association'') is
the professional organization that represents the collective voice of
the fish and wildlife agencies in all 50 states, the U.S. Virgin
Islands, and District of Columbia (``state agencies''). These agencies
exercise primary statutory authority for management of fish and
wildlife as public trust resources within their borders. We thank the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations (``Subcommittee'') for its
leadership to address the ongoing, ever increasing challenges related
to wildlife disease surveillance. As more than 60% of human diseases
and 75% of all emerging diseases have origins in wildlife, the capacity
of state fish and wildlife agencies to monitor and address these
threats in coordination with their federal partners is of foremost
concern.
As the Subcommittee is well aware, the economic burden of
suppressing wildlife-borne diseases, particularly those with zoonotic
potential, can increase exponentially once they become established.
With limited resources and capacity, current fish and wildlife disease
surveillance and response efforts are typically driven by crises, often
lacking consistent funding and logistical support. Therefore, an
adequately funded wildlife disease surveillance network is needed to
provide coordinated, timely, and effective responses designed to
address these critical needs. Further, this network should leverage and
enhance existing resources and expertise in an effort to build
sustainable resilience and capacity.
The Association has long promoted the National Fish and Wildlife
Health Initiative \1\ to establish and sustainably fund a coordinated
network of federal, state, and university wildlife disease
laboratories. We are committed to improving the coordination of
measures that ensure fish and wildlife health, while recognizing and
respecting the missions, jurisdictions, and abilities of state and
federal fish and wildlife managers and their agencies. We support the
following programs and initiatives designed to build capacities, detect
and manage emerging and increasingly varied fish and wildlife disease
challenges, and effectively mitigate and suppress the significant
economic, social, and cultural impacts associated with fish and
wildlife diseases:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ https://www.fishwildlife.org/application/files/7715/3980/9208/
national_fish_and_wildlife_ health_initiative_toolkit_AFWA_2008.pdf.
1. Increase and sustain funding for existing federal and state fish
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
and wildlife disease laboratories;
2. Encourage Congress to provide new and sustained federal funding
to establish and/or enhance fish and wildlife disease
surveillance capacities in those regions of the United
States lacking such resources;
3. Encourage Congress to provide increased and sustained federal
funding for state, federal and tribal fish and wildlife
agencies to train and coordinate their operational
workforces to deliver effective fish and wildlife health
programs; and
4. Encourage Congress to provide increased and sustained federal
funding for aligned university research and training
programs to assure that their enormous capacities are
harnessed in support of targeted fish and wildlife disease
surveillance and management efforts.
Efforts to establish a national framework are increasingly vital in
light of the COVID-19 pandemic and the emergence of potentially
zoonotic diseases, including the continued spread of Chronic Wasting
Disease (``CWD''). While no cases of CWD have been documented in
humans, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (``CDC'') warn
of its zoonotic potential and the World Health Organization emphasizes
the importance of keeping prion diseases from entering the human food
chain.\2\ States have borne the brunt of the costs for surveillance and
management actions designed to curb the spread of CWD by redirecting
funds from other programs and are in dire need of increased resources
and federal coordination. Congress already has the ability to take
action by fully funding the CWD provisions authorized in the America's
Conservation Enhancement Act (P.L. 16-188, ``ACE Act'') and increasing
funding for CWD cooperative agreements administered by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture's (``USDA'') Animal Plant and Health
Inspection Service (``APHIS''). While the Fiscal Year 2023
appropriations process is underway, we encourage Federal partners to
expeditiously establish the CWD Task Force directed by the ACE Act.
Further, in accordance with the Association's Best Management Practices
for Prevention, Surveillance, and Management of Chronic Wasting
Disease,\3\ we encourage a prohibition on the movement of live farmed
cervids.
\2\ https://www.cdc.gov/prions/cwd/
index.html#::text=Chronic%20wasting%20disease%20(CWD)
%20is,States%2C%20Norway%20and%20South%20Korea.
\3\ AFWA_CWD_BMPS_12_September_2018_FINAL.pdf (fishwildlife.org).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We applaud the United States Geological Survey (``USGS'') and the
National Wildlife Health Center (``NWHC'') for their support of a
collaborative One-Health framework with state agencies, including
development of the Wildlife Health Information Sharing Partnership
(``WHISPers''). While there are some ongoing concerns with data
ownership, privacy, and sensitive data release related to Freedom of
Information Act requests as well as capacity for data entry, the
Association is encouraged by the commitment from USGS to continue
collaborating with state, federal, tribal, academic and NGO partners as
they continue to develop WHISPers. To that end, the Association
transmitted a letter to USGS \4\ with recommended improvements and
elements that should be considered for the system to be successful, of
which the recognition of state agencies' statutory authority and unique
roles and responsibilities is most critical.
\4\ https://www.fishwildlife.org/application/files/3316/5238/0451/
AFWA_support_for_WHISPers_ March_2022_Final2.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The increasing emergence of zoonotic diseases, exemplified by the
COVID-19 pandemic, demands increased attention to wildlife health and
wildlife disease prevention, surveillance, and response. With the
statutory authority and obligation to manage the public trust species
within their borders, state agencies are the front line of defense to
prevent, surveille, and combat wildlife-borne diseases. While wildlife
can be negatively impacted by diseases, they can also serve as
sentinels for environmental contaminants and infectious diseases
affecting humans and domestic animals. Human and domestic animal health
can impact wildlife and ecosystem health, and vice versa.
We again thank the Subcommittee for its attention to this
increasingly vital issue, and we are glad to offer our assistance on
these or any other matters relevant to the management of our nation's
fish and wildlife resources.
______
Statement for the Record
Preventing Pandemics at the Source
U.S. Wildlife and Health Alliance
May 11, 2022
Honorable Members of the House Natural Resources Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations of the United States Congress:
United States leadership is crucial to ending the current COVID-19
pandemic and preventing future pandemics from occurring. Tragically, we
will soon approach the horrific milestone of one million American lives
lost to COVID-19.
We do not know where or when the next pandemic will start. We do
know it is likely to emerge within a decade and to be the result of
zoonotic spillover of a virus from wildlife to humans, like all other
pandemics over the last century.
We have a good chance of stopping the next pandemic before it
starts. To do so we must learn quickly from the latest science and
translate this into policy to ensure various US Government agencies
work together, and with other nations, to support key actions around
the world.
As organizations with deep expertise on wildlife-human health
linkages we also know that much can, fortunately, be done to prevent
disease spillover before it occurs. This requires addressing problems
with wildlife trade and markets, preventing deforestation and forest
degradation, and improving livestock biosecurity and management
practices.
It is of the utmost importance that actions to prevent spillover at
the source be given far greater attention in US policy. Such actions
must be part of any comprehensive plan to prevent and prepare for
future pandemics. We cannot stress enough how much more cost effective
and efficient it is to prevent spillover in the first place, than to
try to control an outbreak, epidemic, or pandemic.
Even a one percent reduction in future pandemic risk is more than
justified by the global annual spending of about $20 billion needed to
address the root causes of spillover. Governments, including the US,
have so far failed to work together to prioritize this spending.
Failing to address the drivers of emerging infectious diseases and
pandemics would be a grave mistake and ignores emerging scientific
consensus, including a significant report from a global science
taskforce convened by Harvard University's T.H. Chan School of Public
Health (see link at the end of the hearing text). A ``containment-
only'' strategy also will be seen as acceptance of sickness and death
among front line communities, and the poorest members of society, who
will always suffer more with this approach.
Our coalitions, the Coalition to Prevent Pandemics at the Source,
and the U.S. Wildlife and Health Alliance bring together a diverse
group of organizations and many of the leading public health, wildlife
and conservation practitioners and experts. Our coalitions have
developed a suite of recommendations and statement of principles,
respectively, that we have shared with the Administration and that we
urge you to review and address. The Coalition to Prevent Pandemics at
the Source has also developed an action agenda describing the
interventions needed around the world. We stand ready to assist in any
way that we can and to provide more detailed recommendations to your
Committee and its members.
An ounce of prevention is truly worth a pound of cure.
______
[LIST OF DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD RETAINED IN THE COMMITTEE'S
OFFICIAL FILES]
1. Submission from Preventing Pandemics at the Source and the
U.S. Wildlife and Health Alliance: Appendix to May 11, 2022
statement. [ Can be viewed on the Committee Repository at:
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/II/II15/20220428/114672/HHRG-
117-II15-20220428-SD003.pdf ]
[all]