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ENSURING AMERICAN GLOBAL LEADERSHIP AND ENGAGEMENT ACT

DECEMBER 30, 2022.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. MEEKS, from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, submitted the following

R E P O R T

together with

DISSENTING VIEWS

[To accompany H.R. 3524]

The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 3524) to revitalize and reassert United States leadership, investment, and engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and globally, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do pass.

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AMENDMENT

The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the "Ensuring American Global Leadership and Engagement Act" or the "EAGLE Act".

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Findings.
Sec. 4. Statement of policy.
Sec. 5. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 6. Rules of construction.

TITLE I—INVESTING IN AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS

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Sec. 102. Report on national technology and industrial base.

Subtitle B—Global Infrastructure and Energy Development

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Sec. 126. Sense of Congress on digital technology issues.
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Sec. 128. Digital connectivity and cybersecurity partnership.
Sec. 129. Sense of Congress on ideological competition.

Subtitle D—Financial Diplomacy and Leadership

Sec. 131. Findings on Chinese financial industrial policy.
Sec. 132. Report on importance of American financial strength for global leadership.
Sec. 133. Review of Chinese companies on United States capital markets.
Sec. 134. Report on diplomatic and economic implications of changes to cross-border payment and financial messaging systems.

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Subtitle A—Strategic and Diplomatic Matters

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Sec. 203. Boosting Quad cooperation.
Sec. 204. Establishment of Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group.
Sec. 205. Statement of policy on cooperation with ASEAN.
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Sec. 208. Enhancing the United States-Taiwan partnership.
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Sec. 210. Taiwan Peace and Stability Act.
Sec. 211. Taiwan International Solidarity Act.
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Sec. 214. Report on bilateral efforts to address Chinese fentanyl trafficking.
Sec. 215. Facilitation of increased equity investments under the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018.
Sec. 216. Expanding investment by United States International Development Finance Corporation for vaccine manufacturing.
Sec. 217. Ensuring United States diplomatic posts align with American strategic national security and economic objectives.
Sec. 218. Authorization of appropriations for the Fulbright-Hays Program.
Sec. 219. Supporting independent media and countering disinformation.
Sec. 219A. Global Engagement Center.
Sec. 219B. Report on origins of the COVID–19 pandemic.
Sec. 219C. Extension of Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018.
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SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—Unless otherwise defined, the term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(2) CCP.—The term "CCP" means the Chinese Communist Party.

(3) PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY; PLA.—The terms "People's Liberation Army" and "PLA" mean the armed forces of the People's Republic of China.

(4) PRC; CHINA.—The terms "PRC" and "China" mean the People's Republic of China.

SEC. 3. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The People's Republic of China (PRC) is leveraging its political, diplomatic, economic, military, technological, and ideological power to become a strategic, near-peer, global competitor of the United States. The policies increasingly pursued by the PRC in these domains are contrary to the interests and values of the United States, its partners, and much of the rest of the world.

(2) A number of policies being pursued by the PRC—

(A) threaten the future character of the international order and are shaping the rules, norms, and institutions that govern relations among states;

(B) will put at risk the ability of the United States to secure its national interests; and

(C) will put at risk the future peace, prosperity, and freedom of the international community in the coming decades.

(3) After normalizing diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1979, the United States actively worked to advance the PRC's economic and social development to ensure that it participated in, and benefited from, the free and open international order. The United States pursued these goals and contributed to the welfare of the Chinese people by—

(A) increasing the PRC's trade relations and access to global capital markets;

(B) promoting the PRC's accession to the World Trade Organization;

(C) providing development finance and technical assistance;

(D) promoting research collaboration;

(E) educating the PRC's top students;

(F) permitting transfers of cutting-edge technologies and scientific knowledge; and

(G) providing intelligence and military assistance.

(4) It is now clear that the PRC has chosen to pursue state-led, mercantilist economic policies, an increasingly authoritarian governance model at home through increased restrictions on personal freedoms, and an aggressive and assertive foreign policy. These policies frequently and deliberately undermine United States interests and are contrary to core United States values and the values of other nations, both in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. In response to this strategic decision of the CCP, the United States has been compelled to reexamine and revise its strategy towards the PRC and reanimate its defense of the international order.

(5) The General Secretary of the CCP and the Chairman of the People's Republic of China, Xi Jinping, has elevated the "Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation" as central to the domestic and foreign policy of the PRC. His program demands—

(A) strong, centralized CCP leadership;

(B) concentration of military power;

(C) a dominant role for the CCP in the state and the economy;

(D) an aggressive foreign policy seeking control over broadly asserted territorial claims; and

(E) the denial of any universal values and individual rights that are deemed to threaten the CCP.

(6) The PRC views its Leninist model of governance as superior to, and at odds with, the constitutional models of the United States and other democracies. This approach to governance is lauded by the CCP as essential to securing the PRC's status as a global leader, and to shaping the future of the world. In a 2013 speech, General Secretary Xi said, "We firmly believe that as socialism with Chinese characteristics develops further . . . it is . . . inevitable that the superiority of our socialist system will be increasingly apparent . . . [and] our country's road of development will have increasingly greater influence on the world.".

(7) The PRC's objectives are to first establish regional hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and then to use that dominant position to propel the PRC to become the "leading world power", shaping an international order that is conducive to the its interests. Achieving these objectives requires turning the PRC into a wealthy nation under strict CCP rule by using a strong military and advanced technological capability to pursue the PRC's objectives, regardless of other countries' interests.

(8) The PRC is reshaping the current international order, which is built upon the rule of law and free and open ideals and principles, by conducting global information and influence operations, seeking to redefine international laws and norms to align with the objectives of the CCP, rejecting the legitimacy of internationally recognized human rights, and seeking to co-opt the leadership and agenda of multinational organizations for the benefit of the PRC and other authoritarian regimes at the expense of the interests of the United States and the international community.

(9) The PRC is encouraging other countries to follow its model of development and governance. During the 19th Party Congress in 2017, General Secretary Xi said that the PRC could serve as a model of development for other countries by utilizing "Chinese wisdom" and a "Chinese approach to solving problems".

(10) The PRC is promoting its governance model and attempting to weaken other models of governance by—

(A) undermining democratic institutions;

(B) subverting financial institutions;

(C) coercing businesses to accommodate the policies of the PRC; and

(D) using disinformation to disguise the nature of the actions described in subparagraphs (A) through (C).

(11) The PRC is progressing toward becoming the global leader in science and technology. In May 2018, General Secretary Xi said that for the PRC to reach "prosperity and rejuvenation", it needs to "endeavor to be a major world center for science and innovation". The PRC has invested the equivalent of billions of dollars into education and research and development and established joint scientific research centers and science universities.

(12) The PRC's drive to become a "manufacturing and technological superpower" and to promote "innovation with Chinese characteristics" is coming at the expense of human rights and longstanding international rules and norms with respect to economic competition, and presents a challenge to United States national security and the security of allies and like-minded countries. In particular, the PRC advances its illiberal political and social policies through mass surveillance, social credit systems, and a significant role of the state in internet governance. Through these means, the PRC increases direct and indirect government control over its citizens' everyday lives. Its national strategy of "civil-military fusion" mandates that civil and commercial research, which increasingly drives global innovation, is leveraged to develop new military capabilities.

(13) The PRC is using legal and illegal means to achieve its objective of becoming a manufacturing and technological superpower. The PRC uses state-directed industrial policies in anticompetitive ways to ensure the dominance of PRC companies. The CCP engages in and encourages actions that actively undermine a free and open international market, such as intellectual property theft, forced technology transfers, regulatory and financial subsidies, and mandatory CCP access to proprietary data as part of business and commercial agreements between Chinese and foreign companies.

(14) The policies referred to in paragraph (13) are designed to freeze United States and other foreign firms out of the PRC market, while eroding competition in other important markets. The heavy subsidization of Chinese companies includes potential violation of its World Trade Organization commitments. In May 2018, General Secretary Xi said that the PRC aims to keep the "initiatives of innovation and development security . . . in [China's] own hands".

(15) The PRC is advancing its global objectives through a variety of avenues, including its signature initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative (referred to in this section as "BRI"), which is enshrined in the Chinese Constitution and includes the Digital Silk Road and Health Silk Road. The PRC describes BRI as a straightforward and wholly beneficial plan for all countries. Eventually, it seeks to create a web of economic relations with the PRC at its center, making it the most concrete geographical representation of the PRC's global ambitions. BRI increases the economic influence of state-owned PRC firms in global markets, enhances the PRC's political leverage with government leaders around the world, and provides greater access to strategic nodes such as ports and railways. Through BRI, the PRC seeks political deference through economic dependence.

(16) The PRC is executing a plan to establish regional hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and displace the United States from the region. As a Pacific power, the United States has built and supported enduring alliances and economic partnerships that secure peace and prosperity and promote the rule of law and political pluralism in a free and open Indo-Pacific. In contrast, the PRC uses economic and military coercion in the region to secure its own interests.

(17) The PRC's military strategy seeks to keep the United States military from operating in the Western Pacific and erodes United States security guarantees.

(18) The PRC is aggressively pursuing exclusive control of critical land routes, sea lanes, and air space in the Indo-Pacific in the hopes of eventually exercising greater influence beyond the region. This includes lanes crucial to commercial activity, energy exploration, transport, and the exercise of security operations in areas permitted under international law.

(19) The PRC seeks so-called "reunification" with Taiwan through whatever means may ultimately be required. The CCP's insistence that so-called "reunification" is Taiwan's only option makes this goal inherently coercive. In January 2019, General Secretary Xi stated that the PRC "make[s] no promise to renounce the use of force and reserve[s] the option of taking all necessary means". Taiwan's embodiment of democratic values and economic liberalism challenges General Secretary Xi's goal of achieving national rejuvenation. The PRC plans

to exploit Taiwan's dominant strategic position in the First Island Chain and to project power into the Second Island Chain and beyond.

(20) In the South China Sea, the PRC has executed an illegal island-building campaign that threatens freedom of navigation and the free-flow of commerce, damages the environment, bolsters the PLA power projection capabilities, and coerces and intimidates other regional claimants in an effort to advance its unlawful claims and control the waters around neighboring countries. Despite General Secretary Xi's September 2015 speech, in which he said the PRC was not militarizing the South China Sea, during the 2017 19th Party Congress, General Secretary Xi announced that "construction on islands and reefs in the South China Sea have seen steady progress".

(21) The PRC is rapidly modernizing the PLA to attain a level of capacity and capability superior to the United States in terms of equipment and conduct of modern military operations by shifting its military doctrine from having a force "adequate [for] China's defensive needs" to having a force "commensurate with China's international status". Ultimately, this transformation could enable China to impose its will in the Indo-Pacific region through the threat of military force. In 2017, General Secretary Xi established the following developmental benchmarks for the advancement of the PLA:

(A) A mechanized force with increased informatized and strategic capabilities by 2020.

(B) The complete modernization of China's national defense by 2035.

(C) The full transformation of the PLA into a world-class force by 2050.

(22) The PRC's strategy and supporting policies described in this section undermine United States interests, such as—

(A) upholding a free and open international order;

(B) maintaining the integrity of international institutions with liberal norms and values;

(C) preserving a favorable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific;

(D) ensuring the defense of its allies;

(E) preserving open sea and air lanes;

(F) fostering the free flow of commerce through open and transparent markets; and

(G) promoting individual freedom and human rights.

(23) The global COVID–19 pandemic has intensified and accelerated these trends in the PRC's behavior and therefore increased the need for United States global leadership and a competitive posture. The PRC has capitalized on the world's focus on the COVID–19 pandemic by—

(A) moving rapidly to undermine Hong Kong's autonomy, including imposing a so-called "national security law" on Hong Kong;

(B) aggressively imposing its will in the East and South China Seas;

(C) increasing its territorial aggression in South Asia, including against India; and

(D) engaging in a widespread and government-directed disinformation campaign to obscure the PRC Government's efforts to cover up the seriousness of COVID–19, sow confusion about the origination of the outbreak, and discredit the United States, its allies, and global health efforts.

(24) The CCP's disinformation campaign referred to in paragraph (24)(D) has included—

(A) concerted efforts, in the early days of the pandemic, to downplay the nature and scope of the outbreak in Wuhan in the PRC, as well as cases of person-to-person transmission;

(B) claims that the virus originated in United States biological defense research at Fort Detrick, Maryland;

(C) Chinese state media reports insinuating a possible link between the virus and other United States biological facilities; and

(D) efforts to block access to qualified international infectious disease experts who might contradict the CCP's narrative.

(25) In response to the PRC's strategy and policies, the United States must adopt a policy of strategic competition with the PRC to protect and promote our vital interests and values.

(26) The United States policy of strategic competition with respect to the People's Republic of China is part of a broader strategic approach to the Indo-Pacific and the world that aligns with cooperation with United States allies and partners to advance shared values and interests and to preserve and enhance a free, open, democratic, inclusive, rules-based, stable, and diverse region.

(27) The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409) contributed to a comprehensive framework for promoting United State security in-

terests, economic interests, and values in the Indo-Pacific region, investing $7,500,000,000 over 5 years—

(A) to support greater security and defense cooperation between the United States and allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region;

(B) to advance democracy and the protection and promotion of human rights in the Indo-Pacific region;

(C) to enhance cybersecurity cooperation between the United States and partners in the Indo-Pacific;

(D) to deepen people-to-people engagement through programs such as the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative and the ASEAN Youth Volunteers program; and

(E) to enhance energy cooperation and energy security in the Indo-Pacific region.

SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

(a) OBJECTIVES.—It is the policy of the United States to pursue the following objectives:

(1) The United States global leadership role is sustained and its political system and major foundations of national power are secured for the long-term in the political, economic, technological, and military domains.

(2) The United States position as an indispensable power in the Indo-Pacific and globally is sustained through diplomacy, multilateralism, and engagement.

(3) The United States deters military confrontation with the PRC and both nations work to reduce the risk of conflict.

(4) The United States and its allies maintain a stable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific with China. The United States and its allies maintain unfettered access to the region, including through freedom of navigation and the free flow of commerce, consistent with international law and practice.

(5) The allies and partners of the United States—

(A) maintain confidence in United States leadership and its commitment to the Indo-Pacific region;

(B) can withstand and combat subversion by the PRC; and

(C) work closely with the United States in setting global rules, norms, and standards that benefit the international community.

(6) The combined economic and military strength of the United States and its allies and partners demonstrates to the PRC that the risks of attempts to dominate other states outweigh the potential benefits.

(7) The United States leads the free, open, and rules-based international order, which comprises resilient states and institutions that uphold and defend principles, such as sovereignty, rule of law, individual freedom, and human rights. The international order is strong enough to withstand attempts at destabilization by illiberal and authoritarian actors.

(8) The key rules, norms, and standards of international engagement in the 21st century are maintained, including—

(A) the protection of human rights, commercial engagement and investment, and technology; and

(B) that such rules, norms, and standards are in alignment with the values and interests of the United States, its allies and partners, and other stakeholders in the liberal international order.

(9) The United States counters attempts by the PRC to—

(A) undermine open and democratic societies;

(B) distort global markets;

(C) manipulate the international trade system;

(D) coerce other nations via economic, cyber, and military means; or

(E) use its technological advantages to undermine individual freedoms or other states' national security interests.

(10) The United States deters military confrontation with the PRC and both nations work to reduce the risk of conflict.

(b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States, in pursuit of the objectives set forth in subsection (a)—

(1) to strengthen the United States domestic foundation by reinvesting in market-based economic growth, education, scientific and technological innovation, democratic institutions, and other areas that improve the ability of the United States to pursue its vital economic, foreign policy, and national security interests;

(2) to pursue a strategy of strategic competition with the PRC in the political, diplomatic, economic, development, security, informational, and technological realms to maximize the United States' strengths and increase the costs for the

PRC of harming the interests and values of the United States and its partners and allies;

(3) to lead a free, open, and secure international system characterized by the rule of law, open markets and the free flow of commerce, and a shared commitment to security and peaceful resolution of disputes, human rights, good and transparent governance, and freedom from coercion;

(4) to strengthen and deepen United States alliances and partnerships by pursuing greater bilateral and multilateral cooperative initiatives that advance shared interests and values and bolster partner countries' confidence that the United States is and will remain a strong, committed, and reliable partner that respects the views and interests of its allies and friends;

(5) to encourage and collaborate with United States allies and partners in boosting their own capabilities and resiliency to pursue, defend, and protect shared interests and values, free from coercion and external pressure;

(6) to pursue fair, reciprocal treatment and healthy, constructive competition in United States-China economic relations by—

(A) advancing policies that harden the United States economy against unfair and illegal commercial or trading practices and the coercion of United States businesses; and

(B) improving United States laws and regulations as necessary to prevent any PRC attempts to harm United States economic competitiveness;

(7) to demonstrate the value of private sector-led growth in emerging markets around the world, including through the use of United States Government tools that—

(A) support greater private sector investment and advance capacity-building initiatives that are grounded in the rule of law;

(B) promote open markets;

(C) establish clear policy and regulatory frameworks;

(D) improve the management of key economic sectors;

(E) combat corruption;

(F) foster and support greater collaboration with and among partner countries and the United States private sector to develop secure and sustainable infrastructure; and

(G) support American workers and create American jobs;

(8) to play a leading role in advancing international rules and norms that foster free and reciprocal trade and open and integrated markets;

(9) to conduct vigorous commercial diplomacy in support of United States companies and businesses in partner countries that seek fair competition;

(10) to ensure that the United States is second to none in the innovation of critical and emerging technologies, such as next-generation telecommunications, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, semiconductors, and biotechnology, by—

(A) providing necessary investment and concrete incentives for the private sector to accelerate development of such technologies;

(B) modernizing export controls and investment screening regimes and associated policies and regulations;

(C) enhancing the role of the United States in technical standards-setting bodies and avenues for developing norms regarding the use of emerging critical technologies;

(D) reducing United States barriers and increasing incentives for collaboration with allies and partners on the research and co-development of critical technologies;

(E) collaborating with allies and partners to protect critical technologies by—

(i) coordinating and aligning export control measures;

(ii) building capacity for defense technology security;

(iii) safeguarding chokepoints in strategically critical supply chains; and

(iv) ensuring diversification; and

(F) designing major defense capabilities for export to vetted allies and partners;

(11) to collaborate with like-minded democracies and other willing partners to promote ideals and principles that—

(A) advance a free and open international order;

(B) strengthen democratic institutions;

(C) protect and promote human rights; and

(D) uphold a free press and fact-based reporting;

(12) to develop comprehensive strategies and policies to counter PRC disinformation campaigns;

(13) to demonstrate effective leadership at the United Nations, its associated agencies, and other multilateral organizations and ensure the integrity and effectiveness of these organizations in facilitating solutions to global challenges;

(14) to advocate for the defense of fundamental freedoms and human rights in the United States relationship with the PRC;

(15) to cooperate with allies, partners, and multilateral organizations that sustain and strengthen a free and open order and address regional and global challenges posed by the Government of the PRC regarding—

(A) violations and abuses of human rights;

(B) restrictions on religious practices; and

(C) the undermining and abrogation of treaties, other international agreements, and other international norms related to human rights;

(16) to expose the PRC's use of corruption, repression, and coercion to attain unfair economic advantages or compel other nations to defer to its political and strategic objectives in ways that threaten the United States or its allies and partners;

(17) to maintain United States access to the Western Pacific, including through necessary investments in United States military capabilities, policies, and concepts in the Indo-Pacific, as well as robust cooperation, exercises, and interoperability with allies and partners;

(18) to deter the PRC from—

(A) initiating armed conflict;

(B) coercing nations; or

(C) using grey-zone tactics below the level of armed conflict;

(19) to strengthen United States-PRC military-to-military communication and improve both military and civilian crisis avoidance and management procedures to de-conflict operations and reduce the risk of unwanted conflict, including through high-level visits and recurrent exchanges between civilian and military officials and other measures, in alignment with United States interests; and

(20) to strengthen stability and reduce suspicions, cooperate with the PRC when interests align, including through bilateral or multilateral means and at the United Nations, as appropriate, and especially in the following areas—

(A) global fight against climate change;

(B) nuclear security; and

(C) global financial stability.

SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that the execution of the policy described in section 3(b) requires the following actions:

(1) Revitalizing American leadership globally and in the Indo-Pacific will require the United States—

(A) to marshal sustained political will to protect its vital interests, promote its values, and advance its economic and national security objectives; and

(B) to achieve this sustained political will, persuade the American people and United States allies and partners of—

(i) the current challenges facing the international rules based order; and

(ii) the need for long-term investments and engagement to defend shared interests and values.

(2) The United States must coordinate closely with allies and partners to compete effectively with the PRC, including to encourage allies and partners to assume, as appropriate, greater roles in balancing and checking aggressive PRC behavior.

(3) Effective United States strategy toward China requires—

(A) bipartisan cooperation within Congress; and

(B) frequent, sustained, and meaningful collaboration and consultation between the executive branch and Congress.

(4) The United States must ensure close integration among economic and foreign policymakers and provide support to the private sector, civil society, universities and academic institutions, and other relevant actors in free and open societies to enable such actors—

(A) to collaborate to advance common interests; and

(B) to identify appropriate policies—

(i) to strengthen the United States and its allies; and

(ii) to promote a compelling vision of a free and open order.

(5) The United States must ensure that all Federal departments, agencies, and overseas missions are organized and resourced to effectively defend and advance United States interests, by—

(A) dedicating more personnel in the Indo-Pacific region, at posts around the world, and in Washington, DC;

(B) placing greater numbers of foreign service officers, international development professionals, members of the foreign commercial service, intelligence professionals, and other United States Government personnel in the Indo-Pacific region; and

(C) ensuring that this workforce has the training, demonstrated proficiency in language and culture, technical skills, and other competencies required to advance a successful strategy in relation to the PRC.

(6) The United States must place renewed priority and emphasis on strengthening the nonmilitary instruments of national power, including diplomacy, information, technology, economics, foreign assistance and development finance, commerce, intelligence, and law enforcement, which are crucial for addressing the challenges posed by the PRC.

(7) The United States must sustain military capabilities necessary to achieve United States political objectives in the Indo-Pacific, including—

(A) promoting regional security in the Indo-Pacific;

(B) reassuring allies and partners while protecting them from coercion; and

(C) deterring PRC aggression and preventing unwanted conflict.

(8) Competition with the PRC requires skillful adaptation to the information environment of the 21st century. United States public diplomacy and messaging efforts must effectively—

(A) promote the value of partnership with the United States; and

(B) counter CCP propaganda and disinformation that threatens United States interests.

SEC. 6. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.

(a) APPLICABILITY OF EXISTING RESTRICTIONS ON ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN SECURITY FORCES.—Nothing in this Act shall be construed to diminish, supplant, supersede, or otherwise restrict or prevent responsibilities of the United States Government under section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d) or section 362 of title 10, United States Code.

(b) NO AUTHORIZATION FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE.—Nothing in this Act may be construed as authorizing the use of military force.

TITLE I—INVESTING IN AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS

Subtitle A—Science and Technology

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION TO ASSIST UNITED STATES COMPANIES WITH GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN DIVERSIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT.

(a) AUTHORIZATION TO CONTRACT SERVICES.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, is authorized to establish a program to facilitate the contracting by the Department of State for the professional services of qualified experts, on a reimbursable fee for service basis, to assist interested United States persons and business entities with supply chain management issues related to the People's Republic of China (PRC), including—

(1) exiting from the PRC market or relocating certain production facilities to locations outside the PRC;

(2) diversifying sources of inputs, and other efforts to diversify supply chains to locations outside of the PRC;

(3) navigating legal, regulatory, or other challenges in the course of the activities described in paragraphs (1) and (2); and

(4) identifying alternative markets for production or sourcing outside of the PRC, including through providing market intelligence, facilitating contact with reliable local partners as appropriate, and other services.

(b) CHIEF OF MISSION OVERSIGHT.—The persons contracted to perform the services described in subsection (a) shall—

(1) be under the authority of the United States Chief of Mission in the country in which they are hired, in accordance with existing United States laws;

(2) coordinate with Department of State and Department of Commerce officers; and

(3) coordinate with United States missions and relevant local partners in other countries as needed to carry out the services described in subsection (a).

(c) PRIORITIZATION OF MICRO-, SMALL-, AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES.—The services described in subsection (a) shall be prioritized for assisting micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises with regard to the matters described in subsection (a).

(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated $15,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for the purposes of carrying out this section.

(e) PROHIBITION ON ACCESS TO ASSISTANCE BY FOREIGN ADVERSARIES.—None of the funds appropriated pursuant to this section may be provided to an entity—

(1) under the foreign ownership, control, or influence of the Government of the PRC or the CCP, or other foreign adversary;

(2) determined to have beneficial ownership from foreign individuals subject to the jurisdiction, direction, or influence of foreign adversaries; and

(3) that has any contract in effect at the time of the receipt of such funds, or has had a contract within the previous one year that is no longer in effect, with—

(A) the Government of the PRC;

(B) the CCP;

(C) the PLA;

(D) an entity majority-owned, majority-controlled, or majority-financed by the Government of the PRC, the CCP, or the PLA; or

(E) a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of an entity described in subparagraph (D).

(f) DEFINITIONS.—The terms "foreign ownership, control, or influence" and "FOCI" have the meanings given to those terms in the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (DOD 5220.22–M), or a successor document.

SEC. 102. REPORT ON NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL BASE.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) a more streamlined, shared, and coordinated approach, which leverages economies of scale with major allies, is necessary for the United States to retain its lead in defense technology;

(2) allowing for the export, re-export, or transfer of defense-related technologies and services to members of the national technology and industrial base (as defined in section 2500 of title 10, United States Code) would advance United States security interests by helping to leverage the defense-related technologies and skilled workforces of trusted allies to reduce the dependence on other countries, including countries that pose challenges to United States interests around the world, for defense-related innovation and investment; and

(3) it is in the interest of the United States to continue to increase cooperation with Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to protect critical defense-related technology and services and leverage the investments of like-minded, major ally nations in order to maximize the strategic edge afforded by defense technology innovation.

(b) REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that—

(A) describes the Department of State's efforts to facilitate access among the national technology and industrial base to defense articles and services subject to the United States Munitions List under section 38(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)); and

(B) identifies foreign legal, regulatory, foreign policy, or other challenges or considerations that prevent or frustrate these efforts, to include any gaps in the respective export control regimes implemented by United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Australia, or Canada.

(2) FORM.—This report required under paragraph (1) shall be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.

Subtitle B—Global Infrastructure and Energy Development

SEC. 111. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.

In this subtitle, the term "appropriate committees of Congress" means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 112. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL QUALITY INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT STANDARDS.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COLLABORATIVE STANDARDS.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should initiate collaboration among governments, the private sector, and civil society to encourage the adoption of the standards for quality global infrastructure development advanced by the G20 at Osaka in 2018, including with respect to the following issues:

(1) Respect for the sovereignty of countries in which infrastructure investments are made.
(2) Anti-corruption.
(3) Rule of law.
(4) Human rights and labor rights.
(5) Fiscal and debt sustainability.
(6) Social and governance safeguards.
(7) Transparency.
(8) Environmental and energy standards.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COMMITMENT TO COOPERATION.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should launch a series of fora around the world showcasing the commitment of the United States and partners of the United States to high-quality development cooperation, including with respect to the issues described in subsection (a).

SEC. 113. SUPPORTING ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE FROM THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

(a) FINDING.—It is in the national interest of the United States to establish a coordinated interagency strategy to marshal the resources of the United States Government to provide foreign countries with financing that strengthens independent economic capacity and therefore reduces a foreign government's need to enter into agreements with the People's Republic of China (PRC), including to obtain support from its Belt and Road Initiative.

(b) STRATEGY.—

(1) AUTHORITY.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall develop and submit a strategy to the relevant congressional committees to use the resources of Federal agencies to counteract offers of assistance and financing from the PRC to foreign governments that are of strategic importance to the United States.

(2) COMPONENTS OF STRATEGY.—The strategy shall—

(A) identify primary sectors where the United States could provide a competitive advantage to increase a country's economic independence;

(B) select countries with corresponding economic needs, with priority given to those who are vulnerable to Chinese economic influence;

(C) identify any corresponding existing financing available from United States Government entities to prioritize and devise specific financing tailored to the needs of such foreign governments if none are currently available;

(D) identify any cooperative and complementary assistance and financing from friendly foreign governments, including coordinated assistance and cofinancing;

(E) create a streamlined decision-making process, directed by the National Security Council, to devise financing and make agency decisions and commitments on a timely basis to support United States competitive offers;

(F) establish a formal G7+European Commission Working Group to develop a comprehensive strategy to develop alternatives to the PRC's Belt and Road Initiative for development finance; and

(G) integrate existing efforts into the strategy, including efforts to address the Government of the PRC's use of the United Nations to advance the Belt and Road Initiative, including the proliferation of memoranda of understanding between the PRC and United Nations funds and programs regarding the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative.

(3) PARTICIPATING AGENCIES.—Participating Federal agencies should include the Department of State, Department of the Treasury, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), United States International Development Finance Corporation, Millennium Challenge Corporation, United States Trade and Development Agency, Department of Commerce, and other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate.

(4) EXECUTION OF STRATEGY.—The President should issue an Executive Order to implement the strategy and make such changes in agency regulations and procedures as are necessary to put the strategy into effect.

(5) RELEVANT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—In this section, the term "relevant congressional committees" means—

(A) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.

(c) AUTHORITY.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the USAID, is authorized to establish or continue an initiative, to be known as the "Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network", under which the Secretary of State, in consultation with other relevant Federal agencies, including those represented on the Global Infrastructure Coordinating Committee, may carry out various programs to advance the development of sustainable, transparent, and high-quality infrastructure worldwide in the Indo-Pacific region by—

(1) strengthening capacity-building programs to improve project evaluation processes, regulatory and procurement environments, and project preparation capacity of countries that are partners of the United States in such development;

(2) providing transaction advisory services and project preparation assistance to support sustainable infrastructure; and

(3) coordinating the provision of United States assistance for the development of infrastructure, including infrastructure that uses United States manufactured goods and services, and catalyzing investment led by the private sector.

(d) TRANSACTION ADVISORY FUND.—As part of the "Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network" described under subsection (c), the Secretary of State is authorized to provide support, including through the Transaction Advisory Fund, for advisory services to help boost the capacity of partner countries to evaluate contracts and assess the financial and environmental impacts of potential infrastructure projects, including through providing services such as—

(1) legal services;

(2) project preparation and feasibility studies;

(3) debt sustainability analyses;

(4) bid or proposal evaluation; and

(5) other services relevant to advancing the development of sustainable, transparent, and high-quality infrastructure.

(e) STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE FUND.——

(1) IN GENERAL.—As part of the "Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network" described under subsection (c), the Secretary of State is authorized to provide support, including through the Strategic Infrastructure Fund, for technical assistance, project preparation, pipeline development, and other infrastructure project support.

(2) JOINT STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS.—Funds authorized for the Strategic Infrastructure Fund should be used in coordination with the Department of Defense, the International Development Finance Corporation, like-minded donor partners, and multilateral banks, as appropriate, to support joint infrastructure projects that are in the national security interest of the United States and vulnerable to strategic competitors.

(f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2022 to 2026, $75,000,000 to the Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network, of which $20,000,000 should be made available for the Transaction Advisory Fund.

SEC. 114. STRATEGY FOR ADVANCED AND RELIABLE ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct a comprehensive, multi-year, whole of government effort, in consultation with the private sector, to counter predatory lending and financing, including in the form of providing support to companies incorporated in the People's Republic of China (PRC) that engage in such activities, by the Government of the PRC in the energy sectors of developing countries.

(b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to—

(1) regularly evaluate current and forecasted energy needs and capacities of developing countries, and analyze the presence and involvement of PRC state-owned industries and other companies incorporated in the PRC, Chinese nationals providing labor, and financing of energy projects, including direct financing by the PRC government, PRC financial institutions, or direct state support to state-owned enterprises and other companies incorporated in the PRC;

(2) pursue strategic support and investment opportunities, and diplomatic engagement on power sector reforms, to expand the development and deployment of advanced energy technologies in developing countries;

(3) offer financing, loan guarantees, grants, and other financial products on terms that advance domestic economic and local employment opportunities, utilize advanced energy technologies, encourage private sector growth, and, when appropriate United States equity and sovereign lending products as alternatives to the predatory lending tools offered by Chinese financial institutions;

(4) pursue partnerships with likeminded international financial and multilateral institutions to leverage investment in advanced energy technologies in developing countries; and

(5) pursue bilateral partnerships focused on the cooperative development of advanced energy technologies with countries of strategic significance, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, to address the effects of energy engagement by the PRC through predatory lending or other actions that negatively impact other countries.

(c) ADVANCED ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES EXPORTS.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a United States Government strategy to increase United States exports of advanced energy technologies to—

(1) improve energy security in allied and developing countries;

(2) create open, efficient, rules-based, and transparent energy markets;

(3) improve free, fair, and reciprocal energy trading relationships; and

(4) expand access to affordable, reliable energy.

SEC. 115. REPORT ON THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S INVESTMENTS IN FOREIGN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT.

(a) IN GENERAL.—No later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that—

(1) identifies priority countries for deepening United States engagement on energy matters, in accordance with the economic and national security interests of the United States and where deeper energy partnerships are most achievable;

(2) describes the involvement of the Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and companies incorporated in the PRC in the development, operation, financing, or ownership of energy generation facilities, transmission infrastructure, or energy resources in the countries identified in paragraph (1);

(3) evaluates strategic or security concerns and implications for United States national interests and the interests of the countries identified in paragraph (1), with respect to the PRC's involvement and influence in developing country energy production or transmission; and

(4) outlines current and planned efforts by the United States to partner with the countries identified in paragraph (1) on energy matters that support shared interests between the United States and such countries.

(b) PUBLICATION.—The assessment required in subsection (a) shall be published on the Department of State's website.

Subtitle C—Economic Diplomacy and Leadership

SEC. 121. FINDINGS ON REGIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The United States played a leadership role in constructing the architecture, rules, and norms governing the international economic order following the Second World War, yielding decades of domestic economic and geopolitical prosperity and stability.

(2) In 2017, the United States withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an economic pact that was negotiated by 12 countries that covered 40 percent of the world economy, leading the 11 remaining Asia-Pacific countries to sign the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) the following year, setting high-standard rules for regional economic engagement.

(3) In 2020, the 10 countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations along with South Korea, China, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the world's biggest trade deal in terms of GDP.

(4) Reduced United States economic engagement has led United States allies and partners to question the United States' commitment to the Indo-Pacific re-

gion. Despite its distortive and unfair trade practices, the People's Republic of China is taking advantage of this vacuum by deepening its partnerships in the region and promoting its own state-led economic model.

(5) The United States is increasingly on the outside looking in with regards to economic pacts in the Indo-Pacific. United States absence from these agreements puts it at both a strategic and competitive disadvantage in the region and allows competitors to expand their economic influence at the United States' expense.

(6) Given that these partnerships and agreements will define the rules and norms that will govern regional commerce over the coming decades, the United States is currently not well positioned to shape the coming economic landscape.

(7) It is in the United States' vital interest to upgrade its economic engagement and leadership in the Indo-Pacific and develop concrete steps to strengthen its commercial diplomacy to fully participle in the region's economic dynamism.

SEC. 122. REVIEW OF TRADE AND ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT GLOBALLY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

(a) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the United States Trade Representative and the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that describes the global trade and investment diplomacy and engagement of the People's Republic of China (PRC) over the past decade, including any bilateral or plurilateral trade and investment agreements it has signed, and their impact on the United States economy, American companies and workers, as well as on the countries that have entered into agreements with the PRC and the global economy as a whole.

(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report shall include the following:

(1) A survey and comparison of the PRC's international economic practices, which will—

(A) provide an overview of the PRC's distortive trade policies;

(B) list the PRC's trade and investment agreements globally, both agreements it has signed or entered into and any ongoing negotiations it has with individual countries or groups of countries;

(C) detail the other mechanisms the PRC uses to advance its international economic objectives, including economic and commercial dialogues and BRI related activities;

(D) compare the United States and Chinese approaches and priorities on trade and investment with major global economies, United States allies, and for each region of the world; and

(E) outline what further steps the PRC may take in the Indo-Pacific region to bolster its economic position and influence.

(2) An evaluation of the impacts of the PRC's trade and investment policies, including—

(A) the impact of these trade and investment agreements on the PRC's economy, with a focus on its trade and investment profile, the impact on the PRC's economic growth and per-capita income, and the impact on the profitability and market share of Chinese companies and SOEs;

(B) the impact of these agreements on the PRC's political and diplomatic relations with the countries it entered into agreements with and by region; and

(C) the impact of the PRC's trade and investment relationships with other countries on the market share of United States companies.

SEC. 123. REPORT ON ENTRENCHING AMERICAN ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that United States national interests and the primacy of United States power in the Indo-Pacific are intimately tied to the following economic objectives:

(1) Deepening United States trade and investment relationships in the region, especially with key allies and partners.

(2) Confirming American leadership and participation in global regional economic organizations and fora, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).

(3) Leveraging bilateral and plurilateral sectoral agreements on trade and investment, as well as negotiations at the WTO to reassert United States economic leadership by writing the rules of the road on critical economic questions.

(4) Building secure and resilient supply chains for industries critical for United States national interest, including semiconductors, vaccines, and personal protective equipment.

(5) Showcasing the benefits and appeal of a market-based economic model.

(b) REPORTING.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the United States Trade Representative and the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress that presents the steps the United States is taking and plans to take to achieve the objectives outlined in subsection (a) and includes specific action plans for the following:

(1) Enhancing United States trade and investment relationships in the region bilaterally and plurilaterally, especially with United States allies and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

(2) Reenergizing APEC as a critical component of the region's economic architecture.

(3) Work to ensure that the United States absence from the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership do not undermine the United States' ability to shape regional trade and investment rules.

(4) Working with allies and partners to build resilient and trusted supply chains especially for critical and emerging technologies, including semiconductors, and products and components critical for national health, including vaccines and related materials and personal protective equipment.

(5) Driving the formation and adoption of high-standards and rules for the region in the following areas:

(A) Advanced technologies and the digital sphere.

(B) Labor practices and environmental standards.

(C) Intellectual property rights.

(6) Developing roadmaps for how to counter the PRC's unfair trade and economic practices, with a specific focus on—

(A) subsidies and unfair competition by state-owned enterprises; and

(B) corruption and politicized infrastructure.

(c) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this section, the term "appropriate committees of Congress" means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

SEC. 124. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE NEED TO BOLSTER AMERICAN LEADERSHIP IN THE ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States has benefitted from the regional economic integration agenda of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum since its inception in 1989;

(2) APEC is a hub of trade and commerce for 21 member economies that, as of 2018, accounted for 60 percent of global GDP and 48 percent of global trade;

(3) APEC has contributed to the reduction in trade barriers, harmonization of regulations, and enhanced access to global value chains, while raising the profile of critical topics such as fair trade, sustainability, gender parity, and inclusive growth;

(4) it is in the United States interest to engage and lead at APEC to push for an open and inclusive regional economy that benefits United States workers, consumers, and businesses and better integrates the United States economy with others in the region;

(5) when the United States last hosted APEC in 2011, it was able to promote United States interests, while reassuring allies and partners about its strong commitment to the region in the economic arena;

(6) today, APEC can again be used as a forum to make progress on several United States priorities, that are shared by United States allies and partners, including—

(A) making regional commerce more inclusive;

(B) fostering innovation and digitization; and

(C) addressing climate change and environmental protection;

(7) hosting APEC would provide a tremendous opportunity to leverage American leadership to shape the regional economic agenda;

(8) hosting APEC would allow the United States to advance several of its own priorities in the region, including to—

(A) expand the participation of APEC stakeholders to include labor groups, environmental advocates, and other part of civil society;

(B) upgrade APEC's work to empower and promote small and medium enterprises;

(C) spotlight best practices and plans to upgrade skills for the next-generation of technology jobs;

(D) advance a climate and sustainable trade and development agenda with a focus on green technologies, infrastructure and finance; and

(E) advance work on digital trade, including by expanding rules on data privacy, promoting digital inclusiveness and promoting the free flow of data; and

(9) with no host confirmed for 2023, the United States should immediately announce its interest to host APEC in 2023 and work with the APEC Secretariat and like-minded APEC members to build support.

SEC. 125. STRATEGY ON DETERRENCE OF ECONOMIC COERCION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a whole-of-government strategy to deter Chinese economic coercion against third countries that includes the following:

(1) An explanation of the means available to the United States, with the cooperation of allies, to enable a country with a smaller economy to withstand such coercion.

(2) A description of the role that the Secretary of State, acting through the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, will play in the imposition of reputational costs on the PRC for conducting economic coercion.

(3) Role clarity for the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, the Secretary of Defense, the head of each element of the intelligence community (as such term is defined by section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)), the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, and the United States International Development Finance Corporation in implementing such strategy.

(b) UPDATE.—Not later than 2 years after the date of the submission of the strategy under subsection (a), and every 2 years thereafter for 8 years, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an assessment of the implementation and effectiveness of the strategy, lessons learned from the past year, and planned changes to the strategy.

(c) FORM.—The strategy and update required by subsections (a) and (b), respectively, shall be submitted in classified form with an unclassified summary.

(d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.

SEC. 126. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY ISSUES.

(a) LEADERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS SETTING.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States must lead in international bodies that set the governance norms and rules for critical digitally enabled technologies in order to ensure that these technologies operate within a free, secure, interoperable, and stable digital domain.

(b) COUNTERING DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States, along with allies and partners, should lead an international effort that uses all of the economic and diplomatic tools at its disposal to combat the expanding use of information and communications technology products and services to surveil, repress, and manipulate populations (also known as "digital authoritarianism").

(c) FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN THE DIGITAL AGE.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should lead a global effort to ensure that freedom of information, including the ability to safely consume or publish information without fear of undue reprisals, is maintained as the digital domain becomes an increasingly integral mechanism for communication.

(d) EFFORTS TO ENSURE TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT DOES NOT THREATEN DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OR HUMAN RIGHTS.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should lead a global effort to develop and adopt a set of common principles and standards for critical technologies to ensure that the use of such technologies cannot be abused by malign actors, whether they are governments or other entities, and that they do not threaten democratic governance or human rights.

SEC. 127. DIGITAL TRADE AGREEMENTS.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) as the COVID–19 pandemic accelerated United States dependence on digital tools, international rules around digital governance and trade have remained largely piecemeal;

(2) the People's Republic of China is operating under and advancing a set of digital rules that are contrary to United States values and interests, and those of United States allies and partners;

(3) a patchwork of plurilateral, trilateral, and bilateral digital trade agreements, including the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Singapore-Australia Digital Trade Agreement, and the Singapore-New Zealand-Chile Digital Economy Partnership Agreement have emerged, creating a set of rules that the United States should be driving;

(4) the United States has already underscored the need for such agreements by signing the U.S.-Japan Digital Trade Agreement in October 2019 and including a robust digital trade or e-commerce chapter in the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement;

(5) a regional deal on digital governance and trade would allow the United States to unite a group of like-minded economies around common standards and norms, including the principles of openness, inclusiveness, fairness, transparency, and the free flow of data with trust, that are increasingly vital for the global economy;

(6) such an agreement would facilitate the creation of common rules and standards that govern cross-border data flows, the protection of privacy, and cybersecurity at a time of growing digital vulnerabilities for individuals, businesses, and institutions around the world;

(7) such an agreement would facilitate the participation of small and medium-sized enterprises in the global economy through trade facilitation measures, including e-marketing, e-invoicing and e-payment; and

(8) the United States Trade Representative, in consultation with the Secretary of State should negotiate bilateral and plurilateral agreements or arrangements relating to digital trade with the like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific region, the European Union, the member countries of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance, and other partners and allies, as appropriate.

SEC. 128. DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY AND CYBERSECURITY PARTNERSHIP.

(a) DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY AND CYBERSECURITY PARTNERSHIP.—The President is authorized to establish a program, to be known as the "Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership" to help foreign countries—

(1) expand and increase secure Internet access and digital infrastructure;

(2) adopt policies and regulatory positions that foster and encourage open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet, equitable access, the free flow of data, multi-stakeholder models of internet governance, and pro-competitive and secure information and communications technology (ICT) policies and regulations;

(3) promote and protect human rights and counter corruption and predatory behavior throughout communications and cybersecurity policy and implementation;

(4) guard against privacy abuses, cybercrime, disinformation and misinformation, and the use of digital technology and services to carry out criminal activity or human rights violations;

(5) bolster the role of civil society in informing ICT policy and regulations;

(6) promote exports of United States ICT goods and services and increase United States company market share in target markets;

(7) promote the innovation and diversification of ICT goods and supply chain services to be less reliant on imports from the People's Republic of China;

(8) build cybersecurity capacity, expand interoperability, and promote best practices for a national approach to cybersecurity; and

(9) enhance the security of their digital infrastructure to facilitate better information sharing with the United States and United States allies and partners, as appropriate.

(b) IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall jointly submit to the appropriate congressional committees an implementation plan for the 3-year period beginning on the date of the submission of the plan to advance the goals identified in subsection (a). The implementation plan shall also include a description of interagency responsibilities to carry out implementation, a description of any barriers to successful im-

plementation, and a description of any additional resources or authorities needed for successful implementation.

(c) CONSULTATION.—In developing the implementation plan required by subsection (b), the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall consult with—

(1) the appropriate congressional committees;

(2) leaders of the United States industry;

(3) civil society leaders with expertise in technology, telecommunications, cybersecurity, economic development and competitiveness, and human rights, including from the Open Technology Fund;

(4) representatives from relevant United States Government agencies; and

(5) representatives from like-minded allies and partners.

(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated such sums as necessary for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to carry out this section.

SEC. 129. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IDEOLOGICAL COMPETITION.

It is the sense of Congress that National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan correctly observed that the United States and likeminded democracies are in an ideological competition with the People's Republic of China, under the direction and control of the Chinese Communist Party, when he stated, "China is essentially making the case that the Chinese model is better than the American model. . . This is not any longer some kind of implied contrast. It is an explicit statement that there is an alternative model to the democratic market economy model that the United States has been advancing over the course of decades.".

Subtitle D—Financial Diplomacy and Leadership

SEC. 131. FINDINGS ON CHINESE FINANCIAL INDUSTRIAL POLICY.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The People's Republic of China operates a system of state-owned financial institutions including retail banks, investment banks, asset managers, and insurers which are given favorable treatment under Chinese law while foreign financial institutions have strict restrictions on their ability to operate in the PRC.

(2) In order to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, the PRC Government committed to opening the credit card payment business to foreign firms by 2006.

(3) After years of the PRC refusing to open its payment market, the United States brought a case against the PRC before the WTO. In 2012, the WTO mandated that the PRC open its card payment market to global competitors.

(4) Even after the WTO's ruling, the PRC Government refused to comply with the ruling and maintained a rule that required all yuan-denominated payment cards to use the PRC's Union Pay network. Only in 2020, after the Chinese payment market had grown to $27 trillion, did the PRC Government approve the application of foreign firms to enter the market.

(5) The PRC continues to maintain aggressive capital controls, limiting access to the Chinese market to foreign investors while hamstringing its own citizens ability to control their money.

(6) On November 5, 2018, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced that the PRC would launch a technology innovation stock exchange. The Shanghai Stock Exchange STAR Market launched on July 22, 2019.

(7) On October 24, 2020, Chinese billionaire Jack Ma referred to "pawnshop mentality" of state-owned banks. Shortly thereafter, the initial public offering of his firm Ant Financial was canceled by Chinese regulators.

(8) The PRC Government is pioneering the use of a fully digitized yuan, which is set to be the world's first central bank backed digital currency, and the People's Bank of China and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority have already begun testing the cross-border functionality of the digital currency.

SEC. 132. REPORT ON IMPORTANCE OF AMERICAN FINANCIAL STRENGTH FOR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the dominance of the dollar as the global reserve currency has yielded significant benefits to the United States and the American people by allowing the United States to maintain economic independence, better control its monetary policy, and finance government outlays;

(2) American global leadership has benefited from the United States monetary stability, creditworthiness, deep capital markets, and financial technology innovations;

(3) effective diplomacy and safeguarding of American national security rely on the United States role as the global financial leader, hub of global trade, and source of economic opportunity;

(4) by cracking down on dissent in the key financial center of Hong Kong, driving the creation of a technology focused stock exchange, and pushing forward a Central Bank digital currency, the People's Republic of China is attempting to become the leading hub of finance in the world; and

(5) the United States must maintain its position as a global financial leader to continue its broader global leadership role around the world.

(b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that—

(1) lists and examines the benefits to American foreign policy that derive from the United States financial leadership and the dollar's status as the world's global reserve currency;

(2) describes the actions taken by the People's Republic of China that could cement China's role as the world's leading financial center;

(3) analyzes the possible impact on American national security and foreign policy were the yuan to supplant the dollar as the world's leading reserve currency;

(4) outlines how the United States can work diplomatically with allies, partners, and other nations to preserve a financial system that is free, open, and fair; and

(5) identifies steps the United States can take to preserve its status as the world's leading financial center and maintain the dollar's position as the global reserve currency.

(c) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this section, the term "appropriate committees of Congress" means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;

(2) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives;

(3) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and

(4) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.

SEC. 133. REVIEW OF CHINESE COMPANIES ON UNITED STATES CAPITAL MARKETS.

(a) FINDINGS.—

(1) Beginning in the 1990s, a wave of Chinese companies sought to raise capital and list shares on American stock markets.

(2) In 2011 and 2012, more than 100 Chinese firms were delisted from the New York Stock Exchange as a result of fraud, accounting scandals, and other corporate governance failures.

(3) Following extensive diplomatic efforts by the United States Government, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) signed a memorandum of understanding with the China Securities Regulatory Commission and the China Ministry of Finance for the production and exchange of audit documents.

(4) Despite signing the agreement, Chinese regulators continue to hinder the PCAOB's access to relevant documents that are necessary for the PCAOB to carry out its enforcement duties.

(5) In August 2020, the Department of State sent a letter to American universities warning about national security implications related to Chinese stock holdings.

(6) In December 2020, Congress passed and the President signed the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act (Public Law 116–222), which requires foreign companies listed on American stock markets to comply with PCAOB auditing rules within three years. Under the legislation, issuers not in compliance within three years will be delisted.

(b) REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes the costs and benefits to the United States posed by the presence of companies incorporated in the People's Republic of China (PRC) that are listed on American stock exchanges or traded over the counter, in the form of American depository receipts.

(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report shall—

(A) identify companies incorporated in the PRC that—

(i) are listed or traded on one or several stock exchanges within the United States, including over-the-counter market and "A Shares" added to indexes and exchange-traded funds out of mainland exchanges in the PRC; and

(ii) based on the factors for consideration described in paragraph (3), have knowingly and materially contributed to—

(I) activities that undermine United States national security;

(II) serious abuses of internationally recognized human rights; or

(III) a substantially increased financial risk exposure for United States-based investors;

(B) describe the activities of the companies identified pursuant to subparagraph (A), and their implications for the United States; and

(C) develop policy recommendations for the United States Government, State governments, United States financial institutions, United States equity and debt exchanges, and other relevant stakeholders to address the risks posed by the presence in United States capital markets of the companies identified pursuant to subparagraph (A).

(3) FACTORS FOR INCLUSION OF A COMPANY.—In completing the report under paragraph (1), the President shall consider whether a company should be identified pursuant to paragraph (2)(A) because the company has—

(A) materially contributed to the development or manufacture, or sold or facilitated procurement by the PLA, of lethal military equipment or component parts of such equipment;

(B) contributed to the construction and militarization of features in the South China Sea;

(C) been sanctioned by the United States or has been determined to have conducted business with sanctioned entities;

(D) engaged in an act or a series of acts of intellectual property theft;

(E) engaged in corporate or economic espionage;

(F) contributed to the proliferation of nuclear or missile technology in violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions or United States sanctions;

(G) contributed to the repression of religious and ethnic minorities within the PRC, including in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region or Tibet Autonomous Region;

(H) contributed to the development of technologies that enable censorship directed or directly supported by the Government of the PRC; or

(I) contributed to other activities or behavior determined to be relevant by the President.

(4) FACTORS FOR MAKING POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS.—In completing the report under paragraph (1), the President shall weigh the national security implications and consider the following factors identified pursuant to paragraph (3) (except that such report should exclude from its analysis the delisting or potential delisting of companies from United States markets as a result of failing to retain a Public Company Accounting Oversight Board-registered public accounting firm as required by section 104 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7214)):

(A) The possibility that banning or delisting companies from United States markets could lead to an outflow of companies to list in the PRC.

(B) The possibility that banning or delisting companies from United States markets could impact the status of the United States as the world's leading capital markets center, particularly vis-à-vis the PRC.

(C) The impact on American foreign policy and national security if United States leadership in capital markets was weakened vis-à-vis the PRC.

(c) REPORT FORM.—The report required under subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form.

(d) PUBLICATION.—The report required under subsection (b) shall be made accessible to the public online through relevant United States Government websites.

SEC. 134. REPORT ON DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGES TO CROSS-BORDER PAYMENT AND FINANCIAL MESSAGING SYSTEMS.

(a) REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the diplomatic and economic implications of cross-border payment systems.

(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall—

(A) assess the extent to which American diplomacy and global leadership hinge upon the current infrastructure and existing ecosystem of cross-border payment and financial messaging systems;

(B) examine the durability of the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication cooperative;

(C) review and analyze ways in which the Cross Border Interbank Payment Systems, cryptocurrencies, and central bank digital currencies could erode this system; and

(D) analyze how changes to global cross-border payment systems could undermine United States national security interests including impacts on the efficacy of sanctions, the countering of terrorist finance, and the enforcement of anti-money laundering provisions.

(b) REPORT FORM.—The report required under subsection (a)(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form.

(c) PUBLICATION.—The report under subsection (a)(1) shall be made accessible to the public online through relevant United States Government websites.

TITLE II—INVESTING IN ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS

Subtitle A—Strategic and Diplomatic Matters

SEC. 201. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.

In this subtitle, the term "appropriate committees of Congress" means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 202. UNITED STATES COMMITMENT AND SUPPORT FOR ALLIES AND PARTNERS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific provide a unique strategic advantage to the United States and are among the Nation's most precious assets, enabling the United States to advance its vital national interests, defend its territory, expand its economy through international trade and commerce, establish enduring cooperation with allies while seeking to establish new partnerships, prevent the domination of the Indo-Pacific and its surrounding maritime and air lanes by a hostile power or powers, and deter potential aggressors;

(2) the Governments of the United States, Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand are critical allies in advancing a free and open order in the Indo-Pacific region and tackling challenges with unity of purpose, and have collaborated to advance specific efforts of shared interest in areas such as defense and security, economic prosperity, infrastructure connectivity, and fundamental freedoms;

(3) the United States greatly values other partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, including with India, Singapore, Indonesia, Taiwan, New Zealand, and Vietnam, as well as its trilateral and quadrilateral dialogues, and regional architecture such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, which are essential to further shared interests;

(4) the security environment in the Indo-Pacific demands consistent United States and allied commitment to strengthening and advancing alliances so that they are postured to meet these challenges, and will require sustained political will, concrete partnerships, economic, commercial, technological, and security cooperation, consistent and tangible commitments, high-level and extensive consultations on matters of mutual interest, mutual and shared cooperation in the acquisition of key capabilities important to allied defenses, and unified mutual support in the face of political, economic, or military coercion;

(5) fissures in the United States alliance relationships and partnerships benefit United States adversaries and weaken the collective ability to advance shared interests;

(6) the United States must work with allies to prioritize human rights throughout the Indo-Pacific region;

(7) as the report released in August 2020 by the Expert Group of the International Military Council on Climate and Security (IMCCS), entitled "Climate

and Security in the Indo-Asia Pacific" noted, the Indo-Pacific region is one of the regions most vulnerable to climate impacts, and as former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment Sherri Goodman, Secretary General of IMCCS, noted, climate shocks act as a threat multiplier in the Indo-Pacific region, increasing humanitarian response costs and impacting security throughout the region as sea levels rise, fishing patterns shift, food insecurity rises, and storms grow stronger and more frequent;

(8) the United State should continue to engage on and deepen cooperation with allies and partners of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, as laid out in the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (Public Law 115–409), in the areas of—

(A) forecasting environmental challenges;

(B) assisting with transnational cooperation on sustainable uses of forest and water resources with the goal of preserving biodiversity and access to safe drinking water;

(C) fisheries and marine resource conservation; and

(D) meeting environmental challenges and developing resilience;

(9) the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, should facilitate a robust interagency Indo-Pacific climate resiliency and adaptation strategy focusing on internal and external actions needed—

(A) to facilitate regional early recovery, risk reduction, and resilience to weather-related impacts on strategic interests of the United States and partners and allies of the United States in the region; and

(B) to address humanitarian and food security impacts of weather-related changes in the region; and

(10) ASEAN centrality and ASEAN-led mechanisms remain essential to the evolving institutional architecture of the Indo-Pacific region.

(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of the United States—

(1) to deepen diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation with and among United States allies in the Indo-Pacific, as appropriate, including through diplomatic engagement, regional development, energy security and development, scientific and health partnerships, educational and cultural exchanges, intelligence-sharing, and other diplomatic and defense-related initiatives;

(2) to uphold the United States multilateral and bilateral treaty obligations, including—

(A) defending Japan consistent with the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan, done at Washington, January 19, 1960, and all related and subsequent bilateral security agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the date of enactment of this Act;

(B) defending the Republic of Korea consistent with the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea, done at Washington, October 1, 1953, and all related and subsequent bilateral security agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the date of enactment of this Act;

(C) defending the Philippines consistent with article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines, done at Washington, August 30, 1951, and all related and subsequent bilateral security agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the date of enactment of this Act;

(D) defending Thailand consistent with the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty ("Manila Pact"), done at Manila, September 8, 1954, understanding thereto the Thanat-Rusk communique of 1962, and all related and subsequent bilateral security agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the date of enactment of this Act; and

(E) defending Australia consistent with the Security Treaty Between Australia and the United States of America, done at San Francisco, September 1, 1951, and all related and subsequent bilateral security agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the date of enactment of this Act;

(3) to strengthen and deepen the United States' bilateral and regional partnerships, including with India, Taiwan, ASEAN, and New Zealand;

(4) to cooperate with allies and partners to promote human rights across the Indo-Pacific region bilaterally and through regional and multilateral fora and pacts;

(5) to strengthen and advance diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation with regional partners, such as Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and India; and

(6) to collaborate and cooperate on the sustainable development of the Mekong River Basin, including by providing support for environmental conservation and protection initiatives in the Mekong sub-region and through assistance to Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, whose governments comprise the Mekong River Commission (MRC). United States efforts should focus on increasing MRC member countries' capacity in the sustainable conservation and management of natural resources.

SEC. 203. BOOSTING QUAD COOPERATION.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) as a Pacific power, the United States should continue to strengthen its cooperation with Australia, India, and Japan, (commonly referred to as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or "Quad") to enhance and implement a shared vision to meet regional challenges and to promote a free, open, inclusive, resilient, and healthy Indo-Pacific, characterized by respect for democratic norms, rule of law, and market-driven economic growth, and that is free from undue influence and coercion;

(2) the United States should expand dialogue and cooperation through the Quad with a range of partners to support the rule of law, freedom of navigation and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, democratic values, and territorial integrity, and to uphold peace and prosperity and strengthen democratic resilience in the Indo-Pacific;

(3) the recent pledge from the first-ever Quad leaders meeting on March 12, 2021, to respond to the economic and health impacts of COVID–19, including expanding safe, affordable, and effective vaccine production and equitable access, and to address shared challenges, including in cyberspace, critical technologies, counterterrorism, quality infrastructure investment, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, as well as maritime domains, further advances the important cooperation among Quad nations that is so critical to the Indo-Pacific region;

(4) building upon their announced commitment to finance 1,000,000,000 or more COVID–19 vaccines by the end of 2022 for use in the Indo-Pacific region, the United States International Development Finance Corporation, the Japan International Cooperation Agency, and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, including through partnerships other multilateral development banks, should also venture to finance development and infrastructure projects in the Indo-Pacific region that are competitive, transparent, and sustainable;

(5) the United States should participate in the Resilient Supply Chain Initiative launched by Australia, Japan, and India in 2020, along with similar initiatives that relocate supply chains in the health, economic, and national security sectors to the United States, its Quad partners, and other like-minded countries; and

(6) the formation of a Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group could—

(A) sustain and deepen engagement between senior officials of the Quad countries on a full spectrum of issues; and

(B) be modeled on the successful and long-standing bilateral intra-parliamentary groups between the United States and Mexico, Canada, and the United Kingdom, as well as other formal and informal parliamentary exchanges.

(b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy for bolstering engagement and cooperation with the Quad.

(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) A description of how the United States intends to demonstrate democratic leadership in the Indo-Pacific through quadrilateral engagement with India, Japan, and Australia on shared interests and common challenges.

(B) A summary of—

(i) current and past Quad initiatives across the whole of the United States Government, including to promote broad based and inclusive economic growth, trade, and investment, and to advance technology cooperation, energy innovation, climate mitigation and adaptation, physical and digital infrastructure development, education, disaster management, and global health security;

(ii) proposals shared among Quad countries to deepen existing security cooperation, intelligence sharing, economic partnerships, and multilateral coordination; and

(iii) initiatives and agreements undertaken jointly with Quad countries, in addition to other like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific, on areas of shared interest.

(C) A description of efforts to jointly—

(i) expand ongoing COVID–19 cooperation to prepare for the next pandemic by focusing on medium-term vaccine and medical supply production and building a broader dialogue on global public health;

(ii) combat economic coercion, deepen regional economic engagement and integration, and strengthen regional rules and standards around trade and investment;

(iii) strengthen climate actions on mitigation, adaptation, resilience, technology, capacity-building, and climate finance;

(iv) facilitate the development of quality infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific through joint financing, investment, technical assistance, and standards setting;

(v) enhance joint maritime security and maritime domain awareness initiatives to protect the maritime commons and support international law and freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific; and

(vi) develop international technology standards and share or co-develop new innovative technologies of the future.

SEC. 204. ESTABLISHMENT OF QUAD INTRA-PARLIAMENTARY WORKING GROUP.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall seek to enter into negotiations with the governments of Japan, Australia, and India (collectively, with the United States, known as the "Quad") with the goal of reaching a written agreement to establish a Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group to facilitate closer cooperation on shared interests and values.

(b) UNITED STATES GROUP.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—At such time as the governments of the Quad countries enter into a written agreement described in subsection (a) to establish a Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group, there shall be established a United States Group, which shall represent the United States at the Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group.

(2) MEMBERSHIP.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The United States Group shall be comprised of not more than 24 Members of Congress.

(B) APPOINTMENT.—Of the Members of Congress appointed to the United States Group under subparagraph (A)—

(i) half shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives from among Members of the House, not fewer than four of whom shall be members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs; and

(ii) half shall be appointed by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, based on recommendations of the majority leader and minority leader of the Senate, from among Members of the Senate, not fewer than four of whom shall be members of the Committee on Foreign Relations (unless the majority leader and minority leader determine otherwise).

(3) MEETINGS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The United States Group shall seek to meet not less frequently than annually with representatives and appropriate staff of the legislatures of Japan, Australia, and India, and any other country invited by mutual agreement of the Quad countries.

(B) LIMITATION.—A meeting described in subparagraph (A) may be held—

(i) in the United States;

(ii) in another Quad country during periods when Congress is not in session; or

(iii) virtually.

(4) CHAIRPERSON AND VICE CHAIRPERSON.—

(A) HOUSE DELEGATION.—The Speaker of the House of Representatives shall designate the chairperson or vice chairperson of the delegation of the United States Group from the House from among members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

(B) SENATE DELEGATION.—The President Pro Tempore of the Senate shall designate the chairperson or vice chairperson of the delegation of the United States Group from the Senate from among members of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

(5) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appropriated $1,000,000 for each fiscal years 2022 through 2025 for the United States Group.

(B) DISTRIBUTION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—For each fiscal year for which an appropriation is made for the United States Group, half of the amount appropriated shall be available to the delegation from the House of Representatives and half of the amount appropriated shall be available to the delegation from the Senate.

(ii) METHOD OF DISTRIBUTION.—The amounts available to the delegations of the House of Representatives and the Senate under clause (i) shall be disbursed on vouchers to be approved by the chairperson of the delegation from the House of Representatives and the chairperson of the delegation from the Senate, respectively.

(6) PRIVATE SOURCES.—The United States Group may accept gifts or donations of services or property, subject to the review and approval, as appropriate, of the Committee on Ethics of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Ethics of the Senate.

(7) CERTIFICATION OF EXPENDITURES.—The certificate of the chairperson of the delegation from the House of Representatives or the delegation of the Senate of the United States Group shall be final and conclusive upon the accounting officers in the auditing of the accounts of the United States Group.

(8) ANNUAL REPORT.—The United States Group shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report for each fiscal year for which an appropriation is made for the United States Group, including a description of its expenditures under such appropriation.

SEC. 205. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH ASEAN.

It is the policy of the United States to—

(1) stand with the nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as they respond to COVID–19 and support greater cooperation in building capacity to prepare for and respond to pandemics and other public health challenges;

(2) support high-level United States participation in the annual ASEAN Summit held each year;

(3) reaffirm the importance of United States-ASEAN economic engagement, including the elimination of barriers to cross-border commerce, and support the ASEAN Economic Community's (AEC) goals, including strong, inclusive, and sustainable long-term economic growth and cooperation with the United States that focuses on innovation and capacity-building efforts in technology, education, disaster management, food security, human rights, and trade facilitation, particularly for ASEAN's poorest countries;

(4) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to foster greater integration and unity within the ASEAN community, as well as to foster greater integration and unity with non-ASEAN economic, political, and security partners, including Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, the European Union, and India;

(5) recognize the value of strategic economic initiatives such as United States-ASEAN Connect, which demonstrates a commitment to ASEAN and the AEC and builds upon economic relationships in the region;

(6) support ASEAN nations in addressing maritime and territorial disputes in a constructive manner and in pursuing claims through peaceful, diplomatic, and, as necessary, legitimate regional and international arbitration mechanisms, consistent with international law, including through the adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea that represents the interests of all parties and promotes peace and stability in the region;

(7) urge all parties involved in the maritime and territorial disputes in the Indo-Pacific region, including the Government of the People's Republic of China—

(A) to cease any current activities, and avoid undertaking any actions in the future, that undermine stability, or complicate or escalate disputes through the use of coercion, intimidation, or military force;

(B) to demilitarize islands, reefs, shoals, and other features, and refrain from new efforts to militarize, including the construction of new garrisons and facilities and the relocation of additional military personnel, material, or equipment;

(C) to oppose actions by any country that prevent other countries from exercising their sovereign rights to the resources in their exclusive economic zones and continental shelves by enforcing claims to those areas in the South China Sea that lack support in international law; and

(D) to oppose unilateral declarations of administrative and military districts in contested areas in the South China Sea;

(8) urge parties to refrain from unilateral actions that cause permanent physical damage to the marine environment and support the efforts of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and ASEAN to implement guidelines to address the illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the region;

(9) urge ASEAN nations to develop a common approach to encourage China and the Philippines to comply with the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration's 2016 ruling in favor of the Republic of the Philippines in the case against the People's Republic of China's excessive maritime claims;

(10) reaffirm the commitment of the United States to continue joint efforts with ASEAN to halt human smuggling and trafficking in persons and urge ASEAN to create and strengthen regional mechanisms to provide assistance and support to refugees and migrants;

(11) support the Mekong-United States Partnership;

(12) support newly created initiatives with ASEAN nations, including the United States-ASEAN Smart Cities Partnership, the ASEAN Policy Implementation Project, the United States-ASEAN Innovation Circle, and the United States-ASEAN Health Futures;

(13) encourage the President to communicate to ASEAN leaders the importance of promoting the rule of law and open and transparent government, strengthening civil society, and protecting human rights, including releasing political prisoners, ceasing politically motivated prosecutions and arbitrary killings, and safeguarding freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, and freedom of speech and expression;

(14) support efforts by organizations in ASEAN that address corruption in the public and private sectors, enhance anti-bribery compliance, enforce bribery criminalization in the private sector, and build beneficial ownership transparency through the ASEAN–USAID PROSPECT project partnered with the South East Asia Parties Against Corruption (SEA–PAC);

(15) support the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative as an example of a people-to-people partnership that provides skills, networks, and leadership training to a new generation that will create and fill jobs, foster cross-border cooperation and partnerships, and rise to address the regional and global challenges of the future;

(16) support the creation of initiatives similar to the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative for other parts of the Indo-Pacific to foster people-to-people partnerships with an emphasis on civil society leaders;

(17) acknowledge those ASEAN governments that have fully upheld and implemented all United Nations Security Council resolutions and international agreements with respect to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs and encourage all other ASEAN governments to do the same; and

(18) allocate appropriate resources across the United States Government to articulate and implement an Indo-Pacific strategy that respects and supports the crucial role of ASEAN and supports ASEAN as a source of well-functioning and problem-solving regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific community.

SEC. 206. YOUNG SOUTHEAST ASIAN LEADERS INITIATIVE.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the "Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative Act" or the "YSEALI Act".

(b) YOUNG SOUTHEAST ASIAN LEADERS INITIATIVE.—

(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established in the Department of State the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative ("YSEALI") program.

(2) GOALS.—The YSEALI program shall seek to build to capacity of young leaders in Southeast Asia to—

(A) support young leaders from Southeast Asia by offering professional development and a global network to share expertise, including in the areas of civic engagement, economic empowerment and social entrepreneurship, education and environmental issues; and

(B) further strengthen the enduring partnership between the United States and Southeast Asia and connect United States experts with YSEALI participants.

(3) YSEALI PROGRAMS.—

(A) YSEALI ACADEMIC FELLOWS PROGRAM.—There is established the YSEALI Academic Fellows Program to bring students from YSEALI partner countries to the United States for the purposes of building practical expertise, leadership skills, and professional networks relating to one or more of the YSEALI themes. The Secretary of State may award fellowships under

the Academic Fellows Program to eligible individuals based on the following:

(i) Citizenship and residency in a YSEALI partner country.

(ii) Status as a full-time undergraduate student, or recent graduate of college, university, or other institutions of higher learning.

(iii) Other criteria determined appropriate by the Secretary.

(B) YSEALI PROFESSIONAL FELLOWS PROGRAM.—There is established the YSEALI Professional Fellows Program to bring professionals from YSEALI partner countries to the United States for the purposes of building practical expertise, leadership skills, and professional networks relating to one or more of the YSEALI themes. The Secretary of State may award fellowships under the Professional Fellows Program to eligible individuals based on the following:

(i) Citizenship and residency in a YSEALI partner country.

(ii) Status as an emerging leader in government, civil society, or the private sector, and demonstrated expertise relating to one or more of the YSEALI themes.

(iii) Current employment, and two or more years of professional work experience relevant to one or more YSEALI themes.

(iv) Other criteria determined appropriate by the Secretary.

(C) OTHER INITIATIVES.—The Secretary of State may designate other initiatives as YSEALI initiatives under this section if they advance the goals of the YSEALI program as described in paragraph (2).

(4) ACTIVITIES.—

(A) UNITED STATES-BASED ACTIVITIES.—The Secretary of State shall oversee all United States-based activities carried out under the YSEALI program, including the participation of YSEALI Academic Fellows in a program at a United States university or college, and the participation of YSEALI Professional Fellows at United States private and public sector organizations for individually-tailored work placements. Both fellowships may include site visits, professional networking opportunities, leadership training, community service, and organized cultural activities, as appropriate.

(B) SOUTHEAST ASIA-BASED ACTIVITIES.—The Secretary of State should continue to support overseas initiatives of the program, including the following:

(i) Quality leadership training, professional development, and networking opportunities for YSEALI alumni.

(ii) Reciprocal exchanges for YSEALI Professional Fellows Program's United States professional hosts and interlocutors to support post-United States exchange action plans and other related public diplomacy goals, as appropriate.

(iii) Opportunities for networking with YSEALI alumni and professionals and experts who are American and Southeast Asian.

(iv) The YSEALI Regional Workshop program, offering networking, mentoring, hands-on training, and the tools necessary to lead communities in addressing economic, environmental, educational, and civic engagement issues.

(v) The YSEALI Seeds for the Future program, providing small, competitive grants to young leaders in Southeast Asia to improve their communities, countries, and the region towards one or more of the themes of civic engagement, economic empowerment and social entrepreneurship, education, or environmental issues.

(vi) The YSEALI Academy at Fulbright University Vietnam, offering executive-level seminars for entry to mid-level professionals around the themes of technology and innovation, public policy, and entrepreneurship.

(vii) The YSEALI Women's Leadership Academy Program, enhancing people-to-people ties and engagement with young and emerging leaders by promoting gender equality and advancing the status of women and girls, such as in the public health sector

(C) ALUMNI PLATFORM.—The Secretary of State is authorized to convene current YSEALI participants and YSEALI alumni through a platform to promote networking opportunities within the YSEALI community.

(D) IMPLEMENTATION.—To carry out this paragraph, United States diplomatic and consular posts, the Secretary of State, and agency external partners managing and implementing the YSEALI program—

(i) shall promote United States policy goals in Southeast Asia by providing tools and resources to help young Southeast Asian leaders de-

velop important skills and connections, including through online campaigns and public diplomacy initiatives;

(ii) shall establish a system for monitoring, evaluating, and improving the YSEALI program; and

(iii) may accept financial contributions from foundations, corporations, private donors, program partners, and implementing agency external partners intended to foster the goals of the YSEALI program.

(5) REPORTS.—

(A) STRATEGY.—The Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy for implementing the YSEALI program, including the following:

(i) YSEALI program goals, targets, and planned outcomes for each year and, separately, for the YSEALI program generally during the duration of its implementation.

(ii) The continuation of YSEALI program monitoring and evaluation plan, including metrics for measuring YSEALI program progress identification of annual YSEALI program goals, and targets.

(B) ANNUAL REPORTS.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this section, and annually thereafter for 4 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and publish on a publicly available website of the Department a report on—

(i) YSEALI program progress and an assessment of the metrics, goals, targets, and outcomes described in subparagraph (A)(i), including information relating to YSEALI program implementation and outcome activities during the year covered by each report; and

(ii) recommendations for improvements or amendments to the YSEALI program and strategy, if any, that would improve their effectiveness during subsequent years of YSEALI program implementation.

(C) FINAL REPORT.—Not later than the date of the submission of the last report required under subparagraph (B), the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a final assessment report that evaluates YSEALI program implementation and outcomes during the entire duration of YSEALI program operation, including recommendations regarding whether the YSEALI program should be reauthorized and any changes that would improve its effectiveness.

(6) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(A) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(i) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;

(ii) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives;

(iii) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and

(iv) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

(B) IMPLEMENTING AGENCY EXTERNAL PARTNERS.—The term "implementing agency external partners" means any external partner that is not a United States Government agency, and may include one or more of the following entities:

(i) Local or multinational corporations.

(ii) Nongovernmental organizations.

(iii) Universities.

(iv) Regional institutions.

(C) YSEALI THEME.—The term "YSEALI theme" means—

(i) civic engagement;

(ii) economic empowerment and social entrepreneurship;

(iii) education;

(iv) environmental issues; or

(v) any other theme included by the Secretary of State.

(D) YSEALI PARTNER COUNTRIES.—The term "YSEALI partner countries" includes each member country of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and each other country or political entity the Secretary of State determines appropriate to include in the programs established under this section.

SEC. 207. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH G7 AND G20 COUNTRIES.

It is the sense of Congress that the President, acting through the Secretary of State, should initiate an agenda with G7 and G20 countries on matters relevant to economic and democratic freedoms, including relating to the following:

(1) Trade and investment issues and enforcement.

(2) Building support for international infrastructure standards, including standards agreed to at the G20 summit in Osaka in 2018.
(3) The erosion of democracy and human rights.
(4) The security of 5G telecommunications.
(5) Anti-competitive behavior, such as intellectual property theft, massive subsidization of companies, and other policies and practices.
(6) Predatory international sovereign lending that is inconsistent with Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and Paris Club principles.
(7) International influence campaigns.
(8) Environmental standards.
(9) Coordination with like-minded regional partners that are not in the G7 and G20.

SEC. 208. ENHANCING THE UNITED STATES-TAIWAN PARTNERSHIP.

(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States—
(1) to support the close economic, political, and security relationship between Taiwan and the United States and recognize Taiwan as a vital part of the approach to the United States Indo-Pacific;
(2) to advance the security of Taiwan and its democracy a vital national security interest of the United States;
(3) to reinforce all existing United States Government commitments to Taiwan, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8), the three joint communiques, and the "Six Assurances";
(4) to support Taiwan's implementation of its asymmetric defense strategy, including the priorities identified in Taiwan's Overall Defense Concept;
(5) to urge Taiwan to increase its defense spending in order to fully resource its defense strategy;
(6) to conduct regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan in order to enhance Taiwan's self-defense capabilities, particularly its efforts to develop and integrate asymmetric capabilities, such as anti-ship, coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense, advanced command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and resilient command and control capabilities, into its military forces;
(7) to advocate and actively advance Taiwan's meaningful participation in international organizations, including the World Health Assembly, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization, and other international bodies as appropriate;
(8) to advocate for information sharing with Taiwan in the International Agency for Research on Cancer;
(9) to promote meaningful cooperation among the United States, Taiwan, and other like-minded partners;
(10) to enhance bilateral trade, including potentially through new agreements or resumption of talks under the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement;
(11) to actively engage in trade talks in pursuance of a bilateral free trade agreement;
(12) to expand bilateral economic and technological cooperation, including improving supply chain security;
(13) to support United States educational and exchange programs with Taiwan, including by promoting the study of Chinese language, culture, history, and politics in Taiwan; and
(14) to expand people-to-people exchanges between the United States and Taiwan.

(b) SUPPORTING UNITED STATES EDUCATIONAL AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH TAIWAN.—
(1) ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES-TAIWAN CULTURAL EXCHANGE FOUNDATION.—The Secretary of State should consider establishing an independent nonprofit entity that—
(A) is dedicated to deepening ties between the future leaders of Taiwan and the United States; and
(B) works with State and local school districts and educational institutions in the United States to send high school and university students to Taiwan to study the Chinese language, culture, history, politics, and other relevant subjects.
(2) PARTNER.—State and local school districts and educational institutions, including public universities, in the United States are encouraged to partner with the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States to establish programs to promote an increase in educational and cultural exchanges.

SEC. 209. TAIWAN DIPLOMATIC REVIEW.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) Pursuant to the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301(b)(1)), it is the policy of the United States to "promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people of Taiwan".

(2) In May 2019, the Taiwanese counterpart to the American Institute in Taiwan, the Coordination Council for North American Affairs, was renamed the "Taiwan Council for U.S. Affairs".

(3) It is the policy of the United States to refer to Taiwan as "Taiwan", not "Taipei" or "Chinese Taipei".

(4) The Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office is inaptly named as it works to cultivate the extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people, organizations, and enterprises of Taiwan, not merely those in Taipei.

(b) NEGOTIATIONS TO RENAME TECRO.—Reflective of the substantively deepening ties between Taiwan and the United States, the Secretary of State shall seek to enter into negotiations with appropriate officials of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States with the objective of renaming its office in Washington, D.C., the Taiwan Representative Office in the United States, and its subsidiary offices in the United States, accordingly.

SEC. 210. TAIWAN PEACE AND STABILITY ACT.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the "Taiwan Peace and Stability Act".

(b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

(2) INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION.—The term "international organization" includes United Nations funds, programs, specialized agencies, entities, and bodies, as well as other organizations outside of the United Nations system that the Secretary of State determines appropriate, in consultation with other relevant Federal departments and agencies.

(3) ONE-CHINA PRINCIPLE.—The term "One-China Principle" means only the PRC's policy toward Taiwan.

(4) CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS.—The term "civil society organizations" means international civil society organizations that are critical to maintaining Taiwan's international space and enabling Taiwan to play a positive and constructive role in the global community.

(5) POTENTIAL PLA CAMPAIGNS.—The term "potential PLA campaigns" means—

(A) a naval blockade of Taiwan;

(B) an amphibious assault and ground invasion of Taiwan, especially such invasion designed to accomplish a fiat accompli before intervention is possible; or

(C) a seizure of one or more of Taiwan's outlying islands.

(c) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The United States has consistently sought to advance peace and stability in East Asia as a central element of United States foreign policy toward the region.

(2) The Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC), especially since the election of Tsai Ing-Wen in 2016, has conducted a coordinated campaign to weaken Taiwan diplomatically, economically, and militarily in a manner that threatens to erode United States policy and create a fait accompli on questions surrounding Taiwan's future.

(3) In order to ensure the longevity of United States policy and preserve the ability of the people of Taiwan to determine their future independently, it is necessary to reinforce Taiwan's diplomatic, economic, and physical space.

(4) Taiwan has provided monetary, humanitarian, and medical assistance to combat diseases such as AIDS, tuberculosis, Ebola, and dengue fever in countries around the world. During the COVID–19 pandemic, Taiwan donated millions of pieces of personal protective equipment and COVID–19 tests to countries in need.

(5) Since 2016, the Gambia, São Tomé and Principe, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, El Salvador, the Solomon Islands, and Kiribati have

severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan in favor of diplomatic relations with China.

(6) Taiwan was invited to participate in the World Health Assembly (WHA), the decision-making body of the World Health Organization, as an observer annually between 2009 and 2016. Since the 2016 election of President Tsai, the PRC has increasingly resisted Taiwan's participation in the WHA. Taiwan was not invited to attend the WHA in 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, or 2021.

(7) The Taipei Flight Information Region reportedly served 1,750,000 flights and 68,900,000 passengers in 2018 and is home to Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport, the 11th busiest airport in the world. Taiwan has been excluded from participating at the International Civil Aviation Organization since 2013.

(8) United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (1971) does not address the issue of representation of Taiwan and its people at the United Nations, nor does it give the PRC the right to represent the people on Taiwan.

(d) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to—

(1) maintain the position that peace and stability in the Western Pacific are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern; and

(2) work with allies and partners to promote peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific and deter military acts or other forms of coercive behavior that would undermine regional stability.

(e) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TAIWAN'S MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) Taiwan is free, democratic, and prosperous, is home to 23,500,000 people, and is an important contributor to the global community;

(2) multiple United States Government Administrations have taken important steps to advance Taiwan's meaningful participation in international organizations and to enhance cooperation with Taiwan to provide global public goods, including through development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief in trilateral and multilateral fora;

(3) nonetheless, significant structural, policy, and legal barriers remain to advancing Taiwan's meaningful participation in the international community; and

(4) efforts to share Taiwan's expertise with other parts of the global community could be further enhanced through a systematic approach, along with greater attention from Congress and the American public to such efforts.

(f) STRATEGY TO SUPPORT TAIWAN'S MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary of State, in consultation with other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy—

(A) to advance Taiwan's meaningful participation in a prioritized set of international organizations; and

(B) that responds to growing pressure from the PRC on foreign governments, international organizations, commercial actors, and civil society organizations to comply with its "One-China Principle" with respect to Taiwan.

(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy required under paragraph (1) shall include—

(A) an assessment of the methods the PRC uses to coerce actors to into adhering to its "One-China Principle", including those employed against governments, international organizations, and civil society organizations and pressure on commercial actors, to the extent relevant in the context of Taiwan's meaningful participation international organizations;

(B) an assessment of the policies of foreign governments toward the PRC and Taiwan, to identify likeminded allies and partners who might become public or private partners in the strategy;

(C) a systematic analysis of all international organizations, as practicable, to identify those that best lend themselves to advancing Taiwan's participation, including—

(i) the organization's policy on the requirements to obtain membership and observer status, as well as the foundational documents defining membership requirements and observer status within the organization;

(ii) the organization's participation rules;

(iii) the processes for developing membership requirements and participation rules;

(iv) the policies of current members regarding Taiwan's political status; and

(v) the organization's relative reliance on contributions from the PRC and how it may affect internal decision-making;

(D) an evaluation of the feasibility and advisability of expanding economic, security, and diplomatic engagement with countries that have demonstrably strengthened, enhanced, or upgraded relations with Taiwan, where it aligns with United States interests;

(E) a survey of international organizations that have allowed Taiwan's meaningful participation, including an assessment of whether any erosion in Taiwan's engagement has occurred within those organizations and how Taiwan's participation has positively strengthened the capacity and activity of these organizations, providing positive models for Taiwan's inclusion in other similar forums;

(F) a list of not more than 20 international organizations at which the United States Government will prioritize using its voice, vote, and influence to advance Taiwan's meaningful participation over the three-year period following the date of enactment of this Act, to be derived from the organizations identified pursuant to subparagraph (C); and

(G) a description of the diplomatic strategies and the coalitions the United States Government plans to develop to implement subparagraph (F).

(3) FORM.—The strategy required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in classified form but may include an unclassified summary.

(4) CONSULTATION.—The Secretary of State shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees—

(A) not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, with respect to the international organizations identified pursuant to paragraph (2)(C); and

(B) not later than 180 days after the date of the submission of the strategy required under paragraph (1), and every 180 days thereafter for 2 years, regarding the development and implementation of the strategy required.

(g) EXPANDING UNITED STATES-TAIWAN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—No later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), in consultation with the United States International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on cooperation with Taiwan on trilateral and multilateral development initiatives, through the American Institute in Taiwan as appropriate.

(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required in paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) A comprehensive review of existing cooperation mechanisms and initiatives between USAID or DFC and relevant departments and agencies in Taiwan, including, but not limited to Taiwan's International Cooperation and Development Fund (ICDF).

(B) An assessment of how USAID and DFC development cooperation with relevant departments and agencies in Taiwan compares to comparable cooperation with partners of similar economic size and foreign assistance capacity.

(C) An analysis of the opportunities and challenges the cooperation described in subparagraph (A) has offered to date, including—

(i) opportunities collaboration has offered to expand USAID's and DFC's ability to deliver assistance into a wider range communities;

(ii) sectors where USAID, DFC, ICDF, other relevant agencies and departments in Taiwan, or the organizations' implementing partners, have a comparative advantage in providing assistance; and

(iii) opportunities to transition virtual capacity building events relevant departments and agencies in Taiwan, through the Global Cooperation and Training Framework and other forums, into in-person, enduring forms of development cooperation.

(D) An assessment of any legal, policy, logistical, financial, or administrative barriers to expanding cooperation in trilateral or multilateral development, including—

(i) availability of personnel at the American Institute in Taiwan responsible for coordinating development assistance cooperation;

(ii) volume of current cooperation initiatives and barriers to expanding it;

(iii) diplomatic, policy, or legal barriers facing the United States or other partners to including Taiwan in formal and informal multilateral development cooperation mechanisms;

(iv) resource or capacity barriers to expanding cooperation facing the United States or Taiwan; and

(v) geopolitical barriers that complicate United States-Taiwan cooperation in third countries.

(E) Recommendations to address the challenges identified in subparagraph (D).

(F) A description of any additional resources or authorities that expanding cooperation might require.

(3) FORM.—The strategy required in paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

(h) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON EXPANDING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN.—It is the sense of the Congress that—

(1) expanding United States economic relations with Taiwan has benefited the people of both the United States and Taiwan; and

(2) the United States should explore opportunities to deepen, and where possible expand, economic ties between Taiwan and the United States, through dialogue, and by developing the legal templates required to support potential future agreements.

(i) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) PRC attempts to intimidate Taiwan, including through high rates of PRC sorties into air space near Taiwan, and PRC amphibious assault exercises near Taiwan, jeopardizes the long-standing United States position that differences in cross-Strait relations must be resolved peacefully;

(2) given the potential for a cross-Strait conflict to be highly destructive and destabilizing, any increase in the risk of conflict demands attention and obligates leaders to reinforce deterrence, as the most viable means to prevent war;

(3) Taiwan should continue to implement its asymmetric defense strategy, including investing in cost-effective and resilient capabilities, while also strengthening recruitment and training of its reserve and civil defense forces, and those capabilities include, but are not limited to, coastal defense cruise missiles; and

(4) while enhancing deterrence, it is also essential to maintain open and effective crisis communication and risk reduction mechanisms, as a means to reduce the risk of misunderstanding and ultimately, conflict.

(j) STRATEGY TO ENHANCE DETERRENCE OVER A CROSS-STRAIT CONFLICT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—No later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a whole-of-government strategy to enhance deterrence over a cross-Strait military conflict between the PRC and Taiwan.

(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy shall include the following:

(A) A comprehensive review of existing diplomatic, economic, and military tools to establish deterrence over a cross-Strait conflict and an assessment of their efficacy.

(B) An examination of the present and future capabilities of the United States and Taiwan to respond to the potential PLA campaigns against Taiwan in 5, 10, and 15 years. The analysis shall include an assessment of the progress Taiwan has made in developing the cost-effective and resilient capabilities needed to respond to its strategic environment, as well as any additional personnel, procurement, or training reforms required.

(C) An evaluation of the feasibility of expanding coordination with United States allies and partners to enhance deterrence over a cross-Strait conflict. The review shall include a review of the following matters:

(i) Expanding coordination of public or private messaging on deterrence vis-à-vis Taiwan.

(ii) Coordinating use of economic tools to raise the costs of PRC military action that could precipitate a cross-Strait conflict.

(iii) Enhancing codevelopment and codeployment of military capabilities related to deterrence over a cross-Strait conflict, or enhancing coordination on training of Taiwan's military forces.

(D) Recommendations on significant additional diplomatic, economic, and military steps available to the United States Government, unilaterally and in concert with United States allies and partners, to enhance the clarity and credibility of deterrence over a cross-Strait conflict.

(E) A description of any additional resources or authorities needed to implement the recommendations identified in subparagraph (D).

(3) FORM.—The strategy required in paragraph (1) shall be submitted classified form but may include an unclassified annex.

(4) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than every 180 days thereafter for 7 years, the President (or a designee), as well as representatives from the agencies and departments involved in developing the strategy required in paragraph (1), shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees regarding the development and implementation of the strategy required in this subsection. The representatives from the relevant agencies and departments shall be at the Under Secretary level or above.

(k) STRENGTHENING TAIWAN'S CIVILIAN DEFENSE PROFESSIONALS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall present to the appropriate congressional committees a plan for strengthening the community of civilian defense professionals in Taiwan, facilitated through the American Institute in Taiwan as appropriate.

(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The plan required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) A comprehensive review of existing United States Government and non-United States Government programmatic and funding modalities to support Taiwan's civilian defense professionals in pursuing professional development, educational, and cultural exchanges in the United States, including—

(i) opportunities through Department of State-supported programs, such as the International Visitor Leaders Program; and

(ii) opportunities offered through nongovernmental institutions, such as think tanks, to the extent the review can practicably make such an assessment.

(B) A description of the frequency that civilian defense professionals from Taiwan pursue or are selected for the programs reviewed pursuant to subparagraph (A).

(C) An analysis of any funding, policy, administrative, or other barriers preventing greater participation from Taiwan's civilian defense professionals in the opportunities identified pursuant to subparagraph (A).

(D) An evaluation of the value expanding the opportunities reviewed pursuant to subparagraph (A) would offer for strengthening Taiwan's existing civilian defense community, and for increasing the perceived value of the field for young professionals in Taiwan.

(E) An assessment of options the United States Government could take individually, with partners in Taiwan, or with foreign governments, or nongovernmental partners, to expand the opportunities reviewed pursuant to subparagraph (A).

(F) A description of additional resources and authorities required by the options assessed pursuant to subparagraph (E).

(3) FORM.—The plan required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 211. TAIWAN INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY ACT.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the "Taiwan International Solidarity Act".

(b) CLARIFICATION REGARDING UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2758.—Subsection (a) of section 2 of the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (Public Law 116–135) (relating to diplomatic relations with Taiwan) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:

"(10) United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (1971) established the representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China as the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations. The resolution did not address the issue of representation of Taiwan and its people in the United Nations or any related organizations, nor did the resolution take a position on the relationship between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan or include any statement pertaining to Taiwan's sovereignty.

"(11) The United States opposes any initiative that seeks to change Taiwan's status without the consent of the people.".

(c) UNITED STATES ADVOCACY FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO RESIST THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S EFFORTS TO DISTORT THE "ONE CHINA" POSITION.—Section 4 of the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (relating to the policy of the United States regarding Taiwan's participation in international organizations) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (2), by striking "and" after the semicolon at the end;

(2) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at the end and inserting "; and"; and

(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

"(4) to instruct, as appropriate, representatives of the United States Government in all organizations described in paragraph (1) to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to advocate such organizations to resist the People's Republic of China's efforts to distort the decisions, language, policies, or procedures of such organizations regarding Taiwan.".

(d) OPPOSING THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S EFFORTS TO UNDERMINE TAIWAN'S TIES AND PARTNERSHIPS INTERNATIONALLY.—Subsection (a) of section 5 of the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (relating to strengthening ties with Taiwan) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (2), by striking "and" after the semicolon at the end;

(2) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at the end and inserting "; and"; and

(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

"(4) encourage, as appropriate, United States allies and partners to oppose the People's Republic of China's efforts to undermine Taiwan's official diplomatic relationships and its partnerships with countries with which it does not maintain diplomatic relations.".

(e) REPORT ON THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S ATTEMPTS TO PROMOTE ITS "ONE CHINA" POSITION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (b) of section 5 of the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (relating to strengthening ties with Taiwan) is amended by inserting before the period at the end the following: ", as well as information relating to any prior or ongoing attempts by the People's Republic of China to undermine Taiwan's membership or observer status in all organizations described in section (4)(1) and Taiwan's ties and relationships with other countries in accordance with subsection (a) of this section".

(2) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and apply beginning with the first report required under subsection (b) of section 5 of the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019, as amended by paragraph (1), that is required after such date.

SEC. 212. TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the "Taiwan Fellowship Act".

(b) FINDINGS; PURPOSES.—

(1) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(A) The Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) affirmed United States policy "to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, as well as the people on the China mainland and all other peoples of the Western Pacific area".

(B) Consistent with the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409), the United States has grown its strategic partnership with Taiwan's vibrant democracy of 23,000,000 people.

(C) Despite a concerted campaign by the People's Republic of China to isolate Taiwan from its diplomatic partners and from international organizations, including the World Health Organization, Taiwan has emerged as a global leader in the coronavirus global pandemic response, including by donating more than 2,000,000 surgical masks and other medical equipment to the United States.

(D) The creation of a United States fellowship program with Taiwan would support—

(i) a key priority of expanding people-to-people exchanges, which was outlined in President Donald J. Trump's 2017 National Security Strategy;

(ii) President Joseph R. Biden's commitment to Taiwan, "a leading democracy and a critical economic and security partner", as expressed in his March 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance; and

(iii) April 2021 guidance from the Department of State based on a review required under the Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020 (subtitle B of title III of division FF of Public Law 116–260) to "encourage U.S. government engagement with Taiwan that reflects our deepening unofficial relationship".

(2) PURPOSES.—The purposes of this section are—

(A) to further strengthen the United States-Taiwan strategic relationship and broaden understanding of the Indo-Pacific region by temporarily assigning officials of agencies of the United States Government to Taiwan for intensive study in Mandarin Chinese and placement as Fellows with the governing authorities on Taiwan or a Taiwanese civic institution;

(B) to expand United States Government expertise in Mandarin Chinese language skills and understanding of the politics, history, and culture of Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific region by providing eligible United States personnel the opportunity to acquire such skills and understanding through the Taiwan Fellowship Program established under subsection (c); and

(C) to better position the United States to advance its economic, security, and human rights interests and values in the Indo-Pacific region.

(c) TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.—

(1) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(A) AGENCY HEAD.—The term "agency head" means, in the case of the executive branch of United States Government, or in the case of a legislative branch agency specified in subparagraph (B), the head of the respective agency.

(B) AGENCY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.—The term "agency of the United States Government" includes the Government Accountability Office, the Congressional Budget Office, the Congressional Research Service, and the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission of the legislative branch, as well as any agency of the executive branch.

(C) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(i) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and

(ii) the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

(D) DETAILEE.—The term "detailee" means an employee of an agency of the United States Government on loan to the American Institute in Taiwan, without a change of position from the agency at which such employee is employed.

(E) IMPLEMENTING PARTNER.—The term "implementing partner" means any United States organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from tax under section 501(a) of such Code that—

(i) is selected through a competitive process;

(ii) performs logistical, administrative, and other functions, as determined by the Department of State and the American Institute of Taiwan, in support of the Taiwan Fellowship Program; and

(iii) enters into a cooperative agreement with the American Institute in Taiwan to administer the Taiwan Fellowship Program.

(2) ESTABLISHMENT OF TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.—

(A) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State shall establish the "Taiwan Fellowship Program" (referred to in this section as the "Program") to provide a fellowship opportunity in Taiwan of up to two years for eligible United States citizens through the cooperative agreement established in subparagraph (B). The Secretary of State, in consultation with appropriate counterparts at the American Institute in Taiwan and the implementing partner, may modify the name of the Program.

(B) COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—The American Institute in Taiwan shall use amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization under paragraph (6)(A) to enter into an annual or multi-year cooperative agreement with an appropriate implementing partner.

(ii) FELLOWSHIPS.—The Secretary of State, in consultation with the American Institute in Taiwan and, as appropriate, the implementing partner, shall award to eligible United States citizens, subject to available funding—

(I) not fewer than five fellowships during the first two years of the Program; and

(II) not fewer than ten fellowships during each of the remaining years of the Program.

(C) INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT; IMPLEMENTING PARTNER.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the American Institute in Taiwan, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall—

(i) begin negotiations with the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office, or with another appropriate entity, for the purpose of entering into an agreement to facilitate the placement of fellows in an agency of the governing authorities on Taiwan; and

(ii) begin the process of selecting an implementing partner, which—

(I) shall agree to meet all of the legal requirements required to operate in Taiwan; and

(II) shall be composed of staff who demonstrate significant experience managing exchange programs in the Indo-Pacific region.

(D) CURRICULUM.—

(i) FIRST YEAR.—During the first year of each fellowship under this subsection, each fellow should study—

(I) the Mandarin Chinese language;

(II) the people, history, and political climate on Taiwan; and

(III) the issues affecting the relationship between the United States and the Indo-Pacific region.

(ii) SECOND YEAR.—During the second year of each fellowship under this section, each fellow, subject to the approval of the Secretary of State, the American Institute in Taiwan, and the implementing partner, and in accordance with the purposes of this section, shall work in—

(I) a parliamentary office, ministry, or other agency of the governing authorities on Taiwan; or

(II) an organization outside of the governing authorities on Taiwan, whose interests are associated with the interests of the fellow and the agency of the United States Government from which the fellow had been employed.

(E) FLEXIBLE FELLOWSHIP DURATION.—Notwithstanding any requirement under this section, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the American Institute in Taiwan and, as appropriate, the implementing partner, may award fellowships that have a duration of between nine months and two years, and may alter the curriculum requirements under subparagraph (D) for such purposes.

(F) SUNSET.—The Program shall terminate ten years after the date of the enactment of this section.

(3) PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS.—

(A) ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS.—A United States citizen is eligible for a fellowship under this section if he or she—

(i) is an employee of the United States Government;

(ii) has at least two years of experience in any branch of the United States Government;

(iii) has received at least one exemplary performance review in his or her current United States Government role within at least the last three years prior to beginning the fellowship;

(iv) has a demonstrated professional or educational background in the relationship between the United States and countries in the Indo-Pacific region; and

(v) has demonstrated his or her commitment to further service in the United States Government.

(B) RESPONSIBILITIES OF FELLOWS.—Each recipient of a fellowship under this section shall agree, as a condition of such fellowship—

(i) to maintain satisfactory progress in language training and appropriate behavior in Taiwan, as determined by the Department of State, the American Institute in Taiwan and, as appropriate, its implementing partner;

(ii) to refrain from engaging in any intelligence or intelligence-related activity on behalf of the United States Government; and

(iii) to continue Federal Government employment for a period of not less than four years after the conclusion of the fellowship, or for not less than two years for a fellowship that is one year or shorter.

(C) RESPONSIBILITIES OF IMPLEMENTING PARTNER.—

(i) SELECTION OF FELLOWS.—The implementing partner, in close coordination with the Secretary of State and the American Institute in Taiwan, shall—

(I) make efforts to recruit fellowship candidates who reflect the diversity of the United States;

(II) select fellows for the Program based solely on merit, with appropriate supervision from the Department of State and the American Institute in Taiwan; and

(III) prioritize the selection of candidates willing to serve a fellowship lasting one year or longer.

(ii) FIRST YEAR.—The implementing partner should provide each fellow in the first year (or shorter duration, as jointly determined by the Secretary of State and the American Institute in Taiwan, for those who are not serving a two-year fellowship) with—

(I) intensive Mandarin Chinese language training; and

(II) courses in the politic, culture, and history of Taiwan, China, and the broader Indo-Pacific.

(iii) WAIVER OF REQUIRED TRAINING.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the American Institute in Taiwan and, as appropriate, the implementing partner, may waive any of the training required under clause (ii) to the extent that a fellow has Mandarin Chinese language skills, knowledge of the topics described in clause (ii)(II), or for other related reasons approved by the Secretary of State and the American Institute in Taiwan. If any of the training requirements are waived for a fellow serving a two-year fellowship, the training portion of his or her fellowship may be shortened to the extent appropriate.

(iv) OFFICE; STAFFING.—The implementing partner, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the American Institute in Taiwan, shall maintain an office and at least one full-time staff member in Taiwan to—

(I) liaise with the American Institute in Taiwan and the governing authorities on Taiwan; and

(II) serve as the primary in-country point of contact for the recipients of fellowships under this section and their dependents.

(v) OTHER FUNCTIONS.—The implementing partner should perform other functions in association in support of the Program, including logistical and administrative functions, as included in the cooperative agreement entered into pursuant to paragraph (2)(B) by the Secretary of State and the American Institute in Taiwan.

(D) NONCOMPLIANCE.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—Any fellow who fails to comply with the requirements under this section shall reimburse the American Institute in Taiwan for—

(I) the Federal funds expended for the fellow's participation in the fellowship, as set forth in clauses (ii) and (iii); and

(II) interest accrued on such funds (calculated at the prevailing rate).

(ii) FULL REIMBURSEMENT.—Any fellow who violates clause (i) or (ii) of subparagraph (B) shall reimburse the American Institute in Taiwan in an amount equal to the sum of—

(I) all of the Federal funds expended for the fellow's participation in the fellowship; and

(II) interest on the amount specified in subclause (I), which shall be calculated at the prevailing rate.

(iii) PRO RATA REIMBURSEMENT.—Any fellow who violates subparagraph (B)(iii) shall reimburse the American Institute in Taiwan in an amount equal to the difference between—

(I) the amount specified in clause (ii); and

(II) the product of—

(aa) the amount the fellow received in compensation during the final year of the fellowship, including the value of any allowances and benefits received by the fellow; multiplied by

(bb) the percentage of the period specified in subparagraph (B)(iii) during which the fellow did not remain employed by the United States Government.

(E) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the selection of the first class of fellows under this section and annually thereafter for 10 years, the Secretary of State shall offer to brief the appropriate congressional committees regarding the following:

(i) An assessment of the performance of the implementing partner in fulfilling the purposes of this section.

(ii) The number of applicants each year, the number of applicants willing to serve a fellowship lasting one year or longer, and the number of such applicants selected for a fellowship.

(iii) The names and sponsoring agencies of the fellows selected by the implementing partner and the extent to which such fellows represent the diversity of the United States.

(iv) The names of the parliamentary offices, ministries, other agencies of the governing authorities on Taiwan, and nongovernmental institutions to which each fellow was assigned.

(v) Any recommendations, as appropriate, to improve the implementation of the Program, including added flexibilities in the administration of the program.

(vi) An assessment of the Program's value upon the relationship between the United States and Taiwan or the United States and Asian countries.

(F) ANNUAL FINANCIAL AUDIT.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—The financial records of any implementing partner shall be audited annually in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards by independent certified public accountants or independent licensed public accountants who are certified or licensed by a regulatory authority of a State or another political subdivision of the United States.

(ii) LOCATION.—Each audit under clause (i) shall be conducted at the place or places where the financial records of the implementing partner are normally kept.

(iii) ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS.—The implementing partner shall make available to the accountants conducting an audit under clause (i)—

(I) all books, financial records, files, other papers, things, and property belonging to, or in use by, the implementing partner that are necessary to facilitate the audit; and

(II) full facilities for verifying transactions with the balances or securities held by depositories, fiscal agents, and custodians.

(iv) REPORT.—

(I) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the end of each fiscal year, the implementing partner shall provide a report of the audit conducted for such fiscal year under clause (i) to the Secretary of State and the American Institute in Taiwan.

(II) CONTENTS.—Each audit report under subclause (I) shall—

(aa) set forth the scope of the audit at issue;

(bb) include such statements, along with the auditor's opinion of those statements, as may be necessary to present fairly the implementing partner's assets and liabilities, surplus or deficit, with reasonable detail;

(cc) include a statement of the implementing partner's income and expenses during the year; and

(dd) include a schedule of—

(AA) all contracts and cooperative agreements requiring payments greater than $5,000; and

(BB) any payments of compensation, salaries, or fees at a rate greater than $5,000 per year.

(III) COPIES.—Each audit report shall be produced in sufficient copies for distribution to the public.

(4) TAIWAN FELLOWS ON DETAIL FROM GOVERNMENT SERVICE.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—

(i) DETAIL AUTHORIZED.—With the approval of the Secretary of State, an agency head may detail, for a period of not more than two years, an employee of the agency of the United States Government who has been awarded a fellowship under this Act, to the American Institute in Taiwan for the purpose of assignment to the governing authorities on Taiwan or an organization described in paragraph (2)(D)(ii)(II).

(ii) AGREEMENT.—Each detailee shall enter into a written agreement with the Federal Government before receiving a fellowship, in which the fellow shall agree—

(I) to continue in the service of the sponsoring agency at the end of fellowship for a period of at least four years (or at least two years if the fellowship duration is one year or shorter) unless such detailee is involuntarily separated from the service of such agency; and

(II) to pay to the American Institute in Taiwan any additional expenses incurred by the United States Government in connection with the fellowship if the detailee voluntarily separates from service with the sponsoring agency before the end of the period for which the detailee has agreed to continue in the service of such agency.

(iii) EXCEPTION.—The payment agreed to under clause (ii)(II) may not be required of a detailee who leaves the service of the sponsoring agency to enter into the service of another agency of the United States Government unless the head of the sponsoring agency notifies the detailee before the effective date of entry into the service of the other agency that payment will be required under this subsection.

(B) STATUS AS GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE.—A detailee under this paragraph—

(i) is deemed, for the purpose of preserving allowances, privileges, rights, seniority, and other benefits, to be an employee of the sponsoring agency;

(ii) is entitled to pay, allowances, and benefits from funds available to such agency, which is deemed to comply with section 5536 of title 5, United States Code; and

(iii) may be assigned to a position with an entity described in paragraph (2)(D)(ii)(I) if acceptance of such position does not involve—

(I) the taking of an oath of allegiance to another government; or

(II) the acceptance of compensation or other benefits from any foreign government by such detailee.

(C) RESPONSIBILITIES OF SPONSORING AGENCY.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—The agency of the United States Government from which a detailee is detailed should provide the fellow allowances and benefits that are consistent with Department of State Standardized Regulations or other applicable rules and regulations, including—

(I) a living quarters allowance to cover the cost of housing in Taiwan;

(II) a cost of living allowance to cover any possible higher costs of living in Taiwan;

(III) a temporary quarters subsistence allowance for up to seven days if the fellow is unable to find housing immediately upon arriving in Taiwan;

(IV) an education allowance to assist parents in providing the fellow's minor children with educational services ordinarily provided without charge by public schools in the United States;

(V) moving expenses to transport personal belongings of the fellow and his or her family in their move to Taiwan, which is comparable to the allowance given for American Institute in Taiwan employees assigned to Taiwan; and

(VI) an economy-class airline ticket to and from Taiwan for each fellow and the fellow's immediate family.

(ii) MODIFICATION OF BENEFITS.—The American Institute in Taiwan and its implementing partner, with the approval of the Department of State, may modify the benefits set forth in clause (i) if such modification is warranted by fiscal circumstances.

(D) NO FINANCIAL LIABILITY.—The American Institute in Taiwan, the implementing partner, and any governing authorities on Taiwan or nongovernmental entities in Taiwan at which a fellow is detailed during the second year of the fellowship may not be held responsible for the pay, allowances, or any other benefit normally provided to the detailee.

(E) REIMBURSEMENT.—Fellows may be detailed under clause (A)(ii) without reimbursement to the United States by the American Institute in Taiwan.

(F) ALLOWANCES AND BENEFITS.—Detailees may be paid by the American Institute in Taiwan for the allowances and benefits listed in subparagraph (C).

(5) GAO REPORT.—Not later than one year before the sunset of the Program pursuant to paragraph (2)(F), the Comptroller General of the United States shall transmit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report that includes the following:

(A) An analysis of United States Government participants in the Program, including the number of applicants and the number of fellowships undertaken, and the places of employment.

(B) An assessment of the costs and benefits for participants in the Program and for the United States Government of such fellowships.

(C) An analysis of the financial impact of the fellowship on United States Government offices that have detailed fellows to participate in the Program.

(D) Recommendations, if any, on how to improve the Program.

(6) FUNDING.—

(A) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated to the American Institute in Taiwan—

(i) for fiscal year 2022, $2,900,000, of which $500,000 should be made available to an appropriate implementing partner to launch the Program; and

(ii) for fiscal year 2023, and each succeeding fiscal year, $2,400,000.

(B) PRIVATE SOURCES.—The implementing partner selected to implement the Program may accept, use, and dispose of gifts or donations of services or property in carrying out such program, subject to the review and approval of the American Institute in Taiwan.

SEC. 213. INCREASING DEPARTMENT OF STATE PERSONNEL AND RESOURCES DEVOTED TO THE INDO-PACIFIC.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) In fiscal year 2020, the Department of State allocated $1,500,000,000 to the Indo-Pacific region in bilateral and regional foreign assistance resources, including as authorized by section 201(b) of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409; 132 Stat. 5391), and $798,000,000 in the fiscal year 2020 diplomatic engagement budget. These amounts represent only 5 percent of the diplomatic engagement budget and only 4 percent of the total Department of State-USAID budget.

(2) Over the last 5 years the diplomatic engagement budget and personnel levels in the Indo-Pacific averaged only 5 percent of the total, while foreign assistance resources averaged only 4 percent of the total.

(3) In 2020, the Department of State began a process to realign certain positions at posts to ensure that its personnel footprint matches the demands of great-power competition, including in the Indo-Pacific.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the size of the United States diplomatic corps must be sufficient to meet the current and emerging challenges of the 21st century, including those in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere;

(2) robust Chinese-language skills are necessary for the success of the United States diplomatic corps and integral to its ability to meet national security objectives;

(3) the increase must be designed to meet the objectives of an Indo-Pacific strategy focused on strengthening the good governance and sovereignty of countries that adhere to and uphold the rules-based international order; and

(4) the increase must be implemented with a focus on increased numbers of economic, political, and public diplomacy officers, representing a cumulative increase of at least 200 Foreign Service officer generalists, to—

(A) advance free, fair, and reciprocal trade and open investment environments for United States entities, and engaged in increased commercial diplomacy in key markets;

(B) better articulate and explain United States policies, strengthen civil society and democratic principles, enhance reporting on global activities, promote people-to-people exchanges, and advance United States influence; and

(C) increase capacity at small- and medium-sized embassies and consulates in the Indo-Pacific and other regions around the world, as necessary.

(c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of the United States to—

(1) ensure Department of State funding levels and personnel footprint in the Indo-Pacific reflect the region's high degree of importance and significance to United States political, economic, and security interests; and

(2) increase diplomatic engagement and foreign assistance funding and the quantity of personnel dedicated to the Indo-Pacific region respective to the Department of State's total budget.

(d) ACTION PLAN.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees of Congress an action plan that includes the following elements:

(1) Identification of requirements to advance United States strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific and the personnel and budgetary resources for the Department of State needed to satisfy such objectives, assuming an unconstrained resource environment.

(2) A plan to increase the portion of the Department's budget dedicated to the Indo-Pacific in terms of DE and FA focused on development, economic, and security assistance.

(3) A plan to increase the number of positions at posts in the Indo-Pacific region and bureaus with responsibility for the Indo-Pacific region, including a description of increases at each post or bureau, a breakdown of increases by cone,

and a description of how such increases in personnel will advance United States strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific region.

(4) A plan to increase the number of Chinese-language speakers and translation specialists at posts in the Indo-Pacific region and within bureau offices with responsibility for the Indo-Pacific region, including in INR.

(5) A description of any staffing or other training or personnel reforms that may be required to quickly increase departmental capacity to address the interdisciplinary, interconnected opportunities and challenges presented in the Indo-Pacific, including but not limited to issues related to climate change, public health, supply chains, cybersecurity, and digital technology issues.

(6) Defined concrete and annual benchmarks that the Department will meet in implementing the action plan.

(7) A description of any barriers to implementing the action plan and recommendations to address these barriers, noting whether additional authorities or resources from Congress is needed to address these barriers.

(e) UPDATES TO REPORT AND BRIEFING.—Every 180 days after the submission of the action plan described in subsection (d) for not more than 3 years, the Secretary of State shall submit an update and brief the appropriate congressional committees on the implementation of such action plan, with supporting data and including a detailed assessment of benchmarks reached.

(f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated, for fiscal year 2022, $2,000,000,000 in bilateral and regional foreign assistance resources to carry out the purposes of part I and chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq., 2346 et seq.) to the Indo-Pacific region and $1,250,000,000 in diplomatic engagement resources to the Indo-Pacific region.

(g) INCLUSION OF AMOUNTS APPROPRIATED PURSUANT TO ASIA REASSURANCE INITIATIVE ACT OF 2018.—Amounts authorized to be appropriated under subsection (f) include funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant to section 201(b) of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409).

(h) BENCHMARKS UPDATE.—Not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall report to the appropriate congressional committees on the extent to which the strategic objectives described in the action plan in subsection (d) have been satisfied or progress toward such satisfaction has been made.

SEC. 214. REPORT ON BILATERAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS CHINESE FENTANYL TRAFFICKING.

(a) CHINA'S CLASS SCHEDULING OF FENTANYL AND SYNTHETIC OPIOID PRECURSORS.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and Attorney General shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a written report detailing—

(1) a description of United States Government efforts to gain a commitment from the Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) to submit unregulated fentanyl precursors such as 4–AP to controls;

(2) a plan for future steps the United States Government will take to urge the PRC to combat illicit fentanyl production and trafficking originating in the PRC;

(3) an assessment of the intersection between illicit fentanyl trafficking originating in China and illicit environmental trade and possible relationships of trade-based money laundering; and

(4) an assessment of the intersection between illicit fentanyl trafficking originating in China and counterfeit medicines and medical supplies in the United States.

(b) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form with a classified annex.

SEC. 215. FACILITATION OF INCREASED EQUITY INVESTMENTS UNDER THE BETTER UTILIZATION OF INVESTMENTS LEADING TO DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 2018.

(a) APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL CREDIT REFORM ACT OF 1990.—Section 1421(c) of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9621(c)) is amended by adding at the end the following:

"(7) APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL CREDIT REFORM ACT OF 1990.—

"(A) IN GENERAL.—Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), support provided under paragraph (1) with respect to a project shall be considered to be a Federal credit program that is subject to the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (2 U.S.C. 661 et seq.) for purposes of applying the requirements of such Act to such support.

"(B) DETERMINATION OF COST.—

"(i) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of section 502(5) of the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (2 U.S.C. 661a(5) et seq.) the cost of support pro-

vided under paragraph (1) with respect to a project shall be the net present value, at the time when funds are disbursed to provide the support, of the following estimated cash flows:

"(I) The purchase price of the support.

"(II) Dividends, redemptions, and other shareholder distributions during the term of the support.

"(III) Proceeds received upon a sale, redemption, or other liquidation of the support.

"(IV) Adjustments for risk of estimated losses, if any.

"(ii) CHANGES IN TERMS INCLUDED.—The estimated cash flows described in subclauses (I) through (IV) of clause (i) shall include the effects of changes in terms resulting from the exercise of options included in the agreement to provide the support.

"(C) REESTIMATE OF COST.—When the estimated cost of support provided under paragraph (1) with respect to a project made in a single fiscal year is reestimated in a subsequent year, the difference between the reestimated cost and the previous cost estimate shall be paid from the balances available in the Corporate Capital Account established under section 1434.".

(b) MAXIMUM CONTINGENT LIABILITY.—Section 1433 of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9633) is amended by striking "$60,000,000,000" and inserting "$100,000,000,000".

(c) FUNDING FOR CORPORATE CAPITAL ACCOUNT.—Section 1434(b) of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9634(b)) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (5), by striking "and" at the end;

(2) by redesignating paragraph (6) as paragraph (7); and

(3) by inserting after paragraph (5) the following:

"(6) receipts of reestimated costs received pursuant to section 1421(c); and".

(d) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development Finance Corporation shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report on—

(1) a plan to expand the Corporation's financing to support United States national security and development priorities in critical regions; and

(2) the budgetary, staffing, and programmatic resources that would be required in order to carry out the plan required by this subsection.

SEC. 216. EXPANDING INVESTMENT BY UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION FOR VACCINE MANUFACTURING.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Development Finance Corporation is authorized to provide financing to entities in India and in other less developed countries to increase vaccine manufacturing capacity for the following purposes:

(1) Manufacturing Stringent Regulatory Authorization (SRA) or World Health Organization (WHO) Emergency Use Listing COVID–19 vaccines.

(2) Manufacturing SRA or WHO Emergency Use Listing therapeutics used to treat symptoms related to COVID–19.

(3) Manufacturing critical medical supplies needed for preventing, detecting and treating COVID–19, including ventilators, personal protective equipment, oxygen, diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines.

(b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Chief Executive Officer of the Development Finance Corporation, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall provide a report to the appropriate congressional committees—

(1) outlining the countries where DFC financing could be most impactful for vaccine manufacturing and to achieve the goal of manufacturing 1 billion COVID–19 vaccines by 2022;

(2) including a detailed explanation of the United States and partner country interests served by the United States providing support to such projects;

(3) including a detailed description of any support provided by other United States allies and partners to expand the initiatives outlined in subsection (a); and

(4) including a detailed description of any support provided by the People's Republic of China in support of the initiatives outlined in subsection (a).

(c) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required by subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form with a classified annex if necessary.

SEC. 217. ENSURING UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC POSTS ALIGN WITH AMERICAN STRATEGIC NATIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES.

(a) FINDING.—With 276 embassies and other representative offices globally, China now has more diplomatic posts around the world than any other country, including the United States. Many of Beijing's new missions can be found in countries that recently broke ties with Taiwan (Burkina Faso, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, the Gambia, and São Tomé and Principe) or do not have any United States diplomatic physical presence despite these countries asking for increased United States engagement and investment (Antigua and Barbuda and Dominica).

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress, that the Department of State should conduct an assessment of all United States diplomatic missions and posts to verify such missions and posts align with United States national security and economic interests, as well as ensuring that these locations position the United States appropriately with its strategic competitors to advance the national interest in every country worldwide, including those countries currently lacking any physical United States diplomatic presence, whether an embassy, consulate general, or principal officer post.

(c) REPORTING.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and biennially thereafter for 4 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report assessing the number, location, and objectives of each of its diplomatic missions and posts worldwide, including an assessment of any gaps that exist compared to other country strategic competitors. The Secretary of State shall coordinate with the heads of other Federal departments and agencies having an overseas presence at any United States diplomatic mission or post to ensure such assessment reflects all Federal Government equities and viewpoints.

SEC. 218. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE FULBRIGHT-HAYS PROGRAM.

There are authorized to be appropriated, for the 5-year period beginning on October 1, 2021, $105,500,000, to promote education, training, research, and foreign language skills through the Fulbright-Hays Program, in accordance with section 102(b) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2452(b)).

SEC. 219. SUPPORTING INDEPENDENT MEDIA AND COUNTERING DISINFORMATION.

(a) AUTHORIZATION OF USAGM APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated for the United States Agency for Global Media $100,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026, for ongoing and new programs to support local media, build independent media, combat CCP disinformation inside and outside of the People's Republic of China, invest in technology to subvert censorship, and monitor and evaluate such programs, of which—

(1) not less than $50,000,000 shall be directed to a grant to Radio Free Asia language services;

(2) not less than $20,000,000 shall be made available to serve populations in China through Mandarin, Cantonese, Uyghur, and Tibetan language services; and

(3) not less than $5,500,000 shall be made available for digital media services—

(A) to counter propaganda of non-Chinese populations in foreign countries; and

(B) to counter propaganda of Chinese populations in China through "Global Mandarin" programming.

(b) SUPPORT FOR LOCAL MEDIA.—The Secretary of State, acting through the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, acting through the Assistant Administrator for Development, Democracy, and Innovation, shall jointly support and train foreign journalists on investigative techniques necessary to ensure public accountability, promote transparency, fight corruption, and support the ability of the public to develop informed opinions about pressing issues facing their countries.

(c) INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAMS.—The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor shall continue to support internet freedom programs.

(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State and United States Agency for International Development $170,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026, for ongoing and new programs in support of press freedom, training, and protection of journalists. Amounts appropriated pursuant to this authorization are authorized to remain available until expended and shall be in addition to amounts otherwise authorized to be appropriated to support press freedom, training, and protection of journalists.

SEC. 219A. GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER.

(a) FINDING.—Congress established the Global Engagement Center to "direct, lead, and coordinate efforts" of the Federal Government to "recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign state and non-state propaganda and disinformation globally".

(b) EXTENSION.—Section 1287(j) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended by striking "the date that is 8 years after the date of the enactment of this Act" and inserting "December 31, 2027".

(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the Global Engagement Center should expand its coordinating capacity of diplomatic messaging through the exchange of liaison officers with Federal departments and agencies that manage aspects of identifying and countering foreign disinformation, including the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and Special Operations Command's Joint MISO Web Operations Center.

(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated $150,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 for the Global Engagement Center to counter foreign state and non-state sponsored propaganda and disinformation.

SEC. 219B. REPORT ON ORIGINS OF THE COVID–19 PANDEMIC.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) it is critical to understand the origins of the COVID–19 pandemic so the United States can better prepare, prevent, and respond to pandemic health threats in the future;

(2) given the impact of the COVID–19 pandemic on all Americans, the American people deserve to know what information the United States Government possesses about the origins of COVID–19, as appropriate;

(3) it is critical for independent experts to have full access to all pertinent human, animal, and environmental data, biological sample, research, and personnel involved in the early stages of the outbreak relevant to determining how this pandemic emerged;

(4) Congress shares the concerns expressed by the United States Government and 13 other foreign governments that the international team of experts dispatched to the People's Republic of China by the World Health Organization (WHO) to study the origins of the SARS–CoV–2 virus was "significantly delayed and lacked access to complete, original data and samples";

(5) the March 30, 2021, statement by the Director-General of the WHO, Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, further affirms that the investigative team had encountered "difficulties" in accessing necessary raw data, that "we have not yet found the source of the virus", and that "all hypotheses remain on the table";

(6) the G7 communique expressing support for full implementation of the International Health Regulations, including "a timely, transparent, expert-led, and science-based WHO-convened Phase 2 COVID–19 Origins study including, as recommended by the experts' report, in China" is a valuable commitment by the United States and its allies to investigating the origins of COVID–19 in order to better prepare for future pandemics; and

(7) Congress supports the effort announced by President Biden, directing the intelligence community to conduct a 90 day review to further analyze information pointing to the origins of COVID–19.

(b) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days after enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report consisting of—

(1) an assessment of the most likely source or origin of the SARS–CoV–2 virus, including a detailed review of all information the United States possesses that it has identified as potentially relevant to the source or origin of the SARS–CoV–2 virus, including zoonotic transmission and spillover, or other sources of origin, transmission, or spillover, based on the information the United States Government has to date;

(2) its level of confidence in its assessment; and

(3) challenges identified to its ability to make such an assessment.

(c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

(d) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this section, the term "appropriate committees of Congress" means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;

(3) the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions of the Senate;

(4) the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate;

(5) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;

(6) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and

(7) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 219C. EXTENSION OF ASIA REASSURANCE INITIATIVE ACT OF 2018.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the Indo-Pacific region is home to many of the world's most dynamic democracies, economic opportunities, as well as many challenges to United States interests and values as a result of the growth in authoritarian governance in the region and by broad challenges posed by nuclear proliferation, the changing environment, and deteriorating adherence to human rights principles and obligations;

(2) the People's Republic of China poses a particular threat as it repeatedly violates internationally recognized human rights, engages in unfair economic and trade practices, disregards international laws and norms, coerces its neighbors, engages in malign influence operations, and enables global digital authoritarianism;

(3) the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 ("ARIA") enhances the United States' commitment in the Indo-Pacific region by—

(A) expanding its defense cooperation with its allies and partners;

(B) investing in democracy and the protection of human rights;

(C) engaging in cybersecurity initiatives; and

(D) supporting people-to-people engagement and other shared priorities; and

(4) the 2019 Department of Defense Indo-Pacific Strategy Report concludes that ARIA "enshrines a generational whole-of-government policy framework that demonstrates U.S. commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific region".

(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409) is amended—

(1) in section 201(b), by striking "$1,500,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023" and inserting "$2,000,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026";

(2) in section 215(b), by striking "2023" and inserting "2026";

(3) in section 306(a)—

(A) in paragraph (1), by striking "5 years" and inserting "8 years"; and

(B) in paragraph (2), by striking "2023" and inserting "2026";

(4) in section 409(a)(1), by striking "2023" and inserting "2026";

(5) in section 410—

(A) in subsection (c), by striking "2023" and inserting "2026"; and

(B) in subsection (d), in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking "2023" and inserting "2026"; and

(6) in section 411, by striking "2023" and inserting "2026".

SEC. 219D. INVESTMENT, TRADE, AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.

(a) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall establish United States strategies to promote, facilitate, and increase trade and investment and development in Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean.

(2) FOCUS OF STRATEGY.—The strategy required by paragraph (1) shall focus on increasing two-way trade and investment with Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean by 200 percent in real dollar value by the date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(3) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—

(A) UNITED STATES STRATEGY TO PROMOTE TWO-WAY TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, AND THE CARIBBEAN.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President, in consultation with the heads of the relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and make publicly available a government-wide strategy for Africa, to be known as the Prosper Africa Strategy, and for Latin America and the Caribbean, that provides detailed descriptions of how the United States intends to fulfill the policy objectives described in paragraph (2). The strategies shall—

(i) support and be aligned with other existing United States Government strategies; and

(ii) include specific and measurable goals, benchmarks, performance metrics, timetables, and monitoring and evaluation plans to ensure the accountability and effectiveness of all policies and initiatives carried out under the strategy.

(B) SPECIFIC PLANS FOR DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES.—The strategies submitted pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall also include specific implementation plans, in coordination with the recommendations and activities of the Economic Diplomacy Action Group under section 708 of the Championing American Business Through Diplomacy Act of 2019 (22 U.S.C. 9904), from each of the relevant Federal departments and agencies that describes—

(i) the anticipated contributions of the department or agency, including technical, financial, and in-kind contributions, to implement the strategies;

(ii) the efforts of the department or agency to ensure that the policies and initiatives carried out pursuant to the strategies are designed to achieve maximum impact and effectiveness; and

(iii) recommendations on necessary resources, including staffing, to expand efforts to promote trade and investment between the United States and Africa, and the United States and Latin America and the Caribbean.

(C) INTERAGENCY COORDINATION.—The strategies submitted pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall include plans for coordinating with relevant departments and agencies the implementation of agency-specific plans described in subparagraph (B), particularly as it relates to advancing two-way trade and investment transactions and business enabling environment reforms.

(b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the submission of the strategies required by subsection (a)(3), and annually thereafter until 2026, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report, in coordination with the report required by section 707 of the Championing American Business Through Diplomacy Act of 2019 (22 U.S.C. 9903) that—

(1) summarizes and evaluates the implementation of United States diplomatic efforts and foreign assistance programs, projects, and activities to advance the policy objectives set forth in subsection (a)(2);

(2) describes the nature and extent of the coordination among the relevant Federal departments and agencies, including summary of activities and engagements of the Economic Diplomacy Action Group; and

(3) describes the monitoring and evaluation tools, mechanisms, and indicators to assess progress made on the policy objectives of this section.

(c) EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS FOR AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN TRADE AND INVESTMENT.—The President shall designate an individual to serve as the Executive Director for Trade and Investment Strategy in Africa, also known as the Prosper Africa Executive Director, and an individual to serve as Executive Director for Trade and Investment Strategy in Latin America and the Caribbean to—

(1) oversee the development and implementation of the strategies required by subsection (a); and

(2) coordinate developing and implementing the strategy with the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the Office of Management and Budget, and the relevant departments and agencies.

(d) BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT EXCHANGES WITH AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.—It is the sense of Congress that, not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, high-level officials of relevant departments and agencies of the United States Government with responsibility for promoting trade, investment, financing, and development should conduct joint activities to advance the strategies described in subsection(a), including business development exchanges with public and private sector representatives from Africa and Latin America, and the Caribbean who are focused on promoting two-way trade and investment.

(e) TRAINING, INTERAGENCY COORDINATION, AND INFORMATION SHARING.—The President shall develop a plan—

(1) to standardize the training received by United States and Foreign Commercial Service officers, economic officers of the Department of State, and economic officers of the United States Agency for International Development with respect to the programs and procedures of the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the United States International Development Finance Corporation, the Small Business Administration, and the United States Trade and Development Agency; and

(2) to ensure that—

(A) not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act—

(i) all personnel referred to in paragraph (1) receive the training described in that paragraph; and

(ii) relevant departments and agencies share information on trade and investment transactions facilitated by the United States Government and funded by the public or private sector;

(B) not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator of USAID and the Chief Executive Officer of DFC shall develop a plan to enhance coordination and expedite information sharing that includes—

(i) a process for sharing of information in a timely fashion, and at least monthly, on—

(I) active and early stage leads on transactions initiated, promoted, or facilitated by DFC;

(II) transactions deemed ineligible for DFC support or not being pursued by DFC for other reasons; and

(III) transaction opportunities identified by USAID or other relevant United States departments and agencies submitted for DFC consideration; and

(ii) any training required for DFC, USAID, or other interagency staff to implement the plan;

(C) the Executive Directors and their appointed staff shall be responsible for coordinating implementation of this plan; and

(D) DFC and USAID shall, in consultation with the Executive Directors and Congress, identify targets for DFC's financial commitments and any private capital mobilized to finalize a transaction.

(f) DATA SHARING PLATFORM.—

(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Administrator of USAID shall, in consultation with the Executive Directors and relevant department and agencies, establish an interoperable digital platform maintained by the staff of the Executive Directors to—

(A) facilitate interagency information sharing and collaboration on trade and investment transactions; and

(B) ensure relevant department and agencies use such platform to review, track, and develop consensus on transactions and their relative priorities.

(2) COORDINATION.—The Executive Directors shall coordinate regularly with the leadership of relevant Federal department and agencies to—

(A) advance and finalize transactions; or

(B) provide a written justification for any transaction deemed ineligible for United States Government financing under existing authorities.

(g) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;

(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(D) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(2) RELEVANT FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES.—The term "relevant Federal departments and agencies" includes—

(A) the Department of State;

(B) the Department of the Treasury;

(C) the Department of Commerce;

(D) the United States Agency for International Development (USAID);

(E) the Millennium Challenge Corporation;

(F) the United States International Development Finance Corporation (DFC);

(G) the United States Trade and Development Agency;

(H) the United States African Development Foundation;

(I) the Export Import Bank;

(J) the Small Business Administration;

(K) the Department of Agriculture; and

(L) any other entity deemed appropriate by the President.

(3) EARLY-STAGE LEAD.—The term "early-stage lead" means a prospective transaction which is being evaluated by DFC staff, prior to DFC holding an internal screening meeting or accepting an application.

(4) TWO-WAY TRADE AND INVESTMENT.—The term "two-way trade and investment" means United States exports to Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, United States public and private investment in Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, exports from Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean to the United States, and Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean investment in the United States.

SEC. 219E. CHINA WATCHER PROGRAM.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, acting through the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and in coordination with relevant offices and bureaus of the Department of State, shall implement a "China Watcher Program" within the Department of State to—

(1) monitor and combat Chinese malign influence across economic and political sectors in foreign countries; and

(2) augment the capacity of United States Government engagement with foreign countries and regional and international economic and political organizations and institutions relating to policy coordination regarding China and such Chinese malign influence.

(b) PLACEMENT.—In carrying out the China Watcher Program under this section, the Secretary of State shall place Foreign Service officers in positions in select United States diplomatic and consular posts, at the discretion of the Secretary of State, to engage both Chinese and third-country nationals, including host governments, on the matters described in subsection (a).

(c) ANNUAL REPORT.—Each diplomatic or consular post with a China Watcher Program shall produce an annual report outlining the steps each such post has taken to advance the mission, trends observed, and the nature and extent of Chinese foreign direct investment and influence in key economic and political sectors, including technology, manufacturing, transportation, energy, metals, agriculture, and real estate.

(d) AUTHORIZATION OF ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated $5,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 and each fiscal year thereafter to carry out this section.

SEC. 219F. LIU XIAOBO FUND FOR STUDY OF THE CHINESE LANGUAGE.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) as a substitute to Confucius Institutes, the United States Government should invest heavily into alternative programs and institutions that ensure there remains a robust pipeline of Americans learning China's many languages; and

(2) in a 21st century that will be dominated by a strategic competition between the United States and China, it is in the national security interests of the United States to ensure that Americans continue to invest in Chinese language skills, as well as Tibetan, Uyghur, and Mongolian languages, while ensuring they can do so in a context free of malign political influence from foreign state actors.

(b) ESTABLISHMENT OF THE LIU XIAOBO FUND FOR STUDY OF THE CHINESE LANGUAGE.—The Secretary of State shall establish in the Department of State the "Liu Xiaobo Fund for Study of the Chinese Language" to fund study by United States persons of Mandarin and Cantonese Chinese, Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongolian, and other contemporary spoken languages of China, abroad or in the United States.

(c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State for fiscal year 2021 and every fiscal year thereafter, $10,000,000 to carry out the Liu Xiaobo Fund for Study of the Chinese Language.

(d) REQUIRED ACTIVITIES.—Amounts authorized to be appropriated pursuant to subsection (c) shall—

(1) be designed to advance the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States, as determined by the Secretary of State;

(2) favor funding mechanisms that can maximize the total number of United States persons given the opportunity to acquire full conversational linguistic proficiency in Mandarin and Cantonese Chinese, Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongolian, and other contemporary spoken languages of China;

(3) favor funding mechanisms that provide opportunities for such language study to areas traditionally under-served by such opportunities;

(4) be shaped by an ongoing consultative process taking into account design inputs of—

(A) civil society institutions, including Chinese diaspora community organizations;

(B) language experts in Mandarin and Cantonese Chinese, Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongolian, and other contemporary spoken languages of China;

(C) organizations representing historically disadvantaged socioeconomic groups in the United States; and

(D) human rights organizations; and

(5) favor opportunities to fund the study of Mandarin and Cantonese Chinese, Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongolian, and other contemporary spoken languages of China at Alaska Native-serving institutions, Asian American and Native American Pacific Islander-serving institutions, Hispanic-serving institutions, histori-

cally Black college or universities, Native American-serving nontribal institutions, Native Hawaiian-serving institutions, Predominantly Black institutions, Tribal Colleges or Universities.

(e) REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for five years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of appropriate Federal departments and agencies, as appropriate, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report detailing activities and disbursements made to carry out this Act over the immediately preceding academic year.

(2) REPORT CONTENTS.—Each report required under paragraph (1) shall include details on—

(A) which institutions, programs, or entities received funds through the Liu Xiaobo Fund for Study of the Chinese Language;

(B) funds distribution disaggregated by institution, program, or entity, including identification of the State or country in which such institution, program, or entity is located;

(C) the number of United States persons who received language study under the Liu Xiaobo Fund for Study of the Chinese Language, and the average amount disbursed per person for such study;

(D) a comparative analysis of per dollar program effectiveness and efficiency in allowing United States persons to reach conversational proficiency Mandarin or Cantonese Chinese, Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongolian, or other contemporary spoken languages of China;

(E) an analysis of which of the languages referred to in subparagraph (D) were studied through the funding from the Liu Xiaobo Fund for Study of the Chinese Language; and

(F) any recommendations of the Secretary of State for improvements to the authorities, priorities, or management of the Liu Xiaobo Fund for Study of the Chinese Language.

(f) INTERAGENCY FUNDS TRANSFERS AUTHORIZATION.—Amounts authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State to carry out this Act are authorized to be transferred to the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies for similar purposes, subject to prior notification to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. Such heads shall consult with the Secretary in the preparation of the report required under subsection (e).

(g) LIMITATIONS.—Amounts authorized to be appropriated to carry out this Act may only be made available for the costs of language study funded and administration incurred by the Department of State or programs carried out by the Department of State (or by another Federal department or agency pursuant to subsection (f)) to carry out this section.

(h) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) ALASKA NATIVE-SERVING INSTITUTION.—The term "Alaska Native-serving institution" has the meaning given such term in section 317(b) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1059d(b)).

(2) ASIAN AMERICAN AND NATIVE AMERICAN PACIFIC ISLANDER-SERVING INSTITUTION.—The term "Asian American and Native American Pacific Islander-serving institution" has the meaning given such term in section 371(c) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1067q(c)).

(3) HISPANIC-SERVING INSTITUTION.—The term "Hispanic-serving institution" has the meaning given such term in section 502 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1101a).

(4) HISTORICALLY BLACK COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY.—The term "historically Black college or university" means a part B institution described in section 322(2) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (22 U.S.C. 1061(2)).

(5) NATIVE AMERICAN-SERVING NONTRIBAL INSTITUTION.—The term "Native American-serving nontribal institution" has the meaning given such term in section 371(c) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1067q(c)).

(6) NATIVE HAWAIIAN-SERVING INSTITUTION.—The term "Native Hawaiian-serving institution" has the meaning given such term in section 317(b) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1059d(b)).

(7) PREDOMINANTLY BLACK INSTITUTION.—The term "Predominantly Black institution" has the meaning given such term in section 371(c) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1067q(c)).

(8) TRIBAL COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY.—The term "Tribal College or University" has the meaning given such term in section 316(b) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1059c(b)).

SEC. 219G. OVERSIGHT OF FUNDS MADE AVAILABLE THROUGH THE AMERICAN RESCUE PLAN ACT OF 2021.

(a) AUTHORITIES AND CONDITIONS.—Amounts authorized and appropriated under title X of the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (Public Law 117–2) to carry out the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) shall be subject to the applicable authorities and conditions for funds made available to carry out the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) and division K of Public Law 116–260.

(b) OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY.—Amounts authorized and appropriated under sections 10001 and 10002 of American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 may be transferred to the Inspector General of the Department of State and the Inspector General of the United States Agency for International Development to expand the capacity of such Inspectors General to conduct effective oversight of the foreign assistance programs and activities under such Act.

(c) UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS, AND MALARIA COVID–19 RESPONSE MECHANISM.—United States contributions to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria COVID–19 Response Mechanism under section 10003(a)(2) of American Rescue Plan Act of 2021—

(1) shall be meaningfully leveraged in a manner that incentivizes other public and private donor contributions; and

(2) shall be subject to the reporting and withholding requirements under subsections (c), (d)(4)(A)(ii), (d)(4)(C), (d)(5), (d)(6), (f), and (g) of section 202 of the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7622).

SEC. 219H. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO VACCINE BRANDING.

The President shall ensure that every vaccine donated or otherwise procured and financed by the United States Government shall be clearly branded with the United States flag.

Subtitle B—International Security Matters

SEC. 221. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.

In this subtitle, the term "appropriate committees of Congress" means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 222. ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.

There is authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal years 2022 through fiscal year 2026 for the Department of State, out of amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for assistance under chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347 et seq.) (relating to international military education and training assistance), $45,000,000 for activities in the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with this subtitle. Funds may be disbursed only after vetting of individuals proposed to be trained, consistent with sections 502B and 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2304 and 2378d).

SEC. 223. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON MARITIME FREEDOM OF OPERATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS AND AIRSPACE OF THE INDO-PACIFIC AND ON ARTIFICIAL LAND FEATURES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Congress—

(1) condemns coercive and threatening actions or the use of force to impede freedom of navigation operations in international airspace by military or civilian aircraft, to alter the status quo, or to destabilize the Indo-Pacific region;

(2) urges the Government of the People's Republic of China to refrain from implementing the declared East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), or an ADIZ in the South China Sea, where contrary to freedom of overflight in international airspace, and to refrain from taking similar provocative actions elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific region;

(3) reaffirms that the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration decision is final and legally binding on both parties and that the People's Republic of China's claims to offshore resources across most of the South China Sea are unlawful; and

(4) condemns the People's Republic of China for failing to abide by the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling, despite the PRC's obligations as a state party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of the United States to—

(1) reaffirm its commitment and support for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, including with respect to the mutual defense treaties with Indo-Pacific allies;

(2) oppose claims that impinge on the rights, freedoms, and lawful use of the sea, or the airspace above it, that are available to all countries, and oppose the militarization of new and reclaimed land features in the South China Sea;

(3) continue certain policies with respect to the PRC claims in the South China Sea, specifically—

(A) that PRC claims in the South China Sea, including to offshore resources across most of the South China Sea, are unlawful;

(B) that the PRC cannot lawfully assert a maritime claim vis-à-vis the Philippines in areas that the Permanent Court of Arbitration found to be in the Philippines' Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) or on its continental shelf;

(C) to reject any PRC claim to waters beyond a 12 nautical mile territorial sea derived from islands it claims in the Spratly Islands; and

(D) that the PRC has no lawful territorial or maritime claim to James Shoal;

(4) urge all parties to refrain from engaging in destabilizing activities, including environmentally harmful and provocative land reclamation;

(5) ensure that disputes are managed without intimidation, coercion, or force;

(6) call on all claimants to clarify or adjust claims in accordance with international law;

(7) uphold the principle that territorial and maritime claims, including territorial waters or territorial seas, must derive from land features and otherwise comport with international law;

(8) oppose the imposition of new fishing regulations covering disputed areas in the South China Sea, regulations which have raised tensions in the region;

(9) support an effective Code of Conduct, if that Code of Conduct reflects the interests of Southeast Asian claimant countries and does not serve as a vehicle for the People's Republic of China to advance its unlawful maritime claims;

(10) reaffirm that an existing body of international rules and guidelines, including the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, done at London October 12, 1972 (COLREGs), is sufficient to ensure the safety of navigation between the United States Armed Forces and the forces of other countries, including the People's Republic of China;

(11) support the development of regional institutions and bodies, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense Minister's Meeting Plus, the East Asia Summit, and the expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum, to build practical cooperation in the region and reinforce the role of international law;

(12) encourage the deepening of partnerships with other countries in the region for maritime domain awareness and capacity building, as well as efforts by the United States Government to explore the development of appropriate multilateral mechanisms for a "common operating picture" in the South China Sea among Southeast Asian countries that would serve to help countries avoid destabilizing behavior and deter risky and dangerous activities;

(13) oppose actions by any country to prevent any other country from exercising its sovereign rights to the resources of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf by making claims to those areas in the South China Sea that have no support in international law; and

(14) assure the continuity of operations by the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, including, when appropriate, in cooperation with partners and allies, to reaffirm freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea.

SEC. 224. REPORT ON CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT OF INDO-PACIFIC ALLIES AND PARTNERS.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the Secretary of State should expand and strengthen existing measures under the United States Conventional Arms Transfer Policy to provide capabilities to allies and partners consistent with agreed-on division of responsibility for alliance roles, missions and capabilities, prioritizing allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with United States strategic imperatives;

(2) the United States should design for export to Indo-Pacific allies and partners capabilities critical to maintaining a favorable military balance in the region, including long-range precision fires, air and missile defense systems, antiship cruise missiles, land attack cruise missiles, conventional hypersonic systems, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, and command

and control systems consistent with law, regulation, policy, and international commitments;

(3) the United States should pursue, to the maximum extent possible, anticipatory technology security and foreign disclosure policy on the systems described in paragraph (2);

(4) the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, should—

(A) urge allies and partners to invest in sufficient quantities of munitions to meet contingency requirements and avoid the need for accessing United States stocks in wartime; and

(B) cooperate with allies to deliver such munitions, or when necessary, to increase allies' capacity to produce such munitions; and

(5) it is in the United States interest to not authorize arms transfers or security cooperation to governments that demonstrate patterns of gross violations of human rights if such arms or security cooperation could be used to commit or support such violations.

(b) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—In this section, the term "appropriate committees of Congress" means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(c) REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that describes United States priorities for building more capable security partners in the Indo-Pacific region.

(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall—

(A) provide a priority list of defense and military capabilities that Indo-Pacific allies and partners must possess for the United States to be able to achieve its military objectives in the Indo-Pacific region;

(B) identify, from the list referred to in subparagraph (A), the capabilities that are best provided, or can only be provided, by the United States;

(C) identify—

(i) actions required to expedite fielding the capabilities identified in subparagraph (B); and

(ii) steps needed to fully account for and a plan to integrate all means of United States foreign military sales, direct commercial sales, security assistance, and all applicable authorities of the Department of State and the Department of Defense;

(D) assess the requirements for United States security assistance, including International Military Education and Training, in the Indo-Pacific region, as a part of the means to deliver critical partner capability requirements identified in subparagraph (B);

(E) assess the resources necessary to meet the requirements for United States security assistance, and identify resource gaps;

(F) assess the major obstacles to fulfilling requirements for United States security assistance in the Indo-Pacific region, including resources and personnel limits, foreign legislative and policy barriers, and factors related to specific partner countries;

(G) identify limitations on the ability of the United States to provide such capabilities, including capabilities identified under subparagraph (B), because of existing United States treaty obligations, United States policies, including sections 502B and 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2304 and 2378d), or other regulations;

(H) recommend improvements to the process for developing requirements for United States partner capabilities; and

(I) identify required jointly agreed recommendations for infrastructure and posture, based on any ongoing mutual dialogues.

(3) FORM.—The report required under this subsection shall be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 225. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING THE THREAT POSED BY THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION.

It is the policy of the United States to—

(1) urge NATO allies to work closely with like-minded partners, in particular with the European Union, to protect critical infrastructure, strengthen resil-

ience, maintain a technological edge, and address the challenges to the rules-based international order posed by the Chinese Communist Party;

(2) encourage NATO allies to explore how to monitor and defend against any activity of the Chinese Communist Party that could impact collective defense, military readiness, or resilience in the Supreme Allied Commander Europe's Area of Responsibility, including by identifying vulnerabilities of key sectors and supply chains, in coordination with the European Union;

(3) push for NATO allies to establish a consultative body to bring together such allies, and other institutions and partners as relevant, to exchange information, share experiences, and discuss all aspects of such allies' security interests with respect to the Chinese Communist Party; and

(4) prioritize urging all NATO allies to share the burden that comes with collective security in an increasingly complex security environment by reaching by 2024 the pledge set at the 2014 Wales Summit to spend two percent of GDP on defense spending and 20 percent of annual defense spending on major new equipment.

SEC. 226. IDENTIFICATION OF PLA–SUPPORTED INSTITUTIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall publish and disseminate to United States institutions and places of study a list identifying the research, engineering, and scientific institutions that the Secretary determines are affiliated with, or funded by, the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

(b) FORM.—The list published and disseminated under subsection (a) shall be unclassified and publicly accessible, but may include a classified annex.

Subtitle C—Multilateral Strategies to Bolster American Power

SEC. 231. FINDINGS ON MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENT.

Congress finds the following:

(1) Every UN member state is legally required to finance the UN's core budget in order to ensure that these missions are properly resourced, and assessment rates are renegotiated every three years by the UN General Assembly.

(2) While the United States is the largest single financial contributor to the UN system, the current model is beneficial because it requires all UN member states, no matter how big or small, to help shoulder the UN's regular and peacekeeping budgets at specified levels.

(3) Failing to meet our financial commitments to the UN also empowers the PRC, which has raised our annual shortfalls to claim we are not a reliable partner and is seeking to leverage its own contributions to the regular budget and peacekeeping in ways that run counter to United States interests and values.

(4) The People's Republic of China is now the second largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping, having gone from an assessment rate of just 3 percent in 2008 to more than 15 percent today, and is the ninth largest troop-contributor to UN missions, providing more personnel than the other four permanent members of the Security Council combined.

(5) With greater engagement comes greater influence, and PRC diplomats have sought to use their expanded clout to push back against the human rights, civilian protection, and gender-based violence aspects of UN peacekeeping mandates, using United States funding shortfalls as a pretext.

(6) The PRC has also used its growing clout to fill key posts at UN agencies: Chinese nationals currently occupy the top posts of four of the UN's 15 specialized agencies, while the United States occupies only one.

(7) From 2021 to 2022, there will be 15 elections for the heads of UN specialized agencies and five for major UN funds and programs. With the exception of the World Food Programme, none are currently led by Americans.

(8) A 2020 Department of State Inspector General Inspection found that the Bureau for International Organizations did not have a standard operating procedure for tracking and promoting the employment of American Citizens in the UN system, and their recommendation to the department to establish one remains open.

SEC. 232. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON AMERICA'S MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENT.

It is the policy of the United States that—

(1) the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations serves as a standing member of the cabinet;

(2) assessed dues to multilateral organizations be paid in full in a timely fashion;

(3) Federal agencies utilize all the authorities under section 3343 of title 5, United States Code, and subpart C of title 5, Code of Federal Regulations (relating to detail and transfer of Federal employees to international organizations), to detail or transfer employees to relevant international organizations;

(4) the Secretary of State should assist the Department of State and other Federal agencies in carrying out paragraph (3) to the fullest extent;

(5) the Secretary of State should support qualified American candidates in their bid to win election to United Nations-related leadership positions; and

(6) the Secretary of State should support the placement of Junior Professional Officers sponsored by the United States in United Nations-affiliated agencies.

SEC. 233. SUPPORT FOR AMERICANS AT THE UNITED NATIONS.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State is authorized to establish within the Department of State's Bureau of International Organization Affairs an Office of Multilateral Strategy and Personnel.

(b) DUTIES.—The office established under subsection (a) of this section shall be responsible for—

(1) promoting United States leadership and participation in the United Nations system, with a focus on issue areas where authoritarian nations are exercising increased influence in and determining the agenda of the United Nations system;

(2) establishing and implementing a standard operating procedure for the promotion and efficient tracking of United States citizen employment at the United Nations and other international organizations that includes Mission Geneva;

(3) monitoring the pipeline of United Nations jobs and identifying qualified United States citizens and other qualified nationals to promote for such positions;

(4) tracking leadership changes in United Nations Secretariat, funds, programs, and agencies, and developing strategies to ensure that coalitions of like-minded countries are assembled to ensure leadership races are not won by countries that do not share United States interests;

(5) eliminating current barriers to the employment of United States citizens in the United Nations Secretariat, funds, programs, and agencies; and

(6) increasing the number of qualified United States candidates for leadership and oversight positions at the United Nations Secretariat, funds, programs, agencies, and at other international organizations.

SEC. 234. JUNIOR PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS.

(a) INCREASE IN JUNIOR PROFESSIONAL OFFICER POSITIONS.—The Secretary of State should increase the number of Junior Professional Officer positions sponsored by the United States within the United Nations system.

(b) REPORT.—Not later than December 31 of each year, the Secretary of State shall provide the appropriate congressional committees information regarding the amount of funding each bureau has designated during the immediately preceding fiscal year for Junior Professional Officer positions in the United Nations system and the number of such positions that exist as of the end of the prior fiscal year.

SEC. 235. REPORT ON AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, shall develop and submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on how many Federal employees are currently detailed or transferred to an international organization during the immediately preceding 1-year period and a strategy for increasing the number of Federal employees so detailed or transferred.

(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Each report required by subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) The number of Federal employees detailed or transferred to an international organization under section 3343 of title 5, United States Code, and subpart C of title 5, Code of Federal Regulations (relating to the detail and transfer of Federal employees to international organizations), including—

(A) an identification of the Federal agency from which such employees were detailed or transferred; and

(B) an identification of the international organizations to and from which such employees have been so detailed or transferred.

(2) A list of international organizations to and from which the United States previously detailed or transferred Federal employees.

Subtitle D—Regional Strategies to Bolster American Power

SEC. 241. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS AROUND THE WORLD.

It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to strengthen alliances and partnerships with like-minded countries around the globe; and

(2) to work in collaboration with such allies and partners—

(A) to address significant diplomatic, economic, and military challenges posed by the People's Republic of China (PRC);

(B) to deter the PRC from pursuing military aggression;

(C) to promote the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes in accordance with international law;

(D) to promote private sector-led long-term economic development while countering efforts by the Government of the PRC to leverage predatory economic practices as a means of political and economic coercion in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond;

(E) to promote the values of democracy and human rights, including through efforts to end the repression by the PRC of political dissidents, Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities, Tibetan Buddhists, Christians, and other ethnic minorities;

(F) to respond to the crackdown by the PRC, in contravention of the commitments made under the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 and the Basic Law of Hong Kong, on the legitimate aspirations of the people of Hong Kong; and

(G) to counter the PRC Government's efforts to spread disinformation in the PRC and beyond with respect to its response to COVID–19.

PART I—WESTERN HEMISPHERE

SEC. 242. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES-CANADA RELATIONS.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States and Canada have a unique relationship based on shared geography, extensive personal connections, deep economic ties, mutual defense commitments, and a shared vision to uphold democracy, human rights, and the rules based international order established after World War II;

(2) the United States and Canada can better address the People's Republic of China's economic, political, and security influence through closer cooperation on counternarcotics, environmental stewardship, transparent practices in public procurement and infrastructure planning, the Arctic, energy and connectivity issues, trade and commercial relations, bilateral legal matters, and support for democracy, good governance, and human rights;

(3) amidst the COVID–19 pandemic, the United States and Canada should maintain joint initiatives to address border management, commercial and trade relations and infrastructure, a shared approach with respect to the People's Republic of China, and transnational challenges, including pandemics, energy security, and environmental stewardship;

(4) the United States and Canada should enhance cooperation to counter Chinese disinformation, influence operations, economic espionage, and propaganda efforts;

(5) the People's Republic of China's infrastructure investments, particularly in 5G telecommunications technology, extraction of natural resources, and port infrastructure, pose national security risks for the United States and Canada;

(6) the United States should share, as appropriate, intelligence gathered regarding—

(A) Huawei's 5G capabilities; and

(B) the PRC government's intentions with respect to 5G expansion;

(7) the United States and Canada should continue to advance collaborative initiatives to implement the January 9, 2020, United States-Canada Joint Action Plan on Critical Minerals Development Collaboration; and

(8) the United States and Canada should prioritize cooperation on continental defense and in the Arctic, including by modernizing the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) sensor architecture to provide effective warning and tracking of threats by peer competitors, including long-range missiles and high-precision weapons, to the Northern Hemisphere.

SEC. 243. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING CHINA'S ARBITRARY IMPRISONMENT OF CANADIAN CITIZENS.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the Government of the People's Republic of China's apparent arbitrary detention and abusive treatment of Canadian nationals Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig in apparent retaliation for the Government of Canada's arrest of Meng Wanzhou is deeply concerning;

(2) the Government of Canada has shown international leadership by—

(A) upholding the rule of law and complying with its international legal obligations, including obligations pursuant to the Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and Canada, signed at Washington December 3, 1971; and

(B) launching the Declaration Against Arbitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations, which has been endorsed by 57 countries and the European Union, and reaffirms well-established prohibitions under international human rights conventions against the arbitrary detention of foreign nationals to be used as leverage in country-to-country relations; and

(3) the United States continues to join the Government of Canada in calling for the immediate release of Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig and for due process for Canadian national Robert Schellenberg.

SEC. 244. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH CANADA.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, and the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, a strategy that describes how the United States will enhance cooperation with the Government of Canada in managing relations with the Government of the People's Republic of China.

(b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall—

(1) identify key policy points of convergence and divergence between the United States and Canada in managing relations with the People's Republic of China in the areas of technology, trade, economic practices, cyber security, secure supply chains and critical minerals, and illicit narcotics;

(2) include a description of United States development and coordination efforts with Canadian counterparts to enhance the cooperation between the United States and Canada with respect to—

(A) managing economic relations with the People's Republic of China;

(B) democracy and human rights in the People's Republic of China;

(C) technology issues involving the People's Republic of China;

(D) defense issues involving the People's Republic of China; and

(E) international law enforcement and transnational organized crime issues;

(3) detail diplomatic efforts and future plans to work with Canada to counter the People's Republic of China's projection of an authoritarian governing model around the world;

(4) detail diplomatic, defense, and intelligence cooperation to date and future plans to support Canadian efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives to Huawei's 5G technology;

(5) detail diplomatic and defense collaboration—

(A) to advance joint United States-Canadian priorities for responsible stewardship in the Arctic Region; and

(B) to counter the People's Republic of China's efforts to project political, economic, and military influence into the Arctic Region; and

(6) detail diplomatic efforts to work with Canada to track and counter the People's Republic of China's attempts to exert influence across the multilateral system.

(c) FORM.—The strategy required under this section shall be submitted in an unclassified form that can be made available to the public, but may include a classified annex, if necessary.

(d) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and not less frequently than every 180 days thereafter for five years, the Secretary of State shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees, and the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, regarding the development and implementation of the strategy required under this section.

SEC. 245. STRATEGY TO STRENGTHEN ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS, GOVERNANCE, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation, as appropriate, with the Secretary of

the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Attorney General, the United States Trade Representative, and the Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development Finance Corporation, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Finance and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate a multi-year strategy for increasing United States economic competitiveness and promoting good governance, human rights, and the rule of law in Latin American and Caribbean countries, particularly in the areas of—

(1) investment;
(2) equitable, inclusive, and sustainable development;
(3) commercial relations;
(4) anti-corruption activities; and
(5) infrastructure projects.

(b) ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include a plan of action, including benchmarks to achieve measurable progress, to—

(1) enhance the technical capacity of Latin American and Caribbean countries to advance the sustainable and inclusive development of equitable economies;
(2) reduce trade and non-tariff barriers between such countries;
(3) facilitate a more open, transparent, and competitive environment for United States businesses in the region;
(4) establish frameworks or mechanisms to review long term financial sustainability and security implications of foreign investments in strategic sectors or services, including transportation, communications, natural resources, and energy;
(5) establish competitive, transparent, and inclusive infrastructure project selection and procurement processes that promote transparency, supplier diversity, open competition, financial sustainability, adherence to robust global standards, and the employment of a diverse local workforce and management;
(6) strengthen legal structures critical to robust democratic governance, fair competition, combatting corruption, and ending impunity; and
(7) enhance transparent, affordable, and equitable access to the internet and digital infrastructure in the Western Hemisphere.

(c) BRIEFING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for five years, the Secretary of State, after consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United States Trade Representative, and the leadership of the United States International Development Finance Corporation, shall brief the congressional committees specified in subsection (a) regarding the implementation of this section, including examples of successes and challenges.

SEC. 246. ENGAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE DEFENSE SECTOR IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.

(a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this section, the term "appropriate committees of Congress" means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;
(5) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and
(6) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

(b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that assesses the nature, intent, and impact on United States strategic interests of Chinese diplomatic activity aimed at influencing the decisions, procedures, and programs of multilateral organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean, including the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Organization of American States, and the Inter-American Development Bank.

(2) DEFENSE SECTOR.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall include an assessment of the nature, intent, and impact on United States strategic interests of Chinese military activity in Latin America and the Caribbean, including military education and training programs, weapons sales, and space-related activities in the military or civilian spheres, such as—

(A) the satellite and space control station the People's Republic of China constructed in Argentina; and

(B) defense and security cooperation carried out by the People's Republic of China in Latin America and the Caribbean, including sales of surveillance and monitoring technology to governments in the region such as Venezuela, Cuba, Ecuador, and Colombia, and the potential use of such technologies as tools of Chinese intelligence services.

(3) FORM.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form and include classified annexes.

SEC. 247. DEFENSE COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.

(a) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State $13,500,000 for the International Military Education and Training Program for Latin America and the Caribbean for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026.

(b) MODERNIZATION.—The Secretary of State shall modernize and strengthen the programs receiving funding in accordance with subsection (a) to ensure that such programs are vigorous, substantive, and the preeminent choice for international military education and training for Latin American and Caribbean partners.

(c) REQUIRED ELEMENTS.—The programs referred to in subsection (a) shall—

(1) provide training and capacity-building opportunities to Latin American and Caribbean security services;

(2) provide practical skills and frameworks for—

(A) improving the functioning and organization of security services in Latin America and the Caribbean;

(B) creating a better understanding of the United States and its values; and

(C) using technology for maximum efficiency and organization;

(3) promote and ensure that security services in Latin America and the Caribbean respect civilian authority and operate in compliance with international norms, standards, and rules of engagement, including a respect for human rights, and full compliance with requirements under section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d; commonly referred to as the "Leahy law"); and

(4) receive funds only after vetting of individuals proposed to be trained, consistent with sections 502B and 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2304 and 2378d).

SEC. 248. ENGAGEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN REGARDING ACCOUNTABILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE RISKS OF PERVASIVE SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the Government of the People's Republic of China is exporting its model for internal security and state control of society through advanced technology and artificial intelligence; and

(2) the inclusion of communication networks and communications supply chains with equipment and services from companies with close ties to or that are susceptible to pressure from governments or security services without reliable legal checks on governmental powers can lead to breaches of citizens' private information, increased censorship, violations of human rights, and harassment of political opponents.

(b) DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT.—The Secretary of State shall conduct diplomatic engagement with governments and civil society organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean to—

(1) help identify and mitigate the risks to civil liberties posed by technologies and services described in subsection (a); and

(2) offer recommendations on ways to mitigate such risks.

(c) INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAMS.—The Chief Executive Officer of the United States Agency for Global Media, who may work through the Open Technology Fund of the Agency, and the Secretary of State, working through the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor's Internet Freedom and Business and Human Rights Section, shall expand and prioritize efforts to provide anti-censorship technology and services to journalists in Latin America and the Caribbean, in order to enhance their ability to safely access or share digital news and information.

(d) SUPPORT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall work through nongovernmental organizations to—

(1) support and promote programs that support internet freedom and the free flow of information online in Latin America and the Caribbean;

(2) protect open, interoperable, secure, and reliable access to internet in Latin America and the Caribbean;

(3) provide integrated support to civil society for technology, digital safety, policy and advocacy, and applied research programs in Latin America and the Caribbean;

(4) train journalists and civil society leaders in Latin America and the Caribbean on investigative techniques necessary to ensure public accountability and prevent government overreach in the digital sphere;

(5) assist independent media outlets and journalists in Latin America and the Caribbean to build their own capacity and develop high-impact, in-depth news reports covering governance and human rights topics;

(6) provide training for journalists and civil society leaders on investigative techniques necessary to improve transparency and accountability in government and the private sector;

(7) provide training on investigative reporting of incidents of corruption and unfair trade, business, and commercial practices;

(8) assist nongovernmental organizations to strengthen their capacity to monitor the incidents and practices described in paragraph (7); and

(9) identify local resources to support the preponderance of activities that would be carried out under this subsection.

SEC. 249. CARIBBEAN ENERGY INITIATIVE AS ALTERNATIVE TO CHINA'S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The countries of the Caribbean are heavily reliant upon imported oil to provide for approximately 90 percent of their energy production.

(2) The level of dependence is even higher including—

(A) Jamaica, which relies on oil for 95.9 percent of its electricity;

(B) Barbados, which relies on oil for 96 percent of its electricity;

(C) The Virgin Islands, which relies on oil for nearly 100 percent of its electricity; and

(D) St. Lucia, which relies on oil for 100 percent of its electricity.

(3) Overreliance on imported fossil fuels has had a detrimental effect on economic development, growth, and competitiveness in the Caribbean.

(4) Since 1970, more than 80 percent of Caribbean coral reefs have been lost due to coastal development and pollution. Soot particulates and climate change caused by burning fossil fuels have seriously damaged coral reefs, which are a significant source of tourism dollars, fishing, biodiversity, and natural beauty.

(5) Air pollution caused by burning oil for electricity—

(A) has serious health impacts in the form of higher rates of asthma and other lung ailments; and

(B) can also exacerbate climate change.

(6) The Caribbean region is particularly vulnerable to sea level rise and stronger storms.

(7) Between 2005 and 2018, the dependence of the countries of the Caribbean on oil was perpetuated by the Venezuelan-led Petrocaribe oil alliance, which—

(A) offered preferential terms for oil sales; and

(B) supplies some countries with up to 40 percent of their energy production needs.

(8) The ongoing domestic economic crisis and political turmoil in Venezuela has forced the Government of Venezuela to retract its commitments to the Petrocaribe oil alliance and step away as a regional power. Only Cuba still receives preferential Petrocaribe pricing on fuel exports from Venezuela, while other Petrocaribe member countries are experiencing a destabilized flow of oil.

(9) China has spent more than $244,000,000,000 on energy projects worldwide since 2000, 25 percent of which was spent in Latin America and the Caribbean. Although the majority of this spending was for oil, gas, and coal, China has also been the largest investor in clean energy globally for almost a decade.

(10) The World Bank estimates that the Caribbean will need $12,000,000,000 in power investments through 2035.

(11) Renewable energy technology costs have decreased dramatically in recent years, offering a more viable economic alternative for energy production. Solar energy prices have fallen by 80 percent since 2008, causing significant market growth, and according to data released by the International Renewable Energy Agency, ⅓ of global power capacity is based in renewable energy.

(12) In 2016, the International Monetary Fund estimated that transportation accounted for 36 percent of the total primary energy consumed in the Caribbean subregion.

(13) According to the United Nations Environment Programme, Latin America and the Caribbean could achieve annual savings of $621,000,000,000 and a reduction of 1,100,000,000 tons of CO2 by 2050 if the region's energy and transport sectors reach net zero emissions.

(14) The Caribbean has an abundance of onshore and offshore resources needed for renewable energy, including sun, wind, geothermal, and some hydropower production capacity.

(15) The United States Government is deeply engaged in providing technical and policy assistance to countries of the Caribbean on energy issues through—

(A) the Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas;

(B) Connecting the Americas 2022; and

(C) bilateral assistance programs.

(16) On February 19, 2014, at the North American Leaders' Summit, President Barack Obama, Prime Minister Stephen Harper of Canada, and President Enrique Peña Nieto of Mexico reaffirmed their commitment to bring affordable, reliable, and increasingly renewable power to the Caribbean, while opening wider markets for clean energy and green technology.

(17) On June 19, 2015, President Barack Obama announced the Caribbean Energy Security Initiative, which would partner with individual countries—

(A) to transform its energy sector;

(B) to work to increase access to finance, good governance, and diversification; and

(C) to maximize the impact of existing donor effects.

(18) On May 4, 2016, at the United States-Caribbean-Central American Energy Summit, the energy security task force formally launched the Caribbean Sustainable Energy Roadmap and Strategy (C–SERMS) as a mechanism to manage regional coordination and action on energy security and agreed to expand the regional market and transmission system.

(19) The United States has an important opportunity—

(A) to deepen this engagement;

(B) to work as a partner with Caribbean countries on a more regional and coordinated basis;

(C) to help ease the region's dependence on imported oil; and

(D) to promote affordable alternative sources of energy.

(b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES.—The term "Caribbean countries" means countries in the Caribbean region, but does not include Cuba or Venezuela.

(2) CARIBBEAN GOVERNMENTS.—The term "Caribbean governments" means the national governments of the Caribbean countries.

(c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to help Caribbean countries—

(1) achieve greater energy security and improve domestic energy resource mobilization;

(2) lower their dependence on imported fuels;

(3) eliminate the use of diesel, heavy fuel oil, other petroleum products, and coal for the generation of electricity;

(4) increase production of renewable energy; and

(5) meet the greenhouse gas mitigation goals of their national determined contributions to the Paris Agreement.

(d) STRATEGY.—

(1) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a multi-year strategy that describes how the Department of State will promote regional cooperation with Caribbean countries—

(A) to lower dependence on imported fuels, grow domestic clean energy production in the region, strengthen regional energy security, and lower energy sector greenhouse gas emissions;

(B) to decrease dependence on oil in the transportation sector;

(C) to increase energy efficiency, energy conservation, and investment in alternatives to imported fuels;

(D) to improve grid reliability and modernize electricity transmission networks;

(E) to advance deployment of innovative solutions to expand community and individuals' access to electricity;

(F) to help reform energy markets to encourage good regulatory governance and to promote a climate of private sector investment; and

(G) to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions from the energy and transportation sector.

(2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include—

(A) a thorough review and inventory of United States Government activities that are being carried out bilaterally, regionally, and in coordination with multilateral institutions—

(i) to promote energy and climate security in the Caribbean region; and

(ii) to reduce the region's reliance on oil for electricity generation;

(B) opportunities for marshaling regional cooperation—

(i) to overcome market barriers resulting from the small size of Caribbean energy markets;

(ii) to address the high transportation and infrastructure costs faced by Caribbean countries;

(iii) to ensure greater donor coordination between governments, multilateral institutions, multilateral banks, and private investors; and

(iv) to expand regional financing opportunities to allow for lower cost energy entrepreneurship;

(C) measures to ensure that each Caribbean government has—

(i) an independent utility regulator or equivalent;

(ii) affordable access by third party investors to its electrical grid with minimal regulatory interference;

(iii) effective energy efficiency and energy conservation;

(iv) programs to address technical and nontechnical issues;

(v) a plan to eliminate major market distortions;

(vi) cost-reflective tariffs; and

(vii) no tariffs or other taxes on clean energy solutions; and

(D) recommendations for how United States policy, technical, and economic assistance can be used in the Caribbean region—

(i) to advance renewable energy development and the incorporation of renewable technologies into existing energy grids and the development and deployment of micro-grids where appropriate and feasible to boost energy security and reliability, particularly to underserved communities;

(ii) to increase the generation of clean energy sufficiently to replace and allow for the retirement of obsolete fossil fuel energy generation units in Caribbean countries;

(iii) to create regional financing opportunities to allow for lower cost energy entrepreneurship;

(iv) to deploy transaction advisors in the region to help attract private investment and break down any market or regulatory barriers; and

(v) to establish a mechanism for each host government to have access to independent legal advice—

(I) to speed the development of energy-related contracts; and

(II) to better protect the interests of Caribbean governments and citizens.

(3) CONSULTATION.—In devising the strategy under this subsection, the Secretary of State shall work with the Secretary of Energy and shall consult with—

(A) the Secretary of the Interior;

(B) the Secretary of Commerce;

(C) the Secretary of the Treasury;

(D) the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank of the United States;

(E) the Board of Directors of the Development Finance Corporation;

(F) the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development;

(G) the Caribbean governments;

(H) the Inter-American Development Bank;

(I) the World Bank Group; and

(J) the Caribbean Electric Utility Services Corporation.

SEC. 250. UNITED STATES-CARIBBEAN RESILIENCE PARTNERSHIP.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The United States shares with the Caribbean a collective vulnerability to natural disasters, which affects the lives and the economies of our citizens.

(2) The April 9, 2021, eruption of the La Soufriere volcano is another reminder of the devastation caused by the many natural disasters the Caribbean confronts each year and the region's vulnerability to external shocks. Hurricane Dorian, the largest storm to hit the region, wiped out large parts of the northern Bahamas in 2019, and Hurricanes Maria and Irma devastated multiple islands across the region in 2017, including Puerto Rico. According to IMF re-

search, of the 511 plus disasters worldwide to hit small states since 1950, around two-thirds (324) have been in the Caribbean.

(3) This region is seven times more likely to experience a natural disaster than elsewhere. And, when one occurs, it will incur as much as six times more damage.

(4) Extreme weather events and other environmental impacts will only worsen over the coming years, and if not addressed, we will see only increasing economic shocks on these countries, driving irregular migration.

(5) While the United States has considerable expertise and capacity in assisting countries with disaster response, there remains a need for stronger partnerships that build regional resilience through efficient and interoperable platforms, protecting people and speeding recovery.

(6) The People's Republic of China has dramatically increased its engagement in the Caribbean in the past five years, including offering loans and grants related to disaster response and resilience and sought to acquire property rights in the Caribbean that would be detrimental to United States national security interests.

(7) In 2019, the United States launched a new U.S.-Caribbean Resilience Partnership to deepen cooperation and investment to strengthen our disaster resilience throughout the Caribbean region, including—

(A) to streamline early warning response networks and formalize communication channels;

(B) to enhance, encourage, and work collaboratively on further developing aviation disaster resilience plans and partnerships;

(C) to prioritize regional technical exchange in energy planning, risk reduction, and resilience;

(D) to increase communications network interoperability between Caribbean partners and the United States;

(E) to utilize storm surge mapping data and share real-time information in preparation for potential damage resulting from tropical cyclones and tsunamis;

(F) to use meteorological services to strengthen and deepen physical and communications infrastructure, data collection networks, and human and technical capacity throughout the region, as well as interactions with the public;

(G) to understand that while the use of international and military and civil defense assets in disaster response may only be considered as a last resort, when local, national, and international civilian capabilities are overwhelmed, civil-military coordination should occur, in support of the affected nation;

(H) to develop a framework that would govern the deployment of international military and civil defense assets in disaster response when local, national, and international civilian capabilities are overwhelmed, in support of the affected nation;

(I) to seek common mechanisms for ensuring rapid disaster response and recovery, including waiving or expediting diplomatic clearances, waiving of or reducing customs fees, streamlining overflight and airspace clearance, and ensuring that the first responders have the ability to rapidly respond to disasters in other countries;

(J) to promote the integration and coordination of regional response mechanisms in the Caribbean, including through the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency, the Regional Security System, United States Government Agencies, and allies in ways that facilitate more effective and efficient planning, mitigation, response, and resilience to natural disasters;

(K) to share best practices in improved building codes with national disaster organizations, including building better programs, at regional, national and community levels; and

(L) to promote community-based disaster preparedness and mitigation activities, particularly in underserved communities, with the aim of increasing broad public participation and resilience.

(b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to help Caribbean countries—

(1) increase their resilience and adapt to natural disasters and the impacts of severe weather events and a changing environment;

(2) partner with United States Federal, State, and local agencies and engage in technical cooperation, dialogue, and assistance activities;

(3) harmonize standards and practices related to paragraphs (1) and (2) to promote increased investment and integration;

(4) increase investment from United States companies in the Caribbean on resilience-building, adaptation, and climate-related mitigation efforts;

(5) promote regional cooperation and ensure efforts by the United States, Caribbean countries, and international partners complement each other; and

(6) further assist with the efforts described in subsection (a)(7).

(c) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other Federal departments and agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a multi-year strategy that describes how the Department of State will achieve the policies described in subsection (b).

(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated for activities, programs, technical assistance, and engagement under this section the following:

(1) $20,000,000 for fiscal year 2022.

(2) $25,000,000 for fiscal year 2023.

(3) $30,000,000 for fiscal year 2024 and each fiscal year thereafter.

(e) REPORTING AND MONITORING.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated each fiscal year pursuant to subsection (d), at least five percent of all programming funding allocation shall support and be directed toward reporting, monitoring, and assessment of effectiveness.

(2) ENGAGEMENT AND COLLABORATION.—The Department of State shall ensure that at least 20 percent of amounts authorized to be appropriated pursuant to subsection (d) directly support the training of, engagement with, collaboration with, and exchange of expertise on resilience between United States Federal, State, and local officials and their Caribbean government counterparts. Such amounts should also support, as appropriate, increased academic, civil society, media, and private sector engagement in the fields of resilience-building, adaptation, and mitigation.

SEC. 251. COUNTERING CHINA'S EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL DIPLOMACY IN LATIN AMERICA.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) According to a report by the National Endowment for Democracy, China has spent the equivalent of billions of dollars to shape public opinion and perceptions around the world through thousands of people-to-people exchanges, cultural activities, educational programs, and the development of media enterprises and information initiatives with global reach.

(2) Educational and exchange programs are a core element of United States public diplomacy, elevating our culture, policies, and interests worldwide.

(3) These programs provide students with access to international knowledge, an opportunity to learn foreign languages, and a unique environment for developing cultural understanding, all of which are valuable skills in today's global economy.

(4) 90 percent of ECA's appropriation is spent in the United States or invested directly in American citizens or American organizations.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) China's efforts to mold public opinion and influence educational institutions undermine United States' influence in Latin America and the Caribbean and threaten democratic institutions and practices in the region;

(2) the United States Government should expand current educational and cultural exchange programs in Latin America and the Caribbean, which are cost-effective and strengthen people-to-people diplomacy, to promote national security and foreign policy interests of the United States; and

(3) educational exchanges foster linguistic, cultural, and educational skills that advance United States economic competitiveness, strengthen alliances, and support democracies worldwide.

(c) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, acting through the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, and in coordination with the Assistant Administrator for the Bureau of Economic Growth, Education, and Environment at the United States Agency for International Development, shall devise a strategy—

(1) to evaluate and expand existing programs and, as necessary, design and implement new educational, professional, and cultural exchanges and other programs to—

(A) create and sustain mutual understanding with other countries necessary to advance United States foreign policy goals by cultivating people-to-people ties among current and future global leaders that build enduring networks and personal relationships; and

(B) promote United States national security interests and values, including through the expansion of exchange visitor programs such as international visitor leadership programs and the Young Leaders of the Americas Initiative, as well as professional capacity building programs that prioritize building skills in entrepreneurship, promoting transparency, and technology;

(2) to ensure that exchange programs for Americans abroad and international visitors attract a diverse pool of participants, including from underrepresented, marginalized, and low-income communities; and

(3) to evaluate, expand, and strengthen existing programs, and, as necessary, design and implement new basic and higher education programs in Latin America and the Caribbean, in accordance with the United States Strategy on International Basic Education and the United States Agency for International Development Education Policy, to enable all young adults, youth, and children to acquire the quality education and skills needed to be productive members in society, which will lead to better individual and societal outcomes.

(d) REPORT WITH INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that assesses the nature and impact of the People's Republic of China's educational and cultural sector activity in Latin America and the Caribbean, its impact on United States' strategic interests, and recommendations for the United States Government to expand people-to-people ties.

SEC. 252. NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) narcotics trafficking continues to pose a security threat to the countries and peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean;

(2) other forms of transnational organized crime, including arms trafficking, human smuggling, money laundering, and illicit financing, are drivers of irregular migration;

(3) narcotics trafficking is fueled by governments that fail to curb the illicit drug trade by adequately regulating the legal trade of non-fentanyl opioids and precursor chemicals used to produce fentanyl, fentanyl analogs, and other synthetic drugs;

(4) further, governments that do not cooperate sufficiently on financial investigations and prosecutions, withhold information with respect to money laundering crimes, or are determined to facilitate illicit activities, particularly by transnational organized criminal organizations, should be held accountable;

(5) as noted in the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2020, China "has not cooperated sufficiently on financial investigations and does not provide adequate responses to requests for financial investigation information";

(6) the United States should apply economic and other targeted financial sanctions with respect to individuals engaged in financial crimes and money laundering that fosters narcotics trafficking in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean; and

(7) the United States should look to policies to hold accountable countries that fail to sufficiently investigate financial crimes and money laundering that foster narcotics trafficking in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.

PART II—TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIPS

SEC. 255. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIPS.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States, European Union, the United Kingdom, and other European countries are close partners, sharing values grounded in democracy, human rights, transparency, and the rules-based international order established after World War II;

(2) without a common approach by the United States, European Union, the United Kingdom, and other European countries on connectivity, trade, transnational challenges, and support for democracy and human rights, the People's Republic of China will continue to increase its economic, political, and security leverage in Europe;

(3) the People's Republic of China's deployment of assistance to European countries following the COVID–19 outbreak showcased a coercive approach to aid, but it also highlighted Europe's deep economic ties to the People's Republic of China;

(4) as European countries seek to recover from the economic toll of the COVID–19 outbreak, the United States must stand in partnership with Europe to support our collective economic recovery, reinforce our collective national security, and defend shared values;

(5) the United States, European Union, the United Kingdom, and other European countries should coordinate on joint strategies to diversify reliance on supply chains away from the People's Republic of China, especially in the medical and pharmaceutical sectors;

(6) the United States, European Union, the United Kingdom, and other European countries should leverage their respective economic innovation capabilities to support the global economic recovery from the COVID–19 recession and draw a contrast with the centralized economy of the People's Republic of China;

(7) the United States, United Kingdom, and European Union should accelerate efforts to de-escalate their trade disputes, including negotiating a United States-European Union trade agreement that benefits workers and the broader economy in both the United States and European Union;

(8) the United States, European Union, and Japan should continue trilateral efforts to address the security, economic, democracy, and human rights challenges posed by the People's Republic of China;

(9) the United States, European Union, the United Kingdom, and other European countries should enhance cooperation to counter People's Republic of China disinformation, influence operations, and propaganda efforts;

(10) the United States and Europe share serious concerns with the repressions being supported and executed by the Government of the People's Republic of China, and should continue implementing measures to address the Government of the People's Republic of China's specific abuses in Tibet, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang, and should build joint mechanisms and programs to prevent the export of China's authoritarian governance model to countries around the world;

(11) the United States and Europe should remain united in their shared values against attempts by the Government of the People's Republic of China at the United Nations and other multilateral organizations to promote efforts that erode the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, like the "community of a shared future for mankind" and "democratization of international relations";

(12) the People's Republic of China's infrastructure investments around the world, particularly in 5G telecommunications technology and port infrastructure, could threaten democracy across Europe and the national security of key countries;

(13) as appropriate, the United States should share intelligence with European allies and partners on Huawei's 5G capabilities and the intentions of the Government of the People's Republic of China with respect to 5G expansion in Europe;

(14) the European Union's Investment Screening Regulation, which came into force in October 2020, is a welcome development, and member states should closely scrutinize PRC investments in their countries through their own national investment screening measures;

(15) the President should actively engage the European Union on the implementation of the Export Control Reform Act regulations and to better harmonize United States and European Union policies with respect to export controls;

(16) the President should strongly advocate for the listing of more items and technologies to restrict dual use exports controlled at the National Security and above level to the People's Republic of China under the Wassenaar Arrangement;

(17) the United States should explore the value of establishing a body akin to the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) that would specifically coordinate United States and European Union export control policies with respect to limiting exports of sensitive technologies to the People's Republic of China; and

(18) the United States should work with counterparts in Europe to—

(A) evaluate United States and European overreliance on goods originating in the People's Republic of China, including in the medical and pharmaceutical sectors, and develop joint strategies to diversify supply chains;

(B) develop a common strategy for promoting energy security and economic growth in eastern Europe and the Balkans that addresses shared concerns related to China's Belt and Road Initiative in these regions, including complementary investments in the Three Seas Initiative Fund for clean energy and digital connectivity projects;

(C) counter PRC efforts to use COVID–19-related assistance as a coercive tool to pressure developing countries by offering relevant United States and European expertise and assistance; and

(D) leverage the United States and European private sectors to advance the post-COVID–19 economic recovery.

SEC. 256. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION WITH RESPECT TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall brief the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives on a strategy for how the United States will enhance cooperation with the European Union, NATO, and European partner countries with respect to the People's Republic of China.

(b) ELEMENTS.—The briefing required under subsection (a) shall include the following elements with respect to the strategy referred to in such subsection:

(1) An identification of the senior Senate-confirmed Department of State official who leads United States efforts to cooperate with the European Union, NATO, and European partner countries to advance a shared approach with respect to the People's Republic of China.

(2) An identification of key policy points of convergence and divergence between the United States and European allies and partners with respect to the People's Republic of China in the areas of technology, trade, and economic practices.

(3) A description of efforts to advance shared interests with European counterparts on—

(A) security and economic challenges with respect to the People's Republic of China;

(B) democracy and human rights challenges with respect to the People's Republic of China;

(C) technology issues with respect to the People's Republic of China;

(D) defense issues with respect to the People's Republic of China; and

(E) developing a comprehensive strategy to respond to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) established by the Government of the People's Republic of China.

(4) A description of the coordination mechanisms among key regional and functional bureaus within the Department of State and Department of Defense tasked with engaging with European allies and partners on the People's Republic of China.

(5) A detailing of diplomatic efforts up to the date of the briefing and future plans to work with European allies and partners to counter the Government of the People's Republic of China's advancement of an authoritarian governance model around the world.

(6) A detailing of the diplomatic efforts made up to the date of the briefing and future plans to support European efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives to Huawei's 5G technology.

(7) A detailing of how United States public diplomacy tools, including the Global Engagement Center of the Department of State, will coordinate efforts with counterpart entities within the European Union to counter Chinese propaganda.

(8) A description of the staffing and budget resources the Department of State dedicates to engagement between the United States and the European Union on the People's Republic of China and provide an assessment of out-year resource needs to execute such strategy.

(9) A detailing of diplomatic efforts to work with European allies and partners to track and counter Chinese attempts to exert influence across multilateral fora, including at the World Health Organization.

(c) FORM.—The briefing required under section (a) shall be classified.

(d) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for three years, the Secretary of State shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives regarding the development and implementation of the elements described in subsection (b).

SEC. 257. ENHANCING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION ON PROMOTING PRIVATE SECTOR FINANCE.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The President should work with transatlantic partners to build on the agreement among the Development Finance Corporation, FinDev Canada, and the European Development Finance Institutions (referred to as the "DFI Alli-

ance") to enhance coordination on shared objectives to foster private sector-led development and provide market-based alternatives to state-directed financing in emerging markets, particularly as related to the People's Republic of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), including by integrating efforts such as—

(1) the European Union Strategy on Connecting Europe and Asia;

(2) the Three Seas Initiative and Three Seas Initiative Fund;

(3) the Blue Dot Network among the United States, Japan, and Australia; and

(4) a European Union-Japan initiative that has leveraged $65,000,000,000 for infrastructure projects and emphasizes transparency standards.

(b) STANDARDS.—The United States and the European Union should coordinate and develop a strategy to enhance transatlantic cooperation with the OECD and the Paris Club on ensuring the highest possible standards for Belt and Road Initiative contracts and terms with developing countries.

SEC. 258. REPORT AND BRIEFING ON COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA AND IRAN AND BETWEEN CHINA AND RUSSIA.

(a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this section, the term "appropriate committees of Congress" means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Finance, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(b) REPORT AND BRIEFING REQUIRED.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of the Treasury, and such other heads of Federal agencies as the Director considers appropriate, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report and brief such committees on cooperation between—

(A) the People's Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Iran; and

(B) the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation.

(2) CONTENTS.—The report and briefing under paragraph (1) shall include the following elements:

(A) An identification of major areas of diplomatic energy, infrastructure, banking, financial, economic, military, and space cooperation—

(i) between the People's Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Iran; and

(ii) between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation.

(B) An assessment of the effect of the COVID–19 pandemic on such cooperation.

(C) An assessment of the effect that United States compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) starting in January 14, 2016, and United States withdrawal from the JCPOA on May 8, 2018, had on the cooperation described in subparagraph (A)(i).

(D) An assessment of the effect on the cooperation described in subparagraph (A)(i) that would be had by the United States reentering compliance with the JCPOA or a successor agreement and the effect of the United States not reentering compliance with the JCPOA or reaching a successor agreement.

(3) FORM.—The report submitted under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SHARING WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS.—It is the sense of Congress that the Director of National Intelligence and the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies should share with important allies and partners of the United States, as appropriate, the findings of the report required under subsection (b).

PART III—SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA

SEC. 261. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States should continue to stand with friends and partners, while also working to establish new partners in South and Central Asia as they contend with efforts by the Government of the People's Republic of China to interfere in their respective political systems and encroach upon their sovereign territory; and

(2) the United States should reaffirm its commitment to the Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership with India and further deepen bilateral defense consultations and collaboration with India commensurate with its status as a major defense partner.

SEC. 262. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and, the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a strategy for how the United States will engage with the countries of South and Central Asia, including through the C5+1 mechanism, with respect to the People's Republic of China.

(b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include the following elements:

(1) A detailed description of the security and economic challenges that the People's Republic of China (PRC) poses to the countries of South and Central Asia, including border disputes with South and Central Asian countries that border the People's Republic of China, and PRC investments in land and sea ports, transportation infrastructure, and energy projects across the region.

(2) A detailed description of United States efforts to provide alternatives to PRC investment in infrastructure and other sectors in South and Central Asia.

(3) A detailed description of bilateral and regional efforts to work with countries in South Asia on strategies to build resilience against PRC efforts to interfere in their political systems and economies.

(4) A detailed description of United States diplomatic efforts to work with the Government of Afghanistan on addressing the challenges posed by PRC investment in the Afghan mineral sector.

(5) A detailed description of United States diplomatic efforts with the Government of Pakistan with respect to matters relevant to the People's Republic of China, including investments by the People's Republic of China in Pakistan through the Belt and Road Initiative.

(6) In close consultation with the Government of India, identification of areas with respect to which the United States Government can provide diplomatic and other support as appropriate for India's efforts to address economic and security challenges posed by the People's Republic of China in the region.

(7) A description of the coordination mechanisms among key regional and functional bureaus within the Department of State and Department of Defense tasked with engaging with the countries of South and Central Asia on issues relating to the People's Republic of China.

(8) A description of the efforts being made by Federal departments and agencies, including the Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, and the Office of the United States Trade Representative, to help the countries of South and Central Asia develop trade and commerce links that will help those countries diversify their trade away from the People's Republic of China.

(9) A detailed description of United States diplomatic efforts with Central Asian countries, Turkey, and any other countries with significant populations of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities fleeing persecution in the People's Republic of China to press those countries to refrain from deporting ethnic minorities to the People's Republic of China, protect ethnic minorities from intimidation by Chinese Government authorities, and protect the right to the freedoms of assembly and expression.

(c) FORM.—The strategy required under section (a) shall be submitted in an unclassified form that can be made available to the public, but may include a classified annex as necessary.

(d) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and not less often than annually thereafter for five years, the Secretary of State shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives regarding the development and implementation of the strategy required under subsection (a).

SEC. 263. INDIAN OCEAN REGION STRATEGIC REVIEW.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The Indian Ocean region is a vitally important part of the Indo-Pacific where the United States has political, economic, and security interests.

(2) The United States has an interest in working with partners in the Indo-Pacific, including India, Japan, and Australia, to address regional governance, economic connectivity, and security challenges including threats to freedom of navigation.

(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—As a part of the United States engagement in the Indo-Pacific, it shall be the policy of the United States to strengthen engagement with the countries in the Indian Ocean region, including with governments, civil society, and private sectors in such countries to—

(1) promote United States political engagement with such region, including through active participation in regional organizations, and strengthened diplomatic relations with United States partners in such region;

(2) enhance United States economic connectivity and commercial exchange with such region;

(3) defend freedom of navigation in such region from security challenges, including related to piracy;

(4) support the ability of governments and organizations in such region to respond to natural disasters;

(5) support and facilitate the role of regional allies and partners as net providers of security to such region and as partners to the United States in addressing security challenges in such region, including through assistance to such allies and partners to build capacity in maritime security and maritime domain awareness;

(6) continue to build the United States-India relationship in order to regularize security cooperation through the negotiation of agreements concerning access, communication, and navigation, including through foundational agreements; and

(7) promote cooperation with United States allies in the Indo-Pacific, including Japan and Australia, and major defense partners, including India, and NATO allies, including the United Kingdom and France, to support a rules-based order in such region.

(c) STRATEGY.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a multi-year strategy for United States engagement to support United States interests in the Indian Ocean region. Such strategy shall—

(A) define United States political, economic, and security interests in the Indian Ocean region;

(B) outline challenges to the interests of the United States in such region;

(C) outline efforts to improve cooperation between the United States and members of the Quad, including India, Japan, and Australia, through coordination in diplomacy and development priorities, joint military exercises and operations, and other activities that promote United States political, economic, and security interests;

(D) outline efforts to support economic connectivity in such region, including through the United States-India-Japan Trilateral Infrastructure Working Group, the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, and other efforts to expand and enhance connectivity across the Indo-Pacific, including with the countries of Southeast Asia, that maintain high standards of investment and support for civil society and people-to-people connectivity;

(E) describe how the United States can engage with regional intergovernmental organizations and entities, including the Indian Ocean Rim Association, to promote United States political, economic, and security interests in such region;

(F) review the United States diplomatic posture in such region, including an assessment of United States diplomatic engagement in countries without a permanent United States embassy or diplomatic mission, and an assessment of ways to improve the cooperation with the Maldives, the Seychelles, and Comoros;

(G) review United States diplomatic agreements with countries in such region that facilitate United States military operations in such region, including bilateral and multilateral agreements, and describe efforts to expand United States cooperation with such countries through the negotiation of additional agreements; and

(H) include a security assistance strategy for such region that outlines priorities, objectives, and actions for United States security assistance ef-

forts to governments of countries in such region to promote United States political, economic, and security interests in such region.

(2) INCLUSION.—The strategy required under paragraph (1) may be submitted as a part of any other strategy relating to the Indo-Pacific.

(3) REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION.—Not later than one year after the submission of the strategy required under paragraph (1) and one year thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on progress made toward implementing such strategy.

(d) UNITED STATES-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subparagraph (E) of section 1238(c)(2) of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (22 U.S.C. 7002(c)(2)) is amended—

(A) by inserting ", including in the Indian Ocean region" after "deployments of the People's Republic of China military"; and

(B) by adding at the end the following new sentence: "In this subparagraph, the term 'Indian Ocean region' means the Indian Ocean, including the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, and the littoral areas surrounding the Indian Ocean.".

(2) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by paragraph (1) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and apply beginning with the first report required under section 1238 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (as amended by such paragraph) that is submitted after such date.

(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—The term "appropriate committees of Congress" means the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

(2) INDIAN OCEAN REGION.—The term "Indian Ocean region" means the Indian Ocean, including the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, and the littoral areas surrounding the Indian Ocean.

PART IV—AFRICA

SEC. 271. ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SECURITY ACTIVITY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN AFRICA.

(a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this section, the term "appropriate committees of Congress" means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(b) INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that assesses the nature and impact of the People's Republic of China's political, economic, socio-cultural, and security sector activity in Africa, and its impact on United States strategic interests, including information relating to—

(1) the amount and impact of direct investment, loans, development financing, oil-for-loans deals, and other preferential trading arrangements;

(2) the involvement of People's Republic of China (PRC) state-owned enterprises in Africa;

(3) the amount of African debt held by the PRC;

(4) the involvement of PRC private security, technology and media companies in Africa;

(5) the scale and impact of PRC arms sales to African countries;

(6) the scope of PRC investment in and control of African energy resources and minerals critical for emerging and foundational technologies;

(7) an analysis on the linkages between PRC's aid and assistance to African countries and African countries supporting PRC geopolitical goals in international fora;

(8) the methods, tools, and tactics used to facilitate illegal and corrupt activity, including trade in counterfeit and illicit goods, to include smuggled extractive resources and wildlife products, between Africa and the PRC;

(9) the methods and techniques that the PRC uses to exert undue influence on African governments and facilitate corrupt activity in Africa, including

through the CCP's party-to-party training program, and to influence African multilateral organizations; and

(10) an analysis of the soft power, cultural and educational activities undertaken by the PRC and CCP to seek to expand its influence in Africa.

SEC. 272. INCREASING THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE UNITED STATES IN AFRICA.

(a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this section, the term "appropriate committees of Congress" means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

(b) STRATEGY REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United States Trade Representative, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the leadership of the United States International Development Finance Corporation, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report setting forth a multi-year strategy for increasing United States economic competitiveness and promoting improvements in the investment climate in Africa, including through support for—

(1) democratic institutions and the rule of law, including property rights; and

(2) improved transparency, anti-corruption efforts, and good governance.

(c) ELEMENTS.—The strategy submitted pursuant to subsection (a) shall include—

(1) a description and assessment of barriers to United States investment in Africa for United States businesses, including a clear identification of the different barriers facing small-sized and medium-sized businesses, and an assessment of whether existing programs effectively address such barriers;

(2) a description and assessment of barriers to African diaspora investment in Africa, and recommendations to overcome such barriers;

(3) an identification of the economic sectors in the United States that have a comparative advantage in African markets;

(4) a determination of priority African countries for promoting two-way trade and investment and an assessment of additional foreign assistance needs, including democracy and governance and rule of law support, to promote a conducive operating environment in priority countries;

(5) an identification of opportunities for strategic cooperation with European allies on trade and investment in Africa, and for establishing a dialogue on trade, security, development, and environmental issues of mutual interest; and

(6) a plan to regularly host a United States-Africa Leaders Summit to promote two-way trade and investment, strategic engagement, and security in Africa.

(d) ASSESSMENT OF UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HUMAN RESOURCES CAPACITY.—The Comptroller General of the United States shall—

(1) conduct a review of the number of Foreign Commercial Service Officers and Department of State Economic Officers at United States embassies in sub-Saharan Africa; and

(2) develop and submit to the appropriate congressional committees an assessment of whether human resource capacity in such embassies is adequate to meet the goals of the various trade and economic programs and initiatives in Africa, including the African Growth and Opportunity Act and Prosper Africa.

SEC. 273. DIGITAL SECURITY COOPERATION WITH RESPECT TO AFRICA.

(a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this section, the term "appropriate committees of Congress" means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(b) INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP TO COUNTER PRC CYBER AGGRESSION IN AFRICA.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall establish an interagency Working Group, which shall include representatives of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and such other agencies of the United States Government as the President considers appropriate, on means to counter PRC cyber aggression with respect to Africa.

(2) DUTIES.—The Working Group established pursuant to this subsection shall develop and submit to the appropriate congressional committees a set of recommendations, such as for—

(A) bolstering the capacity of governments in Africa to ensure the integrity of their data networks and critical infrastructure, where applicable;

(B) providing alternatives to Huawei;

(C) an action plan for United States embassies in Africa to provide assistance to host-country governments with respect to protecting their vital digital networks and infrastructure from PRC espionage, including an assessment of staffing resources needed to implement the action plan in embassies in Africa;

(D) utilizing interagency resources to counter PRC disinformation and propaganda in traditional and digital media targeted to African audiences; and

(E) helping civil society in Africa counter digital authoritarianism and identifying tools and assistance to enhance and promote digital democracy.

SEC. 274. SUPPORT FOR YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS INITIATIVE.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the Young African Leaders Initiative, launched in 2010, is a signature effort to invest in the next generation of African leaders;

(2) Africa is a continent of strategic importance and it is vital for the United States to support strong and enduring partnerships with the next generation of African leaders; and

(3) the United States Government should prioritize investments to build the capacity of emerging young African leaders in sub-Saharan Africa, including through efforts to enhance leadership skills, encourage entrepreneurship, strengthen public administration and the role of civil society, and connect young African leaders continentally and globally across the private, civic, and public sectors.

(b) YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS INITIATIVE PROGRAM.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—There is established in the Department of State the Young African Leaders Initiative ("YALI") program.

(2) PURPOSE.—The YALI program shall seek to build the capacity of young African leaders in sub-Saharan Africa in the areas of business, civic engagement, or public administration, including through efforts to—

(A) support young African leaders by offering professional development, training, and networking opportunities, particularly in the areas of leadership, innovation, civic engagement, elections, human rights, entrepreneurship, good governance, and public administration; and

(B) provide increased economic and technical assistance to young African leaders to promote economic growth and strengthen ties between United States and African businesses.

(3) FELLOWSHIPS.—The YALI program shall award fellowships under the Mandela Washington Fellowship for Young African Leaders program to young African leaders ages 18 to 35 who have demonstrated strong capabilities in entrepreneurship, innovation, public service, and leadership, and who have had a positive impact in their communities, organizations, or institutions.

(4) REGIONAL LEADERSHIP CENTERS.—The YALI program shall seek to establish regional leadership centers in sub-Saharan Africa to offer training to young African leaders ages 18 to 35 who have demonstrated strong capabilities in entrepreneurship, innovation, public service and leadership, and who have had a positive impact in their communities, organizations, or institutions.

(5) ACTIVITIES.—

(A) UNITED STATES-BASED ACTIVITIES.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator for the United States Agency for International Development and the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall oversee all United States-based activities carried out under the YALI program, including the following:

(i) The participation of Mandela Washington fellows in a six-week Leadership Institute at a United States university or college in business, civic engagement, or public management, including academic sessions, site visits, professional networking opportunities, leadership training, community service, and organized cultural activities.

(ii) The participation by Mandela Washington fellows in an annual Mandela Washington Fellowship Summit, to provide such Fellows the opportunity to meet with United States leaders from the private, public, and non-profit sectors.

(B) AFRICA-BASED ACTIVITIES.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator for the United States Agency for International Development and the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agen-

cies, should continue to support YALI programs in sub-Saharan Africa, including the following:

(i) Access to continued leadership training and other professional development opportunities for Mandela Washington Fellowship for Young African Leaders alumni upon their return to their home countries, including online courses, technical assistance, and access to funding.

(ii) Training for young African leaders at regional leadership centers established in accordance with paragraph (4), and through online and in-person courses offered by such centers.

(iii) Opportunities for networking and engagement with—

(I) other alumni of the Mandela Washington Fellowship for Young African Leaders;

(II) alumni of programs at regional leadership centers established in accordance with paragraph (4); and

(III) United States and like-minded diplomatic missions, business leaders, and others as appropriate.

(C) IMPLEMENTATION.—To carry out this paragraph, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development and the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies shall seek to partner with the private sector to pursue public-private partnerships, leverage private sector expertise, expand networking opportunities, and identify funding opportunities as well as fellowship and employment opportunities for participants in the YALI program.

(6) IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development and the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a plan for implementing the YALI program, including the following:

(A) A description of clearly defined program goals, targets, and planned outcomes for each year and for the duration of implementation of the program.

(B) A strategy to monitor and evaluate the program and progress made toward achieving such goals, targets, and planned outcomes.

(C) A strategy to ensure the program is promoting United States foreign policy goals in Africa, including ensuring that the program is clearly branded and paired with robust public diplomacy efforts.

(7) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and publish in a publicly accessible, internet–based form, a report on the following:

(A) The progress made toward achieving the goals, targets, and planned outcomes described in paragraph (6)(A), including an overview of the program implemented in the previous year and an estimated number of beneficiaries.

(B) An assessment of how the YALI program is contributing to and promoting United States-Africa relations, particularly in areas of increased private sector investment, trade promotion, support to civil society, improved public administration, and fostering entrepreneurship and youth empowerment.

(C) Recommendations for improvements or changes to the program and implementation plan, if any, that would improve their effectiveness during subsequent years of implementation of the program.

(8) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

(9) SUNSET.—The requirements of this section shall terminate on the date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 275. AFRICA BROADCASTING NETWORKS.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Chief Executive Officer of the United States Agency for Global Media shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the resources and timeline needed to establish within the Agency an organization the mission of which shall be to pro-

mote democratic values and institutions in Africa by providing objective, accurate, and relevant news and information to the people of Africa and counter disinformation from malign actors, especially in countries in which a free press is banned by the government or not fully established, about the region, the world, and the United States through uncensored news, responsible discussion, and open debate.

SEC. 276. AFRICA ENERGY SECURITY AND DIVERSIFICATION.

(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to support increased access to energy in Africa and reduce Africa's energy dependence on countries that use energy reliance for undue political influence such as the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China.

(b) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) Lack of access to energy remains a significant barrier to economic advancement and opportunity in Africa. As of 2018, an estimated 789,000,000 people, the vast majority of them in sub-Saharan Africa, lacked access to any modern electricity. Even in the region's most advanced economies, average annual per capita electricity consumption is often under 200 kilowatt-hours, less than what is needed to power a typical refrigerator. Only a small fraction of the 12,000,000 young Africans who enter the job market each year find employment; and the cost and reliability of electricity remain top constraints to job creation and economic competitiveness.

(2) The United States' global strategic competitors have stepped in to address this disparity and finance energy sector development across Africa. China is the single largest trading partner for African countries in aggregate, and the largest bilateral lender for public sector loans across Africa. Approximately 65 percent of Chinese lending to Africa goes to infrastructure, and between 2013–2020, the energy sector consistently accounted for the largest share of all investment under China's Belt and Road Initiative.

(3) Reliable, affordable, and sustainable power is the foundation for all modern economies and necessary for increasing growth and employment.

(4) Increasing energy supply in low- and lower middle-income countries is necessary in the next decades in order to meet human, social, security, and economic needs.

(5) Addressing energy poverty, powering inclusive economies, and making energy systems resilient in low- and lower middle-income countries will require diversified power systems and a mix of technologies that align with local conditions, resources, and needs.

(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that countries in Africa continue to be important partners to the United States and the DFC should continue to make investments in sub-Saharan Africa to facilitate technologies that contribute to energy security and reliable, affordable, and sustainable power in low and lower middle-income countries.

(d) AMENDMENT.—Section 3 of the Electrify Africa Act of 2015 (Public Law 114–121; 22 U.S.C. 2293 note) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (8), by striking "and" at the end;

(2) in paragraph (9), by striking the period and inserting a semicolon; and

(3) by inserting after paragraph (9) the following:

"(10) advance United States foreign policy and development goals by assisting African countries to reduce their dependence on energy resources from countries that use energy dependence for undue political influence, such as the Russian Federation or the People's Republic of China, which have used energy and financial resources to influence other countries;

"(11) promote the energy security of allies and partners of the United States by encouraging the development of accessible, transparent, and competitive energy markets that provide diversified sources and reliable, affordable, and sustainable power;

"(12) encourage United States public and private sector investment in African energy infrastructure projects to bridge the gap between energy security requirements and commercial demand in a way that is consistent with the region's capacity; and

"(13) help facilitate the export of United States energy resources, technology, and expertise to global markets in a way that benefits the energy security of allies and partners of the United States, including in Africa.".

PART V—MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

SEC. 281. STRATEGY TO COUNTER CHINESE INFLUENCE IN, AND ACCESS TO, THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the People's Republic of China is upgrading its influence in the Middle East and North Africa through its energy and infrastructure investments, technology transfer, and arms sales;

(2) the People's Republic of China seeks to establish military or dual use facilities in geographically strategic locations in the Middle East and North Africa to further its Belt and Road Initiative at the expense of United States national security interests; and

(3) the export of certain communications infrastructure from the People's Republic of China degrades the security of partner networks, exposes intellectual property to theft, threatens the ability of the United States to conduct security cooperation with compromised regional partners, and furthers China's authoritarian surveillance model.

(b) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, shall jointly develop and submit to the appropriate congressional committees and the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a strategy for countering and limiting the People's Republic of China's influence in, and access to, the Middle East and North Africa.

(2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under paragraph (1) shall include—

(A) an assessment of the People's Republic of China's intent with regards to increased cooperation with Middle East and North African countries and how such cooperation fits into its broader global strategic objectives;

(B) an assessment of how governments across the region are responding to the People's Republic of China's efforts to increase its military presence in their countries;

(C) efforts to improve regional cooperation through foreign military sales, financing, and efforts to build partner capacity and increase interoperability with the United States;

(D) an assessment of the People's Republic of China's joint research and development with the Middle East and North Africa, impacts on the United States' national security interests, and recommended steps to mitigate the People's Republic of China's influence in such area;

(E) an assessment of arms sales and weapons technology transfers from the People's Republic of China to the Middle East and North Africa, impacts on United States' national security interests, and recommended steps to mitigate the People's Republic of China's influence in such area;

(F) an assessment of the People's Republic of China's military sales to the region, including lethal and non-lethal unmanned aerial systems;

(G) an assessment of People's Republic of China military basing and dual-use facility initiatives across the Middle East and North Africa, impacts on United States' national security interests, and recommended steps to mitigate the People's Republic of China's influence in such area;

(H) efforts to improve regional security cooperation with United States allies and partners with a focus on—

(i) maritime security in the Arabian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean;

(ii) integrated air and missile defense;

(iii) cyber security;

(iv) border security; and

(v) critical infrastructure security, to include energy security;

(I) increased support for government-to-government engagement on critical infrastructure development projects, including ports and water infrastructure;

(J) efforts to encourage United States private sector and public-private partnerships in healthcare technology and foreign direct investment in non-energy sectors;

(K) efforts to expand youth engagement and professional education exchanges with key partner countries;

(L) specific steps to counter increased investment from the People's Republic of China in telecommunications infrastructure and diplomatic efforts

to stress the political, economic, and social benefits of a free and open internet;

(M) efforts to promote United States private sector engagement in and public-private partnerships on renewable energy development;

(N) the expansion of public-private partnership efforts on water, desalination, and irrigation projects; and

(O) efforts to warn United States partners in the Middle East and North Africa of the risks associated with the People's Republic of China's telecommunications infrastructure and provide alternative "clean paths" to the People's Republic of China's technology.

(c) FORM.—The strategy required under section (b) shall be submitted in an unclassified form that can be made available to the public, but may include a classified annex as necessary.

SEC. 282. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA ENGAGEMENT.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The United States and the international community have long-term interests in the stability, security, and prosperity of the people of the Middle East and North Africa.

(2) In addition to and apart from military and security efforts, the United States should harness a whole of government approach, including bilateral and multilateral statecraft, economic lines of effort, and public diplomacy to compete with and counter PRC influence.

(3) A clearly articulated positive narrative of United States engagement, transparent governance structures, and active civil society engagement help counter predatory foreign investment and influence efforts.

(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States that the United States and the international community should continue diplomatic and economic efforts throughout the Middle East and North Africa that support reform efforts to—

(1) promote greater economic opportunity;

(2) foster private sector development;

(3) strengthen civil society;

(4) promote transparent and democratic governance and the rule of law; and

(5) promote greater regional integration and intraregional cooperation, including with Israel.

SEC. 283. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA-IRAN RELATIONSHIP.

It is the sense of Congress that the People's Republic of China's economic relationship with Iran, including oil purchases in violation of United States sanctions, undermines United States efforts to compel Iran to abandon its malign activities.

PART VI—ARCTIC REGION

SEC. 285. ARCTIC DIPLOMACY.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ARCTIC SECURITY.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the rapidly changing Arctic environment—

(A) creates new national and regional security challenges due to increased military activity in the Arctic;

(B) heightens the risk of the Arctic emerging as a major theater of conflict in ongoing strategic competition;

(C) threatens maritime safety as Arctic littoral countries have inadequate capacity to patrol the increased vessel traffic in this remote region, which is a result of diminished annual levels of sea ice;

(D) impacts public safety due to increased human activity in the Arctic region where search and rescue capacity remains very limited; and

(E) threatens the health of the Arctic's fragile and pristine environment and the unique and highly sensitive species found in the Arctic's marine and terrestrial ecosystems; and

(2) the United States should reduce the consequences described in paragraph (1) by—

(A) evaluating the wide variety and dynamic set of security and safety risks developing in the Arctic;

(B) developing policies and making preparations to mitigate and respond to threats and risks in the Arctic, including by continuing to work with allies and partners in the Arctic region to deter potential aggressive activities and build Arctic competencies;

(C) adequately funding the National Earth System Prediction Capability to substantively improve weather, ocean, and ice predictions on the time scales necessary to ensure regional security and trans-Arctic shipping;

(D) investing in resources, including a significantly expanded icebreaker fleet, to ensure that the United States has adequate capacity to prevent and respond to security threats in the Arctic region; and

(E) pursuing diplomatic engagements with all states in the Arctic region to reach an agreement for—

(i) maintaining peace and stability in the Arctic region;

(ii) fostering cooperation on stewardship and safety initiatives in the Arctic region;

(iii) ensuring safe and efficient management of commercial maritime traffic in the Arctic;

(iv) promoting responsible natural resource management and economic development; and

(v) countering China's Polar Silk Road initiative;

(vi) examining the possibility of reconvening the Arctic Chiefs of Defense Forum; and

(vii) reducing black carbon and methane emissions in the Arctic Region, including by working with observers of the Arctic Council, including India and the People's Republic of China, to adopt mitigation plans consistent with the findings and recommendations of the Arctic Council's Framework for Action on Black Carbon and Methane.

(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to recognize only the states specified in subsection (c)(1) as Arctic states, and to reject all other claims to such status; and

(2) that the militarization of the Arctic poses a serious threat to Arctic peace and stability, and the interests of United States allies and partners.

(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) ARCTIC STATES.—The term "Arctic states" means Russia, Canada, the United States, Norway, Denmark (including Greenland), Finland, Sweden, and Iceland.

(2) ARCTIC REGION.—The term "Arctic Region" means the geographic region north of the 66.56083 parallel latitude north of the equator.

(d) DESIGNATION OF AMBASSADOR AT LARGE FOR ARCTIC AFFAIRS.—There is established within the Department of State an Ambassador at Large for Arctic Affairs (referred to in this section as the "Ambassador"), appointed in accordance with paragraph (1).

(1) APPOINTMENT.—The Ambassador shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

(2) DUTIES.—

(A) DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION.—Subject to the direction of the President and the Secretary of State, the Ambassador is authorized to represent the United States in matters and cases relevant to the Arctic Region in—

(i) contacts with foreign governments, intergovernmental organizations, and specialized agencies of the United Nations, the Arctic Council, and other international organizations of which the United States is a member; and

(ii) multilateral conferences and meetings relating to Arctic affairs.

(B) CHAIR OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL.—The Ambassador shall serve as the Chair of the Arctic Council when the United States holds the Chairmanship of the Arctic Council.

(3) POLICIES AND PROCEDURES.—The Ambassador shall coordinate United States policies related to the Arctic Region, including—

(A) meeting national security, economic, and commercial needs pertaining to Arctic affairs;

(B) protecting the Arctic environment and conserving its biological resources;

(C) promoting environmentally sustainable natural resource management and economic development;

(D) strengthening institutions for cooperation among the Arctic states;

(E) involving Arctic indigenous people in decisions that affect them;

(F) enhancing scientific monitoring and research on local, regional, and global environmental issues;

(G) integrating scientific data on the current and projected effects of climate change in the Arctic Region and ensure that such data is applied to the development of security strategies for the Arctic Region;

(H) making available the methods and approaches on the integration of climate science to other regional security planning programs in the Department of State to better ensure that broader decision-making processes may more adequately account for the effects of climate change; and

(I) reducing black carbon and methane emissions in the Arctic Region.

(e) ARCTIC REGION SECURITY POLICY.—The Ambassador shall develop a policy, to be known as the "Arctic Region Security Policy", to assess, develop, budget for, and implement plans, policies, and actions—

(1) to bolster the diplomatic presence of the United States in Arctic states, including through enhancements to diplomatic missions and facilities, participation in regional and bilateral dialogues related to Arctic security, and coordination of United States initiatives and assistance programs across agencies to protect the national security of the United States and its allies and partners;

(2) to enhance the resilience capacities of Arctic states to the effects of environmental change and increased civilian and military activity by Arctic states and other states that may result from increased accessibility of the Arctic Region;

(3) to assess specific added risks to the Arctic Region and Arctic states that—

(A) are vulnerable to the changing Arctic environment; and

(B) are strategically significant to the United States;

(4) to coordinate the integration of environmental change and national security risk and vulnerability assessments into the decision making process on foreign assistance awards with Greenland;

(5) to advance principles of good governance by encouraging and cooperating with Arctic states on collaborative approaches—

(A) to responsibly manage natural resources in the Arctic Region;

(B) to share the burden of ensuring maritime safety in the Arctic Region;

(C) to prevent the escalation of security tensions by mitigating against the militarization of the Arctic Region;

(D) to develop mutually agreed upon multilateral policies among Arctic states on the management of maritime transit routes through the Arctic Region and work cooperatively on the transit policies for access to and transit in the Arctic Region by non-Arctic states; and

(E) to facilitate the development of Arctic Region Security Action Plans to ensure stability and public safety in disaster situations in a humane and responsible fashion;

(6) to evaluate the vulnerability, security, survivability, and resiliency of United States interests and non-defense assets in the Arctic Region; and

(7) to reduce black carbon and methane emissions in the Arctic.

SEC. 286. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING OBSERVER STATUS FOR TAIWAN ON THE ARCTIC COUNCIL.

It is the policy of the United States to urge that Taiwan be given observer status on the Arctic Council.

PART VII—OCEANIA

SEC. 291. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON UNITED STATES ENGAGEMENT IN OCEANIA.

It shall be the policy of the United States—

(1) to elevate the countries of Oceania as a strategic national security and economic priority of the United States Government;

(2) to promote civil society, the rule of law, and democratic governance across Oceania as part of a free and open Indo-Pacific region;

(3) to broaden and deepen relationships with the Freely Associated States of the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia through robust defense, diplomatic, economic, and development exchanges that promote the goals of individual countries and the entire region;

(4) to work with the Governments of Australia, New Zealand, and Japan to advance shared alliance goals of the Oceania region concerning health, environmental protection, disaster resilience and preparedness, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, maritime security, and economic development;

(5) to participate, wherever possible and appropriate, in existing regional organizations and international structures to promote the national security and economic goals of the United States and countries of Oceania;

(6) to invest in a whole-of-government United States strategy that will enhance youth engagement and advance long-term growth and development throughout the region, especially as such relates to protecting marine resources that are critical to livelihoods and strengthening the resilience of the countries of Oceania against current and future threats resulting from extreme weather and severe changes in the environment;

(7) to deter and combat acts of malign foreign influence and corruption aimed at undermining the political, environmental, social, and economic stability of the people and governments of the countries of Oceania;

(8) to improve the local capacity of the countries of Oceania to address public health challenges and improve global health security;

(9) to help the countries of Oceania access market-based private sector investments that adhere to best practices regarding transparency, debt sustainability, and environmental and social safeguards as an alternative to state-directed investments by authoritarian governments;

(10) to ensure the people and communities of Oceania remain safe from the risks of old and degrading munitions hazards and other debris that threaten health and livelihoods;

(11) to cooperate with Taiwan by offering United States support for maintaining Taiwan's diplomatic partners in Oceania; and

(12) to work cooperatively with all governments in Oceania to promote the dignified return of the remains of members of the United States Armed Forces who are missing in action from previous conflicts in the Indo-Pacific region.

SEC. 292. OCEANIA STRATEGIC ROADMAP.

(a) OCEANIA STRATEGIC ROADMAP.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategic roadmap for strengthening United States engagement with the countries of Oceania, including an analysis of opportunities to cooperate with Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, to address shared concerns and promote shared goals in pursuit of security and resiliency in the countries of Oceania.

(b) ELEMENTS.—The strategic roadmap required by subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) A description of United States regional goals and concerns with respect to Oceania and increasing engagement with the countries of Oceania.

(2) An assessment, based on paragraph (1), of United States regional goals and concerns that are shared by Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, including a review of issues related to anti-corruption efforts, maritime and other security issues, environmental protection, fisheries management, economic growth and development, and disaster resilience and preparedness.

(3) A review of ongoing programs and initiatives by the Governments of the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan in pursuit of shared regional goals and concerns.

(4) A review of ongoing programs and initiatives by regional organizations and other related intergovernmental structures aimed at addressing shared regional goals and concerns.

(5) A plan for aligning United States programs and resources in pursuit of shared regional goals and concerns, as appropriate.

(6) Recommendations for additional United States authorities, personnel, programs, or resources necessary to execute the strategic roadmap.

(7) Any other elements the Secretary of State considers appropriate.

SEC. 293. OCEANIA SECURITY DIALOGUE.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress on the feasibility and advisability of establishing a United States-based public-private sponsored security dialogue (to be known as the "Oceania Security Dialogue") among the countries of Oceania for the purposes of jointly exploring and discussing issues affecting the economic, diplomatic, and national security of the Indo-Pacific countries of Oceania.

(b) REPORT REQUIRED.—The briefing required by subsection (a) shall, at a minimum, include the following:

(1) A review of the ability of the Department of State to participate in a public-private sponsored security dialogue.

(2) An assessment of the potential locations for conducting an Oceania Security Dialogue in the jurisdiction of the United States.

(3) Consideration of dates for conducting an Oceania Security Dialogue that would maximize participation of representatives from the Indo-Pacific countries of Oceania.

(4) A review of the funding modalities available to the Department of State to help finance an Oceania Security Dialogue, including grant-making authorities available to the Department of State.

(5) An assessment of any administrative, statutory, or other legal limitations that would prevent the establishment of an Oceania Security Dialogue with participation and support of the Department of State.

(6) An analysis of how an Oceania Security Dialogue could help to advance the Boe Declaration on Regional Security, including its emphasis on the changing environment as the greatest existential threat to countries of Oceania.

(7) An evaluation of how an Oceania Security Dialogue could help amplify the issues and work of existing regional structures and organizations dedicated to the security of the Oceania region, such as the Pacific Island Forum and Pacific Environmental Security Forum.

(8) An analysis of how an Oceania Security Dialogue would help with implementation of the strategic roadmap required by section 292 and advance the National Security Strategy of the United States.

(c) INTERAGENCY CONSULTATION.—To the extent practicable, the Secretary of State may consult with the Secretary of Defense and, where appropriate, evaluate the lessons learned of the Regional Centers for Security Studies of the Department of Defense to determine the feasibility and advisability of establishing the Oceania Security Dialogue.

SEC. 294. OCEANIA PEACE CORPS PARTNERSHIPS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Peace Corps shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on strategies to reasonably and safely expand the number of Peace Corps volunteers in Oceania, with the goals of—

(1) expanding the presence of the Peace Corps to all currently feasible locations in Oceania; and

(2) working with regional and international partners of the United States to expand the presence of Peace Corps volunteers in low-income Oceania communities in support of climate resilience initiatives.

(b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection (a) shall—

(1) assess the factors contributing to the current absence of the Peace Corps and its volunteers in Oceania;

(2) examine potential remedies that include working with United States Government agencies and regional governments, including governments of United States allies—

(A) to increase the health infrastructure and medical evacuation capabilities of the countries of Oceania to better support the safety of Peace Corps volunteers while in such countries;

(B) to address physical safety concerns that have decreased the ability of the Peace Corps to operate in Oceania; and

(C) to increase transportation infrastructure in the countries of Oceania to better support the travel of Peace Corps volunteers and their access to necessary facilities;

(3) evaluate the potential to expand the deployment of Peace Corps Response volunteers to help the countries of Oceania address social, economic, and development needs of their communities that require specific professional expertise; and

(4) explore potential new operational models to address safety and security needs of Peace Corps volunteers in the countries of Oceania, including—

(A) changes to volunteer deployment durations; and

(B) scheduled redeployment of volunteers to regional or United States-based healthcare facilities for routine physical and behavioral health evaluation.

(c) VOLUNTEERS IN LOW-INCOME OCEANIA COMMUNITIES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—In examining the potential to expand the presence of Peace Corps volunteers in low-income Oceania communities under subsection (a)(2), the Director of the Peace Corps shall consider the development of initiatives described in paragraph (2).

(2) INITIATIVES DESCRIBED.—Initiatives described in this paragraph are volunteer initiatives that help the countries of Oceania address social, economic, and development needs of their communities, including by—

(A) addressing, through appropriate resilience-based interventions, the vulnerability that communities in Oceania face as result of extreme weather, severe environmental change, and other climate related trends; and

(B) improving, through smart infrastructure principles, access to transportation and connectivity infrastructure that will help address the economic and social challenges that communities in Oceania confront as a result of poor or nonexistent infrastructure.

(d) OCEANIA DEFINED.—In this section, the term "Oceania" includes the following:

(1) Easter Island of Chile.

(2) Fiji.

(3) French Polynesia of France.

(4) Kiribati.

(5) New Caledonia of France.

(6) Nieu of New Zealand.

(7) Papua New Guinea.
(8) Samoa.
(9) Vanuatu.
(10) The Ashmore and Cartier Islands of Australia.
(11) The Cook Islands of New Zealand.
(12) The Coral Islands of Australia.
(13) The Federated States of Micronesia.
(14) The Norfolk Island of Australia.
(15) The Pitcairn Islands of the United Kingdom.
(16) The Republic of the Marshal Islands.
(17) The Republic of Palau.
(18) The Solomon Islands.
(19) Tokelau of New Zealand.
(20) Tonga.
(21) Tuvalu.
(22) Wallis and Futuna of France.

PART VIII—PACIFIC ISLANDS

SEC. 295. SHORT TITLE.

This part may be cited as the "Boosting Long-term U.S. Engagement in the Pacific Act" or the "BLUE Pacific Act".

SEC. 296. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) The Pacific Islands—

(A) are home to roughly 10 million residents, including over 8.6 million in Papua New Guinea, constituting diverse and dynamic cultures and peoples;

(B) are spread across an expanse of the Pacific Ocean equivalent to 15 percent of the Earth's surface, including the three sub-regions of Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia; and

(C) face shared challenges in development that have distinct local contexts, including climate change and rising sea levels, geographic distances from major markets, and vulnerability to external shocks such as natural disasters.

(2) The United States is a Pacific country with longstanding ties and shared values and interests with the Pacific Islands, including through the Compacts of Free Association with the Freely Associated States, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau.

(3) The United States has vital national security interests in the Pacific Islands, including—

(A) protecting regional peace and security that fully respects the sovereignty of all nations;

(B) advancing economic prosperity free from coercion through trade and sustainable development; and

(C) supporting democracy, good governance, the rule of law, and human rights and fundamental freedoms.

(4) Successive United States administrations have recognized the importance of the Pacific region, including the Pacific Islands, in high-level strategic documents, including the following:

(A) The 2015 National Security Strategy, which first declared the rebalance to Asia and the Pacific, affirmed the United States as a Pacific nation, and paved the way for subsequent United States engagement with the Pacific Islands, including several new policies focused on conservation and resilience to climate change announced in September 2016.

(B) The 2017 National Security Strategy, which includes a commitment to "shore up fragile partner states in the Pacific Islands region to reduce their vulnerability to economic fluctuations and natural disasters".

(C) The 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, which identified the Pacific Islands as "critical to U.S. strategy because of our shared values, interests, and commitments" and committed the United States to "building capacity and resilience to address maritime security; Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated fishing; drug trafficking; and resilience to address climate change and disaster response".

(5) The United States has deepened its diplomatic engagement with the Pacific Islands through several recent initiatives, including—

(A) the Pacific Pledge, which provided an additional $100,000,000 in 2019 and $200,000,000 in 2020, on top of the approximately $350,000,000 that the United States provides annually to the region to support shared priorities in economic and human development, climate change, and more; and

(B) the Small and Less Populous Island Economies (SALPIE) Initiative launched in March 2021 to strengthen United States collaboration with island countries and territories, including in the Pacific Islands, on COVID–19 economic challenges, long-term economic development, climate change, and other shared interests.

(6) The Boe Declaration on Regional Security, signed by leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum in 2018, affirmed that climate change "remains the single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security, and wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific" and asserted "the sovereign right of every Member to conduct its national affairs free of external interference and coercion".

(7) The Asian Development Bank has estimated that the Pacific Islands region needs upwards of $2.8 billion a year in investment needs through 2030, in addition to $300 million a year for climate mitigation and adaptation over the same period.

(8) The Pacific Islands swiftly enacted effective policies to prevent and contain the spread of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (commonly referred to as "COVID–19") pandemic to their populations. The United States has provided over $130,000,000 in assistance to the Pacific Islands for their COVID–19 response. However, priorities must be met to ensure continued success in preventing the spread of the COVID–19 pandemic, achieving swift and widespread vaccinations, and pursuing long-term economic recovery in the Pacific Islands, including through—

(A) expanding testing capacity and acquisition of needed medical supplies, including available COVID–19 vaccines and supporting vaccination efforts, through a reliable supply chain;

(B) planning for lifting of lockdowns and reopening of economic and social activities; and

(C) mitigating and recovering from the impacts of the COVID–19 pandemic on the health system and the reliance on food and energy imports as well as lost tourism revenue and other economic and food security damages caused by the pandemic.

(9) Since 1966, thousands of Peace Corps volunteers have proudly served in the Pacific Islands, building strong people-to-people relationships and demonstrating the United States commitment to peace and development in the region. Prior to the COVID–19 pandemic, the Peace Corps maintained presence in four countries of the Pacific Islands. Peace Corps volunteers continue to be in high demand in the Pacific Islands and have been requested across the region.

SEC. 297. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to develop and commit to a comprehensive, multifaceted, and principled United States policy in the Pacific Islands that—

(A) promotes peace, security, and prosperity for all countries through a rules-based regional order that respects the sovereignty and political independence of all nations;

(B) preserves the Pacific Ocean as an open and vibrant corridor for international maritime trade and promotes trade and sustainable development that supports inclusive economic growth and autonomy for all nations and addresses socioeconomic challenges related to public health, education, renewable energy, digital connectivity, and more;

(C) supports regional efforts to address the challenges posed by climate change, including by strengthening resilience to natural disasters and through responsible stewardship of natural resources;

(D) improves civil society, strengthens democratic governance and the rule of law, and promotes human rights and the preservation of the region's unique cultural heritages;

(E) assists the Pacific Islands in preventing and containing the spread of the COVID–19 pandemic and in pursuing long-term economic recovery; and

(F) supports existing regional architecture and international norms;

(2) to support the vision, values, and objectives of existing regional multilateral institutions and frameworks, such as the Pacific Islands Forum and the Pacific Community, including—

(A) the 2014 Framework for Pacific Regionalism;

(B) the 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional Security; and

(C) the Boe Declaration Action Plan;

(3) to extend and renew the provisions of the Compacts of Free Association and related United States law that will expire in 2023 for the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia and in 2024 for the Republic of Palau unless they are extended and renewed; and

(4) to work closely with United States allies and partners with existing relationships and interests in the Pacific Islands, such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Taiwan, in advancing common goals.

SEC. 298. DEFINITION.

In this part, the terms "Pacific Islands" means the Cook Islands, the Republic of Fiji, the Republic of Kiribati, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of Nauru, Niue, the Republic of Palau, the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, the Independent State of Samoa, the Solomon Islands, the Kingdom of Tonga, Tuvalu, and the Republic of Vanuatu.

SEC. 299. AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE REPORTS; FORM OF REPORTS.

(a) AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE REPORTS.—Any reports required to be submitted to the appropriate congressional committees under this part that are subject to deadlines for submission consisting of the same units of time may be consolidated into a single report that is submitted to the appropriate congressional committees pursuant to such deadlines and that contains all information required under such reports.

(b) FORM OF REPORTS.—Each report required by this part shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.

SEC. 299A. DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the strategic importance of the Pacific Islands necessitates an examination of whether United States diplomatic, economic, and development engagement and presence in the Pacific Islands region is sufficient to effectively support United States objectives and meaningful participation in regional fora;

(2) improving shared understanding of and jointly combatting the transnational challenges pertinent to the Pacific Islands region with countries of the Pacific Islands and regional partners such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Taiwan is vitally important to our shared long-term interests of stability, security, and prosperity;

(3) the United States should seek to participate in and support efforts to coordinate a regional response toward maritime security, including through continued United States and Pacific Islands participation in the Pacific Fusion Centre in Vanuatu and Information Fusion Centre in Singapore, and robust cooperation with regional allies and partners; and

(4) the United States Government should commit to sending appropriate levels of representation to regional events.

(b) REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for five years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the diplomatic and development presence of the United States in the Pacific Islands.

(2) ELEMENTS.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) A description of the Department of State, United States Agency for International Development, United States International Development Finance Corporation, Millennium Challenge Corporation, and United States Commercial Service presence, staffing, programming, and resourcing of operations in the Pacific Islands, including programming and resourcing not specifically allocated to the Pacific Islands.

(B) A description of gaps in such presence, including unfilled full-time equivalent positions.

(C) A description of limitations and challenges such gaps pose to United States strategic objectives, including—

(i) gaps in support of the Pacific Islands due to operations being conducted from the United States Agency for International Development offices in Manila and Suva; and

(ii) gaps in programming and resourcing.

(D) A strategy to expand and elevate such presence to fill such gaps, including by establishing new missions, expanding participation in regional forums, and elevating United States representation in regional forums.

(c) AUTHORITY TO ENHANCE DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT.—The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce are authorized to hire locally employed staff in the Pacific Islands for the purpose of promoting increased diplomatic engagement and economic and commercial engagement between the United States and the Pacific Islands.

(d) REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every five years thereafter, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a regional development cooperation strategy for the Pacific Islands.

SEC. 299B. COORDINATION WITH REGIONAL ALLIES AND PARTNERS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall consult and coordinate with regional allies and partners, such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Taiwan, and regional institutions such as the Pacific Islands Forum and the Pacific Community, with respect to programs to provide assistance to the Pacific Islands, including programs established by this Act, including for purposes of—

(1) deconflicting programming;

(2) ensuring that any programming does not adversely affect the absorptive capacity of the Pacific Islands; and

(3) ensuring complementary programs benefit the Pacific Islands to the maximum extent practicable.

(b) FORMAL CONSULTATIVE PROCESS.—The Secretary of State shall establish a formal consultative process with such regional allies and partners to coordinate with respect to such programs and future-years programming.

(c) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report that includes—

(1) a review of ongoing efforts, initiatives, and programs undertaken by regional allies and partners, including multilateral organizations, to advance priorities identified in this Act;

(2) a review of ongoing efforts, initiatives, and programs undertaken by non-allied foreign actors that are viewed as being potentially harmful or in any way detrimental to one or more countries of the Pacific Islands;

(3) an assessment of United States programs in the Pacific Islands and their alignment and complementarity with the efforts of regional allies and partners identified in paragraph (1); and

(4) a review of the formal consultative process required in subsection (b) to summarize engagements held and identify opportunities to improve coordination with regional allies and partners.

SEC. 299C. CLIMATE RESILIENT DEVELOPMENT IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States Government should leverage the full range of authorities and programs available to assist the Pacific Islands in achieving their development goals;

(2) United States development assistance should seek to build on existing public and private sector investments while creating new opportunities toward a favorable environment for additional such investments; and

(3) United States development efforts should be coordinated with and seek to build on existing efforts by like-minded partners and allies and regional and international multilateral organizations.

(b) STRATEGY.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development Finance Corporation, shall develop and implement a strategy to—

(1) invest in and improve critical infrastructure, including transport connectivity, information and communications technology, food security, coastal zone management, marine and water resource management, and energy security and access to electricity in the Pacific Islands, with an emphasis on climate resiliency and sustainable development;

(2) provide technical assistance to assist local government and civil society leaders assess risks to local infrastructure, especially those posed by climate change, consider and implement risk mitigation efforts and policies to strengthen resilience, and evaluate proposed projects and solutions for their efficacy and sustainability; and

(3) support investment and improvement in ecosystem conservation and protection for the long-term sustainable use of ecosystem services, especially those

that mitigate effects of climate change and those that support food security and livelihoods.

(c) CONDUCT OF STRATEGY.—The strategy developed under this section shall be coordinated with like-minded partners and allies, regional and international multilateral organizations, and regional frameworks for development in the Pacific Islands.

(d) INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.—The Secretary of the Treasury shall direct the representatives of the United States to the World Bank Group, the International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development Bank to use the voice and vote of the United States to support climate resilient infrastructure projects in the Pacific Islands.

(e) REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on Natural Resources of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate a report on foreign infrastructure developments in the Pacific Islands.

(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall include—

(A) a review of foreign infrastructure developments in the Pacific Islands by non-United States allies and partners;

(B) assessments of the environmental impact and sustainability of such developments; and

(C) an analysis of the financial sustainability of such developments and their impacts on the debt of host countries in the Pacific Islands.

(f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated $50,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to carry out this section.

SEC. 299D. INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY FOR THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall develop and implement a plan to expand coverage of the International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEA) program for the Pacific Islands, including by—

(1) expanding coverage of the regional program located in Bangkok, Thailand, to the Pacific Islands; or

(2) establishing a new regional program for the Pacific Islands.

(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The plan required by subsection (a) shall include consultation and coordination with existing regional law enforcement entities, including the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police and civil society, including those focused on human rights and specializing in victim-centered approaches, and take into consideration costs of implementation, effectiveness, and capacity of the Pacific Islands to participate in the ILEA program.

(c) BRIEFING REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall provide the appropriate congressional committees a briefing on the plan developed under this section.

SEC. 299E. SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.

(a) STRATEGY.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense and in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall develop and implement a comprehensive strategy to provide assistance to and build the capacity of local civilian and national security institutions of the Pacific Islands for purposes of—

(A) enhancing maritime security and maritime domain awareness to address challenges such as illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing;

(B) assisting local law enforcement in detecting, preventing, and combatting human and drug trafficking and other forms of transnational crime;

(C) participating in efforts by regional institutions and frameworks to coordinate and facilitate cooperation on shared security challenges; and

(D) expanding information sharing and to work toward operational coordination and interoperability among Pacific Island maritime security forces, including through regional fusion centers.

(2) PROGRAMS AND AUTHORITIES DESCRIBED.—The strategy required by this subsection shall build on but not be limited to the following programs and authorities:

(A) The International Military Education and Training program.

(B) The Foreign Military Financing program.

(C) The authority to build the capacity of foreign security forces under section 333 of title 10, United States Code.

(D) The authority to provide excess defense articles under section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j).

(E) The Department of Defense State Partnership Program.

(3) NATIONAL POLICE FORCES AND COAST GUARDS.—The national police forces and coast guards of the Pacific Islands are eligible to receive assistance under the programs and authorities described in paragraph (2) (other than the programs and authorities described in subparagraphs (A), (D), and (F) of paragraph (2)) for purposes of the strategy required by this subsection.

(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy required by subsection (a) shall seek to preserve peace and regional stability in the Pacific Islands and take into consideration and seek to build upon but not duplicate existing assistance provided by United States allies and partners.

(c) REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains the strategy developed under this section.

(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall include—

(A) an assessment of security challenges to the Pacific Islands;

(B) an analysis of demonstrated needs of the Pacific Islands for assistance;

(C) a review of existing security assistance programs in the Pacific Islands, including programs and efforts provided by United States allies and partners;

(D) a plan for programs for training, equipping, and sustainment, including excess defense equipment and related materials;

(E) a list of militaries, national police forces, coast guards, and other national security forces of the Pacific Islands receiving assistance under the strategy;

(F) a review of existing cross-border maritime law enforcement operations (commonly known as "shiprider agreements") with the Pacific Islands, an assessment of additional resourcing needs to enhance operational capacity, and a plan to improve on these programs and operations;

(G) a review of existing Department of Defense State Partnership Programs with the Pacific Islands and an assessment of additional opportunities to leverage Department of Defense State Partnership Programs to address national security, law enforcement, disaster relief and emergency management, and related priorities;

(H) a review of current efforts and progress in removing unexploded ordnance in the Pacific Islands and an assessment of additional resourcing needed to ensure continued progress, including to support coordination with regional efforts and those of United States allies and partners;

(I) a review of existing regional fusion centers and other cooperative intelligence sharing efforts in the Pacific Islands to address maritime security, transnational crime, natural disasters, and other security challenges and an assessment of opportunities for the United States to participate in such efforts, including by allocating staff and supplying resourcing;

(J) measures to evaluate success for the strategy; and

(K) a detailed assessment of appropriations required to achieve the objectives for the strategy in future years.

(3) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate.

SEC. 299F. COUNTERING TRANSNATIONAL CRIME.

(a) RATIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall prioritize efforts to assist the Pacific Islands in ratifying and implementing international legal conventions related to transnational crime, such as—

(A) the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wildlife Fauna and Flora;

(B) the Agreement on Port State Measures; and

(C) relevant protocols supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, such as—

(i) the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Person, Especially Women and Children; and

(ii) the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air.

(2) BIENNIAL REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and every two years thereafter as appropriate, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on—

(A) the status of the progress of each country of the Pacific Islands toward ratifying and implementing international legal conventions related to transnational crime; and

(B) United States plans for assisting those countries that have yet to fully ratify such conventions with their respective ratification efforts.

(b) UPDATES OF CERTAIN REPORTS.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with other Federal agencies as appropriate, shall identify and update existing reports to include forms of transnational crime affecting the Pacific Islands, such as—

(1) the International Narcotics Control Strategy report;

(2) the Improving International Fisheries Management report; and

(3) the Trafficking in Persons report.

(c) ILLEGAL LOGGING AND ASSOCIATED TRADE.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of relevant Federal agencies, shall submit to appropriate congressional committees a report that identifies countries of the Pacific Islands that are countries of concern with respect to illegal logging and associated trade.

(2) ELEMENTS.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) A description of the impact illegal logging and associated trade have had on local communities, good governance, and biodiversity, including an identification of those foreign countries that may be financing or in any other manner supporting illegal logging activities.

(B) A description of efforts taken by countries identified under paragraph (1) to comply and take appropriate corrective action to mitigate illegal logging, and an evaluation of the progress of those efforts.

(C) A description of steps taken by the heads of relevant Federal agencies to assist the Pacific Islands in adopting and implementing international measures comparable to those of the United States, such as the Lacey Act, to reduce impacts of illicit logging.

(3) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Finance of the Senate.

(d) ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED, AND UNREGULATED FISHING.—Section 3553 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (16 U.S.C. 8033) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (7), by striking "and" at the end;

(2) by redesignating paragraph (8) as paragraph (9); and

(3) by inserting after paragraph (7) (as amended) the following:

"(8) an assessment of gaps or limitations in the ability of the United States to effectively assist priority regions and priority flag states relating to IUU fishing due to resource constraints and the additional resources necessary to overcome those constraints; and".

SEC. 299G. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS INITIATIVE FOR THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall develop and implement an initiative to assist the Pacific Islands in enhancing their preparedness for and resilience to natural disasters and other emergencies.

(b) CONDUCT OF PROGRAM.—The program developed under this section shall include—

(1) education and training programs on natural disaster prevention and preparedness for emergency management professionals in the Pacific Islands, including by leveraging the expertise of nonprofit organizations and institutions of higher education in the United States;

(2) technical assistance, including through grants and cooperative agreements for qualified United States and local nongovernmental organizations, to enhance early warning systems, emergency management and preparedness procedures, and post-disaster relief and recovery; and

(3) coordination of existing disaster mitigation and response plans in the region, including by United States allies and partners in the region.

(c) REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the program developed under this section.

(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall include—

(A) an assessment of disaster risks in the Pacific Islands and existing local and regional capacity to respond to such risks;

(B) a review of existing efforts by United States allies and partners to provide assistance and training for natural disaster preparedness and emergency management; and

(C) objectives, means of implementation, and measures of success for the initiative.

(3) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Natural Resources of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate.

(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated $40,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to carry out this section.

SEC. 299H. PEACE CORPS IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the presence of the Peace Corps in the Pacific Islands should be expanded and the Peace Corps should reopen its programs in as many of the Pacific Islands as possible, including where it has previously operated but has suspended operations;

(2) consulting like-minded regional allies and partners, such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Taiwan is crucial for identifying and overcoming challenges for increased Peace Corps presence in the Pacific Islands;

(3) the Peace Corps, whose mission is to promote world peace and friendship in part by helping the people of interested countries in meeting their need for trained men and women, provides an invaluable opportunity to connect the American people with the people of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau; and

(4) the Peace Corps should promptly reopen its programs in the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau.

(b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Peace Corps shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes—

(1) a comparative analysis of the Peace Corps presence in the Pacific Islands region to other regions of the world, including a cost-benefit analysis of placement in the region versus elsewhere globally;

(2) analysis of current impediments to Peace Corps expansion in the Pacific Islands region;

(3) outcomes of consultations among United States agencies, and with regional allies and partners, on areas in which cooperation can reduce factors limiting Peace Corps expansion, particularly those related to medical transportation and personal safety; and

(4) a plan and timeline for implementing outcomes identified in paragraph (3) to facilitate expansion of Peace Corps presence in the region, where appropriate.

TITLE III—INVESTING IN OUR VALUES

SEC. 301. STATEMENT OF CONGRESS ON THE CONTINUED VIOLATION OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS OF THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) Despite international condemnation, the Government of the People's Republic of China ("PRC") continues to disregard its international legal obligations under the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong ("Joint Declaration"), in which the PRC committed that—

(A) Hong Kong would enjoy a high degree of autonomy;

(B) for at least 50 years the "social and economic systems in Hong Kong" would remain unchanged; and

(C) the personal rights and freedoms of the people of Hong Kong would be protected by law.

(2) As part of its continued efforts to undermine the established rights of the Hong Kong people, the PRC National People's Congress Standing Committee ("Standing Committee") passed and imposed upon Hong Kong oppressive and intentionally vague national security legislation on June 30, 2020, that grants Beijing sweeping powers to punish acts of "separating the country, subverting state power, and organizing terroristic activities".

(3) The legislative process by which the Standing Committee imposed the national security law on Hong Kong bypassed Hong Kong's local government in a potential violation of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China ("Basic Law"), and involved unusual secrecy, as demonstrated by the fact that the legislation was only the second law since 2008 that the Standing Committee has passed without releasing a draft for public comment.

(4) On July 30, 2020, election officials of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) disqualified twelve pro-democracy candidates from participating in the September 6 Legislative Council elections, which were subsequently postponed for a year until September 5, 2021, by citing the public health risk of holding elections during the COVID–19 pandemic.

(5) On July 31, 2020, in an attempt to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction, the HKSAR Government announced indictments of and arrest warrants for six Hong Kong activists living overseas, including United States citizen Samuel Chu, for alleged violations of the national security law.

(6) On November 11, 2020, the HKSAR Government removed four lawmakers from office for allegedly violating the law after the Standing Committee passed additional legislation barring those who promoted or supported Hong Kong independence and refused to acknowledge PRC sovereignty over Hong Kong, or otherwise violates the national security law, from running for or serving in the Legislative Council.

(7) On December 2, 2020, pro-democracy activists Joshua Wong, Agnes Chow, and Ivan Lam were sentenced to prison for participating in 2019 protests.

(8) Ten of the twelve Hong Kong residents (also known as "the Hong Kong 12") who sought to flee by boat from Hong Kong to Taiwan on August 23, 2020, were taken to mainland China and sentenced on December 30, 2020, to prison terms ranging from seven months to three years for illegal border crossing.

(9) On December 31, 2020, Hong Kong's highest court revoked bail for Jimmy Lai Chee-Ying, a pro-democracy figure and publisher, who was charged on December 12 with colluding with foreign forces and endangering national security under the national security legislation.

(10) On January 4, 2021, the Departments of Justice in Henan and Sichuan province threatened to revoke the licenses of two lawyers hired to help the Hong Kong 12.

(11) On January 5, 2021, the Hong Kong Police Force arrested more than fifty opposition figures, including pro-democracy officials, activists, and an American lawyer, for their involvement in an informal July 2020 primary to select candidates for the general election originally scheduled for September 2020, despite other political parties having held similar primaries without retribution.

(12) On April 22, 2021, a Hong Kong court convicted Choy Yuk-ling, a video producer with Radio Television Hong Kong, in relation to her investigative reporting on the Hong Kong police.

(13) On June 24, 2021, Apple Daily, Hong Kong's only surviving pro-democracy newspaper, published its final edition following months of intimidation and repression by the HKSAR Government, including through the arrest of its senior editors, police raids on its offices, and the freezing of its financial assets.

(b) STATEMENT OF CONGRESS.—Congress—

(1) condemns the actions taken by the Government of the People's Republic of China ("PRC") and the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region ("HKSAR"), including the adoption and implementation of national security legislation for Hong Kong through irregular procedures, that violate the rights and freedoms of the people of Hong Kong that are guaranteed by the Joint Declaration and its implementing document, the Basic Law;

(2) reaffirms its support for the people of Hong Kong, who face grave threats to their rights and freedoms;

(3) calls on the Governments of the PRC and HKSAR to—

(A) respect and uphold—

(i) commitments made to the international community and the people of Hong Kong under the Joint Declaration; and

(ii) the judicial independence of the Hong Kong legal system; and

(B) release pro-democracy activists and politicians arrested under the national security law; and

(4) encourages the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of the Treasury to coordinate with allies and partners and continue United States efforts to respond to developments in Hong Kong, including by—

(A) providing protection for Hong Kong residents who fear persecution;

(B) supporting those who may seek to file a case before the International Court of Justice to hold the Government of the PRC accountable for violating its binding legal commitments under the Joint Declaration;

(C) encouraging allies and partner countries to instruct, as appropriate, their respective representatives to the United Nations to use their voice, vote, and influence to press for the appointment of a United Nations special mandate holder to monitor and report on human rights developments in Hong Kong;

(D) ensuring the private sector, particularly United States companies with economic interests in Hong Kong, is aware of risks the national security legislation poses to the security of United States citizens and to the medium and long-term interest of United States businesses in Hong Kong;

(E) continuing to implement sanctions authorities, especially authorities recently enacted to address actions undermining the rights and freedoms of the Hong Kong people, such as the Hong Kong Autonomy Act (Public Law 116–149) and the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019 (Public Law 116–76), with respect to officials of the Chinese Communist Party, the Government of the PRC, or the Government of the HKSAR who are responsible for undermining such rights and freedoms; and

(F) coordinating with allies and partners to ensure that such implementation of sanctions is multilateral.

SEC. 302. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY IN HONG KONG.

(a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated $10,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the Department of State to promote democracy in Hong Kong.

(b) ADMINISTRATION.—The Secretary of State shall designate an office with the Department of State to administer and coordinate the provision of such funds described in subsection (a) within the Department of State and across the United States Government.

SEC. 303. HONG KONG PEOPLE'S FREEDOM AND CHOICE.

(a) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this section:

(1) JOINT DECLARATION.—The term "Joint Declaration" means the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong, signed on December 19, 1984, and entered into force on May 27, 1985.

(2) PRIORITY HONG KONG RESIDENT.—The term "Priority Hong Kong resident" means—

(A) a permanent resident of Hong Kong who—

(i) holds no right to citizenship in any country or jurisdiction other than the People's Republic of China (referred to in this section as the "PRC"), Hong Kong, or Macau as of the date of enactment of this Act;

(ii) has resided in Hong Kong for not less than the last ten years as of the date of enactment of this Act; and

(iii) has been designated by the Secretary of State or Secretary of Homeland Security as having met the requirements of this subparagraph, in accordance with the procedures described in subsection (f) of this section; or

(B) the spouse of a person described in subparagraph (A), or the child of such person as such term is defined in section 101(b)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(1)), except that a child shall be an unmarried person under twenty-seven years of age.

(3) HONG KONG NATIONAL SECURITY LAW.—The term "Hong Kong National Security Law" means the Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region that was passed unanimously by the National People's Congress and signed by President Xi Jinping on June 30, 2020, and promulgated in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (referred to in this section as "Hong Kong SAR") on July 1, 2020.

(4) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate.

(b) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) The Hong Kong National Security Law promulgated on July 1, 2020—

(A) contravenes the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (referred to in this Act as "the Basic Law") that provides in Article 23 that the Legislative Council of Hong Kong shall enact legislation related to national security;

(B) violates the PRC's commitments under international law, as defined by the Joint Declaration; and

(C) causes severe and irreparable damage to the "one country, two systems" principle and further erodes global confidence in the PRC's commitment to international law.

(2) On July 14, 2020, in response to the promulgation of the Hong Kong National Security Law, President Trump signed an Executive order on Hong Kong normalization that, among other policy actions, suspended the special treatment of Hong Kong persons under U.S. law with respect to the issuance of immigrant and nonimmigrant visas.

(3) The United States has a long and proud history as a destination for refugees and asylees fleeing persecution based on race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.

(4) The United States also shares deep social, cultural, and economic ties with the people of Hong Kong, including a shared commitment to democracy, to the rule of law, and to the protection of human rights.

(5) The United States has sheltered, protected, and welcomed individuals who have fled authoritarian regimes, including citizens from the PRC following the violent June 4, 1989, crackdown in Tiananmen Square, deepening ties between the people of the United States and those individuals seeking to contribute to a free, open society founded on democracy, human rights, and the respect for the rule of law.

(6) The United States has reaped enormous economic, cultural, and strategic benefits from welcoming successive generations of scientists, doctors, entrepreneurs, artists, intellectuals, and other freedom-loving people fleeing fascism, communism, violent Islamist extremism, and other repressive ideologies, including in the cases of Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and Soviet-controlled Central Europe, Cuba, Vietnam, and Iran.

(7) A major asymmetric advantage of the United States in its long-term strategic competition with the Communist Party of China is the ability of people from every country in the world, irrespective of their race, ethnicity, or religion, to immigrate to the United States and become American citizens.

(c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to reaffirm the principles and objectives set forth in the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (Public Law 102–383), specifically that—

(A) the United States has "a strong interest in the continued vitality, prosperity, and stability of Hong Kong";

(B) "support for democratization is a fundamental principle of United States foreign policy", and therefore "naturally applies to United States policy toward Hong Kong";

(C) "the human rights of the people of Hong Kong are of great importance to the United States and are directly relevant to United States interests in Hong Kong and serve as a basis for Hong Kong's continued economic prosperity"; and

(D) Hong Kong must remain sufficiently autonomous from the PRC to "justify treatment under a particular law of the United States, or any provision thereof, different from that accorded the People's Republic of China";

(2) to continue to support the high degree of autonomy and fundamental rights and freedoms of the people of Hong Kong, as enumerated by—

(A) the Joint Declaration;

(B) the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, done at New York, December 19, 1966; and

(C) the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, done at Paris, December 10, 1948;

(3) to continue to support the democratic aspirations of the people of Hong Kong, including the "ultimate aim" of the selection of the Chief Executive and all members of the Legislative Council by universal suffrage, as articulated in the Basic Law;

(4) to urge the Government of the PRC, despite its recent actions, to uphold its commitments to Hong Kong, including allowing the people of Hong Kong to govern Hong Kong with a high degree of autonomy and without undue interference, and ensuring that Hong Kong voters freely enjoy the right to elect the Chief Executive and all members of the Hong Kong Legislative Council by universal suffrage;

(5) to support the establishment of a genuine democratic option to freely and fairly nominate and elect the Chief Executive of Hong Kong, and the establishment of open and direct democratic elections for all members of the Hong Kong Legislative Council;

(6) to support the robust exercise by residents of Hong Kong of the rights to free speech, the press, and other fundamental freedoms, as provided by the Basic Law, the Joint Declaration, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

(7) to support freedom from arbitrary or unlawful arrest, detention, or imprisonment for all Hong Kong residents, as provided by the Basic Law, the Joint Declaration, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

(8) to draw international attention to any violations by the Government of the PRC of the fundamental rights of the people of Hong Kong, as provided by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and any encroachment upon the autonomy guaranteed to Hong Kong by the Basic Law and the Joint Declaration;

(9) to protect United States citizens and long-term permanent residents living in Hong Kong, as well as people visiting and transiting through Hong Kong;

(10) to maintain the economic and cultural ties that provide significant benefits to both the United States and Hong Kong, including the reinstatement of the Fulbright exchange program with regard to Hong Kong at the earliest opportunity;

(11) to coordinate with allies, including the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, to promote democracy and human rights in Hong Kong; and

(12) to welcome and protect in the United States residents of Hong Kong fleeing persecution or otherwise seeking a safe haven from violations by the Government of the PRC of the fundamental rights of the people of Hong Kong.

(d) TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS FOR HONG KONG RESIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES.—

(1) DESIGNATION.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a), Hong Kong shall be treated as if it had been designated under subsection (b)(1)(C) of such section, subject to the provisions of this section.

(B) PERIOD OF DESIGNATION.—The initial period of the designation referred to in subparagraph (A) shall be for the 18-month period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act.

(2) ALIENS ELIGIBLE.—As a result of the designation made under subsection (a), an alien is deemed to satisfy the requirements under paragraph (1) of section 244(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a(c)), subject to paragraph (3) of such section, if the alien—

(A) was a permanent resident of Hong Kong at the time such individual arrived into the United States and is a national of the PRC (or in the case of an individual having no nationality, is a person who last habitually resided in Hong Kong);

(B) has been continuously physically present in the United States since the date of the enactment of this Act;

(C) is admissible as an immigrant, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2)(A) of such section, and is not ineligible for temporary protected status under paragraph (2)(B) of such section; and

(D) registers for temporary protected status in a manner established by the Secretary of Homeland Security.

(3) CONSENT TO TRAVEL ABROAD.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Homeland Security shall give prior consent to travel abroad, in accordance with section 244(f)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a(f)(3)), to an alien who is granted temporary protected status pursuant to the designation made under paragraph (1) if the alien establishes to the satisfaction of the Secretary of Homeland Security that emergency and extenuating circumstances beyond the control of the alien require the alien to depart for a brief, temporary trip abroad.

(B) TREATMENT UPON RETURN.—An alien returning to the United States in accordance with an authorization described in subparagraph (A) shall be treated as any other returning alien provided temporary protected status under section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a).

(4) FEE.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—In addition to any other fee authorized by law, the Secretary of Homeland Security is authorized to charge and collect a fee of $360 for each application for temporary protected status under section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act by a person who is only eligible for such status by reason of paragraph (1).

(B) WAIVER.—The Secretary of Homeland Security shall permit aliens to apply for a waiver of any fees associated with filing an application referred to in subparagraph (A).

(e) TREATMENT OF HONG KONG RESIDENTS FOR IMMIGRATION PURPOSES.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, during the five fiscal year period beginning on the first day of the first full fiscal year after the date of enactment of this Act, Hong Kong shall continue to be considered a foreign state separate and apart from the PRC as mandated under section 103 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990 (Public Law 101–649) for purposes of the numerical limitations on immigrant visas under sections 201, 202, and 203 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1151, 1152, and 1153).

(f) VERIFICATION OF PRIORITY HONG KONG RESIDENTS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall publish in the Federal Register, an interim final rule establishing procedures for designation of Priority Hong Kong Residents. Notwithstanding section 553 of title 5, United States Code, the rule shall be effective, on an interim basis, immediately upon publication, but may be subject to change and revision after public notice and opportunity for comment. The Secretary of State shall finalize such rule not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act. Such rule shall establish procedures—

(A) for individuals to register with any United States embassy or consulate outside of the United States, or with the Department of Homeland Security in the United States, and request designation as a Priority Hong Kong Resident; and

(B) for the appropriate Secretary to verify the residency of registered individuals and designate those who qualify as Priority Hong Kong Residents.

(2) DOCUMENTATION.—The procedures described in paragraph (1) shall include the collection of—

(A) biometric data;

(B) copies of birth certificates, residency cards, and other documentation establishing residency; and

(C) other personal information, data, and records deemed appropriate by the Secretary.

(3) GUIDANCE.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall issue guidance outlining actions to enhance the ability of the Secretary to efficiently send and receive information to and from the United Kingdom and other like-minded allies and partners for purposes of rapid verification of permanent residency in Hong Kong and designation of individuals as Priority Hong Kong Residents.

(4) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report detailing plans to implement the requirements described in this subsection.

(5) PROTECTION FOR REFUGEES.—Nothing in this section may be construed to prevent a Priority Hong Kong Resident from seeking refugee status under section 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157) or requesting asylum under section 208 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1158).

(g) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—On an annual basis, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with other Federal agencies, as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report detailing for the previous fiscal year—

(A) the number of Hong Kong SAR residents who have applied for United States visas or immigration benefits, disaggregated by visa type or immigration benefit, including asylum, refugee status, temporary protected status, and lawful permanent residence;

(B) the number of approvals, denials, or rejections of applicants for visas or immigration benefits described in subparagraph (A), disaggregated by visa type or immigration benefit and basis for denial;

(C) the number of pending refugee and asylum applications for Hong Kong SAR residents, and the length of time and reason for which such applications have been pending; and

(D) other matters determined relevant by the Secretaries relating to efforts to protect and facilitate the resettlement of refugees and victims of persecution in Hong Kong.

(2) FORM.—Each report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form and published on a text-searchable, publicly available website of the Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security.

(h) STRATEGY FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON HONG KONG.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—It is the policy of the United States—

(A) to support the people of Hong Kong by providing safe haven to Hong Kong SAR residents who are nationals of the PRC following the enactment of the Hong Kong National Security Law that places certain Hong Kong persons at risk of persecution; and

(B) to encourage like-minded nations to make similar accommodations for Hong Kong people fleeing persecution by the Government of the PRC.

(2) PLAN.—The Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other Federal agencies, as appropriate, shall develop a plan to engage with other countries, including the United Kingdom, on cooperative efforts to—

(A) provide refugee and asylum protections for victims of, and individuals with a fear of, persecution in Hong Kong, either by Hong Kong authorities or other authorities acting on behalf of the PRC;

(B) enhance protocols to facilitate the resettlement of refugees and displaced persons from Hong Kong;

(C) identify and prevent the exploitation of immigration and visa policies and procedures by corrupt officials; and

(D) expedite the sharing of information, as appropriate, related to the refusal of individual applications for visas or other travel documents submitted by residents of the Hong Kong SAR based on—

(i) national security or related grounds under section 212(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)); or

(ii) fraud or misrepresentation under section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)).

(3) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other Federal agencies, as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report on the plan described in paragraph (2).

(i) REFUGEE STATUS FOR CERTAIN RESIDENTS OF HONG KONG.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Aliens described in paragraph (2) may establish, for purposes of admission as a refugee under sections 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157) or asylum under section 208 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1158), that such alien has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion by asserting such a fear and a credible basis for concern about the possibility of such persecution.

(2) ALIENS DESCRIBED.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—An alien is described in this subsection if such alien—

(i) is a Priority Hong Kong Resident and—

(I) had a significant role in a civil society organization supportive of the protests in 2019 and 2020 related to the Hong Kong National Security Law and the encroachment on the autonomy of Hong Kong by the PRC;

(II) was arrested, charged, detained, or convicted of an offense arising from their participation in an action as described in section 206(b)(2) of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5726(b)(2)) that was not violent in nature; or

(III) has had their citizenship, nationality, or residency revoked for having submitted to any United States Government agency a nonfrivolous application for refugee status, asylum, or any other immigration benefit under the immigration laws (as defined in section 101(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)));

(ii) is a Priority Hong Kong Resident spouse or child of an alien described in clause (i); or

(iii) is the parent of an alien described in clause (i), if such parent is a citizen of the PRC and no other foreign state.

(B) OTHER CATEGORIES.—The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, may designate other categories of aliens for purposes of establishing a well-founded fear of persecution under paragraph (1) if such aliens share common characteristics that identify them as targets of persecution in the PRC on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.

(C) SIGNIFICANT ROLE.—For purposes of subclause (I) of paragraph (2)(A)(i), a significant role shall include, with respect to the protests described in such clause—

(i) an organizing role;

(ii) a first aid responder;

(iii) a journalist or member of the media covering or offering public commentary;

(iv) a provider of legal services to one or more individuals arrested for participating in such protests; or

(v) a participant who during the period beginning on June 9, 2019, and ending on June 30, 2020, was arrested, charged, detained, or convicted as a result of such participation.

(3) AGE OUT PROTECTIONS.—For purposes of this subsection, a determination of whether an alien is a child shall be made using the age of the alien on the date an application for refugee or asylum status in which the alien is a named beneficiary is filed with the Secretary of Homeland Security.

(4) EXCLUSION FROM NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS.—Aliens provided refugee status under this subsection shall not be counted against the numerical limitation on refugees established in accordance with the procedures described in section 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157).

(5) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and every 90 days thereafter, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report on the matters described in subparagraph (B).

(B) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Each report required by subparagraph (A) shall include, with respect to applications submitted under this section—

(i) the total number of refugee and asylum applications that are pending at the end of the reporting period;

(ii) the average wait-times for all applicants for refugee status or asylum pending—

(I) a prescreening interview with a resettlement support center;

(II) an interview with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services; and

(III) the completion of security checks;

(iii) the number of approvals, referrals including the source of the referral, denials of applications for refugee status or asylum, disaggregated by the reason for each such denial; and

(iv) the number of refugee circuit rides to interview populations that would include Hong Kong SAR completed in the last 90 days, and the number planned for the subsequent 90-day period.

(C) FORM.—Each report required by subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(D) PUBLIC REPORTS.—The Secretary of State shall make each report submitted under this paragraph available to the public on the internet website of the Department of State.

(j) ADMISSION FOR CERTAIN HIGHLY SKILLED HONG KONG RESIDENTS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to subsection (c), the Secretary of Homeland Security, or, notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of State in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, may provide an alien described in subsection (b) with the status of a special immigrant under section 101(a)(27) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)), if the alien—

(A) or an agent acting on behalf of the alien, submits a petition for classification under section 203(b)(4) of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(4));

(B) is otherwise eligible to receive an immigrant visa;

(C) is otherwise admissible to the United States for permanent residence (excluding the grounds for inadmissibility specified in section 212(a)(4) of such Act (8 U.S.C. (a)(4))); and

(D) clears a background check and appropriate screening, as determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security.

(2) ALIENS DESCRIBED.—

(A) PRINCIPAL ALIENS.—An alien is described in this subsection if—

(i) the alien—

(I) is a Priority Hong Kong Resident; and

(II) has earned a bachelor's or higher degree from an institution of higher education; and

(ii) the Secretary of Homeland Security determines that such alien's relocation to the United States would provide a significant benefit to the United States.

(B) SPOUSES AND CHILDREN.—An alien is described in this subsection if the alien is the spouse or child of a principal alien described in paragraph (1).

(3) NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The total number of principal aliens who may be provided special immigrant status under this section may not exceed 5,000 per year for each of the five fiscal years beginning after the date of the enactment of this Act. The Secretary of Homeland Security may, in consultation with the Secretary of State, prioritize the issuance of visas to individuals with a bachelor's or higher degree in science, technology, engineering, mathematics, medicine, or health care.

(B) EXCLUSION FROM NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS.—Aliens provided immigrant status under this section shall not be counted against any numerical limitation under section 201, 202, 203, or 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1151, 1152, 1153, and 1157).

(4) ELIGIBILITY FOR ADMISSION UNDER OTHER CLASSIFICATION.—No alien shall be denied the opportunity to apply for admission under this section solely because such alien qualifies as an immediate relative or is eligible for any other immigrant classification.

(5) TIMELINE FOR PROCESSING APPLICATIONS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall ensure that all steps under the control of the United States Government incidental to the approval of such applications, including required screenings and background checks, are completed not later than one year after the date on which an eligible applicant submits an application under subsection (a).

(B) EXCEPTION.—Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the relevant Federal agencies may take additional time to process applications described in paragraph (1) if satisfaction of national security concerns requires such additional time, provided that the Secretary of Homeland Security, or the designee of the Secretary, has determined that the applicant meets the requirements for status as a special immigrant under this section and has so notified the applicant.

(k) TERMINATION.—Except as provided in section 6 of this Act, this section shall cease to have effect on the date that is five years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 304. EXPORT PROHIBITION OF MUNITIONS ITEMS TO THE HONG KONG POLICE FORCE.

Section 3 of the Act entitled "An Act to prohibit the commercial export of covered munitions items to the Hong Kong Police Force", approved November 27, 2019 (Public Law 116–77; 133 Stat. 1173), is amended by striking "on December 31, 2021." and inserting the following: "on the date on which the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that—

"(1) the Secretary of State has, on or after the date of the enactment of this paragraph, certified under section 205 of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 that Hong Kong warrants treatment under United States law in the same manner as United States laws were applied to Hong Kong before July 1, 1997;

"(2) the Hong Kong Police have not engaged in gross violations of human rights during the 1-year period ending on the date of such certification; and

"(3) there has been an independent examination of human rights concerns related to the crowd control tactics of the Hong Kong Police and the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region has adequately addressed those concerns.".

SEC. 305. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TREATMENT OF UYGHURS AND OTHER ETHNIC MINORITIES IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The Uyghurs are one of several predominantly Muslim Turkic groups living in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in the northwest of the People's Republic of China (PRC).

(2) Following Uyghur demonstrations and unrest in 2009 and clashes with government security personnel and other violent incidents in subsequent years, PRC leaders sought to "stabilize" the XUAR through large-scale arrests and extreme security measures, under the pretext of combatting alleged terrorism, religious extremism, and ethnic separatism.

(3) In May 2014, the PRC launched its "Strike Hard Against Violent Extremism" campaign, which placed further restrictions on and facilitated additional human rights violations against minorities in the XUAR under the pretext of fighting terrorism.

(4) In August 2016, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo member Chen Quanguo, former Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) Party Secretary, known for overseeing intensifying security operations and human rights abuses in the TAR, was appointed as Party Secretary of the XUAR.

(5) Beginning in 2017, XUAR authorities have sought to forcibly "assimilate" Uyghurs and other Turkic minorities into Chinese society through a policy of cultural erasure known as "Sinicization".

(6) Since 2018, credible reporting including from the BBC, France24, and the New York Times has shown that the Government of the PRC has built mass internment camps in the XUAR, which it calls "vocational training" centers, and detained Uyghurs and other groups in them and other facilities.

(7) Since 2015, XUAR authorities have arbitrarily detained an estimated 1,500,000 Uyghurs—12.5 percent of the XUAR's official Uyghur population of 12,000,000—and a smaller number of other ethnic minorities in the "vocational training" centers and other detention and pre-detention facilities.

(8) In 2017, the XUAR accounted for less than two percent of the PRC's total population but 21 percent of all arrests in China.

(9) The Atlantic, Radio Free Asia, and other sources have revealed that detainees are forced to renounce many of their Islamic beliefs and customs and repudiate Uyghur culture, language, and identity.

(10) Investigations by Human Rights Watch and other human rights organizations have documented how detainees are subject to political indoctrination, forced labor, crowded and unsanitary conditions, involuntary biometric data collection, both medical neglect and intrusive medical interventions, food and water deprivation, beatings, sexual violence, and torture.

(11) Research by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute suggests that, since late 2019, many detainees have been placed in higher security facilities and convicted of formal crimes.

(12) Human Rights Watch has reported that the PRC uses data collection programs, including facial recognition technology, to surveil Uyghurs in the XUAR and to identify individuals whom authorities may detain.

(13) PRC authorities have placed countless children whose parents are detained or in exile in state-run institutions and boarding schools without the consent of their parents.

(14) New York Times reporting revealed that numerous local PRC officials who did not agree with the policies carried out in XUAR have been fired and imprisoned.

(15) Associated Press reporting documented widespread and systemic efforts by PRC authorities to force Uyghur women to take contraceptives or to subject them to sterilization or abortion, threatening to detain those who do not comply.

(16) PRC authorities prohibit family members and advocates inside and outside China from having regular communications with relatives and friends imprisoned in the XUAR, such as journalist and entrepreneur Ekpar Asat.

(17) PRC authorities have imposed pervasive restrictions on the peaceful practice of Islam in the XUAR, to the extent that Human Rights Watch asserts the PRC "has effectively outlawed the practice of Islam".

(18) Individuals who are not detained in camps have been forced to attend political indoctrination sessions, subjected to movement restrictions, mass surveillance systems, involuntary biometric data collection, and other human rights abuses.

(19) International media, nongovernmental organizations, scholars, families, and survivors have reported on the systemic nature of many of these abuses.

(20) On June 26, 2020, a group of 50 independent United Nations experts jointly expressed alarm over China's deteriorating human rights record, includ-

ing its repression in Xinjiang, and called on the international community "to act collectively and decisively to ensure China respects human rights and abides by its international obligations".

(21) On October 6, 2020, 39 United Nations member countries issued a public statement condemning human rights violations by PRC authorities and calling on the PRC to allow the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights unfettered access to Xinjiang.

(22) The United States Congress passed the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116–145).

(23) The United States Congress passed the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note), which has been used to sanction PRC officials and entities for their activities in the XUAR.

(24) The United States Government has implemented additional targeted restrictions on trade with Xinjiang and imposed visa and economic sanctions on PRC officials and entities for their activities in the XUAR.

(25) The United States Government has documented human rights abuses and violations of individual freedoms in the XUAR, including in the 2019 Department of State Report on International Religious Freedom.

(26) On January 19, 2021, during his confirmation hearing, Secretary of State Antony Blinken testified that "forcing men, women, and children into concentration camps, trying to in effect reeducate them to be adherents to the Chinese Communist Party—all of that speaks to an effort to commit genocide".

(27) On January 19, 2021, Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen, during her confirmation hearing, publicly stated that China is guilty of "horrendous human rights abuses".

(28) On January 27, 2021, in response to a question from the press regarding the Uyghurs, Secretary Blinken stated that his "judgement remains that genocide was committed against the Uyghurs".

(29) On March 10, 2021, in response to a question on Xinjiang during his testimony before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, Secretary Blinken reiterated, "We've been clear, and I've been clear, that I see it as genocide, other egregious abuses of human rights, and we'll continue to make that clear.".

(30) The 2020 Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: China states that "[g]enocide and crimes against humanity occurred during the year against the predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang".

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the atrocities committed by the PRC against Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim Turkic groups in Xinjiang, including forced labor, sexual violence, the internment of over 1,000,000 individuals, and other horrific abuses must be condemned;

(2) the President, the Secretary of State, and the United States Ambassador to the United Nations should speak publicly about the ongoing human rights abuses in the XUAR, including in formal speeches at the United Nations and other international fora;

(3) the President, the Secretary of State, and the United States Ambassador to the United Nations should appeal to the United Nations Secretary-General to take a more proactive and public stance on the situation in the XUAR, including by supporting calls for an investigation and accountability for individuals and entities involved in abuses against the people of the XUAR;

(4) the United States should continue to use targeted sanctions and all diplomatic tools available to hold those responsible for the atrocities in Xinjiang to account;

(5) United States agencies engaged with China on trade, climate, defense, or other bilateral issues should include human rights abuses in the XUAR as a consideration in developing United States policy;

(6) the United States supports Radio Free Asia Uyghur, the only Uyghur-language news service in the world independent of Chinese government influence; and

(7) the United States recognizes the repeated requests from the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights for unfettered access to the XUAR and the PRC's refusal to comply, and therefore—

(A) PRC authorities must allow unfettered access by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to the XUAR;

(B) the United States should urge collaborative action between the United States Government and international partners to pressure PRC authorities to allow unfettered access to the XUAR;

(C) the President, the Secretary of State, and the United States Ambassador to the United Nations should simultaneously outline a strategy to investigate the human rights abuses and crimes that have taken place in the XUAR, collect evidence, and transfer the evidence to a competent court; and

(D) United States partners and allies should undertake similar strategies in an effort to build an international investigation outside of the PRC if PRC authorities do not comply with a United Nations investigation in the XUAR.

SEC. 306. PREVENTION OF UYGHUR FORCED LABOR.

(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to prohibit the import of all goods, wares, articles, or merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured, wholly or in part, by forced labor from the People's Republic of China and particularly any such goods, wares, articles, or merchandise produced in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (commonly referred to as "Xinjiang" or "XUAR") of China;

(2) to encourage the international community to reduce the import of any goods made with forced labor from the People's Republic of China, particularly goods mined, manufactured, or produced in the XUAR;

(3) to coordinate with Mexico and Canada to effectively implement Article 23.6 of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement to prohibit the importation of goods produced in whole or in part by forced or compulsory labor, which includes goods produced in whole or in part by forced or compulsory labor in the People's Republic of China;

(4) to actively work to prevent, publicly denounce, and end human trafficking as a horrific assault on human dignity and to restore the lives of those affected by human trafficking, a modern form of slavery;

(5) to regard the prevention of atrocities as in its national interest, including efforts to prevent torture, enforced disappearances, severe deprivation of liberty, including mass internment, arbitrary detention, and widespread and systematic use of forced labor, and persecution targeting any identifiable ethnic or religious group; and

(6) to address gross violations of human rights in the XUAR through bilateral diplomatic channels and multilateral institutions where both the United States and the People's Republic of China are members and with all the authorities available to the United States Government, including visa and financial sanctions, export restrictions, and import controls.

(b) PROHIBITION ON IMPORTATION OF GOODS MADE IN THE XUAR.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in paragraph (2), all goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part in the XUAR of China, or by persons working with the XUAR government for purposes of the "poverty alleviation" program or the "pairing-assistance" program which subsidizes the establishment of manufacturing facilities in the XUAR, shall be deemed to be goods, wares, articles, and merchandise described in section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307) and shall not be entitled to entry at any of the ports of the United States.

(2) EXCEPTION.—The prohibition described in paragraph (1) shall not apply if the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection—

(A) determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that any specific goods, wares, articles, or merchandise described in paragraph (1) were not produced wholly or in part by convict labor, forced labor, or indentured labor under penal sanctions; and

(B) submits to the appropriate congressional committees and makes available to the public a report that contains such determination.

(3) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This section shall take effect on the date that is 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(c) ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY TO ADDRESS FORCED LABOR IN THE XUAR.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force, established under section 741 of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement Implementation Act (19 U.S.C. 4681), shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains an enforcement strategy to effectively address forced labor in the XUAR of China or products made by Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tibetans, or members of other persecuted groups through forced labor in any other part of the People's Republic of China. The enforcement strategy shall describe the specific enforcement plans of the United States Government regarding—

(A) goods, wares, articles, and merchandise described in subsection (b)(1) that are imported into the United States directly from the XUAR or made

by Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tibetans, or members of other persecuted groups in any other part of the People's Republic of China;

(B) goods, wares, articles, and merchandise described in subsection (b)(1) that are imported into the United States from the People's Republic of China and are mined, produced, or manufactured in part in the XUAR or by persons working with the XUAR government or the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps for purposes of the "poverty alleviation" program or the "pairing-assistance" program; and

(C) goods, wares, articles, and merchandise described in subsection (b)(1) that are imported into the United States from third countries and are mined, produced, or manufactured in part in the XUAR or by persons working with the XUAR government or the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps for purposes of the "poverty alleviation" program or the "pairing-assistance" program.

(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) A description of the actions taken by the United States Government to address forced labor in the XUAR under section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307), including a description of all Withhold Release Orders issued, goods detained, and fines issued.

(B) A list of products made wholly or in part by forced or involuntary labor in the XUAR or made by Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tibetans, or members of other persecuted groups in any other part of the People's Republic of China, and a list of businesses that sold products in the United States made wholly or in part by forced or involuntary labor in the XUAR or made by Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tibetans, or members of other persecuted groups in any other part of the People's Republic of China.

(C) A list of facilities and entities, including the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, that source material from the XUAR or by persons working with the XUAR government or the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps for purposes of the "poverty alleviation" program or the "pairing-assistance" program, a plan for identifying additional such facilities and entities, and facility- and entity-specific enforcement plans, including issuing specific Withhold Release Orders to support enforcement of subsection (b), with regard to each listed facility or entity.

(D) A list of high-priority sectors for enforcement, including cotton, tomatoes, polysilicon, and a sector-specific enforcement plan for each high-priority sector.

(E) A description of the additional resources necessary for U.S. Customs and Border Protection to effectively implement the enforcement strategy.

(F) A plan to coordinate and collaborate with appropriate nongovernmental organizations and private sector entities to discuss the enforcement strategy for products made in the XUAR.

(3) FORM.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex, if necessary.

(4) UPDATES.—The Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force shall provide briefings to the appropriate congressional committees on a quarterly basis and, as applicable, on any updates to the strategy required by paragraph (1) or any additional actions taken to address forced labor in the XUAR, including actions described in this section.

(5) SUNSET.—This section shall cease to have effect on the earlier of—

(A) the date that is eight years after the date of the enactment of this Act; or

(B) the date on which the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees a determination that the Government of the People's Republic of China has ended mass internment, forced labor, and any other gross violations of human rights experienced by Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority groups in the XUAR.

(d) DETERMINATION RELATING TO CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY OR GENOCIDE IN THE XUAR.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall—

(A) determine if the practice of forced labor or other crimes against Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority groups in the XUAR of China can be considered systematic and widespread and therefore constitutes crimes against humanity or constitutes genocide as defined in subsection (a) of section 1091 of title 18, United States Code; and

(B) submit to the appropriate congressional committees and make available to the public a report that contains such determination.

(2) FORM.—The report required by paragraph (1)—

(A) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex, if necessary; and

(B) may be included in the report required by subsection (e).

(e) DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY TO ADDRESS FORCED LABOR IN THE XUAR.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains a United States strategy to promote initiatives to enhance international awareness of and to address forced labor in the XUAR of China.

(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy required by paragraph (1) shall include—

(A) a plan to enhance bilateral and multilateral coordination, including sustained engagement with the governments of United States partners and allies, to end forced labor of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority groups in the XUAR;

(B) public affairs, public diplomacy, and counter-messaging efforts to promote awareness of the human rights situation, including forced labor in the XUAR; and

(C) opportunities to coordinate and collaborate with appropriate nongovernmental organizations and private sector entities to raise awareness about forced labor made products from the XUAR and to provide assistance to Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority groups in the XUAR, including those formerly detained in mass internment camps in the region.

(3) ADDITIONAL MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall also include—

(A) to the extent practicable, a list of—

(i) entities in the People's Republic of China or affiliates of such entities that directly or indirectly use forced or involuntary labor in the XUAR; and

(ii) foreign persons that acted as agents of the entities or affiliates of entities described in clause (i) to import goods into the United States; and

(B) a description of actions taken by the United States Government to address forced labor in the XUAR under existing authorities, including—

(i) the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (Public Law 106–386; 22 U.S.C. 7101 et seq.);

(ii) the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–441; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note); and

(iii) the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 2656 note).

(4) FORM.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex, if necessary.

(5) UPDATES.—The Secretary of State shall include any updates to the strategy required by paragraph (1) in the annual Trafficking in Persons report required by section 110(b) of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7107(b)).

(6) SUNSET.—This section shall cease to have effect the earlier of—

(A) the date that is eight years after the date of the enactment of this Act; or

(B) the date on which the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees a determination that the Government of the People's Republic of China has ended mass internment, forced labor, and any other gross violations of human rights experienced by Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority groups in the XUAR.

(f) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO FORCED LABOR IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.—

(1) REPORT REQUIRED.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and not less frequently than annually thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that identifies each foreign person, including any official of the Government of the People's Republic of China, that the President determines—

(i) knowingly engages in, is responsible for, or facilitates the forced labor of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority groups in the XUAR; and

(ii) knowingly engages in, contributes to, assists, or provides financial, material or technological support for efforts to contravene United States law regarding the importation of forced labor goods from the XUAR.

(B) FORM.—The report required under subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

(2) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—The President shall impose the sanctions described in paragraph (3) with respect to each foreign person identified in the report required under paragraph (1)(A).

(3) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions described in this subsection are the following:

(A) ASSET BLOCKING.—The President shall exercise all of the powers granted to the President under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in property and interests in property of a foreign person identified in the report required under paragraph (1)(A) if such property and interests in property—

(i) are in the United States;

(ii) come within the United States; or

(iii) come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(B) INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—

(i) VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—An alien described in paragraph (1)(A) is—

(I) inadmissible to the United States;

(II) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and

(III) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).

(ii) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

(I) IN GENERAL.—An alien described in paragraph (1)(A) is subject to revocation of any visa or other entry documentation regardless of when the visa or other entry documentation is or was issued.

(II) IMMEDIATE EFFECT.—A revocation under subclause (I) shall—

(aa) take effect immediately; and

(bb) automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the alien's possession.

(4) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.—

(A) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may exercise all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this section.

(B) PENALTIES.—The penalties provided for in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a foreign person that engages in an activity described in paragraph (1)(A) to the same extent that such penalties apply to a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of such section 206.

(5) WAIVER.—The President may waive the application of sanctions under this section with respect to a foreign person identified in the report required under paragraph (1)(A) if the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that such a waiver is in the national interest of the United States.

(6) EXCEPTIONS.—

(A) EXCEPTION FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.—Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any activity subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized intelligence activities of the United States.

(B) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES.—Sanctions under paragraph (3)(B) shall not apply with respect to an alien if admitting or paroling the alien into the United States is necessary—

(i) to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations; or

(ii) to carry out or assist law enforcement activity in the United States.

(7) TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS.—The President may terminate the application of sanctions under this section with respect to a foreign person if the President determines and reports to the appropriate congressional committees not less than 15 days before the termination takes effect that—

(A) information exists that the person did not engage in the activity for which sanctions were imposed;

(B) the person has been prosecuted appropriately for the activity for which sanctions were imposed;

(C) the person has credibly demonstrated a significant change in behavior, has paid an appropriate consequence for the activity for which sanctions were imposed, and has credibly committed in the future to not engage in such activity; or

(D) the termination of the sanctions is in the national security interests of the United States.

(8) SUNSET.—This section, and any sanctions imposed under this section, shall terminate on the date that is five years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(9) DEFINITIONS OF ADMISSION; ADMITTED; ALIEN.—In this section, the terms "admission", "admitted", and "alien" have the meanings given those terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).

(g) DISCLOSURES TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES RELATED TO THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.—

(1) POLICY STATEMENT.—It is the policy of the United States to protect American investors, through stronger disclosure requirements, alerting them to the presence of Chinese and other companies complicit in gross violations of human rights in United States capital markets, including American and foreign companies listed on United States exchanges that enable the mass internment and population surveillance of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Muslim minorities and source products made with forced labor in the XUAR. Such involvements represent clear, material risks to the share values and corporate reputations of certain of these companies and hence to prospective American investors, particularly given that the United States Government has employed sanctions and export restrictions to target individuals and entities contributing to human rights abuses in the People's Republic of China.

(2) DISCLOSURE OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES RELATING TO THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.—Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

"(s) DISCLOSURE OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES RELATING TO THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.—

"(1) IN GENERAL.—Each issuer required to file an annual or quarterly report under subsection (a) shall disclose in that report the information required by paragraph (2) if, during the period covered by the report, the issuer or any affiliate of the issuer—

"(A) knowingly engaged in an activity with an entity or the affiliate of an entity engaged in creating or providing technology or other assistance to create mass population surveillance systems in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (commonly referred to as 'Xinjiang' or 'XUAR') of China, including any entity included on the Department of Commerce's 'Entity List' in the XUAR;

"(B) knowingly engaged in an activity with an entity or an affiliate of an entity building and running detention facilities for Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other members of Muslim minority groups in the XUAR;

"(C) knowingly engaged in an activity with an entity or an affiliate of an entity described in section 306(e)(3)(A)(i) of the Ensuring American Global Leadership and Engagement Act, including—

"(i) any entity engaged in the 'pairing-assistance' program which subsidizes the establishment of manufacturing facilities in the XUAR; or

"(ii) any entity for which the Department of Homeland Security has issued a 'Withhold Release Order' under section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307); or

"(D) knowingly conducted any transaction or had dealings with—

"(i) any person the property and interests in property of which were sanctioned by the Secretary of State for the detention or abuse of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, or other members of Muslim minority groups in the XUAR;

"(ii) any person the property and interests in property of which are sanctioned pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 2656 note); or

"(iii) any person or entity responsible for, or complicit in, committing atrocities in the XUAR.

"(2) INFORMATION REQUIRED.—

"(A) IN GENERAL.—If an issuer described under paragraph (1) or an affiliate of the issuer has engaged in any activity described in paragraph (1), the information required by this paragraph is a detailed description of each such activity, including—

"(i) the nature and extent of the activity;

"(ii) the gross revenues and net profits, if any, attributable to the activity; and

"(iii) whether the issuer or the affiliate of the issuer (as the case may be) intends to continue the activity.

"(B) EXCEPTION.—The requirement to disclose information under this paragraph shall not include information on activities of the issuer or any affiliate of the issuer activities relating to—

"(i) the import of manufactured goods, including electronics, food products, textiles, shoes, and teas, that originated in the XUAR; or

"(ii) manufactured goods containing materials that originated or are sourced in the XUAR.

"(3) NOTICE OF DISCLOSURES.—If an issuer reports under paragraph (1) that the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer has knowingly engaged in any activity described in that paragraph, the issuer shall separately file with the Commission, concurrently with the annual or quarterly report under subsection (a), a notice that the disclosure of that activity has been included in that annual or quarterly report that identifies the issuer and contains the information required by paragraph (2).

"(4) PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION.—Upon receiving a notice under paragraph (3) that an annual or quarterly report includes a disclosure of an activity described in paragraph (1), the Commission shall promptly—

"(A) transmit the report to—

"(i) the President;

"(ii) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives; and

"(iii) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and

"(B) make the information provided in the disclosure and the notice available to the public by posting the information on the Internet website of the Commission.

"(5) INVESTIGATIONS.—Upon receiving a report under paragraph (4) that includes a disclosure of an activity described in paragraph (1), the President shall—

"(A) make a determination with respect to whether any investigation is needed into the possible imposition of sanctions under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 2656 note) or section 306(f) of the Ensuring American Global Leadership and Engagement Act or whether criminal investigations are warranted under statutes intended to hold accountable individuals or entities involved in the importation of goods produced by forced labor, including under section 545, 1589, or 1761 of title 18, United States Code; and

"(B) not later than 180 days after initiating any such investigation, make a determination with respect to whether a sanction should be imposed or criminal investigations initiated with respect to the issuer or the affiliate of the issuer (as the case may be).

"(6) ATROCITIES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term 'atrocities' has the meaning given the term in section 6(2) of the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–441; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note).".

(3) SUNSET.—Section 13(s) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as added by paragraph (2), is repealed on the earlier of—

(A) the date that is eight years after the date of the enactment of this Act; or

(B) the date on which the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees a determination that the Government of the People's Republic of China has ended mass internment, forced labor, and any other gross violations of human rights experienced by Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority groups in the XUAR.

(4) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by paragraph (2) shall take effect with respect to reports required to be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(h) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate.

(2) ATROCITIES.—The term "atrocities" has the meaning given the term in section 6(2) of the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–441; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note).

(3) CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY.—The term "crimes against humanity" includes, when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack—

(A) murder;

(B) deportation or forcible transfer of population;

(C) torture;

(D) extermination;

(E) enslavement;

(F) rape, sexual slavery, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable severity;

(G) persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law; and

(H) enforced disappearance of persons.

(4) FORCED LABOR.—The term "forced labor" has the meaning given the term in section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307).

(5) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term "foreign person" means a person that is not a United States person.

(6) PERSON.—The term "person" means an individual or entity.

(7) MASS POPULATION SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM.—The term "mass population surveillance system" means installation and integration of facial recognition cameras, biometric data collection, cell phone surveillance, and artificial intelligence technology with the "Sharp Eyes" and "Integrated Joint Operations Platform" or other technologies that are used by Chinese security forces for surveillance and big-data predictive policing.

(8) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term "United States person" means—

(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or

(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.

SEC. 307. UYGHUR HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the "Uyghur Human Rights Protection Act".

(b) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has a long history of repressing Turkic Muslims and other Muslim minority groups, particularly Uyghurs, in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (commonly referred to as "Xinjiang" or "XUAR"), also known as East Turkestan. Central and regional PRC government policies have systematically discriminated against these minority groups by denying them a range of civil and political rights, particularly freedom of religion. Senior Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials bear direct responsibility for these gross human rights violations.

(2) PRC government abuses include the arbitrary detention of more than 1,000,000 Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority groups, separation of working age adults from their children and elderly parents, and the integration of forced labor into supply chains. Those held in detention facilities and internment camps in the XUAR have described forced political indoctrination, torture, beatings, food deprivation, sexual assault, coordinated campaigns to reduce birth rates among Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims through forced sterilization, and denial of religious, cultural, and linguistic freedoms. Recent media reports indicate that since 2019, the PRC government has newly constructed, expanded, or fortified at least 60 detention facilities with higher security or prison-like features in Xinjiang.

(3) The PRC government's actions against Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority groups in the XUAR violate international human rights laws and norms, including—

(A) the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, to which the PRC has acceded;

(B) the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which the PRC has signed and ratified;

(C) The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which the PRC has signed and ratified;

(D) the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the PRC has signed; and

(E) the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Labor Organization's Force Labor Convention (no. 29) and the Abolition of Forced Labor Convention (no. 105).

(c) REFUGEE PROTECTIONS FOR CERTAIN RESIDENTS OF THE XUAR.—

(1) POPULATIONS OF SPECIAL HUMANITARIAN CONCERN.—The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall designate, as Priority 2 refugees of special humanitarian concern—

(A) aliens who were nationals of the PRC and residents of the XUAR on January 1, 2021;

(B) aliens who fled the XUAR after June 30, 2009, and reside in other provinces of the PRC or in a third country where such alien is not firmly resettled; and

(C) the spouses, children, and parents (as such terms are defined in subsections (a) and (b) of section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101)) of individuals described in subparagraphs (A) and (B), except that a child shall be an unmarried person under 27 years of age.

(2) PROCESSING OF XUAR REFUGEES.—The processing of individuals described in paragraph (1) for classification as refugees may occur in the PRC or a third country.

(3) ELIGIBILITY FOR ADMISSION AS A REFUGEE.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Aliens described in subparagraph (B) may establish, for purposes of admission as a refugee under section 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157) or asylum under section 208 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1158), that such alien has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion by asserting such a fear and asserting a credible basis for concern about the possibility of such persecution.

(B) ALIENS DESCRIBED.—An alien is described in this subsection if such alien has been identified as a person of special humanitarian concern pursuant to paragraph (1) and—

(i) has experienced persecution in the XUAR by the PRC government, including—

(I) forced and arbitrary detention including in an internment or re-education camp;

(II) forced political indoctrination, torture, beatings, food deprivation, and denial of religious, cultural, and linguistic freedoms;

(III) forced labor;

(IV) forced separation from family members;

(V) other forms of systemic threats, harassment, and gross human rights violations; or

(VI) has been formally charged, detained, or convicted on account of their peaceful actions as described in the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116–145).

(ii) is currently a national of the PRC whose residency in the XUAR, or any other area within the jurisdiction of the PRC, was revoked for having submitted to any United States Government agency a nonfrivolous application for refugee status, asylum, or any other immigration benefit under United States law.

(C) ELIGIBILITY FOR ADMISSION UNDER OTHER CLASSIFICATION.—An alien may not be denied the opportunity to apply for admission as a refugee or asylum under this section solely because such alien qualifies as an immediate relative of a national of the United States or is eligible for admission to the United States under any other immigrant classification.

(4) PRIORITY.—The Secretary of State shall prioritize bilateral diplomacy with third countries hosting former residents of the XUAR and who face significant diplomatic pressures from the PRC government.

(5) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and every 90 days thereafter, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representa-

tives, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report on the matters described in subparagraph (B).

(B) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Each report required by subparagraph (A) shall include, with respect to applications submitted under this section—

(i) the total number of applications that are pending at the end of the reporting period;

(ii) the average wait-times and number of applicants who are currently pending—

(I) a pre-screening interview with a resettlement support center;

(II) an interview with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services;

(III) the completion of security checks;

(IV) receipt of a final decision after completion of an interview with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services; and

(iii) the number of denials of applications for refugee status, disaggregated by the reason for each such denial.

(C) FORM.—Each report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(D) PUBLIC REPORTS.—The Secretary of State shall make each report submitted under this subsection available to the public on the internet website of the Department of State.

(d) STATEMENT OF POLICY ON ENCOURAGING ALLIES AND PARTNERS TO MAKE SIMILAR ACCOMMODATIONS.—It is the policy of the United States to encourage United States allies and partners to make accommodations similar to the accommodations made in this section for residents of the XUAR who are fleeing oppression by the PRC Government.

(e) TERMINATION.—This section shall terminate on the date that is ten years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 308. REMOVAL OF MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL THAT COMMIT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.

The President shall direct the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to—

(1) reform the process for removing Member States of the United Nations Human Rights Council that commit gross and systemic violations of human rights, including—

(A) lowering the threshold vote at the United Nations General Assembly for removal to a simple majority;

(B) ensuring information detailing the Member State's human rights record is publicly available before the vote on removal; and

(C) making the vote of each country on the removal from the United Nations Human Rights Council publicly available;

(2) reform the rules on electing members to the United Nations Human Rights Council to ensure United Nations Member States that have committed gross and systemic violations of human rights are not elected to the Human Rights Council; and

(3) oppose the election to the United Nations Human Rights Council of any United Nations Member State—

(A) currently designated as a country engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights pursuant to section 116 or section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n or 2304);

(B) the government of which the Secretary of State currently determines has repeatedly provided support for international terrorism pursuant to—

(i) section 1754(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019;

(ii) section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371);

(iii) section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2779A); or

(iv) any other provision of law;

(C) currently designated as a Tier 3 country under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7101 et seq.);

(D) the government of which is identified on the list published by the Secretary of State pursuant to section 404(b) of the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 (22 U.S.C. 2370c–1(b)) as a government that recruits and uses child soldiers; or

(E) the government of which the United States determines to have committed genocide or crimes against humanity.

SEC. 309. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO TIBET.

(a) RANK OF UNITED STATES SPECIAL COORDINATOR FOR TIBETAN ISSUES.—Section 621 of the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e), as subsections (c), (d), (e), and (f), respectively; and

(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new subsection:

"(b) RANK.—The Special Coordinator shall either be appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, or shall be an individual holding the rank of Under Secretary of State or higher.".

(b) TIBET UNIT AT UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN BEIJING.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall establish a Tibet Unit in the Political Section of the United States Embassy in Beijing, People's Republic of China (PRC).

(2) OPERATION.—The Tibet Unit established under paragraph (1) shall operate until such time as the Government of the PRC permits—

(A) the United States Consulate General in Chengdu, PRC, to reopen; or

(B) a United States Consulate General in Lhasa, Tibet, to open.

(3) STAFF.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall—

(i) assign not fewer than two United States direct-hire personnel to the Tibet Unit established under paragraph (1); and

(ii) hire not fewer than one locally engaged staff member for such unit.

(B) LANGUAGE TRAINING.—The Secretary shall make Tibetan language training available to the personnel assigned under subparagraph (A), consistent with the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note).

SEC. 310. UNITED STATES POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT ON THE SUCCESSION OR REINCARNATION OF THE DALAI LAMA AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM OF TIBETAN BUDDHISTS.

(a) REAFFIRMATION OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States, as provided under section 342(b) of division FF of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (Public Law 116–260), that any "interference by the Government of the People's Republic of China or any other government in the process of recognizing a successor or reincarnation of the 14th Dalai Lama and any future Dalai Lamas would represent a clear abuse of the right to religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists and the Tibetan people".

(b) INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO PROTECT RELIGIOUS FREEDOM OF TIBETAN BUDDHISTS.—The Secretary of State should engage with United States allies and partners to—

(1) support Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders' sole religious authority to identify and install the 15th Dalai Lama;

(2) oppose claims by the Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) that the PRC has the authority to decide for Tibetan Buddhists the 15th Dalai Lama; and

(3) reject interference by the Government of the PRC in the religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists.

SEC. 311. DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF INTERNET FREEDOM AND GREAT FIREWALL CIRCUMVENTION TOOLS FOR THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The People's Republic of China (PRC) has repeatedly violated its obligations under the Joint Declaration by suppressing the basic rights and freedoms of the people of Hong Kong.

(2) On June 30, 2020, the National People's Congress passed a "National Security Law" that further erodes Hong Kong's autonomy and enables authorities to suppress dissent.

(3) The Government of the PRC continues to utilize the National Security Law to undermine the fundamental rights of the Hong Kong people through suppression of the freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and the press.

(4) Article 9 of the National Security Law authorizes unprecedented regulation and supervision of internet activity in Hong Kong, including expanded police powers to force internet service providers to censor content, hand over user information, and block access to platforms.

(5) On January 13, 2021, the Hong Kong Broadband Network blocked public access to HK Chronicles, a website promoting pro-democracy viewpoints, under the authorities of the National Security Law.

(6) On February 12, 2021, internet service providers blocked access to the Taiwan Transitional Justice Commission website in Hong Kong.

(7) Major tech companies, including Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp and Google, have stopped reviewing requests for user data from Hong Kong authorities.

(8) On February 28, 2021, 47 pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong were arrested and charged under the National Security Law on the charge of "conspiracy to commit subversion".

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should—

(1) support the ability of the people of Hong Kong to maintain their freedom to access information online; and

(2) focus on investments in technologies that facilitate the unhindered exchange of information in Hong Kong in advance of any future efforts by the Chinese Communist Party—

(A) to suppress internet access;

(B) to increase online censorship; or

(C) to inhibit online communication and content-sharing by the people of Hong Kong.

(c) HONG KONG INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAM.—

(1) WORKING GROUP.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State is authorized to establish a working group to develop a strategy to bolster internet resiliency and online access in Hong Kong.

(B) MEMBERSHIP.—The working group under subparagraph (A) shall consist of—

(i) the Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights;

(ii) the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs;

(iii) the Chief Executive Officer of the United States Agency for Global Media and the President of the Open Technology Fund of the Agency; and

(iv) the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development.

(2) HONG KONG INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAMS.—

(A) DEPARTMENT OF STATE.—The Secretary of State shall establish a Hong Kong Internet Freedom Program in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor in the Department of State.

(B) OPEN TECHNOLOGY FUND.—The President of the Open Technology Fund of the United States Agency for Global Media is authorized to establish a Hong Kong Internet Freedom Program.

(C) OPERATION.—The Programs referred to in subparagraphs (A) and (B) shall operate independently, but in strategic coordination with other entities in the working group under paragraph (1). The Open Technology Fund shall remain independent from Department of State direction in its implementation of the Program of such Fund, and any other internet freedom programs.

(3) INDEPENDENCE.—During the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on September 30, 2023, the Hong Kong Internet Freedom Programs described in paragraph (2) shall be carried out independently from any other internet freedom programs relating to the People's Republic of China carried out by the Department of State or the Open Technology Fund of the United States Agency for Global Media, as the case may be, in order that such Hong Kong Internet Freedom Programs may focus on supporting liberties presently enjoyed by the people of Hong Kong.

(4) CONSOLIDATION OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE PROGRAM.—Beginning on October 1, 2023, the Secretary of State may—

(A) consolidate the Hong Kong Internet Freedom Program of the Department of State with any other internet freedom programs relating to the People's Republic of China carried out by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; or

(B) continue to carry out the Program in accordance with paragraph (3).

(5) CONSOLIDATION OF OPEN TECHNOLOGY FUND PROGRAM.—Beginning on October 1, 2023, the President of the Open Technology Fund of the United States Agency for Global Media may—

(A) consolidate the Hong Kong Internet Freedom Program of the Fund with any other internet freedom programs relating to the People's Republic of China carried out by the Fund; or

(B) continue to carry out the Program in accordance with paragraph (3).

(d) SUPPORT FOR INTERNET FREEDOM TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS.—

(1) GRANTS AUTHORIZED.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, working through the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and President of the Open Technology Fund of the United States Agency for Global Media, are each separately and independently authorized to award grants and contracts to private organizations to support and develop programs in Hong Kong that promote or expand—

(i) an open, interoperable, reliable and secure internet; and

(ii) the online exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms of individual citizens, activists, human rights defenders, independent journalists, civil society organizations, and marginalized populations in Hong Kong.

(B) GOALS.—The goals of the programs developed pursuant to grants awarded pursuant to subparagraph (A) should be—

(i) to make the internet available in Hong Kong;

(ii) to increase the number of the tools in the technology portfolio;

(iii) to promote the availability of such technologies and tools in Hong Kong;

(iv) to encourage the adoption of such technologies and tools by the people of Hong Kong;

(v) to scale up the distribution of such technologies and tools throughout Hong Kong;

(vi) to prioritize the development of tools, components, code, and technologies that are fully open-source, to the extent practicable;

(vii) to conduct research on repressive tactics that undermine internet freedom in Hong Kong;

(viii) to ensure digital safety guidance and support is available to repressed individual citizens, human rights defenders, independent journalists, civil society organizations and marginalized populations in Hong Kong; and

(ix) to engage United States private industry, including e-commerce firms and social networking companies, on the importance of preserving internet access in Hong Kong.

(C) GRANT RECIPIENTS.—Grants awarded pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall be distributed to multiple vendors and suppliers through an open, fair, competitive, and evidence-based decision process—

(i) to diversify the technical base; and

(ii) to reduce the risk of misuse by bad actors.

(D) SECURITY AUDITS.—New technologies developed using grants awarded pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall undergo comprehensive security audits to ensure such technologies are secure and have not been compromised in a manner detrimental to the interests of the United States or to individuals or organizations benefitting from programs supported by the Open Technology Fund.

(2) FUNDING SOURCE.—The Secretary of State is authorized to expend funds made available to the Human Rights and Democracy Fund of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the Department of State for each of fiscal years 2022 and 2023 for grants authorized under paragraph (1) by any entity in the working group established under subsection (c)(1).

(3) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

(A) OPEN TECHNOLOGY FUND.—In addition to the funds authorized to be expended pursuant to paragraph (2), there are authorized to be appropriated to the Open Technology Fund of the United States Agency for Global Media $5,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 and 2023 for grants to carry out this subsection. Such amounts are in addition to any amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Open Technology Fund under section 1299P of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116–283).

(B) BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR.—In addition to the funds authorized to be expended pursuant to paragraph (2), there are authorized to be appropriated to the Office of Internet Freedom Programs of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the Department of State $10,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 and 2023 to carry out this subsection.

(C) AVAILABILITY.—Amounts authorized to be appropriated pursuant to subparagraphs (A) and (B) shall remain available until expended.

(e) STRATEGIC PLANNING REPORT.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the working group under subsection (c)(1) shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a classified report that—

(1) describes the Federal Government's plan to bolster and increase the availability of Great Firewall circumvention and internet freedom technology in Hong Kong during fiscal year 2022;

(2) outlines a plan for—

(A) supporting the preservation of an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet in Hong Kong;

(B) increasing the supply of the technology referred to in paragraph (1);

(C) accelerating the dissemination of such technology;

(D) promoting the availability of internet freedom in Hong Kong;

(E) utilizing presently-available tools in the existing relevant portfolios for further use in the unique context of Hong Kong;

(F) expanding the portfolio of tools in order to diversify and strengthen the effectiveness and resiliency of the circumvention efforts;

(G) providing training for high-risk groups and individuals in Hong Kong; and

(H) detecting analyzing, and responding to new and evolving censorship threats;

(3) includes a detailed description of the technical and fiscal steps necessary to safely implement the plans referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2), including an analysis of the market conditions in Hong Kong;

(4) describes the Federal Government's plans for awarding grants to private organizations for the purposes described in subsection (d)(1)(A);

(5) outlines the working group's consultations regarding the implementation of this section to ensure that all Federal efforts are aligned and well coordinated; and

(6) outlines the Department of State's strategy to influence global internet legal standards at international organizations and multilateral fora.

(f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(2) JOINT DECLARATION.—The term "Joint Declaration" means the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong, done at Beijing on December 19, 1984.

SEC. 312. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available to carry out section 409 of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2019 (Public Law 115–409) should include programs that prioritize the protection and advancement of the freedoms of association, assembly, religion, and expression for women, human rights activists, and ethnic and religious minorities in the People's Republic of China (PRC).

(b) USE OF FUNDS.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to section 409 of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2019 (Public Law 115–409) may be used to fund nongovernmental agencies within the Indo-Pacific region that are focused on the issues described in subsection (a).

(c) CONSULTATION REQUIREMENT.—In carrying out this section, the Assistant Secretary of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees and representatives of civil society regarding—

(1) strengthening the capacity of the organizations referred to in subsection (b);

(2) protecting members of the groups referred to in subsection (a) who have been targeted for arrest, harassment, forced sterilizations, coercive abortions, forced labor, or intimidation, including members residing outside of the PRC; and

(3) messaging efforts to reach the broadest possible audiences within the PRC about United States Government efforts to protect freedom of association, expression, assembly, and the rights of ethnic minorities.

SEC. 313. MODIFICATIONS TO AND REAUTHORIZATION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.

(a) DEFINITIONS.—Section 1262 of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended by striking paragraph (2).

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—(1) The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended by inserting after section 1262 the following new section:

"SEC. 1262A. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

"It is the sense of Congress that the President should establish and regularize information sharing and sanctions-related decision making with like-minded governments possessing human rights and anti-corruption sanctions programs similar in nature to those authorized under this subtitle."; and

(2) The table of contents in section 2(b) and in title XII of division A of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328) are each amended by inserting after the items relating to section 1262 the following:

"Sec. 1262A. Sense of Congress.".

(c) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (a) of section 1263 of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended to read as follows:

"(a) IN GENERAL.—The President may impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to any foreign person that the President determines, based on credible information—

"(1) is responsible for or complicit in, or has directly or indirectly engaged in, serious human rights abuse or any violation of internationally recognized human rights;

"(2) is a current or former government official, or a person acting for or on behalf of such an official, who is responsible for or complicit in, or has directly or indirectly engaged in—

"(A) corruption; or

"(B) the transfer or facilitation of the transfer of the proceeds of corruption;

"(3) is or has been a leader or official of—

"(A) an entity, including a government entity, that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in, any of the activities described in subparagraph (A) or (B) related to the tenure of the leader or official; or

"(B) an entity whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this section as a result of activities related to the tenure of the leader or official;

"(4) has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of—

"(A) an activity described in subparagraph (A) or (B) that is conducted by a foreign person;

"(B) a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this section; or

"(C) an entity, including a government entity, that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in, an activity described in subparagraph (A) or (B) conducted by a foreign person; or

"(5) is owned or controlled by, or acts or is purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this section.".

(2) CONSIDERATION OF CERTAIN INFORMATION.—Subsection (c)(2) of such section is amended by inserting "corruption and" after "monitor".

(3) REQUESTS BY CONGRESS.—Subsection (d) of such section is amended—

(A) in paragraph (1), in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking "subsection (a)" and inserting "subsection (a)(1)";

(B) in paragraph (2)—

(i) in subparagraph (A)—

(I) in the subparagraph heading, by striking "HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS" and inserting "SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE OR VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHTS"; and

(II) by striking "described in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a)" and inserting "described in subsection (a)(1) relating to serious human rights abuse or any violation of internationally recognized human rights"; and

(ii) in subparagraph (B)—

(I) in the matter preceding clause (i), by striking "described in paragraph (3) or (4) of subsection (a)" and inserting "described in subsection (a)(1) relating to corruption or the transfer or facilitation of the transfer of the proceeds of corruption"; and

(II) by striking "ranking member of" and all that follows through the period at the end and inserting "ranking member of one of the appropriate congressional committees.".

(d) REPORTS TO CONGRESS.—Section 1264(a) of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (5), by striking "; and" and inserting a semicolon;

(2) in paragraph (6), by striking the period at the end and inserting ";"; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

"(7) a description of additional steps taken by the President through diplomacy, international engagement, and assistance to foreign or security sectors to address persistent underlying causes of serious human rights abuse, violations of internationally recognized human rights, and corruption in each country in which foreign persons with respect to which sanctions have been imposed under section 1263 are located; and

"(8) a description of additional steps taken by the President to ensure the pursuit of judicial accountability in appropriate jurisdictions with respect to those foreign persons subject to sanctions under section 1263 for serious human rights abuse, violations of internationally recognized human rights, and corruption.".

(e) REPEAL OF SUNSET.—(1) Section 1265 of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is repealed.

(2) The table of contents in section 2(b) and in title XII of division A of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328) are each amended by striking the items relating to section 1265.

SEC. 314. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONDEMNING ANTI-ASIAN RACISM AND DISCRIMINATION.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Since the onset of the COVID–19 pandemic, crimes and discrimination against Asians and those of Asian descent have risen dramatically worldwide. In May 2020, United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said "the pandemic continues to unleash a tsunami of hate and xenophobia, scapegoating and scare-mongering" and urged governments to "act now to strengthen the immunity of our societies against the virus of hate".

(2) Asian American and Pacific Island (AAPI) workers make up a large portion of the essential workers on the frontlines of the COVID–19 pandemic, making up 8.5 percent of all essential healthcare workers in the United States. AAPI workers also make up a large share—between 6 percent and 12 percent based on sector—of the biomedical field.

(3) The United States Census notes that Americans of Asian descent alone made up nearly 5.9 percent of the United States population in 2019, and that Asian Americans are the fastest-growing racial group in the United States, projected to represent 14 percent of the United States population by 2065.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the reprehensible attacks on people of Asian descent and concerning increase in anti-Asian sentiment and racism in the United States and around the world have no place in a peaceful, civilized, and tolerant world;

(2) the United States is a diverse country with a proud tradition of immigration, and the strength and vibrancy of the United States is enhanced by the diverse ethnic backgrounds and tolerance of its citizens, including Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders;

(3) the United States Government should encourage foreign governments to use the official and scientific names for the COVID–19 pandemic, as recommended by the World Health Organization and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; and

(4) the United States Government and other governments around the world must actively oppose racism and intolerance, and use all available and appropriate tools to combat the spread of anti-Asian racism and discrimination.

SEC. 315. ANNUAL REPORTING ON CENSORSHIP OF FREE SPEECH WITH RESPECT TO INTERNATIONAL ABUSES OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

Section 116(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (227 U.S.C. 2151n(d)) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (11)(C), by striking "and" at the end;

(2) in paragraph (12)(C)(ii), by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

"(13) wherever applicable, instances in which the government of each country has attempted to extraterritorially intimidate or pressure a company or entity to censor or self-censor the speech of its employees, contractors, customers, or

associated staff with regards to the abuse of human rights in such country, or sought retaliation against such employees or contractors for the same, including any instance in which the Government of the People's Republic of China has sought to extraterritorially censor or punish speech that is otherwise legal in the United States on the topics of—

"(A) repression and violation of fundamental freedoms in Hong Kong;

"(B) repression and persecution of religious and ethnic minorities in China, including in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and the Tibet Autonomous Region;

"(C) efforts to proliferate and use surveillance technologies to surveil activists, journalists, opposition politicians, or to profile persons of different ethnicities; and

"(D) other gross violations of human rights; and

"(14) wherever applicable, instances in which a company or entity located in or based in a third country has censored or self-censored the speech of its employees, contractors, customers, or associated staff on the topic of abuse of human rights in each country or sought to retaliate against such employees for the same, due to intimidation or pressure from or the fear of intimidation by the foreign government.".

SEC. 316. POLICY TOWARD THE XXIV OLYMPIC WINTER GAMES AND THE XIII PARALYMPIC WINTER GAMES.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) In October 2020, 39 countries at the United Nations Third Committee of the General Assembly appealed for action on the mass arbitrary detentions and other crimes against the Uyghur Muslim population of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

(2) The 2018 concluding observations of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination decried reports of mass arbitrary detention of Uyghurs.

(3) Over 400 international nongovernmental organizations have joined together to decry the mass arbitrary detentions of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

(4) The Olympic Charter states that the practice of sport "is a human right" that "shall be secured without discrimination of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, sexual orientation, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status", a right that by definition cannot be secured in a country in which over 1,000,000 people are imprisoned in camps because of their race, language, and religion.

(5) The 2008 Olympics in Beijing were accompanied by widespread tracking, arrest, and intimidation of foreign journalists and bloggers, as well as restrictions on movement of journalists, contrary to explicit commitments made by the Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) to the International Olympic Committee.

(6) The Government of the PRC denied visas for some journalists granted press accreditation for the 2008 Olympic Games, and the Beijing Organising Committee of the Olympic Games repeatedly refused to address incidents involving freedom of expression.

(7) The International Olympic Committee faced broad criticism for failing to adequately anticipate infringements by the Government of the PRC's on freedom of expression and press for international media and 2008 Olympics participants, and failing to hold the Government of the PRC to their own commitments to safeguard human rights during the 2008 games.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the International Olympic Committee should—

(1) consider that the Olympic Charter's principles of solidarity and nondiscrimination are hard to reconcile with holding the 2022 Winter Games in a country the government of which stands credibly accused of perpetrating crimes against humanity and genocide against ethnic and religious minorities;

(2) take into account the recent precedent of the 2008 games, at which Olympic athletes, spectators, and international media had their fundamental freedoms severely challenged, and the likely limitations the Government of the PRC will seek to enforce on participants speaking out about ongoing persecution of the Uyghurs and other human rights abuses in the PRC, despite repeated commitments by the Government of the PRC;

(3) emphasize that the International Olympic Committee is not opposed to moving an Olympic competition in all circumstances, and should immediately rebid the 2022 Winter Olympic Games to be hosted by a country that recognizes and respects human rights;

(4) affirm the International Olympic Committee's—

(A) desire to stay above politics does not permit turning a blind eye to mass atrocity crimes, which cannot and should not be dismissed as mere political concerns; and

(B) commitment to the fundamental rights instruments of the international system, which are beyond partisan or domestic policy, and upon which the success of the entire Olympic project depends;

(5) propose a set of clear, executable actions to be taken by the International Olympic Committee upon infringement of freedom of expression by a host country's government during any Olympics event, including the 2022 Winter Olympics, against athletes, participants, and international media; and

(6) rescind Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter, which restricts the freedom of expression by athletes when competing during Olympics events, and affirm the rights of athletes to political and other speech during athletic competitions, including speech that is critical of their host countries.

(c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of the United States—

(1) to implement a presidential and cabinet level diplomatic boycott of the XXIV Olympic Winter Games and the XIII Paralympic Winter Games in the PRC;

(2) to encourage other nations, especially democratic partners and allies, to do the same; and

(3) to call for an end to the Chinese Communist Party's ongoing human rights abuses, including the Uyghur genocide.

SEC. 317. REVIEW AND CONTROLS ON EXPORT OF ITEMS WITH CRITICAL CAPABILITIES TO ENABLE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.

(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to use export controls to the extent necessary to further the protection of internationally recognized human rights.

(b) REVIEW OF ITEMS WITH CRITICAL CAPABILITIES TO ENABLE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and as appropriate thereafter, the Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Director of National Intelligence, and the heads of other Federal agencies as appropriate, shall conduct a review of items subject to controls for crime control reasons pursuant to section 742.7 of the Export Administration Regulations.

(c) CONTROLS.—In furtherance of the policy set forth in subsection (a), not later than 60 days after completing the review required by subsection (b), the Secretary, in coordination with the heads of other Federal agencies as appropriate, shall determine whether additional export controls are needed to protect human rights, including whether—

(1) controls for crime control reasons pursuant to section 742.7 of the Export Administration Regulations should be imposed on additional items, including items with critical capabilities to enable human rights abuses involving—

(A) censorship or social control;

(B) surveillance, interception, or restriction of communications;

(C) monitoring or restricting access to or use of the internet;

(D) identification of individuals through facial or voice recognition or biometric indicators; or

(E) DNA sequencing; or

(2) end-use and end-user controls should be imposed on the export, reexport, or in-country transfer of certain items with critical capabilities to enable human rights abuses that are subject to the Export Administration Regulations if the person seeking to export, reexport, or transfer the item has knowledge, or the Secretary determines and so informs that person, that the end-user or ultimate consignee will use the item to enable human rights abuses.

(d) COOPERATION OF OTHER AGENCIES.—Upon request from the Secretary, the head of a Federal agency shall provide full support and cooperation to the Secretary in carrying out this section.

(e) INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION ON CONTROLS TO PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS.—It shall be the policy of the United States to seek to secure the cooperation of other governments to impose export controls that are consistent, to the extent possible, with the controls imposed under this section.

(f) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 1752(2)(A) of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 20 4811(2)(A)) is amended—

(1) in clause (iv), by striking "; or" and inserting a semicolon;

(2) in clause (v), by striking the period and inserting "; or"; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

"(vi) serious human rights abuses.".

(g) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) END-USER; KNOWLEDGE; ULTIMATE CONSIGNEE.—The terms "end-user", "knowledge", and "ultimate consignee" have the meanings given those terms in section 772.1 of the Export Administration Regulations.

(2) EXPORT; EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS; IN-COUNTRY TRANSFER; ITEM; REEXPORT.—The terms "export", "Export Administration Regulations", "in-country transfer", "item", and "reexport" have the meanings given those terms in section 1742 of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801).

(3) SECRETARY.—The term "Secretary" means the Secretary of Commerce.

SEC. 318. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COMMERCIAL EXPORT CONTROL POLICY.

It is the sense of Congress that the President should reexamine United States commercial export control policy for any country, including the People's Republic of China, that is known to supply arms or dual use items to any country the government of which has been designated pursuant to any applicable provision of law as a state sponsor of terrorism or to any entity designated by the Secretary of State as a foreign terrorist organization.

SEC. 319. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO SYSTEMATIC RAPE, COERCIVE ABORTION, FORCED STERILIZATION, OR INVOLUNTARY CONTRACEPTIVE IMPLANTATION IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116–145; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is amended by inserting after subparagraph (E) the following:

"(F) Systematic rape, coercive abortion, forced sterilization, or involuntary contraceptive implantation policies and practices.".

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICABILITY.—The amendment made by subsection (a)—

(1) takes effect on the date of the enactment of this Act; and

(2) applies with respect to the first report required by section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 submitted after such date of enactment.

SEC. 320. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING CENSORSHIP OF POLITICAL SPEECH.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) The People's Republic of China censors political speech of throughout the country through many means including through mass censorship of the Internet, the Great Firewall, radical curtailment of the freedom of the press.

(2) The PRC employs several other means to stifle dissent including instigating private person to target dissenting individuals and private companies to target offending companies.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) censorship of political speech in China is contrary to the human rights of the Chinese people;

(2) censorship of political speech, whether conducted by the government, or private or quasi-private entities is antithetical to United States values and interests; and

(3) the democratic way to conduct political disputes is through argument and persuasion, not force or political speech.

SEC. 321. REPORT ON MANNER AND EXTENT TO WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA EXPLOITS HONG KONG TO CIRCUMVENT UNITED STATES LAWS AND PROTECTIONS.

Title III of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5731 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

"SEC. 303. REPORT ON MANNER AND EXTENT TO WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA EXPLOITS HONG KONG TO CIRCUMVENT UNITED STATES LAWS AND PROTECTIONS.

"(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the manner and extent to which the Government of China uses the status of Hong Kong to circumvent the laws and protections of the United States.

"(b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection (a) shall include the following:

"(1) In consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence—

"(A) an assessment of how the Government of China uses Hong Kong to circumvent United States export controls; and

"(B) a list of all significant incidents in which the Government of China used Hong Kong to circumvent such controls during the reporting period.

"(2) In consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Commerce—

"(A) an assessment of how the Government of China uses Hong Kong to circumvent duties on merchandise exported to the United States from the People's Republic of China; and

"(B) a list of all significant incidents in which the Government of China used Hong Kong to circumvent such duties during the reporting period.

"(3) In consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence—

"(A) an assessment of how the Government of China uses Hong Kong to circumvent sanctions imposed by the United States or pursuant to multilateral regimes; and

"(B) a list of all significant incidents in which the Government of China used Hong Kong to circumvent such sanctions during the reporting period.

"(4) In consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence, an assessment of how the Government of China uses formal or informal means to extradite or coercively move individuals, including United States persons, from Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China.

"(5) In consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Director of Homeland Security—

"(A) an assessment of how the intelligence, security, and law enforcement agencies of the Government of China, including the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Public Security, and the People's Armed Police, use the Hong Kong Security Bureau and other security agencies in Hong Kong to conduct espionage on foreign nationals, including United States persons, conduct influence operations, or violate civil liberties guaranteed under the laws of Hong Kong; and

"(B) a list of all significant incidents of such espionage, influence operations, or violations of civil liberties during the reporting period.

"(c) FORM OF REPORT; AVAILABILITY.—

"(1) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified index.

"(2) AVAILABILITY.—The unclassified portion of the report required by subsection (a) shall be posted on a publicly available internet website of the Department of State.

"(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

"(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term 'appropriate congressional committees' means—

"(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Finance, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

"(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

"(2) FOREIGN NATIONAL.—The term 'foreign national' means a person that is neither—

"(A) an individual who is a citizen or national of the People's Republic of China; or

"(B) an entity organized under the laws of the People's Republic of China or of a jurisdiction within the People's Republic of China.

"(3) REPORTING PERIOD.—The term 'reporting period' means the 5-year period preceding submission of the report required by subsection (a).

"(4) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term 'United States person' means—

"(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or

"(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.".

SEC. 322. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING ANNUAL COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES.

It is the sense of Congress that the Department of State's annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices should include relevant information regarding whether a particular country has provided assistance to the PRC or any entity under the influence of the Chinese Communist Party in its genocide against the Uyghurs, including through the forcible repatriation of Uyghurs to the PRC without reasonable opportunity for them to be assessed and protected as refugees.

SEC. 323. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING PRESS FREEDOM IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that the People's Republic of China maintains one of the worst media environments in the world and seeks to curtail political speech inside and outside the country, including by—

(1) targeting independent and foreign media in China through systematic harassment including the denial of visas to foreign journalists, imprisonment, the

denial of medical care to imprisoned journalists, and curtailing access to legal representation;

(2) pervasively monitoring and censoring online and social media content, including through the banning of virtual private networks;

(3) using the full force of the State to stifle internal dissent including dissent online, particularly dissent that could lead to political change and content that criticizes China's leaders, however trivial, reportedly even to the point of censoring comparisons of Xi Jingping's looks with Winnie the Pooh;

(4) spreading propaganda to foreign audiences through the United Front Work Department and related activities;

(5) seeking to intimidate American-based journalists working for Radio Free Asia and reporting on gross human rights violations in China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region by jailing or otherwise harassing members of their families; and

(6) championing a "sovereign Internet" model and exporting technology to enhance the ability of like-minded authoritarian regimes to suppress dissent online and monitor the activity of their people.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the freedom of the press is an unalienable right that is necessary for citizens to hold their government to account;

(2) the PRC should cease its repression of journalists, citizen journalists, news organizations; and

(3) the PRC should cease the censorship of political satire, including comparisons of Xi Jingping's looks with Winnie the Pooh.

SEC. 324. UNITED STATES SPECIAL ENVOY FOR XINJIANG PROVINCE.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall establish within the Department of State the position of United States Special Envoy for Xinjiang Province (in this section referred to as the "Special Envoy").

(b) APPOINTMENT.—The Secretary may appoint an individual to the position of Special Envoy from among officers and employees of the Department of State. The Secretary may allow such officer or employee to retain the position (and the responsibilities associated with such position) held by such officer or employee prior to the appointment of such officer or employee to the position of Special Envoy.

(c) DUTIES.—The Special Envoy shall coordinate diplomatic, political, public diplomacy, financial assistance, sanctions, counterterrorism, security resources, and congressional reporting requirements within the United States Government to respond to the gross violations of universally recognized human rights occurring in Xinjiang Province of the People's Republic of China, including by addressing—

(1) the mass detentions of Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities;

(2) the deployment of technologically advanced surveillance and police detection methods; and

(3) the counterterrorism and counter-radicalism claims used to justify the policies of the Chinese Government in Xinjiang Province.

SEC. 325. CHINA CENSORSHIP MONITOR AND ACTION GROUP.

(a) REPORT ON CENSORSHIP AND INTIMIDATION OF UNITED STATES PERSONS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.—

(1) REPORT.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall select and seek to enter into an agreement with a qualified research entity that is independent of the Department of State to write a report on censorship and intimidation in the United States and its possessions and territories of United States persons, including United States companies that conduct business in the People's Republic of China, which is directed or directly supported by the Government of the People's Republic of China.

(B) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required under subparagraph (A) shall—

(i) assess major trends, patterns, and methods of the Government of the People's Republic of China's efforts to direct or directly support censorship and intimidation of United States persons, including United States companies that conduct business in the People's Republic of China, which are exercising their right to freedom of speech;

(ii) assess, including through the use of illustrative examples, as appropriate, the impact on and consequences for United States persons, including United States companies that conduct business in the People's Republic of China, that criticize—

(I) the Government of the People's Republic of China;

(II) the Chinese Communist Party;

(III) the authoritarian model of government of the People's Republic of China; or

(IV) a particular policy advanced by the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of the People's Republic of China;

(iii) identify the implications for the United States of the matters described in clauses (i) and (ii);

(iv) assess the methods and evaluate the efficacy of the efforts by the Government of the People's Republic of China to limit freedom of expression in the private sector, including with respect to media, social media, film, education, travel, financial services, sports and entertainment, technology, telecommunication, and internet infrastructure interests;

(v) include policy recommendations for the United States Government, including recommendations regarding collaboration with United States allies and partners, to address censorship and intimidation by the Government of the People's Republic of China; and

(vi) include policy recommendations for United States persons, including United States companies that conduct business in China, to address censorship and intimidation by the Government of the People's Republic of China.

(C) APPLICABILITY TO UNITED STATES ALLIES AND PARTNERS.—To the extent practicable, the report required under subparagraph (A) should identify implications and policy recommendations that are relevant to United States allies and partners facing censorship and intimidation directed or directly supported by the Government of the People's Republic of China.

(2) SUBMISSION OF REPORT.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit the report written by the qualified research entity selected pursuant to paragraph (1)(A) to the appropriate congressional committees.

(B) PUBLICATION.—The report referred to in subparagraph (A) shall be made accessible to the public online through relevant United States Government websites.

(3) FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SUPPORT.—The Secretary of State and other Federal agencies selected by the President shall provide the qualified research entity selected pursuant to paragraph (1)(A) with timely access to appropriate information, data, resources, and analyses necessary for such entity to write the report described in paragraph (1) in a thorough and independent manner.

(b) CHINA CENSORSHIP MONITOR AND ACTION GROUP.—

(1) CERTIFICATION.—Upon receipt and review of the report described in subsection (a), the President shall make a determination on whether the Government of the People's Republic of China engages in the censorship and intimidation of United States persons, including United States companies that conduct business in the People's Republic of China, which are exercising their right to freedom of speech, taking into account the contents of the report and other information available to the government of the United States.

(2) IN GENERAL.—If there is a determination under paragraph (1) that the Government of the People's Republic of China engages in the censorship and intimidation of United States persons, including United States companies that conduct business in the People's Republic of China, which are exercising their right to freedom of speech, the President shall establish an interagency task force, which shall be known as the "China Censorship Monitor and Action Group" (referred to in this section as the "Task Force").

(3) MEMBERSHIP.—If, upon receipt and review of the report described in subsection (a), he deems it in the national interest, the President shall—

(A) appoint the chair of the Task Force from among the staff of the National Security Council;

(B) appoint the vice chair of the Task Force from among the staff of the National Economic Council; and

(C) direct the head of each of the following executive branch agencies to appoint personnel to participate in the Task Force:

(i) The Department of State.

(ii) The Department of Commerce.

(iii) The Department of the Treasury.

(iv) The Department of Justice.

(v) The Office of the United States Trade Representative.

(vi) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and other appropriate elements of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)).

(vii) The Federal Communications Commission.

(viii) The United States Agency for Global Media.

(ix) Other agencies designated by the President.

(4) RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Task Force shall—

(A) oversee the development and execution of an integrated Federal Government strategy to monitor and address the impacts of efforts directed, or directly supported, by the Government of the People's Republic of China to censor or intimidate, in the United States or in any of its possessions or territories, any United States person, including United States companies that conduct business in the People's Republic of China, which are exercising their right to freedom of speech; and

(B) submit the strategy developed pursuant to subparagraph (A) to the appropriate congressional committees not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(5) MEETINGS.—The Task Force shall meet not less frequently than twice per year.

(6) CONSULTATIONS.—The Task Force should regularly consult, to the extent necessary and appropriate, with—

(A) Federal agencies that are not represented on the Task Force;

(B) independent agencies of the United States Government that are not represented on the Task Force;

(C) relevant stakeholders in the private sector and the media; and

(D) relevant stakeholders among United States allies and partners facing similar challenges related to censorship or intimidation by the Government of the People's Republic of China.

(7) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.—

(A) ANNUAL REPORT.—The Task Force shall submit an annual report to the appropriate congressional committees that describes, with respect to the reporting period—

(i) the strategic objectives and policies pursued by the Task Force to address the challenges of censorship and intimidation of United States persons while in the United States or any of its possessions or territories, which is directed or directly supported by the Government of the People's Republic of China;

(ii) the activities conducted by the Task Force in support of the strategic objectives and policies referred to in clause (i); and

(iii) the results of the activities referred to in clause (ii) and the impact of such activities on the national interests of the United States.

(B) FORM OF REPORT.—Each report submitted pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.

(C) CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFINGS.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Task Force shall provide briefings to the appropriate congressional committees regarding the activities of the Task Force to execute the strategy developed pursuant to paragraph (3)(A).

(c) SUNSET.—This section shall terminate on the date that is five years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) QUALIFIED RESEARCH ENTITY.—The term "qualified research entity" means an entity that—

(A) is a nonpartisan research organization or a federally funded research and development center;

(B) has appropriate expertise and analytical capability to write the report required under section 3; and

(C) is free from any financial, commercial, or other entanglements, which could undermine the independence of such report or create a conflict of interest or the appearance of a conflict of interest, with—

(i) the Government of the People's Republic of China;

(ii) the Chinese Communist Party;

(iii) any company incorporated in the People's Republic of China or a subsidiary of such company; or

(iv) any company or entity incorporated outside of the People's Republic of China that is believed to have a substantial financial or commercial interest in the People's Republic of China.

(2) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term "United States person" means—

(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or

(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.

SEC. 326. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE ON BIS LICENSING INFORMATION.

The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives shall make aggregate statistics on licensing information, ensuring all confidential business information is protected, for PRC companies on the Entity List contained in the Export Administration Regulations available to the public.

TITLE IV—INVESTING IN OUR ECONOMIC STATECRAFT

SEC. 401. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S INDUSTRIAL POLICY.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the challenges presented by a nonmarket economy like the economy of the People's Republic of China (PRC), which has captured such a large share of global economic exchange, are in many ways unprecedented and require sufficiently elevated and sustained long-term focus and engagement;

(2) in order to truly address the most detrimental aspects of Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-directed mercantilist economic strategy, the United States must adopt policies that—

(A) expose the full scope and scale of intellectual property theft and mass subsidization of Chinese firms, and the resulting harm to the United States, foreign markets, and the global economy;

(B) ensure that PRC companies face costs and consequences for anticompetitive behavior;

(C) provide options for affected United States persons to address and respond to unreasonable and discriminatory CCP-directed industrial policies; and

(D) strengthen the protection of critical technology and sensitive data, while still fostering an environment that provides incentives for secure but open investment, innovation, and competition;

(3) the United States must work with its allies and partners and multilateral venues and fora—

(A) to reinforce long-standing generally accepted principles of fair competition and market behavior and address the PRC's anticompetitive economic and industrial policies that undermine decades of global growth and innovation;

(B) to ensure that the PRC is not granted the same treatment as that of a free-market economy until it ceases the implementation of laws, regulations, policies, and practices that provide unfair advantage to PRC firms in furtherance of national objectives and impose unreasonable, discriminatory, and illegal burdens on market-based international commerce; and

(C) to align policies with respect to curbing state-directed subsidization of the private sector, such as advocating for global rules related to transparency and adherence to notification requirements, including through the efforts currently being advanced by the United States, Japan, and the European Union;

(4) the United States and its allies and partners must collaborate to provide incentives to their respective companies to cooperate in areas such as—

(A) advocating for protection of intellectual property rights in markets around the world;

(B) fostering open technical standards; and

(C) increasing joint investments in overseas markets; and

(5) the United States should develop policies that—

(A) insulate United States entities from PRC pressure against complying with United States laws;

(B) together with the work of allies and partners and multilateral institutions, counter the potential impact of the blocking regime of the PRC established by the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC on January 9, 2021, when it issued Order No. 1 of 2021, entitled "Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extraterritorial Application of Foreign Legislation and other Measures"; and

(C) plan for future actions that the Government of the PRC may take to undermine the lawful application of United States legal authorities, including with respect to the use of sanctions.

SEC. 402. ECONOMIC DEFENSE RESPONSE TEAMS.

(a) PILOT PROGRAM.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall develop and implement a pilot program for the creation of deployable economic defense response teams to help provide emergency technical assistance and support to a country subjected to the threat or use of coercive economic measures (in this section referred to as a "partner country") and to play a liaison role between the legitimate government of that country and the United States Government. Such assistance and support may include the following activities:

(1) Reducing the partner country's vulnerability to coercive economic measures.

(2) Minimizing the damage that such measures by an adversary could cause to the partner country.

(3) Implementing any bilateral or multilateral contingency plans that may exist for responding to the threat or use of such measures.

(4) In coordination with the partner country, developing or improving plans and strategies by the country for reducing vulnerabilities and improving responses to such measures in the future.

(5) Assisting the partner country in dealing with foreign sovereign investment in infrastructure or related projects that may undermine the partner country's sovereignty.

(6) Assisting the partner country in responding to specific efforts from an adversary attempting to employ economic coercion that undermines the partner country's sovereignty, including efforts in the cyber domain, such as efforts that undermine cybersecurity or digital security of the partner country or initiatives that introduce digital technologies in a manner that undermines freedom, security, and sovereignty of the partner country.

(7) Otherwise providing direct and relevant short-to-medium term economic or other assistance from the United States and marshalling other resources in support of effective responses to such measures.

(b) REPORTS REQUIRED.—

(1) REPORT ON ESTABLISHMENT.—Upon establishment of the pilot program required by subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall provide the appropriate congressional committees with a detailed report and briefing describing the pilot program, the major elements of the program, the personnel and institutions involved, and the degree to which the program incorporates the elements described in subsection (a).

(2) FOLLOW-UP REPORT.—Not later than one year after the date on which the report required by paragraph (1) is submitted, the Secretary of State shall provide the appropriate congressional committees with a detailed report and briefing describing the operations over the previous year of the pilot program established pursuant to subsection (a), as well as the Secretary's assessment of its performance and suitability for becoming a permanent program.

(3) FORM.—Each report required under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(c) DECLARATION OF AN ECONOMIC CRISIS REQUIRED.—

(1) NOTIFICATION.—The President may activate an economic defense response team for a period of 180 days under the authorities of this section to assist a partner country in responding to an unusual and extraordinary economic coercive threat by an adversary of the United States upon the declaration of a coercive economic emergency, together with notification to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(2) EXTENSION AUTHORITY.—The President may activate the response team for an additional 180 days upon the submission of a detailed analysis to the committees described in paragraph (1) justifying why the continued deployment of the economic defense response team in response to the economic emergency is in the national security interest of the United States.

(d) SUNSET.—The authorities provided under this section shall expire on December 31, 2026.

(e) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Neither the authority to declare an economic crisis provided for in subsection (d), nor the declaration of an economic crisis pursuant to subsection (d), shall confer or be construed to confer any authority, power, duty, or responsibility to the President other than the authority to activate an economic defense response team as described in this section.

(f) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this section, the term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Agriculture, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 403. COUNTERING OVERSEAS KLEPTOCRACY.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) Authoritarian leaders in foreign countries abuse their power to steal assets from state institutions, enrich themselves at the expense of their countries' economic development, and use corruption as a strategic tool both to solidify their grip on power and to undermine democratic institutions abroad.

(2) Global corruption harms the competitiveness of United States businesses, weakens democratic governance, feeds terrorist recruitment and transnational organized crime, enables drug smuggling and human trafficking, and stymies economic growth.

(3) Illicit financial flows often penetrate countries through what appear to be legitimate financial transactions, as kleptocrats launder money, use shell companies, amass offshore wealth, and participate in a global shadow economy.

(4) The Government of the Russian Federation is a leading model of this type of kleptocratic system, using state-sanctioned corruption to both erode democratic governance from within and discredit democracy abroad, thereby strengthening the authoritarian rule of Vladimir Putin.

(5) Corrupt individuals and entities in the Russian Federation, often with the backing and encouragement of political leadership, use stolen money—

(A) to purchase key assets in other countries, often with a goal of attaining monopolistic control of a sector;

(B) to gain access to and influence the policies of other countries; and

(C) to advance Russian interests in other countries, particularly those that undermine confidence and trust in democratic systems.

(6) Systemic corruption in the People's Republic of China (PRC), often tied to, directed by, or backed by the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Government of the PRC is used—

(A) to provide unfair advantage to certain PRC economic entities;

(B) to increase other countries' economic dependence on the PRC to secure greater deference to the PRC's diplomatic and strategic goals; and

(C) to exploit corruption in foreign governments and among other political elites to enable PRC state-backed firms to pursue predatory and exploitative economic practices.

(7) Thwarting these tactics by Russian, Chinese, and other kleptocratic actors requires the international community to strengthen democratic governance and the rule of law. International cooperation in combating corruption and illicit finance is vital to such efforts, especially by empowering reformers in foreign countries during historic political openings for the establishment of the rule of law in those countries.

(8) Technical assistance programs that combat corruption and strengthen the rule of law, including through assistance provided by the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and the United States Agency for International Development, and through programs like the Department of Justice's Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training and the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, can have lasting and significant impacts for both foreign and United States interests.

(9) There currently exist numerous international instruments to combat corruption, kleptocracy, and illicit finance, including—

(A) the Inter-American Convention against Corruption of the Organization of American States, done at Caracas March 29, 1996;

(B) the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development, done at Paris December 21, 1997 (commonly referred to as the "Anti-Bribery Convention");

(C) the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, done at New York November 15, 2000;

(D) the United Nations Convention against Corruption, done at New York October 31, 2003;

(E) Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, adopted November 26, 2009; and

(F) recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force comprising the International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation.

(b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Finance, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate;

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives.

(2) FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.—The term "foreign assistance" means foreign assistance authorized under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2251 et seq.).

(3) FOREIGN STATE.—The term "foreign state" has the meaning given such term in section 1603(a) of title 28, United States Code.

(4) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term "intelligence community" has the meaning given such term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).

(5) PUBLIC CORRUPTION.—The term "public corruption" includes the unlawful exercise of entrusted public power for private gain, such as through bribery, nepotism, fraud, extortion, or embezzlement.

(6) RULE OF LAW.—The term "rule of law" means the principle of governance in which all persons, institutions, and entities, whether public or private, including the state, are accountable to laws that are—

(A) publicly promulgated;

(B) equally enforced;

(C) independently adjudicated; and

(D) consistent with international human rights norms and standards.

(c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to leverage United States diplomatic engagement and foreign assistance to promote the rule of law;

(2)(A) to promote international instruments to combat corruption, kleptocracy, and illicit finance, including instruments referred to in subsection (a)(9), and other relevant international standards and best practices, as such standards and practices develop; and

(B) to promote the adoption and implementation of such laws, standards, and practices by foreign states;

(3) to support foreign states in promoting good governance and combating public corruption;

(4) to encourage and assist foreign partner countries to identify and close loopholes in their legal and financial architecture, including the misuse of anonymous shell companies, free trade zones, and other legal structures, that are enabling illicit finance to penetrate their financial systems;

(5) to help foreign partner countries to investigate, prosecute, adjudicate, and more generally combat the use of corruption by malign actors, including authoritarian governments, particularly the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the People's Republic of China, as a tool of malign influence worldwide;

(6) to assist in the recovery of kleptocracy-related stolen assets for victims, including through the use of appropriate bilateral arrangements and international agreements, such as the United Nations Convention against Corruption, done at New York October 31, 2003, and the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, done at New York November 15, 2000;

(7) to use sanctions authorities, such as the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (subtitle F of title XII of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note)) and section 7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2020 (division G of Public Law 116–94), to identify and take action against corrupt foreign actors;

(8) to ensure coordination between relevant Federal departments and agencies with jurisdiction over the advancement of good governance in foreign states; and

(9) to lead the creation of a formal grouping of like-minded states—

(A) to coordinate efforts to counter corruption, kleptocracy, and illicit finance; and

(B) to strengthen collective financial defense.

(d) ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTION FUND.—

(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established in the United States Treasury a fund, to be known as the "Anti-Corruption Action Fund", only for the purposes of—

(A) strengthening the capacity of foreign states to prevent and fight public corruption;

(B) assisting foreign states to develop rule of law-based governance structures, including accountable civilian police, prosecutorial, and judicial institutions;

(C) supporting foreign states to strengthen domestic legal and regulatory frameworks to combat public corruption, including the adoption of best practices under international law; and

(D) supplementing existing foreign assistance and diplomacy with respect to efforts described in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C).

(2) FUNDING.—

(A) TRANSFERS.—Beginning on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, if total criminal fines and penalties in excess of $50,000,000 are imposed against a person under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (Public Law 95–213) or section 13, 30A, or 32 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m, 78dd–1, and 78ff), whether pursuant to a criminal prosecution, enforcement proceeding, deferred prosecution agreement, nonprosecution agreement, a declination to prosecute or enforce, or any other resolution, the court (in the case of a conviction) or the Attorney General shall impose an additional prevention payment equal to $5,000,000 against such person, which shall be deposited in the Anti-Corruption Action Fund established under paragraph (1).

(B) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—Amounts deposited into the Anti-Corruption Action Fund pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall be available to the Secretary of State only for the purposes described in paragraph (1), without fiscal year limitation or need for subsequent appropriation.

(C) LIMITATION.—None of the amounts made available to the Secretary of State from the Anti-Corruption Action Fund may be used inside the United States, except for administrative costs related to overseas program implementation pursuant to paragraph (1).

(3) SUPPORT.—The Anti-Corruption Action Fund—

(A) may support governmental and nongovernmental parties in advancing the purposes described in paragraph (1); and

(B) shall be allocated in a manner complementary to existing United States foreign assistance, diplomacy, and anti-corruption activities.

(4) ALLOCATION AND PRIORITIZATION.—In programming foreign assistance made available through the Anti-Corruption Action Fund, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Attorney General, shall prioritize projects that—

(A) assist countries that are undergoing historic opportunities for democratic transition, combating corruption, and the establishment of the rule of law; and

(B) are important to United States national interests.

(5) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDERS.—For any technical assistance to a foreign governmental party under this section, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Attorney General, shall prioritize United States Government technical assistance providers as implementers, in particular the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training and the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program at the Department of Justice.

(6) PUBLIC DIPLOMACY.—The Secretary of State shall announce that funds deposited in the Anti-Corruption Action Fund are derived from actions brought under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to demonstrate that the use of such funds are—

(A) contributing to international anti-corruption work; and

(B) reducing the pressure that United States businesses face to pay bribes overseas, thereby contributing to greater competitiveness of United States companies.

(7) REPORTING.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act and not less frequently than annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that contains—

(A) the balance of the funding remaining in the Anti-Corruption Action Fund;

(B) the amount of funds that have been deposited into the Anti-Corruption Action Fund; and

(C) a summary of the obligation and expenditure of such funds.

(8) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.—None of the amounts made available to the Secretary of State from the Anti-Corruption Action Fund pursuant to this section shall be available for obligation, or for transfer to other departments, agencies, or entities, unless the Secretary of State notifies the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, not later than 15 days in advance of such obligation or transfer.

(e) INTERAGENCY ANTI-CORRUPTION TASK FORCE.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Interagency Anti-Corruption Task Force established pursuant to paragraph (2), shall manage a whole-of-government effort to improve coordination among Federal departments and agencies and donor organizations with a role in—

(A) promoting good governance in foreign states; and

(B) enhancing the ability of foreign states to combat public corruption.

(2) INTERAGENCY ANTI-CORRUPTION TASK FORCE.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall establish and convene the Interagency Anti-Corruption Task Force (referred to in this section as the "Task Force"), which shall be composed of representatives appointed by the President from appropriate departments and agencies, including the Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development, the Department of Justice, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, the Department of Commerce, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the intelligence community.

(3) ADDITIONAL MEETINGS.—The Task Force shall meet not less frequently than twice per year.

(4) DUTIES.—The Task Force shall—

(A) evaluate, on a general basis, the effectiveness of existing foreign assistance programs, including programs funded by the Anti-Corruption Action Fund, that have an impact on—

(i) promoting good governance in foreign states; and

(ii) enhancing the ability of foreign states to combat public corruption;

(B) assist the Secretary of State in managing the whole-of-government effort described in paragraph (1);

(C) identify general areas in which such whole-of-government effort could be enhanced; and

(D) recommend specific programs for foreign states that may be used to enhance such whole-of-government effort.

(5) BRIEFING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act and not less frequently than annually thereafter through the end of fiscal year 2026, the Secretary of State shall provide a briefing to the appropriate congressional committees regarding the ongoing work of the Task Force. Each briefing shall include the participation of a representative of each of the departments and agencies described in paragraph (2), to the extent feasible.

(f) DESIGNATION OF EMBASSY ANTI-CORRUPTION POINTS OF CONTACT.—

(1) EMBASSY ANTI-CORRUPTION POINT OF CONTACT.—The chief of mission of each United States embassy shall designate an anti-corruption point of contact for each such embassy.

(2) DUTIES.—The designated anti-corruption points of contact designated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall—

(A) coordinate, in accordance with guidance from the Interagency Anti-Corruption Task Force established pursuant to subsection (e)(2), an interagency approach within United States embassies to combat public corruption in the foreign states in which such embassies are located that is tailored to the needs of such foreign states, including all relevant Federal departments and agencies with a presence in such foreign states, such as the Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development, the Department of Justice, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the intelligence community;

(B) make recommendations regarding the use of the Anti-Corruption Action Fund and other foreign assistance funding related to anti-corruption efforts in their respective countries of responsibility that aligns with United States diplomatic engagement; and

(C) ensure that anti-corruption activities carried out within their respective countries of responsibility are included in regular reporting to the Secretary of State and the Interagency Anti-Corruption Task Force, including United States embassy strategic planning documents and foreign assistance-related reporting, as appropriate.

(3) TRAINING.—The Secretary of State shall develop and implement appropriate training for the designated anti-corruption points of contact.

(g) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.—

(1) REPORT OR BRIEFING ON PROGRESS TOWARD IMPLEMENTATION.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 3 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit a report or provide a briefing to the appropriate congressional committees that summarizes progress made in combating public corruption and in implementing this Act, including—

(A) identifying opportunities and priorities for outreach with respect to promoting the adoption and implementation of relevant international law and standards in combating public corruption, kleptocracy, and illicit finance;

(B) describing—

(i) the bureaucratic structure of the offices within the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development that are engaged in activities to combat public corruption, kleptocracy, and illicit finance; and

(ii) how such offices coordinate their efforts with each other and with other relevant Federal departments and agencies;

(C) providing a description of how the provisions under paragraphs (4) and (5) of subsection (d) have been applied to each project funded by the Anti-Corruption Action Fund;

(D) providing an explanation as to why a United States Government technical assistance provider was not used if technical assistance to a foreign governmental entity is not implemented by a United States Government technical assistance provider;

(E) describing the activities of the Interagency Anti-Corruption Task Force established pursuant to subsection (e)(2);

(F) identifying—

(i) the designated anti-corruption points of contact for foreign states; and

(ii) any training provided to such points of contact; and

(G) recommending additional measures that would enhance the ability of the United States Government to combat public corruption, kleptocracy, and illicit finance overseas.

(2) ONLINE PLATFORM.—The Secretary of State, in conjunction with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, should consolidate existing reports with anti-corruption components into a single online, public platform that includes—

(A) the Annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices required under section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n);

(B) the Fiscal Transparency Report required under section 7031(b) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2019 (division F of Public Law 116–6);

(C) the Investment Climate Statement reports;

(D) the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report;

(E) any other relevant public reports; and

(F) links to third-party indicators and compliance mechanisms used by the United States Government to inform policy and programming, as appropriate, such as—

(i) the International Finance Corporation's Doing Business surveys;

(ii) the International Budget Partnership's Open Budget Index; and

(iii) multilateral peer review anti-corruption compliance mechanisms, such as—

(I) the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions;

(II) the Follow-Up Mechanism for the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption; and

(III) the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, done at New York October 31, 2003.

SEC. 404. ANNUAL REPORT ON CHINESE SURVEILLANCE COMPANIES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter until 2040, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, a report with respect to persons in China that the Secretary determines—

(1) have operated, sold, leased, or otherwise provided, directly or indirectly, items or services related to targeted digital surveillance to—

(A) a foreign government or entity located primarily inside a foreign country where a reasonable person would assess that such transfer could result in a use of the items or services in a manner contrary to human rights; or

(B) a country or any governmental unit thereof, entity, or other person determined by the Secretary of State, in a notice published in the Federal Register, to have used items or services for targeted digital surveillance in a manner contrary to human rights; or

(2) have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or items or services to or in support of, the activities described in paragraph (1).

(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required by subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) The name of each foreign person that the Secretary determines—

(A) meets the requirements of subsection (a)(1); and

(B) meets the requirements of subsection (a)(2).

(2) The name of each intended and actual recipient of items or services described in subsection (a).

(3) A detailed description of such items or services.

(4) An analysis of the appropriateness of including the persons listed in (b)(1) on the entity list maintained by the Bureau of Industry and Security.

(c) CONSULTATION.—In compiling data and making assessments for the purposes of preparing the report required by subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall consult with a wide range of organizations, including with respect to—

(1) classified and unclassified information provided by the Director of National Intelligence;

(2) information provided by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor's Internet Freedom, Business and Human Rights section;

(3) information provided by the Department of Commerce, including the Bureau of Industry and Security;

(4) information provided by the advisory committees established by the Secretary to advise the Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security on controls under the Export Administration Regulations, including the Emerging Technology and Research Advisory Committee;

(5) information on human rights and technology matters, as solicited from civil society and human rights organizations through regular consultative processes; and

(6) information contained in the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices published annually by the Department of State.

(d) FORM AND PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF REPORT.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form. The report shall be posted by the President not later than 14 days after being submitted to Congress on a text-based, searchable, and publicly available internet website.

(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) TARGETED DIGITAL SURVEILLANCE.—The term "targeted digital surveillance" means the use of items or services that enable an individual or entity to detect, monitor, intercept, collect, exploit, preserve, protect, transmit, retain, or otherwise gain access to the communications, protected information, work product, browsing data, research, identifying information, location history, or online and offline activities of other individuals, organizations, or entities, with or without the explicit authorization of such individuals, organizations, or entities.

(2) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term "foreign person" means an individual or entity that is not a United States person.

(3) IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO HUMAN RIGHTS.—The term "in a manner contrary to human rights", with respect to targeted digital surveillance, means engaging in targeted digital surveillance—

(A) in violation of basic human rights, including to silence dissent, sanction criticism, punish independent reporting (and sources for that reporting), manipulate or interfere with democratic or electoral processes, persecute minorities or vulnerable groups, or target advocates or practitioners of human rights and democratic rights (including activists, journalists, artists, minority communities, or opposition politicians); or

(B) in a country in which there is lacking a minimum legal framework governing its use, including established—

(i) authorization under laws that are accessible, precise, and available to the public;

(ii) constraints limiting its use under principles of necessity, proportionality, and legitimacy;

(iii) oversight by bodies independent of the government's executive agencies;

(iv) involvement of an independent and impartial judiciary branch in authorizing its use; or

(v) legal remedies in case of abuse.

TITLE V—ENSURING STRATEGIC SECURITY

SEC. 501. COOPERATION ON A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DIALOGUE.

(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to pursue, in coordination with United States allies and partners, arms control negotiations and sustained and regular engagement with the People's Republic of China (PRC)—

(A) to enhance understanding of each other's respective nuclear policies, doctrine, and capabilities;

(B) to improve transparency; and

(C) to help manage the risks of miscalculation and misperception;

(2) to formulate a strategy to engage the Government of the PRC on relevant issues that lays the groundwork for a constructive arms control framework, including—

(A) fostering dialogue on arms control leading to the convening of strategic security talks;

(B) negotiating norms for outer space;

(C) developing pre-launch notification regimes aimed at reducing nuclear miscalculation; and

(D) expanding lines of communication between both governments for the purposes of reducing the risks of conventional war and increasing transparency;

(3) to pursue relevant negotiations in coordination with United States allies and partners to ensure the security of United States and allied interests to slow the PRC's military modernization and expansion, including on—

(A) ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles;

(B) integrated air and missile defense;

(C) hypersonic missiles;

(D) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance;

(E) space-based capabilities;

(F) cyber capabilities; and

(G) command, control, and communications; and

(4) to ensure that the United States policy continues to reassure United States allies and partners.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) it is in the interest of the United States and China to cooperate in reducing risks of conventional and nuclear escalation;

(2) a physical, cyber, electronic, or any other People's Liberation Army (PLA) attack on United States early warning satellites, other portions of the nuclear command and control enterprise, or critical infrastructure poses a high risk to inadvertent but rapid escalation;

(3) the United States and its allies and partners should promote international norms on military operations in space, the employment of cyber capabilities, and the military use of artificial intelligence, as an element of risk reduction regarding nuclear command and control; and

(4) United States allies and partners should share the burden of promoting and protecting norms regarding the weaponization of space, highlighting unsafe

behavior that violates international norms, such as in rendezvous and proximity operations, and promoting responsible behavior in space and all other domains.

SEC. 502. REPORT ON UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO ENGAGE THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON NUCLEAR ISSUES AND BALLISTIC MISSILE ISSUES.

(a) REPORT ON THE FUTURE OF UNITED STATES-PRC ARMS CONTROL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report, and if necessary a separate classified annex, that outlines the approaches and strategies such Secretaries will pursue to engage the Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on arms control and risk reduction, including—

(1) areas of potential dialogue between the Governments of the United States and the PRC, including on ballistic, hypersonic glide, and cruise missiles, conventional forces, nuclear, space, and cyberspace issues, as well as other new strategic domains, which could reduce the likelihood of war, limit escalation if a conflict were to occur, and constrain a destabilizing arms race in the Indo-Pacific region;

(2) how the United States Government can engage the Government of the PRC in a constructive arms control dialogue;

(3) identifying strategic military capabilities of the PRC that the United States Government is most concerned about and how limiting these capabilities may benefit United States and allied security interests;

(4) mechanisms to avoid, manage, or control nuclear, conventional, and unconventional military escalation between the United States and the PRC;

(5) the personnel and expertise required to effectively engage the PRC in strategic stability and arms control dialogues; and

(6) opportunities and methods to encourage transparency from the PRC.

(b) REPORT ON ARMS CONTROL TALKS WITH PRC.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes—

(1) a concrete plan for arms control talks with the PRC;

(2) if a bilateral arms control dialogue does not arise, what alternative plans the Department of State envisages for ensuring the security of the United States and its allies through international arms control negotiations;

(3) effects on the credibility of United States extended deterrence assurances to allies and partners if arms control negotiations do not materialize and the implications for regional security architectures;

(4) efforts at engaging the PRC to join arms control talks, whether on a bilateral or international basis; and

(5) the interest level of the Government of PRC in joining arms control talks, whether on a bilateral or international basis, including through—

(A) a formal invitation to appropriate officials from the PRC, and to each of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, to observe a United States-Russian Federation New START Treaty on-site inspection to demonstrate the security benefits of transparency into strategic nuclear forces;

(B) discussions on how to advance international negotiations on the fissile material cut-off;

(C) an agreement with the PRC that allows for advance notifications of ballistic missile launches, through the Hague Code of Conduct or other data exchanges or doctrine discussions related to strategic nuclear forces;

(D) an agreement not to target or interfere in nuclear command, control, and communications (commonly referred to as "NC3") infrastructure; or

(E) any other cooperative measure that benefits United States-PRC strategic stability.

(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 503. COUNTERING THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S PROLIFERATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES AND NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TO THE MIDDLE EAST.

(a) MTCR TRANSFERS.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a written determination, and any documentation to support that determination detailing—

(1) whether any foreign person in the People's Republic of China (PRC) knowingly exported, transferred, or engaged in trade of any item designated under Category I of the MTCR Annex to any foreign person in the previous three fiscal years; and

(2) the sanctions the President has imposed or intends to impose pursuant to section 11B(b) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 4612(b)) against any foreign person who knowingly engaged in the export, transfer, or trade of that item or items.

(b) PRC'S NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE COOPERATION.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report detailing—

(1) whether any foreign person in the PRC engaged in cooperation with any other foreign person in the previous three fiscal years in the construction of any nuclear-related fuel cycle facility or activity that has not been notified to the International Atomic Energy Agency and would be subject to complementary access if an Additional Protocol was in force; and

(2) the policy options required to prevent and respond to any future effort by the PRC to export to any foreign person an item classified as "plants for the separation of isotopes of uranium" or "plants for the reprocessing of irradiated nuclear reactor fuel elements" under Part 110 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission export licensing authority.

(c) FORM OF REPORT.—The determination required under subsection (b) and the report required under subsection (c) shall be unclassified with a classified annex.

(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) The term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and

(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(2) FOREIGN PERSON; PERSON.—The terms "foreign person" and "person" mean—

(A) a natural person that is an alien;

(B) a corporation, business association, partnership, society, trust, or any other nongovernmental entity, organization, or group, that is organized under the laws of a foreign country or has its principal place of business in a foreign country;

(C) any foreign governmental entity operating as a business enterprise; and

(D) any successor, subunit, or subsidiary of any entity described in subparagraph (B) or (C).

TITLE VI—INVESTING IN A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE

SEC. 601. ENSURING NATIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC PRIORITIES WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND OTHER COUNTRIES ACCOUNT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND CLIMATE CHANGE.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) The Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5°C, published by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change on October 8, 2018, and the Fourth National Climate Assessment, first published by the United States Global Change Research Program in 2018, concluded that—

(A) the release of greenhouse gas emissions, most notably the combustion of fossil fuels and the degradation of natural resources that absorb atmospheric carbon from human activity, are the dominant causes of climate change during the past century;

(B) changes in the Earth's climate are—

(i) causing sea levels to rise;

(ii) increasing the global average temperature of the Earth;

(iii) increasing the incidence and severity of wildfires; and

(iv) intensifying the severity of extreme weather, including hurricanes, cyclones, typhoons, flooding, droughts, and other disasters that threaten human life, healthy communities, and critical infrastructure.

(2) An increase in the global average temperature of 2 degrees Celsius compared to pre-industrialized levels would cause—

(A) the displacement, and the forced internal migration, of an estimated 143,000,000 people in Latin America, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa by 2050 if insufficient action is taken (according to the World Bank);

(B) the displacement of an average of 17,800,000 people worldwide by floods every year (according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre) because of the exacerbating effects of climate change;

(C) more than $500,000,000,000 in lost annual economic output in the United States (a 10 percent contraction from 2018 levels) by 2100 (according to the Fourth National Climate Assessment);

(D) an additional 100,000,000 people worldwide to be driven into poverty by 2030 (according to the World Bank);

(E) greater food insecurity and decreased agricultural production due to climate change's effects on the increased frequency and intensity of extreme weather events;

(F) the proliferation of agricultural pests and crop diseases, loss of biodiversity, degrading ecosystems, and water scarcity; and

(G) more than 350,000,000 additional people worldwide to be exposed to deadly heat stress by 2050.

(3) According to the International Energy Agency, the United States, China, India, and the European Union (including the United Kingdom) account for more than 58 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions. China, which is the world's top greenhouse gases emitter and has an outsized impact on the United States' core interest in climate stability—

(A) is likely to achieve its carbon emissions mitigation pledge to the Paris Agreement, contained in its 2015 nationally determined contribution, to "peak" emissions around 2030 ahead of schedule;

(B) announced, on September 22, 2020, and restated on April 22, 2021, a pledge to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060;

(C) announced on April 22, 2021, its intent to strictly control coal fired power generation projects, as well as strictly limit the increase in coal consumption over the 14th five year plan period and phase it down in the 15th five year plan period; and

(D) however, remains uncommitted to internationally recognized metrics for achieving these goals.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) to address the climate crisis, the United States must leverage the full weight of its diplomatic engagement and foreign assistance to promote our national security and economic interests related to climate change;

(2) in the absence of United States leadership on global issues driving international climate-related policymaking, it would lead to a substantial and harmful decline in the Nation's global competitiveness;

(3) promoting international instruments on climate action and other relevant international standards and best practices, as such standards and practices develop, serve the interests of the American people and protect United States environmental resources and the planet;

(4) promoting the adoption and implementation of international climate-related agreements, standards, and practices by foreign states ensures a level playing field for United States businesses and other stakeholders;

(5) working with international allies and partners to promote environmental justice and climate justice serves the American people's interests;

(6) finding common ground with the People's Republic of China (PRC) on climate action where possible is important, but the United States must also continue to hold the PRC accountable where its actions undermine the interests of the United States and its allies and partners;

(7) and in furtherance of the previous clauses, the United States should—

(A) explore opportunities for constructive cooperation on climate action initiatives with the PRC and other countries while ensuring the United States maintains its competitive advantage in climate-related fields of expertise and industry, including—

(i) support for international cooperative policies, measures, and technologies to decarbonize industry and power, including through circular economy, energy storage and grid reliability, carbon capture, and green hydrogen; and

(ii) increased deployment of clean energy, including renewable and advanced nuclear power; green and climate resilient agriculture; energy efficient buildings; green, and low-carbon transportation;

(B) cooperate on addressing emissions of methane and other non-CO_2 greenhouse gases;

(C) cooperate on addressing emissions from international civil aviation and maritime activities;

(D) reduce emissions from coal, oil, and gas;

(E) implement the Paris Agreement that significantly advances global climate ambition on mitigation, adaptation, and support;

(F) coordinate among relevant federal, state, and local departments and agencies on climate action related initiatives;

(G) provide resources, authorities and support for enhancing United States ambition and commitment to solving the climate crisis including climate action specific assistance and multilateral fund contributions; and

(H) integrate considerations for climate change into broader United States foreign policy decision-making and the United States national security apparatus.

(c) PURPOSE.—The purpose of this section is to provide authorities, resources, policies, and recommended administrative actions—

(1) to restore United States global leadership on addressing the climate crisis and make United States climate action and climate diplomacy a more central tenet of United States foreign policy;

(2) to improve the United States commitment to taking more ambitious action to help mitigate global greenhouse gas emission and improve developing countries' resilience and adaptation capacities to the effects of climate change;

(3) to ensure the United States maintains competitive advantage over global strategic competitors in diplomacy and new technological development;

(4) to encourage the pursuit of new bilateral cooperation agreements with other world powers on initiatives to advance global clean energy innovation and other measures to mitigate global greenhouse gas emissions and improve climate change adaptation capacities;

(5) to ensure that the United States national security apparatus integrates critically important data on the compounding effects that climate change is having on global security risks by enhancing our understanding of how, where, and when such effects are destabilizing countries and regions in ways that may motivate conflict, displacement, and other drivers of insecurity; and

(6) to authorize funding and programs to support a reaffirmation of the United States' commitments to international cooperation and support for developing and vulnerable countries to take climate action.

(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this title:

(1) CLEAN ENERGY.—The term "clean energy" means—

(A) renewable energy and related systems;

(B) energy production processes that emit zero greenhouse gas emissions, including nuclear power;

(C) systems and processes that capture and permanently store greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuel production and electricity generation units; and

(D) products, processes, facilities, or systems designed to retrofit and improve the energy efficiency and electricity generated from electrical generation units, while using less fuel, less or fewer power production resources, or less feedstocks.

(2) CLIMATE ACTION.—The term "climate action" means enhanced efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-induced impacts, including—

(A) climate-related hazards in all countries;

(B) integrating climate change measures into national policies, strategies and planning; and

(C) improving education, awareness-raising, and human and institutional capacity with respect to climate change mitigation, adaptation, impact reduction, and early warning.

(3) CLIMATE CRISIS.—The term "climate crisis" means the social, economic, health, safety, and security impacts on people, and the threats to biodiversity and natural ecosystem health, which are attributable to the wide-variety of effects on global environmental and atmospheric conditions as a result of disruptions to the Earth's climate from anthropogenic activities that generate greenhouse gas emissions or reduce natural resource capacities to absorb and regulate atmospheric carbon.

(4) CLIMATE DIPLOMACY.—The term "climate diplomacy" means methods of influencing the decisions and behavior of foreign governments and peoples through dialogue, negotiation, cooperation, and other peaceful measures on or about issues related to addressing global climate change, including—

(A) the mitigation of global greenhouse gas emissions;

(B) discussion, analysis, and sharing of scientific data and information on the cause and effects of climate change;

(C) the security, social, economic, and political instability risks associated with the effects of climate change;

(D) economic cooperation efforts and trade matters that are related to or associated with climate change and greenhouse gas mitigation from the global economy;

(E) building resilience capacities and adapting to the effects of change;

(F) sustainable land use and natural resource conservation;

(G) accounting for loss and damage attributed to the effects of climate change;

(H) just transition of carbon intense economies to low or zero carbon economies and accounting for laborers within affected economies;

(I) technological innovations that reduce or eliminate carbon emissions; and

(J) clean energy and energy systems.

(5) CLIMATE FINANCING.—The term "climate financing" means the transfer of new and additional public funds from developed countries to developing countries for projects and programs that—

(A) reduce or eliminate greenhouse gas emissions;

(B) enhance and restore natural carbon sequestration; and

(C) promote adaptation to climate change.

(6) CLIMATE SECURITY.—The term "climate security" means the effects of climate change on—

(A) United States national security concerns and subnational, national, and regional political stability; and

(B) overseas security and conflict situations that are potentially exacerbated by dynamic environmental factors and events, including—

(i) the intensification and frequency of droughts, floods, wildfires, tropical storms, and other extreme weather events;

(ii) changes in historical severe weather, drought, and wildfire patterns;

(iii) the expansion of geographical ranges of droughts, floods, and wildfires into regions that had not regularly experienced such phenomena;

(iv) global sea level rise patterns and the expansion of geographical ranges affected by drought; and

(v) changes in marine environments that effect critical geostrategic waterways, such as the Arctic Ocean, the South China Sea, the South Pacific Ocean, the Barents Sea, and the Beaufort Sea.

(7) GREEN CLIMATE FUND.—The term "Green Climate Fund" means the independent, multilateral fund—

(A) established by parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; and

(B) adopted by decision as part of the financial mechanism of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

(8) PARIS AGREEMENT.—The term "Paris Agreement" means the annex to Decision 1/CP.21 adopted by the 21st Conference of Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Paris, France, on December 12, 2015.

(9) RESILIENCE.—The term "resilience" means the ability of human made and natural systems (including their component parts) to anticipate, absorb, cope, accommodate, or recover from the effects of a hazardous event in a timely and efficient manner, including through ensuring the preservation, restoration, or improvement of its essential basic structures and functions. It is not preparedness or response.

SEC. 602. ENHANCING SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR GLOBAL CLIMATE DISRUPTIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall conduct biennial comprehensive evaluations of present and ongoing disruptions to the global climate system, including—

(1) the intensity, frequency, and range of natural disasters;

(2) the scarcity of global natural resources, including fresh water;

(3) global food, health, and energy insecurities;

(4) conditions that contribute to—

(A) intrastate and interstate conflicts;

(B) foreign political and economic instability;

(C) international migration of vulnerable and underserved populations;

(D) the failure of national governments; and

(E) gender-based violence; and

(5) United States and allied military readiness, operations, and strategy.

(b) PURPOSES.—The purposes of the evaluations conducted under subsection (a) are—

(1) to support the practical application of scientific data and research on climate change's dynamic effects around the world to improve resilience, adaptability, security, and stability despite growing global environmental risks and changes;

(2) to ensure that the strategic planning and mission execution of United States international development and diplomatic missions adequately account for heightened and dynamic risks and challenges associated with the effects of climate change;

(3) to improve coordination between United States science agencies conducting research and forecasts on the causes and effects of climate change and United States national security agencies;

(4) to better understand the disproportionate effects of global climate disruptions on women, girls, indigenous communities, and other historically marginalized populations; and

(5) to inform the development of the climate security strategy described in subsection (d).

(c) SCOPE.—The evaluations conducted under subsection (a) shall—

(1) examine developing countries' vulnerabilities and risks associated with global, regional, and localized effects of climate change; and

(2) assess and make recommendations on necessary measures to mitigate risks and reduce vulnerabilities associated with effects, including—

(A) sea level rise;

(B) freshwater resource scarcity;

(C) wildfires; and

(D) increased intensity and frequency of extreme weather conditions and events, such as flooding, drought, and extreme storm events, including tropical cyclones.

(d) CLIMATE SECURITY STRATEGY.—The Secretary shall use the evaluations required under subsection (a)—

(1) to inform the development and implementation of a climate security strategy for the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, embassies, consulates, regional bureaus, and other offices and programs operating chief of mission authority, including those with roles in conflict avoidance, prevention and security assistance, or humanitarian disaster response, prevention, and assistance; and

(2) in furtherance of such strategy, to assess, develop, budget for, and (upon approval) implement plans, policies, and actions—

(A) to account for the impacts of climate change to global human health, safety, governance, oceans, food production, fresh water and other critical natural resources, settlements, infrastructure, marginalized groups, and economic activity;

(B) to evaluate the climate change vulnerability, security, susceptibility, and resiliency of United States interests and non-defense assets abroad;

(C) to coordinate the integration of climate change risk and vulnerability assessments into all foreign policy and security decision-making processes, including awarding foreign assistance;

(D) to evaluate specific risks to certain regions and countries that are—

(i) vulnerable to the effects of climate change; and

(ii) strategically significant to the United States;

(E) to enhance the resilience capacities of foreign countries to the effects of climate change as a means of reducing the risks of conflict and instability;

(F) to advance principles of good governance by encouraging foreign governments, particularly nations that are least capable of coping with the effects of climate change—

(i) to conduct climate security evaluations; and

(ii) to facilitate the development of climate security action plans to ensure stability and public safety in disaster situations in a humane and responsible fashion;

(G) to evaluate the vulnerability, security, susceptibility, and resiliency of United States interests and nondefense assets abroad;

(H) to build international institutional capacity to address climate security implications and to advance United States interests, regional stability, and global security; and

(I) other activities that advance—

(i) the utilization and integration of climate science in national security planning; and

(ii) the clear understanding of how the effects of climate change can exacerbate security risks and threats.

(e) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and every two years thereafter for the following 20 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives an unclassified report, with a classified annex if necessary, that includes—

(1) a review of the efforts, initiatives, and programs in support of the strategy in subsection (c), as well as—

(A) an assessment of the funding expended by relevant Federal departments and agencies on emerging events exacerbated by climate change and the legal, procedural, and resource constraints faced by the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development throughout respective budgeting, strategic planning, and management cycles to support the prevention of and response to emerging events exacerbated by climate change;

(B) current annual global assessments of emerging events exacerbated by climate change;

(C) recommendations to further strengthen United States capabilities described in this section; and

(D) consideration of analysis, reporting, and policy recommendations by civil society, academic, and nongovernmental organizations and institutions, and partner countries to prevent and respond to emerging events exacerbated by climate change;

(2) recommendations to ensure shared responsibility by—

(A) enhancing multilateral mechanisms for preventing, mitigating, and responding to emerging events exacerbated by climate change; and

(B) strengthening regional organizations; and

(3) the implementation status of the recommendations included in the review under paragraph (1).

(f) REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.—The Director of National Intelligence is encouraged to include, in the Director's annual (or more often as appropriate) unclassified testimony, accompanied by a classified annex, if necessary, to Congress on threats to United States national security—

(1) a review of countries and regions at risk of emerging events exacerbated by climate change; and

(2) whenever possible, specific identification of countries and regions at immediate risk of emerging events exacerbated by climate change.

SEC. 603. BALANCING ACCOUNTABILITY AND COOPERATION WITH CHINA.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) successful mitigation of global greenhouse gas emissions and changes to the environment require global cooperation and coordination of efforts, as well as holding other countries such as the People's Republic of China (PRC) accountable for their actions and commitments to ensure a level playing field with the United States and its allies and partners;

(2) other countries look toward the United States and the PRC, as the world's largest emitters and largest economies, for leadership by example to effectively mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, develop and deploy energy generation technologies, and integrate sustainable adaptation solutions to the inevitable effects of climate change;

(3) given the volume of the PRC's greenhouse gas emissions and the scientific imperative to swiftly reduce global greenhouse gas emissions to net-zero emissions around 2050, China should—

(A) revise its long-term pledge;

(B) seek to immediately peak its emissions;

(C) begin reducing its greenhouse gas emissions significantly to meet a more ambitious long-term 2050 reductions target; and

(D) update its nationally determined contribution along a trajectory that aligns with achieving a more ambitious net-zero by 2050 emissions target;

(4) it is in the United States national interest to emphasize the environment and climate change in its bilateral engagement with the PRC, as global climate risks cannot be mitigated without a significant reduction in PRC domestic and overseas emissions;

(5) the United States and the PRC, to the extent practicable, should coordinate on making and delivering ambitious pledges to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with aspirations towards achieving net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050;

(6) the United States and its allies and partners should work together, using diplomatic and economic tools, to hold the PRC accountable for any failure by the PRC—

(A) to increase ambition in its 2030 nationally determined contribution, in line with net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 before the 26th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC scheduled for November 2021 and meeting a more ambitious nationally determined contribution;

(B) to work faithfully to uphold the principles, goals, and rules of the Paris Agreement;

(C) to avoid and prohibit efforts to undermine or devolve the Paris Agreement's rule or underlying framework, particularly within areas of accountability transparency, and shared responsibility among all parties;

(D) to eliminate greenhouse gas intensive projects from the PRC's Belt and Road Initiative and other overseas investments, including—

(i) working with United States allies and partners to eliminate support for coal power production projects in the Belt and Road Initiative;

(ii) providing financing and project support for cleaner and less risky alternatives; and

(iii) undertaking "parallel initiatives" to enhance capacity building programs and overseas sustainable investment criteria, including in areas such as integrated energy planning, power sector reform, just transition, distributed generation, procurement, transparency, and standards to support low-emissions growth in developing countries; and

(E) to phase out existing coal power plants and reduce net coal power production;

(7) the United States should pursue confidence-building opportunities for the United States and the PRC to undertake "parallel initiatives" on clean energy research, development, finance, and deployment, including through economic and stimulus measures with clear, mutually agreed upon rules and policies to protect intellectual property, ensure equitable, nonpunitive provision of support, and verify implementation, which would provide catalytic progress towards delivering a global clean energy transformation that benefits all people;

(8) the United States should pursue cooperative initiatives to reduce global deforestation, including efforts to shift toward the import and consummation of forest and agricultural commodities that are produced in a manner that does not contribute to deforestation; and

(9) the United States should pursue appropriate scientific cooperative exchanges and research that align with United States interests and those of its international partners and allies, provide reciprocity of access, protect intellectual property rights, and preserve the values and human rights interests of the American people.

SEC. 604. PROMOTING RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The President should seek opportunities to partner with multilateral development finance institutions to develop financing tools based on shared development finance criteria and mechanisms to support investments in developing countries that—

(1) support low carbon economic development; and

(2) promote resiliency and adaptation to environmental changes and natural disasters.

(b) PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT.—The Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development Finance Corporation should seek to partner with other multilateral development finance institutions and development finance institutions to leverage the respective available funds to support low carbon economic development, which may include clean energy including renewable and nuclear energy projects, environmental adaptation, and resilience activities in countries.

(c) CO-FINANCING OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS.—

(1) AUTHORIZATION.—Subject to paragraph (2), the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies are authorized to co-finance infrastructure, resilience, and environmental adaptation projects that advance the development objectives of the United States overseas and provide viable alternatives to projects that would otherwise be included within the People's Republic of China's Belt and Road Initiative.

(2) CONDITIONS.—Co-financing arrangements authorized pursuant to paragraph (1) may not be approved unless—

(A) the projects to be financed—

(i) promote the public good;

(ii) promote United States national security or economic interests;

(iii) promote low carbon emissions, including clean energy renewable and nuclear energy projects; and

(iv) will have substantially lower environmental impact than the proposed Belt and Road Initiative alternative; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives are notified not later than 15 days in advance of entering into such co-financing arrangements.

SEC. 605. USING CLIMATE DIPLOMACY TO BETTER SERVE NATIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The President and the Secretary of State shall prioritize climate action and climate diplomacy in United States foreign policy by—

(1) ensuring diplomacy, support, and interagency coordination for bilateral and multilateral actions to address the climate crisis; and

(2) improving coordination and integration of climate action across all bureaus and United States missions abroad.

(b) CLIMATE ACTION INTEGRATION.—The Secretary of State shall—

(1) prioritize climate action and clean energy within the bureaus and offices under the leadership of the Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment;

(2) ensure that such bureaus and offices are coordinating with other bureaus of the Department of State regarding the integration of climate action and climate diplomacy as a cross-cutting imperative across the Department of State;

(3) encourage all Under Secretaries of State—

(A) to assess how issues related to climate change and United States climate action are integrated into their operations and programs;

(B) to coordinate crosscutting actions and diplomatic efforts that relate to climate action; and

(C) to make available the technical assistance and resources of the bureaus and offices with relevant expertise to provide technical assistance and expert support to other bureaus within the Department of State regarding climate action, clean energy development, and climate diplomacy;

(4) manage the integration of scientific data on the current and anticipated effects of climate change into applied strategies and diplomatic engagements across programmatic and regional bureaus of the Department of State and into the Department of State's decision making processes;

(5) ensure that the relevant bureaus and offices provide appropriate technical support and resources—

(A) to the President, the Secretary of State, and their respective designees charged with addressing climate change and associated issues;

(B) to United States diplomats advancing United States foreign policy related to climate action; and

(C) for the appropriate engagement and integration of relevant domestic agencies in international climate change affairs, including United States participation in multilateral fora; and

(6) carry out other activities, as directed by the Secretary of State, that advance United States climate-related foreign policy objectives, including global greenhouse gas mitigation, climate change adaptation activities, and global climate security.

(c) RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS.—The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs shall ensure that all foreign missions are—

(1) advancing United States bilateral climate diplomacy;

(2) engaging strategically on opportunities for bilateral climate action cooperation with foreign governments; and

(3) utilizing the technical resources and coordinating adequately with the bureaus reporting to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy and the Environment.

(d) REPORT.—Not later than 200 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment, in cooperation with the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that—

(1) assesses how climate action and United States climate diplomacy is integrated across the Bureaus of the Department of State; and

(2) includes recommendations on strategies to improve cross bureau coordination and understanding of United States climate action and climate diplomacy.

(e) EFFECT OF ELIMINATION OF POSITIONS.—If the positions of Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment and the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs are eliminated or undergo name changes, the responsibilities of such Under Secretaries under this section shall be reassigned to other Under Secretaries of State, as appropriate.

(f) CLIMATE CHANGE OFFICERS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall establish and staff Climate Change Officer positions. Such Officers shall serve under the supervision of the appropriate chief of mission or the Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment of the Department of State, as the case may be. The Secretary shall ensure each embassy, consulate, and diplomatic mission to which such Officers are assigned pursuant to paragraph (2) has sufficient additional and appropriate staff to support such Officers.

(2) ASSIGNMENT.—Climate Change Officers shall be assigned to the following posts:

(A) United States embassies, or, if appropriate, consulates.

(B) United States diplomatic missions to, or liaisons with, regional and multilateral organizations, including the United States diplomatic missions to the European Union, African Union, Organization of American States, Arctic Council, and any other appropriate regional organization, and the United Nations and its relevant specialized agencies.

(C) Other posts as designated by the Secretary.

(3) RESPONSIBILITIES.—Each Climate Change Officer shall—

(A) provide expertise on effective approaches to—

(i) mitigate the emission of gases which contribute to global climate change and formulate national and global plans for reducing such gross and net emissions; and

(ii) reduce the detrimental impacts attributable to global climate change, and adapt to such impacts;

(B) engage and convene, in a manner that is equitable, inclusive, and just, with individuals and organizations which represent a government office, a nongovernmental organization, a social or political movement, a private sector entity, an educational or scientific institution, or any other entity concerned with—

(i) global climate change; the emission of gases which contribute to global climate change; or

(ii) reducing the detrimental impacts attributable to global climate change;

(C) facilitate engagement by United States entities in bilateral and multilateral cooperation on climate change; and

(D) carry out such other responsibilities as the Secretary may assign.

(4) RESPONSIBILITIES OF UNDER SECRETARY.—The Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment of the Department of State shall, including by acting through the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs of the Department of State—

(A) provide policy guidance to Climate Change Officers established under this subsection;

(B) develop relations with, consult with, and provide assistance to relevant individuals and organizations concerned with studying, mitigating, and adapting to global climate change, or reducing the emission of gases which contribute to global climate change; and

(C) assist officers and employees of regional bureaus of the Department of State to develop strategies and programs to promote studying, mitigating, and adapting to global climate change, or reducing the emission of gases which contribute to global climate change.

(g) ACTIONS BY CHIEFS OF MISSION.—Each chief of mission in a foreign country shall—

(1) develop, as part of annual joint strategic plans or equivalent program and policy planning, a strategy to promote actions to improve and increase studying, mitigating, and adapting to global climate change, or reducing the emission of gases which contribute to global climate change by—

(A) consulting and coordinating with and providing support to relevant individuals and organizations, including experts and other professionals and stakeholders on issues related to climate change; and

(B) holding periodic meetings with such relevant individuals and organizations relating to such strategy; and

(2) hold ongoing discussions with the officials and leaders of such country regarding progress to improve and increase studying, mitigating, and adapting to global climate change, or reducing the emission of gases which contribute to global climate change in a manner that is equitable, inclusive, and just in such country; and

(3) certify annually to the Secretary of State that to the maximum extent practicable, considerations related to climate change adaptation and mitigation, sustainability, and the environment were incorporated in activities, management, and operations of the United States embassy or other diplomatic post under the director of the chief of mission.

(h) TRAINING.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall establish curriculum at the Department of State's Foreign Service Institute that supplements political and economic reporting tradecraft courses in order to provide employees of the Department with specialized training with respect to studying, mitigating, and adapting to global climate change, or reducing the emission of gases which contribute to global climate change. Such training shall include the following:

(1) Awareness of the full range of national and subnational agencies, offices, personnel, statutory authorities, funds, and programs involved in the international commitments of the United States regarding global climate change and the emission of gases which contribute to global climate change, the science of global climate change, and methods for mitigating and adapting to global climate change.

(2) Awareness of methods for mitigating and adapting to global climate change and reducing the emission of gases which contribute to global climate change that are equitable, inclusive, and just.

(3) Familiarity with United States agencies, multilateral agencies, international financial institutions, and the network of donors providing assistance to mitigate and adapt to global climate change.

(4) Awareness of the most frequently announced goals and methods of the entities specified in subsection (f)(3)(B).

(i) CONTRACTING.—Contracting and agreements officers of the Department of State, and other United States embassy personnel responsible for contracts, grants, or acquisitions, shall receive training on evaluating proposals, solicitations, and bids, for considerations related to sustainability and adapting to or mitigating impacts from climate change.

(j) REPORTING.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and biennially thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes a detailed breakdown of posts at which staff are assigned the role of Climate Change Officer, the responsibilities to which they have been assigned, and the strategies developed by the chief of mission, as applicable.

(k) CLIMATE CHANGE SUPPORT AND FINANCING.—The Secretary of State shall facilitate the coordination among the Department of State and other relevant Federal departments and agencies toward contributing technical cooperation, engagement, development finance, or foreign assistance relevant to United States international climate action and in support of United States climate diplomacy.

(l) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that climate diplomacy tools as described in this section are critical for demonstrating the commitment to include climate changes issues as core tenets of foreign policy priorities, as well as preserving the United States' role as a global leader on climate change action.

SEC. 606. DRIVING A GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE RESILIENCE STRATEGY.

(a) AMENDMENT.—Section 117 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151p) is amended—

(1) in subsection (b)—

(A) by inserting "(1)" after "(b)"; and

(B) by adding at the end the following:

"(2)(A) The President is authorized to furnish assistance to programs and initiatives that—

"(i) promote resilience among communities facing harmful impacts from climate change; and

"(ii) reduce the vulnerability of persons affected by climate change.

"(B) There shall be, in the Department of State, a Coordinator of Climate Change Resilience."; and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

"(d)(1) The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall establish a comprehensive, integrated, 10-year strategy, which shall be referred to as the 'Global Climate

Change Resilience Strategy', to mitigate the impacts of climate change on displacement and humanitarian emergencies.

"(2) The Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy shall—

"(A) focus on addressing slow-onset and rapid-onset effects of events caused by climate change, consider the effects of events caused by climate change, and describe the key features of successful strategies to prevent such conditions;

"(B) include specific objectives and multisectoral approaches to the effects of events caused by climate change;

"(C) promote United States national security and economic interests while leading international climate-related policymaking efforts, on which the absence of United States leadership would lead to a substantial and harmful decline in the nation's global competitiveness;

"(D) promote international instruments on climate action and other relevant international standards and best practices, as such standards and practices develop, that serve the interests of the American people and protect United States environmental resources and the planet;

"(E) promote the adoption and implementation of such international climate-related agreements, standards, and practices by foreign states;

"(F) work with United States allies and partners to ensure a level playing field exists when it comes to climate action and to encourage and assist foreign countries to make similar or even greater commitments than the United States;

"(G) describe approaches that ensure national leadership, as appropriate, and substantively engage with civil society, local partners, and the affected communities, including marginalized populations and underserved populations, in the design, implementation, and monitoring of climate change programs to best safeguard the future of those subject to displacement;

"(H) assign roles for relevant Federal agencies to avoid duplication of efforts, while ensuring that—

"(i) the Department of State is responsible for—

"(I) leading the Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy;

"(II) establishing United States foreign policy;

"(III) advancing diplomatic and political efforts; and

"(IV) guiding security assistance and related civilian security efforts to mitigate climate change threats;

"(ii) the United States Agency for International Development is—

"(I) responsible for overseeing programs to prevent the effects of events caused by climate change;

"(II) the lead implementing agency for development and related non-security program policy related to building resilience and achieving recovery; and

"(III) responsible for providing overseas humanitarian assistance to respond to international and internal displacement caused by climate change and to coordinate the pursuit of durable solutions for climate-displaced persons; and

"(iii) other Federal agencies support the activities of the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development, as appropriate, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development;

"(I) describe programs that agencies will undertake to achieve the stated objectives, including descriptions of existing programs and funding by fiscal year and account;

"(J) identify mechanisms to improve coordination between the United States, foreign governments, and international organizations, including the World Bank, the United Nations, regional organizations, and private sector organizations;

"(K) address efforts to expand public-private partnerships and leverage private sector resources;

"(L) describe the criteria, metrics, and mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation of programs and objectives in the Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy;

"(M) describe how the Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy will ensure that programs are country-led and context-specific;

"(N) establish a program to monitor climate and social conditions to anticipate and prevent climate and environmental stressors from evolving into national security risks;

"(O) include an assessment of climate risks in the Department of State's Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review; and

"(P) prioritize foreign aid, to the extent practicable, for international climate resilience in support of this Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy.

"(3) Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this subsection, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, based in part on the information collected pursuant to this section, that details the Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy. The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex, if necessary.

"(4) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this subsection, the Secretary of State and the Coordinator of Global Climate Change Resilience shall brief the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives regarding the progress made by the Federal Government in implementing the Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy.

"(5)(A) Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this subsection, and annually thereafter, the Comptroller General of the United States, in cooperation and consultation with the Secretary of State, shall produce a report evaluating the progress that the Federal Government has made toward incorporating climate change into department and agency policies, including the resources that have been allocated for such purpose.

"(B) The report required under subparagraph (A) shall assess—

"(i) the degree to which the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) are—

"(I) developing climate change risk assessments; and

"(II) providing guidance to missions on how to include climate change risks in their integrated country strategies;

"(ii) whether the Department of State and USAID have sufficient resources to fulfill the requirements described in paragraph (2); and

"(iii) any areas in which the Department of State and USAID may lack sufficient resources to fulfill such requirements.".

(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy.

SEC. 607. ADDRESSING INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION, ADAPTATION, AND SECURITY.

(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) CONVENTION.—The term "Convention" means the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, done at New York May 9, 1992, and entered into force March 21, 1994.

(2) MOST VULNERABLE COMMUNITIES AND POPULATIONS.—The term "most vulnerable communities and populations" means communities and populations that are at risk of substantial adverse effects of climate change and have limited capacity to respond to such effects, including women, impoverished communities, children, indigenous peoples, and informal workers.

(3) MOST VULNERABLE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.—The term "most vulnerable developing countries" means, as determined by the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, developing countries that are at risk of substantial adverse effects of climate change and have limited capacity to respond to such effects, considering the approaches included in any international treaties and agreements.

(4) PROGRAM.—The term "Program" means the International Climate Change Adaptation, Mitigation, and Security Program established pursuant to subsection (c).

(b) PURPOSE.—The purpose of this section is to provide authorities for additional, new, current, and ongoing bilateral and regional international development assistance, and, as appropriate, to leverage private resources, in support of host country driven projects, planning, policies, and initiatives designed to improve the ability of host countries—

(1) to primarily produce reliable renewable energy and reduce or mitigate carbon emissions from the power sector while facilitating the transition in key global markets from electricity generated from fossil fuel power to low-cost clean energy sources, in a manner that is equitable for workers and communities;

(2) to adapt and become more resilient to current and forecasted effects of climate change; and

(3) to employ—

(A) sustainable land use practices that mitigate desertification and reduce greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation; and

(B) agricultural production practices that reduce poverty while improving soil health, protecting water quality, and increasing food security and nutrition.

(c) ESTABLISHMENT OF PROGRAM.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), shall establish a program, to be known as the "International Climate Change Adaptation, Mitigation, and Security Program", to provide bilateral and regional assistance to developing countries for programs, projects, and activities described in subsection (e).

(d) SUPPLEMENT NOT SUPPLANT.—Assistance provided under this section shall be used to supplement, and not to supplant, any other Federal, State, or local resources available to carry out activities that fit the characteristics of the Program.

(e) POLICY.—It shall be the policy of the United States to ensure that the Program provides resources to developing countries, particularly the most vulnerable communities and populations in such countries, to support the development and implementation of programs, projects, and activities that—

(1) reduce greenhouse gas emissions through the integration and deployment of clean energy, including transmission, distribution, and interconnections to renewable energy, while facilitating the transition from electricity generated from fossil fuel power to low-cost renewable energy sources, in a manner that is equitable for workers and communities;

(2) address financial or other barriers to the widespread deployment of clean energy technologies that reduce, sequester, or avoid greenhouse gas emissions;

(3) improve the availability, viability, and accessibility of zero emission vehicles, including support for design and development of transportation networks and land use practices that mitigate carbon emissions in the transportation sector;

(4) support building capacities that may include—

(A) developing and implementing methodologies and programs for measuring greenhouse gas emissions and verifying emissions mitigation, including building capacities to conduct emissions inventories and meet reporting requirements under the Paris Agreement;

(B) assessing, developing, and implementing technology and policy options for greenhouse gas emissions mitigation and avoidance of future emissions, including sector-based and cross-sector mitigation strategies;

(C) enhancing the technical capacity of regulatory authorities, planning agencies, and related institutions in developing countries to improve the deployment of clean energy technologies and practices, including through increased transparency;

(D) training and instruction regarding the installation and maintenance of renewable energy technologies; and

(E) activities that support the development and implementation of frameworks for intellectual property rights in developing countries;

(5) improve resilience, sustainable economic growth, and adaptation capacities in response to the effects of climate change;

(6) promote appropriate job training and access to new job opportunities in new economic sectors and industries that emerge due to the transition from fossil fuel energy to clean energy;

(7) reduce the vulnerability and increase the resilience capacities of communities to the effects of climate change, including effects on—

(A) water availability;

(B) agricultural productivity and food security;

(C) flood risk;

(D) coastal resources;

(E) biodiversity;

(F) economic livelihoods;

(G) health and diseases;

(H) housing and shelter; and

(I) human migration;

(8) help countries and communities adapt to changes in the environment through enhanced community planning, preparedness, and growth strategies that take into account current and forecasted regional and localized effects of climate change;

(9) conserve and restore natural resources, ecosystems, and biodiversity threatened by the effects of climate change to ensure such resources, ecosystems, and biodiversity are healthy and continue to provide natural protections from the effects of climate change such as extreme weather;

(10) provide resources, information, scientific data and modeling, innovative best practices, and technical assistance to support vulnerable developing countries to adapt to the effects of climate change;

(11) promote sustainable and climate-resilient societies, including through improvements to make critical infrastructure less vulnerable to the effects of climate change;

(12) encourage the adoption of policies and measures, including sector-based and cross-sector policies and measures, that substantially reduce, sequester, or avoid greenhouse gas emissions from the domestic energy and transportation sectors of developing countries;

(13) reduce deforestation and land degradation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and implement sustainable forestry practices;

(14) promote sustainable land use activities, including supporting development planning, design, and construction with respect to transportation systems and land use;

(15) promote sustainable agricultural practices that mitigate carbon emissions, conserve soil, and improve food and water security of communities;

(16) foster partnerships with private sector entities and nongovernmental international development organizations to assist with developing solutions and economic opportunities that support projects, planning, policies, and initiatives described in subsection (b);

(17) provide technical assistance and strengthen capacities of developing countries to meet the goals of the conditional nationally determined contributions of those countries;

(18) establish investment channels designed to leverage private sector financing in—

(A) clean energy;

(B) sustainable agriculture and natural resource management; and

(C) the transportation sector as described in paragraph (3); and

(19) provide technical assistance and support for non-extractive activities that provide alternative economic growth opportunities while preserving critical habitats and natural carbon sinks.

(f) PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Administrator of USAID, in consultation with other Federal departments and agencies, shall provide assistance under the Program—

(A) in the form of bilateral assistance pursuant to the requirements under subsection (g);

(B) to multilateral funds or international institutions with programs for climate mitigation or adaptation in developing countries consistent with the policy described in subsection (e); or

(C) through a combination of the mechanisms specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B).

(2) LIMITATION.—

(A) CONDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION TO MULTILATERAL FUNDS OR INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS.—In any fiscal year, the Administrator of USAID may provide up to 40 percent of the assistance available to carry out the Program to 1 or more multilateral funds or international institutions that meet the requirements of subparagraph (B).

(B) MULTILATERAL FUND OR INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTION ELIGIBILITY.—A multilateral fund or international institution is eligible to receive assistance under subparagraph (A)—

(i) if—

(I) such fund or institution is established pursuant to—

(aa) the Convention; or

(bb) an agreement negotiated under the Convention; or

(II) the assistance is directed to 1 or more multilateral funds or international development institutions, pursuant to an agreement negotiated under the Convention; and

(ii) if such fund or institution—

(I) specifies the terms and conditions under which the United States is to provide assistance to the fund or institution, and under which the fund or institution is to provide assistance to recipient countries;

(II) ensures that assistance from the United States to the fund or institution and the principal and income of the fund or institution are disbursed only—

(aa) to support projects, planning, policies, and initiatives described in subsection (b);

(bb) consistent with the policy described in subsection (e); and

(cc) in regular consultation with relevant governing bodies of the fund or institution that—

(AA) include representation from countries among the most vulnerable developing countries; and

(BB) provide public access.

(C) CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.—The Secretary of State, the Administrator of USAID, or the Secretary of the Treasury shall notify the appropriate congressional committees not later than 15 days before providing assistance to a multilateral fund or international institution under this subsection.

(3) LOCAL CONSULTATIONS.—Programs, projects, and activities supported by assistance provided under this subsection shall require consultations with local communities, particularly the most vulnerable communities and populations in such communities, and indigenous peoples in areas in which any programs, projects, or activities are planned to engage such communities and peoples through adequate disclosure of information, public participation, and consultation, including full consideration of the interdependence of vulnerable communities and ecosystems to promote the resilience of local communities.

(g) BILATERAL ASSISTANCE.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Except to the extent inconsistent with this subsection, the administrative authorities under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) shall apply to the implementation of this subsection to the same extent and in the same manner as such authorities apply to the implementation of such Act in order to provide the Administrator of USAID with the authority to provide assistance to countries, including the most vulnerable developing countries, for programs, projects, and activities consistent with the purposes described in subsection (b) and the policy described in subsection (e).

(2) CONSIDERATIONS.—In carrying out this subsection, the Administrator shall ensure that—

(A) the environmental impact of proposed programs, projects, and activities is considered through adequate consultation, public participation, and public disclosure of relevant information; and

(B) programs, projects, and activities under this subsection—

(i) avoid environmental degradation, to the maximum extent practicable; and

(ii) are aligned, to the maximum extent practicable, with broader development, poverty alleviation, or natural resource management objectives and initiatives in the recipient country.

(3) COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT.—The Administrator shall seek to ensure that—

(A) local communities, particularly the most vulnerable communities and populations in areas in which any programs, projects, or activities are carried out under this subsection, are engaged in the design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of such programs, projects, and activities through disclosure of information, public participation, and consultation; and

(B) the needs and interests of the most vulnerable communities and populations are addressed in national or regional climate change adaptation plans developed with USAID support.

(4) CONSULTATION AND DISCLOSURE.—For each country receiving assistance under this subsection, the Administrator shall establish a process for consultation with, and disclosure of information to, local, national, and international stakeholders regarding any programs, projects, or activities carried out under this subsection.

(h) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section $2,000,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 and each fiscal year thereafter.

SEC. 608. REDUCING THE NEGATIVE IMPACTS FROM BLACK CARBON, METHANE, AND HIGH-GWP HYDROFLUOROCARBONS.

(a) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term "high-GWP HFC" means newly manufactured hydrofluorocarbons with a global warming potential calculated over a 100-year period of greater than 150, as described in the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

(b) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct the United States representatives to appropriate international bodies and conferences to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States, consistent with the broad foreign policy goals of the United States, to advocate that each such body or conference—

(1) commit to significantly increasing efforts to reduce black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC;

(2) invest in and develop alternative energy sources, industrial and agricultural processes, appliances, and products to replace sources of black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC;

(3) enhance coordination with the private sector—

(A) to increase production and distribution of clean energy alternatives, industrial processes, and products that will replace sources of black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC;

(B) to develop action plans to mitigate black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC from various private sector operations;

(C) to encourage best technology, methods, and management practices for reducing black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC;

(D) to craft specific financing mechanisms for the incremental costs associated with mitigating black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC pollutants; and

(E) to grow economic opportunities and develop markets, as appropriate, for reducing black carbon, methane, tropospheric ozone, and hydrofluorocarbons;

(4) provide technical assistance to foreign regulatory authorities and governments to remove unnecessary barriers to investment in short-lived climate mitigation solutions, including—

(A) the use of safe and affordable clean energy;

(B) the implementation of policies requiring industrial and agricultural best practices for capturing or mitigating the release of methane from extractive, agricultural, and industrial processes; and

(C) climate assessment, scientific research, monitoring, and technological development activities;

(5) develop and implement clear, accountable, and metric-based targets to measure the effectiveness of projects described in paragraph (4); and

(6) engage international partners in an existing multilateral forum (or, if necessary, establish through an international agreement a new multilateral forum) to improve global cooperation for—

(A) creating tangible metrics for evaluating efforts to reduce black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC;

(B) developing and implementing best practices for phasing out sources of black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC, including expanding capacity for innovative instruments to mitigate black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC at the national and subnational levels of foreign countries, particularly countries with little capacity to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and deploy clean energy facilities, and countries that lack sufficient policies to advance such development;

(C) encouraging the development of standards and practices, and increasing transparency and accountability efforts for the reduction of black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC;

(D) integrating tracking and monitoring systems into industrial processes;

(E) fostering research to improve scientific understanding of—

(i) how high concentrations of black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC affect human health, safety, and our environment;

(ii) changes in the amount and regional concentrations of black carbon and methane emissions, based on scientific modeling and forecasting;

(iii) effective means to sequester black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC; and

(iv) other related areas of research the United States representatives deem necessary;

(F) encouraging the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other international finance organizations—

(i) to prioritize efforts to combat black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC; and

(ii) to enhance transparency by providing sufficient and adequate information to facilitate independent verification of their climate finance reporting;

(G) encouraging observers of the Arctic Council (including India and China) to adopt mitigation plans consistent with the findings and recommendations of the Arctic Council's Framework for Action on Black Carbon and Methane;

(H) collaborating on technological advances in black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC pollutant mitigation, sequestration and reduction technologies; and

(I) advising foreign countries, at both the national and subnational levels, regarding the development and execution of regulatory policies, services, and laws pertaining to reducing the creation and the collection and safe management of black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC.

(c) ENHANCING INTERNATIONAL OUTREACH AND PARTNERSHIP OF UNITED STATES AGENCIES INVOLVED IN GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTIONS.—

(1) FINDING.—Congress recognizes the success of the United States Climate Alliance and the greenhouse gas reduction programs and strategies established by the Environmental Protection Agency's Center for Corporate Climate Leadership.

(2) AUTHORIZATION OF EFFORTS TO BUILD FOREIGN PARTNERSHIPS.—The Secretary of State shall work with the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to build partnerships, as appropriate, with the governments of foreign countries and to support international efforts to reduce black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC.

(d) NEGOTIATION OF NEW INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND REASSERTION OF TARGETS IN EXISTING AGREEMENTS.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to Congress that—

(1) assesses the potential for negotiating new international agreements, new targets within existing international agreements or cooperative bodies, and the creation of a new international forum to mitigate globally black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC to support the efforts described in subsection (b);

(2) describes the provisions that could be included in such agreements;

(3) assesses potential parties to such agreements;

(4) describes a process for reengaging with Canada and Mexico regarding the methane targets agreed to at the 2016 North American Leaders' Summit; and

(5) describes a process for reengaging with the countries of the Arctic Council regarding the methane and black carbon targets that were negotiated in 2015 through the Framework for Action.

(e) CONSIDERATION OF BLACK CARBON, METHANE, AND HIGH-GWP HFC IN NEGOTIATING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS.—In negotiating any relevant international agreement with any country or countries after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall—

(1) consider the impact black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC are having on the increase in global average temperatures and the resulting global climate change;

(2) consider the effects that climate change is having on the environment; and

(3) ensure that the agreement strengthens efforts to eliminate black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC from such country or countries.

(f) PLAN TO REDUCE BLACK CARBON EMISSIONS FROM SHIPS.—Consistent with strategies adopted by the International Maritime Organization to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from ships, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator, and the Commandant of the Coast Guard, shall develop a comprehensive plan to reduce black carbon emissions from ships based on appropriate emissions data from oceangoing vessels. The plan shall provide for such reduction through—

(1) a clean freight partnership;

(2) limits on black carbon emissions; and

(3) efforts that include protection of access to critical fuel shipments and emergency needs of coastal communities.

(g) ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON BLACK CARBON, METHANE, AND HIGH-GWP HFC POLLUTANT MITIGATION.—

(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall establish a task force, to be known as the Interagency Working Group on Black Carbon, Methane, and High-GWP HFC Pollutant Mitigation.

(2) MEMBERSHIP.—The members of the Working Group shall include the head (or a designee thereof) of each relevant Federal agency.

(3) DUTIES.—The Working Group shall—

(A) not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes specific plans of each relevant Federal agency—

(B) look for opportunities with other countries to promote alternatives to high-GWP HFC, and transition over time to equipment that uses safer and more sustainable alternatives to high-GWP HFC;

(C) review the policy recommendations made by—

(i) the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change;

(ii) the United States Climate Alliance;

(iii) the Interagency Strategy to Reduce Methane Emissions;

(iv) the Council on Climate Preparedness and Resilience;
(v) the Clean Cooking Alliance;
(vi) the International Maritime Organization; and
(vii) other relevant organizations and institutions; and

(D) develop an action plan to reduce black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC pollutants that incorporates any appropriate proposals or recommendations made by the entities referred to in subparagraph (C).

SEC. 609. BUILDING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC GROWTH AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION THROUGH THE GREEN CLIMATE FUND.

(a) GREEN CLIMATE FUND.—

(1) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that—

(A) climate change most severely impacts vulnerable and disadvantaged communities in the United States and around the world;

(B) it is the responsibility of the United States Government to work with and press other countries to address environmental justice and climate justice;

(C) the report of the United Nations Environment Programme entitled "Climate Change and the Cost of Capital in Developing Countries", dated May 2018, found that, in the 10 years prior to the publication of the report, climate vulnerability has cost the 20 nations most affected by catastrophes rooted in climate change an additional $62,000,000,000 in interest payments alone;

(D) individuals and families, particularly communities of color, indigenous communities, and low-income communities, that are on the frontlines of climate change across the globe are often in close proximity to environmental stressors or sources of pollution;

(E) the communities described in subparagraph (D)—

(i) are often the first exposed to the causes and impacts of climate change; and

(ii) have the fewest resources with which to mitigate those impacts or to relocate;

(F) all efforts to adapt to and mitigate climate change must include specific protections for and acknowledgment of the harm of climate change to communities of color, indigenous peoples, women, and other frontline communities and marginalized peoples around the world;

(G) in Paris, on December 12, 2015, the parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change adopted the Paris Agreement, a benchmark agreement—

(i) to combat climate change;

(ii) to accelerate and intensify the actions and investments needed for a sustainable low carbon future; and

(iii) that acknowledges, "Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity";

(H) the Paris Agreement—

(i) notes the importance of "climate justice" when mitigating and adapting to climate change; and

(ii) recognizes "the need for an effective and progressive response to the urgent threat of climate change";

(I) it is imperative for all countries to undertake mitigation activities to rapidly meet the goal of limiting global warming to not more than 1.5 degrees Celsius;

(J) developed countries have the greatest capacity to mitigate their greenhouse gas emissions, while—

(i) developing countries have the least capacity to engage in mitigation activities; and

(ii) the capacity of developing countries to engage in mitigation activities is less than the national mitigation potential of those developing countries;

(K) the determination for the fair share of mitigation and adaptation activities for each country must take into account—

(i) the historic greenhouse gas emissions of each country; and

(ii) the current capacity of each country to both mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to climate impacts;

(L) developed countries that have historically emitted a disproportionately high share of greenhouse gas emissions, and reaped the economic benefits of those polluting activities, have a corresponding disproportionately greater responsibility to engage in global mitigation and adaptation activities, as compared to less industrialized countries that have historically polluted far less;

(M) the only realistic way for less industrialized countries to meet their full mitigation potential is through international climate financing by more developed countries;

(N) in the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, developed countries committed to jointly mobilize, starting in 2020, $100,000,000,000 per year in public climate financing (as well as private investment and other alternative forms of finance), for developing countries, a commitment reaffirmed in 2015 in Decision 1/CP.21 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris Agreement;

(O) the $100,000,000,000 commitment described in subparagraph (N) was a political compromise that falls short of the actual financing needs for climate action in developing countries;

(P) Bloomberg New Energy Finance has estimated that the transition to renewable energy sources in developing countries will require hundreds of billions of dollars annually;

(Q) the United Nations Environment Programme has estimated that adaptation needs relating to climate change in developing countries may be as much as $300,000,000,000 annually by 2030;

(R) the Green Climate Fund was created in 2010 by 194 countries to serve as a crucial financing mechanism to help developing countries limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to climate change;

(S) in 2015, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change agreed that the Green Climate Fund should serve the goals of the Paris Agreement, which states that "developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention";

(T) the Green Climate Fund is an essential institution for climate financing, as the Green Climate Fund ensures—

(i) balanced governance between developed and developing countries;

(ii) stakeholder engagement and discourse;

(iii) a balanced approach between mitigation and adaptation;

(iv) fair and equal labor and working conditions;

(v) conservation of biodiversity and critical habitats; and

(vi) strong environmental, social, and gender protections;

(U) the Green Climate Fund—

(i) promotes and protects human rights and the rights of marginalized groups, including indigenous peoples, women, children, and people with disabilities; and

(ii) continues to take steps to strengthen protection for marginalized groups;

(iii) the United States committed $3,000,000,000 of the first $10,000,000,000 raised for the initial resource mobilization period of the Green Climate Fund, though only ⅓ of this pledge was fulfilled, leaving the United States the only country to fall substantially short of a commitment of a country to the Green Climate Fund; and

(V) the Green Climate Fund is a fully operational and proven institution supporting well over 100 projects and programs in developing countries around the world.

(2) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to provide climate financing—

(A) as an essential part of the global effort to combat climate change; and

(B) that—

(i) upholds the principles of environmental justice and climate justice;

(ii) supports programs and projects developed by recipient countries and communities;

(iii) is designed and implemented with the free, prior, and informed consent of indigenous peoples and other impacted communities;

(iv) promotes gender equality as essential in all of the projects and programs supported by climate financing;

(v) includes best practices for environmental and social safeguards to ensure that projects and programs supported by climate financing respect fundamental human rights; and

(vi) addresses both mitigation and adaptation as essential aspects of responding to climate change.

(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated for contributions to the Green Climate Fund $4,000,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2022 and 2023.

(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the climate financing needs to achieve the greenhouse gas emissions reductions required to keep the planet at or below 1.5 degrees Celsius of global warming are significantly greater than the amount of funds authorized to be appropriated under subsection (a).

SEC. 610. ENSURING A WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO CLIMATE ACTION.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State shall establish a Climate Impacts Task Force (referred to in this section as the "Task Force") with the mandate to—

(1) monitor climate and related impacted social conditions to anticipate and prevent climate and environmental stressors from evolving into national security risks;

(2) monitor and assess climate action undertaken by other countries in response to national strategies and international commitments, and coordinate closely with allies and partners to ensure a coordinated response against any state or non-state actors, including the People's Republic of China (PRC) and PRC companies, undermining global climate objectives, norms, and practices;

(3) strengthen the efforts of the Department of State and the United States Government to act proactively to mitigate the human harms and potential for national security risks resulting from emerging events exacerbated by climate change; and

(4) assist other Federal departments and agencies, foreign partners, and multilateral organizations in their efforts to do the same.

(b) LEADERSHIP.—The Secretary of State shall designate a senior career official, as appropriate, of the Department of State to serve as the Chair of the Task Force. Such official shall report to the Secretary of State.

(c) RESPONSIBILITIES.—Under the direction of the Chair, the Task Force shall—

(1) meet regularly to ensure that events exacerbated by climate change and the risk of emerging events exacerbated by climate change throughout the world are adequately considered and addressed;

(2) facilitate the development and execution of policies and tools to enhance the capacity of the United States to prevent and respond to emerging events exacerbated by climate change worldwide;

(3) monitor developments throughout the world that heighten the risk of emerging events exacerbated by climate change;

(4) identify gaps in United States foreign policy related to the prevention of and response to emerging events exacerbated by climate change with respect to certain regions or particular countries;

(5) incorporate lessons learned from past United States efforts to prevent and respond to emerging events exacerbated by climate change and other impacts that are comparable in scope or severity;

(6) provide the Secretary of State with recommendations and potential improvements to policies, programs, resources, and tools related to the prevention of and response to emerging events exacerbated by climate change;

(7) coordinate the Department of State's engagement in interagency processes led by the National Security Council that share the Task Force's objectives;

(8) conduct outreach not less frequently than biannually, with representatives of nongovernmental organizations dedicated to the prevention of and response to emerging events exacerbated by climate change and other appropriate parties, to—

(A) receive assistance relating to the Task Force's efforts to address emerging events exacerbated by climate change and develop new or improved policies, programs, resources, and tools; and

(B) provide a public understanding of the work of the Task Force;

(9) in carrying out paragraphs (1) through (9), focus on particular ways for the United States to develop, strengthen, and enhance its capabilities to—

(A) monitor, receive early warning of, and coordinate responses to potential emerging events exacerbated by climate change;

(B) engage allies and partners, including multilateral and regional institutions, to build capacities and mobilize action for preventing and responding to emerging events exacerbated by climate change;

(C) encourage the deployment of civilian advisors to prevent and respond to emerging events exacerbated by climate change;

(D) increase the capacity of and develop doctrine for the United States Foreign Service, civil service, Armed Forces, development professionals, and

other actors to engage in the full spectrum of activities to prevent and respond to emerging events exacerbated by climate change;

(E) develop and implement tailored foreign assistance programs that address and mitigate the risks of emerging events exacerbated by climate change;

(F) ensure intelligence collection, analysis, and sharing of appropriate information; and

(G) address any other issues that the Task Force determines appropriate;

(10) in carrying out paragraphs (1) through (9), receive support from bureaus and offices of the Department of State, as the Secretary of State determines appropriate; and

(11) facilitate annual coordination between the Department of State and other appropriate departments and agencies to ensure international and domestic climate change objectives are aligned.

(d) COMPOSITION.—The Task Force shall—

(1) seek to ensure that its efforts complement and support interagency processes led by the National Security Council that share the Task Force's objectives; and

(2) operate with regular consultation and participation of designated representatives, at the Assistant Secretary level or higher, from all such executive departments, agencies, or offices as the Chair may designate.

(e) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and every 2 years thereafter for the following 10 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Task Force, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives an unclassified report, with a classified annex if necessary, that includes—

(1) a review, in consultation with the designated representatives specified in subsection (d), consisting of—

(A) an evaluation of the efficacy of current efforts based on United States and locally identified indicators, including capacities and constraints for United States Government-wide detection, early warning and response, information-sharing, contingency planning, and coordination of efforts to prevent and respond to emerging events exacerbated by climate change;

(B) an assessment of the funding expended by relevant Federal departments and agencies on emerging events exacerbated by climate change and the legal, procedural, and resource constraints faced by the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development throughout respective budgeting, strategic planning, and management cycles to support the prevention of and response to emerging events exacerbated by climate change;

(C) current annual global assessments of emerging events exacerbated by climate change;

(D) recommendations to further strengthen United States capabilities described in subparagraph (A); and

(E) consideration of analysis, reporting, and policy recommendations by civil society, academic, and other nongovernmental organizations and institutions to prevent and respond to emerging events exacerbated by climate change;

(2) recommendations to ensure shared responsibility by—

(A) enhancing multilateral mechanisms for preventing, mitigating, and responding to emerging events exacerbated by climate change; and

(B) strengthening regional organizations; and

(3) the implementation status of the recommendations included in the review under paragraph (1).

(f) BRIEFINGS AND MATERIALS.—The Chair and members of the Task Force shall, not less frequently than annually, provide briefings and materials to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(g) REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.—The Director of National Intelligence is encouraged to include, in his or her annual (or more often as appropriate) unclassified testimony, accompanied by a classified annex, if necessary, to Congress on threats to United States national security—

(1) a review of countries and regions at risk of emerging events exacerbated by climate change; and

(2) whenever possible, specific identification of countries and regions at immediate risk of emerging events exacerbated by climate change.

(h) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that rapid and robust climate change response mechanisms, including the establishment of the Task Force,

are critical for ensuring other countries remain accountable to their climate action commitments as well as preserving the national security and economic interests of the United States.

SEC. 611. WORKING WITH INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS TO REDUCE DEFORESTATION.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) The People's Republic of China (PRC) is having a substantial impact on the most important forest ecosystems in the world, and illegal logging and agricultural expansion have caused the massive forest loss. According to the World Resources Institute, the PRC has become the world's leading importer and consumer of timber products, soybeans, and palm oil, as well as the largest manufacturing and export country of forest products.

(2) In 2016, the PRC imported logs from more than 100 countries in the world. According to a Global Witness report, between January 2013 and April 2020, Chinese financial institutions provided more than $22.5 billion to major companies that produce and trade commodities at high risk of driving deforestation. These commodities include beef, soy, palm oil, paper, pulp, rubber, and timber.

(3) Further, the growing international demand for such agricultural commodities causes the majority of deforestation emissions globally, and most of the associated land-clearing violates applicable national or local laws. According to a 2021 Forest Trends report, at least 69 percent of forest land converted to pasture or cropland was cleared illegally.

(4) The growing demand for timber and agricultural commodities has accelerated unsustainable—and often illegal—logging and the trade of timber products, which harms the countries in which it takes place by siphoning away government tax revenue, transforming the livelihoods of communities dependent on forests, and hurting legal businesses' competitiveness. Further, illegal logging and illegal conversion of forest to agricultural land threatens biodiversity and accelerates deforestation and forest degradation in key timber supply countries, undermining United States and global climate goals.

(5) The United States should work with international partners to ensure that Chinese and other banks factor into lending practices the environmental and social impact of the companies they finance. This should include pressuring the PRC and other countries to revise regulations to require the banking sector not to finance companies linked to deforestation and include rigorous checks on the companies operating in sectors or regions where there is a high risk of deforestation to ensure they are not associated with deforestation.

(b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) ADMINISTRATOR.—Except as otherwise expressly provided, the term "Administrator" means the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development.

(2) DEFORESTATION.—The term "deforestation" means a change in land use from a forest (including peatlands) to any other land use.

(3) DEVELOPING COUNTRY.—The term "developing country" means a country eligible to receive official development assistance according to the income guidelines of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

(4) EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS.—The term "emissions reductions" means greenhouse gas emissions reductions achieved from reduced or avoided deforestation under this section.

(5) FOREST.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The term "forest" means a terrestrial ecosystem, including wetland forests, comprised of native tree species generated and maintained primarily through natural ecological and evolutionary processes.

(B) EXCLUSION.—The term "forest" does not include plantations, such as crops of trees planted by humans primarily for the purposes of harvesting.

(6) FOREST DEGRADATION.—The term "forest degradation" is any reduction in the carbon stock of a forest due to the effects of human land-use activities, including such land-use activities on peatlands.

(7) INTACT FOREST.—The term "intact forest" means an unbroken expanse of natural ecosystems within the global extent of forest cover that—

(A) covers an area of at least 500 square kilometers and is at least 10 kilometers in each direction; and

(B) contains forest and non-forest ecosystems minimally influenced by human economic activity and large enough that all native biodiversity, including viable populations of wide-ranging species, could be maintained.

(9) LEAKAGE.—The term "leakage" means the unexpected loss of anticipated carbon benefits due to the displacement of activities in a project area to areas outside the project, resulting in carbon emissions.

(10) LEAKAGE PREVENTION ACTIVITIES.—The term "leakage prevention activities" means activities in developing countries that are directed at preserving existing forest carbon stocks, including forested wetlands and peatlands that might, absent such activities, be lost through leakage.

(11) NATIONAL DEFORESTATION REDUCTION ACTIVITIES.—The term "national deforestation reduction activities" means activities in developing countries that reduce a quantity of greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation that is calculated by measuring actual emissions against a national deforestation baseline established pursuant to subparagraphs (B) and (C) of subsection (d)(4).

(12) SUBNATIONAL DEFORESTATION AND FOREST DEGRADATION REDUCTION ACTIVITIES.—The term "subnational deforestation and forest degradation reduction activities" means activities in developing countries that reduce a quantity of greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation that is calculated by measuring actual emissions using an appropriate baseline, or an alternative determined under subsection (d)(4)(B)(ii), established by the Administrator at the State or provincial level.

(c) PURPOSES.—The purposes of this section are to provide United States assistance to developing countries to develop, implement, and improve actions that reduce deforestation and forest degradation or conserve or restore forest ecosystems—

(1) to protect the value of forest ecosystems with respect to permanent carbon capture and sequestration in a manner in which such value is measurable, reportable, and verifiable; and

(2) in a manner that—

(A) is consistent with and enhances the implementation of complementary United States policies that support the good governance of forests, biodiversity conservation, and environmentally sustainable development;

(B) takes into consideration the views and participation of local communities and most vulnerable communities and populations, particularly forest-dependent communities; and

(C) incorporates the right to free prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples.

(d) EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS THROUGH REDUCED DEFORESTATION.—

(1) ESTABLISHMENT OF PROGRAM.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator, in consultation with other appropriate agencies, shall establish a program to provide assistance to reduce deforestation in developing countries and its impacts, in accordance with this section.

(2) OBJECTIVES.—The objectives of the program established under paragraph (1) shall be—

(A) to achieve—

(i) emissions reductions of at least 7,000,000,000 tons of carbon dioxide equivalent in 2025;

(ii) cumulative emissions reductions of at least 11,000,000,000 tons of carbon dioxide equivalent by December 31, 2030; and

(iii) additional emissions reductions in subsequent years;

(B) to build capacity to reduce deforestation at a national level in developing countries experiencing deforestation, which may include—

(i) preparing developing countries to participate in international markets for international offset credits for reduced emissions from deforestation;

(ii) supporting the development of overseas domestic policy frameworks to ensure effective, efficient, and equitable benefit-sharing of the proceeds of such credits issued by national and subnational governments; and

(iii) promoting and expanding land titling initiatives and programs in other countries;

(C) to preserve forest carbon stocks in countries where such forest carbon may be vulnerable to leakage, particularly in developing countries with largely intact native forests;

(D) to build the scientific knowledge and institutional capacity to help developing countries—

(i) monitor the effects of climate change on their forests;

(ii) develop and implement strategies to conserve their forests; and

(iii) support forest-dependent communities adapt to climate change;

(E) to the extent practicable, to reduce deforestation in ways that reduce the vulnerability and increase the resilience to climate effects for forests and forest-dependent communities;

(F) to prevent degradation and fragmentation of forests and other intact ecosystems, particularly in tropical countries, including by providing assistance or supporting policies to—

(i) conserve, protect, and restore the integrity of such ecosystems; and

(ii) support the rights of Indigenous People and local communities and their ability to continue their effective stewardship of their intact traditional lands and territories;

(G) to build capacity to address illegal deforestation for agricultural commodities; and

(H) to remove subsidies that favor deforestation;

(e) REQUIREMENTS FOR INTERNATIONAL DEFORESTATION REDUCTION PROGRAM.—

(1) ELIGIBLE COUNTRIES.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the Administrator may provide assistance under this section only with respect to a developing country that—

(i) the Administrator, in consultation with other appropriate agencies, determines—

(I) is experiencing deforestation or forest degradation; or

(II) has standing forest carbon stocks that may be at risk of deforestation or degradation;

(ii) has the legal regimes, standards, and safeguards to ensure that the rights and interests of indigenous peoples and forest-dependent communities are protected in accordance with the standards established under paragraph (4); and

(iii) has entered into a bilateral or multilateral agreement or arrangement with the United States, or is part of an international program supported by the United States to prevent deforestation, that establishes the conditions of participation by the country in the program established under this section, which shall include an agreement to meet the standards established under paragraph (4) for the activities to which such standards apply.

(B) EXCEPTION.—A developing country that does not meet the requirement described in paragraph (1)(A)(ii) may receive assistance under this section for the purpose of building capacity to meet such requirement.

(2) AUTHORIZED ACTIVITIES.—Subject to the requirements of this section, in providing assistance under this section, the Administrator may support activities to achieve the objectives described in subsection (c)(2), such as—

(A) national deforestation reduction activities;

(B) subnational deforestation and forest degradation reduction activities, including pilot activities, policies, and measures that reduce greenhouse gas emissions and are subject to significant uncertainty;

(C) activities to measure, monitor, and verify deforestation, avoided deforestation, and rates of deforestation, including, if applicable, spatially explicit land use plans that identify intact and primary forest areas and managed forest areas;

(D) leakage prevention activities;

(E) the development and implementation of measurement, monitoring, reporting, and verification capacities and governance structures, including legal regimes, standards, processes, and safeguards, as established under paragraph (4), to enable a country to quantify emissions reductions for purposes of purchasing or trading subnational emissions reduction credits in carbon markets;

(F) the identification of, and actions to address, the drivers of land use emissions;

(G) programs that would exclude from the United States illegally harvested timber or products made from illegally harvested timber, in accordance with and consistent with the objectives of the Lacey Act Amendments of 1981 (16 U.S.C. 3371 et seq.);

(H) the development and strengthening of governance capacities to reduce deforestation and other land use emissions and to combat illegal logging and associated trade, including the development of systems for independent monitoring of the efficacy of forest law enforcement and increased enforcement cooperation, including joint efforts with Federal agencies, to enforce the Lacey Act Amendments of 1981 (16 U.S.C. 3371 et seq.);

(I) programs to help countries strengthen the necessary governance and technological capacity to trace and make publicly available the origin of agricultural commodities associated with tropical deforestation, such as beef, soy, palm oil, paper, pulp, cocoa, and rubber;

(J) the development and strengthening of governance capacities and associated implementation activities to combat illegal deforestation related to the production of agricultural commodities, such as those described in subparagraph (I);

(K) the provision of incentives for policy reforms to achieve the objectives described in subsection (c)(2);

(L) the development of pilot projects—

(i) to examine where mitigation and adaptation activities in forest ecosystems coincide; and

(ii) to explore means for enhancing the resilience of forest ecosystems and forest-dependent communities;

(M) the promotion of mechanisms to deliver resources for local action and to address the needs, rights, interests, and participation of local and indigenous communities;

(N) the promotion of land tenure and titling programs, including legal recognition and effective protection of the land tenure, access and use rights of Indigenous People and local communities; and

(O) the monitoring and evaluation of the results of the activities conducted under this section.

(3) MECHANISMS.—The Administrator shall apply the administrative authorities under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), except to the extent inconsistent with the provisions of this section, to the same extent and in the same manner as such authorities apply to the implementation of such Act in order to support activities to achieve the objectives described in subsection (c)(2) by—

(A) developing and implementing programs and project-level activities that achieve such objectives;

(B) to the extent practicable, giving priority in any review process to activities under paragraph (2)(A); and

(C) as appropriate, considering multi-year funding arrangements in carrying out the purposes of this section.

(4) STANDARDS.—The Administrator, in consultation with other appropriate agencies, shall establish program standards that—

(A) ensure that emissions reductions achieved through supported activities—

(i) are additional, measurable, verifiable, and monitored;

(ii) account for leakage, uncertainty, and permanence; and

(iii) at a minimum, meet the standards established under the emissions unit criteria of the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) developed by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO);

(B) require—

(i) the establishment of a national deforestation baseline for each country with national deforestation reduction activities that is used to account for reductions achieved from such activities; or

(ii) if a developing country has established policies and taken measures to reduce emissions from disturbed peatlands, deforestation, or forest degradation, but has not established a national baseline, the provision of a credible, transparent, accurate, and conservative alternative for quantifying emissions;

(C) provide that each national deforestation baseline established under subparagraph (B)(i)—

(i) is national, or subnational on an interim basis, in scope; and

(ii) is consistent with nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or actions with respect to deforestation, taking into consideration—

(I) the average annual historical deforestation rates of the country during a period of at least 5 years; and

(II) the applicable drivers of deforestation and other factors to ensure additionality;

(iii) establishes a trajectory that would result in zero net deforestation by not later than 20 years after the date on which the baseline is established;

(iv) is adjusted over time to account for changing national circumstances; and

(v) is designed to account for all significant sources of greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation in the country;

(D) with respect to assistance provided for activities described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (2), require emissions reductions to be

achieved and verified before the provision of any assistance under this section;

(E) with respect to accounting for subnational deforestation and forest degradation reduction activities that lack the standardized or precise measurement and monitoring techniques needed for a full accounting of changes in emissions or baselines, or are subject to other sources of uncertainty, apply a conservative discount factor to reflect the uncertainty regarding the levels of reductions achieved;

(F) ensure that activities under this section are designed, carried out, and managed—

(i) using forest management practices that, in an open and transparent process—

(I) improve the livelihoods of forest communities in a manner that promotes the maintenance of intact forests, protects associated biodiversity, and restores native forest species and ecosystems while avoiding the introduction of invasive nonnative species;

(II) maintain natural biodiversity, resilience, and carbon storage capacity of forests;

(III) to the extent practicable, do not adversely affect the permanence of forest carbon stocks or emissions reductions;

(IV) include broad stakeholder participation and the free prior and informed consent of affected indigenous peoples; and

(V) take into account the needs and interests of local communities, forest-dependent communities, indigenous peoples, and vulnerable social groups;

(ii) in consultation with, and with the full and effective participation of, local communities, indigenous peoples, and forest-dependent communities in affected areas, as partners and primary stakeholders, before and during the design, planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of activities; and

(iii) with equitable sharing of profits and benefits derived from the activities with local communities, indigenous peoples, and forest-dependent communities; and

(G) with respect to assistance for all activities under this section, seek to ensure the establishment and enforcement of legal regimes, standards, processes, and safeguards by the country in which the activities are conducted, as a condition of such assistance or as a proposed activity for which such assistance may be provided, which—

(i) protect the rights and interests of local communities, indigenous peoples, forest-dependent communities, human rights defenders, and vulnerable social groups; and

(ii) promote consultations with local communities, indigenous peoples, and forest-dependent communities in affected areas, as partners and primary stakeholders, before and during the design, planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of activities under this section; and

(iii) ensure equitable sharing of profits and benefits from incentives for emissions reductions or leakage prevention with local communities, indigenous peoples, and forest-dependent communities.

(5) SCOPE.—

(A) REDUCED EMISSIONS.—The Administrator shall include reduced emissions from forest degradation and disturbance of peatlands within the scope of activities under this section.

(B) EXPANSION OF AUTHORIZED ACTIVITIES.—If the Administrator determines, in consultation with other appropriate agencies, that sufficient methodologies and technical capacities exist to measure, monitor, and account for the emissions referred to in subparagraph (A), the Administrator may expand the authorized activities under this section, as appropriate, to include reduced soil carbon-derived emissions associated with deforestation and degradation of forested wetlands and peatlands, consistent with a comprehensive approach to maintaining and enhancing forests, increasing climate resiliency, reducing emissions, and increasing removals of greenhouse gases.

(6) ACCOUNTING.—The Administrator shall use a publicly accessible registry to account for and register the emissions reductions achieved through assistance provided under this section each year, after appropriately discounting for uncertainty and other relevant factors as required by the standards established under paragraph (4).

(7) INTERNATIONAL DEFORESTATION REDUCTION PROGRAM INSURANCE ACCOUNT FOR NONCOMPLETION OR REVERSAL.—In furtherance of the objectives described in subsection (c)(2), the Administrator shall develop and implement a program that—

(A) addresses noncompletion or reversal with respect to any greenhouse gas emissions that were not, or are no longer, sequestered; and

(B) may include a mechanism to hold in reserve a portion of the amount allocated for projects to support the program.

(8) EXTENSION OF ASSISTANCE.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The Administrator may extend, for an additional 5 years, the period during which assistance is authorized for activities supported by assistance under this section, if the Administrator determines that—

(i) the country in which the activities are conducted is making substantial progress toward adopting and implementing a program to achieve reductions in deforestation measured against a national baseline;

(ii) the greenhouse gas emissions reductions achieved as a result of the activities are not resulting in significant leakage;

(iii) such greenhouse gas emissions reductions are being appropriately discounted to account for any leakage that is occurring; and

(iv) such extension would further advance or ensure achievement of the objectives of the activities.

(B) ASSISTANCE FOR SUBNATIONAL DEFORESTATION AND FOREST DEGRADATION REDUCTION ACTIVITIES.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—If the Administrator extends the period during which assistance is authorized for activities under subparagraph (A), the Administrator shall determine, based on the criteria specified that subparagraph, whether such assistance should include assistance for subnational deforestation and forest degradation reduction activities.

(ii) CONTINUED ASSISTANCE.—The Administrator may extend the period during which assistance is authorized for subnational deforestation and forest degradation reduction activities beyond the 5-year period described in subparagraph (A) in order to further the objectives described in subparagraph (B) or (C) of subsection (c)(2).

(9) COORDINATION WITH FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.—Subject to the direction of the President, the Administrator shall, to the extent practicable and consistent with the objectives described in subsection (c)(2), seek to align activities under this section with broader development, poverty alleviation, or natural resource management objectives and initiatives in countries receiving assistance under this section.

(10) ASSISTANCE AS SUPPLEMENT.—The provision of assistance for activities under this section shall be used to supplement, and not to supplant, any other Federal, State, or local support available to carry out activities under this section.

(11) FUNDING LIMITATION.—Of the funds made available to carry out this section in any fiscal year, not more than 7 percent may be used for the administrative expenses of the United States Agency for International Development in support of activities described in paragraph (2). Such amount shall be in addition to other amounts otherwise available for such purposes.

(f) LEGAL EFFECT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Nothing in this section may be construed to supersede, limit, or otherwise affect any restriction imposed by Federal law (including regulations) on any interaction between an entity located in the United States and an entity located in a foreign country.

(2) ROLE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE.—Nothing in this section may be construed to affect the role of the Secretary of State or the responsibilities of the Secretary under section 622(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2382(c)).

(g) INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.—The President shall direct the United States representatives to the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other international financial institutions (as defined in section 1701(c) of the International Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262r(c)) to prioritize efforts to combat deforestation.

SEC. 612. CONTROLLING THE EXPORT OF ELECTRONIC WASTE TO PROTECT UNITED STATES SUPPLY CHAINS.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) It is in the national security interests of the United States to ensure that the export of electronic waste does not become the source of counterfeit goods

that may reenter electronics supply chains in the United States, and for other purposes.

(2) A 2012 Senate Armed Services Committee Report "discovered counterfeit electronic parts from China in the Air Force's largest cargo plane, in assemblies intended for Special Operations helicopters, and in a Navy surveillance plane among 1,800 cases of bogus parts".

(3) Further, exporting such material has often resulted in environmental damage because of illegal dumping or inadequate environmental regulations in other countries for ensuring their safe and secure disposal.

(4) China, the single largest producer of electronic waste, is on track for its e-waste industry to total $23,800,000,000 by 2030, given its high supply of used products, demand for recycled materials, and capacity to transport these materials.

(5) As the second largest producer of electronic waste, the United States has a strong economic and national security incentive to enhance domestic e-waste recycling capacity rather than exporting to China and other countries.

(6) Given China's lack of regulations and worker protections, workers in the e-waste industry have been exposed to over 1,000 harmful substances, including lead and mercury, endangering the health and wellbeing of workers.

(b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) ELECTRONIC WASTE.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The term "electronic waste" means any of the following used items containing electronic components, or fragments thereof, including parts or subcomponents of such items:

(i) Computers and related equipment.

(ii) Data center equipment (including servers, network equipment, firewalls, battery backup systems, and power distribution units).

(iii) Mobile computers (including notebooks, netbooks, tablets, and e-book readers).

(iv) Televisions (including portable televisions and portable DVD players).

(v) Video display devices (including monitors, digital picture frames, and portable video devices).

(vi) Digital imaging devices (including printers, copiers, facsimile machines, image scanners, and multifunction machines).

(vii) Consumer electronics—

(I) including digital cameras, projectors, digital audio players, cellular phones and wireless internet communication devices, audio equipment, video cassette recorders, DVD players, video game systems (including portable systems), video game controllers, signal converter boxes, and cable and satellite receivers; and

(II) not including appliances that have electronic features.

(viii) Portable global positioning system navigation devices.

(ix) Other used electronic items that the Secretary determines to be necessary to carry out this section.

(B) EXEMPT ITEMS.—The term "electronic waste" does not include—

(i) exempted electronic waste items;

(ii) electronic parts of a motor vehicle; or

(iii) electronic components, or items containing electronic components, that are exported or reexported to an entity under the ownership or control of the person exporting or reexporting the components or items, with the intent that the components or items be used for the purpose for which the components or items were used in the United States.

(2) EXEMPTED ELECTRONIC WASTE ITEMS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The term "exempted electronic waste items" means the following:

(i) Tested, working used electronics.

(ii) Low-risk counterfeit electronics.

(iii) Recalled electronics.

(B) DEFINITIONS.—In this paragraph:

(i) TESTED, WORKING USED ELECTRONICS.—The term "tested, working used electronics" means any used electronic items that—

(I) are determined, through testing methodologies established by the Secretary, to be—

(aa) fully functional for the purpose for which the items were designed; or

(bb) in the case of multifunction devices, fully functional for at least one of the primary purposes for which the items were designed;

(II) are exported with the intent to reuse the products as functional products; and

(III) are appropriately packaged for shipment to prevent the items from losing functionality as a result of damage during shipment.

(ii) LOW-RISK COUNTERFEIT ELECTRONICS.—The term "low-risk counterfeit electronics" means any electronic components or items that—

(I) have been subjected to destruction processes that render the items unusable for their original purpose; and

(II) are exported as a feedstock, with no additional mechanical or hand separation required, in a reclamation process to render the electronic components or items recycled consistent with the laws of the foreign country performing the reclamation process.

(iii) RECALLED ELECTRONICS.—The term "recalled electronics" means any electronic items that—

(I) because of a defect in the design or manufacture of the items—

(aa) are subject to a recall notice issued by the Consumer Product Safety Commission or other pertinent Federal authority and have been received by the manufacturer or its agent and repaired by the manufacturer or its agent to cure the defect; or

(bb) have been recalled by the manufacturer as a condition of the validity of the warranty on the items and have been repaired by the manufacturer or its agent to cure the defect; and

(II) are exported by the manufacturer of the items.

(iv) FEEDSTOCK.—The term "feedstock" means any raw material constituting the principal input for an industrial process.

(3) COUNTERFEIT GOOD.—The term "counterfeit good" means any good on which, or in connection with which, a counterfeit mark is used.

(4) COUNTERFEIT MILITARY GOOD.—The term "counterfeit military good" means a counterfeit good that—

(A) is falsely identified or labeled as meeting military specifications; or

(B) is intended for use in a military or national security application.

(5) COUNTERFEIT MARK.—The term "counterfeit mark" has the meaning given that term in section 2320 of title 18, United States Code.

(6) EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS.—The term "Export Administration Regulations" means the regulations set forth in subchapter C of chapter VII of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations, or successor regulations.

(7) EXPORT; REEXPORT.—The terms "export" and "reexport" have the meanings given such terms in section 1742 of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801).

(8) SECRETARY.—The term "Secretary" means the Secretary of Commerce.

(9) USED.—The term "used", with respect to an item, means the item has been operated or employed.

(c) PROHIBITION.—Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d), no person or entity may export or reexport electronic waste or exempted electronic waste items.

(d) EXPORT PROHIBITION EXEMPTIONS.—A person or entity may export or reexport exempted electronic waste items, but only if the following requirements are met:

(1) REGISTRATION.—The person or entity is listed on a publicly available registry maintained by the Secretary.

(2) FILING OF EXPORT INFORMATION.—For each export transaction, the person or entity files in the Automated Export System, in accordance with part 758 of the Export Administration Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation or ruling), electronic export information that contains at least the following information:

(A) A description of the type and total quantity of exempted electronic waste items exported.

(B) The name of each country that received the exempted electronic waste items for reuse or recycling.

(C)(i) The name of the ultimate consignee to which the exempted electronic waste items were received for reclamation, recall, or reuse; and

(ii) documentation and a declaration that such consignee has the necessary permits, resources, and competence to manage the exempted electronic waste items as reusable products or recyclable feedstock and prevent its release as a counterfeit good or counterfeit military good.

(3) COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING LAWS.—The export or reexport of exempted electronic waste items otherwise comply with applicable international agree-

ments to which the United States is a party and with other trade and export control laws of the United States.

(4) EXPORT DECLARATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS.—The exempted electronic waste items are accompanied by—

(A) documentation of the registration of the exporter required under paragraph (1);

(B) a declaration signed by an officer or designated representative of the exporter asserting that the exempted electronic waste items meet the applicable requirements for exempted electronic waste items under this section;

(C) a description of the contents and condition of the exempted electronic waste items in the shipment;

(D) for tested, working electronics, a description of the testing methodologies and test results for each item;

(E) the name of the ultimate consignee and declaration of the consignee's applicable permits, resources, and competence to process or use the items as intended; and

(F) with respect to low-risk counterfeit electronics only and when required by the importing country, the written consent of the competent authority of the receiving country to allow the products in such country.

(e) EXCEPTION FOR PERSONAL USE.—The Secretary may provide for an exception to the requirements of this section, subject to such recordkeeping requirements as the Secretary may impose, for the export or reexport of 5 or fewer items that are or contain electronic components intended for personal use.

(f) EFFECTIVE DATE.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2), this section shall take effect upon the expiration of the 1-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.

(2) MODIFICATION OF EAR.—The Secretary shall, not later than the effective date under paragraph (1), ensure that the Export Administration Regulations are modified to carry out this section.

(g) PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS.—Any person who violates this section or the regulations issued under subsection (e)(2) shall be subject to the same penalties as those that apply to any person violating any other provision of the Export Administration Regulations.

PURPOSE AND SUMMARY

H.R. 3524, the Ensuring American Global Leadership and Engagement (EAGLE) Act, is a comprehensive bill to revitalize U.S. diplomacy, leadership, and investments globally in response to the policy challenges posed by the People's Republic of China (PRC). The bill would bolster the foundations of U.S. competitiveness by assisting companies to diversify from and manage risks within the PRC market, dedicating resources to counteract Chinese assistance and financing in global infrastructure and energy development, and boosting U.S. development assistance, economic diplomacy, and global financial leadership. It seeks to strengthen U.S. alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region and globally and increase our diplomatic footprint in the region. Areas of focus include expanding cooperation with the Quad, strengthening people-to-people exchanges and leadership development programs, boosting vaccine diplomacy, increasing U.S. engagement in international organizations and fora, enhancing multilateral cooperation to ensure peace and stability and safeguard U.S. interests globally, and working with civil society and independent media to counter PRC propaganda and promote U.S. values.

H.R. 3524 holds the PRC government to account for its gross human rights violations in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and other regions of China and provides temporary protected status and refugee status for qualifying individuals. It expands the United States' ability to respond to and counter corruption and economic coercive measures from foreign governments, and track those in China who enable the use of items or services related to targeted digital surveil-

lance in ways contrary to human rights. The legislation mandates a strategy to engage the PRC on arms control and risk reduction and counter the PRC's proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear technology to other regions. Lastly, the bill calls for greater interagency coordination on climate change and makes climate action a central tenet of U.S. foreign policy to pressure the PRC to upgrade and meet its climate commitments. It creates Climate Change Officer positions within the Foreign Service, authorizes contributions to the Green Climate Fund, creates the Coordinator of Climate Change Resilience at the Department of State, and ensures a whole-of-government response to climate action to hold China accountable.

BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR LEGISLATION

The People's Republic of China poses an urgent and grave challenge to the United States and the American-led rules-based international order, which has yielded decades of growing prosperity and relative peace in Asia and the wider world. As China has grown in economic heft, its government has used its newfound influence and power in ways that run contrary to U.S. interests as well as the interests of U.S. allies and partners in the region and clash with the international laws and norms which facilitated China's rise.

In recent years, the PRC has aggressively pressed its border, maritime, and territorial claims, threatening peace and security in the Indo-Pacific. Utilizing economic coercion against U.S. allies and partners, the PRC has been pushing its political objectives in ways that undermine international rules and norms. It has been distorting global commerce through the theft of intellectual property and technology, and its anti-competitive industrial and trade policies that have for years put American companies and workers at a disadvantage. Beijing is simultaneously trying to mold regional and international institutions in ways that undermine a rules-based order, neglect universal human rights, erode the market principles of non-discrimination, market access, reciprocity, fairness, and transparency, and apply undue influence on sovereign states.

At the same time, China has been using it large and growing economic heft to make significant financial and military investments, to induce and pressure sovereign states to allow or tolerate growing PRC presence and influence within their territories and support PRC policy objectives internationally. For instance, it has squeezed countries to cut off relations with Taiwan and restrict its ability to engage in international forums to cut off Taiwan's already limited international space. Taken together, the PRC's grey zone activities, the significant and accelerated buildup of the People's Liberation Army's Navy, and its illegal construction and occupation of the contested South China Seas are clear signals that Beijing aims to secure its policy objectives through coercion and force rather than diplomacy and peaceful negotiation.

The China challenge was encapsulated in how the PRC glaringly abrogated its commitments to the one country-two systems principle in Hong Kong through the draconian National Security Law, and its continued attacks on the freedoms and the rights of the people of Hong Kong. Furthermore, since 2014 the PRC has unduly

detained more than one million Uyghurs and sentenced hundreds of thousands to prison terms. Its actions have led many governments, institutions, and civil society organizations to accuse the PRC of committing crimes against humanity against mostly Muslim ethnic minorities in Xinjiang and genocide against the Uyghur people. Simultaneously, the PRC has built and deployed high-tech surveillance and censorship tools domestically that it has no compunction in exporting abroad.

Today, the PRC represents the most urgent and substantial geopolitical challenge the United States faces. Its policies and actions directly threaten U.S. allies and partners in the region and signal that the PRC aims to challenge U.S. presence and critical interests in the Indo-Pacific and U.S. primacy globally. Complicating matters further, given that China is the world's second largest economy, largest population, and largest greenhouse gas emitter, and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, myriad global challenges and problems cannot be addressed unless China plays a constructive role. Whether it is nuclear security, global health, or climate change, the United States and the world cannot afford a China that plays the role of spoiler. As the Covid–19 pandemic proved, China's policy mistakes and lack of cooperation with the international community can pose tremendous challenges to the United States and the world.

Therefore, it is a central goal of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs to safeguard American global interests that are threatened by China's policies by renewing American institutions and competitiveness at home and American engagement and leadership abroad. United States diplomacy and global leadership are critical tools for advancing American foreign policy and national security and addressing the China challenge. H.R. 3524 upgrades United States diplomacy and leadership by investing in the foundations of United States core values and leveraging critical alliances and partnerships. H.R. 3524 positions the United States for effective and constructive strategic competition China and to defend the rules based global order.

HEARINGS

In compliance with clause 3(c) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the following Committee or Subcommittee hearings were used to develop or consider H.R. 3524:

On May 6, 2021, the Full Committee held a hearing entitled "The Atrocities Against Uyghurs and Other Minorities in Xinjiang." Witnesses included the Honorable Nury Turkel, Chairman of the Board of the Uyghur Human Rights Project; Ms. Tursunay Ziyawudun, survivor and advocate; and Dr. James A. Millward, Professor of Inter-societal History at Georgetown University's Walsh School of Foreign Service.

On June 9, 2021, the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia, and Nonproliferation held a hearing entitled "Democratic Values in the Indo-Pacific in an Era of Strategic Competition." Witnesses included Mr. Scott Busby, Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor at the United States Department of State; Mr. Craig Hart, Acting Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for East Asia and the Pacific at the United States Agency for International Development;

Mr. Dean Thompson, Acting Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs at the United States Department of State; and Mr. Francisco Bencosme, Senior Advisor to the Acting Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the United States Department of State.

On June 7, 2021, the Full Committee held a hearing entitled "The State Department's Foreign Policy Strategy and FY22 Budget Request." The hearing witness was the Honorable Antony Blinken, the 71st United States Secretary of State.

On April 29, 2021, the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia, and Nonproliferation held a hearing entitled "Maritime Security in the Indo-Pacific and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea." Witnesses included the Honorable Daniel Russel, Vice President for International Security and Diplomacy at the Asia Society Policy Institute and former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; Admiral Scott Swift (USN, Ret.), former Commander United States Pacific Fleet; Ms. Bonnie Glaser, Director of the Asia Program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States; and Mr. Brent Sadler, Senior Fellow for Naval Warfare and Advanced Technology at the Heritage Foundation.

On March 19, 2021, the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia, and Nonproliferation held a hearing entitled "America's Way Forward in the Indo-Pacific." Witnesses included the Honorable Richard N. Hass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations and former Director of Policy Planning at the United States Department of State; the Honorable Randall G. Schriver, Chairman of the Project 2049 Institute and former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs; and Ms. Nadège Rolland, Senior Fellow for Political and Security Affairs at the National Bureau of Asian Research.

On March 10, 2021, the Full Committee held a hearing entitled "Secretary Blinken: The Biden Administration's Priorities for U.S. Foreign Policy." The hearing witness was the Honorable Antony Blinken, the 71st United States Secretary of State.

Additional hearings were held that informed the development of H.R. 3524.

On June 16, 2021, the Full Committee held a hearing entitled "The Biden Administration's Priorities for Engagement with the United Nations." The hearing witness was the Honorable Linda Thomas-Greenfield, United States Ambassador to the United Nations.

On May 12, 2021, the Full Committee held a hearing entitled "Driving a Global, Whole-of-Society Response to Climate Action." The hearing witness was the Honorable John Kerry, Special Presidential Envoy for Climate at the United States Department of State.

On December 10, 2020, the Subcommittee on the Asia, the Pacific, and Nonproliferation held a hearing entitled "Taiwan and the United States: Enduring Bonds in the Face of Adversity." Witnesses included Ms. Bonnie Glaser, Senior Adviser for Asia and Director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Dr. Shelley Rigger, Brown Professor of Political Science at Davidson College; and Ms. Shirley Kan, retired Specialist in Asian Security Affairs at the Congressional Research Service.

On July 1, 2020, the Full Committee held a hearing entitled "The End of One Country, Two Systems?: Implications of Beijing's National Security Law in Hong Kong." Witnesses included Mr. Cheuk Yan Lee, General Secretary of the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions; Ms. Carole J. Petersen, Professor of Law at the William S. Richardson School of Law and Graduate Chair of the Matsunaga Institute for Peace at the University of Hawai'i at Manoa; Mr. Nathan Law, former Hong Kong Legislative Council Member and graduate student at Yale University; Mr. Brian Leung, a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Washington.

On June 30, 2020, the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and Nonproliferation held a hearing entitled "China's Maritime Ambitions." Witnesses included Gregory B. Poling, Senior Fellow for Southeast Asia and Director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Dr. Oriana Skylar Mastro, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and Assistant Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University; Dr. Andrew S. Erickson, Professor of Strategy in the Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute and Visiting Scholar at Harvard University's Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies.

On December 10, 2019, the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and Nonproliferation held a hearing entitled "Authoritarianism with Chinese Characteristics: Political and Religious Human Rights Challenges in China." Witnesses included Dr. Sophie Richardson, China Director at Human Rights Watch; Ms. Joey Siu, Vice President of City University of Hong Kong's Students Union; Mr. Ferkat Jawdat, a Uyghur American; and Dr. Adrian Zenz, Senior Fellow in China Studies at the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation.

On May 9, 2019, the Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and International Terrorism held a hearing entitled "Chinese and Russian Influence in the Middle East." Witnesses included Dr. Jon B. Alterman, Senior Vice President, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security, and Geostrategy Director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Dr. Andrew Exum, Executive at Hakluyt and Company and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East Policy; the Honorable Christine Wormuth, Director of the International Security and Defense Policy Center and Senior Fellow at RAND Corporation and former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; and Ms. Anna Borshchevskaya, Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

On May 9, 2019, the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment held a hearing entitled "China's Expanding Influence in Europe and Eurasia." Witnesses included Mr. Philippe Le Corre, Nonresident Senior Fellow in the Europe and Asia Programs at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and former Special Assistant for International Affairs to the French Defense Minister; Ms. Stephanie Segal, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow at the Simon Chair in Political Economy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and former Co-director of the East Asia Office at the United States Department of the Treasury; Dr. Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Senior Fellow and Director at the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American

Security and former Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Russia and Eurasia in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; and Dr. Zack Cooper, Research Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and former Assistant to the Deputy National Security Adviser for Combating Terrorism at the National Security Council.

On May 9, 2019, the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade held a hearing entitled "Dollar Diplomacy or Debt Trap? Examining China's Role in the Western Hemisphere." Witnesses included Ms. Margaret Myers, Program Director of the Asia and Latin America Program at Inter-American Dialogue; Mr. Brian Fonseca, Director of the Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy at Florida International University's Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs; and Mr. Christopher Walker, Vice President for Studies and Analysis at the National Endowment for Democracy.

On May 8, 2019, the Full Committee held a hearing entitled "Smart Competition: Adapting U.S. Strategy Toward China at 40 Years." Witnesses included Dr. Elizabeth Economy, the C. V. Starr Senior Fellow and Director for Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations; Ms. Samm Sacks, Cybersecurity Policy and China Digital Economy Fellow at New America; Ms. Kelly Magsamen, Vice President of National Security and International Policy at the Center for American Progress and former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs; and Dr. Aaron Friedberg, Professor of Politics and International Affairs and Co-Director of the Woodrow Wilson School's Center for International Security Studies at Princeton University and former Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs in the Office of the Vice President.

On May 8, 2019, the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and Nonproliferation held a hearing entitled "China's Growing Influence in Asia and the United States." Witnesses included Dr. Daniel Kliman, Senior Fellow in the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security; Ms. Shamila Chaudhary, Senior Advisor in the School for Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University and South Asia Fellow at New America; Mr. Peter Mattis, Research Fellow in China Studies at the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation; and Dr. David Shullman, Senior Advisor at the International Republican Institute.

COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION

The Committee considered H.R. 3524, the Ensuring American Global Leadership and Engagement Act on June 30 to July 1, 2021, July 13, 2021, and July 15, 2021, and ordered the measure, as amended, to be favorably reported to the House of Representatives (roll call 26Y–22N).

Amendments considered en bloc and adopted without objection:

- Barr Amendment #2: The amendment is a statement of policy that says it is U.S. policy to work with NATO allies to address challenges posed by the Chinese Communist Party and share the burden that comes with collective security.
- Burchett Amendment #89: The amendment is a statement of policy that says it is U.S. policy to urge that Taiwan be given observer status on the Arctic Council.

• Chabot Amendment #15: The amendment requires the State Department to submit a report to Congress describing the Department's efforts to facilitate access among the National Technology and Industrial Base to defense articles and services subject to the U.S. Munitions List.

• Chabot Amendment #22: The amendment expresses the sense of Congress that the PRC should respect freedom of press and expression.

• Chabot Amendment #23: The amendment expresses the sense of Congress that the PRC censors political speech which is antithetical to human rights and U.S. values and interests.

• Meijer Amendment #21: The amendment requires the State Department to submit a report to Congress on how the PRC uses the status of Hong Kong to circumvent U.S. laws and protections.

• Meuser Amendment #7: The amendment applies FAA restrictions onto American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 funds, including the Global Fund contribution, and allows for the funding to be transferred to the Inspector General for oversight work.

• Tenney Amendment #1: The amendment expresses the sense of Congress that the State Department's annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices should include information on forcible repatriation of Uyghurs and other support for the PRC's genocide against Uyghurs.

• Tenney Amendment #6: The amendment directs the President to ensure that every vaccine donated, procured, or financed by the U.S. Government is clearly branded with the U.S. flag.

Amendments considered separately:

• Meeks, an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 3524 (adopted, roll call 26Y–21N)

Members voting AYE (26)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA

Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting NO (21)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Young Kim, R–CA

• McCaul, an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 3524 (not adopted, roll call 26N–20Y)

Members voting NO (26)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX

Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (20)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Young Kim, R–CA

• Barr Amendment #10: The amendment limits the use of funds authorized for the Green Climate Fund to go to any entity under the influence, control ownership, or jurisdiction of the CCP or PRC and thus would block U.S. participation in Green Climate Fund, which is required to be open all UNFCCC developing states. (not agreed to by voice vote)

• Barr Amendment #17: The amendment expresses the sense of Congress that no envoy of USG disregard human rights abuses in efforts to get a climate or emissions-related commitment (not agreed to, roll call 25N–22Y)

Members voting NO (25)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA

Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (22)

Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Young Kim, R–CA

• Barr Amendment #44: The amendment imposes unilateral U.S. export controls on a particular widely used semiconductor, and also calls for a renewed U.S. effort to broaden multilateral consistency on export controls (not agreed to, roll call 25N–23Y)

Members voting NO (25)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA

Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (23)

Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Ronny Jackson, R–TX
Young Kim, R–CA

• Bass Amendment #44: The amendment authorizes existing State and USAID programs that engage and cultivate young African "future" leaders who could counter authoritarian influences in Africa's public and private sectors. (agreed to by voice vote)

• Burchett Amendment #1: The amendment requires the Secretary of State to submit a determination as to whether the PRC has violated Article VI of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (not agreed to, roll call 26N–22Y)

Members voting NO (26)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX

Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (22)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Ronny Jackson, R–TX
Young Kim, R–CA

• Burchett Amendment #19: The amendment expresses the sense of Congress that State should not be offering gender markers until the COVID-related passport backlog is cleared (not agreed to, roll call 25Y–20N)

Members voting NO (25)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX

Andy Levin, D–MI
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Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (20)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Young Kim, R–CA

• Burchett Amendment #53: The amendment expresses the sense of Congress that NSA Jake Sullivan correctly observed that the U.S. and likeminded democracies are in an ideological competition with the PRC. (agreed to by voice vote)

• Burchett Amendment #78: The amendment requires that Huawei remain on the Commerce Department's Entity List until Congress acts to remove it. (withdrawn)

• Burchett Amendment #90: The amendment prohibits the U.S. Government from conducting commercial diplomacy on behalf of the NBA and other organizations that limit the free speech of Americans in order to hold events in China. (not agreed to by voice vote)

• Castro Amendment #48: The amendment allows for appropriations to the DFC's equity programs to be treated more similar to a loan, taking into account returns, losses, and risks rather than treating them as grants as they currently are. (agreed to by voice vote)

• Castro Amendment #5: The amendment enables a research entity to examine the problem of Chinese government censorship in the U.S. and establish a monitoring group pursuant to the results of the review. (agreed to by voice vote)

• Chabot Amendment #21: The amendment calls on the President to create a whole-of-government strategy to deter Chinese economic coercion against third countries. (agreed to by voice vote)
• Chabot Amendment #25: The amendment strikes a part of Sec 208 of the Statement of Policy (not agreed to, roll call 25N–23Y)

Members voting NO (25)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (23)

Brad Sherman, D–CA
Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI

Ronny Jackson, R–TX
Young Kim, R–CA

• Chabot Amendment #51: The amendment includes measures on altering diplomatic relations with Taiwan, including economic and defense relations. (not agreed to, roll call 26N–21Y)

Members voting NO (26)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (21)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Ronny Jackson, R–TX

Young Kim, R–CA

• Green Amendment #1: The amendment bars the United States from contributing to the Green Climate Fund till some countries are banned from receiving Green Climate funds (not agreed to, roll call 26N–19Y)

Members voting NO (26)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (19)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Ronny Jackson, R–TX
Young Kim, R–CA

• Green Amendment #3: The amendment expresses the sense of Congress that USG should prioritize countering malign activities over U.S. climate or social policies (not agreed to, roll call 26N–22Y)

Members voting NO (26)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (22)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Ronny Jackson, R–TX

Young Kim, R–CA

• Green Amendment #79: The amendment prohibits the USG from providing technical assistance to U.S. film companies that co-produce a film with a Chinese entity (not agreed to, roll call 26N–21Y)

Members voting NO (26)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (21)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Ronny Jackson, R–TX

Young Kim, R–CA

• Jacobs Amendment #1: The amendment strikes Sec 116 (agreed to by voice vote)

• Y. Kim Amendment #24: The amendment amends the appointment authority relating to the Quad Interparliamentary Group (not agreed to, roll call 25N–22Y)

Members voting NO (25)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (22)

Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY

Peter Meijer, R–MI
Young Kim, R–CA

• Y. Kim Amendment #52: The amendment directs the Secretary of State to establish the Pacific Responsive Infrastructure Program (not agreed to, roll call 28N–17Y)

Members voting NO (28)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL
Scott Perry, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO

Members voting AYE (17)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Young Kim, R–CA

• Y. Kim Amendment #6: The amendment is a statement of policy that says it is U.S. policy to have a maximum pressure policy on North Korea (not agreed to, roll call 26N–21Y)

Members voting NO (26)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (21)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Young Kim, R–CA

• Malinowski Amendment #28: The amendment establishes the Liu Xiaobo Fund for Study of the Chinese Language to fund alternatives to Confucius Institutes at U.S. universities. (agreed to by voice vote)

• Malliotakis Amendment #19: The amendment duplicates an existent USTR-led program by directing the Secretary of State to create a list of state-owned enterprises that benefit from IP violations against U.S. firms (not agreed to, roll call 26N–22Y)

Members voting NO (26)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (22)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY

August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Ronny Jackson, R–TX
Young Kim, R–CA

• Malliotakis Amendment #26: The amendment expresses the sense of Congress that governments that do not cooperate on financial investigations with respect to transnational crimes should be held accountable, that China has not cooperated with financial investigations, that the U.S. should apply economic and financial sanctions, and that the U.S. should look into policies that punish countries that fail to sufficiently investigate activities that foster narcotics trafficking in Latin America. (revised) (agreed to by voice vote)

• Mast Amendment #10: The amendment prohibits NIH from providing grants or financial resources to any individual or entity for research to be conducted within the PRC, Russia, Iran, or North Korea (not agreed to, roll call 26N–21Y)

Members voting NO (26)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (21)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY

Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Young Kim, R–CA

• Mast Amendment #26: The amendment is a statement of policy that says the removal of Hamas control over Gaza is a prerequisite to a peace settlement between Palestinians and Israelis (not agreed to, roll call 26N–22Y)

Members voting NO (26)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (22)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY

Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Ronny Jackson, R–TX
Young Kim, R–CA

• Mast Amendment #27: The amendment requires the President to declassify information on COVID–19 (not agreed to, roll call 25N–23Y)

Members voting NO (25)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (23)

Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY

Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Ronny Jackson, R–TX
Young Kim, R–CA

• Mast Amendment #28: The amendment provides that the President shall transmit to Congress an agreement with Iran relating to its nuclear program, no later than 5 days after reaching the agreement (not agreed to, roll call 25N–21Y)

Members voting NO (25)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (21)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY

Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Young Kim, R–CA

• Mast Amendment #39: The amendment requires U.S. strategy to reduce WTO developing country designations (not agreed to, roll call 25N–23Y)

Members voting NO (25)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (23)

Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO

Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Ronny Jackson, R–TX
Young Kim, R–CA

• Mast Amendment #43: The amendment amends the International Emergency Economic Powers Act that provides the President broad authority to regulate a variety of economic transactions following a declaration of national emergency (not agreed to, roll call 24N–22Y)

Members voting NO (24)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (22)

Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY

Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Young Kim, R–CA

• Mast Amendment #68: The amendment directs the Secretary of State to submit a report analyzing the funding structures for all Chinese entities that contribute to human rights abuses or use forced labor, describing U.S. investment in PRC companies that contribute to human rights violation, and offering recommendations for cutting off Chinese companies contributing to human rights in the PRC from U.S. markets. (not agreed to by voice vote)

• Mast Amendment #75: The amendment transfers the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security to the State Department, without providing any rationale (not agreed to, roll call 25N–20Y)

Members voting NO (25)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (20)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX

Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Young Kim, R–CA

• McCaul Amendment #1: The amendment directs the President to impose sanctions on the Chinese Academy of Scientists researchers and their families and associates (not agreed to, roll call 25N–21Y)

Members voting NO (25)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (21)

Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ

Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Ronny Jackson, R–TX
Young Kim, R–CA

• McCaul Amendment #76: The amendment directs the Secretary of Commerce to designate on the Entity List for companies on Sec. 1237 of the NDAA of FY 1999, thus imposing an export embargo (not agreed to, roll call 26N–21Y)

Members voting NO (26)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (21)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH

Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Young Kim, R–CA

• Meuser Amendment #12: The amendment prohibits the authorization of funds to the Green Climate Fund until China is barred as a recipient of these multilateral funds (not agreed to, roll call 26N–22Y)

Members voting NO (26)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (22)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH

Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Ronny Jackson, R–TX
Young Kim, R–CA

• Meuser Amendment #40: The amendment exempts DFC and USAID from all U.S. restrictions on energy projects for sub-Saharan African countries (not agreed to, roll call 26N–22Y)

Members voting NO (26)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (22)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH

Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Ronny Jackson, R–TX
Young Kim, R–CA

• Perry Amendment #11: The amendment prohibits funding to be authorized for the Green Climate Fund that would be used to purchase products produced by forced labor (not agreed to, roll call 25N–20Y)

Members voting NO (25)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (20)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH

Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI

• Perry Amendment #191: The amendment strikes the entirety of the climate-related Title from the bill (not agreed to, roll call 26N–20Y)

Members voting NO (26)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA

Members voting AYE (20)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA

Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Young Kim, R–CA

• Perry Amendment #192: The amendment mandates that the President withdraw the U.S. from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (not agreed to, roll call 28N–19Y)

Members voting NO (28)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Peter Meijer, R–MI

Members voting AYE (19)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA

Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Ronny Jackson, R–TX
Young Kim, R–CA

• Perry Amendment #193: The amendment strikes Sec. 609 on the Green Climate Fund (not agreed to, roll call 27N–19Y)

Members voting NO (27)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA

Members voting AYE (19)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO

Brian Mast, R–FL
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Young Kim, R–CA

• Perry Amendment #194: The amendment bars climate change officers from meeting with individuals who have incited violence against the U.S. or others around the world (not agreed to, roll call 26N–21Y)

Members voting NO (26)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (21)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA

Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Ronny Jackson, R–TX
Young Kim, R–CA

• Perry Amendment #195: The amendment strikes Pacific Islands climate resilience provisions (not agreed to, roll call 26N–20Y)

Members voting NO (26)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL
Brian Fitzpatrick

Members voting AYE (20)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN

Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Young Kim, R–CA

• Perry Amendment #196: The amendment is a statement of policy affirming that Tibet is an occupied country; opposes aggression and other illegal uses of force by one country against the sovereignty of another, and condemns violations of international law (not agreed to, roll call 26N–20Y)

Members voting NO (26)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (20)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO

Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Young Kim, R–CA

• Perry Amendment #197: The amendment encourages the President to recognize Tibet as an independent country (not agreed to, roll call 26N–22Y)

Members voting NO (26)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (22)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL

Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Ronny Jackson, R–TX
Young Kim, R–CA

• Perry Amendment #198: The amendment requires Treasury to impose sanctions on two Chinese sportswear entities (not agreed to, roll call 26N–20Y)

Members voting NO (26)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (20)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL

Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI

• Perry Amendment #199: The amendment prohibits funding for the Wuhan Institute of Virology (not agreed to, roll call 26N–19Y)

Members voting NO (26)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (19)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA

August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI

• Perry Amendment #200: The amendment expresses the sense of Congress that the IOC should immediately rebid the 2022 Winter Olympics to be hosted by a country that recognizes and respects human rights. (agreed to by voice vote)

• Perry Amendment #201: The amendment requires the USG to only use highest CCP titles when referring to Chinese officials (not agreed to, roll call 26N–20Y)

Members voting NO (26)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (20)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL

Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI

• Perry Amendment #202: The amendment strikes Sec. 606, Driving a Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy (not agreed to, roll call 27N–19Y)

Members voting NO (27)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA

Members voting AYE (19)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY

August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI

• Perry Amendment #203: The amendment amends the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 by treating Taiwan as if it was designated by the President as a major non-NATO ally (not agreed to, roll call 26N–22Y)

Members voting NO (26)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (22)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX

Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Young Kim, R–CA
Maria Elvira Salazar, R–FL

• Perry Amendment #204: The amendment prohibits funds authorized by the Act from funding the USAGM until it releases a McGuire Woods report commissioned by Michael Pack. (withdrawn)

• Perry Amendment #205: The amendment directs Taiwan to be treated as a NATO plus 5 country (not agreed to, roll call 26N–20Y)

Members voting NO (26)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (20)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA

Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Young Kim, R–CA

• Perry Amendment #207: The amendment requires the Secretary of State to submit a report to Congress describing the risks posed to the U.S. by the presence in U.S. capital markets of companies incorporated in the PRC. (withdrawn)

• Perry Amendment #73: The amendment states that it is the policy of the U.S. to issue undefined "denial orders" for all entities that are significantly contributing to the modernization of the CCP's military (not agreed to, roll call 26N–20Y)

Members voting NO (26)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (20)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL

Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Young Kim, R–CA

• Perry Amendment #77: The amendment directs the Secretary of commerce to designate ZTE on the Entity List, thus imposing an export embargo (not agreed to, roll call 26N–20Y)

Members voting NO (26)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (20)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY

Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Young Kim, R–CA

• Pfluger Amendment #14: The amendment prohibits agencies from incentivizing climate action by countries that suffer from energy poverty (not agreed to, roll call 26N–21Y)

Members voting NO (26)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (21)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA

Claudia Tenney, R–NY
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Ronny Jackson, R–TX
Young Kim, R–CA

• Pfluger Amendment #31: The amendment expresses the sense of Congress of the negative consequences of the Administration's border policies (not agreed to, roll call 26N–22Y)

Members voting NO (26)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (22)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY

August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Ronny Jackson, R–TX
Young Kim, R–CA

• Pfluger Amendment #80: The amendment would require Yangtze Memory Technologies Inc to be added to Commerce's Entity List, thus imposing an export embargo (not agreed to, roll call 26N–22Y)

Members voting NO (26)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (22)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA

Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Ronny Jackson, R–TX
Young Kim, R–CA

• Sherman Amendment #36: The amendment mandates the exclusion of the delisting or potential delisting of companies from U.S. markets as a result of failing to retain a Public Company Accounting Oversight Board-registered public accounting firm from the mandated Treasury Department report on the costs and benefits to the U.S. posed by the presence of companies incorporated in the PRC that are listed on American stock exchanges or traded over the counter. (agreed to by voice vote)

• Sherman Amendment #39: The amendment requires periodic Commerce Department-led interagency review of export control lists to ensure that items are included that would provide China with a critical capability for surveillance or repression. (agreed to by voice vote)

• Smith Amendment #1: The amendment urges the Administration to do whatever it can unilaterally to move the 2022 Olympics from Beijing, China to another country (not agreed to, roll call 26N–21Y)

Members voting NO (26)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (21)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ

Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Ronny Jackson, R–TX
Young Kim, R–CA

• Smith Amendment #13: The amendment authorizes funds for FMF assistance, State's Southeast Asia Maritime Law Enforcement Initiative, and other activities in the Indo-Pacific, all over and above what is already appropriated (not agreed to, roll call 26N–21Y)

Members voting NO (26)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (21)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX

Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Young Kim, R–CA

• Smith Amendment #18: The amendment imposes sanctions based on systematic rape, coercive abortion, forced sterilization, or involuntary contraceptive implantation policies and practices in Xinjiang (agreed to by voice vote)

• Smith Amendment #2: The amendment modifies sovereign immunities exceptions to allow foreign countries to be sued for damages arising from misrepresentations made to the WHO (not agreed to, roll call 26N–21Y)

Members voting NO (26)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX

Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (21)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Young Kim, R–CA

• Smith Amendment #30: The amendment establishes within the State Department the position of United States Special Envoy for Xinjiang Province and authorizes the coordination on human rights and other pressing issues relevant to Xinjiang and enables the State Department to dual-hat and swiftly fill the position. (agreed to by voice vote)

• Smith Amendment #31: The amendment requires the State Department and the Treasury to submit a report to Congress identifying persons involved in the production of fentanyl and trafficking it into the U.S. (not agreed to, roll call 26N–21Y)

Members voting NO (26)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ

Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (21)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Ronny Jackson, R–TX
Young Kim, R–CA

• Tenney Amendment #13: The amendment suspends the establishment of climate diplomacy officers at overseas missions (not agreed to, roll call 25N–21Y)

Members voting NO (25)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA

Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (21)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Ronny Jackson, R–TX
Young Kim, R–CA

• Tenney Amendment #34: The amendment requires a State-led interagency monitoring and reporting of all Chinese public and private investments globally (not agreed to, roll call 25N–23Y)

Members voting NO (25)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA

Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (23)

Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Ronny Jackson, R–TX
Young Kim, R–CA

• Tenney Amendment #35: The amendment creates a "China Watchers" program that designates FSO positions at U.S. posts abroad to assess the PRC's malign influence in the economic and political sectors (agreed to, roll call 43Y–3N)

Members voting AYE (43)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX

Brad Schneider, D–IL
Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Young Kim, R–CA

Members voting NO (3)

Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Sara Jacobs, D–CA

• Tenney Amendment #36: The amendment imposes sanctions on senior CCP officials (not agreed to, roll call 26N–22Y)

Members voting NO (26)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX

Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (22)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Ronny Jackson, R–TX
Young Kim, R–CA

• Tenney Amendment #38: The amendment mandates that USG donated COVID–19 vaccines to be provided immediately and directly to recipient countries to further U.S. vaccine diplomacy and not through COVAX (not agreed to, roll call 25N–21Y)

Members voting NO (25)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX

Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (21)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Young Kim, R–CA

• Tenney Amendment #47: The amendment would override an Executive Order and change interagency voting procedures on export licenses (not agreed to, roll call 26N–20Y)

Members voting NO (26)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (20)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Young Kim, R–CA

• Tenney Amendment #71: The amendment requires a periodic report from the Commerce Department to Congress on licenses issued for exports by U.S. firms to Chinese companies on the Commerce Entity List (agreed to by voice vote)

• Wagner Amendment #24: The amendment requires the USG to compile a list of telecommunications and information technology goods and bans their export to China (not agreed to, roll call 26N–22Y)

Members voting NO (26)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA

Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (22)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Ronny Jackson, R–TX
Young Kim, R–CA

• Wagner Amendment #26: The amendment requires the publishing of a list of institutions affiliated with or funded by the PLA (agreed to, roll call 48Y–0N)

Members voting AYE (48)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA

Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL
Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Ronny Jackson, R–TX
Young Kim, R–CA

Members voting NO (0)

• Wagner Amendment #5: The amendment prohibits federal funding of Sinopharm or Sinovac vaccines (not agreed to, roll call 26N–22Y)

Members voting NO (26)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA

Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (22)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Ronny Jackson, R–TX
Young Kim, R–CA

• Wilson Amendment #2: The amendment expresses a sense of Congress that China's violation of U.S. sanctions on Iran undermine U.S. efforts to compel Iran to abandon its malign activities (agreed to by voice vote)

• Wilson Amendment #38: The amendment expresses a sense of Congress that the President should reexamine U.S. export policy to any country, including China, that supplies arms or dual use items to any country designated a state sponsor of terror or any entity designated a foreign terrorist organization (agreed to by voice vote)

• Wilson Amendment #92: The amendment directs the President to impose sanctions on any foreign person who spreads disinformation (not agreed to, roll call 26N–22Y)

Members voting NO (26)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN

Colin Allred, D–TX
Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting AYE (22)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Ronny Jackson, R–TX
Young Kim, R–CA

H.R. 3524 was ordered favorably reported, as amended, to the House of Representatives (roll call 26Y–22N).

Members voting AYE (26)

Gregory W. Meeks, D–NY
Brad Sherman, D–CA
Albio Sires, D–NJ
Gerald E. Connolly, D–VA
Theodore E. Deutch, D–FL
Karen Bass, D–CA
William R. Keating, D–MA
David N. Cicilline, D–RI
Ami Bera, D–CA
Joaquin Castro, D–TX
Dina Titus, D–NV
Ted Lieu, D–CA
Susan Wild, D–PA
Dean Phillips, D–MN
Colin Allred, D–TX

Andy Levin, D–MI
Abigail Spanberger, D–VA
Chrissy Houlahan, D–PA
Tom Malinowski, D–NJ
Andy Kim, D–NJ
Sara Jacobs, D–CA
Kathy Manning, D–NC
Jim Costa, D–CA
Juan Vargas, D–CA
Vicente Gonzalez, D–TX
Brad Schneider, D–IL

Members voting NO (22)

Michael T. McCaul, R–TX
Chris Smith, R–NJ
Steve Chabot, R–OH
Joe Wilson, R–SC
Scott Perry, R–PA
Darrell Issa, R–OH
Lee Zeldin, R–NY
Ann Wagner, R–MO
Brian Mast, R–FL
Brian Fitzpatrick, R–PA
Ken Buck, R–CO
Tim Burchett, R–TN
Mark Green, R–FL
Andy Barr, R–KY
Greg Steube, R–FL
Dan Meuser, R–PA
Claudia Tenney, R–NY
August Pfluger, R–TX
Nicole Malliotakis, R–NY
Peter Meijer, R–MI
Young Kim, R–CA
Maria Elvira Salazar, R–FL

COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS

In compliance with Clause 3 (c)(1) of rule XIII of the rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee reports that the findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on oversight activities under Clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report, particularly in the "Background and Need for Legislation" section.

NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY, TAX EXPENDITURES, AND CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATES

With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section 308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and with respect to requirements of clause (3)(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee has requested but not received a cost estimate for this bill from the Director of Congressional Budget Office. The Committee adopts as its own cost estimate the forthcoming cost es-

timate of the Director of the Congressional Budget Office, should such cost estimate be made available before House passage of the bill.

NON-DUPLICATION OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS

Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of House rule XIII, the committee states that no provision of this bill establishes or reauthorizes a program of the Federal Government known to be duplicative of another Federal program, a program that was included in any report from the Government Accountability Office to Congress pursuant to section 21 of Public Law 111–139, or a program related to a program identified in the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance.

PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

As explained with greater specificity in the "Purpose and Summary," "Background and Need for Legislation" and "Section-by-Section Analysis" sections of this report, the general goal of H.R. 3524 is to revitalize U.S. diplomacy, leadership, and investments globally in response to the policy challenges posed by the People's Republic of China.

CONGRESSIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY ACT

H.R. 3524 does not apply to terms and conditions of employment or to access to public services or accommodations within the legislative branch.

NEW ADVISORY COMMITTEES

H.R. 3524 does not establish or authorize any new advisory committees.

EARMARK IDENTIFICATION

H.R. 3524 contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as described in clauses 9(e), 9(f), and 9(g) of House rule XXI.

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents

Sec. 2. Definitions

This section includes several definitions that apply throughout the bill.

Sec. 3. Findings

Puts forward findings on the history of U.S. engagement with the PRC, the historical and current political, diplomatic, economic, developmental, security, and ideological objectives of the PRC, problematic and illegal PRC policies, PRC aggression in the Indo-Pacific, and U.S. policies in response to the PRC.

Sec. 4. Statement of policy

Provides a statement of policy of key U.S policy objectives, including but not limited to the need for the U.S to preserve and ad-

vance its global leadership role, strengthen cooperation and partnerships with allies and other like-minded countries, advocate for and defend key U.S values, fundamental freedoms, and international norms, promote technologic innovation, and reduce the risk of conflict with the PRC.

Sec. 5. Sense of Congress

Expresses the sense of Congress that successful execution of the policy requires actions such as the revitalization of American leadership both globally and in the Indo-Pacific, coordination with allies and partners to compete effectively with the PRC, provision of support to the private sector, civil society, universities and academic institutions, organization of Federal Agencies to defend U.S interests, prioritization of strengthening nonmilitary instruments of power, and adaptation to the information environment of the 21st century.

Sec. 6. Rules of construction

This section describes the applicability of existing restrictions on assistance to foreign security forces and states that nothing in this Act authorizes the use of military force.

TITLE I—INVESTING IN AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS

SUBTITLE A—SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Sec. 101. Authorization to assist United States companies with global supply chain diversification and management

Authorizes $90M over six years for a State Department program that allows for U.S. embassies to hire contractors to assist interested U.S. persons and businesses with supply chain management issues related to China.

Sec. 102. Report on National Technology and Industrial Base

Requires the State Department to submit a report to Congress describing the Department's efforts to facilitate access among the National Technology and Industrial Base to defense articles and services subject to the U.S. Munitions List.

SUBTITLE B—GLOBAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT

Sec. 111. Appropriate committees of Congress defined

Sec. 112. Sense of Congress on international quality infrastructure investment standards

Expresses the sense of Congress that the U.S. should initiate collaboration among foreign governments, the private sector, and civil society to encourage the adoption of the quality global infrastructure development standards advanced by the G20 in 2018, and that the U.S. should launch a series of fora around the world to demonstrate the commitment of the U.S. and its partners to high-quality development cooperation.

Sec. 113. Supporting economic independence from the People's Republic of China

States that the President should develop and submit a strategy utilizing Federal agencies and resources to counteract Chinese as-

sistance and financing to foreign governments. Authorizes the Secretary of State in coordination with the USAID Administrator to establish a new initiative or continue an existing one as the Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network to advance the development of sustainable, transparent, and high-quality infrastructure and to help boost the capacity of partner countries to evaluate contracts and assess the financial and environmental impacts of potential infrastructure projects. Authorizes $375M for the Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network.

Sec. 114. Strategy for advanced and reliable energy infrastructure

Directs the President to create a whole of government effort to counter predatory lending and financing by the Government of China in the energy sectors of developing countries. Directs the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to increase U.S. exports of advanced energy technologies.

Sec. 115. Report on the People's Republic of China's investments in foreign energy development

Requires a report from the State Department on priority countries for deepening U.S. engagement on energy matters, PRC government and companies involved in the development of energy infrastructure in those countries, and current and planned efforts to partner with those countries.

SUBTITLE C—ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY AND LEADERSHIP

Sec. 121. Findings on regional economic order

Puts forward findings on the importance of U.S. leadership in constructing the international economic order, the effects that reduced U.S. economic engagement has on allies and partners and the Indo-Pacific region, and the vital need for the U.S. to upgrade its economic engagement and leadership and develop concrete steps to strengthen its commercial diplomacy.

Sec. 122. Review of trade and economic engagement globally of the People's Republic of China

Directs the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and the Commerce Department, to report on the PRC's global trade and investment diplomacy and engagement over the past decade, including any bilateral or plurilateral trade and investment agreements it has signed, as well as their impact on the U.S. economy and on countries that have entered into agreements with the PRC.

Sec. 123. Report on entrenching American economic diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific

Directs the Secretary of State, in coordination with USTR and Commerce, to report on the steps the United States is taking and plans to take to enhance U.S. commercial relationships in the Indo-Pacific.

Sec. 124. Sense of Congress on the need to bolster American leadership in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation

Expresses the sense of Congress that the U.S. has benefited from its participation in APEC and should announced its interest to host APEC in 2023.

Sec. 125. Strategy on deterrence of economic coercion

Directs the President to submit to Congress a whole-of-government strategy to deter Chinese economic coercion against third countries and, subsequently, an assessment of the implementation and effectiveness of the strategy, lessons learned, and planned changes to the strategy.

Sec. 126. Sense of Congress on digital technology issues

Expresses the sense of Congress that the U.S. must reassert its leadership in international standard-setting bodies that set the governance norms and rules for digital technologies, that the U.S. should lead an international effort to combat digital authoritarianism, that the U.S. should lead a global effort to ensure the freedom of information in the digital age, and that the U.S. should convene a global effort to ensure that technological development does not threaten democratic governance.

Sec. 127. Digital trade agreements

Expresses the sense of Congress that USTR, in consultation with the Department of State, should consider agreements on digital issues with like-minded countries.

Sec. 128. Digital connectivity and cybersecurity partnership

Authorizes the President to create the "Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership" to help foreign countries expand and increase secure internet access and digital infrastructure in emerging markets, protect technological assets, adopt policies that foster open models of internet governance, promote exports of U.S. ICT goods and services, and build cybersecurity capacity.

Sec. 129. Sense of Congress on ideological competition

Expresses the sense of Congress with regards to ideological competition with the PRC.

SUBTITLE D—FINANCIAL DIPLOMACY AND LEADERSHIP

Sec. 131. Findings on Chinese financial industrial policy

Finds that the PRC gives favorable treatment to state-owned financial institutions, while foreign institutions endure strict restrictions on their ability to operate. This protectionism is in violation of international agreements that China signed decades ago.

Sec. 132. Report on importance of American financial strength for global leadership

Expresses the sense of Congress that the dominance of the dollar yields significant benefits, allowing the U.S. to maintain economic independence, better control its monetary policy, and finance government outlays. Effective diplomacy and national security rely on the U.S. remaining a global financial leader; the findings above

demonstrate the PRC is attempting to replace the U.S. in that position. Requires the Secretary of State and Secretary of the Treasury to submit a report to the appropriate committees that lists and examines benefits from U.S. global financial leadership to American foreign policy and identifies steps the U.S. can take to preserve its current status as the world's leading financial center.

Sec. 133. Review of Chinese companies on United States capital markets

This section requires the Secretary of State & Secretary of the Treasury to submit a report to the appropriate committees that describes the costs & benefits to the U.S. posed by the presence of companies listed on American stock exchanges or traded over the counter in the form of American depository receipts which are incorporated in the PRC. The report will list Chinese companies that endanger American national security interests and mandates an evaluation of the costs and benefits of Chinese companies being listed in the United States.

Sec. 134. Report on diplomatic and economic implications of changes to cross-border payment and financial messaging systems

This section requires the Secretary of State & the Secretary of the Treasury to submit a report to appropriate committees on the diplomatic and economic implications of cross-border payment systems.

TITLE II—INVESTING IN ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS

SUBTITLE A—STRATEGIC AND DIPLOMATIC MATTERS

Sec. 201. Appropriate committees of Congress defined

Sec. 202. United States commitment and support for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific

Expresses the sense of Congress that maintaining and strengthening relationships with allies and partners is critical to the U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific region, and that the U.S. will work with allies to prioritize human rights in the region. Provides a statement of policy that the U.S. shall deepen diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation between and among U.S. allies in the region, as well as uphold its treaty obligations, strengthen regional partnerships, and promote human rights.

Sec. 203. Boosting Quad cooperation

Directs the Secretary of State to develop and submit a report with a strategy for bolstering engagement and cooperation with the Quad, including ways to expand cooperation on COVID 19, climate change, maritime security, quality infrastructure, technology standards, and combatting economic coercion.

Sec. 204. Establishment of Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group

Directs the Secretary of State to enter negotiations with the governments of Japan, Australia, and India with the goal of establishing a Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group to facilitate

closer cooperation on shared interests and values. Authorizes $4M to the United States Group for the next 4 FYs.

Sec. 205. Statement of policy on cooperation with ASEAN

Provides a statement of policy that the U.S. stands with the nations of ASEAN as they respond to COVID 19, urges ASEAN to continue its efforts to foster greater integration and unity, supports ASEAN nations in addressing maritime and territorial disputes in a constructive manner, and supports ASEAN as a source of well-functioning and problem-solving regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific region.

Sec. 206. Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative

Directs the Secretary of State to oversee all U.S.-based activities carried out under the YSEALI program and to continue supporting overseas initiatives of the program. Directs the Secretary of State to submit a strategy for implementing the YSEALI program, an annual report on the program's progress and an assessment of the metrics, goals, targets, and outcomes and recommendations for improvements or amendments to the YSEALI program and strategy, and a final assessment report that evaluates the program's implementation and outcomes during the entire duration of its program operation

Sec. 207. Sense of Congress on negotiations with G7 and G20 countries

Expresses the sense of Congress that the President should initiate an agenda at the G7 and G20 on matters relevant to economic and democratic freedoms.

Sec. 208. Enhancing the United States-Taiwan partnership

Provides a statement of policy reiterating the U.S.'s commitment to Taiwan and recognizing Taiwan as a vital part of the U.S. approach to the Indo-Pacific. Advises the Secretary of State to establish the United States-Taiwan Cultural Exchange Foundation to deepen ties between the future leaders of Taiwan and the U.S. by sending students to Taiwan to study the Chinese language, culture, history, politics, and other relevant subjects.

Sec. 209. Taiwan diplomatic review

Directs the Secretary of State to seek to enter into negotiations with appropriate officials of TECRO with the objective of renaming its office in Washington, D.C., the Taiwan Representative Office in the United States, and its subsidiary offices in the United States.

Sec. 210. Taiwan Peace and Stability Act

Provides a statement of policy of U.S. interests in maintaining the peace and stability in the Western Pacific and working with allies and partners to promote peace and stability and deter military acts or other forms of coercive behavior in the Indo-Pacific. Expresses the sense of Congress of Taiwan's meaningful participation in the international community, the benefit from expanding U.S. economic relations with Taiwan, and the importance of Taiwan's ability to deter acts of PRC intimidation and defend itself. Directs the Secretary of State, in consultation with other Federal depart-

ments and agencies, to submit a strategy that advances Taiwan's meaningful participation in a prioritized set of international organizations and responds to PRC pressure on foreign governments, international organizations, commercial actors, and civil society organizations to comply with its "One-China Principle" with respect to Taiwan. Directs the USAID Administrator, in consultation with DFC, to submit a report on cooperation with Taiwan on trilateral and multilateral development initiatives. Directs the President to submit a whole-of-government strategy to enhance deterrence over a cross-Strait military conflict between the PRC and Taiwan. Directs the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, to present a plan for strengthening the community of civilian defense professionals in Taiwan.

Sec. 211. Taiwan International Solidarity Act

Amends the TAIPEI Act of 2019 by adding that UN recognition of the PRC did not address the issue of Taiwan representation at the UN or any related organizations, nor take a position on the relationship between the PRC and Taiwan or Taiwan's sovereignty, and that the U.S. opposes any initiative that seeks to change Taiwan's status without the consent of the people. Amends the TAIPEI Act of 2019 by instructing USG representatives in all organizations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the U.S. to advocate such organizations to resist PRC efforts to influence such organizations regarding Taiwan. Amends the TAIPEI Act of 2019 by encouraging U.S. allies and partners to oppose PRC efforts to undermine Taiwan's official diplomatic relationships and its partnerships with countries with which it does not maintain diplomatic relations. Amends the reporting criteria on the PRC's attempts to promote its "One China" position.

Sec. 212. Taiwan Fellowship Program

The "Taiwan Fellowship Act" directs the Secretary of State to establish the "Taiwan Fellowship Program" to provide a fellowship opportunity in Taiwan of up to two years for eligible U.S. citizens. Authorizes $2.9M for FY 2022, and $2.4M for FY 2023 and each succeeding FY.

Sec. 213. Increasing Department of State personnel and resources devoted to the Indo-Pacific

Presents a statement of policy that the U.S. shall increase funding and personnel dedicated to the Indo-Pacific region. Requires an action plan from the Secretary of State to increase budgetary and personnel resources. Authorizes $2B under the Foreign Assistance Act to the Indo-Pacific and $1.25B for diplomatic engagement.

Sec. 214. Report on bilateral efforts to address Chinese fentanyl trafficking

Directs the Secretary of State and Attorney General to report on U.S. Government efforts to gain a commitment from the Chinese Government to submit unregulated fentanyl precursors to controls and a plan for future steps the U.S. Government will take to urge China to combat illicit fentanyl production and trafficking originating in China.

Sec. 215. Facilitation of increased equity investments under the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018

Expresses the sense of Congress that support provided under section 1421(c)(1) of the BUILD Act of 2018 should be considered a Federal credit program that is subject to the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 for purposes of applying the requirements of such Act to such support. Amends Section 1433 of the BUILD Act of 2018 by increasing the maximum contingent liability to $100B.

Sec. 216. Expanding investment by United States International Development Finance Corporation for vaccine manufacturing

Authorizes DFC to provide financing to entities in India and in other less developed countries to increase capacity for the manufacturing of SRA or WHO Emergency Use Listing COVID–19 vaccines, therapeutics, or critical medical supplies. Directs the DFC CEO, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to report on the countries where DFC financing could be most impactful for vaccine manufacturing and to achieve the goal of manufacturing 1 billion COVID–19 vaccines by 2022; U.S. and partner country interests served by U.S. support to such projects; support provided by other U.S. allies and partners to increase manufacturing capacity for SRA or WHO Emergency Use Listing COVID–19 vaccines, therapeutics, or critical medical supplies; and support provided by China to increase this manufacturing capacity.

Sec. 217. Ensuring United States diplomatic posts align with American strategic national security and economic objectives

Requires the Department of State in consultation with other departments and agencies to assess and report to Congress biannually on whether the number, location, and objectives of U.S. diplomatic missions are sufficient to achieve United States national security and economic interests vis-a-vis our strategic competitors. In particular, it requires the Department of State to explain any gaps that exist where the United States has no physical presence—either embassy, consulate general, or principal officer post—but where China does maintain a physical presence.

Sec. 218. Authorization of appropriations for the Fulbright-Hays Program

Authorizes $105.5M to promote education, training, research, and foreign language skills through the Fulbright-Hays Program, in accordance with the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961.

Sec. 219. Supporting independent media and countering disinformation

Authorizes $500M for the United States Agency for Global Media for ongoing and new programs to support local media, build independent media, combat PRC disinformation inside and outside of China, invest in technology to subvert censorship, and monitor and evaluate these programs. Directs the Secretary of State, acting through the A/S for DRL, and the USAID Administrator, acting through the Assistant Administrator for DDI, to support and train journalists on investigative techniques necessary to ensure public

accountability, promote transparency, fight corruption, and support the ability of the public to develop informed opinions about pressing issues facing their countries. Directs DRL to continue to support internet freedom programs. Authorizes $170M to the State Department and USAID for ongoing and new programs in support of press freedom, training, and protection of journalists.

Sec. 219A. Global Engagement Center

Amends the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 by delaying the termination of the Global Engagement Center to December 31, 2027. Expresses the sense of Congress that the Global Engagement Center should expand its coordinating capacity of diplomatic messaging through the exchange of liaison officers with Federal departments and agencies that manage aspects of identifying and countering foreign disinformation, including the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and Special Operations Command's Joint MISO Web Operations Center. Authorizes $150M for FY 2022 for the Global Engagement Center to counter foreign state and non-state sponsored propaganda and disinformation.

Sec. 219B. Report on origins of the COVID–19 pandemic

Expresses the sense of Congress on the importance of understanding the origins of the COVID–19 pandemic. Directs the President to submit a report that assesses the most likely source or origin of the SARS–CoV–2 virus, the level of confidence in the assessment, and challenges identified to the USG's ability to make such an assessment.

Sec. 219C. Extension of Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018

Expresses the sense of Congress of the importance of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (ARIA) on the U.S. commitment to the Indo-Pacific. Amends the ARIA by increasing funding for each fiscal year to $2B and extending it three years until 2026.

Sec. 219D. Investment, trade, and development in Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean

Directs the President, in consultation with the heads of the relevant Federal departments and agencies, to submit a government-wide strategy for Africa, to be known as the Prosper Africa Strategy, and for Latin America and the Caribbean, that increases economic engagements with Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean by 200 percent in real dollar value. Directs the President to submit an annual report that summarizes and evaluates the implementation of U.S. diplomatic efforts and foreign assistance programs, projects, and activities to advance these policy objectives, describes the nature and extent of the coordination among the relevant Federal departments and agencies, and describes the monitoring and evaluation tools, mechanisms, and indicators to assess progress made on these policy objectives. Directs the President to designate an individual to serve as the Executive Director for Trade and Investment Strategy in Africa, also known as the Prosper Africa Executive Director, and an individual to serve as Executive Director for Trade and Investment Strategy in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Sec. 219E. China Watcher Program

Creates a "China Watchers" program that designates FSO positions at U.S. posts abroad to assess the PRC's malign influence in the economic and political sectors.

Sec. 219F. Liu Xiaobo Fund for study of the Chinese Language

Establishes the Liu Xiaobo Fund for Study of the Chinese Language to fund alternatives to Confucius Institutes at U.S. universities.

Sec. 219G. Oversight of funds made available through the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021

Applies FAA restrictions onto American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 funds, including the Global Fund contribution, and allows for the funding to be transferred to the Inspector General for oversight work.

Sec. 219H. Requirements relating to vaccine branding

Directs the President to ensure that every vaccine donated, procured, or financed by the U.S. Government is clearly branded with the U.S. flag.

SUBTITLE B—INTERNATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS

Sec. 221. Definitions

Includes definitions applicable to this subtitle.

Sec. 222. Additional funding for international military education and training in the Indo-Pacific

Authorizes $225M over five years for State Department international military education and training (IMET) assistance.

Sec. 223. Statement of policy on maritime freedom of operations in international waterways and airspace of the Indo-Pacific and on artificial land features in the South China Sea

Expresses the sense of Congress that Congress condemns the use of force to impede freedom of navigation operations in the Indo-Pacific region and presents a statement of policy with respect to PRC claims in the South China Sea.

Sec. 224. Report on capability development of Indo-Pacific allies and partners

Expresses the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State should expand measures under the U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer Policy to provide capabilities to allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, and, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, urge allies and partners to invest in sufficient quantities of munitions to meet contingency requirements. Requires a report from the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, on U.S. priorities for building more capable security partners in the Indo-Pacific, focusing on areas in which the U.S. can help develop allies' capabilities.

Sec. 225. Statement of policy regarding the threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

States that it is U.S. policy to work with NATO allies to address challenges posed by the Chinese Communist Party and share the burden that comes with collective security.

Sec. 226. Identification of PLA-supported institutions

Requires the publishing of a list of institutions affiliated with or funded by the PLA.

SUBTITLE C—MULTILATERAL STRATEGIES TO BOLSTER AMERICAN POWER

Sec. 231. Findings on multilateral engagement

Puts forward findings on the legal requirements of UN member states to finance the UN's core budget, the role of the U.S. as the largest single financial contributor to the UN system and its importance, how U.S. failure to meet its UN financial commitments enhances the PRC's power within the organization, and a State report about the lack of a standard operating procedure within IO for tracking and promoting the employment of American Citizens in the UN system and its recommendation to the department to establish one.

Sec. 232. Statement of policy on America's multilateral engagement

Provides a statement of policy that the U.S. Special Representative to the UN serves as a standing member of the cabinet; assessed dues to multilateral organizations be paid in full in a timely fashion; Federal agencies utilize all the authorities to detail or transfer employees to relevant international organizations; the Secretary of State shall assist the State Department and other Federal agencies in carrying out employee details or transfers; the Secretary of State shall support qualified American candidates in their bid to win election to UN-related leadership positions; and the Secretary of State shall support the placement of JPOs sponsored by the U.S. in UN-affiliated agencies.

Sec. 233. Support for Americans at the United Nations

Authorizes the Secretary of State to establish within the Department of State's Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO) an Office for American Citizens, which will advocate for the employment of U.S. citizens by all international organizations of which the U.S. is a member, coordinate the interagency support of non-American candidates for leadership roles when no American candidate has been nominated and when it is in the U.S. interest, and establish and implement a standard operating procedure for the promotion and efficient tracking of U.S. citizen employment at international organizations, along with other related responsibilities towards increasing qualified Americans in international organizations.

Sec. 234. Junior professional officers

Calls on the Secretary of State to increase the number of Junior Professional Officer positions sponsored by the U.S. within the UN

system. Calls on the head of each bureau of the State Department to provide the head of the Office of Multilateral Staffing and Personnel of the Department information regarding the amount of funding each such bureau has designated during the immediately preceding fiscal year for Junior Professional Officer positions in the UN system and the number of such positions that exist as of such fiscal year.

Sec. 235. Report on American employment in international organizations

Directs the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, to develop and submit a report on how many Federal employees are currently detailed or transferred to an international organization during the immediately preceding 12-month period and a one-time strategy for increasing the number of Federal employees so detailed or transferred.

SUBTITLE D—REGIONAL STRATEGIES TO BOLSTER AMERICAN POWER

Sec. 241. Statement of policy on cooperation with allies and partners around the world

States that it is the policy of the U.S. to strengthen alliances and partnerships with Europe and with like-minded countries to compete with the PRC. Identifies the promotion of democracy and human rights in China as policy areas to address, including human rights abuses against the Uyghurs, other religious minorities, and political dissidents in Hong Kong. Highlights the importance of counteracting the Chinese government's predatory economic practices, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, as well as countering Chinese Communist Party disinformation relating to COVID–19.

PART I—WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Sec. 242. Sense of Congress regarding United States-Canada relations

Expresses the sense of Congress that the U.S. and Canada share a unique relationship and should cooperate in policy areas such as counternarcotics, environmental and energy issues, trade and commercial relations, and security defense of the region and the Arctic. Underscores the value of the U.S.-Canada partnership in addressing China's economic, political, and security influence, including in relation to the People's Republic of China's infrastructure investments in 5G telecommunications technology, extraction of natural resources, and port infrastructure.

Sec. 243. Sense of Congress regarding China's arbitrary imprisonment of Canadian citizens

States that the U.S. joins the Canadian government's call for the immediate release of Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig, two Canadian nationals that the People's Republic of China detained in apparent retaliation for the Government of Canada's arrest of Meng Wanzhou.

Sec. 244. Strategy to enhance cooperation with Canada

Instructs the President to submit a strategy describing U.S. efforts to cooperate with the Government of Canada in managing relations with the Government of China in economic, democratic and human rights, technological, and defense policy areas.

Sec. 245. Strategy to strengthen economic competitiveness, governance, human rights, and the rule of law in Latin America and the Caribbean

Instructs the Secretary of State, in consultation with relevant agencies, to submit a multi-year strategy for increasing U.S. economic competitiveness and promoting good governance, human rights, and the rule of law in Latin American and Caribbean countries.

Sec. 246. Engagement in international organizations and the defense sector in Latin America and the Caribbean

Requires the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, to submit a report assessing the nature, intent, and impact to U.S. strategic interests of Chinese diplomatic activity aimed at influencing multilateral organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean and of Chinese military activity in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Sec. 247. Defense cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean

Authorizes $67.5M over five years to the Department of State for the International Military Education and Training Program for Latin America and the Caribbean. Specifies that the authorized funds shall be used for improving Latin American and Caribbean security services and ensuring that security services in Latin America and the Caribbean respect civilian authority.

Sec. 248. Engagement with civil society in Latin America and the Caribbean regarding accountability, human rights, and the risks of pervasive surveillance technologies

Expresses the sense of Congress that China is exporting its model for internal security and state control of society to Latin America and the Caribbean through advanced technology and artificial intelligence. Instructs the Secretary of State to engage with governments and civil society organizations in the region to address and mitigate this threat. Instructs the U.S. Agency for Global Media to expand and prioritize efforts to provide anti-censorship technology and services to journalists in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Sec. 249. Caribbean energy initiative as alternative to China's Belt and Road Initiative

Requires the Department of State in coordination with USAID to submit a multi-year strategy to Congress to promote regional cooperation with Caribbean countries for improving energy security, grid reliability, and energy efficiency, as well as reforming energy markets and investing in cleaner energy technologies. It also seeks to reduce the Caribbean's dependency on oil from Venezuelan sources.

Sec. 250. U.S.-Caribbean Resilience Partnership

Seeks to promote long-term resilience in the Caribbean to natural disasters, severe weather events, and a changing ocean environment by authorizing appropriations in support of the U.S. Caribbean Resilience Partnership, which the Department of State and fifteen federal agencies launched in 2019 to increase engagement between federal, state, and local government officials and experts with their Caribbean counterparts. It also seeks to build partnerships among academic institutions and the private sector in the region as well as design effective regional and bilateral programs to further efforts to adapt to, mitigate, and promote resilience to environmental impacts. Requires the Department of State in coordination with other agencies to submit a multi-year strategy to Congress in furtherance of these objectives.

Sec. 251. Countering China's educational and cultural diplomacy in Latin America

Directs the Secretary of State, acting through the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, and in coordination with the Assistant Administrator for the Bureau of Economic Growth, Education, and Environment at USAID, to devise a strategy that evaluates and expands existing people-to-people programs and creates new exchanges and people-to-people programs that advance U.S. foreign policy goals and promote U.S. national security interests and values. Directs the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, to submit a report that assesses the nature and impact of the PRC's educational and cultural sector activity in Latin America and the Caribbean, its impact on U.S. strategic interests, and recommendations for USG to expand people-to-people ties.

Sec. 252. Narcotics trafficking in Latin America and the Caribbean

Expresses the sense of Congress that governments that do not cooperate on financial investigations with respect to transnational crimes should be held accountable, that China has not cooperated with financial investigations, that the U.S. should apply economic and financial sanctions, and that the U.S. should look into policies that punish countries that fail to sufficiently investigate activities that foster narcotics trafficking in Latin America.

PART II—TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIPS

Sec. 255. Sense of Congress on Transatlantic relationships

Outlines the sense of Congress that the United States and European countries share a set of common values grounded in democracy, human rights, transparency, and a rules-based order—which necessitates closer cooperation to counter PRC efforts to increase economic, political, and security leverage in Europe. Calls for a joint strategy to diversify supply chains away from the PRC, cooperate to counter PRC disinformation campaigns, address ongoing PRC human rights violations, harmonize export control policies, and ensure adequate security in critical infrastructure.

Sec. 256. Strategy to enhance Transatlantic cooperation with respect to the People's Republic of China

Calls for the President to brief Congress on its strategy for enhancing cooperation with the European Union, NATO, and European partner countries with respect to the PRC on topics including: key policy points of convergence and divergence in technology, trade, and economic practices; shared interests on PRC economic challenges, human rights, technology, and defense issues; a response to the Belt and Road Initiative; interagency coordination mechanisms; and United States diplomatic and public diplomacy efforts in furtherance of these objectives.

Sec. 257. Enhancing Transatlantic cooperation on promoting private sector finance

Calls for the President to work with transatlantic development partners to foster private sector-led development and provide market-based alternatives to state-directed financing in emerging markets, particularly as it pertains to the Belt and Road Initiative. Specifically, looks to integrate efforts under the Three Seas Initiative; the European Union Strategy on Connecting Europe and Asia; the Blue Dot Network among the United States, Japan, and Australia; and a European-Japan initiative on infrastructure and transparency. Calls for a joint United States-European Union strategy to enhance cooperation with the OECD and Paris Club to ensure the highest possible standards on Belt and Road Initiative contracts with developing countries.

Sec. 258. Report and briefing on cooperation between China and Iran and between China and Russia

Requires the Director of National Intelligence in coordination with other departments and agencies to submit a report to Congress on cooperation between the PRC and Iran, and between the PRC and Russia. Provides the sense of Congress that the findings from this report should be shared with allies and partners of the United States.

PART III—SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA

Sec. 261. Sense of Congress on South and Central Asia

Expresses the sense of Congress that the U.S. should stand with its partners in South and Central Asia in countering the Government of China's efforts to interfere in their respective political systems and encroach upon their sovereign territory. Calls for the U.S. to reaffirm its commitment to the Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership with India and deepen bilateral defense consultations and collaboration with India.

Sec. 262. Strategy to enhance cooperation with South and Central Asia

Directs the President to submit a strategy for how the U.S. will engage with the countries of South and Central Asia in managing relations with China, including through the C5+1 mechanism. Specifies that the strategy must include detailed descriptions on issues such as the security and economic challenges that China poses to the countries of South and Central Asia and U.S. efforts

to provide alternatives to Chinese investment in infrastructure and other sectors in South and Central Asia.

Sec. 263. Indian Ocean region strategic review

Directs the Secretary of State, in coordination with Defense and USAID, to develop a multi-year strategy for U.S. engagement to support U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean region, including describing challenges to U.S. interests in the region, efforts to improve cooperation in the Quad, efforts to support economic connectivity, proposed U.S. engagement in regional intergovernmental organizations and entities, an assessment of U.S. diplomatic presence and agreements in the region, and a security assistance strategy.

PART IV—AFRICA

Sec. 271. Assessment of political, economic, and security activity of the People's Republic of China in Africa

Requires the Secretary of State, in coordination with DNI, to submit a report to Congress that assesses the nature and impact of Chinese political, economic, sociocultural, and security sector activity in Africa and its impact on U.S. strategic interests.

Sec. 272. Increasing the competitiveness of the United States in Africa

Requires that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the U.S. Trade Representative, the USAID Administrator, and the leadership of the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation submit to Congress a report setting forth a multi-year strategy for increasing U.S. economic competitiveness and promoting improvements in the investment climate in Africa, including through support for democratic institutions, the rule of law, including property rights, and for improved transparency, anti-corruption and governance.

Sec. 273. Digital security cooperation with respect to Africa

Requires the President to establish an interagency Working Group, which shall include representatives of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and other agencies the President considers appropriate, on means to counter Chinese cyber aggression with respect to Africa. Requires that the Working Group establish a set of recommendations for bolstering the capacity of African governments to ensure the integrity of their data networks and critical infrastructure, providing alternatives to Huawei, developing an action plan for U.S. embassies to assist host-country governments, utilizing interagency resources to counter Chinese disinformation and propaganda, and helping civil society in Africa counter digital authoritarianism.

Sec. 274. Support for Young African Leaders Initiative

Authorizes the Young African Leaders Initiative to be carried out by the Secretary of State, in coordination with USAID, to provide fellows from Africa education and training in leadership and pro-

fessional development. Requires the USAID Administrator to establish regional centers in Africa to provide in-person and online training throughout the year in business and entrepreneurship, civic leadership, and public management, as well as an online network that provides information and online courses on topics related to entrepreneurship and leadership. Establishes that it is the sense of the Congress that the number of fellows from Africa participating in the Mandela Washington Fellowship should be increased above the current 700 projected for FY 2021.

Sec. 275. Africa broadcasting networks

Requires the CEO of the U.S. Agency for Global Media to submit a report on the resources and timeline needed to establish within the Agency an organization with the mission of promoting democratic values and institutions in Africa through the provision of objective, accurate, and relevant news and information to the people of Africa.

Sec. 276. Africa energy security and diversification

Amends the Electrify Africa Act of 2015 by expanding the statement of U.S. policy to include advancing U.S. foreign policy and development goals by assisting African countries to reduce their energy dependence on countries that use energy dependence for undue political influence; promoting the energy security of U.S. allies and partners; encouraging U.S. public and private sector investment in African energy infrastructure projects; and helping facilitate the export of U.S. energy resources, technology, and expertise to global markets in a way that benefits the energy security of U.S. allies and partners, including in Africa.

PART V—MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

Sec. 281. Strategy to counter Chinese influence in, and access to, the Middle East and North Africa.

Expresses the sense of Congress that the PRC is upgrading its influence in the region through energy and infrastructure investments, technology transfer, and arms sales, and seeks to establish military or dual use facilities in strategic locations. Requires that the Secretary of State, in consultation with USAID and other appropriate federal agencies, submit to Congress a strategy for countering and limiting Chinese influence in, and access to, the Middle East and North Africa.

Sec. 282. Sense of Congress on Middle East and North Africa engagement

Finds that the U.S. and international community have long-term interests in the stability, security, and prosperity of the people of the Middle East and North Africa. Establishes that the U.S. should harness a whole of government approach to compete with and counter Chinese influence. Establishes that a clearly articulated positive narrative of U.S. engagement can help counter predatory foreign investment and influence efforts. Establishes that it is the policy of the U.S. that the U.S. and international community should continue diplomatic and economic efforts throughout MENA.

Sec. 283. Sense of Congress on People's Republic of China-Iran relationship

Expresses the sense of Congress that China's violation of U.S. sanctions on Iran undermine U.S. efforts to compel Iran to abandon its malign activities.

PART VI—ARCTIC REGION

Sec. 285. Arctic diplomacy

Expresses a sense of Congress that the rapidly changing Arctic environment and increased military activity poses new national and regional security challenges, including a heightened risk of the Arctic emerging as a major theater of conflict in ongoing strategic competition. Requires the United States to conduct periodic comprehensive evaluations of present and ongoing disruptions to the global climate system and account for global climate disruptions in National Security Planning. Directs the United States to develop a strategy for protecting national interests in the Arctic and establishes an Ambassador at Large for Arctic Affairs appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, who would coordinate United States policies related to the Arctic and Chair the Arctic Council when the United States holds such Chairmanship.

Sec. 286. Statement of policy regarding observer status for Taiwan on the Arctic Council

States that it is U.S. policy to urge that Taiwan be given observer status on the Arctic Council.

PART VII—OCEANIA

Sec. 291. Statement of policy on United States engagement in Oceania

Establishes that it shall be the policy of the U.S. to elevate the countries of Oceania as a strategic national security and economic priority; to promote civil society, rule of law, and democratic governance in the region; and to broaden and deepen the U.S. relationship with Palau, the Marshall Islands, and Micronesia. Establishes that the U.S. shall work with the regional organizations and with the governments of Australia, New Zealand, and Japan to advance our development goals in the region, and that the U.S. invest in a whole-of-government strategy to enhance youth engagement in the region and to deter and combat malign foreign influence and corruption. Also states that the policy of the U.S. shall include improving the local capacity of the countries of Oceania; helping the countries in the region address market-based private sector investments; ensuring that the people and the communities in the region remain safe; and working cooperatively with the governments of the region to promote the dignified return of the returns of U.S. Armed Forces members.

Sec. 292. Oceania strategic roadmap

Requires the Secretary of State to submit to Congress an Oceania Strategic Roadmap, outlining how the U.S. will strengthen engagement with the countries in Oceania and including an analysis

of the opportunities to cooperate with Australia, New Zealand, and Japan to address their shared concerns in the region.

Sec. 293. Oceania Security Dialogue

Directs the Secretary of State to brief the appropriate committees of Congress on the feasibility and advisability of establishing the U.S.-based public-private sponsored security dialogue, the "Oceania Security Dialogue," among the countries of Oceania for the purposes of jointly exploring and discussing issues affecting the economic, diplomatic, and national security of the Indo-Pacific countries of Oceania.

Sec. 294. Oceania Peace Corps partnerships

Directs the Director of the Peace Corps to report on strategies to expand the number of Peace Corps volunteers in Oceania, with the goals of expanding the Peace Corps presence to all currently feasible locations in Oceania and working with regional and international partners to expand the presence of Peace Corps volunteers in low-income Oceania communities in support of climate resilience initiatives.

PART VIII—PACIFIC ISLANDS

Sec. 295. Short title

Sec. 296. Findings

Puts forward findings on the importance of the Pacific Islands and the vital U.S. national security interests in the Pacific Islands. Highlights the shared challenges the region faces, the deepening of U.S. diplomatic engagement with the Pacific Islands, and the consistent Peace Corps presence in the region.

Sec. 297. Statement of policy

States that the United States seeks to develop and commit to a comprehensive, multifaceted, and principled U.S. policy in the Pacific Islands that promotes peace, security, stability and prosperity, to support the vision, values, and objectives of existing regional multilateral institutions and frameworks, to extend and renew the provisions of the Compacts of Free Association and related U.S. law that will soon expire, and to work closely with allies and partners with existing relationships and interests in the Pacific Islands in advancing common goals.

Sec. 298. Definitions

Sec. 299. Authority to consolidate reports; form of reports

Authorizes reports subject to deadlines for submission consisting of the same units of time may be consolidated into a single report that is submitted to appropriate congressional committees pursuant to such deadlines and that contains all information required under such reports.

Sec. 299A. Diplomatic presence in the Pacific Islands

Directs the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and USAID Administrator, to report on the U.S. diplomatic and development presence in the Pacific Islands. Author-

izes the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce to hire locally employed staff in the Pacific Islands for the purpose of promoting increased diplomatic engagement and economic and commercial engagement between the U.S. and the Pacific Islands. Directs the USAID Administrator to submit a regional development cooperation strategy for the Pacific Islands.

Sec. 299B. Coordination with regional allies and partners

Directs the Secretary of State to establish a formal consultative process with such regional allies and partners to coordinate with respect to programs that provide assistance to the Pacific Islands. Directs the Secretary of State to report on ongoing efforts undertaken by regional allies and partners to advance priorities identified in this Act; ongoing efforts, initiatives, and programs undertaken by non-allied foreign actors that are viewed as being potentially harmful or in any way detrimental to one or more countries of the Pacific Islands; U.S. programs in the Pacific Islands and their alignment and complementarity with the efforts of regional allies and partners; and the formal consultative process to summarize engagements held and identify opportunities to improve coordination with regional allies and partners.

Sec. 299C. Climate resilient development in the Pacific Islands

Directs the Secretary of State, in coordination with the USAID Administrator, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the DFC CEO, to develop and implement a strategy to invest in and improve critical infrastructure, provide technical assistance to assist local government and civil society leaders assess risks to local infrastructure, and support investment and improvement in ecosystem conservation and protection for the long-term sustainable use of ecosystem services. Directs the Secretary of the Treasury to direct the U.S. representatives to the World Bank, the IMF, and ADB to use the voice and vote of the U.S. to support climate resilient infrastructure projects in the Pacific Islands. Directs the Secretary of State to report on foreign infrastructure developments in the Pacific Islands. Authorizes $250M to carry out this section.

Sec. 299D. International law enforcement academy for the Pacific Islands

Directs the Secretary of State to develop and implement a plan to expand coverage of the International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEA) program for the Pacific Islands, including by expanding coverage of the regional program located in Bangkok, Thailand, to the Pacific Islands; or establishing a new regional program for the Pacific Islands. Directs the Secretary of State to brief the appropriate committees on this plan.

Sec. 299E. Security assistance for the Pacific Islands

Directs the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense and in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, to develop and implement and report on a comprehensive strategy to provide assistance to and build the capacity of local civilian and national security institutions of the Pacific Islands for purposes of enhancing maritime security and maritime domain awareness to address challenges; assisting local law en-

forcement in detecting, preventing, and combatting transnational crime; participating in efforts to coordinate and facilitate cooperation on shared security challenges; and expanding information sharing and to work toward operational coordination and interoperability among Pacific Island maritime security forces.

Sec. 299F. Countering transnational crime

Directs the Secretary of State to submit a report on the status of the progress of each country of the Pacific Islands toward ratifying and implementing international legal conventions related to transnational crime and U.S. plans for assisting those countries that have yet to fully ratify such conventions with their respective ratification efforts. Directs the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of relevant Federal agencies, to submit a report that identifies Pacific Island countries that are countries of concern with respect to illegal logging and associated trade. Amends the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 by adding a reporting requirement on the assessment of gaps or limitations in the U.S. ability to effectively assist priority regions and priority flag states relating to IUU fishing due to resource constraints and the additional resources necessary to overcome those constraints.

Sec. 299G. Emergency preparedness initiative for the Pacific Islands

Directs the USAID Administrator to develop and implement and report on a program to assist the Pacific Islands in enhancing their preparedness for and resilience to natural disasters and other emergencies. Authorizes $200M for this program.

Sec. 299H. Peace Corps in the Pacific Islands

Expresses the sense of Congress on the importance of expanding the presence of the Peace Corps in the Pacific Islands. Directs the Director of the Peace Corps to submit a report that includes a comparative analysis of the Peace Corps presence in the Pacific Islands region to other regions of the world; analysis of current impediments to Peace Corps expansion in the Pacific Islands region; outcomes of consultations among U.S. agencies, and with regional allies and partners, on areas in which cooperation can reduce factors limiting Peace Corps expansion; and a plan and timeline for implementing these outcomes to facilitate expansion of Peace Corps presence in the region.

TITLE III—INVESTING IN OUR VALUES

Sec. 301. Sense of Congress on the continued violation of rights and freedoms of the people of Hong Kong

Puts forwards findings on the PRC's abrogation of its obligations and commitments under international law and agreements and the erosion of Hong Kong's autonomy, undermining of democratic norms and human rights, and the use of violence and excessive force after the imposition of the national security law. Expresses the sense of Congress that condemns the actions taken by the PRC and HKSAR governments, reaffirms support for the people of Hong Kong, calls the PRC and HKSAR governments to honor its commitments in respect to Hong Kong and to release those detained under the national security law, and encourages the President, the Sec-

retary of State, and the Secretary of the Treasury to coordinate with allies and partners and continue U.S. efforts to respond to developments in Hong Kong.

Sec. 302. Authorization of appropriations for promotion of democracy in Hong Kong

Authorizes $10M for the State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor to promote democracy in Hong Kong.

Sec. 303. Hong Kong people's freedom and choice

Provides temporary protected status and refugee status for qualifying Hong Kong residents for the 18-month period beginning after enactment. Stipulates that Hong Kong continue to be considered a foreign state separate and apart from the PRC for purposes of the numerical limitations on immigrant visas. Directs the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, to publish an interim final rule establishing procedures for designation of Priority Hong Kong Residents and finalize such rule no later than 1 year after enactment. Directs the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with other Federal agencies, to submit a report detailing the number of HKSAR residents who have applied for U.S. visas or immigration benefits; the number of approvals, denials, or rejections of applicants for visas or immigration benefits; the number of pending refugee and asylum applications for HKSAR residents, and the length of time and reason for which such applications have been pending. Directs the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security to report on refugee and asylum related matters related to HKSAR applications, average wait-times, approvals, referrals, denials, and refugee circuit rides to interview populations that would include Hong Kong SAR. Authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of State in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security to provide special immigrant status admission for certain priority highly skilled Hong Kong residents, not to exceed 5,000 per year for each of the 5 FYs.

Sec. 304. Export prohibition of munitions items to the Hong Kong police force

Amends "An Act to prohibit the commercial export of covered munitions items to the Hong Kong Police Force" by extending the prohibition to the date on which the President certifies that (1) the Secretary of State has certified that Hong Kong warrants treatment under U.S. law in the same manner as U.S. laws were applied to Hong Kong before July 1, 1997; (2) the Hong Kong Police have not engaged in gross violations of human rights during the 1-year period ending on the date of such certification; and (3) there has been an independent examination of human rights concerns related to the crowd control tactics of the Hong Kong Police and that the HKSAR government has adequately addressed those concerns.

Sec. 305. Sense of Congress on treatment of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

Expresses the sense of Congress that the ongoing atrocities in Xinjiang must be condemned; the President, the Secretary of State,

and the U.S. Ambassador to the UN should speak publicly about the ongoing human rights abuses and appeal to the UN Secretary-General to take a more proactive and public stance on the situation in the XUAR; the U.S. should continue to use targeted sanctions and all diplomatic tools available to hold those responsible accountable; U.S. agencies engaged with China on bilateral issues should include human rights abuses in the XUAR as a consideration in developing U.S. policy; the U.S. supports Radio Free Asia Uyghur; and the U.S. recognizes the repeated requests from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights for unfettered access to the XUAR and the PRC's refusal to comply, requiring the U.S. and its allies and partners to pressure PRC authorities to allow unfettered access to the XUAR and build an international investigation outside of the PRC if PRC authorities do not comply with a UN investigation.

Sec. 306. Prevention of Uyghur forced labor

Imposes various restrictions related to China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous region, including by prohibiting certain imports from Xinjiang and imposing sanctions on those responsible for human rights violations there. Instructs the President to periodically report a list of foreign entities and individuals knowingly facilitating (1) the forced labor of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority groups in Xinjiang; and (2) efforts to contravene U.S. laws regarding the importation of forced labor goods from Xinjiang. Calls on the President to impose property-blocking sanctions on the listed individuals and entities and impose visa-blocking sanctions on the listed individuals. Instructs securities issuers required to file annual or quarterly reports with the Securities Exchange Commission to disclose instances in which the issuer knowingly engaged in certain activities related to Xinjiang and the President to determine whether to investigate if sanctions or criminal charges are warranted. Requires the Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force and the State Department to report strategies to address forced labor in Xinjiang or any other part of China. Requires the State Department to report a determination of whether the treatment of Muslim groups in Xinjiang constitutes crimes against humanity or genocide under U.S. law.

Sec. 307. Uyghur human rights protection

The "Uyghur Human Rights Protection Act" designates aliens who were Chinese nationals and Xinjiang residents on January 1, 2021; aliens who fled Xinjiang after June 30, 2009 and reside in other Chinese provinces or a third country where they are not firmly resettled; and the spouses, children, and parents as Priority 2 refugees of special humanitarian concern. Directs the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security to submit a report on the applications submitted under this section.

Sec. 308. Removal of members of the United Nations Human Rights Council that commit human rights abuses

Instructs the President to direct the U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to reform the rules and processes of the UN Human Rights Council so that members that commit gross and systemic violations

of human rights are removed, not elected to the Council, and are opposed in an election.

Sec. 309. Policy with respect to Tibet

Amends the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 to make changes to the position of the U.S. Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues at the State Department.

Sec. 310. United States policy and international engagement on the succession or reincarnation of the Dalai Lama and religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists

Provides a statement of policy that interference by the PRC or any other government in the process of recognizing a successor or reincarnation of the 14th Dalai Lama and any future Dalai Lamas would represent a clear abuse of the right to religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists and the Tibetan people. Advises the Secretary of State to engage with U.S. allies and partners to support Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders' sole religious authority to identify and install the 15th Dalai Lama, oppose PRC claims that it has the authority to decide the 15th Dalai Lama, and reject PRC interference in Tibetan Buddhists' religious freedom.

Sec. 311. Development and deployment of internet freedom and Great Firewall circumvention tools for the people of Hong Kong

Authorizes the Secretary of State to establish a Hong Kong Internet Freedom Program in DRL to develop a strategy to bolster internet resiliency and online access in Hong Kong. Authorizes the President of the Technology Fund to establish a Hong Kong Internet Freedom Program.

Authorizes $10M to the Open Technology Fund and $20M to DRL's Office of Internet Freedom Programs. Directs the Secretary of State and the working group to submit a classified report on the Federal Government's strategy to promote and support Great Firewall circumvention and internet freedom in Hong Kong, influence global internet legal standards at international organizations and multilateral fora, and other related topics.

Sec. 312. Authorization of appropriations for protecting human rights in the People's Republic of China

Authorizes funding to nongovernmental agencies within the Indo-Pacific region that are focused on the protection and advancement of the freedoms of association, assembly, religion, and expression for women, human rights activists, and ethnic and religious minorities in the PRC. Directs the A/S of DRL to consult with the appropriate congressional committees and civil society representatives regarding strengthening the capacity of these organizations, protecting members of at-risk groups, and messaging about U.S. efforts to protect freedom of association, expression, assembly, and the rights of ethnic minorities.

Sec. 313. Modifications to and reauthorization of sanctions with respect to human rights violations

Amends the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act to express the sense of Congress that the President should establish and regularize information sharing and sanctions-related deci-

sion making with like-minded governments possessing human rights and anti-corruption sanctions programs, to make modifications to the President's sanctions authority, to add additional criteria to the reporting requirements to Congress, and to repeal the sunset.

Sec. 314. Sense of Congress condemning anti-Asian racism and discrimination

Puts forwards findings on the rise of crimes and discrimination against Asians and those of Asian descent since the onset of COVID–19. Expresses the sense of Congress that anti-Asian attacks and discrimination have no place in a peaceful, civilized, and tolerant world and that the U.S. should encourage other governments to use the scientific names for COVID–19 and combat the spread of anti-Asian racism and discrimination.

Sec. 315. Annual reporting on censorship of free speech with respect to international abuses of human rights

Amends the Foreign Assistance Act to expand reporting on censorship of free speech with respect to international abuses of human rights to include instances in which a government attempts to extraterritorially intimidate or pressure a company or entity to censor or self-censor the speech of its employees, contractors, customers, or associated staff with regards to the abuse of human rights in such country, or seeks retaliation against such employees or contractors for the same.

Sec. 316. Policy toward the XXIV Olympic Winter Games and the XIII Paralympic Winter Games

Expresses the sense of Congress that the IOC should publicly declare that it will consider moving the 2022 Beijing Olympics given the human rights situation and initiate an emergency search process for suitable replacement facilities if China doesn't release all the detained minorities in Xinjiang, affirm its commitment to the fundamental rights instruments of the international system, develop a set of actions it would take if any host country infringes on the freedom of expression of athletes, journalists, and participants, and rescind Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter. Puts forward a statement of policy that the U.S. implement a presidential and cabinet level diplomatic boycott of the 2022 Beijing Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games, encourage other nations to do the same, and call for an end to the CCP's ongoing human rights abuses.

Sec. 317. Review and controls on export of items with critical capabilities to enable human rights abuses

Requires periodic Commerce Department-led interagency review of export control lists to ensure that items are included that would provide China with a critical capability for surveillance or repression.

Sec. 318. Sense of Congress on commercial export control policy

Expresses the sense of Congress that the President should reexamine U.S. export policy to any country, including China, that supplies arms or dual use items to any country designated a state

sponsor of terror or any entity designated a foreign terrorist organization.

Sec. 319. Imposition of sanctions with respect to systematic rape, coercive abortion, forced sterilization, or involuntary contraceptive implantation in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

Amends the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 to impose sanctions based on systematic rape, coercive abortion, forced sterilization, or involuntary contraceptive implantation policies and practices in Xinjiang.

Sec. 320. Sense of Congress regarding censorship of political speech

Expresses the sense of Congress that the PRC censors political speech which is antithetical to human rights and U.S. values and interests.

Sec. 321. Report on manner and extent to which the Government of China exploits Hong Kong to circumvent United States laws and protections

Requires the State Department to submit a report to Congress on how the PRC uses the status of Hong Kong to circumvent U.S. laws and protections.

Sec. 322. Sense of Congress regarding annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices

Expresses the sense of Congress that the State Department's annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices should include information on forcible repatriation of Uyghurs and other support for the PRC's genocide against Uyghurs.

Sec. 323. Sense of Congress regarding press freedom in the People's Republic of China

Expresses the sense of Congress that the PRC should respect freedom of press and expression.

Sec. 324. United States Special Envoy for Xinjiang Province

Establishes within the State Department the position of United States Special Envoy for Xinjiang Province and authorizes the coordination on human rights and other pressing issues relevant to Xinjiang and enables the State Department to dual-hat and swiftly fill the position.

Sec. 325. China Censorship Monitor and Action Group

Enables a research entity to examine the problem of Chinese government censorship in the U.S. and establish a monitoring group pursuant to the results of the review.

Sec. 326. Public disclosure on BIS licensing information

Expresses that the Committee on Foreign Affairs make aggregate statistics on licensing information for Chinese companies on the Commerce Entity List public.

TITLE IV—INVESTING IN OUR ECONOMIC STATECRAFT

Sec. 401. Sense of Congress regarding the PRC's industrial policy

Expresses the sense of Congress that the U.S. must adopt policies to expose the detrimental aspects of the PRC's nonmarket policies, provide options for those affected by unreasonable and discriminatory industrial policies, ensure that PRC companies face costs and consequences for anticompetitive behavior, and strengthen the protection of critical technology and sensitive data. The U.S. should work with allies and partners to reinforce long-standing principles, address the PRC's anticompetitive policies, counter detrimental PRC actions, and collaborate to provide incentives to their respective companies to cooperate, as well as taking other actions to respond to the PRC's mercantilist economic strategy.

Sec. 402. Economic defense response teams

Directs the President to develop and implement a pilot program for the creation of deployable economic defense response teams to help provide emergency technical assistance and support to a country subjected to the threat or use of coercive economic measures and to play a liaison role between the legitimate government of that country and the U.S. Government. Directs the Secretary of State to report to and brief the appropriate committees of Congress on the pilot program upon its establishment and as a follow-up no later than one year after the initial report. Authorizes the President to activate an economic defense response team for a period of 180 days to assist a partner country in responding to an unusual and extraordinary economic coercive threat by an adversary of the U.S. upon the declaration of a coercive economic emergency, together with notification to SFRC and HFAC.

Sec. 403. Countering overseas kleptocracy

Targets authoritarian leaders in foreign countries who abuse their power to steal assets from state institutions and use corruption to solidify their grip on power and undermine democratic institutions abroad. Calls on the leveraging of diplomatic engagement and foreign assistance to promote the rule of law, promote international instruments to combat corruption, close loopholes in legal and financial architecture, assist in the prosecution of such individuals and recovery of assets for victims, and employ existing sanctions authorities as necessary. Establishes an Anti-Corruption Action Fund at the Department of the Treasury in furtherance of these objectives to be funded from fines and penalties pursuant to criminal prosecutions under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Creates an interagency anti-corruption task force at the Department of State to improve government coordination in promoting overseas good governance and countering public corruption. Requires USAID to consolidate existing reports having anti-corruption components into a single online, public platform.

Sec. 404. Annual report on Chinese surveillance companies

Directs the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, to submit an annual report on people in China who have provided items or services related to targeted digital surveillance to a foreign government or entity where the items

or services could be used in a manner contrary to human rights or to a country, entity, or person determined by the Secretary of State to have used items or services for targeted digital surveillance in a manner contrary to human rights; and on people who have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or items or services to or in support of these activities.

TITLE V—ENSURING STRATEGIC SECURITY

Sec. 501. Cooperation on a strategic nuclear dialogue

Provides a statement of policy that the U.S. pursues arms control negotiations and sustained and regular engagement with the PRC, formulates a strategy to lay the groundwork for a constructive arms control framework with the PRC, and pursues negotiations in coordination with allies and partners. Expresses the sense of Congress that it is in the interest of both nations to cooperate, that a PLA attack on U.S. infrastructure risks escalation, that the U.S. and allies should promote international norms, and that allies and partners should share the burden in promoting norms and responsible behavior.

Sec. 502. Report on United States efforts to engage the People's Republic of China on nuclear issues and ballistic missile issues

Directs the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy, to report on the approaches and strategies they will pursue to engage the PRC on arms control and risk reduction. Directs the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy, to report on its plan for arms control talks with the PRC, alternative State plans if dialogue does not arise, implications for the credibility of U.S. deterrence commitments if talks do not materialize, efforts at engaging the PRC to join arms control talks, and the PRC's interest level in joining arms control talks.

Sec. 503. Countering China's proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear technology to the Middle East

Directs the President to submit a written determination detailing whether any foreign person in China knowingly exported, transferred, or engaged in trade of any item designated under Category I of the MTCR Annex to any foreign person and the sanctions the President has imposed or intends to against any foreign person who knowingly engaged in the export, transfer, or trade of that item or items. Directs the President to submit a report detailing whether any foreign person in China engaged in cooperation with any other foreign person in the construction of any nuclear-related fuel cycle facility or activity that has not been notified to the IAEA and would be subject to complementary access if an Additional Protocol was in force; and the policy options required to prevent and respond to any future effort by China to export to any foreign person an item classified as "plants for the separation of isotopes of uranium" or "plants for the reprocessing of irradiated nuclear reactor fuel elements"' under Part 110 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission export licensing authority.

TITLE VI—INVESTING IN A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE

Sec. 601. Ensuring national security and economic priorities with China and other countries account for environmental issues and climate change

Sets the objectives for investing in a sustainable future: (1) to ensure the United States maintains its strategic competitiveness as countries shift to clean energy and green technologies; to demonstrate Congressional support and cooperation with the executive branch effort to restore the U.S's indispensable leadership in global cooperative efforts to combat climate change; (2) to find common ground with China on climate action where possible, but continue to hold China accountable where its actions undermine the interests of the United States, its allies, and partners; (3) to provide resources, authorities and support for enhancing the U.S.'s ambition and commitment to work with other countries to set an ambitious climate action agenda; (4) to create pathways for specific assistance and international financing options; (5) to integrate considerations for climate change into broader U.S. foreign policy decision-making; (6) and to improve diplomatic relationships and consider the pursuit of new bilateral and multilateral opportunities for advancing cooperative climate action.

Sec. 602. Enhancing security considerations for global climate disruptions

Calls for interagency coordination on the development of periodic evaluations and strategic planning on the evolving security risks associated with climate change, with special attention towards improving predicative capacities around future and evolving threats and instability through the integration and use of climate models and forecasting. The section also details a United States' climate security strategy.

Sec. 603. Balancing accountability and cooperation with China

Expresses the sense of Congress that climate change requires global cooperation, especially between the United States and China and that both countries should work together to undertake parallel initiatives to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, develop and deploy clean energy generation technologies, and integrate sustainable adaptation solutions. Instructs the United States and its allies to work together to hold China accountable for increasing its emissions targets, eliminating greenhouse gas intensive projects from its Belt and Road Initiative, and avoiding efforts that undermine the Paris Agreement's underlying framework.

Sec. 604. Promoting responsible development alternatives to the People's Republic of China's Belt and Road Initiative

Calls on the President to partner with multilateral development finance institutions to develop financing tools based on shared development finance criteria and mechanisms to support investments in developing countries that support clean energy development, resiliency, and adaptation to environmental changes and natural disasters. Authorizes the Secretary of State, USAID and other relevant agency heads to co-finance infrastructure, resilience, and environmental adaptation projects that advance the development ob-

jectives of the United States overseas and provide viable alternatives to projects that would otherwise be included within China's Belt and Road Initiative. Allows the International Development Finance Corporation to partner with other multilateral development finance institutions in furtherance of these objectives.

Sec. 605. Using climate diplomacy to better serve national security and economic interests

Makes diplomatic engagement and climate action a central and crosscutting tenet of the State Department. Calls for greater coordination and integration of climate change diplomacy into the United States' missions around the world and charges the Secretary of State with coordinating/facilitating the integration of climate action, diplomacy, and scientific data into the Department of State. Charges the Secretary of State to ensure each mission has a climate diplomacy strategy and to utilize resources within the bureau. Specifically, creates Climate Change Officer positions within the Foreign Service responsible for convening stakeholders and supporting U.S. engagement on climate change and requires corresponding curriculum at the Foreign Service Institute. Additionally, requires Chiefs of Mission to have a strategy on addressing climate change and to certify that, to the extent practicable, they have integrated climate change considerations into mission activities, management, and operations.

Sec. 606. Driving a global climate change resilience strategy

Amends the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to authorize the President to furnish assistance to programs and initiatives that promote resilience to climate change and creates a Coordinator of Climate Change Resilience at the Department of State. This coordinator will oversee the development of a 10-year strategy to mitigate the impacts of climate change and work with allies and partners to ensure a level playing field exists when it comes to climate action. Requires the Department of State to provide a report within 270 days after enactment on implementation of these requirements and an assessment of risks and resources related to achieving the strategy.

Sec. 607. Addressing international climate change mitigation, adaptation, and security

Authorizes a successor foreign assistance program to the *Global Climate Change Initiative*. Would provide specific, supplemental (not supplanted) foreign assistance for clean energy, sustainable land use, and adaptation, but with considerable focus on building resilience capacities, improving food security and natural resource conservation, and ensuring that mitigation of transportation sector emissions are eligible activities. Contributions to multilateral funds, as well as bilateral regional assistance would be eligible to receive funds.

Sec. 608. Reducing the negative impacts from black carbon, methane, and high-GWP hydrofluorocarbons

Establishes a policy and instructs U.S. representatives to multilateral institutions, and other U.S. diplomats, to advance international efforts to control highly potent environmental pollutants

consisting of or deriving from black carbon, methane, and high-GWP hydrofluorocarbons. Calls for exploring appropriate international mechanisms to deal specifically with these pollutants, which present long-term health and environmental risks if left unaddressed or unmitigated.

Sec. 609. Building United States economic growth and technological innovation through the Green Climate Fund

Two-year authorization of contributions to the Green Climate Fund. $4 billion each for FY 2022 and FY 2023, which will further international efforts in assisting developing countries with mitigating and adapting to climate change. Calls for the United States to lead efforts to ensure the Fund uses best practices for environmental and social safeguards and respects human rights.

Sec. 610. Ensuring a whole-of-government response to climate action.

Establishes an interagency task force, led by the Department of State, to monitor climate change impacts on social conditions to anticipate potential national security risks to the United States, as well as assess the actions taken by other countries vis-á-vis their national climate strategies and international commitments to ensure a coordinated response with allies and partners if state and non-state actors seek to undermine global climate objectives and norms. It also seeks to improve interagency and international coordination in these efforts. Requires a report to Congress within 180 days of enactment.

Sec. 611. Working with international partners to reduce deforestation.

In recognition of the substantial negative impact by China on global forest ecosystems due to its substantial consumption of timber products, soybeans, and other products, this section establishes a program at USAID in consultation with other appropriate agencies that provides assistance to developing countries to reduce deforestation and forest degradation through measurable sustainable development practices. It sets carbon dioxide emissions reduction targets for 2025 and 2030 by assisting other countries to build capacity to reduce deforestation. It calls on U.S. representatives at the World Bank, IMF, and other international financial institutions to prioritize efforts to combat deforestation.

Sec. 612. Controlling the export of electronic waste to protect United States supply chains.

With China being the largest producer of e-waste and evidence existing of Chinese counterfeit electronic parts entering the U.S. military's supply chain, this provision would bar persons and entities from exporting or reexporting electronic waste items unless exempted. Among other requirements, an exemption requires that all export transactions be registered in accordance part 758 of Export Administration Regulation, contain a certification that the item is a low-risk counterfeit electronic, and has written consent to enter the destination country. The receiving party must also certify it has the necessary permits, resources, and competence to reuse or recy-

cle the item, and prevent its subsequent release as a counterfeit good or counterfeit military good.

DISSENTING VIEWS

It is deeply regrettable that, with H.R. 3524, the majority has taken an ineffectual and wholly partisan approach to the gravest threat to the national security and economic welfare of the United States of this generation. As underscored by the complete lack of minority support at committee markup, committee Republicans strongly oppose House consideration of this problematic bill for the reasons outlined below.

INTRODUCTION

Under the totalitarian rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the People's Republic of China has emerged as the United States' preeminent national and economic security threat. This dynamic has become even more acute since Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the CCP in late 2012, consolidated power by purging his rivals and ending the CCP's decades-long tradition of collective leadership, and embraced policies that are genocidal domestically and belligerent abroad. Xi has disregarded Deng Xiaoping's advice to "hide your capabilities and bide your time" and led the CCP and PRC to take malign actions that threaten peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific, the United States, and globally.

We have seen the stark reality of Xi's rule play out. The CCP's People's Liberation Army (PLA) is committing territorial aggression and violating international law across the entire periphery of the PRC, from Japan, to Southeast Asia, to the Himalayas. The CCP took over Hong Kong, threw out the Sino-British Joint Declaration, destroyed "one country, two systems," and took away Hong Kongers' freedoms. Xi has begun a genocide against the Uyghurs and other Muslims in the PRC, which is contaminating global supply chains with forced labor. The PRC's longstanding economic malfeasance is only increasing, from cyber-enabled economic espionage to market-distorting subsidies. PLA aggression against Taiwan is at an all-time high. Additionally, the PLA development of hypersonic weapons can only be intended as a threat to the U.S. homeland and the international order. The challenge we face is generational in scope, but also demands urgent action.

The EAGLE Act fails to rise to this challenge. Recent polling finds that roughly nine in ten U.S. adults consider the PRC a competitor or an enemy. Confronting this challenge is not a Republican issue or a Democrat issue. It's a whole-of-country necessity, and demands a comprehensive bipartisan response. In contrast, H.R. 3524 was crafted solely by the majority, with little to no input from Foreign Affairs Committee Republicans. Republican requests to improve the bill ahead of markup were not given any meaningful consideration. Sadly, the EAGLE Act departs from the Committee's long tradition of bipartisanship on what is arguably the most con-

sequential issue the Committee will consider this Congress and in the years ahead.

The substance of this legislation is even more disappointing than its partisan origins. After the bill was pushed through Committee on a party-line vote, the Chairman characterized it as "comprehensive legislation which addresses the challenges posed by China, not only to the United States, but to the international rules-based system and global economy." Regrettably, this characterization does not square with the facts.

While the majority has presented the EAGLE Act as novel intellectual property, in reality it is a partisan revision of the bipartisan Senate-passed Strategic Competition Act, edited to dilute the Senate's approach to the foreign policy challenges of the CCP and PRC. The EAGLE Act throws away essential components of its parent text, such as its security assistance provisions, a topic on which the EAGLE Act is completely silent. It also adds progressive objectives, such as a radical expansion of U.S. contributions to global climate funds, which it seeks to justify as somehow responding to the threat of the CCP. The Eagle Act disregards the PRC's malign actions that are tied to the climate challenge. The bill also completely fails to exercise critical elements of Foreign Affairs Committee jurisdiction, such as export control authorities, our committee's most powerful tool to slow down the People's Liberation Army and curtail the CCP's grotesque human rights abuses.

What remains is a partisan text that, despite being nearly 700 pages in length, is almost entirely devoid of content that would meaningfully advance the United States' strategic competition with the PRC. Instead, it is an unserious bill comprised largely of findings, reports, and non-binding Senses of Congress. It claims to impose costs on the CCP for human rights abuses, but does so by recycling bills that have already passed the Committee—and some that have already passed the House. It claims to strengthen American economic diplomacy, but it offers zero solutions to the CCP's unfair trade practices and illegal behavior.

The threat we face is very real. The CCP is using our economy to build a military that is superior to ours. It is conducting a genocide to exterminate its minorities, and stealing the foundations of our economic prosperity. If they succeed in their goals, the CCP will be able to hold the United States at risk militarily, coerce us economically, subjugate American values to their Marxist ideology, and preside over a world remade according to their dictates. Ultimately, this is an existential threat that demands real, rapid action. We fail in our duty to the American people if we answer our greatest threat with only lip service. Regrettably, the EAGLE Act fails in every way to rise to the challenge.

A TROJAN HORSE FOR THE GREEN CLIMATE FUND

Title VI of the EAGLE Act is an expansive, partisan global climate bill that has no place in legislation that has been characterized as an answer to the specific challenges posed by the CCP. While Title VI contains some mostly non-binding provisions that are superficially relevant to the topic at hand, there is no substantive content in the title that directly relates to malign CCP activities regarding the environment. There is no content that would

impose consequences for the CCP's ongoing harm to ecosystems around the world.

Instead, Title VI of the EAGLE Act includes radical expansions of U.S. taxpayer-funded contributions to unaccountable global climate slush funds that are already failing to address the CCP's climate malfeasance, and in fact have financially benefitted the CCP. The EAGLE Act authorizes $8 billion specifically for the Green Climate Fund, and another $2 billion annually for multilateral funds which could also be directed to the Green Climate Fund. Even if we assume that none of this second category goes to the Green Climate Fund, which is unlikely, it would still amount to more than tripling the Biden Administration's budget request to Congress for this purpose.

In fact, the radical approach to climate policy taken by the EAGLE Act implies that this bill is not intended to address the national and economic security threat of the CCP, but is actually a progressive climate change initiative that has been disguised with weak national security provisions. By the numbers, the EAGLE Act is predominantly global climate legislation, not counter-CCP legislation. For Fiscal Year 2022 alone, the climate authorizations contained in the EAGLE Act exceed all the national security and foreign policy funding authorized in the bill by at least 130%—but likely substantially more, due to overlap in other authorizations.

However, the Majority unanimously voted to retain Title VI, despite the fact that dropping this content would have made the legislation far more relevant to its stated intent. Inexplicably, this title does not include common-sense safeguards, and the majority rejected Republican amendments to ensure that this massive amount of taxpayer funding does not directly benefit the CCP or violate American values.

Despite being the second-largest economy on Earth, the PRC has already received $100 million from the Green Climate Fund. Committee Democrats voted unanimously against prohibiting the PRC from receiving future U.S. contributions to the Green Climate Fund. The majority also voted unanimously against language urging U.S. officials not to compromise on human rights issues or other U.S. interests in order to elicit climate commitments from the CCP.

It is an accepted fact that the PRC's renewable energy supply chains are closely tied to its genocide against Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minorities. Special Envoy for Climate John Kerry acknowledged before the Foreign Affairs Committee that the PRC's solar industry presents serious concerns of Uyghur forced labor. Despite this, the majority also rejected an amendment to prohibit the use of Green Climate Fund contributions for products produced by forced labor, sending a chilling message to the CCP about the United States' resolve to support human rights.

WEAKENED POLICY

The bulk of the EAGLE Act is comprised of non-binding, hortatory language. Much of this language was borrowed from the Senate's Strategic Competition Act, but then weakened or changed in ways that diverge from that bill's bipartisan consensus. It removes many references to our "strategic competition" with the

PRC. It omits key policy statements from the Senate text, such as that "[t]he President of the United States must lead and direct the entire executive branch to treat the People's Republic of China as the greatest geopolitical and geoeconomic challenge for United States foreign policy." Because of these dilutions, it fails to capture and convey the prevailing bipartisan foreign policy consensus, shared by successive administrations, regarding the generational threat posed by the CCP.

WALL STREET OVER MAIN STREET

In a number of alarming instances, the EAGLE Act significantly weakens text it has borrowed from the Strategic Competition Act. One of the most concerning examples is Section 133, "Review of Chinese Companies on United States Capital Markets." The continued exploitation of U.S. capital markets by the CCP to advance its military ambitions, pursue its industrial policy goals, and further its human rights abuses is an extremely urgent aspect of our strategic competition. The continued ability of PRC companies to list on U.S. exchanges despite flagrantly violating U.S. law has led to billions of dollars in losses due to fraud. Yet this critical provision has been gutted when compared to its Senate companion.

The EAGLE Act slashes the Senate's annual requirement down to a one-off report. Rather than remain focused on threats, the EAGLE Act adds a new requirement for the President to report to Congress on the benefits of PRC companies that are traded on U.S. exchanges—an ironic addition, given that every single one of these companies is in violation of U.S. law.

Despite the fact that Congress has overwhelmingly passed legislation to require delisting PRC companies if they continue to violate the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the EAGLE Act adds new requirements for the report to speculate on hypothetical downsides of delisting PRC companies that are in violation of U.S. law. This particular requirement clearly did not sit well even with the majority, as a Democrat amendment to slightly narrow this provision was adopted.

Finally, the EAGLE Act blocks the report from including a classified annex. These changes overwhelmingly favor PRC companies that are violating U.S. law while benefitting from U.S. capital markets, as well as the entities that enrich themselves taking such PRC companies public in the United States. They are to the detriment of the U.S. investor and U.S. national security.

ABANDONING FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE AUTHORITIES AND JURISDICTION

In addition to its inclusion of radical environmental provisions, and its weakening of important aspects of the Strategic Competition Act, the EAGLE Act as reported by the Committee has major gaps, completely omitting core elements of the Committee's jurisdiction that are essential for strategic competition with the PRC. Specifically, the EAGLE Act contains no security assistance authority whatsoever, and virtually no export control authority except one narrow provision added pursuant to a majority member's amendment. Even disregarding the aforementioned issues, either of these exclusions individually is a fundamental deficiency, and would like-

ly have been grounds for Committee Republicans to oppose the EAGLE Act.

The Committee-reported text completely omits Sec. 225 of the bipartisan Strategic Competition Act, authorizing expanded Foreign Military Financing for the Indo-Pacific, and does not replace it with any alternate provision. During markup, the majority rejected in a party line vote a Republican amendment to simply re-insert Sec. 225. As reported, the EAGLE Act does not even support preexisting FMF activity in the Indo-Pacific. It goes without saying that in the face of increased military belligerence from the PLA, U.S. allies and partners in the region rely on our help to expand their maritime domain awareness and security capabilities—activities that also directly benefit U.S. national security. The total refusal to incorporate security assistance into the EAGLE Act is a fatal flaw that is not only bad policy, but undermines Foreign Affairs Committee jurisdiction.

Just a few weeks after the Committee passage of the EAGLE Act, the PLA began testing hypersonic weapons, a capability that rests upon access to U.S. technology. Yet the EAGLE Act as taken up by the Committee included no export control authorities. A majority amendment to insert a narrow human rights-oriented export control provision was adopted during markup, suggesting that Members on both sides of the aisle perceived this to be a significant gap.

Unfortunately, the majority voted down more forward-leaning provisions to cut off the PLA from U.S. technology, both in the minority substitute amendment, and in several second-degree amendments. These included provisions to coordinate with allies on establishing plurilateral controls for critical technologies, harmonizing the Defense Department's list of CCP military companies with the Commerce Department's entity list, cutting off CCP military companies from U.S. technology, and placing ZTE on the entity list.

GLARING OMISSIONS

In addition to leaving core aspects of Foreign Affairs Committee jurisdiction on the cutting room floor, the EAGLE Act has a wide variety of glaring omissions. Suggestions by Committee Republicans to address these issues were almost universally rejected.

Of note, the majority rejected amendments to hold the CCP accountable for its coverup of the COVID–19 pandemic and cut off funds to the Wuhan Institute of Virology. Committee Democrats voted down Republican amendments to declassify intelligence about the origins of COVID–19, and to stop funding the distribution of Sinopharm and Sinovac vaccines until the FDA approves them. They also voted against Republican amendments to stop funding research with the PRC, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, and against an amendment to pause research funding to the PRC until the CCP allows an independent investigation of the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

In addition to pursuing accountability for the CCP's role in the COVID–19 pandemic, Committee Republicans introduced a number of amendments covering the waterfront of strategic competition—from sanctions for the United Front Work Department, to identifying figures involved in fentanyl trafficking, to publicizing re-

search institutions that supply the PLA. Each of these suggestions were rejected.

CONCLUSION

The Biden administration's CIA Director, William Burns, has correctly called the PRC "the most important geopolitical threat we face in the 21st century." Every day, the CCP is taking concerted actions to move towards its objectives, to the detriment of the United States, our allies, and our partners. Congress must answer this threat with real bipartisan policy action, not political theater that fuels press releases but continues to allow the CCP to erode U.S. national interests.

Ultimately, that is what the EAGLE Act is—political theater. Its priorities, such as radically expanding U.S. contributions to the Green Climate Fund, are only thinly justified by the PRC threat. At the same time, it completely ignores authorities that are essential to making the United States more competitive against the PRC, like export controls and security assistance for our allies and partners. Committee Republicans made repeated efforts to give this legislation substance, both in consultations before markup, and through dozens of amendments. Virtually all were rejected, and the result is a partisan bill that will not meaningfully contribute to the United States' strategic competition with the PRC.

For these reasons, I strongly oppose this measure.

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL,
Ranking Member.

MINORITY VIEWS

INTRODUCTION

Every day, the American people are becoming increasingly aware that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is not merely a competitor, but an adversary. For many who have lost their jobs to the PRC's unfair trade practices and currency manipulation or a cyberattack originating in China, that realization happened a long time ago.

On every front, Beijing is challenging the free world and our premise that open societies, free markets, and the rule of law result in a prosperous and equitable civilization. This challenge is open and obvious whether we look at the PRC's fundamental disregard for human rights, their rampant theft of intellectual property, their manipulation of the international trading system, their penchant for secrecy and coverups which led to the COVID–19 pandemic, or any number of other issues.

As Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia and Nonproliferation, I believe this century will be defined by how we respond to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its ambition for global hegemony. If we respond effectively, freedom and democracy will continue to flourish. If we fail, the People's Republic of China will replace the post-World War II order with a new global order that revolves around Beijing.

For decades since Nixon went to China, the United States has attempted to play nice with the People's Republic of China in hopes that incorporating it into the post-World War II order would push the CCP to become a responsible global stakeholder. It has now become clear that those hopes were, at best, overly optimistic. The Communists in Beijing were never interested in joining our system. Instead, they used our efforts at engagement against us—hiding their strength and biding their time all the while investing heavily into their military and developing strategic initiatives to remake the world in their own image.

In some people's minds, we are not really in a world-defining struggle with the CCP. In fact, this year, progressive advocacy coalitions have sent Congress several open letters, essentially dismissing the genocide in Xinjiang and the CCP's ambitions for hegemony, while hyping the need for climate change cooperation as the sine qua non of our China policy. Frequently, one also reads articles to the effect that the U.S. is starting an arms race, or that we are recklessly confronting the PRC.

But the American people know that China poses a threat to the United States. Now is the time to meet the challenge head on, not debate whether it even exists.

We are in a struggle analogous to the Cold War—only with a more dangerous adversary. And we are in this struggle because the

PRC wants to displace the free world with socialism with Chinese characteristics. We cannot opt in or opt out of this struggle—thanks to the CCP's ambitions, we are in it, whether we like it or not.

THE EAGLE ACT

In the justificatory statements for the EAGLE Act in this report, the Majority does not espouse the progressive talking points that would supposedly secure peace in our time, while paving the way for PRC dominance of the global order. Instead, the Majority seems to recognize the actual scope of the challenge. But as the saying goes, the proof is in the pudding. And here, the EAGLE Act stumbles.

After decades of inaction, we need to re-evaluate the foundations of our approach towards engagement with the Chinese government. We need bold legislation that utilizes the full range of our national power to ensure that freedom will prevail in a strategic competition with the PRC that we did not start and do not want, but which we must win. I think the best way to describe this legislation is that it's timid. It is as if the Majority is unable to match its legislation to its rhetoric. Two central examples make this clear:

EXPORT CONTROLS

Our export control regime is broken. The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) at the Department of Commerce, which is responsible for enforcing our export control regime, seems bent on doing so to the minimum extent possible. Indeed, this Committee recently released data suggesting that BIS approves a majority of technology exports to Huawei.

As the world becomes increasingly connected and dependent on advanced technologies, the new struggle that the PRC is bent on waging will be won or lost in the technological sphere. And the PRC has set its sights on dominating key high-tech industries as the centerpiece of its Made in China 2025 agenda.

Export controls are one of the most powerful tools in the Foreign Affairs Committee's jurisdiction. Unfortunately, the EAGLE Act does not employ them to seriously curtail the PRC's quest for technological supremacy, nor does the legislation even shore up obvious weaknesses in our current system.

FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING

Another powerful tool within this Committee's jurisdiction is Foreign Military Financing. The Senate's Strategic Competition Act allocates significant resources to militaries in partner countries. By building the capacity of partner countries' militaries, the United States is able to ensure that those countries are better able to defend their own interests against the PRC, while also being better able to operate conjunctively with our military.

Unfortunately, the EAGLE Act drops the Senate Foreign Military Financing provisions and when Committee Republicans sought to add them back in during markup, they were rejected by the Majority. In a bill that is ostensibly meant to counter China, it is mys-

tifying why the Majority would oppose using such a central tool for supporting our allies and partners.

CLIMATE CHANGE

In addition to the EAGLE Act's central fault of not rising to the challenge, the legislation also suffers from an identity crisis. At bottom, the EAGLE Act is as much about climate change as it is about China. More money is authorized for so-called climate leadership than all other authorizations combined. Whatever one's views on climate change, climate policy is not China policy. Like any international endeavor, the U.S. could, and does, lead on global attempts to address carbon emissions. Such leadership involves efforts to coerce China's cooperation, as it is a leading producer of such emissions. To that extent, climate leadership involves China policy. But it cannot be, and should not be, the primary focus of our China policy, subsuming all other matters, as the EAGLE act appears aimed at achieving.

The Foreign Affairs Committee could have advanced climate legislation, rather than muddy critical China policy legislation with such provisions. But despite the number of hearings that the Majority has held on the subject and its obvious importance to the Majority, they have not decided to do so. Instead, this Majority chose to brand that legislation as their China bill. By hijacking what was a bipartisan process in the Senate and replacing it with an effort to advance the foreign policy components of the Green New Deal, the EAGLE Act squanders a valuable opportunity to speak with a unified, bipartisan voice in the House on the generational challenge posed by the PRC.

CONCLUSION

When the American people, and the citizens of partnered and allied countries, read the headlines, they see a confident, ascendant PRC that is on the march toward regional hegemony and global preeminence. Now is the time to appraise this threat for what it is and demonstrate leadership that fully responds to this threat.

This legislation should have risen to meet the challenge posed by the PRC—not a challenge as we wish it to be, but as that challenge truly is. The EAGLE Act may have merits, but those merits pale in comparison to the missed opportunity of passing a strong, unified bill to address an overwhelming challenge.

STEVE CHABOT,
Ranking Member.

ADDENDUM—THE THREE JOINT COMMUNIQUES AND TAIWAN POLICY

As a founding Co-Chair of the Congressional Taiwan Caucus, I believe the Majority makes two grievous errors with respect to Taiwan policy.

First, the EAGLE Act endorses the Three Joint Communiques between the United States and the PRC. In its Taiwan policy section, it states: "It is the policy of the United States . . . to reinforce all existing United States Government commitments to Taiwan, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8), the three joint communiques, and the "Six Assurances".

It might be argued that this line is lifted directly from the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act. But ARIA, while an excellent product, was rushed through the House at the end of a session of Congress without the benefit of committee consideration where this language would have been removed.

In fact, ARIA is rather unprecedented in its apparent endorsement of the Communiques and represents one of only two operative references in public law to the Communiques since 1972. The other reference runs in the exact opposite direction and is found in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995: "the Congress makes the following declarations . . . Section 3 of the Taiwan Relations Act take primacy over statements of United States policy, including communiques, regulations, directives, and policies based thereon."

The EAGLE Act's provision appears to be an attempt to accomplish one of two possible things: either synch Congressional precedent with State Department policy; or assuage Beijing's nerves. Beijing's nerves should not get a vote in our Taiwan policy. But if it's the former, ever since President Carter switched diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing, there has been a tension between the State Department and Congress on Taiwan policy. This cuts across parties, and administrations. In fact, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) as a rebuke of the Carter Administration, and has fought for four decades with whatever administration happens to be in charge to follow the TRA as guiding law on Taiwan policy. Congress' support for Taiwan, like our broad support for human rights, keeps the executive branch at least somewhat honest. The tension has probably helped to keep Taiwan free for four decades. This tension is a feature of our system, not a bug, and it ensures that the American people's values and interests are properly represented.

Further, the way this bill's text currently reads looks like the commitments under the TRA are circumscribed by the Communiques. But the Communiques are executive agreements, while the TRA is the law. This would place an executive agreement on par with public law, something Congress, a coequal branch, should never do. Also, as executive agreements, Congress is not bound by the Communiques. As a coequal branch, we are entitled to our own views on such matters, and for forty years, we have chosen to remain pretty much silent on this particular issue—and that silence screams out that this provision does not belong in a properly written Taiwan bill.

The second major error is that the EAGLE Act discards several Taiwan-related provisions that the Senate passed on a bipartisan basis. Among the things not included: first, relaxing our self-imposed restrictions on Taiwanese personnel displaying Republic of China symbols of sovereignty; second, language that requires our government to call Taiwan's government, its government, instead of beating around the bush calling them "Taiwan authorities"; third, renaming the AIT director in Taiwan as "Representative"—the title the British give their Representative; fourth, a strategy requirement to respond to the PRC's sharp power operation against Taiwan; and fifth, a policy statement "to strenuously oppose any

action by the PRC to use force to change the status quo on Taiwan." The EAGLE Act leaves all those out.

The Majority should be commended, however, for including several bipartisan pieces of legislation on Taiwan. Specifically, these are the Taiwan Fellowship Act, which would assist U.S. government employees to go to Taiwan and work in its ministries; the Taiwan Peace and Security Act which would enhance Taiwan's deterrence vis-a-vis the PRC; and portions of the Taiwan Diplomatic Review Act, which should lead to the renaming of Taiwan's de facto embassy here. Mr. Bera and I introduced the first two pieces of legislation, and Mr. Sherman and I introduced the third. Additionally, the legislation also included Mr. Connolly and Mr. Curtis's Taiwan International Solidarity Act, of which I am an original cosponsor. These important provisions will go a long way toward strengthening our relationship with Taiwan.

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman):

TAIWAN ALLIES INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION AND ENHANCEMENT INITIATIVE (TAIPEI) ACT OF 2019

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SEC. 2. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-8) states that it is the policy of the United States "to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan".

(2) The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 states that it is the policy of the United States "to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan".

(3) Taiwan is a free, democratic, and prosperous nation of 23,000,000 people and an important contributor to peace and stability around the world.

(4) Since the election of President Tsai Ing-wen as President of Taiwan in 2016, the Government of the People's Republic of China has intensified its efforts to pressure Taiwan.

(5) Since 2016, the Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, El Salvador, the Solomon Islands, and Kiribati have severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan in favor of diplomatic relations with China.

(6) Taiwan currently maintains full diplomatic relations with 15 nations around the world.

(7) Taiwan's unique relationship with the United States, Australia, India, Japan, and other countries are of significant benefit in strengthening Taiwan's economy and preserving its international space.

(8) According to President Tsai Ing-wen, the severance of diplomatic ties with Taiwan in favor of diplomatic relations with China is "part of a series of diplomatic and military acts of coercion" by China.

(9) The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-409) states that—

(A) it is United States policy "to support the close economic, political, and security relationship between Taiwan and the United States"; and

(B) the President should—

(i) "conduct regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan that are tailored to meet the existing and likely future threats from the People's Republic of China, including supporting the efforts of Taiwan to develop and integrate asymmetric capabilities, as appropriate, including mobile, survivable, and cost-effective capabilities, into its military forces"; and

(ii) "encourage the travel of high-level United States officials to Taiwan, in accordance with the Taiwan Travel Act".

(10) United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (1971) established the representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China as the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations. The resolution did not address the issue of representation of Taiwan and its people in the United Nations or any related organizations, nor did the resolution take a position on the relationship between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan or include any statement pertaining to Taiwan's sovereignty.

(11) The United States opposes any initiative that seeks to change Taiwan's status without the consent of the people.

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SEC. 4. POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH REGARD TO TAIWAN'S PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

It should be the policy of the United States—

(1) to advocate, as appropriate—

(A) for Taiwan's membership in all international organizations in which statehood is not a requirement and in which the United States is also a participant; and

(B) for Taiwan to be granted observer status in other appropriate international organizations;

(2) to instruct, as appropriate, representatives of the United States Government in all organizations described in paragraph (1) to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to advocate for Taiwan's membership or observer status in such organizations; **[**and**]**

(3) for the President or the President's designees to advocate, as appropriate, for Taiwan's membership or observer status in all organizations described in paragraph (1) as part of any rel-

evant bilateral engagements between the United States and the People's Republic of China, including leader summits and the U.S.-China Comprehensive Economic Dialogue[.]*; and*

(4) to instruct, as appropriate, representatives of the United States Government in all organizations described in paragraph (1) to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to advocate such organizations to resist the People's Republic of China's efforts to distort the decisions, language, policies, or procedures of such organizations regarding Taiwan.

SEC. 5. STRENGTHENING OF TIES WITH TAIWAN.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States Government should—

(1) support Taiwan in strengthening its official diplomatic relationships as well as other partnerships with countries in the Indo-Pacific region and around the world;

(2) consider, in certain cases as appropriate and in alignment with United States interests, increasing its economic, security, and diplomatic engagement with nations that have demonstrably strengthened, enhanced, or upgraded relations with Taiwan; [and]

(3) consider, in certain cases as appropriate, in alignment with United States foreign policy interests and in consultation with Congress, altering its economic, security, and diplomatic engagement with nations that take serious or significant actions to undermine the security or prosperity of Taiwan[.]*; and*

(4) encourage, as appropriate, United States allies and partners to oppose the People's Republic of China's efforts to undermine Taiwan's official diplomatic relationships and its partnerships with countries with which it does not maintain diplomatic relations.

(b) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for five years, the Secretary of State shall report to the appropriate congressional committees on the steps taken in accordance with subsection (a)*, as well as information relating to any prior or ongoing attempts by the People's Republic of China to undermine Taiwan's membership or observer status in all organizations described in section (4)(1) and Taiwan's ties and relationships with other countries in accordance with subsection (a) of this section*.

(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

BETTER UTILIZATION OF INVESTMENTS LEADING TO DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 2018

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DIVISION F—BUILD ACT OF 2018

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TITLE II—AUTHORITIES

SEC. 1421. AUTHORITIES RELATING TO PROVISION OF SUPPORT.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The authorities in this title shall only be exercised to—

(1) carry out of the policy of the United States in section 1411 and the purpose of the Corporation in section 1412;

(2) mitigate risks to United States taxpayers by sharing risks with the private sector and qualifying sovereign entities through co-financing and structuring of tools; and

(3) ensure that support provided under this title is additional to private sector resources by mobilizing private capital that would otherwise not be deployed without such support.

(b) LENDING AND GUARANTIES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Corporation may make loans or guaranties upon such terms and conditions as the Corporation may determine.

(2) DENOMINATION.—Loans and guaranties issued under paragraph (1) may be denominated and repayable in United States dollars or foreign currencies. Foreign currency denominated loans and guaranties should only be provided if the Board determines there is a substantive policy rationale for such loans and guaranties.

(3) APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL CREDIT REFORM ACT OF 1990.—Loans and guaranties issued under paragraph (1) shall be subject to the requirements of the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (2 U.S.C. 661 et seq.).

(c) EQUITY INVESTMENTS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Corporation may, as a minority investor, support projects with funds or use other mechanisms for the purpose of purchasing, and may make and fund commitments to purchase, invest in, make pledges in respect of, or otherwise acquire, equity or quasi-equity securities or shares or financial interests of any entity, including as a limited partner or other investor in investment funds, upon such terms and conditions as the Corporation may determine.

(2) DENOMINATION.—Support provided under paragraph (1) may be denominated and repayable in United States dollars or foreign currency. Foreign currency denominated support provided by paragraph (1) should only be provided if the Board determines there is a substantive policy rationale for such support.

(3) GUIDELINES AND CRITERIA.—The Corporation shall develop guidelines and criteria to require that the use of the authority provided by paragraph (1) with respect to a project has a clearly defined development and foreign policy purpose, taking into account the following objectives:

(A) The support for the project would be more likely than not to substantially reduce or overcome the effect of

an identified market failure in the country in which the project is carried out.

(B) The project would not have proceeded or would have been substantially delayed without the support.

(C) The support would meaningfully contribute to transforming local conditions to promote the development of markets.

(D) The support can be shown to be aligned with commercial partner incentives.

(E) The support can be shown to have significant developmental impact and will contribute to long-term commercial sustainability.

(F) The support furthers the policy of the United States described in section 1411.

(4) LIMITATIONS ON EQUITY INVESTMENTS.—

(A) PER PROJECT LIMIT.—The aggregate amount of support provided under this subsection with respect to any project shall not exceed 30 percent of the aggregate amount of all equity investment made to the project at the time that the Corporation approves support of the project.

(B) TOTAL LIMIT.—Support provided pursuant to this subsection shall be limited to not more than 35 percent of the Corporation's aggregate exposure on the date that such support is provided.

(5) SALES AND LIQUIDATION OF POSITION.—The Corporation shall seek to sell and liquidate any support for a project provided under this subsection as soon as commercially feasible, commensurate with other similar investors in the project and taking into consideration the national security interests of the United States.

(6) TIMETABLE.—The Corporation shall create a project-specific timetable for support provided under paragraph (1).

(7) APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL CREDIT REFORM ACT OF 1990.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), support provided under paragraph (1) with respect to a project shall be considered to be a Federal credit program that is subject to the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (2 U.S.C. 661 et seq.) for purposes of applying the requirements of such Act to such support.

(B) DETERMINATION OF COST.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of section 502(5) of the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (2 U.S.C. 661a(5) et seq.) the cost of support provided under paragraph (1) with respect to a project shall be the net present value, at the time when funds are disbursed to provide the support, of the following estimated cash flows:

(I) The purchase price of the support.

(II) Dividends, redemptions, and other shareholder distributions during the term of the support.

(III) Proceeds received upon a sale, redemption, or other liquidation of the support.

(IV) Adjustments for risk of estimated losses, if any.

(ii) CHANGES IN TERMS INCLUDED.—The estimated cash flows described in subclauses (I) through (IV) of clause (i) shall include the effects of changes in terms resulting from the exercise of options included in the agreement to provide the support.

(C) REESTIMATE OF COST.—When the estimated cost of support provided under paragraph (1) with respect to a project made in a single fiscal year is reestimated in a subsequent year, the difference between the reestimated cost and the previous cost estimate shall be paid from the balances available in the Corporate Capital Account established under section 1434.

(d) INSURANCE AND REINSURANCE.—The Corporation may issue insurance or reinsurance, upon such terms and conditions as the Corporation may determine, to private sector entities and qualifying sovereign entities assuring protection of their investments in whole or in part against any or all political risks such as currency inconvertibility and transfer restrictions, expropriation, war, terrorism, civil disturbance, breach of contract, or nonhonoring of financial obligations.

(e) PROMOTION OF AND SUPPORT FOR PRIVATE INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—In order to carry out the purpose of the Corporation described in section 1412(b), the Corporation may initiate and support, through financial participation, incentive grant, or otherwise, and on such terms and conditions as the Corporation may determine, feasibility studies for the planning, development, and management of, and procurement for, potential bilateral and multilateral development projects eligible for support under this title, including training activities undertaken in connection with such projects, for the purpose of promoting investment in such projects and the identification, assessment, surveying, and promotion of private investment opportunities, utilizing wherever feasible and effective, the facilities of private investors.

(2) CONTRIBUTIONS TO COSTS.—The Corporation shall, to the maximum extent practicable, require any person receiving funds under the authorities of this subsection to—

(A) share the costs of feasibility studies and other project planning services funded under this subsection; and

(B) reimburse the Corporation those funds provided under this section, if the person succeeds in project implementation.

(f) SPECIAL PROJECTS AND PROGRAMS.—The Corporation may administer and manage special projects and programs in support of specific transactions undertaken by the Corporation, including programs of financial and advisory support that provide private technical, professional, or managerial assistance in the development of human resources, skills, technology, capital savings, or intermediate financial and investment institutions or cooperatives, and including the initiation of incentives, grants, or studies for energy,

women's economic empowerment, microenterprise households, or other small business activities.

(g) ENTERPRISE FUNDS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Corporation may, following consultation with the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the heads of other relevant departments or agencies, establish and operate enterprise funds in accordance with this subsection.

(2) PRIVATE CHARACTER OF FUNDS.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to make an enterprise fund an agency or establishment of the United States Government, or to make the officers, employees, or members of the Board of Directors of an enterprise fund officers or employees of the United States for purposes of title 5, United States Code.

(3) PURPOSES FOR WHICH SUPPORT MAY BE PROVIDED.—The Corporation, subject to the approval of the Board, may designate private, nonprofit organizations as eligible to receive support under this title for the following purposes:

(A) To promote development of economic freedom and private sectors, including small- and medium-sized enterprises and joint ventures with the United States and host country participants.

(B) To facilitate access to credit to small- and medium-sized enterprises with sound business plans in countries where there is limited means of accessing credit on market terms.

(C) To promote policies and practices conducive to economic freedom and private sector development.

(D) To attract foreign direct investment capital to further promote private sector development and economic freedom.

(E) To complement the work of the United States Agency for International Development and other donors to improve the overall business-enabling environment, financing the creation and expansion of the private business sector.

(F) To make financially sustainable investments designed to generate measurable social benefits and build technical capacity in addition to financial returns.

(4) OPERATION OF FUNDS.—

(A) EXPENDITURES.—Funds made available to an enterprise fund shall be expended at the minimum rate necessary to make timely payments for projects and activities carried out under this subsection.

(B) ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES.—Not more than 3 percent per annum of the funds made available to an enterprise fund may be obligated or expended for the administrative expenses of the enterprise fund.

(5) BOARD OF DIRECTORS.—Each enterprise fund established under this subsection should be governed by a Board of Directors comprised of private citizens of the United States or the host country, who—

(A) shall be appointed by the President after consultation with the chairmen and ranking members of the appropriate congressional committees; and

(B) have pursued careers in international business and have demonstrated expertise in international and emerging market investment activities.

(6) MAJORITY MEMBER REQUIREMENT.—The majority of the members of the Board of Directors shall be United States citizens who shall have relevant experience relating to the purposes described in paragraph (3).

(7) REPORTS.—Not later than one year after the date of the establishment of an enterprise fund under this subsection, and annually thereafter until the enterprise fund terminates in accordance with paragraph (10), the Board of Directors of the enterprise fund shall—

(A) submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report—

(i) detailing the administrative expenses of the enterprise fund during the year preceding the submission of the report;

(ii) describing the operations, activities, engagement with civil society and relevant local private sector entities, development objectives and outcomes, financial condition, and accomplishments of the enterprise fund during that year;

(iii) describing the results of any audit conducted under paragraph (8); and

(iv) describing how audits conducted under paragraph (8) are informing the operations and activities of the enterprise fund; and

(B) publish, on a publicly available internet website of the enterprise fund, each report required by subparagraph (A).

(8) OVERSIGHT.—

(A) INSPECTOR GENERAL PERFORMANCE AUDITS.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—The Inspector General of the Corporation shall conduct periodic audits of the activities of each enterprise fund established under this subsection.

(ii) CONSIDERATION.—In conducting an audit under clause (i), the Inspector General shall assess whether the activities of the enterprise fund—

(I) support the purposes described in paragraph (3);

(II) result in profitable private sector investing; and

(III) generate measurable social benefits.

(B) RECORDKEEPING REQUIREMENTS.—The Corporation shall ensure that each enterprise fund receiving support under this subsection—

(i) keeps separate accounts with respect to such support; and

(ii) maintains such records as may be reasonably necessary to facilitate effective audits under this paragraph.

(9) RETURN OF FUNDS TO TREASURY.—Any funds resulting from any liquidation, dissolution, or winding up of an enter-

prise fund, in whole or in part, shall be returned to the Treasury of the United States.

(10) TERMINATION.—The authority of an enterprise fund to provide support under this subsection shall terminate on the earlier of—

(A) the date that is 10 years after the date of the first expenditure of amounts from the enterprise fund; or

(B) the date on which the enterprise fund is liquidated.

(h) SUPERVISION OF SUPPORT.—Support provided under this title shall be subject to section 622(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2382(c)).

(i) SMALL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Corporation shall undertake, in cooperation with appropriate departments, agencies, and instrumentalities of the United States as well as private entities and others, to broaden the participation of United States small businesses and cooperatives and other small United States investors in the development of small private enterprise in less developed friendly countries or areas.

(2) OUTREACH TO MINORITY-OWNED AND WOMEN-OWNED BUSINESSES.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The Corporation shall collect data on the involvement of minority- and women-owned businesses in projects supported by the Corporation, including—

(i) the amount of insurance and financing provided by the Corporation to such businesses in connection with projects supported by the Corporation; and

(ii) to the extent such information is available, the involvement of such businesses in procurement activities conducted or supported by the Corporation.

(B) INCLUSION IN ANNUAL REPORT.—The Corporation shall include, in its annual report submitted to Congress under section 1443, the aggregate data collected under this paragraph, in such form as to quantify the effectiveness of the Corporation's outreach activities to minority- and women-owned businesses.

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TITLE III—ADMINISTRATIVE AND GENERAL PROVISIONS

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SEC. 1433. MAXIMUM CONTINGENT LIABILITY.

The maximum contingent liability of the Corporation outstanding at any one time shall not exceed in the aggregate **[**$60,000,000,000**]** *$100,000,000,000*.

SEC. 1434. CORPORATE FUNDS.

(a) CORPORATE CAPITAL ACCOUNT.—There is established in the Treasury of the United States a fund to be known as the "Corporate Capital Account" to carry out the purposes of the Corporation.

(b) FUNDING.—The Corporate Capital Account shall consist of—

(1) fees charged and collected pursuant to subsection (c);

(2) any amounts received pursuant to subsection (e);

(3) investments and returns on such investments pursuant to subsection (g);

(4) unexpended balances transferred to the Corporation pursuant to subsection (i);

(5) payments received in connection with settlements of all insurance and reinsurance claims of the Corporation; [and]

(6) receipts of reestimated costs received pursuant to section 1421(c); and

[(6)] *(7)* all other collections transferred to or earned by the Corporation, excluding the cost, as defined in section 502 of the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (2 U.S.C. 661a), of loans and loan guaranties.

(c) FEE AUTHORITY.—Fees may be charged and collected for providing services in amounts to be determined by the Corporation.

(d) USES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to Acts making appropriations, the Corporation is authorized to pay—

(A) the cost, as defined in section 502 of the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, of loans and loan guaranties;

(B) administrative expenses of the Corporation;

(C) for the cost of providing support authorized by subsections (c), (e), (f), and (g) of section 1421;

(D) project-specific transaction costs.

(2) INCOME AND REVENUE.—In order to carry out the purposes of the Corporation, all collections transferred to or earned by the Corporation, excluding the cost, as defined in section 502 of the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, of loans and loan guaranties, shall be deposited into the Corporate Capital Account and shall be available to carry out its purpose, including without limitation—

(A) payment of all insurance and reinsurance claims of the Corporation;

(B) repayments to the Treasury of amounts borrowed under subsection (e); and

(C) dividend payments to the Treasury under subsection (f).

(e) FULL FAITH AND CREDIT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—All support provided pursuant to predecessor authorities or title II shall continue to constitute obligations of the United States, and the full faith and credit of the United States is hereby pledged for the full payment and performance of such obligations.

(2) AUTHORITY TO BORROW.—The Corporation is authorized to borrow from the Treasury such sums as may be necessary to fulfill such obligations of the United States and any such borrowing shall be at a rate determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, taking into consideration the current average market yields on outstanding marketable obligations of the United States of comparable maturities, for a period jointly determined by the Corporation and the Secretary, and subject to such terms and conditions as the Secretary may require.

(f) DIVIDENDS.—The Board, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, shall annually assess a dividend payment to the Treasury if the Corporation's insurance portfolio is more than 100 percent reserved.

(g) INVESTMENT AUTHORITY.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Corporation may request the Secretary of the Treasury to invest such portion of the Corporate Capital Account as is not, in the Corporation's judgment, required to meet the current needs of the Corporate Capital Account.

(2) FORM OF INVESTMENTS.—Such investments shall be made by the Secretary of the Treasury in public debt obligations, with maturities suitable to the needs of the Corporate Capital Account, as determined by the Corporation, and bearing interest at rates determined by the Secretary, taking into consideration current market yields on outstanding marketable obligations of the United States of comparable maturities.

(h) COLLECTIONS.—Interest earnings made pursuant to subsection (g), earnings collected related to equity investments, and amounts, excluding fees related to insurance or reinsurance, collected pursuant to subsection (c), shall not be collected for any fiscal year except to the extent provided in advance in appropriations Acts.

(i) TRANSFER FROM PREDECESSOR AGENCIES AND PROGRAMS.—By the end of the transition period described in title VI, the unexpended balances, assets, and responsibilities of any agency specified in the plan required by section 1462 shall be transferred to the Corporation.

(j) TRANSFER OF FUNDS.—In order to carry out this division, funds authorized to be appropriated to carry out the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) may be transferred to the Corporation and funds authorized to be appropriated to the Corporation may be transferred to the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development.

(k) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term "project-specific transaction costs"—

(1) means those costs incurred by the Corporation for travel, legal expenses, and direct and indirect costs incurred in claims settlements associated with the provision of support under title II and shall not be considered administrative expenses for the purposes of this section; and

(2) does not include information technology (as such term is defined in section 11101 of title 40, United States Code).

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NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017

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DIVISION A—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS

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TITLE XII—MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN NATIONS

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Subtitle H—Other Matters

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SEC. 1287. GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall establish within the Department of State a Global Engagement Center (in this section referred to as the "Center").

(2) PURPOSE.—The purpose of the Center shall be to direct, lead, synchronize, integrate, and coordinate efforts of the Federal Government to recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign state and foreign non-state propaganda and disinformation efforts aimed at undermining or influencing the policies, security, or stability of the United States and United States allies and partner nations.

(b) FUNCTIONS.—The Center shall carry out the following functions:

(1) Direct, lead, synchronize, integrate, and coordinate interagency and international efforts to track and evaluate counterfactual narratives abroad that threaten the policies, security, or stability of the United States and United States allies and partner nations.

(2) Analyze relevant information, data, analysis, and analytics from United States Government agencies, United States allies and partner nations, think tanks, academic institutions, civil society groups, and other nongovernmental organizations.

(3) As needed, support the development and dissemination of fact-based narratives and analysis to counter propaganda and disinformation directed at the United States and United States allies and partner nations.

(4) Identify current and emerging trends in foreign propaganda and disinformation in order to coordinate and shape the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures to expose and refute foreign propaganda and disinformation, and pro-actively support the promotion of credible, fact-based narratives and policies to audiences outside the United States.

(5) Facilitate the use of a wide range of technologies and techniques by sharing expertise among Federal departments

and agencies, seeking expertise from external sources, and implementing best practices.

(6) Measure and evaluate the activities of the Center, including the outcomes of such activities, and implement mechanisms to ensure that the activities of the Center are updated to reflect the results of such measurement and evaluation.

(7) Identify gaps in United States capabilities in areas relevant to the purpose of the Center and recommend necessary enhancements or changes.

(8) Use information from appropriate interagency entities to identify the countries, geographic areas, and populations most susceptible to propaganda and disinformation, as well as the countries, geographic areas, and populations in which such propaganda and disinformation is likely to cause the most harm.

(9) Administer the information access fund established pursuant to subsection (f).

(10) Coordinate with United States allies and partner nations in order to amplify the Center's efforts and avoid duplication.

(11) Maintain, collect, use, and disseminate records (as such term is defined in section 552a(a)(4) of title 5, United States Code) for research and data analysis of foreign state and non-state propaganda and disinformation efforts and communications related to public diplomacy efforts intended for foreign audiences. Such research and data analysis shall be reasonably tailored to meet the purposes of this paragraph and shall be carried out with due regard for privacy and civil liberties guidance and oversight.

(c) HEAD OF CENTER.—

(1) APPOINTMENT.—The head of the Center shall be an individual who is an official of the Federal Government, who shall be appointed by the President.

(2) COMPLIANCE WITH PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LAWS.—The President shall designate a senior official to develop guidance for the Center relating to relevant privacy and civil liberties laws and to ensure compliance with such guidance.

(d) EMPLOYEES OF THE CENTER.—

(1) DETAILEES AND ASSIGNEES.—Any Federal Government employee may be detailed or assigned to the Center with or without reimbursement, consistent with applicable laws and regulations regarding such employee, and such detail or assignment shall be without interruption or loss of status or privilege.

(2) TEMPORARY PERSONNEL.—The Secretary of State should, when hiring temporary United States citizen personnel, preference the use of Foreign Service limited appointments both in the United States and abroad in accordance with section 309 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 3949). The Secretary may hire United States citizens or aliens, as appropriate, including as personal services contractors, for purposes of personnel resources of the Center, if—

(A) the Secretary determines that existing personnel resources or expertise are insufficient;

(B) the period in which services are provided by a personal services contractor, including options, does not exceed 3 years, unless the Secretary determines that exceptional circumstances justify an extension of up to one additional year;

(C) not more than 50 United States citizens or aliens are employed as personal services contractors under the authority of this paragraph at any time; and

(D) the authority of this paragraph is only used to obtain specialized skills or experience or to respond to urgent needs.

(e) TRANSFER OF AMOUNTS AUTHORIZED.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—For each of fiscal years 2019 and 2020, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to transfer, from amounts appropriated to the Secretary pursuant to the authorization under this Act, to the Secretary of State not more than $60,000,000, to carry out the functions of the Center.

(2) NOTICE REQUIREMENT.—The Secretary of Defense shall notify the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of Representatives of a proposed transfer under paragraph (1) not less than 15 days prior to making such transfer.

(3) INAPPLICABILITY OF REPROGRAMMING REQUIREMENTS.—The authority to transfer amounts under paragraph (1) shall not be subject to any reprogramming requirement under any other provision of law.

(f) INFORMATION ACCESS FUND.—

(1) AUTHORITY FOR GRANTS.—The Center is authorized to provide grants or contracts of financial support to civil society groups, media content providers, nongovernmental organizations, federally funded research and development centers, private companies, or academic institutions for the following purposes:

(A) To support local entities and linkages among such entities, including independent media entities, that are best positioned to refute foreign propaganda and disinformation in affected communities.

(B) To collect and store examples of print, online, and social media disinformation and propaganda directed at the United States or United States allies and partner nations.

(C) To analyze and report on tactics, techniques, and procedures of foreign information warfare and other efforts with respect to disinformation and propaganda.

(D) To support efforts by the Center to counter efforts by foreign entities to use disinformation and propaganda to undermine or influence the policies, security, and social and political stability of the United States and United States allies and partner nations.

(2) FUNDING AVAILABILITY AND LIMITATIONS.—The Secretary of State shall provide that each entity that receives funds under this subsection is selected in accordance with the rel-

evant existing regulations through a process that ensures such entity has the credibility and capability to carry out effectively and in accordance with United States interests and objectives the purposes specified in paragraph (1) for which such entity received such funding.

(g) REPORTS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the date on which the Center is established, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report evaluating the success of the Center in carrying out its functions under subsection (b) and outlining steps to improve any areas of deficiency.

(2) DEFINITION.—In this subsection, the term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(h) CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFINGS.—The Secretary of State, together with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall provide a briefing to the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of Representatives not less often than annually regarding the activities of the Global Engagement Center. The briefings required under this subsection shall terminate on the date specified in subsection (j).

(i) LIMITATION.—None of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available to carry out this section shall be used for purposes other than countering foreign propaganda and misinformation that threatens United States national security.

(j) TERMINATION.—The Center shall terminate on [the date that is 8 years after the date of the enactment of this Act] *December 31, 2027*.

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ASIA REASSURANCE INITIATIVE ACT OF 2018

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TITLE II—PROMOTING UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION

SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

(a) DEFINED TERM.—In this section, the term "appropriate committees of Congress" means—

(1) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(3) the Committee on Finance of the Senate;

(4) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives;

(5) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(6) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated for the Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development, and, as appropriate, the Department of Defense, [$1,500,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023] *$2,000,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026*, which shall be used—

(1) to advance United States foreign policy interests and objectives in the Indo-Pacific region in recognition of the value of diplomatic initiatives and programs in the furtherance of United States strategy;

(2) to improve the defense capacity and resiliency of partner nations to resist coercion and deter and defend against security threats, including through foreign military financing and international military education and training programs;

(3) to conduct regular bilateral and multilateral engagements, particularly with the United States' most highly-capable allies and partners, to meet strategic challenges, including—

(A) certain destabilizing activities of the People's Republic of China; and

(B) emerging threats, such as the nuclear and ballistic missile programs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;

(4) to build new counterterrorism partnership programs in Southeast Asia to combat the growing presence of ISIS and other terrorist organizations that pose a significant threat to the United States, its allies, and its citizens' interests abroad;

(5) to help partner countries strengthen their democratic systems, with a focus on good governance;

(6) to ensure that the regulatory environments for trade, infrastructure, and investment in partner countries are transparent, open, and free of corruption;

(7) to encourage responsible natural resource management in partner countries, which is closely associated with economic growth; and

(8) to increase maritime domain awareness programs in South Asia and Southeast Asia—

(A) by expanding the scope of naval and coast guard training efforts with Southeast Asian countries;

(B) by expanding cooperation with democratic partners in South Asia, including Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka;

(C) through intelligence sharing and other information-sharing efforts; and

(D) through multilateral engagements, including by involving Japan, Australia, and India in such efforts.

(c) COUNTERING CHINA'S INFLUENCE TO UNDERMINE THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (b) shall be made available for United States Government efforts to counter the strategic influence of the People's Republic of China, in accordance with the strategy required under section 7043(e)(3) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2014 (division K of Public Law 113-76; 128 Stat. 536) and in consultation with the appropriate committees of Congress.

(d) BURMA.—None of the amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (b) may be made available for International Military Education and Training and Foreign Military Financing Programs for the armed forces of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (historically known as "Burma").

(e) PHILIPPINES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—None of the amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (b) may be made available for counternarcotics assistance for the Philippine National Police unless the Secretary of State determines and reports to the appropriate committees of Congress that the Government of the Philippines has adopted and is implementing a counternarcotics strategy that is consistent with international human rights standards, including investigating and prosecuting individuals who are credibly alleged to have ordered, committed, or covered up extrajudicial killings and other gross violations of human rights in the conduct of counternarcotics operations.

(2) EXCEPTION.—The limitation under paragraph (1) shall not apply to funds made available—

(A) for drug demand reduction, maritime programs, or transnational interdiction programs; or

(B) to support for the development of such counternarcotics strategy, after consultation with the appropriate committees of Congress.

(f) CAMBODIA.—None of the amounts authorized to be appropriated pursuant to subsection (b) may be made available for United States assistance programs that benefit the Government of Cambodia unless the Secretary of State certifies and reports to the appropriate congressional committees that the requirements under section 7043(b)(1) of division K of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (Public Law 115-141) have been met.

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SEC. 215. CYBERSECURITY COOPERATION.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that there should be robust cybersecurity cooperation between the United States and nations in the Indo-Pacific region—

(1) to effectively respond to cybersecurity threats, including state-sponsored threats;

(2) to share best practices to combat such threats;

(3) to strengthen resilience against cyberattacks, misinformation, and propaganda; and

(4) to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure.

(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated $100,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2019 through [2023] *2026* to enhance cooperation between the United States and Indo-Pacific nations for the purposes of combatting cybersecurity threats.

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TITLE III—PROMOTING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION

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SEC. 306. ENERGY PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES.

(a) INDO-PACIFIC ENERGY STRATEGY.—

(1) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following [5 years] *8 years*, the President shall establish a comprehensive, integrated, multiyear strategy to encourage the efforts of Indo-Pacific countries to implement national power strategies and cooperation with United States energy companies and the Department of Energy national laboratories to develop an appropriate mix of power solutions to provide access to sufficient, reliable, and affordable power in order to reduce poverty, drive economic growth and job creation, and to increase energy security in the Indo-Pacific region.

(2) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated $1,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2019 through [2023] *2026* to carry out paragraph (1).

(b) RELIABLE ENERGY PARTNERSHIPS.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should explore opportunities to partner with the private sector and multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, to promote universal access to reliable electricity in the Indo-Pacific region, including Myanmar (historically known as "Burma").

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TITLE IV—PROMOTING UNITED STATES VALUES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION

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SEC. 409. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

(a) PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appropriated $210,000,000, for each of the fiscal years 2019 through [2023] *2026*, to promote democracy, strengthen civil society, human rights, rule of law, transparency, and accountability in the Indo-Pacific region, including for universities, civil society, and multilateral institutions that are focusing on education awareness, training, and capacity building.

(2) DEMOCRACY IN CHINA.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be made available for United States Government efforts, led by the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, to promote democracy, the rule of law, and human rights in the People's Republic of China.

(3) TIBET.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be made available for nongovernmental organizations to support activities preserving cultural traditions and promoting sustainable development, education, and environmental conservation in Tibetan communities in the Tibet Autonomous Region and in other Tibetan communities in China, India, and Nepal.

SEC. 410. INDO-PACIFIC HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS.

(a) DEFINED TERM.—In this section, the term "human rights defenders" means individuals, working alone or in groups, who nonviolently advocate for the promotion and protection of universally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms if the advocacy of such issues may result in the risk of safety or life.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that human rights defenders in the Indo-Pacific region have been facing increased difficulties with the rise of unprecedented crackdowns and conflicts.

(c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated $1,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2019 through [2023] *2026* to provide critical assistance to human rights defenders through the Department of State's Human Rights Defenders Fund.

(d) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter through [2023] *2026*, the Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall submit a report to Congress that includes—

(1) a list and evaluation of the Human Rights Defenders Fund activities since its inception;

(2) a strategy for any increased regional engagement and measures of success for the activities described in paragraph (1); and

(3) an accounting of funds used to execute the Human Rights Defender Fund activities.

SEC. 411. YOUNG LEADERS PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE INITIATIVES.

There are authorized to be appropriated $25,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2019 through [2023] *2026* to support Indo-Pacific young leaders initiatives, including the Young Southeast Asian

Leaders Initiative, the ASEAN Youth Volunteers Program, and other people-to-people exchange programs that focus on building the capacity of democracy, human rights, and good governance activists in the Indo-Pacific region.

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FLOYD D. SPENCE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2001

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DIVISION A—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS

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TITLE XII—MATTERS RELATING TO OTHER NATIONS

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Subtitle D—Other Matters

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SEC. 1238. UNITED STATES-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION.

(a) PURPOSES.—The purposes of this section are as follows:

(1) To establish the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission to review the national security implications of trade and economic ties between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

(2) To facilitate the assumption by the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission of its duties regarding the review referred to in paragraph (1) by providing for the transfer to that Commission of staff, materials, and infrastructure (including leased premises) of the Trade Deficit Review Commission that are appropriate for the review upon the submittal of the final report of the Trade Deficit Review Commission.

(b) ESTABLISHMENT OF UNITED STATES-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—There is hereby established a commission to be known as the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission (in this section referred to as the "Commission").

(2) PURPOSE.—The purpose of the Commission is to monitor, investigate, and report to Congress on the national security implications of the bilateral trade and economic relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

(3) MEMBERSHIP.—The Commission shall be composed of 12 members, who shall be appointed in the same manner provided for the appointment of members of the Trade Deficit Review Commission under section 127(c)(3) of the Trade Deficit Review Commission Act (19 U.S.C. 2213 note), except that—

(A) appointment of members by the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be made after consultation with the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, in addition to consultation with the chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives provided for under clause (iii) of subparagraph (A) of that section;

(B) appointment of members by the President pro tempore of the Senate upon the recommendation of the majority leader of the Senate shall be made after consultation with the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, in addition to consultation with the chairman of the Committee on Finance of the Senate provided for under clause (i) of that subparagraph;

(C) appointment of members by the President pro tempore of the Senate upon the recommendation of the minority leader of the Senate shall be made after consultation with the ranking minority member of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, in addition to consultation with the ranking minority member of the Committee on Finance of the Senate provided for under clause (ii) of that subparagraph;

(D) appointment of members by the minority leader of the House of Representatives shall be made after consultation with the ranking minority member of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, in addition to consultation with the ranking minority member of the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives provided for under clause (iv) of that subparagraph;

(E) persons appointed to the Commission shall have expertise in national security matters and United States-China relations, in addition to the expertise provided for under subparagraph (B)(i)(I) of that section;

(F) each appointing authority referred to under subparagraphs (A) through (D) of this paragraph shall—

(i) appoint 3 members to the Commission;

(ii) make the appointments on a staggered term basis, such that—

(I) 1 appointment shall be for a term expiring on December 31, 2003;

(II) 1 appointment shall be for a term expiring on December 31, 2004; and

(III) 1 appointment shall be for a term expiring on December 31, 2005;

(iii) make all subsequent appointments on an approximate 2-year term basis to expire on December 31 of the applicable year; and

(iv) make appointments not later than 30 days after the date on which each new Congress convenes;

(G) members of the Commission may be reappointed for additional terms of service as members of the Commission; and

(H) members of the Trade Deficit Review Commission as of the date of the enactment of this Act shall serve as members of the Commission until such time as members are first appointed to the Commission under this paragraph.

(4) RETENTION OF SUPPORT.—The Commission shall retain and make use of such staff, materials, and infrastructure (including leased premises) of the Trade Deficit Review Commission as the Commission determines, in the judgment of the members of the Commission, are required to facilitate the ready commencement of activities of the Commission under subsection (c) or to carry out such activities after the commencement of such activities.

(5) CHAIRMAN AND VICE CHAIRMAN.—The members of the Commission shall select a Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Commission from among the members of the Commission.

(6) MEETINGS.—

(A) MEETINGS.—The Commission shall meet at the call of the Chairman of the Commission.

(B) QUORUM.—A majority of the members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business of the Commission.

(7) VOTING.—Each member of the Commission shall be entitled to one vote, which shall be equal to the vote of every other member of the Commission.

(c) DUTIES.—

(1) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than December 1 each year (beginning in 2002), the Commission shall submit to Congress a report, in both unclassified and classified form, regarding the national security implications and impact of the bilateral trade and economic relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China. The report shall include a full analysis, along with conclusions and recommendations for legislative and administrative actions, if any, of the national security implications for the United States of the trade and current balances with the People's Republic of China in goods and services, financial transactions, and technology transfers. The Commission shall also take into account patterns of trade and transfers through third countries to the extent practicable.

(2) CONTENTS OF REPORT.—Each report under paragraph (1) shall include, at a minimum, a full discussion of the following:

(A) The role of the People's Republic of China in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other weapon systems (including systems and technologies of a dual use nature), including actions the United States might take to encourage the People's Republic of China to cease such practices.

(B) The qualitative and quantitative nature of the transfer of United States production activities to the People's Republic of China, including the relocation of manufacturing, advanced technology and intellectual property, and research and development facilities, the impact of such transfers on the national security of the United States (including the dependence of the national security industrial

base of the United States on imports from China), the economic security of the United States, and employment in the United States, and the adequacy of United States export control laws in relation to the People's Republic of China.

(C) The effects of the need for energy and natural resources in the People's Republic of China on the foreign and military policies of the People's Republic of China, the impact of the large and growing economy of the People's Republic of China on world energy and natural resource supplies, prices, and the environment, and the role the United States can play (including through joint research and development efforts and technological assistance) in influencing the energy and natural resource policies of the People's Republic of China.

(D) Foreign investment by the United States in the People's Republic of China and by the People's Republic of China in the United States, including an assessment of its economic and security implications, the challenges to market access confronting potential United States investment in the People's Republic of China, and foreign activities by financial institutions in the People's Republic of China.

(E) The military plans, strategy and doctrine of the People's Republic of China, the structure and organization of the People's Republic of China military, the decision-making process of the People's Republic of China military, the interaction between the civilian and military leadership in the People's Republic of China, the development and promotion process for leaders in the People's Republic of China military, deployments of the People's Republic of China military*, including in the Indian Ocean region*, resources available to the People's Republic of China military (including the development and execution of budgets and the allocation of funds), force modernization objectives and trends for the People's Republic of China military, and the implications of such objectives and trends for the national security of the United States. *In this subparagraph, the term "Indian Ocean region" means the Indian Ocean, including the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, and the littoral areas surrounding the Indian Ocean.*

(F) The strategic economic and security implications of the cyber capabilities and operations of the People's Republic of China.

(G) The national budget, fiscal policy, monetary policy, capital controls, and currency management practices of the People's Republic of China, their impact on internal stability in the People's Republic of China, and their implications for the United States.

(H) The drivers, nature, and implications of the growing economic, technological, political, cultural, people-to-people, and security relations of the People's Republic of China's with other countries, regions, and international and regional entities (including multilateral organizations), in-

cluding the relationship among the United States, Taiwan, and the People's Republic of China.

(I) The compliance of the People's Republic of China with its commitments to the World Trade Organization, other multilateral commitments, bilateral agreements signed with the United States, commitments made to bilateral science and technology programs, and any other commitments and agreements strategic to the United States (including agreements on intellectual property rights and prison labor imports), and United States enforcement policies with respect to such agreements.

(J) The implications of restrictions on speech and access to information in the People's Republic of China for its relations with the United States in economic and security policy, as well as any potential impact of media control by the People's Republic of China on United States economic interests.

(K) The safety of food, drug, and other products imported from China, the measures used by the People's Republic of China Government and the United States Government to monitor and enforce product safety, and the role the United States can play (including through technical assistance) to improve product safety in the People's Republic of China.

(3) RECOMMENDATIONS OF REPORT.—Each report under paragraph (1) shall also include recommendations for action by Congress or the President, or both, including specific recommendations for the United States to invoke Article XXI (relating to security exceptions) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 with respect to the People's Republic of China, as a result of any adverse impact on the national security interests of the United States.

(d) HEARINGS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Commission or, at its direction, any panel or member of the Commission, may for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this section, hold hearings, sit and act at times and places, take testimony, receive evidence, and administer oaths to the extent that the Commission or any panel or member considers advisable.

(2) INFORMATION.—The Commission may secure directly from the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and any other Federal department or agency information that the Commission considers necessary to enable the Commission to carry out its duties under this section, except the provision of intelligence information to the Commission shall be made with due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters, under procedures approved by the Director of Central Intelligence.

(3) SECURITY.—The Office of Senate Security shall—

(A) provide classified storage and meeting and hearing spaces, when necessary, for the Commission; and

(B) assist members and staff of the Commission in obtaining security clearances.

(4) SECURITY CLEARANCES.—All members of the Commission and appropriate staff shall be sworn and hold appropriate security clearances.

(e) COMMISSION PERSONNEL MATTERS.—

(1) COMPENSATION OF MEMBERS.—Members of the Commission shall be compensated in the same manner provided for the compensation of members of the Trade Deficit Review Commission under section 127(g)(1) and section 127(g)(6) of the Trade Deficit Review Commission Act (19 U.S.C. 2213 note).

(2) TRAVEL EXPENSES.—Travel expenses of the Commission shall be allowed in the same manner provided for the allowance of the travel expenses of the Trade Deficit Review Commission under section 127(g)(2) of the Trade Deficit Review Commission Act.

(3) STAFF.—An executive director and other additional personnel for the Commission shall be appointed, compensated, and terminated in the same manner provided for the appointment, compensation, and termination of the executive director and other personnel of the Trade Deficit Review Commission under section 127(g)(3) and section 127(g)(6) of the Trade Deficit Review Commission Act. The executive director and any personnel who are employees of the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission shall be employees under section 2105 of title 5, United States Code, for purposes of chapters 63, 81, 83, 84, 85, 87, 89, and 90 of that title.

(4) DETAIL OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES.—Federal Government employees may be detailed to the Commission in the same manner provided for the detail of Federal Government employees to the Trade Deficit Review Commission under section 127(g)(4) of the Trade Deficit Review Commission Act.

(5) FOREIGN TRAVEL FOR OFFICIAL PURPOSES.—Foreign travel for official purposes by members and staff of the Commission may be authorized by either the Chairman or the Vice Chairman of the Commission.

(6) PROCUREMENT OF TEMPORARY AND INTERMITTENT SERVICES.—The Chairman of the Commission may procure temporary and intermittent services for the Commission in the same manner provided for the procurement of temporary and intermittent services for the Trade Deficit Review Commission under section 127(g)(5) of the Trade Deficit Review Commission Act.

(f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appropriated to the Commission for fiscal year 2001, and for each fiscal year thereafter, such sums as may be necessary to enable the Commission to carry out its functions under this section.

(2) AVAILABILITY.—Amounts appropriated to the Commission shall remain available until expended.

(g) APPLICABILITY OF FACA.—The provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall apply to the activities of the Commission.

(h) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This section shall take effect on the first day of the 107th Congress.

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ELECTRIFY AFRICA ACT OF 2015

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SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

It is the policy of the United States to partner, consult, and coordinate with the governments of sub-Saharan African countries, international financial institutions, and African regional economic communities, cooperatives, and the private sector, in a concerted effort to—

(1) promote first-time access to power and power services for at least 50,000,000 people in sub-Saharan Africa by 2020 in both urban and rural areas;

(2) encourage the installation of at least 20,000 additional megawatts of electrical power in sub-Saharan Africa by 2020 using a broad mix of energy options to help reduce poverty, promote sustainable development, and drive inclusive economic growth;

(3) promote non-discriminatory reliable, affordable, and sustainable power in urban areas (including small urban areas) to promote economic growth and job creation;

(4) promote policies to facilitate public-private partnerships to provide non-discriminatory reliable, sustainable, and affordable electrical service to rural and underserved populations;

(5) encourage the necessary in-country reforms, including facilitating public-private partnerships specifically to support electricity access projects to make such expansion of power access possible;

(6) promote reforms of power production, delivery, and pricing, as well as regulatory reforms and transparency, to support long-term, market-based power generation and distribution;

(7) promote policies to displace kerosene lighting with other technologies;

(8) promote an all-of-the-above energy development strategy for sub-Saharan Africa that includes the use of oil, natural gas, coal, hydroelectric, wind, solar, and geothermal power, and other sources of energy; [and]

(9) promote and increase the use of private financing and seek ways to remove barriers to private financing and assistance for projects, including through charitable organizations[.]*;*

(10) advance United States foreign policy and development goals by assisting African countries to reduce their dependence on energy resources from countries that use energy dependence for undue political influence, such as the Russian Federation or the People's Republic of China, which have used energy and financial resources to influence other countries;

(11) promote the energy security of allies and partners of the United States by encouraging the development of accessible,

transparent, and competitive energy markets that provide diversified sources and reliable, affordable, and sustainable power;

(12) encourage United States public and private sector investment in African energy infrastructure projects to bridge the gap between energy security requirements and commercial demand in a way that is consistent with the region's capacity; and

(13) help facilitate the export of United States energy resources, technology, and expertise to global markets in a way that benefits the energy security of allies and partners of the United States, including in Africa.

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NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020

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DIVISION C—DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY AUTHORIZATIONS AND OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS

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TITLE XXXV—MARITIME MATTERS

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Subtitle C—Maritime SAFE Act

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PART II—ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON IUU FISHING

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SEC. 3553. REPORTS.

Not later than 5 years after the submission of the 5-year integrated strategic plan under section 3552, and 5 years after, the Working Group shall submit a report to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the Senate, the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Natural Resources of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives that contains—

(1) a summary of global and regional trends in IUU fishing;

(2) an assessment of the extent of the convergence between transnational organized illegal activity, including human trafficking and forced labor, and IUU fishing;

(3) an assessment of the topics, data sources, and strategies that would benefit from increased information sharing and recommendations regarding harmonization of data collection and sharing;

(4) an assessment of assets, including military assets and intelligence, which can be used for either enforcement operations or strategies to combat IUU fishing;

(5) summaries of the situational threats with respect to IUU fishing in priority regions and an assessment of the capacity of countries within such regions to respond to those threats;

(6) an assessment of the progress of countries in priority regions in responding to those threats as a result of assistance by the United States pursuant to the strategic plan developed under section 3552, including—

(A) the identification of—

(i) relevant supply routes, ports of call, methods of landing and entering illegally caught product into legal supply chains, and financial institutions used in each country by participants engaging in IUU fishing; and

(ii) indicators of IUU fishing that are related to money laundering;

(B) an assessment of the adherence to, or progress toward adoption of, international treaties related to IUU fishing, including the Port State Measures Agreement, by countries in priority regions;

(C) an assessment of the implementation by countries in priority regions of seafood traceability or capacity to apply traceability to verify the legality of catch and strengthen fisheries management;

(D) an assessment of the capacity of countries in priority regions to implement shiprider agreements;

(E) an assessment of the capacity of countries in priority regions to increase maritime domain awareness; and

(F) an assessment of the capacity of governments of relevant countries in priority regions to sustain the programs for which the United States has provided assistance under this subtitle;

(7) an assessment of the capacity of priority flag states to track the movement of and police their fleet, prevent their flagged vessels from engaging in IUU fishing, and enforce applicable laws and regulations; [and]

(8) an assessment of gaps or limitations in the ability of the United States to effectively assist priority regions and priority flag states relating to IUU fishing due to resource constraints and the additional resources necessary to overcome those constraints; and

[(8)] *(9)* an assessment of the extent of involvement in IUU fishing of organizations designated as foreign terrorist organi-

zations under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189).

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PUBLIC LAW 116-77

AN ACT To prohibit the commercial export of covered munitions items to the Hong Kong Police Force.

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SEC. 3. SUNSET.

The prohibition under section 2 shall expire [on December 31, 2021.] *on the date on which the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that—*

(1) the Secretary of State has, on or after the date of the enactment of this paragraph, certified under section 205 of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 that Hong Kong warrants treatment under United States law in the same manner as United States laws were applied to Hong Kong before July 1, 1997;

(2) the Hong Kong Police have not engaged in gross violations of human rights during the 1-year period ending on the date of such certification; and

(3) there has been an independent examination of human rights concerns related to the crowd control tactics of the Hong Kong Police and the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region has adequately addressed those concerns.

SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

TITLE I—REGULATION OF SECURITIES EXCHANGES

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PERIODICAL AND OTHER REPORTS

SEC. 13. (a) Every issuer of a security registered pursuant to section 12 of this title shall file with the Commission, in accordance with such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate for the proper protection of investors and to insure fair dealing in the security—

(1) such information and documents (and such copies thereof) as the Commission shall require to keep reasonably current the information and documents required to be included in or filed with an application or registration statement filed pursuant to section 12, except that the Commission may not require the filing of any material contract wholly executed before July 1, 1962.

(2) such annual reports (and such copies thereof), certified if required by the rules and regulations of the Commission by independent public accountants, and such quarterly reports (and such copies thereof), as the Commission may prescribe.

Every issuer of a security registered on a national securities exchange shall also file a duplicate original of such information, docu-

ments, and reports with the exchange. In any registration statement, periodic report, or other reports to be filed with the Commission, an emerging growth company need not present selected financial data in accordance with section 229.301 of title 17, Code of Federal Regulations, for any period prior to the earliest audited period presented in connection with its first registration statement that became effective under this Act or the Securities Act of 1933 and, with respect to any such statement or reports, an emerging growth company may not be required to comply with any new or revised financial accounting standard until such date that a company that is not an issuer (as defined under section 2(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7201(a))) is required to comply with such new or revised accounting standard, if such standard applies to companies that are not issuers.

(b)(1) The Commission may prescribe, in regard to reports made pursuant to this title, the form or forms in which the required information shall be set forth, the items or details to be shown in the balance sheet and the earnings statement, and the methods to be followed in the preparation of reports, in the appraisal or valuation of assets and liabilities, in the determination of depreciation and depletion, in the differentiation of recurring and nonrecurring income, in the differentiation of investment and operating income, and in the preparation, where the Commission deems it necessary or desirable, of separate and/or consolidated balance sheets or income accounts of any person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by the issuer, or any person under direct or indirect common control with the issuer; but in the case of the reports of any person whose methods of accounting are prescribed under the provisions of any law of the United States, or any rule or regulation thereunder, the rules and regulations of the Commission with respect to reports shall not be inconsistent with the requirements imposed by such law or rule or regulation in respect of the same subject matter (except that such rules and regulations of the Commission may be inconsistent with such requirements to the extent that the Commission determines that the public interest or the protection of investors so requires).

(2) Every issuer which has a class of securities registered pursuant to section 12 of this title and every issuer which is required to file reports pursuant to section 15(d) of this title shall—

(A) make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer;

(B) devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that—

(i) transactions are executed in accordance with management's general or specific authorization;

(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any other criteria applicable to such statements, and (II) to maintain accountability for assets;

(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management's general or specific authorization; and

(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any differences; and

(C) notwithstanding any other provision of law, pay the allocable share of such issuer of a reasonable annual accounting support fee or fees, determined in accordance with section 109 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.

(3)(A) With respect to matters concerning the national security of the United States, no duty or liability under paragraph (2) of this subsection shall be imposed upon any person acting in cooperation with the head of any Federal department or agency responsible for such matters if such act in cooperation with such head of a department or agency was done upon the specific, written directive of the head of such department or agency pursuant to Presidential authority to issue such directives. Each directive issued under this paragraph shall set forth the specific facts and circumstances with respect to which the provisions of this paragraph are to be invoked. Each such directive shall, unless renewed in writing, expire one year after the date of issuance.

(B) Each head of a Federal department or agency of the United States who issues a directive pursuant to this paragraph shall maintain a complete file of all such directives and shall, on October 1 of each year, transmit a summary of matters covered by such directives in force at any time during the previous year to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

(4) No criminal liability shall be imposed for failing to comply with the requirements of paragraph (2) of this subsection except as provided in paragraph (5) of this subsection.

(5) No person shall knowingly circumvent or knowingly fail to implement a system of internal accounting controls or knowingly falsify any book, record, or account described in paragraph (2).

(6) Where an issuer which has a class of securities registered pursuant to section 12 of this title or an issuer which is required to file reports pursuant to section 15(d) of this title holds 50 per centum or less of the voting power with respect to a domestic or foreign firm, the provisions of paragraph (2) require only that the issuer proceed in good faith to use its influence, to the extent reasonable under the issuer's circumstances, to cause such domestic or foreign firm to devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls consistent with paragraph (2). Such circumstances include the relative degree of the issuer's ownership of the domestic or foreign firm and the laws and practices governing the business operations of the country in which such firm is located. An issuer which demonstrates good faith efforts to use such influence shall be conclusively presumed to have complied with the requirements of paragraph (2).

(7) For the purpose of paragraph (2) of this subsection, the terms "reasonable assurances" and "reasonable detail" mean such level of detail and degree of assurance as would satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of their own affairs.

(c) If in the judgment of the Commission any report required under subsection (a) is inapplicable to any specified class or classes of issuers, the Commission shall require in lieu thereof the submis-

sion of such reports of comparable character as it may deem applicable to such class or classes of issuers.

(d)(1) Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly the beneficial ownership of any equity security of a class which is registered pursuant to section 12 of this title, or any equity security of an insurance company which would have been required to be so registered except for the exemption contained in section 12(g)(2)(G) of this title, or any equity security issued by a closed-end investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 or any equity security issued by a Native Corporation pursuant to section 37(d)(6) of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, or otherwise becomes or is deemed to become a beneficial owner of any of the foregoing upon the purchase or sale of a security-based swap that the Commission may define by rule, and is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 5 per centum of such class shall, within ten days after such acquisition or within such shorter time as the Commission may establish by rule, file with the Commission, a statement containing such of the following information, and such additional information, as the Commission may by rules and regulations, prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors—

(A) the background, and identity, residence, and citizenship of, and the nature of such beneficial ownership by, such person and all other persons by whom or on whose behalf the purchases have been or are to be effected;

(B) the source and amount of the funds or other consideration used or to be used in making the purchases, and if any part of the purchase price is represented or is to be represented by funds or other consideration borrowed or otherwise obtained for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or trading such security, a description of the transaction and the names of the parties thereto, except that where a source of funds is a loan made in the ordinary course of business by a bank, as defined in section 3(a)(6) of this title, if the person filing such statement so requests, the name of the bank shall not be made available to the public;

(C) if the purpose of the purchases or prospective purchases is to acquire control of the business of the issuer of the securities any plans or proposals which such persons may have to liquidate such issuer, to sell its assets to or merge it with any other persons, or to make any other major change in its business or corporate structure;

(D) the number of shares of such security which are beneficially owned, and the number of shares concerning which there is a right to acquire, directly or indirectly, by (i) such person, and (ii) by each associate of such person, giving the background, identity, residence, and citizenship of each such associate; and

(E) information as to any contracts, arrangements, or understandings with any person with respect to any securities of the issuer, including but not limited to transfer of any of the securities, joint ventures, loan or option arrangements, puts or calls, guaranties of loans, guaranties against loss or guaranties of profits, division of losses or profits, or the giving or with-

holding of proxies, naming the persons with whom such contracts, arrangements, or understandings have been entered into, and giving the details thereof.

(2) If any material change occurs in the facts set forth in the statement filed with the Commission, an amendment shall be filed with the Commission, in accordance with such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.

(3) When two or more persons act as a partnership, limited partnership, syndicate, or other group for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities of an issuer, such syndicate or group shall be deemed a "person" for the purposes of this subsection.

(4) In determining, for purposes of this subsection, any percentage of a class of any security, such class shall be deemed to consist of the amount of the outstanding securities of such class, exclusive of any securities of such class held by or for the account of the issuer or a subsidiary of the issuer.

(5) The Commission, by rule or regulation or by order, may permit any person to file in lieu of the statement required by paragraph (1) of this subsection or the rules and regulations thereunder, a notice stating the name of such person, the number of shares of any equity securities subject to paragraph (1) which are owned by him, the date of their acquisition and such other information as the Commission may specify, if it appears to the Commission that such securities were acquired by such person in the ordinary course of his business and were not acquired for the purpose of and do not have the effect of changing or influencing the control of the issuer nor in connection with or as a participant in any transaction having such purpose or effect.

(6) The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to—

(A) any acquisition or offer to acquire securities made or proposed to be made by means of a registration statement under the Securities Act of 1933;

(B) any acquisition of the beneficial ownership of a security which, together with all other acquisitions by the same person of securities of the same class during the preceding twelve months, does not exceed 2 per centum of that class;

(C) any acquisition of an equity security by the issuer of such security;

(D) any acquisition or proposed acquisition of a security which the Commission, by rules or regulations or by order, shall exempt from the provisions of this subsection as not entered into for the purpose of, and not having the effect of, changing or influencing the control of the issuer or otherwise as not comprehended within the purposes of this subsection.

(e)(1) It shall be unlawful for an issuer which has a class of equity securities registered pursuant to section 12 of this title, or which is a closed-end investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, to purchase any equity security issued by it if such purchase is in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission, in the public interest or for the protection of investors, may adopt (A) to define acts and practices which are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative, and (B) to pre-

scribe means reasonably designed to prevent such acts and practices. Such rules and regulations may require such issuer to provide holders of equity securities of such class with such information relating to the reasons for such purchase, the source of funds, the number of shares to be purchased, the price to be paid for such securities, the method of purchase, and such additional information, as the Commission deems necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, or which the Commission deems to be material to a determination whether such security should be sold.

(2) For the purpose of this subsection, a purchase by or for the issuer or any person controlling, controlled by, or under common control with the issuer, or a purchase subject to control of the issuer or any such person, shall be deemed to be a purchase by the issuer. The Commission shall have power to make rules and regulations implementing this paragraph in the public interest and for the protection of investors, including exemptive rules and regulations covering situations in which the Commission deems it unnecessary or inappropriate that a purchase of the type described in this paragraph shall be deemed to be a purchase by the issuer for purposes of some or all of the provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection.

(3) At the time of filing such statement as the Commission may require by rule pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, the person making the filing shall pay to the Commission a fee at a rate that, subject to paragraph (4), is equal to $92 per $1,000,000 of the value of securities proposed to be purchased. The fee shall be reduced with respect to securities in an amount equal to any fee paid with respect to any securities issued in connection with the proposed transaction under section 6(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, or the fee paid under that section shall be reduced in an amount equal to the fee paid to the Commission in connection with such transaction under this paragraph.

(4) ANNUAL ADJUSTMENT.—For each fiscal year, the Commission shall by order adjust the rate required by paragraph (3) for such fiscal year to a rate that is equal to the rate (expressed in dollars per million) that is applicable under section 6(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 for such fiscal year.

(5) FEE COLLECTIONS.—Fees collected pursuant to this subsection for fiscal year 2012 and each fiscal year thereafter shall be deposited and credited as general revenue of the Treasury and shall not be available for obligation.

(6) EFFECTIVE DATE; PUBLICATION.—In exercising its authority under this subsection, the Commission shall not be required to comply with the provisions of section 553 of title 5, United States Code. An adjusted rate prescribed under paragraph (4) shall be published and take effect in accordance with section 6(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77f(b)).

(7) PRO RATA APPLICATION.—The rates per $1,000,000 required by this subsection shall be applied pro rata to amounts and balances of less than $1,000,000.

(f)(1) Every institutional investment manager which uses the mails, or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce in the course of its business as an institutional investment manager

and which exercises investment discretion with respect to accounts holding equity securities of a class described in section 13(d)(1) of this title having an aggregate fair market value on the last trading day in any of the preceding twelve months of at least $100,000,000 or such lesser amount (but in no case less than $10,000,000) as the Commission, by rule, may determine, shall file reports with the Commission in such form, for such periods, and at such times after the end of such periods as the Commission, by rule, may prescribe, but in no event shall such reports be filed for periods longer than one year or shorter than one quarter. Such reports shall include for each such equity security held on the last day of the reporting period by accounts (in aggregate or by type as the Commission, by rule, may prescribe) with respect to which the institutional investment manager exercises investment discretion (other than securities held in amounts which the Commission, by rule, determines to be insignificant for purposes of this subsection), the name of the issuer and the title, class, CUSIP number, number of shares or principal amount, and aggregate fair market value of each such security. Such reports may also include for accounts (in aggregate or by type) with respect to which the institutional investment manager exercises investment discretion such of the following information as the Commission, by rule, prescribes—

(A) the name of the issuer and the title, class, CUSIP number, number of shares or principal amount, and aggregate fair market value or cost or amortized cost of each other security (other than an exempted security) held on the last day of the reporting period by such accounts;

(B) the aggregate fair market value or cost or amortized cost of exempted securities (in aggregate or by class) held on the last day of the reporting period by such accounts;

(C) the number of shares of each equity security of a class described in section 13(d)(1) of this title held on the last day of the reporting period by such accounts with respect to which the institutional investment manager possesses sole or shared authority to exercise the voting rights evidenced by such securities;

(D) the aggregate purchases and aggregate sales during the reporting period of each security (other than an exempted security) effected by or for such accounts; and

(E) with respect to any transaction or series of transactions having a market value of at least $500,000 or such other amount as the Commission, by rule, may determine, effected during the reporting period by or for such accounts in any equity security of a class described in section 13(d)(1) of this title—

(i) the name of the issuer and the title, class, and CUSIP number of the security;

(ii) the number of shares or principal amount of the security involved in the transaction;

(iii) whether the transaction was a purchase or sale;

(iv) the per share price or prices at which the transaction was effected;

(v) the date or dates of the transaction;

(vi) the date or dates of the settlement of the transaction;

(vii) the broker or dealer through whom the transaction was effected;

(viii) the market or markets in which the transaction was effected; and

(ix) such other related information as the Commission, by rule, may prescribe.

(2) The Commission shall prescribe rules providing for the public disclosure of the name of the issuer and the title, class, CUSIP number, aggregate amount of the number of short sales of each security, and any additional information determined by the Commission following the end of the reporting period. At a minimum, such public disclosure shall occur every month.

(3) The Commission, by rule or order, may exempt, conditionally or unconditionally, any institutional investment manager or security or any class of institutional investment managers or securities from any or all of the provisions of this subsection or the rules thereunder.

(4) The Commission shall make available to the public for a reasonable fee a list of all equity securities of a class described in section 13(d)(1) of this title, updated no less frequently than reports are required to be filed pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection. The Commission shall tabulate the information contained in any report filed pursuant to this subsection in a manner which will, in the view of the Commission, maximize the usefulness of the information to other Federal and State authorities and the public. Promptly after the filing of any such report, the Commission shall make the information contained therein conveniently available to the public for a reasonable fee in such form as the Commission, by rule, may prescribe, except that the Commission, as it determines to be necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, may delay or prevent public disclosure of any such information in accordance with section 552 of title 5, United States Code. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, any such information identifying the securities held by the account of a natural person or an estate or trust (other than a business trust or investment company) shall not be disclosed to the public.

(5) In exercising its authority under this subsection, the Commission shall determine (and so state) that its action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of investors or to maintain fair and orderly markets or, in granting an exemption, that its action is consistent with the protection of investors and the purposes of this subsection. In exercising such authority the Commission shall take such steps as are within its power, including consulting with the Comptroller General of the United States, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the appropriate regulatory agencies, Federal and State authorities which, directly or indirectly, require reports from institutional investment managers of information substantially similar to that called for by this subsection, national securities exchanges, and registered securities associations, (A) to achieve uniform, centralized reporting of information concerning the securities holdings of and transactions by or for accounts with respect to which institu-

tional investment managers exercise investment discretion, and (B) consistently with the objective set forth in the preceding subparagraph, to avoid unnecessarily duplicative reporting by, and minimize the compliance burden on, institutional investment managers. Federal authorities which, directly or indirectly, require reports from institutional investment managers of information substantially similar to that called for by this subsection shall cooperate with the Commission in the performance of its responsibilities under the preceding sentence. An institutional investment manager which is a bank, the deposits of which are insured in accordance with the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, shall file with the appropriate regulatory agency a copy of every report filed with the Commission pursuant to this subsection.

(6)(A) For purposes of this subsection the term "institutional investment manager" includes any person, other than a natural person, investing in or buying and selling securities for its own account, and any person exercising investment discretion with respect to the account of any other person.

(B) The Commission shall adopt such rules as it deems necessary or appropriate to prevent duplicative reporting pursuant to this subsection by two or more institutional investment managers exercising investment discretion with respect to the same amount.

(g)(1) Any person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 5 per centum of any security of a class described in subsection (d)(1) of this section or otherwise becomes or is deemed to become a beneficial owner of any security of a class described in subsection (d)(1) upon the purchase or sale of a security-based swap that the Commission may define by ruleshall file with the Commission a statement setting forth, in such form and at such time as the Commission may, by rule, prescribe—

(A) such person's identity, residence, and citizenship; and

(B) the number and description of the shares in which such person has an interest and the nature of such interest.

(2) If any material change occurs in the facts set forth in the statement filed with the Commission, an amendment shall be filed with the Commission, in accordance with such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.

(3) When two or more persons act as a partnership, limited partnership, syndicate, or other group for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities of an issuer, such syndicate or group shall be deemed a "person" for the purposes of this subsection.

(4) In determining, for purposes of this subsection, any percentage of a class of any security, such class shall be deemed to consist of the amount of the outstanding securities of such class, exclusive of any securities of such class held by or for the account of the issuer or a subsidiary of the issuer.

(5) In exercising its authority under this subsection, the Commission shall take such steps as it deems necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors (A) to achieve centralized reporting of information regarding ownership, (B) to avoid unnecessarily duplicative reporting by and minimize the compliance burden on persons required to report, and (C) to tabulate

and promptly make available the information contained in any report filed pursuant to this subsection in a manner which will, in the view of the Commission, maximize the usefulness of the information to other Federal and State agencies and the public.

(6) The Commission may, by rule or order, exempt, in whole or in part, any person or class of persons from any or all of the reporting requirements of this subsection as it deems necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.

(h) LARGE TRADER REPORTING.—

(1) IDENTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR LARGE TRADERS.—For the purpose of monitoring the impact on the securities markets of securities transactions involving a substantial volume or a large fair market value or exercise value and for the purpose of otherwise assisting the Commission in the enforcement of this title, each large trader shall—

(A) provide such information to the Commission as the Commission may by rule or regulation prescribe as necessary or appropriate, identifying such large trader and all accounts in or through which such large trader effects such transactions; and

(B) identify, in accordance with such rules or regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate, to any registered broker or dealer by or through whom such large trader directly or indirectly effects securities transactions, such large trader and all accounts directly or indirectly maintained with such broker or dealer by such large trader in or through which such transactions are effected.

(2) RECORDKEEPING AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR BROKERS AND DEALERS.—Every registered broker or dealer shall make and keep for prescribed periods such records as the Commission by rule or regulation prescribes as necessary or appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of this title, with respect to securities transactions that equal or exceed the reporting activity level effected directly or indirectly by or through such registered broker or dealer of or for any person that such broker or dealer knows is a large trader, or any person that such broker or dealer has reason to know is a large trader on the basis of transactions in securities effected by or through such broker or dealer. Such records shall be available for reporting to the Commission, or any self-regulatory organization that the Commission shall designate to receive such reports, on the morning of the day following the day the transactions were effected, and shall be reported to the Commission or a self-regulatory organization designated by the Commission immediately upon request by the Commission or such a self-regulatory organization. Such records and reports shall be in a format and transmitted in a manner prescribed by the Commission (including, but not limited to, machine readable form).

(3) AGGREGATION RULES.—The Commission may prescribe rules or regulations governing the manner in which transactions and accounts shall be aggregated for the purpose of

this subsection, including aggregation on the basis of common ownership or control.

(4) EXAMINATION OF BROKER AND DEALER RECORDS.—All records required to be made and kept by registered brokers and dealers pursuant to this subsection with respect to transactions effected by large traders are subject at any time, or from time to time, to such reasonable periodic, special, or other examinations by representatives of the Commission as the Commission deems necessary or appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of this title.

(5) FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN COMMISSION ACTIONS.—In exercising its authority under this subsection, the Commission shall take into account—

(A) existing reporting systems;

(B) the costs associated with maintaining information with respect to transactions effected by large traders and reporting such information to the Commission or self-regulatory organizations; and

(C) the relationship between the United States and international securities markets.

(6) EXEMPTIONS.—The Commission, by rule, regulation, or order, consistent with the purposes of this title, may exempt any person or class of persons or any transaction or class of transactions, either conditionally or upon specified terms and conditions or for stated periods, from the operation of this subsection, and the rules and regulations thereunder.

(7) AUTHORITY OF COMMISSION TO LIMIT DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Commission shall not be compelled to disclose any information required to be kept or reported under this subsection. Nothing in this subsection shall authorize the Commission to withhold information from Congress, or prevent the Commission from complying with a request for information from any other Federal department or agency requesting information for purposes within the scope of its jurisdiction, or complying with an order of a court of the United States in an action brought by the United States or the Commission. For purposes of section 552 of title 5, United States Code, this subsection shall be considered a statute described in subsection (b)(3)(B) of such section 552.

(8) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this subsection—

(A) the term "large trader" means every person who, for his own account or an account for which he exercises investment discretion, effects transactions for the purchase or sale of any publicly traded security or securities by use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of a national securities exchange, directly or indirectly by or through a registered broker or dealer in an aggregate amount equal to or in excess of the identifying activity level;

(B) the term "publicly traded security" means any equity security (including an option on individual equity securities, and an option on a group or index of such securities)

listed, or admitted to unlisted trading privileges, on a national securities exchange, or quoted in an automated interdealer quotation system;

(C) the term "identifying activity level" means transactions in publicly traded securities at or above a level of volume, fair market value, or exercise value as shall be fixed from time to time by the Commission by rule or regulation, specifying the time interval during which such transactions shall be aggregated;

(D) the term "reporting activity level" means transactions in publicly traded securities at or above a level of volume, fair market value, or exercise value as shall be fixed from time to time by the Commission by rule, regulation, or order, specifying the time interval during which such transactions shall be aggregated; and

(E) the term "person" has the meaning given in section 3(a)(9) of this title and also includes two or more persons acting as a partnership, limited partnership, syndicate, or other group, but does not include a foreign central bank.

(i) ACCURACY OF FINANCIAL REPORTS.—Each financial report that contains financial statements, and that is required to be prepared in accordance with (or reconciled to) generally accepted accounting principles under this title and filed with the Commission shall reflect all material correcting adjustments that have been identified by a registered public accounting firm in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and the rules and regulations of the Commission.

(j) OFF-BALANCE SHEET TRANSACTIONS.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Commission shall issue final rules providing that each annual and quarterly financial report required to be filed with the Commission shall disclose all material off-balance sheet transactions, arrangements, obligations (including contingent obligations), and other relationships of the issuer with unconsolidated entities or other persons, that may have a material current or future effect on financial condition, changes in financial condition, results of operations, liquidity, capital expenditures, capital resources, or significant components of revenues or expenses.

(k) PROHIBITION ON PERSONAL LOANS TO EXECUTIVES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—It shall be unlawful for any issuer (as defined in section 2 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002), directly or indirectly, including through any subsidiary, to extend or maintain credit, to arrange for the extension of credit, or to renew an extension of credit, in the form of a personal loan to or for any director or executive officer (or equivalent thereof) of that issuer. An extension of credit maintained by the issuer on the date of enactment of this subsection shall not be subject to the provisions of this subsection, provided that there is no material modification to any term of any such extension of credit or any renewal of any such extension of credit on or after that date of enactment.

(2) LIMITATION.—Paragraph (1) does not preclude any home improvement and manufactured home loans (as that term is defined in section 5 of the Home Owners' Loan Act (12 U.S.C.

1464)), consumer credit (as defined in section 103 of the Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. 1602)), or any extension of credit under an open end credit plan (as defined in section 103 of the Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. 1602)), or a charge card (as defined in section 127(c)(4)(e) of the Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. 1637(c)(4)(e)), or any extension of credit by a broker or dealer registered under section 15 of this title to an employee of that broker or dealer to buy, trade, or carry securities, that is permitted under rules or regulations of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System pursuant to section 7 of this title (other than an extension of credit that would be used to purchase the stock of that issuer), that is—

(A) made or provided in the ordinary course of the consumer credit business of such issuer;

(B) of a type that is generally made available by such issuer to the public; and

(C) made by such issuer on market terms, or terms that are no more favorable than those offered by the issuer to the general public for such extensions of credit.

(3) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION FOR CERTAIN LOANS.—Paragraph (1) does not apply to any loan made or maintained by an insured depository institution (as defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813)), if the loan is subject to the insider lending restrictions of section 22(h) of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 375b).

(l) REAL TIME ISSUER DISCLOSURES.—Each issuer reporting under section 13(a) or 15(d) shall disclose to the public on a rapid and current basis such additional information concerning material changes in the financial condition or operations of the issuer, in plain English, which may include trend and qualitative information and graphic presentations, as the Commission determines, by rule, is necessary or useful for the protection of investors and in the public interest.

(m) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF SECURITY-BASED SWAP TRANSACTION DATA.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—

(A) DEFINITION OF REAL-TIME PUBLIC REPORTING.—In this paragraph, the term "real-time public reporting" means to report data relating to a security-based swap transaction, including price and volume, as soon as technologically practicable after the time at which the security-based swap transaction has been executed.

(B) PURPOSE.—The purpose of this subsection is to authorize the Commission to make security-based swap transaction and pricing data available to the public in such form and at such times as the Commission determines appropriate to enhance price discovery.

(C) GENERAL RULE.—The Commission is authorized to provide by rule for the public availability of security-based swap transaction, volume, and pricing data as follows:

(i) With respect to those security-based swaps that are subject to the mandatory clearing requirement described in section 3C(a)(1) (including those security-based swaps that are excepted from the requirement

pursuant to section 3C(g)), the Commission shall require real-time public reporting for such transactions.

(ii) With respect to those security-based swaps that are not subject to the mandatory clearing requirement described in section 3C(a)(1), but are cleared at a registered clearing agency, the Commission shall require real-time public reporting for such transactions.

(iii) With respect to security-based swaps that are not cleared at a registered clearing agency and which are reported to a security-based swap data repository or the Commission under section 3C(a)(6), the Commission shall require real-time public reporting for such transactions, in a manner that does not disclose the business transactions and market positions of any person.

(iv) With respect to security-based swaps that are determined to be required to be cleared under section 3C(b) but are not cleared, the Commission shall require real-time public reporting for such transactions.

(D) REGISTERED ENTITIES AND PUBLIC REPORTING.—The Commission may require registered entities to publicly disseminate the security-based swap transaction and pricing data required to be reported under this paragraph.

(E) RULEMAKING REQUIRED.—With respect to the rule providing for the public availability of transaction and pricing data for security-based swaps described in clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (C), the rule promulgated by the Commission shall contain provisions—

(i) to ensure such information does not identify the participants;

(ii) to specify the criteria for determining what constitutes a large notional security-based swap transaction (block trade) for particular markets and contracts;

(iii) to specify the appropriate time delay for reporting large notional security-based swap transactions (block trades) to the public; and

(iv) that take into account whether the public disclosure will materially reduce market liquidity.

(F) TIMELINESS OF REPORTING.—Parties to a security-based swap (including agents of the parties to a security-based swap) shall be responsible for reporting security-based swap transaction information to the appropriate registered entity in a timely manner as may be prescribed by the Commission.

(G) REPORTING OF SWAPS TO REGISTERED SECURITY-BASED SWAP DATA REPOSITORIES.—Each security-based swap (whether cleared or uncleared) shall be reported to a registered security-based swap data repository.

(H) REGISTRATION OF CLEARING AGENCIES.—A clearing agency may register as a security-based swap data repository.

(2) SEMIANNUAL AND ANNUAL PUBLIC REPORTING OF AGGREGATE SECURITY-BASED SWAP DATA.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—In accordance with subparagraph (B), the Commission shall issue a written report on a semi-annual and annual basis to make available to the public information relating to—

(i) the trading and clearing in the major security-based swap categories; and

(ii) the market participants and developments in new products.

(B) USE; CONSULTATION.—In preparing a report under subparagraph (A), the Commission shall—

(i) use information from security-based swap data repositories and clearing agencies; and

(ii) consult with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Bank for International Settlements, and such other regulatory bodies as may be necessary.

(C) AUTHORITY OF COMMISSION.—The Commission may, by rule, regulation, or order, delegate the public reporting responsibilities of the Commission under this paragraph in accordance with such terms and conditions as the Commission determines to be appropriate and in the public interest.

(n) SECURITY-BASED SWAP DATA REPOSITORIES.—

(1) REGISTRATION REQUIREMENT.—It shall be unlawful for any person, unless registered with the Commission, directly or indirectly, to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce to perform the functions of a security-based swap data repository.

(2) INSPECTION AND EXAMINATION.—Each registered security-based swap data repository shall be subject to inspection and examination by any representative of the Commission.

(3) COMPLIANCE WITH CORE PRINCIPLES.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—To be registered, and maintain registration, as a security-based swap data repository, the security-based swap data repository shall comply with—

(i) the requirements and core principles described in this subsection; and

(ii) any requirement that the Commission may impose by rule or regulation.

(B) REASONABLE DISCRETION OF SECURITY-BASED SWAP DATA REPOSITORY.—Unless otherwise determined by the Commission, by rule or regulation, a security-based swap data repository described in subparagraph (A) shall have reasonable discretion in establishing the manner in which the security-based swap data repository complies with the core principles described in this subsection.

(4) STANDARD SETTING.—

(A) DATA IDENTIFICATION.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—In accordance with clause (ii), the Commission shall prescribe standards that specify the data elements for each security-based swap that shall be collected and maintained by each registered security-based swap data repository.

(ii) REQUIREMENT.—In carrying out clause (i), the Commission shall prescribe consistent data element

standards applicable to registered entities and reporting counterparties.

(B) DATA COLLECTION AND MAINTENANCE.—The Commission shall prescribe data collection and data maintenance standards for security-based swap data repositories.

(C) COMPARABILITY.—The standards prescribed by the Commission under this subsection shall be comparable to the data standards imposed by the Commission on clearing agencies in connection with their clearing of security-based swaps.

(5) DUTIES.—A security-based swap data repository shall—

(A) accept data prescribed by the Commission for each security-based swap under subsection (b);

(B) confirm with both counterparties to the security-based swap the accuracy of the data that was submitted;

(C) maintain the data described in subparagraph (A) in such form, in such manner, and for such period as may be required by the Commission;

(D)(i) provide direct electronic access to the Commission (or any designee of the Commission, including another registered entity); and

(ii) provide the information described in subparagraph (A) in such form and at such frequency as the Commission may require to comply with the public reporting requirements set forth in subsection (m);

(E) at the direction of the Commission, establish automated systems for monitoring, screening, and analyzing security-based swap data;

(F) maintain the privacy of any and all security-based swap transaction information that the security-based swap data repository receives from a security-based swap dealer, counterparty, or any other registered entity; and

(G) on a confidential basis pursuant to section 24, upon request, and after notifying the Commission of the request, make available security-based swap data obtained by the security-based swap data repository, including individual counterparty trade and position data, to—

(i) each appropriate prudential regulator;

(ii) the Financial Stability Oversight Council;

(iii) the Commodity Futures Trading Commission;

(iv) the Department of Justice; and

(v) any other person that the Commission determines to be appropriate, including—

(I) foreign financial supervisors (including foreign futures authorities);

(II) foreign central banks;

(III) foreign ministries; and

(IV) other foreign authorities.

(H) CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT.—Before the security-based swap data repository may share information with any entity described in subparagraph (G), the security-based swap data repository shall receive a written agreement from each entity stating that the entity shall abide by the confidentiality requirements described in section 24

relating to the information on security-based swap transactions that is provided.

(6) DESIGNATION OF CHIEF COMPLIANCE OFFICER.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Each security-based swap data repository shall designate an individual to serve as a chief compliance officer.

(B) DUTIES.—The chief compliance officer shall—

(i) report directly to the board or to the senior officer of the security-based swap data repository;

(ii) review the compliance of the security-based swap data repository with respect to the requirements and core principles described in this subsection;

(iii) in consultation with the board of the security-based swap data repository, a body performing a function similar to the board of the security-based swap data repository, or the senior officer of the security-based swap data repository, resolve any conflicts of interest that may arise;

(iv) be responsible for administering each policy and procedure that is required to be established pursuant to this section;

(v) ensure compliance with this title (including regulations) relating to agreements, contracts, or transactions, including each rule prescribed by the Commission under this section;

(vi) establish procedures for the remediation of noncompliance issues identified by the chief compliance officer through any—

(I) compliance office review;

(II) look-back;

(III) internal or external audit finding;

(IV) self-reported error; or

(V) validated complaint; and

(vii) establish and follow appropriate procedures for the handling, management response, remediation, retesting, and closing of noncompliance issues.

(C) ANNUAL REPORTS.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—In accordance with rules prescribed by the Commission, the chief compliance officer shall annually prepare and sign a report that contains a description of—

(I) the compliance of the security-based swap data repository of the chief compliance officer with respect to this title (including regulations); and

(II) each policy and procedure of the security-based swap data repository of the chief compliance officer (including the code of ethics and conflict of interest policies of the security-based swap data repository).

(ii) REQUIREMENTS.—A compliance report under clause (i) shall—

(I) accompany each appropriate financial report of the security-based swap data repository that is

required to be furnished to the Commission pursuant to this section; and

(II) include a certification that, under penalty of law, the compliance report is accurate and complete.

(7) CORE PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO SECURITY-BASED SWAP DATA REPOSITORIES.—

(A) ANTITRUST CONSIDERATIONS.—Unless necessary or appropriate to achieve the purposes of this title, the swap data repository shall not—

(i) adopt any rule or take any action that results in any unreasonable restraint of trade; or

(ii) impose any material anticompetitive burden on the trading, clearing, or reporting of transactions.

(B) GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS.—Each security-based swap data repository shall establish governance arrangements that are transparent—

(i) to fulfill public interest requirements; and

(ii) to support the objectives of the Federal Government, owners, and participants.

(C) CONFLICTS OF INTEREST.—Each security-based swap data repository shall—

(i) establish and enforce rules to minimize conflicts of interest in the decision-making process of the security-based swap data repository; and

(ii) establish a process for resolving any conflicts of interest described in clause (i).

(D) ADDITIONAL DUTIES DEVELOPED BY COMMISSION.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—The Commission may develop 1 or more additional duties applicable to security-based swap data repositories.

(ii) CONSIDERATION OF EVOLVING STANDARDS.—In developing additional duties under subparagraph (A), the Commission may take into consideration any evolving standard of the United States or the international community.

(iii) ADDITIONAL DUTIES FOR COMMISSION DESIGNEES.—The Commission shall establish additional duties for any registrant described in section 13(m)(2)(C) in order to minimize conflicts of interest, protect data, ensure compliance, and guarantee the safety and security of the security-based swap data repository.

(8) REQUIRED REGISTRATION FOR SECURITY-BASED SWAP DATA REPOSITORIES.—Any person that is required to be registered as a security-based swap data repository under this subsection shall register with the Commission, regardless of whether that person is also licensed under the Commodity Exchange Act as a swap data repository.

(9) RULES.—The Commission shall adopt rules governing persons that are registered under this subsection.

(o) BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP.—For purposes ofthis section and section 16, a person shall be deemed to acquire beneficialownership of an equity security based on the purchase or sale of asecurity-based

swap, only to the extent that the Commission, by rule,determines after consultation with the prudential regulators and the Secretaryof the Treasury, that the purchase or sale of the security-based swap, or classof security-based swap, provides incidents of ownership comparable to directownership of the equity security, and that it is necessary to achieve thepurposes of this section that the purchase or sale of the security-based swaps,or class of security-based swap, be deemed the acquisition of beneficialownership of the equitysecurity.

(p) DISCLOSURES RELATING TO CONFLICT MINERALS ORIGINATING IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO.—

(1) REGULATIONS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this subsection, the Commission shall promulgate regulations requiring any person described in paragraph (2) to disclose annually, beginning with the person's first full fiscal year that begins after the date of promulgation of such regulations, whether conflict minerals that are necessary as described in paragraph (2)(B), in the year for which such reporting is required, did originate in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or an adjoining country and, in cases in which such conflict minerals did originate in any such country, submit to the Commission a report that includes, with respect to the period covered by the report—

(i) a description of the measures taken by the person to exercise due diligence on the source and chain of custody of such minerals, which measures shall include an independent private sector audit of such report submitted through the Commission that is conducted in accordance with standards established by the Comptroller General of the United States, in accordance with rules promulgated by the Commission, in consultation with the Secretary of State; and

(ii) a description of the products manufactured or contracted to be manufactured that are not DRC conflict free ("DRC conflict free" is defined to mean the products that do not contain minerals that directly or indirectly finance or benefit armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or an adjoining country), the entity that conducted the independent private sector audit in accordance with clause (i), the facilities used to process the conflict minerals, the country of origin of the conflict minerals, and the efforts to determine the mine or location of origin with the greatest possible specificity.

(B) CERTIFICATION.—The person submitting a report under subparagraph (A) shall certify the audit described in clause (i) of such subparagraph that is included in such report. Such a certified audit shall constitute a critical component of due diligence in establishing the source and chain of custody of such minerals.

(C) UNRELIABLE DETERMINATION.—If a report required to be submitted by a person under subparagraph (A) relies on

a determination of an independent private sector audit, as described under subparagraph (A)(i), or other due diligence processes previously determined by the Commission to be unreliable, the report shall not satisfy the requirements of the regulations promulgated under subparagraph (A)(i).

(D) DRC CONFLICT FREE.—For purposes of this paragraph, a product may be labeled as "DRC conflict free" if the product does not contain conflict minerals that directly or indirectly finance or benefit armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or an adjoining country.

(E) INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC.—Each person described under paragraph (2) shall make available to the public on the Internet website of such person the information disclosed by such person under subparagraph (A).

(2) PERSON DESCRIBED.—A person is described in this paragraph if—

(A) the person is required to file reports with the Commission pursuant to paragraph (1)(A); and

(B) conflict minerals are necessary to the functionality or production of a product manufactured by such person.

(3) REVISIONS AND WAIVERS.—The Commission shall revise or temporarily waive the requirements described in paragraph (1) if the President transmits to the Commission a determination that—

(A) such revision or waiver is in the national security interest of the United States and the President includes the reasons therefor; and

(B) establishes a date, not later than 2 years after the initial publication of such exemption, on which such exemption shall expire.

(4) TERMINATION OF DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS.—The requirements of paragraph (1) shall terminate on the date on which the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees, but in no case earlier than the date that is one day after the end of the 5-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this subsection, that no armed groups continue to be directly involved and benefitting from commercial activity involving conflict minerals.

(5) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this subsection, the terms "adjoining country", "appropriate congressional committees", "armed group", and "conflict mineral" have the meaning given those terms under section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.

(q) DISCLOSURE OF PAYMENTS BY RESOURCE EXTRACTION ISSUERS.—

(1) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection—

(A) the term "commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals" includes exploration, extraction, processing, export, and other significant actions relating to oil, natural gas, or minerals, or the acquisition of a license for any such activity, as determined by the Commission;

(B) the term "foreign government" means a foreign government, a department, agency, or instrumentality of a

foreign government, or a company owned by a foreign government, as determined by the Commission;

(C) the term "payment"—

(i) means a payment that is—

(I) made to further the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals; and

(II) not de minimis; and

(ii) includes taxes, royalties, fees (including license fees), production entitlements, bonuses, and other material benefits, that the Commission, consistent with the guidelines of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (to the extent practicable), determines are part of the commonly recognized revenue stream for the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals;

(D) the term "resource extraction issuer" means an issuer that—

(i) is required to file an annual report with the Commission; and

(ii) engages in the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals;

(E) the term "interactive data format" means an electronic data format in which pieces of information are identified using an interactive data standard; and

(F) the term "interactive data standard" means standardized list of electronic tags that mark information included in the annual report of a resource extraction issuer.

(2) DISCLOSURE.—

(A) INFORMATION REQUIRED.—Not later than 270 days after the date of enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the Commission shall issue final rules that require each resource extraction issuer to include in an annual report of the resource extraction issuer information relating to any payment made by the resource extraction issuer, a subsidiary of the resource extraction issuer, or an entity under the control of the resource extraction issuer to a foreign government or the Federal Government for the purpose of the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals, including—

(i) the type and total amount of such payments made for each project of the resource extraction issuer relating to the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals; and

(ii) the type and total amount of such payments made to each government.

(B) CONSULTATION IN RULEMAKING.—In issuing rules under subparagraph (A), the Commission may consult with any agency or entity that the Commission determines is relevant.

(C) INTERACTIVE DATA FORMAT.—The rules issued under subparagraph (A) shall require that the information included in the annual report of a resource extraction issuer be submitted in an interactive data format.

(D) INTERACTIVE DATA STANDARD.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—The rules issued under subparagraph (A) shall establish an interactive data standard for the information included in the annual report of a resource extraction issuer.

(ii) ELECTRONIC TAGS.—The interactive data standard shall include electronic tags that identify, for any payments made by a resource extraction issuer to a foreign government or the Federal Government—

(I) the total amounts of the payments, by category;

(II) the currency used to make the payments;

(III) the financial period in which the payments were made;

(IV) the business segment of the resource extraction issuer that made the payments;

(V) the government that received the payments, and the country in which the government is located;

(VI) the project of the resource extraction issuer to which the payments relate; and

(VII) such other information as the Commission may determine is necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.

(E) INTERNATIONAL TRANSPARENCY EFFORTS.—To the extent practicable, the rules issued under subparagraph (A) shall support the commitment of the Federal Government to international transparency promotion efforts relating to the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals.

(F) EFFECTIVE DATE.—With respect to each resource extraction issuer, the final rules issued under subparagraph (A) shall take effect on the date on which the resource extraction issuer is required to submit an annual report relating to the fiscal year of the resource extraction issuer that ends not earlier than 1 year after the date on which the Commission issues final rules under subparagraph (A).

(3) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—To the extent practicable, the Commission shall make available online, to the public, a compilation of the information required to be submitted under the rules issued under paragraph (2)(A).

(B) OTHER INFORMATION.—Nothing in this paragraph shall require the Commission to make available online information other than the information required to be submitted under the rules issued under paragraph (2)(A).

(4) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated to the Commission such sums as may be necessary to carry out this subsection.

(r) DISCLOSURE OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES RELATING TO IRAN.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Each issuer required to file an annual or quarterly report under subsection (a) shall disclose in that report the information required by paragraph (2) if, during the period covered by the report, the issuer or any affiliate of the issuer—

(A) knowingly engaged in an activity described in subsection (a) or (b) of section 5 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note);

(B) knowingly engaged in an activity described in subsection (c)(2) of section 104 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513) or a transaction described in subsection (d)(1) of that section;

(C) knowingly engaged in an activity described in section 105A(b)(2) of that Act; or

(D) knowingly conducted any transaction or dealing with—

(i) any person the property and interests in property of which are blocked pursuant to Executive Order No. 13224 (66 Fed. Reg. 49079; relating to blocking property and prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism);

(ii) any person the property and interests in property of which are blocked pursuant to Executive Order No. 13382 (70 Fed. Reg. 38567; relating to blocking of property of weapons of mass destruction proliferators and their supporters); or

(iii) any person or entity identified under section 560.304 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (relating to the definition of the Government of Iran) without the specific authorization of a Federal department or agency.

(2) INFORMATION REQUIRED.—If an issuer or an affiliate of the issuer has engaged in any activity described in paragraph (1), the issuer shall disclose a detailed description of each such activity, including—

(A) the nature and extent of the activity;

(B) the gross revenues and net profits, if any, attributable to the activity; and

(C) whether the issuer or the affiliate of the issuer (as the case may be) intends to continue the activity.

(3) NOTICE OF DISCLOSURES.—If an issuer reports under paragraph (1) that the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer has knowingly engaged in any activity described in that paragraph, the issuer shall separately file with the Commission, concurrently with the annual or quarterly report under subsection (a), a notice that the disclosure of that activity has been included in that annual or quarterly report that identifies the issuer and contains the information required by paragraph (2).

(4) PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION.—Upon receiving a notice under paragraph (3) that an annual or quarterly report includes a disclosure of an activity described in paragraph (1), the Commission shall promptly—

(A) transmit the report to—

(i) the President;

(ii) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives; and

(iii) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and

(B) make the information provided in the disclosure and the notice available to the public by posting the information on the Internet website of the Commission.

(5) INVESTIGATIONS.—Upon receiving a report under paragraph (4) that includes a disclosure of an activity described in paragraph (1) (other than an activity described in subparagraph (D)(iii) of that paragraph), the President shall—

(A) initiate an investigation into the possible imposition of sanctions under the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note), section 104 or 105A of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, an Executive order specified in clause (i) or (ii) of paragraph (1)(D), or any other provision of law relating to the imposition of sanctions with respect to Iran, as applicable; and

(B) not later than 180 days after initiating such an investigation, make a determination with respect to whether sanctions should be imposed with respect to the issuer or the affiliate of the issuer (as the case may be).

(6) SUNSET.—The provisions of this subsection shall terminate on the date that is 30 days after the date on which the President makes the certification described in section 401(a) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8551(a)).

(s) DISCLOSURE OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES RELATING TO THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Each issuer required to file an annual or quarterly report under subsection (a) shall disclose in that report the information required by paragraph (2) if, during the period covered by the report, the issuer or any affiliate of the issuer—

(A) knowingly engaged in an activity with an entity or the affiliate of an entity engaged in creating or providing technology or other assistance to create mass population surveillance systems in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (commonly referred to as "Xinjiang" or "XUAR") of China, including any entity included on the Department of Commerce's "Entity List" in the XUAR;

(B) knowingly engaged in an activity with an entity or an affiliate of an entity building and running detention facilities for Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other members of Muslim minority groups in the XUAR;

(C) knowingly engaged in an activity with an entity or an affiliate of an entity described in section 306(e)(3)(A)(i) of the Ensuring American Global Leadership and Engagement Act, including—

(i) any entity engaged in the "pairing-assistance" program which subsidizes the establishment of manufacturing facilities in the XUAR; or

(ii) any entity for which the Department of Homeland Security has issued a "Withhold Release Order" under

section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307); or

(D) knowingly conducted any transaction or had dealings with—

(i) any person the property and interests in property of which were sanctioned by the Secretary of State for the detention or abuse of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, or other members of Muslim minority groups in the XUAR;

(ii) any person the property and interests in property of which are sanctioned pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 2656 note); or

(iii) any person or entity responsible for, or complicit in, committing atrocities in the XUAR.

(2) INFORMATION REQUIRED.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—If an issuer described under paragraph (1) or an affiliate of the issuer has engaged in any activity described in paragraph (1), the information required by this paragraph is a detailed description of each such activity, including—

(i) the nature and extent of the activity;

(ii) the gross revenues and net profits, if any, attributable to the activity; and

(iii) whether the issuer or the affiliate of the issuer (as the case may be) intends to continue the activity.

(B) EXCEPTION.—The requirement to disclose information under this paragraph shall not include information on activities of the issuer or any affiliate of the issuer activities relating to—

(i) the import of manufactured goods, including electronics, food products, textiles, shoes, and teas, that originated in the XUAR; or

(ii) manufactured goods containing materials that originated or are sourced in the XUAR.

(3) NOTICE OF DISCLOSURES.—If an issuer reports under paragraph (1) that the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer has knowingly engaged in any activity described in that paragraph, the issuer shall separately file with the Commission, concurrently with the annual or quarterly report under subsection (a), a notice that the disclosure of that activity has been included in that annual or quarterly report that identifies the issuer and contains the information required by paragraph (2).

(4) PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION.—Upon receiving a notice under paragraph (3) that an annual or quarterly report includes a disclosure of an activity described in paragraph (1), the Commission shall promptly—

(A) transmit the report to—

(i) the President;

(ii) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives; and

(iii) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and

(B) make the information provided in the disclosure and the notice available to the public by posting the information on the Internet website of the Commission.

(5) INVESTIGATIONS.—Upon receiving a report under paragraph (4) that includes a disclosure of an activity described in paragraph (1), the President shall—

(A) make a determination with respect to whether any investigation is needed into the possible imposition of sanctions under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 2656 note) or section 306(f) of the Ensuring American Global Leadership and Engagement Act or whether criminal investigations are warranted under statutes intended to hold accountable individuals or entities involved in the importation of goods produced by forced labor, including under section 545, 1589, or 1761 of title 18, United States Code; and

(B) not later than 180 days after initiating any such investigation, make a determination with respect to whether a sanction should be imposed or criminal investigations initiated with respect to the issuer or the affiliate of the issuer (as the case may be).

(6) ATROCITIES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term "atrocities" has the meaning given the term in section 6(2) of the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–441; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note).

[Effective 180 days after the date of enactment (pursuant to paragraph (4) of section 306(g)), section 306(g)(2) of H.R. 3524 (as reported) amends section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by adding at the end a new subsection (s) (shown above). Paragraph (3) of such section 306(g) of H.R. 3524 (as reported) provides for a repeal of subsection (s) of section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as added by section 306(g)(2) of H.R. 3524 (as reported), which states "on the earlier of—(A) the date that is eight years after the date of the enactment of this Act; or (B) the date on which the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees a determination that the Government of the People's Republic of China has ended mass internment, forced labor, and any other gross violations of human rights experienced by Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority groups in the XUAR".]

[(s) DISCLOSURE OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES RELATING TO THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.—

[(1) IN GENERAL.—Each issuer required to file an annual or quarterly report under subsection (a) shall disclose in that report the information required by paragraph (2) if, during the period covered by the report, the issuer or any affiliate of the issuer—

[(A) knowingly engaged in an activity with an entity or the affiliate of an entity engaged in creating or providing technology or other assistance to create mass population surveillance systems in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous

Region (commonly referred to as "Xinjiang" or "XUAR") of China, including any entity included on the Department of Commerce's "Entity List" in the XUAR;

[(B) knowingly engaged in an activity with an entity or an affiliate of an entity building and running detention facilities for Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other members of Muslim minority groups in the XUAR;

[(C) knowingly engaged in an activity with an entity or an affiliate of an entity described in section 306(e)(3)(A)(i) of the Ensuring American Global Leadership and Engagement Act, including—

[(i) any entity engaged in the "pairing-assistance" program which subsidizes the establishment of manufacturing facilities in the XUAR; or

[(ii) any entity for which the Department of Homeland Security has issued a "Withhold Release Order" under section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307); or

[(D) knowingly conducted any transaction or had dealings with—

[(i) any person the property and interests in property of which were sanctioned by the Secretary of State for the detention or abuse of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, or other members of Muslim minority groups in the XUAR;

[(ii) any person the property and interests in property of which are sanctioned pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 2656 note); or

[(iii) any person or entity responsible for, or complicit in, committing atrocities in the XUAR.

[(2) INFORMATION REQUIRED.—

[(A) IN GENERAL.—If an issuer described under paragraph (1) or an affiliate of the issuer has engaged in any activity described in paragraph (1), the information required by this paragraph is a detailed description of each such activity, including—

[(i) the nature and extent of the activity;

[(ii) the gross revenues and net profits, if any, attributable to the activity; and

[(iii) whether the issuer or the affiliate of the issuer (as the case may be) intends to continue the activity.

[(B) EXCEPTION.—The requirement to disclose information under this paragraph shall not include information on activities of the issuer or any affiliate of the issuer activities relating to—

[(i) the import of manufactured goods, including electronics, food products, textiles, shoes, and teas, that originated in the XUAR; or

[(ii) manufactured goods containing materials that originated or are sourced in the XUAR.

[(3) NOTICE OF DISCLOSURES.—If an issuer reports under paragraph (1) that the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer has knowingly engaged in any activity described in that paragraph,

the issuer shall separately file with the Commission, concurrently with the annual or quarterly report under subsection (a), a notice that the disclosure of that activity has been included in that annual or quarterly report that identifies the issuer and contains the information required by paragraph (2).

[(4) PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION.—Upon receiving a notice under paragraph (3) that an annual or quarterly report includes a disclosure of an activity described in paragraph (1), the Commission shall promptly—

[(A) transmit the report to—

[(i) the President;

[(ii) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives; and

[(iii) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and

[(B) make the information provided in the disclosure and the notice available to the public by posting the information on the Internet website of the Commission.

[(5) INVESTIGATIONS.—Upon receiving a report under paragraph (4) that includes a disclosure of an activity described in paragraph (1), the President shall—

[(A) make a determination with respect to whether any investigation is needed into the possible imposition of sanctions under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 2656 note) or section 306(f) of the Ensuring American Global Leadership and Engagement Act or whether criminal investigations are warranted under statutes intended to hold accountable individuals or entities involved in the importation of goods produced by forced labor, including under section 545, 1589, or 1761 of title 18, United States Code; and

[(B) not later than 180 days after initiating any such investigation, make a determination with respect to whether a sanction should be imposed or criminal investigations initiated with respect to the issuer or the affiliate of the issuer (as the case may be).

[(6) ATROCITIES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term "atrocities" has the meaning given the term in section 6(2) of the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–441; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note).]

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TIBETAN POLICY ACT OF 2002

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DIVISION A—DEPARTMENT OF STATE AUTHORIZATION ACT, FISCAL YEAR 2003

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TITLE VI

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

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SUBTITLE B—TIBET POLICY

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SEC. 621. UNITED STATES SPECIAL COORDINATOR FOR TIBETAN ISSUES.

(a) UNITED STATES SPECIAL COORDINATOR FOR TIBETAN ISSUES.—There shall be within the Department a United States Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues (in this section referred to as the "Special Coordinator").

(b) RANK.—The Special Coordinator shall either be appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, or shall be an individual holding the rank of Under Secretary of State or higher.

[(b)**]** *(c)* CONSULTATION.—The Secretary shall consult with the chairmen and ranking minority members of the appropriate congressional committees prior to the designation of the Special Coordinator.

[(c)**]** *(d)* CENTRAL OBJECTIVE.—The central objective of the Special Coordinator is to promote substantive dialogue between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Dalai Lama or his representatives.

[(d)**]** *(e)* DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Special Coordinator shall—

(1) coordinate United States Government policies, programs, and projects concerning Tibet;

(2) vigorously promote the policy of seeking to protect the distinct religious, cultural, linguistic, and national identity of Tibet, and pressing for improved respect for human rights;

(3) maintain close contact with religious, cultural, and political leaders of the Tibetan people, including regular travel to Tibetan areas of the People's Republic of China, and to Tibetan refugee settlements in India and Nepal;

(4) consult with Congress on policies relevant to Tibet and the future and welfare of the Tibetan people;

(5) make efforts to establish contacts in the foreign ministries of other countries to pursue a negotiated solution for Tibet; and

(6) take all appropriate steps to ensure adequate resources, staff, and bureaucratic support to fulfill the duties and responsibilities of the Special Coordinator.

[(e)**]** *(f)* PERSONNEL.—The Secretary shall ensure that the Office of the Special Coordinator is adequately staffed at all times to assist in the management of the responsibilities of this section.

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NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017

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SEC. 2. ORGANIZATION OF ACT INTO DIVISIONS; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) DIVISIONS.—This Act is organized into five divisions as follows:

(1) Division A—Department of Defense Authorizations.

(2) Division B—Military Construction Authorizations.

(3) Division C—Department of Energy National Security Authorizations and Other Authorizations.

(4) Division D—Funding Tables.

(5) Division E—Uniform Code of Military Justice Reform.

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title.

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TITLE XII—MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN NATIONS

* * * * * * *

Subtitle F—Human Rights Sanctions

Sec. 1261. Short title.
Sec. 1262. Definitions.
Sec. 1262A. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 1263. Authorization of imposition of sanctions.
Sec. 1264. Reports to Congress.
[Sec. 1265. Sunset.]

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DIVISION A—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS

TITLE XII—MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN NATIONS

* * * * * * *

Subtitle F—Human Rights Sanctions

Sec. 1261. Short title.
Sec. 1262. Definitions.
Sec. 1262A. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 1263. Authorization of imposition of sanctions.
Sec. 1264. Reports to Congress.
[Sec. 1265. Sunset.]

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Subtitle F—Human Rights Sanctions

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SEC. 1262. DEFINITIONS.

In this subtitle:

(1) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term "foreign person" has the meaning given that term in section 595.304 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act).

[(2) GROSS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHTS.—The term "gross violations of internationally recognized human rights" has the meaning given that term in section 502B(d)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2304(d)(1)).]

(3) PERSON.—The term "person" has the meaning given that term in section 591.308 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act).

(4) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term "United States person" has the meaning given that term in section 595.315 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act).

SEC. 1262A. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that the President should establish and regularize information sharing and sanctions-related decision making with like-minded governments possessing human rights and anti-corruption sanctions programs similar in nature to those authorized under this subtitle.

SEC. 1263. AUTHORIZATION OF IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.

[(a) IN GENERAL.—The President may impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to any foreign person the President determines, based on credible evidence—

[(1) is responsible for extrajudicial killings, torture, or other gross violations of internationally recognized human rights committed against individuals in any foreign country who seek—

[(A) to expose illegal activity carried out by government officials; or

[(B) to obtain, exercise, defend, or promote internationally recognized human rights and freedoms, such as the freedoms of religion, expression, association, and assembly, and the rights to a fair trial and democratic elections;

[(2) acted as an agent of or on behalf of a foreign person in a matter relating to an activity described in paragraph (1);

[(3) is a government official, or a senior associate of such an official, that is responsible for, or complicit in, ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, acts of significant corruption, including the expropriation of private or public assets for personal gain, corruption related to government contracts or the extraction of natural resources, bribery, or the facilitation or transfer of the proceeds of corruption to foreign jurisdictions; or

[(4) has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, an activity described in paragraph (3).]

(a) IN GENERAL.—The President may impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to any foreign person that the President determines, based on credible information—

(1) is responsible for or complicit in, or has directly or indirectly engaged in, serious human rights abuse or any violation of internationally recognized human rights;

(2) is a current or former government official, or a person acting for or on behalf of such an official, who is responsible for or complicit in, or has directly or indirectly engaged in—

(A) corruption; or

(B) the transfer or facilitation of the transfer of the proceeds of corruption;

(3) is or has been a leader or official of—

(A) an entity, including a government entity, that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in, any of the activities described in subparagraph (A) or (B) related to the tenure of the leader or official; or

(B) an entity whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this section as a result of activities related to the tenure of the leader or official;

(4) has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of—

(A) an activity described in subparagraph (A) or (B) that is conducted by a foreign person;

(B) a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this section; or

(C) an entity, including a government entity, that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in, an activity described in subparagraph (A) or (B) conducted by a foreign person; or

(5) is owned or controlled by, or acts or is purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this section.

(b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions described in this subsection are the following:

(1) INADMISSIBILITY TO UNITED STATES.—In the case of a foreign person who is an individual—

(A) ineligibility to receive a visa to enter the United States or to be admitted to the United States; or

(B) if the individual has been issued a visa or other documentation, revocation, in accordance with section 221(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1201(i)), of the visa or other documentation.

(2) BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The blocking, in accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), of all transactions in all property and interests in property of a foreign person if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(B) INAPPLICABILITY OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY REQUIREMENT.—The requirements of section 202 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply for purposes of this section.

(C) EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTATION OF GOODS.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—The authority to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property under subparagraph (A) shall not include the authority to impose sanctions on the importation of goods.

(ii) GOOD.—In this subparagraph, the term "good" has the meaning given that term in section 16 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 4618) (as continued in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)).

(c) CONSIDERATION OF CERTAIN INFORMATION IN IMPOSING SANCTIONS.—In determining whether to impose sanctions under subsection (a), the President shall consider—

(1) information provided jointly by the chairperson and ranking member of each of the appropriate congressional committees; and

(2) credible information obtained by other countries and nongovernmental organizations that monitor *corruption and* violations of human rights.

(d) REQUESTS BY APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after receiving a request that meets the requirements of paragraph (2) with respect to whether a foreign person has engaged in an activity described in [subsection (a)] *subsection (a)(1)*, the President shall—

(A) determine if that person has engaged in such an activity; and

(B) submit a classified or unclassified report to the chairperson and ranking member of the committee or committees that submitted the request with respect to that determination that includes—

(i) a statement of whether or not the President imposed or intends to impose sanctions with respect to the person; and

(ii) if the President imposed or intends to impose sanctions, a description of those sanctions.

(2) REQUIREMENTS.—

(A) REQUESTS RELATING TO [HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS] *SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE OR VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHTS*.—A request under paragraph (1) with respect to whether a foreign person has engaged in an activity [described in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a)] *described in subsection (a)(1) relating to serious human rights abuse or any violation of internationally recognized human rights* shall be submitted to the President in writing jointly by the chairperson and ranking member of one of the appropriate congressional committees.

(B) REQUESTS RELATING TO CORRUPTION.—A request under paragraph (1) with respect to whether a foreign person has engaged in an activity [described in paragraph (3) or (4) of subsection (a)] *described in subsection (a)(1) relat-*

ing to corruption or the transfer or facilitation of the transfer of the proceeds of corruption shall be submitted to the President in writing jointly by the chairperson and [ranking member of—] *ranking member of one of the appropriate congressional committees.*

[(i) one of the appropriate congressional committees of the Senate; and

[(ii) one of the appropriate congressional committees of the House of Representatives.]

(e) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT AND LAW ENFORCEMENT OBJECTIVES.—Sanctions under subsection (b)(1) shall not apply to an individual if admitting the individual into the United States would further important law enforcement objectives or is necessary to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations of the United States.

(f) ENFORCEMENT OF BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.—A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of a sanction described in subsection (b)(2) that is imposed by the President or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out such a sanction shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section.

(g) TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS.—The President may terminate the application of sanctions under this section with respect to a person if the President determines and reports to the appropriate congressional committees not later than 15 days before the termination of the sanctions that—

(1) credible information exists that the person did not engage in the activity for which sanctions were imposed;

(2) the person has been prosecuted appropriately for the activity for which sanctions were imposed;

(3) the person has credibly demonstrated a significant change in behavior, has paid an appropriate consequence for the activity for which sanctions were imposed, and has credibly committed to not engage in an activity described in subsection (a) in the future; or

(4) the termination of the sanctions is in the national security interests of the United States.

(h) REGULATORY AUTHORITY.—The President shall issue such regulations, licenses, and orders as are necessary to carry out this section.

(i) IDENTIFICATION OF SANCTIONABLE FOREIGN PERSONS.—The Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs and other bureaus of the Department of State, as appropriate, is authorized to submit to the Secretary of State, for review and consideration, the names of foreign persons who may meet the criteria described in subsection (a).

(j) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(1) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Financial Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 1264. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, in accordance with subsection (b), a report that includes—

(1) a list of each foreign person with respect to which the President imposed sanctions pursuant to section 1263 during the year preceding the submission of the report;

(2) a description of the type of sanctions imposed with respect to each such person;

(3) the number of foreign persons with respect to which the President—

(A) imposed sanctions under section 1263(a) during that year; and

(B) terminated sanctions under section 1263(g) during that year;

(4) the dates on which such sanctions were imposed or terminated, as the case may be;

(5) the reasons for imposing or terminating such sanctions[; and]*;*

(6) a description of the efforts of the President to encourage the governments of other countries to impose sanctions that are similar to the sanctions authorized by section 1263[.]*;*

(7) a description of additional steps taken by the President through diplomacy, international engagement, and assistance to foreign or security sectors to address persistent underlying causes of serious human rights abuse, violations of internationally recognized human rights, and corruption in each country in which foreign persons with respect to which sanctions have been imposed under section 1263 are located; and

(8) a description of additional steps taken by the President to ensure the pursuit of judicial accountability in appropriate jurisdictions with respect to those foreign persons subject to sanctions under section 1263 for serious human rights abuse, violations of internationally recognized human rights, and corruption.

(b) DATES FOR SUBMISSION.—

(1) INITIAL REPORT.—The President shall submit the initial report under subsection (a) not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(2) SUBSEQUENT REPORTS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The President shall submit a subsequent report under subsection (a) on December 10, or the first day thereafter on which both Houses of Congress are in session, of—

(i) the calendar year in which the initial report is submitted if the initial report is submitted before December 10 of that calendar year; and

(ii) each calendar year thereafter.

(B) CONGRESSIONAL STATEMENT.—Congress notes that December 10 of each calendar year has been recognized in the United States and internationally since 1950 as "Human Rights Day".

(c) FORM OF REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Each report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(2) EXCEPTION.—The name of a foreign person to be included in the list required by subsection (a)(1) may be submitted in the classified annex authorized by paragraph (1) only if the President—

(A) determines that it is vital for the national security interests of the United States to do so;

(B) uses the annex in a manner consistent with congressional intent and the purposes of this subtitle; and

(C) not later than 15 days before submitting the name in a classified annex, provides to the appropriate congressional committees notice of, and a justification for, including the name in the classified annex despite any publicly available credible information indicating that the person engaged in an activity described in section 1263(a).

(d) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The unclassified portion of the report required by subsection (a) shall be made available to the public, including through publication in the Federal Register.

(2) NONAPPLICABILITY OF CONFIDENTIALITY REQUIREMENT WITH RESPECT TO VISA RECORDS.—The President shall publish the list required by subsection (a)(1) without regard to the requirements of section 222(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1202(f)) with respect to confidentiality of records pertaining to the issuance or refusal of visas or permits to enter the United States.

(e) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(1) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives.

[SEC. 1265. SUNSET.

[(a) IN GENERAL.—The authority to impose sanctions under this subtitle shall terminate on the date that is 6 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

[(b) CONTINUATION IN EFFECT OF SANCTIONS.—Sanctions imposed under this subtitle on or before the date specified in subsection (a), and in effect as of such date, shall remain in effect until terminated in accordance with the requirements of section 1263(g).]

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FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961

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PART I

CHAPTER 1—POLICY; DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AUTHORIZATIONS

* * * * * * *

SEC. 116. HUMAN RIGHTS.—(a) No assistance may be provided under this part to the government of any country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, including torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges, causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction and clandestine detention of those persons, or other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, and the security of person, unless such assistance will directly benefit the needy people in such country.

(b) In determining whether this standard is being met with regard to funds allocated under this part, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate or the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives may require the Administrator primarily responsible for administering part I of this Act to submit in writing information demonstrating that such assistance will directly benefit the needy people in such country, together with a detailed explanation of the assistance to be provided (including the dollar amounts of such assistance) and an explanation of how such assistance will directly benefit the needy people in such country. If either committee or either House of Congress disagrees with the Administrator's justification it may initiate action to terminate assistance to any country by a concurrent resolution under section 617 of this Act.

(b) No assistance may be provided to any government failing to take appropriate and adequate measures, within their means, to protect children from exploitation, abuse or forced conscription into military or paramilitary services.

(c) In determining whether or not a government falls within the provisions of subsection (a) and in formulating development assistance programs under this part, the Administrator shall consider, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and in consultation with the Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom—

(1) the extent of cooperation of such government in permitting an unimpeded investigation of alleged violations of internationally recognized human rights by appropriate international organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, or groups or persons acting under the authority of the United Nations or of the Organization of American States;

(2) specific actions which have been taken by the President or the Congress relating to multilateral or security assistance to a less developed country because of the human rights practices or policies of such country; and

(3) whether the government—

(A) has engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom, as defined in section 3 of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998; or

(B) has failed to undertake serious and sustained efforts to combat particularly severe violations of religious freedom (as defined in section 3 of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998), when such efforts could have been reasonably undertaken.

(d) The Secretary of State shall transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, by February 25 of each year, a full and complete report regarding—

(1) the status of internationally recognized human rights, within the meaning of subsection (a)—

(A) in countries that receive assistance under this part, and

(B) in all other foreign countries which are members of the United Nations and which are not otherwise the subject of a human rights report under this Act;

(2) wherever applicable, practices regarding coercion in population control, including coerced abortion and involuntary sterilization;

(3) the status of child labor practices in each country, including—

(A) whether such country has adopted policies to protect children from exploitation in the workplace, including a prohibition of forced and bonded labor and policies regarding acceptable working conditions; and

(B) the extent to which each country enforces such policies, including the adequacy of the resources and oversight dedicated to such policies;

(4) the votes of each member of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights on all country-specific and thematic resolutions voted on at the Commission's annual session during the period covered during the preceding year;

(5) the extent to which each country has extended protection to refugees, including the provision of first asylum and resettlement;

(6) the steps the Administrator has taken to alter United States programs under this part in any country because of human rights considerations;

(7) wherever applicable, violations of religious freedom, including particularly severe violations of religious freedom (as defined in section 3 of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998);

(8) wherever applicable, a description of the nature and extent of acts of anti-Semitism and anti-Semitic incitement that occur during the preceding year, including descriptions of—

(A) acts of physical violence against, or harassment of Jewish people, and acts of violence against, or vandalism of Jewish community institutions, including schools, synagogues, and cemeteries;

(B) instances of propaganda in government and non-government media that attempt to justify or promote racial hatred or incite acts of violence against Jewish people;

(C) the actions, if any, taken by the government of the country to respond to such violence and attacks or to eliminate such propaganda or incitement;

(D) the actions taken by such government to enact and enforce laws relating to the protection of the right to religious freedom of Jewish people; and

(E) the efforts of such government to promote anti-bias and tolerance education;

(9) wherever applicable, consolidated information regarding the commission of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and evidence of acts that may constitute genocide (as defined in article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and modified by the United States instrument of ratification to that convention and section 2(a) of the Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987);

(10) for each country with respect to which the report indicates that extrajudicial killings, torture, or other serious violations of human rights have occurred in the country, the extent to which the United States has taken or will take action to encourage an end to such practices in the country;

(11)(A) wherever applicable, a description of the nature and extent—

(i) of the compulsory recruitment and conscription of individuals under the age of 18 by armed forces of the government of the country, government-supported paramilitaries, or other armed groups, and the participation of such individuals in such groups; and

(ii) that such individuals take a direct part in hostilities;

(B) what steps, if any, taken by the government of the country to eliminate such practices;

(C) such other information related to the use by such government of individuals under the age of 18 as soldiers, as determined to be appropriate by the Secretary; [and]

(12) wherever applicable—

(A) a description of the status of freedom of the press, including initiatives in favor of freedom of the press and efforts to improve or preserve, as appropriate, the independence of the media, together with an assessment of progress made as a result of those efforts;

(B) an identification of countries in which there were violations of freedom of the press, including direct physical attacks, imprisonment, indirect sources of pressure, and censorship by governments, military, intelligence, or police forces, criminal groups, or armed extremist or rebel groups; and

(C) in countries where there are particularly severe violations of freedom of the press—

(i) whether government authorities of each such country participate in, facilitate, or condone such violations of the freedom of the press; and

(ii) what steps the government of each such country has taken to preserve the safety and independence of the media, and to ensure the prosecution of those individuals who attack or murder journalists[.]*;*

(13) wherever applicable, instances in which the government of each country has attempted to extraterritorially intimidate or pressure a company or entity to censor or self-censor the speech of its employees, contractors, customers, or associated staff with regards to the abuse of human rights in such country, or sought retaliation against such employees or contractors for the same, including any instance in which the Government of the People's Republic of China has sought to extraterritorially censor or punish speech that is otherwise legal in the United States on the topics of—

(A) repression and violation of fundamental freedoms in Hong Kong;

(B) repression and persecution of religious and ethnic minorities in China, including in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and the Tibet Autonomous Region;

(C) efforts to proliferate and use surveillance technologies to surveil activists, journalists, opposition politicians, or to profile persons of different ethnicities; and

(D) other gross violations of human rights; and

(14) wherever applicable, instances in which a company or entity located in or based in a third country has censored or self-censored the speech of its employees, contractors, customers, or associated staff on the topic of abuse of human rights in each country or sought to retaliate against such employees for the same, due to intimidation or pressure from or the fear of intimidation by the foreign government.

(e) The President is authorized and encouraged to use not less than $3,000,000 of the funds made available under this chapter, chapter 10 of this part, and chapter 4 of part II for each fiscal year for studies to identify, and for openly carrying out, programs and activities which will encourage or promote increased adherence to civil and political rights, as set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in countries eligible for assistance under this chapter or under chapter 10 of this part, except that funds made available under chapter 10 of this part may only be used under this subsection with respect to countries in sub-Saharan Africa. None of these funds may be used, directly or indirectly, to influence the outcome of any election in any country.

(f)(1) The report required by subsection (d) shall include the following:

(A) A description of the nature and extent of severe forms of trafficking in persons, as defined in section 103 of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, in each foreign country.

(B) With respect to each country that is a country of origin, transit, or destination for victims of severe forms of trafficking in persons, an assessment of the efforts by the government of that country to combat such trafficking. The assessment shall address the following:

(i) Whether government authorities in that country participate in, facilitate, or condone such trafficking.

(ii) Which government authorities in that country are involved in activities to combat such trafficking.

(iii) What steps the government of that country has taken to prohibit government officials from participating in, facilitating, or condoning such trafficking, including the investigation, prosecution, and conviction of such officials.

(iv) What steps the government of that country has taken to prohibit other individuals from participating in such trafficking, including the investigation, prosecution, and conviction of individuals involved in severe forms of trafficking in persons, the criminal and civil penalties for such trafficking, and the efficacy of those penalties in eliminating or reducing such trafficking.

(v) What steps the government of that country has taken to assist victims of such trafficking, including efforts to prevent victims from being further victimized by traffickers, government officials, or others, grants of relief from deportation, and provision of humanitarian relief, including provision of mental and physical health care and shelter.

(vi) Whether the government of that country is cooperating with governments of other countries to extradite traffickers when requested, or, to the extent that such cooperation would be inconsistent with the laws of such country or with extradition treaties to which such country is a party, whether the government of that country is taking all appropriate measures to modify or replace such laws and treaties so as to permit such cooperation.

(vii) Whether the government of that country is assisting in international investigations of transnational trafficking networks and in other cooperative efforts to combat severe forms of trafficking in persons.

(viii) Whether the government of that country refrains from prosecuting victims of severe forms of trafficking in persons due to such victims having been trafficked, and refrains from other discriminatory treatment of such victims.

(ix) Whether the government of that country recognizes the rights of victims of severe forms of trafficking in persons and ensures their access to justice.

(C) Such other information relating to trafficking in persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.

(2) In compiling data and making assessments for the purposes of paragraph (1), United States diplomatic mission personnel shall consult with human rights organizations and other appropriate nongovernmental organizations.

(g) CHILD MARRIAGE STATUS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The report required under subsection (d) shall include, for each country in which child marriage is prevalent, a description of the status of the practice of child marriage in such country.

(2) DEFINED TERM.—In this subsection, the term "child marriage" means the marriage of a girl or boy who is—

(A) younger than the minimum age for marriage under the laws of the country in which such girl or boy is a resident; or

(B) younger than 18 years of age, if no such law exists.

SEC. 117. ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES.—(a) The Congress finds that if current trends in the degradation of natural resources in developing countries continue, they will severely undermine the best efforts to meet basic human needs, to achieve sustained economic growth, and to prevent international tension and conflict. The Congress also finds that the world faces enormous, urgent, and complex problems, with respect to natural resources, which require new forms of cooperation between the United States and developing countries to prevent such problems from becoming unmanageable. It is, therefore, in the economic and security interests of the United States to provide leadership both in thoroughly reassessing policies relating to natural resources and the environment, and in cooperating extensively with developing countries in order to achieve environmentally sound development.

(b)*(1)* In order to address the serious problems described in subsection (a), the President is authorized to furnish assistance under this part for developing and strengthening the capacity of developing countries to protect and manage their environment and natural resources. Special efforts shall be made to maintain and where possible to restore the land, vegetation, water, wildlife, and other resources upon which depend economic growth and human well-being, especially of the poor.

(2)(A) The President is authorized to furnish assistance to programs and initiatives that—

(i) promote resilience among communities facing harmful impacts from climate change; and

(ii) reduce the vulnerability of persons affected by climate change.

(B) There shall be, in the Department of State, a Coordinator of Climate Change Resilience.

(c)(1) The President, in implementing programs and projects under this chapter and chapter 10 of this part, shall take fully into account the impact of such programs and projects upon the environment and natural resources of developing countries. Subject to such procedures as the President considers appropriate, the President shall require all agencies and officials responsible for programs or projects under this chapter—

(A) to prepare and take fully into account an environmental impact statement for any program or project under this chapter significantly affecting the environment of the global commons outside the jurisdiction of any country, the environment of the United States, or other aspects of the environment which the President may specify; and

(B) to prepare and take fully into account an environmental assessment of any proposed program or project under this chapter significantly affecting the environment of any foreign country.

Such agencies and officials should, where appropriate, use local technical resources in preparing environmental impact statements and environmental assessments pursuant to this subsection.

(2) The President may establish exceptions from the requirements of this subsection for emergency conditions and for cases in which compliance with those requirements would be seriously detrimental to the foreign policy interests of the United States.

(d)(1) The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall establish a comprehensive, integrated, 10-year strategy, which shall be referred to as the "Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy", to mitigate the impacts of climate change on displacement and humanitarian emergencies.

(2) The Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy shall—

(A) focus on addressing slow-onset and rapid-onset effects of events caused by climate change, consider the effects of events caused by climate change, and describe the key features of successful strategies to prevent such conditions;

(B) include specific objectives and multisectoral approaches to the effects of events caused by climate change;

(C) promote United States national security and economic interests while leading international climate-related policymaking efforts, on which the absence of United States leadership would lead to a substantial and harmful decline in the nation's global competitiveness;

(D) promote international instruments on climate action and other relevant international standards and best practices, as such standards and practices develop, that serve the interests of the American people and protect United States environmental resources and the planet;

(E) promote the adoption and implementation of such international climate-related agreements, standards, and practices by foreign states;

(F) work with United States allies and partners to ensure a level playing field exists when it comes to climate action and to encourage and assist foreign countries to make similar or even greater commitments than the United States;

(G) describe approaches that ensure national leadership, as appropriate, and substantively engage with civil society, local partners, and the affected communities, including marginalized populations and underserved populations, in the design, implementation, and monitoring of climate change programs to best safeguard the future of those subject to displacement;

(H) assign roles for relevant Federal agencies to avoid duplication of efforts, while ensuring that—

(i) the Department of State is responsible for—

(I) leading the Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy;

(II) establishing United States foreign policy;

(III) advancing diplomatic and political efforts; and

(IV) guiding security assistance and related civilian security efforts to mitigate climate change threats;

(ii) the United States Agency for International Development is—

(I) responsible for overseeing programs to prevent the effects of events caused by climate change;

(II) the lead implementing agency for development and related nonsecurity program policy related to building resilience and achieving recovery; and

(III) responsible for providing overseas humanitarian assistance to respond to international and internal displacement caused by climate change and to coordinate the pursuit of durable solutions for climate-displaced persons; and

(iii) other Federal agencies support the activities of the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development, as appropriate, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development;

(I) describe programs that agencies will undertake to achieve the stated objectives, including descriptions of existing programs and funding by fiscal year and account;

(J) identify mechanisms to improve coordination between the United States, foreign governments, and international organizations, including the World Bank, the United Nations, regional organizations, and private sector organizations;

(K) address efforts to expand public-private partnerships and leverage private sector resources;

(L) describe the criteria, metrics, and mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation of programs and objectives in the Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy;

(M) describe how the Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy will ensure that programs are country-led and context-specific;

(N) establish a program to monitor climate and social conditions to anticipate and prevent climate and environmental stressors from evolving into national security risks;

(O) include an assessment of climate risks in the Department of State's Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review; and

(P) prioritize foreign aid, to the extent practicable, for international climate resilience in support of this Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy.

(3) Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this subsection, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, based in part on the information collected pursuant to this section, that details the Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy. The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex, if necessary.

(4) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this subsection, the Secretary of State and the Coordinator of Global Climate Change Resilience shall brief the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives regarding the progress made by the Federal Government in implementing the Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy.

(5)(A) Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this subsection, and annually thereafter, the Comptroller General of

the United States, in cooperation and consultation with the Secretary of State, shall produce a report evaluating the progress that the Federal Government has made toward incorporating climate change into department and agency policies, including the resources that have been allocated for such purpose.

(B) The report required under subparagraph (A) shall assess—

(i) the degree to which the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) are—

(I) developing climate change risk assessments; and

(II) providing guidance to missions on how to include climate change risks in their integrated country strategies;

(ii) whether the Department of State and USAID have sufficient resources to fulfill the requirements described in paragraph (2); and

(iii) any areas in which the Department of State and USAID may lack sufficient resources to fulfill such requirements.

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JOHN S. MCCAIN NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019

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DIVISION A—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS

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TITLE XVII—REVIEW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND EXPORT CONTROLS

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Subtitle B—Export Control Reform

SEC. 1741. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the "Export Control Reform Act of 2018".

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PART I—AUTHORITY AND ADMINISTRATION OF CONTROLS

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SEC. 1752. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

The following is the policy of the United States:

(1) To use export controls only after full consideration of the impact on the economy of the United States and only to the extent necessary—

(A) to restrict the export of items which would make a significant contribution to the military potential of any other country or combination of countries which would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States; and

(B) to restrict the export of items if necessary to further significantly the foreign policy of the United States or to fulfill its declared international obligations.

(2) The national security and foreign policy of the United States require that the export, reexport, and in-country transfer of items, and specific activities of United States persons, wherever located, be controlled for the following purposes:

(A) To control the release of items for use in—

(i) the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or of conventional weapons;

(ii) the acquisition of destabilizing numbers or types of conventional weapons;

(iii) acts of terrorism;

(iv) military programs that could pose a threat to the security of the United States or its allies**[**; or**]***;*

(v) activities undertaken specifically to cause significant interference with or disruption of critical infrastructure**[**.**]***; or*

(vi) serious human rights abuses.

(B) To preserve the qualitative military superiority of the United States.

(C) To strengthen the United States defense industrial base.

(D) To carry out the foreign policy of the United States, including the protection of human rights and the promotion of democracy.

(E) To carry out obligations and commitments under international agreements and arrangements, including multilateral export control regimes.

(F) To facilitate military interoperability between the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other close allies.

(G) To ensure national security controls are tailored to focus on those core technologies and other items that are capable of being used to pose a serious national security threat to the United States.

(3) The national security of the United States requires that the United States maintain its leadership in the science, technology, engineering, and manufacturing sectors, including foundational technology that is essential to innovation. Such leadership requires that United States persons are competitive in global markets. The impact of the implementation of this part on such leadership and competitiveness must be evaluated on an ongoing basis and applied in imposing controls under sections 1753 and 1754 to avoid negatively affecting such leadership.

(4) The national security and foreign policy of the United States require that the United States participate in multilateral organizations and agreements regarding export controls on items that are consistent with the policy of the United States, and take all the necessary steps to secure the adoption and consistent enforcement, by the governments of such countries, of export controls on items that are consistent with such policy.

(5) Export controls should be coordinated with the multilateral export control regimes. Export controls that are multilateral are most effective, and should be tailored to focus on those core technologies and other items that are capable of being used to pose a serious national security threat to the United States and its allies.

(6) Export controls applied unilaterally to items widely available from foreign sources generally are less effective in preventing end-users from acquiring those items. Application of unilateral export controls should be limited for purposes of protecting specific United States national security and foreign policy interests.

(7) The effective administration of export controls requires a clear understanding both inside and outside the United States Government of which items are controlled and an efficient process should be created to regularly update the controls, such as by adding or removing such items.

(8) The export control system must ensure that it is transparent, predictable, and timely, has the flexibility to be adapted to address new threats in the future, and allows seamless access to and sharing of export control information among all relevant United States national security and foreign policy agencies.

(9) Implementation and enforcement of United States export controls require robust capabilities in monitoring, intelligence, and investigation, appropriate penalties for violations, and the ability to swiftly interdict unapproved transfers.

(10) Export controls complement and are a critical element of the national security policies underlying the laws and regulations governing foreign direct investment in the United States, including controlling the transfer of critical technologies to certain foreign persons. Thus, the President, in coordination with the Secretary, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Energy, and the heads of other Federal agencies, as appropriate, should have a regular and robust process to identify the emerging and other types of critical technologies of concern and regulate their release to foreign persons as warranted regardless of the nature of the underlying transaction. Such identification efforts should draw upon the resources and expertise of all relevant parts of the United States Government, industry, and academia. These efforts should be in addition to traditional efforts to modernize and update the lists of controlled items under the multilateral export control regimes.

(11) The authority under this part may be exercised only in furtherance of all of the objectives set forth in paragraphs (1) through (10).

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UYGHUR HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY ACT OF 2020

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SEC. 6. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.

(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than annually thereafter, the President shall submit a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives that identifies each foreign person, including any official of the Government of the People's Republic of China, that the President determines is responsible for any of the following with respect to Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, members of other Muslim minority groups, or other persons in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region:

(A) Torture.

(B) Cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.

(C) Prolonged detention without charges and trial.

(D) Causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction and clandestine detention of those persons.

(E) Other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of persons.

(F) Systematic rape, coercive abortion, forced sterilization, or involuntary contraceptive implantation policies and practices.

(2) FORM.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

(b) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—The President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (c) with respect to each foreign person identified in the report required under subsection (a)(1).

(c) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions described in this subsection are the following:

(1) ASSET BLOCKING.—The President shall exercise all of the powers granted to the President under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in property and interests in property of a foreign person identified in the report required under subsection (a)(1) if such property and interests in property—

(A) are in the United States;

(B) come within the United States; or

(C) come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(2) INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—

(A) VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—An alien described in subsection (a)(1) is—

(i) inadmissible to the United States;

(ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and

(iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).

(B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—An alien described in subsection (a)(1) is subject to revocation of any visa or other entry documentation regardless of when the visa or other entry documentation is or was issued.

(ii) IMMEDIATE EFFECT.—A revocation under clause (i) shall—

(I) take effect immediately; and

(II) cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the alien's possession.

(3) PENALTIES.—The penalties provided for in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a foreign person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of paragraph (1) to the same extent that such penalties apply to a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of such section 206.

(d) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may exercise all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this section.

(e) WAIVER.—The President may waive the application of sanctions under this section with respect to a person identified in the report required under subsection (a)(1) if the President determines and certifies to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives that such a waiver is in the national interest of the United States.

(f) EXCEPTIONS.—

(1) EXCEPTION FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.—Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any activity subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized intelligence activities of the United States.

(2) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES.—Sanctions under subsection (c)(2) shall not apply with respect to an alien if admitting or paroling the alien into the United States is necessary—

(A) to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations

and the United States, or other applicable international obligations; or

(B) to carry out or assist law enforcement activity in the United States.

(3) EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTATION OF GOODS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The authorities and requirements to impose sanctions authorized under this section shall not include the authority or a requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods.

(B) GOOD DEFINED.—In this paragraph, the term "good" means any article, natural or manmade substance, material, supply, or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment, and excluding technical data.

(g) TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS.—The President may terminate the application of sanctions under this section with respect to a person if the President determines and reports to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives not later than 15 days before the termination takes effect that—

(1) information exists that the person did not engage in the activity for which sanctions were imposed;

(2) the person has been prosecuted appropriately for the activity for which sanctions were imposed;

(3) the person has credibly demonstrated a significant change in behavior, has paid an appropriate consequence for the activity for which sanctions were imposed, and has credibly committed to not engage in an activity described in subsection (a)(1) in the future; or

(4) the termination of the sanctions is in the national security interests of the United States.

(h) SUNSET.—This section, and any sanctions imposed under this section, shall terminate on the date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(i) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) ADMISSION; ADMITTED; ALIEN.—The terms "admission", "admitted", and "alien" have the meanings given those terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).

(2) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term "foreign person" means a person that is not a United States person.

(3) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term "United States person" means—

(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or

(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.

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UNITED STATES-HONG KONG POLICY ACT OF 1992

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TITLE III—REPORTING PROVISIONS

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SEC. 303. REPORT ON MANNER AND EXTENT TO WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA EXPLOITS HONG KONG TO CIRCUMVENT UNITED STATES LAWS AND PROTECTIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the manner and extent to which the Government of China uses the status of Hong Kong to circumvent the laws and protections of the United States.

(b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) In consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence—

(A) an assessment of how the Government of China uses Hong Kong to circumvent United States export controls; and

(B) a list of all significant incidents in which the Government of China used Hong Kong to circumvent such controls during the reporting period.

(2) In consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Commerce—

(A) an assessment of how the Government of China uses Hong Kong to circumvent duties on merchandise exported to the United States from the People's Republic of China; and

(B) a list of all significant incidents in which the Government of China used Hong Kong to circumvent such duties during the reporting period.

(3) In consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence—

(A) an assessment of how the Government of China uses Hong Kong to circumvent sanctions imposed by the United States or pursuant to multilateral regimes; and

(B) a list of all significant incidents in which the Government of China used Hong Kong to circumvent such sanctions during the reporting period.

(4) In consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence, an assessment of how the Government of China uses formal or informal means to extradite or coercively move individuals, including United States persons, from Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China.

(5) In consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Director of Homeland Security—

(A) an assessment of how the intelligence, security, and law enforcement agencies of the Government of China, in-

cluding the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Public Security, and the People's Armed Police, use the Hong Kong Security Bureau and other security agencies in Hong Kong to conduct espionage on foreign nationals, including United States persons, conduct influence operations, or violate civil liberties guaranteed under the laws of Hong Kong; and

(B) a list of all significant incidents of such espionage, influence operations, or violations of civil liberties during the reporting period.

(c) FORM OF REPORT; AVAILABILITY.—

(1) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified index.

(2) AVAILABILITY.—The unclassified portion of the report required by subsection (a) shall be posted on a publicly available internet website of the Department of State.

(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Finance, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

(2) FOREIGN NATIONAL.—The term "foreign national" means a person that is neither—

(A) an individual who is a citizen or national of the People's Republic of China; or

(B) an entity organized under the laws of the People's Republic of China or of a jurisdiction within the People's Republic of China.

(3) REPORTING PERIOD.—The term "reporting period" means the 5-year period preceding submission of the report required by subsection (a).

(4) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term "United States person" means—

(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or

(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.

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