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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

**IN RE BANK OF AMERICA
CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT
BENEFITS LITIGATION**

Case No. 3:21-md-02992-LAB-MSB

**MASTER CONSOLIDATED
COMPLAINT**

This Document Relates to All Actions

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page(s)
I. INTRODUCTION	2
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE	5
III. THE PARTIES	6
A. Class Representative Plaintiffs	6
B. Individual Plaintiffs	15
C. Defendants	16
IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS.....	16
A. The Bank’s Contract with EDD.....	16
B. The Bank’s Failure to Secure EDD Debit Cardholder Information	22
C. The Bank’s Use of Outdated, Vulnerable Magnetic Stripe Technology ..	24
D. The Bank’s Contractual Promises and Representations to Cardholders ...	27
E. The Rampant Third-Party Fraud on EDD Debit Card Accounts	29
F. The Bank’s Evasive and Ineffectual Response Prior to the Filing of Plaintiffs’ Initial Class Action Complaint and The Court’s Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction	33
1. The Bank’s Policy and Practice of Not Employing Reasonable Practices and Procedures to Monitor for, Detect, Stop, and Promptly Notify Cardholders about Suspicious Transactions Involving their Cards and Accounts	34
2. The Bank’s Policy and Practice of Making it Difficult for Cardholders to Report Unauthorized Transactions	36
3. The Bank’s Policy and Practice of Automatically Denying Unauthorized Transaction Claims Without Reasonable Investigation or Explanation, Including Based Solely on a Highly Flawed “Claim Fraud Filter”	37
4. The Bank’s Policy and Practice of Automatically and Indefinitely Freezing Cardholders’ Accounts When They Report Unauthorized Transactions, Based on a Highly Flawed “Claim Fraud Filter”	40
5. The Bank’s Policy and Practice of Denying Reasonable Customer Service to Cardholders Seeking Assistance with Fraud Claims and the Unfreezing of Accounts	42
6. The Court Preliminarily Enjoins the Bank’s Policies and Practices	45
7. The Bank’s Policies and Practices Continue to Harm Cardholders.....	48
G. Class Representative Plaintiffs’ Allegations	49
1. Jennifer Yick.....	49
2. Vanessa Rivera	52
3. Candace Koole.....	54

1	4. Azuri Moon.....	56
2	5. Roland Oosthuizen.....	58
3	6. Rosemary Mathews	60
4	7. Carlos Rodriguez	62
5	8. J. Michael Willrich	64
6	9. Lindsay McClure	66
7	10. Robert L. Wilson	68
8	11. Clara Cajas.....	69
9	12. Stephanie Smith.....	70
10	13. Alan Karam.....	71
11	14. Luis Perez	74
12	15. Brian Wiggins.....	76
13	16. Jonathan Smith.....	77
14	17. Alex Yuan.....	78
15	18. Jory Zoelle	80
16	19. Cindy Baker	81
17	20. Ursula Auburn	82
18	21. Julie Hicks	83
19	22. Kuang Ting Chong	83
20	23. Stephanie Moore	85
21	24. Zinaida Petrova.....	86
22	25. Claire Blankenship.....	87
23	H. Individual Plaintiffs' Allegations	89
24	V. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS	228
25	VI. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF	236
26	FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF	
27	Violations of the Electronic Fund Transfers Act	
28	15 U.S.C. §§1693 et seq.; 12 C.F.R. §§1005.1 et seq.	236
	SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF	
	Violations of the California Consumer Privacy Act	
	Cal. Civ. Code §§1798.100 et seq.	240
	THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF	
	Violations of the California Customer Records Act	
	Cal. Civ. Code §§1798.80 et seq.	244

1	FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF	
2	Violations of the California Unfair Competition Law	
3	Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§17200 et seq.....	246
4	FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF	
5	Negligence and Negligence Per Se	252
6	SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF	
7	Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention	255
8	SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF	
9	Breach of Contract	255
10	EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF	
11	Breach of Implied Contract.....	259
12	NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF	
13	Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing	261
14	TENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF	
15	Breach of Fiduciary Duty	263
16	ELEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF	
17	Breach of Contract (Third-Party Beneficiaries).....	267
18	TWELFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF	
19	Breach of Implied Covenant Of Good Faith and Fair Dealing	
20	(Third-Party Beneficiaries)	269
21	THIRTEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF	
22	Violations of Federal Due Process under the 14th Amendment	
23	(42 U.S.C. §1983)	272
24	FOURTEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF	
25	Violations of the California Due Process Clause	
26	Cal. Const. Art. I, §7(A)	274
27	VII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF	275
28	VIII. JURY TRIAL DEMAND.....	276

1 Plaintiffs, by and through Plaintiffs' Interim Co-Lead Counsel, hereby file
2 this Master Consolidated Complaint for both the Class Action and Individual Cases
3 ("Master Complaint"). This Master Complaint is submitted to serve the
4 administrative functions of efficiency and economy and to present certain common
5 claims and common questions of fact and law for appropriate action by the Court
6 in the context of this multidistrict proceeding, pursuant to the Order Re Case
7 Management (Dkt. No. 48). The filing of this Master Complaint does not constitute
8 a waiver or dismissal of the underlying actions or claims therein.

9 Class representative plaintiffs Jennifer Yick, Vanessa Rivera, Candace
10 Koole, Azuri Moon, Roland Oosthuizen, Rosemary Mathews, Carlos Rodriguez, J.
11 Michael Willrich, Lindsay McClure, Robert L. Wilson, Clara Cajas, Stephanie
12 Smith, Alan Karam, Luis Perez, Brian Wiggins, Jonathan Smith, Alex Yuan, Jory
13 Zoelle, Cindy Baker, Ursula Auburn, Julie Hicks, Kuang Ting Chong, Stephanie
14 Moore, Zinaida Petrova, and Claire Blankenship (collectively, "Class
15 Representative Plaintiffs"), on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated
16 individuals whose California unemployment and other public benefits are or were
17 paid through debit cards issued by Defendant Bank of America, N.A. ("Bank of
18 America" or "Bank") bring this class action against the Bank for violations of the
19 Electronic Funds Transfer Act at 15 U.S.C. §§1693 et seq. ("EFTA") and its
20 implementing regulations at 12 C.F.R. Part 1005 ("Regulation E"), violations of the
21 Due Process Clauses of the U.S. and California Constitutions, breach of contract,
22 negligence, and other state common law and statutory claims, to remedy Bank of
23 America's egregious maladministration of its obligations under the California
24 Employment Development Department's ("EDD") benefits payment programs.
25 Additionally, 241 individual plaintiffs (collectively, "Individual Plaintiffs") bring
26 the same causes of action against Bank of America on behalf of themselves only.
27 In violation of its constitutional, statutory, common law, and contractual obligations
28 to Plaintiffs and Class Members, the Bank has failed to take reasonable steps to

1 protect Plaintiffs' and Class Members' benefits from fraud, has deprived them of
2 their statutory right to public benefits without providing them with notice or an
3 opportunity to be heard, and has otherwise failed to ensure that they are able to
4 receive and access the public benefits to which they are lawfully entitled.

5 I. INTRODUCTION

6 1. Like millions of other Californians, Plaintiffs lost their jobs through
7 no fault of their own during the COVID-19 pandemic. Plaintiffs and Class Members
8 applied for unemployment and other public benefits through programs administered
9 by California's EDD ("EDD benefits"). They were found eligible by EDD to
10 receive, and initially did receive, the benefits to which they were and are lawfully
11 entitled. Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, Plaintiffs and Class Members have
12 relied on these subsistence benefits to pay for food, housing, and other necessities
13 of life.

14 2. Pursuant to an exclusive contract between EDD and Bank of America,
15 Plaintiffs and Class Members received their periodic benefits payments not from
16 EDD directly, but through Bank-issued and Bank-administered prepaid debit cards
17 ("EDD Debit Cards" or "Cards"), which are linked to individual Bank depository
18 accounts ("EDD Debit Card Accounts" or "Accounts"). Although the Bank was
19 entrusted with administering these critical EDD benefits, on which millions of
20 vulnerable Californians' lives depend, and although the Bank was legally required
21 to take necessary and reasonable steps to protect Plaintiffs' and Class Members'
22 EDD Debit Cards and Accounts from fraudulent access by third parties, the Bank
23 failed to do so and indeed treated these Cards and Accounts with *less* care than it
24 affords its regular consumer debit and credit cardholders. Among other things, the
25 Bank failed to secure Plaintiffs' and Class Members' sensitive Card and Account
26 information and issued them EDD Debit Cards without the industry-standard,
27 fraud-preventing EMV chip technology that the Bank has used on all its *regular*
28 *consumer* customers' debit and credit cards since 2014. Instead, for its *government*

1 *benefits* customers, the Bank chose to issue debit cards with only outdated magnetic
2 stripe technology, which makes those cards far more susceptible to skimming,
3 cloning, and other schemes that have allowed third parties to fraudulently use and
4 access Plaintiffs' and Class Members' EDD Debit Cards and Accounts. The Bank
5 further breached its duties through its systemic practice of failing to take reasonable
6 steps to secure Plaintiffs' and Class Members' personal and financial information,
7 including failing to ensure that this information was appropriately handled and not
8 misappropriated by the Bank's subcontractors and their employees and agents,
9 including by customer service representatives and other call center agents. The
10 Bank's systemically lax security practices enabled unauthorized persons to access
11 Plaintiffs' and Class Members' personal and financial information and to make
12 fraudulent, unauthorized transactions involving Plaintiffs' and Class Members'
13 EDD Debit Cards and Accounts.

14 3. In addition to the Bank acting negligently and in breach of its statutory
15 and common law obligations to Plaintiffs and Class Members by failing to protect
16 their EDD Debit Cards and Accounts, the Bank also has violated its statutory and
17 common law obligations to Plaintiffs and Class Members by failing to implement
18 adequate and reasonable systems, measures, and protections to permit: prompt and
19 effective identification of fraud on Plaintiffs' and Class Members' Cards and
20 Accounts, prompt submission of fraud claims (also referred to herein as
21 unauthorized transaction claims), provisional access to already-approved benefits
22 during the course of the Bank's investigations of fraud claims, prompt and accurate
23 resolution of those claims, and prompt reimbursement of funds stolen from
24 Plaintiffs' and Class Members' Accounts. For example, instead of providing an
25 effective and timely process for Plaintiffs and Class Members to report fraud claims,
26 the Bank adopted a series of "customer service" practices and policies that have
27 required Plaintiffs and Class Members to spend dozens of hours on the phone with
28 customer service, and that have otherwise frustrated and obstructed Plaintiffs' and

1 Class Members' efforts to submit such claims. When those Plaintiffs and Class
2 Members who persevered were finally able to reach the Bank's customer service
3 representatives to report that unauthorized transactions had fraudulently been
4 conducted on their EDD Debit Card Accounts, the Bank then violated their
5 statutory, common law, and constitutional due process rights by denying their fraud
6 claims without investigation or explanation and freezing their Accounts
7 indefinitely, thereby depriving them of access to their past *and future* disbursements
8 of EDD benefits without any prior notice or an opportunity to be heard.

9 4. The cardholder agreement between Bank of America and each Plaintiff
10 and Class Member ("Cardholder Agreement") sets forth the Bank's "Zero Liability"
11 policy, which promises to protect each Plaintiff and Class Member from adverse
12 financial consequences if their EDD Debit Cards or Accounts are fraudulently used
13 or accessed by third parties. The Bank has not implemented this policy as promised,
14 which has caused Plaintiffs and Class Members to suffer significant financial losses
15 from third-party fraud, including by the Bank failing to have reasonable procedures
16 in place to identify and receive notifications of fraud, failing to adequately monitor
17 its customer service, establishing procedures that frustrate and obstruct timely
18 submission of fraud claims by Plaintiffs and Class Members, closing fraud claim
19 investigations without having conducted a reasonable investigation, and failing to
20 extend provisional credit to Plaintiffs and Class Members as required by law while
21 fraud claim investigations are underway. The Bank has also deprived Plaintiffs and
22 Class Members of their constitutional rights to notice and an opportunity to be heard
23 before causing their EDD Debit Cards and Accounts to be frozen or blocked for
24 extended periods of time, thereby depriving Plaintiffs and Class Members of access
25 to past, present, and future disbursements of unemployment and other government
26 benefits for which they have been found eligible.

27 5. By the acts and omissions alleged here, Bank of America has violated
28 federal and state constitutional due process protections; violated EFTA and its

1 implementing Regulation E; violated California's Consumer Privacy Act, Customer
2 Records Act, and Unfair Competition Law; acted negligently; and breached its
3 Cardholder Agreement with Plaintiffs and Class Members, its contract with EDD
4 (to which Plaintiffs and Class Members are intended third-party beneficiaries), the
5 implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under those contracts, and its
6 fiduciary duties to Plaintiffs and Class Members. These acts and omissions have
7 caused substantial financial and other harm to Plaintiffs and Class Members, and
8 unless promptly enjoined will cause them and the public to suffer immediate and
9 irreparable harm.

10 II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

11 6. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to: (a) 28 U.S.C.
12 §1331 because this action arises under the federal Due Process Clause and the
13 Electronic Fund Transfers Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1693 et seq.; (b) 28 U.S.C. §1332(d)
14 because this is a class action in which the amount in controversy exceeds
15 \$5,000,000, there are more than 100 putative Class Members, and the majority of
16 putative Class Members are citizens of a state different than the state of which Bank
17 of America is a citizen; (c) 28 U.S.C. §1332(a) because Plaintiffs and Class
18 Members are citizens of California, Bank of America is incorporated under the laws
19 of Delaware and has its principal place of business in North Carolina, and the
20 amount in controversy exceeds \$75,000; and (d) supplemental jurisdiction under 28
21 U.S.C. §1367 with respect to the claims for relief arising under state law.

22 7. This Court has specific personal jurisdiction over Bank of America
23 because the Bank has sufficient minimum contacts with California, has purposely
24 availed itself of the benefits and protection of California law, and conducts a
25 substantial amount of business in and with the State of California (including with
26 EDD), such that the Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Bank is
27 reasonable and accords with due process.
28

1 8. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1407 and the
2 Judicial Panel of Multidistrict Litigation’s Transfer Order transferring the actions
3 comprising this multidistrict litigation to this Court for coordinated or consolidated
4 pretrial proceedings. *See* Dkt. No. 1. Venue is also proper in this District pursuant
5 to 28 U.S.C. §1391 because a substantial portion of the acts or omissions giving rise
6 to the claims alleged occurred in this District, and because Bank of America is
7 subject to the Court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to this action.

8 **III. THE PARTIES**

9 **A. Class Representative Plaintiffs**

10 9. Class Representative Plaintiff Jennifer Yick resides in San Francisco,
11 California. She is a real estate professional who found herself out of work during
12 the COVID-19 pandemic. She then applied for and was found eligible by EDD to
13 receive unemployment benefits in or about April 2020. Yick received a Bank of
14 America EDD Debit Card with a magnetic stripe (but no EMV chip) to access her
15 benefits. She was then the victim of unauthorized transactions on her EDD Debit
16 Card Account in November 2020. Yick promptly reported the unauthorized
17 transactions to Bank of America, which failed to comply with its legal obligations
18 as alleged herein, causing Yick to suffer immediate and irreparable injury. *See infra*
19 ¶¶114–126. Yick is pursuing the claims alleged herein on her own behalf and as a
20 representative of all Class Members.

21 10. Class Representative Plaintiff Vanessa Rivera resides in Rancho
22 Cucamonga, California. She worked as a lien negotiator until early 2020, when she
23 became unemployed. She then applied for and was found eligible by EDD to receive
24 unemployment benefits in or about January 2020. Soon thereafter, she received an
25 EDD Debit Card with a magnetic stripe (but no EMV chip) to access her benefits.
26 On or about January 29, 2021, she was then the victim of an unauthorized \$800
27 ATM withdrawal from her EDD Debit Card Account, which occurred at a Bank of
28 America ATM. Rivera promptly reported the unauthorized transaction to Bank of

1 America, which failed to comply with its legal obligations as alleged herein, causing
2 Rivera to suffer immediate and irreparable injury. *See infra* ¶¶127–135. Rivera is
3 pursuing the claims alleged herein on her own behalf and as a representative of all
4 Class Members.

5 11. Class Representative Plaintiff Candace Koole resides in Temecula,
6 California. She is a doula and a nanny who found herself out of work during the
7 COVID-19 pandemic. She applied for and was found eligible by EDD to receive
8 unemployment benefits. Soon thereafter, she received an EDD Debit Card with a
9 magnetic stripe (but no EMV chip) to access her benefits. In December 2020, she
10 was then the victim of unauthorized transactions on her EDD Debit Card Account.
11 Koole promptly reported the unauthorized transaction to Bank of America, which
12 failed to comply with its legal obligations as alleged herein, causing Koole to suffer
13 immediate and irreparable injury. *See infra* ¶¶136–143. Koole is pursuing the
14 claims alleged herein on her own behalf and as a representative of all Class
15 Members.

16 12. Class Representative Plaintiff Azuri Moon resides in Culver City,
17 California. He is a music educator and a live and studio guitarist. He became
18 unemployed early in the COVID-19 pandemic. He then applied for and was found
19 eligible by EDD to receive unemployment benefits. Soon thereafter, in or about
20 June 2020, he received an EDD Debit Card with a magnetic stripe (but no EMV
21 chip) to access his benefits. In October 2020, he was the victim of two unauthorized
22 ATM withdrawals on his EDD Debit Card Account totaling \$1,800. Moon promptly
23 reported the unauthorized transactions to Bank of America, which failed to comply
24 with its legal obligations as alleged herein, causing Moon to suffer immediate and
25 irreparable injury. *See infra* ¶¶144–151. Moon is pursuing the claims alleged herein
26 on his own behalf and as a representative of all Class Members.

27 13. Class Representative Plaintiff Roland Oosthuizen resides in Lawndale,
28 California. He was furloughed from his job working for ABM at Los Angeles

1 International Airport in or about April 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. He
2 then applied for and was found eligible by EDD to receive unemployment benefits.
3 Oosthuizen received a Bank of America EDD Debit Card with a magnetic stripe
4 (but no EMV chip) to access his benefits. In or about September 2020, Oosthuizen
5 was the victim of five separate unauthorized transactions on his EDD Debit Card
6 Account on five successive days in the amount of \$1,000 each. Oosthuizen
7 promptly reported the unauthorized transactions to Bank of America, which failed
8 to comply with its legal obligations as alleged herein, causing Oosthuizen to suffer
9 immediate and irreparable injury. *See infra* ¶¶152–159. Oosthuizen is pursuing the
10 claims alleged herein on his own behalf and as a representative of all Class
11 Members.

12 14. Class Representative Plaintiff Rosemary Mathews resides in
13 Lawndale, California. She lost her employment with the Staples Center catering
14 department and with a yoga studio in March 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
15 She then applied for and was found eligible by EDD to receive unemployment
16 benefits. Mathews received a Bank of America EDD Debit Card with a magnetic
17 stripe (but no EMV chip) to access her benefits. In or about October 2020, Mathews
18 was the victim of an unauthorized transaction on her EDD Debit Card Account in
19 the amount of \$1,000. Mathews promptly reported the unauthorized transaction to
20 Bank of America, which failed to comply with its legal obligations as alleged
21 herein, causing Mathews to suffer immediate and irreparable injury. *See infra*
22 ¶¶160–170. Mathews is pursuing the claims alleged herein on her own behalf and
23 as a representative of all Class Members.

24 15. Class Representative Plaintiff Carlos Rodriguez resides in Chula
25 Vista, California. Rodriguez's job as a real estate agent slowed to almost a complete
26 stop during the COVID-19 pandemic. Rodriguez then applied for and was found
27 eligible by EDD to receive unemployment benefits. Rodriguez received a Bank of
28 America EDD Debit Card with a magnetic stripe (but no EMV chip) to access his

1 benefits. In December 2020, Rodriguez was the victim of unauthorized transactions
2 that removed \$1,130 from his EDD Debit Card Account. Rodriguez promptly
3 reported the unauthorized transactions to Bank of America, which failed to comply
4 with its legal obligations as alleged herein, causing Rodriguez to suffer immediate
5 and irreparable injury. *See infra* ¶¶171–176. Rodriguez is pursuing the claims
6 alleged herein on his own behalf and as a representative of all Class Members.

7 16. Class Representative Plaintiff J. Michael Willrich resides in San
8 Diego, California. He is a hospitality professional who found himself out of work
9 during the COVID-19 pandemic. He then applied for and was found eligible by
10 EDD to receive unemployment benefits. Soon thereafter, he received a Bank of
11 America EDD Debit Card with a magnetic stripe (but no EMV chip) to access his
12 benefits. He was then the victim of unauthorized transactions that removed
13 \$5,083.75 from his EDD Debit Card Account. Willrich promptly reported the
14 unauthorized transaction to Bank of America, which failed to comply with its legal
15 obligations as alleged herein, causing Willrich to suffer immediate and irreparable
16 injury. *See infra* ¶¶177–186. Willrich is pursuing the claims alleged herein on his
17 own behalf and as a representative of all Class Members.

18 17. Class Representative Plaintiff Lindsay McClure resides in California.
19 She is a visual merchandiser at Nordstrom who found herself out of work during
20 the COVID-19 pandemic. She then applied for and was found eligible by EDD to
21 receive unemployment benefits. Soon thereafter, she received a Bank of America
22 EDD Debit Card with a magnetic stripe (but no EMV chip) to access her benefits.
23 McClure experienced fraudulent charges on her EDD Debit Card Account on or
24 around December 1, 2020. McClure promptly reported the unauthorized
25 transactions to Bank of America, which failed to comply with its legal obligations
26 as alleged herein, causing McClure to suffer immediate and irreparable injury. *See*
27 *infra* ¶¶187–191. McClure is pursuing the claims alleged herein on her own behalf
28 and as a representative of all Class Members.

1 18. Class Representative Plaintiff Robert L. Wilson resides in Stockton,
2 California. He worked in construction doing project management and estimating
3 prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. After the pandemic hit, his work
4 slowed to the point where there were no available opportunities for employment.
5 He applied for and was found eligible by EDD to receive unemployment benefits.
6 He received a Bank of America EDD Debit Card with a magnetic stripe (but no
7 EMV chip) to access his benefits. After becoming aware of approximately \$2,600
8 in unauthorized transactions on his EDD Debit Card Account, Wilson reported
9 these unauthorized transactions to the Bank, which failed to comply with its legal
10 obligations as alleged herein, causing Wilson to suffer immediate and irreparable
11 injury. *See infra* ¶¶192–194. Wilson is pursuing the claims alleged herein on his
12 own behalf and as a representative of all Class Members.

13 19. Class Representative Plaintiff Clara Cajas resides in California. Cajas
14 is a registered dental assistant who works as an instructor, who found herself out of
15 work during the pandemic. She then applied for and was found eligible by EDD to
16 receive unemployment benefits. Soon thereafter, she received a Bank of America
17 EDD Debit Card with a magnetic stripe (no EMV chip) to access her benefits. She
18 was then twice the victim of unauthorized transactions on her EDD Debit Card
19 Account. Cajas promptly reported the unauthorized transaction to Bank of America,
20 which failed to comply with its legal obligations as alleged herein, causing Cajas to
21 suffer immediate and irreparable injury. *See infra* ¶¶195–199. Cajas is pursuing the
22 claims alleged herein on her own behalf and as a representative of all Class
23 Members.

24 20. Class Representative Plaintiff Stephanie Smith resides in Tracy,
25 California. Smith was a salesperson who lost her job in March 2020 because of the
26 COVID-19 pandemic. She then applied for and was found eligible by EDD to
27 receive unemployment benefits. In or about June 2020, she received a Bank of
28 America EDD Debit Card with a magnetic stripe (but no EMV chip) to access her

1 benefits. Despite never having used her Card for a purchase, ATM withdrawal, or
2 other transaction (i.e., she only conducted online transfers through Bank of
3 America's website), unauthorized transactions appeared on her EDD Debit Card
4 Account in late November 2020. Upon discovering the unauthorized transactions,
5 Smith immediately reported them to Bank of America, which failed to comply with
6 its legal obligations as alleged herein, causing Smith to suffer immediate and
7 irreparable injury. *See infra* ¶¶200–202. Smith is pursuing the claims alleged herein
8 on her own behalf and as a representative of all Class Members.

9 21. Class Representative Plaintiff Alan Karam resides in Palos Verdes
10 Estates, California. He operates a food truck in the Los Angeles area, but he found
11 himself out of work due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Karam then applied for and
12 was found eligible by EDD to receive unemployment benefits. In or about June
13 2020, he received a Bank of America EDD Debit Card with a magnetic stripe (but
14 no EMV chip) to access his benefits. In August 2020, his EDD Debit Card Account
15 was subject to over \$2,000 in unauthorized transactions, all of which occurred in
16 New York while Karam was in California with his Card in his possession. Karam
17 promptly reported the unauthorized transactions to Bank of America, which failed
18 to comply with its legal obligations as alleged herein, causing Karam to suffer
19 immediate and irreparable injury. *See infra* ¶¶203–215. Karam is pursuing the
20 claims alleged herein on his own behalf and as a representative of all Class
21 Members.

22 22. Class Representative Plaintiff Luis Perez resides in Orange, California.
23 He worked as a concrete carpenter until July 2020, when he became unable to
24 continue working due to conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic. He applied for and
25 was found eligible by EDD to receive unemployment benefits. Perez received an
26 EDD Debit Card with a magnetic stripe (but no EMV chip) to access his benefits.
27 He was then the victim of an unauthorized transaction on his EDD Debit Card
28 Account in October 2020. Perez promptly reported the unauthorized transactions to

1 Bank of America, which failed to comply with its legal obligations as alleged
2 herein, causing Perez to suffer immediate and irreparable injury. *See infra* ¶¶216–
3 224. Perez is pursuing the claims alleged herein on his own behalf and as a
4 representative of all Class Members.

5 23. Class Representative Plaintiff Brian Wiggins resides in Elk Grove,
6 California. He worked as a security guard until he found himself out of work during
7 the COVID-19 pandemic. He applied for and was found eligible by EDD to receive
8 unemployment benefits. In August 2020, Wiggins received an EDD Debit Card
9 with a magnetic stripe (but no EMV chip) to access his benefits. In November 2020,
10 he was the victim of unauthorized ATM withdrawals on his EDD Debit Card
11 Account, including one in Georgia. Wiggins promptly reported the unauthorized
12 transactions to Bank of America, which failed to comply with its legal obligations
13 as alleged herein, causing Wiggins to suffer immediate and irreparable injury. *See*
14 *infra* ¶¶225–228. Wiggins is pursuing the claims alleged herein on his own behalf
15 and as a representative of all Class Members.

16 24. Class Representative Plaintiff Jonathan Smith resides in Los Angeles,
17 California. He applied for and was found eligible by EDD to receive unemployment
18 benefits. Smith received an EDD Debit Card with a magnetic stripe (but no EMV
19 chip) to access his benefits. He was then the victim of unauthorized transactions on
20 his EDD Debit Card Account. Smith promptly reported the unauthorized
21 transactions to Bank of America, which failed to comply with its legal obligations
22 as alleged herein, causing Smith to suffer immediate and irreparable injury. *See*
23 *infra* ¶¶229–236. Smith is pursuing the claims alleged herein on his own behalf and
24 as a representative of all Class Members.

25 25. Class Representative Plaintiff Alex Yuan resides in San Jose,
26 California. He applied for and was found eligible by EDD to receive unemployment
27 benefits. Yuan received an EDD Debit Card with a magnetic stripe (but no EMV
28 chip) to access his benefits. He was then the victim of unauthorized transactions on

1 his EDD Debit Card Account. Yuan promptly reported the unauthorized
2 transactions to Bank of America, which failed to comply with its legal obligations
3 as alleged herein, causing Yuan to suffer immediate and irreparable injury. *See infra*
4 ¶¶237–245. Yuan is pursuing the claims alleged herein on his own behalf and as a
5 representative of all Class Members.

6 26. Class Representative Plaintiff Jory Zoelle resides in California. She
7 applied for and was found eligible by EDD to receive unemployment benefits.
8 Zoelle received a Bank of America EDD Debit Card with a magnetic stripe (but no
9 EMV chip) to access his benefits. She was then the victim of unauthorized
10 transactions on his EDD Debit Card Account. Zoelle reported the unauthorized
11 transactions to Bank of America, which failed to comply with its legal obligations
12 as alleged herein, causing Zoelle to suffer immediate and irreparable injury. *See*
13 *infra* ¶¶246–249. Zoelle is pursuing the claims alleged herein on her own behalf
14 and as a representative of all Class Members.

15 27. Class Representative Plaintiff Cindy Baker resides in California. She
16 applied for and was found eligible by EDD to receive unemployment benefits.
17 Baker received a Bank of America EDD Debit Card with a magnetic stripe (but no
18 EMV chip) to access her benefits. She was then the victim of unauthorized
19 transactions on her EDD Debit Card Account. Baker reported the unauthorized
20 transactions to Bank of America, which failed to comply with its legal obligations
21 as alleged herein, causing Baker to suffer immediate and irreparable injury. *See*
22 *infra* ¶¶250–253. Baker is pursuing the claims alleged herein on her own behalf
23 and as a representative of all Class Members.

24 28. Class Representative Plaintiff Ursula Auburn resides in California.
25 She applied for and was found eligible by EDD to receive unemployment benefits.
26 Auburn received a Bank of America EDD Debit Card with a magnetic stripe (but
27 no EMV chip) to access her benefits. She was then the victim of unauthorized
28 transactions on her EDD Debit Card Account. Auburn reported the unauthorized

1 transactions to Bank of America, which failed to comply with its legal obligations
2 as alleged herein, causing Auburn to suffer immediate and irreparable injury. *See*
3 *infra* ¶¶254–257. Auburn is pursuing the claims alleged herein on her own behalf
4 and as a representative of all Class Members.

5 29. Class Representative Plaintiff Julie Hicks resides in Santa Clara
6 County, California. She applied for and was found eligible by EDD to receive
7 unemployment benefits. Hicks received an EDD Debit Card with a magnetic stripe
8 (but no EMV chip) to access her benefits. In September 2020, she was the victim
9 of unauthorized transactions on her EDD Debit Card Account. Hicks promptly
10 reported the unauthorized transaction to Bank of America, which failed to comply
11 with its legal obligations as alleged herein, causing Hicks to suffer immediate and
12 irreparable injury. *See infra* ¶¶258–260. Hicks is pursuing the claims alleged herein
13 on her own behalf and as a representative of all Class Members.

14 30. Class Representative Plaintiff Kuang Ting Chong resides in Los
15 Angeles County, California. He applied for and was found eligible by EDD to
16 receive unemployment benefits. Chong received an EDD Debit Card with a
17 magnetic stripe (but no EMV chip) to access his benefits. In July 2020, he was the
18 victim of unauthorized transactions on his EDD Debit Card Account. Chong
19 promptly reported the unauthorized transaction to Bank of America, which failed
20 to comply with its legal obligations as alleged herein, causing Chong to suffer
21 immediate and irreparable injury. *See infra* ¶¶261–267. Chong is pursuing the
22 claims alleged herein on his own behalf and as a representative of all Class
23 Members.

24 31. Class Representative Plaintiff Stephanie Moore resides in Los Angeles
25 County, California. She applied for and was found eligible by EDD to receive
26 unemployment benefits. Moore received an EDD Debit Card with a magnetic stripe
27 (but no EMV chip) to access her benefits. In July 2020, she was the victim of
28 unauthorized transactions on her EDD Debit Card Account. Moore promptly

1 reported the unauthorized transaction to Bank of America, which failed to comply
2 with its legal obligations as alleged herein, causing Moore to suffer immediate and
3 irreparable injury. *See infra* ¶¶268–273. Moore is pursuing the claims alleged
4 herein on her own behalf and as a representative of all Class Members.

5 32. Class Representative Plaintiff Zinaida Petrova resides in Big Bear
6 City, California. She applied for and was found eligible by EDD to receive
7 unemployment benefits. She received an EDD Debit Card with a magnetic stripe
8 (but no EMV chip) to access her benefits. In May 2021, she was the victim of
9 unauthorized transactions on her EDD Debit Card Account. Petrova promptly
10 reported the unauthorized transaction to Bank of America, which failed to comply
11 with its legal obligations as alleged herein, causing Petrova to suffer immediate and
12 irreparable injury. *See infra* ¶¶274–278. Petrova is pursuing the claims alleged
13 herein on her own behalf and as a representative of all Class Members.

14 33. Class Representative Plaintiff Claire Blankenship resides in Pomona,
15 California. She applied for and was found eligible by EDD to receive
16 unemployment benefits during the COVID-19 pandemic. She received an EDD
17 Debit Card with a magnetic stripe (but no EMV chip) to access her benefits. In June
18 and July 2021, she was the victim of unauthorized transactions on her EDD Debit
19 Card Account. Blankenship promptly reported the unauthorized transactions to
20 Bank of America, which failed to comply with its legal obligations as alleged
21 herein, causing Blankenship to suffer immediate and irreparable injury. *See infra*
22 ¶¶279–284. Blankenship is pursuing the claims alleged herein on her own behalf
23 and as a representative of all Class Members.

24 **B. Individual Plaintiffs**

25 34. The 241 Individual Plaintiffs (*see infra* ¶¶286–526) bring actions
26 against Bank of America on behalf of themselves only, and not in a representative
27 capacity on behalf of any of the putative classes alleged herein.
28

C. Defendants

35. Defendant Bank of America, N.A., is a financial institution incorporated in the State of Delaware and headquartered in North Carolina that conducts a substantial amount of business in California, including pursuant to its exclusive contract with the State of California EDD to administer unemployment benefits and other benefit payments through EDD Debit Cards and Accounts.

36. The true names and capacities of Defendants Does 1 through 50, inclusive, are currently unknown to Plaintiffs. Accordingly, Plaintiffs sue each and every Doe Defendant by such fictitious names. Each Doe Defendant, individually and collectively, is responsible in some manner for the unlawful acts alleged herein. Plaintiffs will seek leave of this Court to amend this Master Consolidated Complaint to reflect the true names and capacities of the Doe Defendants when their identities become known.

37. Plaintiffs allege that at all times relevant to the events giving rise to this action, each and every Defendant was acting as an agent or employee of each of the other Defendants. Plaintiffs further allege that at all times relevant to those events, each and every Defendant was acting within the course and scope of that agency or employment at the direction of or with the full knowledge, permission, or consent of each and every other Defendant. In addition, each of the acts or omissions of each and every Defendant was made known to, and ratified by, each of the other Defendants.

IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

A. The Bank's Contract with EDD

38. EDD is an agency of the State of California that is responsible for administering numerous benefits programs for low-income, unemployed, and other Californians, including programs providing Californians with EDD benefits, such as unemployment insurance ("UI") benefits, pandemic unemployment assistance

1 (“PUA”) benefits, pandemic emergency unemployment compensation benefits,
2 disability insurance benefits, and paid family leave benefits.

3 39. In 2010, Bank of America entered into an exclusive contract with EDD
4 for the provision of Electronic Benefits Payment (“EBP”) services, including
5 issuance of Bank of America EDD Debit Cards through which individuals entitled
6 to receive EDD benefits could access those benefits.

7 40. On information and belief, Bank of America obtained that contract in
8 part by falsely representing to EDD that it would provide “best-in-class” fraud
9 monitoring.

10 41. Beginning in or about July 2011, EDD began distributing EDD
11 benefits pursuant to its contract with Bank of America, under which the default
12 means of distributing EDD benefits payments has been through Bank-issued and
13 Bank-administered EDD Debit Cards, rather than paper checks or other forms of
14 payment.

15 42. In or about 2015, Bank of America submitted a response to EDD’s
16 Request for Proposals (“2015 RFP Response” or “2015 Proposal”) to extend the
17 scope and duration of the contract. The 2015 Proposal was accepted by EDD and
18 incorporated by reference into a new contract for EBP Services entered into
19 between EDD and the Bank, with an initial term of August 1, 2016 through July 31,
20 2021 (“EDD–Bank Contract”). In its 2015 Proposal, the Bank represented that it
21 had applied and would continue to apply “the most rigorous fraud detection
22 procedures,” including “the highest level of security and fraud safeguards” based
23 on “multiple layers of extensive security” to ensure that EDD Debit Cardholders do
24 not become the victims of fraud. The Bank’s 2015 Proposal also represented that
25 the Bank has provided and will continue to provide “fraud monitoring” as part of
26 its “multi-faceted approach” to preventing and combatting fraud, and that it would
27 provide “immediate response to emerging fraud trends” to ensure that fraudulent
28 transactions would be “declined in real time.” The 2015 Proposal further

1 represented that the Bank would provide “industry best-in-class” fraud
2 investigations services, “applying specialized processes and tools to resolve fraud,”
3 and that “Bank of America is committed to being at the forefront of fraud and data
4 security strategies, benefiting the EDD and [EDD’s] claimants.”

5 43. In its 2015 Proposal, the Bank also represented that it would fully
6 protect EDD Debit Cardholders in case they became victims of fraud. Specifically,
7 the Bank represented that it would comply with all EFTA and Regulation E
8 requirements and timelines with respect to error resolution and it provided
9 assurance that its EDD Debit Cardholders (which includes Plaintiffs and Class
10 Members) “should feel comfortable in dealing with disputed transactions knowing
11 that we extend our Zero Liability protection on disputed claims, including ATM
12 and pinned POS [point-of-sale] transactions.” The Bank described its error
13 resolution process as follows: “A Claimant can file a dispute by calling the
14 Customer Service Center for complete instructions. . . . After selecting the ‘dispute
15 a transaction’ option within our IVR [Interactive Voice Response], the cardholder
16 will immediately speak with a live representative who will further review the
17 transaction and any other possible fraudulent transactions with the cardholder. . . .
18 Once a dispute is requested in our system, a case will be created within our claims
19 tracking system and tracked until final resolution. Per Regulation E, within 10
20 business days of the initial dispute, we will promptly correct the error. . . . If more
21 time is needed, we will temporarily credit the cardholder’s account within 10
22 business days of the initiated dispute for the full disputed amount. There is no
23 limitation or maximum to the credit amount provided. This will allow the account
24 holder to use the funds while the claim is being resolved.”

25 44. The Bank’s 2015 Proposal also made representations about the
26 “[s]uperb customer service” levels it would guarantee EDD Debit Cardholders,
27 boasting that “[w]e set the bar high and pride ourselves on serving each caller with
28 swift, responsive service,” and providing assurances that “[l]ong call hold waits and

1 busy signals are not tolerated at Bank of America. Your program's average speed
 2 of answer is 30 seconds and your average handle time is 230 seconds." Pursuant to
 3 the EDD-Bank Contract, the Bank promised, among other things, to provide an
 4 IVR system and live Customer Service Representative ("CSR") support available
 5 "24 hours a day, seven days a week." The Bank promised that live CSR agents
 6 would be available 24/7 to assist EDD Debit Cardholders with "[i]nvestigat[ing]
 7 transactions (fraud security, use)," "[p]rocess[ing] lost/stolen/damaged card
 8 reports," and "[c]heck[ing] on the Status of Disputed Transactions." The Bank
 9 further promised that "no call [would be] transferred to voicemail or automatically
 10 disconnected from the queue," that "calls [would] not [be] immediately placed on
 11 hold," that "the average wait time to speak to a live CSR" agent would be "no more
 12 than 30 seconds for 70 percent of the calls, and no more than two (2) minutes for
 13 all calls," and that the Bank would "monitor Customer Service calls to ensure
 14 quality service and address Customer complaints."

15 45. On information and belief, EDD entered into the EDD-Bank Contract
 16 because of, and in reliance on, the Bank's representations in its 2015 Proposal.

17 46. Pursuant to the terms of the EDD-Bank Contract, EDD and the Bank
 18 are engaged in a joint undertaking to administer the EDD benefits programs and to
 19 distribute EDD benefits payments to eligible claimants through EDD Debit Cards.

20 47. EDD Debit Cards are the default payment method for EDD benefits,
 21 and EDD's website presents EDD Debit Cards as the exclusive means of receiving
 22 EDD benefits.¹ EDD promotes EDD Debit Cards as "a fast, convenient, and secure

23
 24 ¹ See, e.g., EDD website, *Unemployment Insurance – After You File a Claim*,
 25 https://www.edd.ca.gov/unemployment/After_you_Filed.htm#receive ("When
 26 your first benefit payment is available, you will receive a debit card in the mail.");
 27 EDD Website, *Guide to Applying for Unemployment Benefits*, [https://](https://unemployment.edd.ca.gov/guide/receive-benefits)
 28 unemployment.edd.ca.gov/guide/receive-benefits ("Benefit payments for
 Unemployment Insurance, Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA),
 Disability Insurance, and Paid Family Leave are all made using the Bank Debit

way to get your benefit payments,” and advertises the many purported benefits of EDD Debit Cards, including: “Get your money sooner”; “Use it everywhere VISA is accepted (in stores, online, and by phone)”; “Withdraw cash at ATMs, banks, and stores with cash back options”; “Transfer funds to the financial institution of your choice at no additional cost”; “Be notified when a deposit is made to your card, or when you have a low balance”; and “Receive fraud protection from a Zero Liability Policy.”²

48. The EDD has delegated to the Bank the public functions of distributing EDD benefits to Cardholders. EDD Debit Cards and Accounts are an integral part of EDD’s benefits distribution and administration system. Under the terms of the EDD–Bank Contract, those Accounts can only receive deposits from the EDD and no commingling of EDD benefits payments with other funds is permitted. The EDD–Bank Contract provides that the Bank “shall disburse to each claimant the entire amount the EDD authorizes” and “shall process all benefit payment amounts provided by the EDD without alteration or adjustment.”

49. The EDD–Bank Contract, which contains an express revenue-sharing agreement, creates a relationship of financial interdependency between EDD and Bank of America. Under the revenue-sharing agreement, the State of California benefits from delegating the administrative burdens of EDD benefits distribution to the Bank at no cost to the State, while the Bank benefits from collecting point-of-sale transaction fees and other fees from millions of EDD Debit Cardholders and vendors and from earning interest on EDD benefits funds that have been deposited into EDD Debit Card Accounts but that remain unspent by Cardholders (commonly referred to as “float”).

Card.”). While it is possible for Cardholders to contact EDD to receive their benefits via paper checks instead of through EDD Debit Cards, that option is neither publicized nor easily accessed.

² EDD website, *Debit Card*, https://www.edd.ca.gov/about_edd/The_EDD_Debit_Card.htm.

1 50. The EDD–Bank Contract also authorizes and obligates the Bank to
2 work jointly with EDD to combat EDD benefits enrollment fraud. Pursuant to those
3 contractual responsibilities, the Bank purports to engage in a joint fraud-prevention
4 undertaking with EDD. Pursuant to EDD’s instructions, the Bank froze a number
5 of Accounts for suspected enrollment fraud between approximately September
6 2020 and March 2021. None of those EDD-initiated freezes are at issue in this case.

7 51. Between approximately September 2020 and February 2021, the Bank
8 itself independently froze approximately 75,000 EDD Debit Card Accounts based
9 on the Bank’s assertions that those Cardholders had engaged in enrollment fraud.
10 On information and belief, the Bank has since then independently frozen or blocked
11 tens of thousands more Accounts and continues to do so, without EDD direction or
12 authorization to freeze those Accounts. These are the Account freezes at issue in
13 this case. The Bank has earned, and continues to earn, interest on funds in the Bank-
14 frozen Accounts.

15 52. If a Cardholder’s Account is frozen by the Bank and the Cardholder
16 contacts the Bank, the Bank informs the Cardholder that they must re-authenticate
17 their identity and re-verify their EDD benefits eligibility with EDD before the Bank
18 will unfreeze their Account—regardless of whether EDD itself has raised any
19 question regarding the Cardholder’s identity or benefits eligibility. When Plaintiffs
20 and Class Members contacted EDD and were actually able to get through to a live
21 representative, they were frequently told that there was no issue with their identity
22 or benefits eligibility from EDD’s perspective and that the issue was with Bank of
23 America. Nevertheless, these Plaintiffs and Class Members continued to be unable
24 to access the funds in their EDD Debit Card Accounts, which remained frozen.

25 53. On October 15, 2020, after EDD had informed the Bank that it had
26 identified Cardholders whose Accounts should be unfrozen, EDD sent the Bank a
27 letter expressing concern that the Bank had neither confirmed compliance with
28 EDD’s requests that those Accounts be unfrozen, nor explained why it had not

1 complied. EDD further informed the Bank that it had become aware that the Bank
2 was itself freezing additional Accounts based on the Bank's own suspicions but that
3 the Bank had not notified EDD's fraud investigation division of such suspicions
4 despite its contractual obligations to do so. EDD instructed the Bank to cease
5 freezing additional Accounts and to explain why it had continued to freeze
6 Accounts without EDD's authorization, and to reverse any such freezes. Finally,
7 EDD informed the Bank that it was aware that the Bank had sent EDD draft notices
8 to Cardholders whose Accounts the Bank had frozen and that the EDD had objected
9 to the content of those notices, and asked for confirmation that the Bank would not
10 send further notices without an understanding as to which Accounts would receive
11 the notice and the language that would be used, to ensure that the language
12 conformed to the language in EDD's own notices.

13 54. The EDD-Bank Contract relieves EDD of any liability for "fraud,
14 misuse, and lost or stolen debit cards," leaving the Bank solely liable for such fraud,
15 misuse, loss, or theft. This potential liability creates a financial incentive for the
16 Bank to circumvent its EFTA and other legal obligations to provide provisional
17 credit and permanent reimbursement for fraudulent transactions that occur in EDD
18 Debit Card Accounts.

19 **B. The Bank's Failure to Secure EDD Debit Cardholder Information**

20 55. Bank of America has failed to store, share, transmit, or otherwise use
21 EDD Debit Cardholders' personally identifiable information, Card and Account
22 information, and other financial data and information, including any such data or
23 information learned in the course of providing customer service to Cardholders
24 (collectively, "Cardholder Information") in a reasonably secure manner and
25 consistent with the Bank's obligations to EDD and to Plaintiffs and Class Members.
26 The Bank has also failed to act reasonably in its hiring, supervision, training, and
27 retention of its agents, including its subcontractors and its subcontractors'
28 employees and agents, who have access to Cardholder Information, including as a

1 result of staffing the Bank's Call Centers, interacting with Cardholders, and
 2 reviewing Cardholders' unauthorized transaction claims. The Bank has failed to
 3 take reasonable steps to ensure that its subcontractors and their employees and
 4 agents, including CSRs and other Call Center agents, maintain the security and
 5 confidentiality of Cardholder Information, including by failing to ensure: that all
 6 such agents were subject to reasonable background checks, that all such agents
 7 received reasonable training on maintaining the security and confidentiality of
 8 Cardholder Information, and that the Bank's subcontractors took reasonable steps
 9 to secure Cardholder Information from unnecessary or unauthorized access,
 10 disclosure, and exfiltration, including by the subcontractors' agents and employees.

11 56. As a result of the Bank's acts and omissions alleged herein, Cardholder
 12 Information has been obtained by unauthorized third parties in a series of security
 13 breaches that have allowed Plaintiffs' and Class Members' benefits to be stolen out
 14 of their Accounts through unauthorized transactions. The Bank's repeated and
 15 ongoing failure to secure Plaintiffs' and Class Members' Cardholder Information
 16 violated and continues to violate the California Consumer Privacy Act, the Gramm-
 17 Leach-Bliley Act and rules and regulations promulgated thereunder that require the
 18 Bank to protect the security and confidentiality of its customers' nonpublic personal
 19 information, and the Bank's common law duty to take reasonable steps to protect
 20 Cardholder Information from unauthorized access, disclosure, and exfiltration,
 21 including by the Bank's own agents.

22 57. Some EDD Debit Cardholders who have had money stolen from their
 23 Debit Card Accounts through unauthorized transactions received and activated their
 24 EDD Debit Cards, but never used their Cards.³ Such unauthorized transactions

25
 26 ³ See, e.g., David Gotfredson, "California Unemployment: Fraudulent Charges
 27 Keep Popping up on Bank Debit Card Accounts," *ABC10 Sacramento (KXTV)*
 28 (Jan. 21, 2021), available at <https://www.abc10.com/article/money/fraudulent-charges-edd-debit-card-accounts/509-5a8b0958-0b56-41fe-81af->

1 could only have occurred if the Bank failed to store, share, transmit, or otherwise
2 use Cardholder Information in a reasonably secure manner.

3 58. For example, Plaintiff Stephanie Smith received her EDD Debit Card
4 in or about June 2020 and activated it on Bank of America's website the same day
5 that she received it. Immediately after activating the Card, she locked the Card in a
6 safe inside her home, and she did not subsequently take the Card out of the safe or
7 use it in any way. Her only activity on her EDD Debit Card Account thereafter was
8 to use Bank of America's website to transfer funds from her Account to her personal
9 consumer bank account (also with Bank of America). She never used the Card at an
10 ATM, for an online purchase, at a retail store, or for any other transaction. Despite
11 never using the Card, an unknown person or persons used the Cardholder
12 Information associated with Smith's EDD Debit Card and/or Account to make
13 unauthorized transactions in November 2020. Smith's Cardholder Information was
14 stolen due to the Bank's failure to prevent such thefts by its own agents.

15 **C. The Bank's Use of Outdated, Vulnerable Magnetic Stripe Technology**

16 59. When a debit or credit cardholder seeks to access funds on the card,
17 for example at a point-of-sale terminal or ATM, the Cardholder Information stored
18 on the card is first sent through a processing network operated by Visa. The first
19 step in that process occurs at the point of sale, where the card must either be swiped
20 or inserted into a card reader. The reader obtains the Cardholder Information stored
21 on the card and transmits it to the financial services provider through a computer
22 network, either at the time of the transaction or later in a "batch" with other
23 transactions.

24 60. From the 1960s until approximately 10 years ago, magnetic stripes
25 were the standard for storing consumer information on debit cards and credit cards

26 _____
27 e3ce446d0690 (reporting that an EDD Debit Cardholder experienced fraud despite
28 the fact that he "never . . . used the card" and "only used the account number to
transfer money to [his] credit union").

1 in the United States. A magnetic stripe contains static data about the card, including
2 the cardholder's name, the card number, and the card expiration date. This data is
3 printed directly on the outside of the card and recorded on the magnetic stripe. When
4 swiped through a reader, this data is collected and transmitted as part of the
5 transaction process.

6 61. Because the data on a magnetic stripe are static and easily readable,
7 magnetic stripe cards are highly susceptible to fraud. One of several common
8 methods of stealing information from magnetic stripe cards is called "skimming,"
9 a process by which a wireless transmitter affixed to a card reader collects the
10 information on the magnetic stripe when the card is swiped or inserted and sends it
11 to a nearby computer. The recipient can then use the information to clone the
12 consumer's card, conduct unauthorized transactions, and access the bank account
13 connected to the card.

14 62. Personal data on magnetic stripe cards can also be captured by hackers
15 on a large scale. For example, in 2013, hackers infiltrated the retailer Target's
16 payment terminals and systematically captured the information of every swiped
17 card for weeks, ultimately gathering the card information of tens of millions of
18 people.⁴ Card data collected in this manner can be sold on an underground market,
19 where the stolen data can be used to make fraudulent purchases.

20 63. Over the past decade, in an effort to stem the consumer fraud enabled
21 by magnetic stripes, the financial services industry in the United States has adopted
22 EMV chip technology as the industry standard. While magnetic stripes are "static,"
23 with the same card-identifying information provided for every transaction, EMV
24 chips are "dynamic," meaning the data they contain can be interacted with, altered,
25

26 ⁴ Elise Hu, "Target Hack a Tipping Point in Moving Away from Magnetic
27 Stripes," *NPR* (Jan. 23, 2014), *available at* [https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2014/01/23/264910138/target-hack-a-tipping-point-in-moving-](https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2014/01/23/264910138/target-hack-a-tipping-point-in-moving-away-from-magnetic-stripes)
28 [away-from-magnetic-stripes](https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2014/01/23/264910138/target-hack-a-tipping-point-in-moving-away-from-magnetic-stripes).

1 and updated. An EMV chip creates a unique electronic signature for each
2 transaction, making data from past EMV chip card purchases useless to would-be
3 thieves, thereby significantly reducing the risk of unauthorized transactions.

4 64. In 2011, the same year the Bank began issuing EDD Debit Cards, the
5 Bank announced it would offer EMV chips in corporate credit cards to its U.S.
6 business customers who regularly traveled outside the United States.

7 65. On September 30, 2014, the Bank announced that it would include
8 EMV chip technology on “all new and reissued” consumer debit cards. In
9 announcing this shift, a Bank of America executive stated that “chip technology is
10 an important tool in increasing card security, and we want our customers to have
11 the best possible experience when using their payment cards.” The executive added
12 that the “new chip-enabled cards will improve security of customers’ transactions.”⁵

13 66. In 2015, card issuers and processors began a nationwide shift to EMV
14 chip cards. By 2017, an estimated 855 million EMV chip cards had been issued to
15 U.S. consumers, and such cards are now standard in the industry.

16 67. In 2015, card-issuing banks and payment networks introduced a new
17 policy that shifted liability for fraudulent transactions away from themselves and
18 onto retailers and card issuers. As of October 1, 2015, retail merchants who did not
19 have certified EMV chip readers became liable for fraudulent transactions if the
20 consumer presented an EMV chip card. In essence, this meant that liability for
21 consumer card fraud would fall on either the retailer or the card issuer, whichever
22 was the least compliant with the EMV protocol.

23 68. Bank of America acknowledges on its website that EMV chip
24 technology “has been around for over 20 years and is the credit and debit card
25

26 ⁵ Bank of America Press Release, “Bank of America Begins Rollout of Chip
27 Debit Cards” (Sept. 30, 2014), *BusinessWire*, available at [https://](https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20140930005292/en/Bank-of-America-Begins-Rollout-of-Chip-Debit-Cards)
28 [www.businesswire.com/news/home/20140930005292/en/Bank-of-America-](https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20140930005292/en/Bank-of-America-Begins-Rollout-of-Chip-Debit-Cards)
[Begins-Rollout-of-Chip-Debit-Cards](https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20140930005292/en/Bank-of-America-Begins-Rollout-of-Chip-Debit-Cards).

1 security standard in many countries around the world. When purchases are made
2 using the chip feature at chip-enabled terminals, the transaction is more secure
3 because of the process used to determine if the card is authentic. This makes the
4 card more difficult to counterfeit or copy.” The Bank also assures Cardholders on
5 its website that “whether you use the magnetic stripe or the chip to make your
6 purchase, you can have confidence in the protection and security features we
7 provide for all credit and debit accounts.”

8 69. Bank of America has been aware for many years that EMV chip cards
9 are significantly more secure than magnetic stripe cards and that EMV chip cards
10 are the “debit card security standard.” Despite that knowledge and despite the
11 Bank’s representations to EDD that it will “focus on claimants” while leveraging
12 “rapidly evolving payment technology” and staying “at the forefront of payments
13 innovation,” the Bank chose to issue EDD Debit Cards using old, vulnerable
14 magnetic stripe technology to hundreds of thousands of the most financially
15 vulnerable Californians—Plaintiffs and Class Members. To this day, the Bank
16 continues to issue EDD Debit Cards with no EMV chip, notwithstanding its
17 announcement nearly seven years ago that it would include EMV chip technology
18 on all consumer debit cards to help prevent fraud. Predictably, the issuance of EDD
19 Debit Cards without EMV chips has led to rampant fraud, resulting in the ongoing
20 loss of millions of dollars in EDD benefits intended to assist Californians who lost
21 their jobs, including during the COVID-19 pandemic.

22 **D. The Bank’s Contractual Promises and Representations to Cardholders**

23 70. Bank of America represented to Plaintiffs and Class Members, in its
24 Cardholder Agreement and on its website, that they would not be responsible for
25 unauthorized transactions on their EDD Debit Cards or Accounts because of the
26 Bank’s “Zero Liability” policy, under which the Bank would fully protect them
27 against, and would reimburse them for, any unauthorized transactions. The Bank
28 also represented to Plaintiffs and Class Members that they could call the Bank 24

1 hours a day 7 days a week to report any unauthorized transaction to live customer
2 services representatives, and that the Bank would promptly investigate the
3 transaction and determine whether it was unauthorized within 10 business days
4 thereafter, except that if the Bank took longer than 10 business days (but in no event
5 longer than 45 calendar days) to investigate the transaction, the Bank “will credit
6 your Account within 10 business days for the amount you think is in error, so that
7 you will have the money during the time it takes us to complete our investigation.”

8 71. In the Bank’s California Employment Development Department Debit
9 Card Account Agreement (“Cardholder Agreement”), to which all EDD Debit
10 Cardholders must agree, Bank of America sets forth the above promises in detail.
11 The Cardholder Agreement has an effective date of March 1, 2018, and thus has
12 been effective throughout the Class Period, as defined below. The Cardholder
13 Agreement states: “Under the Bank of America ‘zero liability’ policy, you may
14 incur no liability for unauthorized use of your Card up to the amount of the
15 unauthorized transaction, provided you notify us within a reasonable time” The
16 Cardholder Agreement advises the Cardholder to “contact us at the number listed
17 below AT ONCE if you believe your Card has been lost or stolen or if you believe
18 that someone may use or has used your PIN assigned to your card without your
19 permission. Telephoning is the best way of keeping your possible losses down.”
20 The Cardholder Agreement requires Cardholders to call or write to report an
21 unauthorized transaction “no later than 60 days” after the Bank sent the statement
22 on which the transaction appeared.


23 72. The Cardholder Agreement promises that Bank of America “will
24 determine whether an error occurred within 10 business days” after an unauthorized
25 transaction is reported. The Cardholder Agreement reserves the right to “take up to
26 45 days to investigate” if the Bank “need[s] more time,” in which case the Bank
27 promises that “we will credit your Account within 10 business days for the amount
28

1 you think is in error, so that you will have the money during the time it takes us to
2 complete our investigation.”

3 73. Bank of America represents to EDD Debit Cardholders that the Bank’s
4 customer service department representatives are continuously available to assist
5 with suspected fraud. On Bank of America’s EDD Debit Card FAQ webpage, in
6 response to the question “What are the Bank of America EDD Debit Card Customer
7 Service hours?” Bank of America claims that “[f]or your convenience,” Bank of
8 America’s “dedicated customer service representatives are available 24 hours [a]
9 day, 7 days a week” by phone. The webpage further explains that the Bank’s
10 customer service representatives can help with the following: “Resolve a question
11 about your account statement,” “Investigate transactions,” “Process
12 lost/stolen/damaged card reports,” and “Request an emergency cash transfer.” In its
13 Cardholder Agreement, Bank of America advises EDD Debit Cardholders that
14 “Telephoning is the best way of keeping your possible losses down.” In addition,
15 Bank of America provides each EDD Debit Cardholder with a “Quick Reference
16 Guide,” which prominently states that “customer service is available 24/7.”

17 **E. The Rampant Third-Party Fraud on EDD Debit Card Accounts**

18 74. In the spring of 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic devastated California’s
19 economy, and millions of workers lost their jobs due to business closures and mass
20 layoffs. The state’s unemployment rate skyrocketed from 3.9% in January 2020 to
21 16.4% in April 2020, following closure orders issued by Governor Gavin Newsom
22 and county health officials. Industries such as hospitality, food service, retail trade,
23 and educational services were especially hard hit.



75. As a result, millions of Californians turned to the EDD unemployment benefits programs administered by Bank of America to pay their bills and make ends meet. Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, EDD has received at least 18.5 million claims for various unemployment benefits. In the first week of December 2020, EDD received 341,813 claims, a 600% increase from December 2019. Bank of America has issued more than 9 million EDD Debit Cards to individuals found by EDD to be eligible for unemployment benefits.

76. As widely reported in the media and as described by California state legislators who report having heard from thousands of constituents, tens of thousands of EDD Debit Cardholders have been the victims of fraud throughout the pandemic, resulting in tens of millions of dollars having been stolen from their Accounts, including through fraudulent ATM withdrawals, such as many Plaintiffs and Class Members experienced.

77. EDD Debit Cardholders have reported thousands of dollars stolen through unauthorized use of their EDD Debit Cards. These unauthorized transactions have taken various forms, including massive ATM withdrawals in

1 distant states and countries,⁶ thousand-dollar charges at luxury vendors, and
2 repeated transactions with food delivery services. Regardless of how or where the
3 fraud has been carried out, the Bank's EDD Debit Cards have proven highly
4 susceptible to unauthorized use.

5 78. After criminals exploit the security vulnerabilities of the Bank's EDD
6 Debit Cards and Accounts and misappropriate Cardholder Information, that
7 information can be sold on the dark web, allowing the buyers to engage in
8 unauthorized use of funds belonging to Plaintiffs and Class Members.⁷

9 79. Such rampant third-party fraud was readily foreseeable given the rapid
10 growth of the number of new unemployment benefits claims, as well as reports from
11 early in the pandemic warning of the potential for fraud and exploitation of the
12 unemployment benefits system by criminals. It is well known in the financial
13 industry that crises such as economic recessions lead to an increase in scams, fraud,
14 and other financial crimes. The early months of the COVID-19 pandemic in the
15 United States—March through May 2020—made clear that the pandemic would be
16 no exception. In late March 2020, the federal Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
17 Economic Security (CARES) Act was signed into law, injecting \$2.2 trillion of
18 relief into the American economy, including \$260 billion in increased
19 unemployment benefits, and hundreds of billions of dollars more in one-time cash
20 payments to taxpayers and forgivable Paycheck Protection Program ("PPP") loans.
21 This rapid influx of pandemic relief to individuals and businesses, combined with
22 rapid growth in the number of new claims for UI, PUA, and other public benefits
23 created a "perfect environment" for fraud that was widely reported in the American
24

25 ⁶ See, e.g., CBSLA Staff, "Bank of America Freezes EDD Accounts of Nearly
26 350,000 Unemployed Californians for Suspected Fraud," *CBS Los Angeles* (Oct.
27 29, 2020), available at <https://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2020/10/29/bank-of-america-freezes-edd-accounts-of-nearly-350000-unemployed-californians-for-suspected-fraud/>.

28 ⁷ See *id.*

media,⁸ and that led to a flood of warnings from government agencies and expert nongovernmental organizations about major increases in malicious cyber activity and financial fraud, including fraud targeting government unemployment benefits and consumer banking and credit services.⁹ Reporting during the early months of

⁸ Ari Shapiro & Martin Kaste, “The Pandemic Creates A Perfect Environment For New Types Of Fraud,” *NPR All Things Considered* (May 21, 2020), <https://www.npr.org/2020/05/21/860584461/the-pandemic-creates-a-perfect-environment-for-new-types-of-fraud> (reporting experts saying that there was a “bonanza” and “gold rush right now” in pandemic-related financial crimes); Steve Inskeep & Martin Kaste, Washington State Hit Hard by Unemployment Fraud, *NPR Morning Edition* (May 22, 2020) (“scams thriving nationwide in the uncertain conditions created by the pandemic,” including hundreds of millions of dollars lost by Washington state to fraudulent unemployment claims).

⁹ See, e.g., National Governor’s Association, *Memorandum To: All Governors Re: COVID-19 and Cybersecurity* at 1 (Apr. 28, 2020) (“State agencies, critical infrastructure sectors, and the general public are experiencing waves of COVID-themed malicious cyber activity.”); Greg Iacurci, “If there’s coronavirus relief money, scammers will try and steal it,” *CNBC* (May 6, 2020), <https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/06/scammers-are-looking-to-steal-your-coronavirus-relief-money.html> (“Federal agencies like the IRS, Federal Trade Commission, Social Security Administration and FBI have warned consumers and business owners in recent weeks to be vigilant as fraudsters try to take advantage of them during the coronavirus pandemic,” including by targeting government financial relief such as unemployment benefits); U.S. Dept. of Labor Press Release, *U.S. Department Of Labor Issues Guidance And Reminders To States To Ensure Integrity Of Unemployment Insurance Programs* (May 11, 2020), <https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/eta/eta20200511-1> (announcing new “targeted guidance and reminders . . . to help states guard against fraud and abuse of their unemployment insurance systems”); Mike Baker, “Feds Suspect Vast Fraud Network Is Targeting U.S. Unemployment Systems,” *The New York Times* (May 16, 2020), available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/16/us/coronavirus-unemployment-fraud-secret-service-washington.html>; AnnaMaria Andriotis & Orla McCaffrey, “Borrower, Beware: Credit-Card Fraud Attempts Rise During the Coronavirus Crisis,” *The Wall Street Journal* (May 27, 2020), available at <https://www.wsj.com/articles/borrower-beware-credit-card-fraud-attempts-rise-during-the-coronavirus-crisis-11590571800> (reporting on the “big jump in attempted credit- and debit-card fraud since coronavirus shut down the U.S. economy” and that “[b]anks have increased their fraud projections for 2020”).

1 the pandemic also noted that the major increases in fraudulent financial activity had,
 2 predictably, caused a corresponding increase in demand on customer service phone
 3 lines, causing many agencies and companies to hire additional customer service
 4 representatives.¹⁰ Bank of America nonetheless failed to take reasonable measures
 5 to prepare for, prevent, or respond to the readily foreseeable wave of transactional
 6 fraud affecting its EDD Debit Cards and Accounts.

7 **F. The Bank's Evasive and Ineffectual Response Prior to the Filing of**
 8 **Plaintiffs' Initial Class Action Complaint and The Court's Issuance of**
 9 **a Preliminary Injunction**

10 80. Bank of America's ineffective response to the rampant transactional
 11 fraud on EDD Debit Cards and Accounts has taken various forms, as detailed
 12 herein, including failing to employ reasonable practices and procedures for
 13 monitoring, detecting, stopping, and notifying Plaintiffs and Class Members about
 14 highly suspicious transactions in their Accounts; not answering the customer
 15 service phone lines it advises Cardholders to call; establishing "customer service"
 16 procedures that frustrate and obstruct Plaintiffs' and Class Members' efforts to file
 17 fraud claims; opening fraud claims and then promptly closing them without
 18 conducting a reasonable and good faith investigation; unilaterally reversing
 19 "permanent" credits previously granted for unauthorized transactions without a
 20 reasonable and good faith basis and without advance notice to the Cardholder;
 21 failing to extend provisional credit to Cardholders without a reasonable and good
 22
 23
 24

25 ¹⁰ See, e.g., Baker, *supra* note 9 (phone calls reporting fraud "flooded"
 26 Washington state unemployment benefits agency and "forced the state to hire
 27 more people to answer the phones"); Andriotis *et al.*, *supra* note 9 (cardholders of
 28 major credit card issuers experiencing difficulty "getting customer-service
 representatives on the phone to remove charges and replace cards").

1 faith basis; and indefinitely freezing or blocking the Accounts of Cardholders who
 2 call Bank of America to report third-party fraud on their Accounts.¹¹

3 **1. The Bank’s Policy and Practice of Not Employing**
 4 **Reasonable Practices and Procedures to Monitor for, Detect,**
 5 **Stop, and Promptly Notify Cardholders about Suspicious**
 6 **Transactions Involving their Cards and Accounts**

7 81. In its 2015 Proposal, Bank of America represented to EDD that, if
 8 EDD were to extend its contract to distribute EDD benefits through EDD Debit
 9 Cards and Accounts, the Bank “fully intend[s] to apply the most rigorous fraud
 10 detection procedures,” including “employ[ing] the highest level of security and
 11 fraud safeguards” based on “multiple layers of extensive security” and a “multi-
 12 faceted approach to combat fraud.” The Bank’s 2015 Proposal specifically promises
 13 that Bank of America would provide “fraud monitoring” for all EDD Debit Cards
 14 and Accounts, and to employ technology that would provide “immediate response
 15 to emerging fraud trends” and allow fraudulent transactions to be “declined in real
 16 time.” On information and belief, the Bank did not keep any of these promises with
 17 respect to Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ Accounts during the Class Period (as
 18 defined herein), resulting in a flood of unauthorized transactions occurring on
 19 Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ Accounts which went unchecked by the Bank.

20 82. For example, at all relevant times, Bank of America knew that the vast
 21 majority of Plaintiffs and Class Members were residents of California based on a
 22 variety of information sources, including Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ contact
 23 information, their EDD Debit Card and Account transaction histories, and the fact
 24 that EDD had determined them to be eligible to receive EDD benefits.

25

 ¹¹ Kenny Choi, “Victims of Bank of America Bank Debit Card Fraud Tell
 26 Stories of Fake Charges, Long Waits, Closed Claims,” *KPIX–CBS SF Bay Area*
 27 (Dec. 22, 2020), *available at* <https://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2020/12/22/victims-of-bank-of-america-edd-debit-card-fraud-tell-stories-of-closed-claims-frustration-loss/>.
 28

1 83. The Bank also knew about the COVID-19 pandemic and the fact that
2 people were engaging in much less long-distance travel (including long-distance in-
3 state, out-of-state, and out-of-country travel) during the pandemic, whether because
4 of pandemic-related fears, pandemic-related travel restrictions imposed by state,
5 national, and foreign governments, or other reasons. The Bank had a legal
6 obligation, but failed, to use this knowledge to monitor for, detect, stop, and notify
7 Cardholders about transactions involving their Card or Account that were
8 suspicious because they were made during the pandemic at a significant distance
9 from where a particular Cardholder resided—especially with respect to transactions
10 being made hundreds of miles away or in another country.

11 84. The Bank also had access to Plaintiffs' and Class Members' individual
12 EDD Debit Card and Account transaction histories. The Bank had an obligation,
13 but failed, to use this knowledge to monitor for, detect, stop, and notify Cardholders
14 about multiple transactions involving their Card or Account that were suspicious
15 because the multiple transactions were made close in time but at a great physical
16 distance away from one another. For example, in November 2020, Class
17 Representative Plaintiff Jennifer Yick used her EDD Debit Card for in-person
18 transactions at stores in the San Francisco Bay Area on the same day or within one
19 day of unauthorized DoorDash transactions that occurred in New York, Texas, and
20 hundreds of miles away in Southern California. Yet the Bank failed to flag any of
21 these transactions as suspicious, stop them, or promptly notify Yick about them.

22 85. The Bank also had an obligation, but failed, to use Plaintiffs' and Class
23 Members' individual EDD Debit Card and Account transaction histories and past
24 Account access behaviors (e.g., logging into Accounts online, checking Account
25 balances) to monitor for, detect, stop, and notify Cardholders about transactions
26 involving their Card or Account and about Account access behaviors that were
27 suspicious because they were significantly inconsistent with how the Cardholder
28 had previously used their Card and Account. For example, Jennifer Yick had never

1 used her EDD Debit Card for transactions from DoorDash or to make any online
2 transactions, but rather had always used her Card over the course of several months
3 for purchasing necessities from brick-and-mortar stores located in or around the San
4 Francisco Bay Area, such as gas stations, grocery stores, and retail stores like Target
5 and Costco. Yet, Bank of America failed to flag as suspicious, stop, or notify her
6 about the four unauthorized DoorDash transactions that occurred within two weeks
7 of each other in November 2020 in New York, Texas, and Southern California.

8 86. Indeed, at all relevant times, the Bank had the obligation, but failed, to
9 employ reasonable policies and procedures for monitoring for, detecting, stopping,
10 and promptly notifying Cardholders about highly suspicious transactions involving
11 their Cards and Accounts, including but limited to using all the information at its
12 disposal to satisfy its constitutional, statutory, common law, and contractual
13 obligations to Plaintiffs and Class Members to monitor for, detect, stop, and
14 promptly notify Cardholders about suspicious activity involving their Card or
15 Account.

16 **2. The Bank's Policy and Practice of Making it Difficult for**
17 **Cardholders to Report Unauthorized Transactions**

18 87. The Bank has prevented many Plaintiffs and Class Members from
19 being able to report fraud in a timely manner, or even at all. For starters, the Bank
20 has established EDD Debit Card customer service phone lines as the virtually
21 exclusive means for EDD Debit Cardholders to seek help regarding issues with their
22 Cards or Accounts. Many Plaintiffs and Class Members, for example, have gone to
23 Bank of America branches seeking assistance with their Cards or Accounts, only
24 for Bank branch employees to tell them that they cannot assist EDD Debit
25 Cardholders, and that the Cardholder must call the phone number on the back of
26 their Card for assistance. Similarly, the Bank has generally not provided EDD Debit
27 Cardholders with the option of communicating their customer service to the Bank
28 by email, online chat, in-app chat, text, or other means now commonly available to

1 customers of financial institutions. Instead, EDD Debit Cardholders are largely
2 limited to calling.

3 88. Calling the Bank's EDD Debit Card customer service phone lines,
4 however, has often required Cardholders to endure hours-long wait times (with no
5 option to receive a callback when a customer service agent becomes available), a
6 variety of mishaps, and customer service agent incompetence. Notwithstanding the
7 foreseeable spike in calls that the Bank knew or should have known would
8 inevitably accompany the dramatic increase in unemployment benefits recipients
9 during the pandemic, the Bank failed to appropriately staff its customer service call
10 centers in a manner that would enable the Bank to honor its contractual
11 commitments under the EDD-Bank Contract and to provide reasonable levels of
12 assistance to the predictably large volume of EDD Debit Cardholders seeking
13 assistance. As a result, Plaintiffs and Class Members attempting to report fraud or
14 to inquire about potential fraud have been kept on hold for hours, have been
15 disconnected without warning, have waited long periods of time to speak with
16 someone only to be told to call back later, have been transferred to various
17 departments with no apparent end or sent to voicemail, have had to deal with
18 unhelpful automated agents, and have unsuccessfully attempted to reach the Bank
19 by email.

20 **3. The Bank's Policy and Practice of Automatically Denying**
21 **Unauthorized Transaction Claims Without Reasonable**
22 **Investigation or Explanation, Including Based Solely on a**
23 **Highly Flawed "Claim Fraud Filter"**

24 89. Even when Plaintiffs and Class Members have been able to report
25 unauthorized transactions to the Bank, the Bank has had a policy and practice since
26 at least October 2020 of automatically and summarily denying the fraud claims of
27 EDD Debit Cardholders without adequate investigation or explanation, including
28 based solely and exclusively on the results of the Bank's highly flawed and

1 unreliable automated “fraud filter” (“Claim Fraud Filter”), which it applies
2 whenever an EDD Debit Cardholder reports an unauthorized transaction on their
3 Account, purportedly to determine if the claimant is using a stolen identity. Pursuant
4 to this policy and/or practice, the Bank has failed to provide provisional credit to
5 tens or hundreds of thousands of Cardholders who filed a fraud claim and were
6 flagged by the Bank’s Claim Fraud Filter. Instead of investigating the claim and
7 providing provisional credit as required by law, the Bank sent those Cardholders a
8 form letter, often dated the very same day or within a day or two of the Cardholder’s
9 report of the unauthorized transactions, closing the Cardholder’s claim. The form
10 letter states: “Your claim has been closed because we believe the account or the
11 claim have been the subject of fraud or suspicious activity. Any temporary credit
12 that was applied to your account related to this claim, including any related
13 reimbursement of fees, has been or will be debited from your account and reflected
14 in your available balance, if any.” The form letter does not provide any
15 individualized information explaining what the Bank’s investigation, if any,
16 entailed, nor does it explain the basis for the Bank’s determination.

17 90. The Bank’s form letter provides a telephone number that Cardholders
18 should call if they wish to “request that [the Bank] reopen your claim for further
19 consideration,” but EDD Debit Cardholders who have called the Bank at that
20 number to make such a request have been given erroneous information or have been
21 told they cannot be helped. Even those who have submitted detailed documentation
22 to the Bank substantiating their fraud claims, such as sworn statements, police
23 reports, and documentary proof of their whereabouts at the time the fraudulent
24 transactions occurred (e.g., that they were nowhere near the ATM from which their
25 funds were withdrawn), have been often ignored and forced to go months without
26 receiving any update from the Bank regarding the status of their claim. Some who
27 submitted additional information simply received yet another form letter from the
28 Bank summarily reaffirming without explanation the Bank’s original decision

1 denying the fraud claim. Even those Cardholders whose claims have been reopened
2 were not issued provisional credit pending completion of the Bank's investigation
3 and were not guaranteed that the Bank's investigation would be completed within
4 a certain number of days.

5 91. The Bank adopted its policy and practice of automatically denying the
6 fraud claims of EDD Debit Cardholders in an attempt to circumvent its obligations
7 under EFTA and Regulation E, which require the Bank to issue provisional credit
8 if it has not completed a good-faith investigation within 10 business days of a
9 Cardholder giving notice of an unauthorized transaction on their Account, to
10 complete a good-faith investigation of the claim within no more than 45 days, and
11 to permanently credit the Cardholder's Account for the amount of the transaction
12 unless the Bank has a reasonable basis for believing that the Cardholder authorized
13 or benefitted from the transaction. In implementing this unlawful policy and
14 practice, the Bank sought to protect its own financial interests at the expense of
15 legitimate claimants whose life-sustaining public benefits had been stolen from
16 their Bank of America Account.

17 92. The Bank also implemented its policy and practice of automatically
18 denying the fraud claims of EDD Debit Cardholders *retroactively* by rescinding
19 "permanent" credits that the Bank had previously paid. Thus, many Plaintiffs and
20 Class Members who previously had been "permanently" credited with the amount
21 of the funds that had been stolen from them and who had been previously informed
22 by the Bank that their fraud claims were favorably resolved suddenly and without
23 explanation had that same amount *debited* from their Accounts, sometimes leaving
24 their Accounts with a negative balance. As a result, when those Cardholders
25 received their next EDD benefits payment deposit into their Account, they were not
26 actually able to access those benefits because the new EDD benefits payments were
27 credited against the negative balance in their Account that resulted from the Bank's
28 actions.

1 **4. The Bank’s Policy and Practice of Automatically and**
 2 **Indefinitely Freezing Cardholders’ Accounts When They**
 3 **Report Unauthorized Transactions, Based on a Highly**
 4 **Flawed “Claim Fraud Filter”**

5 93. In and around October 2020, the Bank implemented an additional
 6 policy and practice of responding to EDD Debit Cardholders who report
 7 unauthorized transactions by automatically and indefinitely freezing or blocking
 8 their Accounts without any prior notice, explanation, or opportunity to be heard,
 9 including based solely on the results of the Bank’s highly flawed and unreliable
 10 automated Claim Fraud Filter. A Cardholder whose Account is frozen or blocked
 11 cannot access any funds in their Account; moreover, the Bank will not accept EDD
 12 benefits payments from EDD for deposit into a frozen Account. Thus, many Class
 13 Members have had the experience of reporting that they were **the victims** of
 14 fraudulent transactions and receiving assurances from the Bank that it will cancel
 15 their old EDD Debit Card and issue them a new one, only to discover that their new
 16 Card is useless because the Bank has frozen (or blocked) their Account. The Bank
 17 implements this policy and practice of freezing or blocking Accounts without any
 18 prior notice, thus depriving Cardholders of access to any EDD benefits that may
 19 have been in the Account at the time of the freeze or block. Moreover, the Bank’s
 20 practice of freezing or blocking Accounts cuts off the affected EDD Debit
 21 Cardholders’ access to any continuing benefits that the EDD deposits into the
 22 Cardholder’s blocked Account or attempts to deposit into the Cardholder’s frozen
 23 Account—EDD benefits to which EDD has determined the Cardholder is entitled.
 24 As a result, many EDD Debit Cardholders who are the victims of third-party fraud
 25 and who turn to the Bank for help, find themselves indefinitely deprived of access
 26 to *all* their EDD benefits and treated as if *they* are the criminals.

27 94. Bank of America has frozen many Cardholders’ Accounts for months
 28 on end, without providing them any information as to when their Accounts will be

1 unfrozen or how they can facilitate that unfreezing. Some EDD Debit Cardholders
2 whose Accounts are frozen in this manner have eventually received a letter from
3 the Bank weeks or months after the fact, but that letter simply states: “It has been
4 determined that there may be irregular, unauthorized, or unlawful activities
5 involved with the prepaid debit card issued to you. As a result . . . a freeze (or hold)
6 has been placed on your account.” The letter states that once the Bank freezes your
7 Account, you “will be unable to use the prepaid debit card or access the money in
8 your account,” and that the Account “will not be available to receive any additional
9 benefits that may be issued to you by [EDD].” The letter further states: “If a
10 conclusion is reached that there is no irregular, unauthorized, or unlawful activity
11 on your account, your account will be unfrozen and your balance will become
12 available in accordance with the terms of the card account agreement and state
13 agency guidelines,” but the letter does not advise the affected Cardholder as to what
14 steps they can take to regain access to their Account.

15 95. After Bank of America has frozen an EDD Debit Card Account in
16 response to a report of transactional fraud, the Bank has had a policy and practice
17 of telling the affected Cardholder that they are required to re-authenticate their
18 identity and re-verify their benefits eligibility with EDD as a condition of
19 unfreezing their Account—even if EDD itself has not raised any question regarding
20 the individual’s identity or eligibility for benefits. Bank of America has imposed
21 this onerous and unreasonable condition on Cardholders who report third-party
22 transactional fraud regardless of whether there is a reasonable basis for suspecting
23 them of having committed benefits eligibility fraud, and despite knowing that
24 EDD’s call center has been completely overwhelmed by the surge in calls from
25 unemployment benefits recipients throughout the pandemic and that many
26 individuals who call EDD will never get through to a live agent. According to the
27 State Auditor, EDD agents answered just 1.4% (697,132 of 50,251,351) of calls
28

1 received in July 2020, and just 6.3% (230,301 of 3,649,193) of calls received in
2 October 2020.

3 96. Even after Cardholders have complied with this onerous and
4 unreasonable Bank-imposed requirement of contacting EDD and obtaining
5 confirmation from EDD that they either do not need to re-verify or have
6 successfully re-verified their benefits eligibility, Bank of America *still* has not
7 unfrozen their EDD Debit Card Account, continuing without explanation to deprive
8 Cardholders of access to their EDD benefits and refusing to process their fraud
9 claims or refund their stolen money, sometimes for months longer.

10 **5. The Bank's Policy and Practice of Denying Reasonable**
11 **Customer Service to Cardholders Seeking Assistance with**
12 **Fraud Claims and the Unfreezing of Accounts**

13 97. Desperate and confused, EDD Debit Cardholders whose fraud claims
14 have been summarily denied and/or whose EDD Debit Card Accounts have been
15 suddenly frozen have spent months calling the Bank's customer service hotline, to
16 no avail.

17 98. The Bank has failed to appropriately staff its customer service call
18 centers in a manner that would allow it to honor its contractual commitments under
19 the EDD-Bank Contract and to provide reasonable levels of assistance to the
20 predictably large volume of EDD Debit Cardholders seeking assistance during this
21 pandemic. Further, the Bank has a policy and practice of failing to provide its
22 customer service representatives the tools or authority necessary to assist
23 Cardholders who call seeking assistance in resolving their fraud claims or
24 unfreezing their Accounts. Although the Bank at some point in the Fall of 2020
25 hired additional customer service agents, on information and belief those newly
26 hired customer service agents are not adequately trained and are not empowered to
27 investigate or resolve fraud claims, and the number of customer service agents
28

1 continued to be too low to handle incoming calls, resulting in hours-long wait times
2 if Cardholders can get through at all.

3 99. Despite the Bank's promise of 24/7 customer service, Plaintiffs and
4 Class Members have found themselves repeatedly kept on hold, sometimes for
5 hours, waiting to speak to a live agent. Plaintiffs and Class Members have routinely
6 been disconnected, hung up on, and treated rudely by overworked and overwhelmed
7 agents. They often spend hours on hold with customer service, despite the Bank
8 having represented in its Cardholder Agreement that "[t]elephoning is the best way
9 of keeping your possible losses down." Even when Plaintiffs and Class Members
10 finally reach customer service representatives, those representatives are unable to
11 offer any meaningful assistance, often conveying false information and
12 contradicting one another.

13 100. The Bank's representatives also often provide erroneous information
14 to Plaintiffs and Class Members regarding the source of their Account freezes.
15 Countless Class Members have been told that the Bank has no control over the
16 freeze, that EDD is the entity responsible for the freeze, and that only EDD has the
17 power to unfreeze their Account. But when Class Members call EDD, EDD informs
18 them that it has no control over their Account and that the freeze is entirely within
19 Bank of America's control. Even when Class Members re-verify their identity with
20 EDD, when EDD confirms their eligibility for benefits, and when EDD or Class
21 Members convey this information to the Bank, the Bank *still* does not unfreeze their
22 Accounts. In some cases, EDD has resumed paying benefits to Class Members
23 through paper checks at the Class Members' request, but those Class Members
24 continue to be unable to access funds in their Accounts, which remain frozen.

25 101. The EDD has publicly stated that the responsibility to prevent
26 fraudulent transactions and to address claims of unauthorized transactions lies
27 entirely with Bank of America, stating on October 29, 2020, that EDD "has no direct
28 access to debit funds on any accounts" and that those impacted by card issues should

1 contact Bank of America.¹² The agency has stated that it has no means to intervene
2 in Bank of America's procedures.

3 102. Bank of America's inadequate response to EDD Debit Cardholders'
4 issues with fraud on their Cards and Accounts results from the Bank's failure to
5 adequately staff its customer-service and fraud-investigation departments, and from
6 Bank procedures that are designed to, or that the Bank knows or reasonably should
7 know will, frustrate and obstruct Cardholders' efforts to submit their claims and to
8 obtain reimbursement under EFTA and the Bank's "Zero Liability" policy.

9 103. Many EDD Debit Cardholders have characterized their efforts to
10 obtain relief from the Bank for the wrongful conduct alleged herein as an "unofficial
11 full-time job trying to get the money back." One defrauded EDD Debit Cardholder
12 reported: "It's kind of like a nightmare Every day I'm wondering what's more
13 important. Do I get on the phone with the bank and try again so I have a place to
14 sleep tomorrow, or do I just accept that I'm going to be on the street and focus on
15 my job search? Because you can't do both."¹³

16 104. A Bank of America customer service worker, addressing the Bank's
17 response to the influx of reports of third-party debit card fraud, stated: "We're
18 actually no longer allowed to tell them a timeframe, because we have no clue
19 Every day, I talk to 30 people with the same story. I just pray for them after my
20 shift, honestly."¹⁴

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22
23 ¹² Matt Fountain, "Bank of America Froze SLO County Residents'
24 Unemployment Benefits Because of Fraud," *San Luis Obispo Tribune* (Dec. 17,
25 2020), available at <https://www.sanluisobispo.com/news/local/article247729155.html>.

26 ¹³ Lauren Hepler & Stephen Council, "How Bank of America Helped Fuel
27 California's Unemployment Meltdown," *CalMatters* (Nov. 20, 2020), available at
28 <https://calmatters.org/economy/2020/11/how-bank-of-america-helped-fuel-californias-unemployment-meltdown/>.

¹⁴ *Id.*

105. Bank of America’s disregard for EDD Debit Cardholders’ issues with fraud and the Bank’s inadequate response contradicts the representations it made to the State in its proposal to administer the EDD public benefits program, in which the Bank represented, “we pride ourselves on providing stellar customer service to every caller. Long call hold waits and busy signals are not tolerated at Bank of America.”

6. The Court Preliminarily Enjoins the Bank’s Policies and Practices

106. On January 14, 2021, Plaintiff Jennifer Yick commenced the class action titled *Yick v. Bank of America, N.A.*, No. 3:21-cv-00376, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. *See Yick*, Dkt. No. 1. Eight related class actions were subsequently filed in the Northern District of California,¹⁵ which the Court consolidated into *Yick* for all purposes on March 29, 2021.

107. Shortly after Plaintiffs put the Bank on notice of their intent to move for a preliminary injunction, on or around March 18, 2021, the Bank announced that it was adopting a new policy and practice of “blocking” rather than “freezing” the Accounts of EDD Debit Cardholders who reported unauthorized transactions on their Account and who were flagged by the Bank’s Claim Fraud Filter, and that it was converting some “frozen” Accounts to “blocked” status. According to the Bank, this new policy permits a Cardholder with a “blocked” Account to regain access to their Account by contacting the Bank and passing a Bank-administered

¹⁵ *See Rodriguez v. Bank of America, N.A.*, No. 21-cv-00494 (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 20, 2021); *Willrich v. Bank of America, N.A.*, No. 21-cv-00547 (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 22, 2021); *McClure v. Bank of America, N.A.*, No. 21-cv-00572 (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 25, 2021); *Oosthuizen v. Bank of America, N.A.*, No. 21-cv-00615 (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 26, 2021); *Wilson v. Bank of America, N.A.*, No. 21-cv-00699 (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 28, 2021); *Mosson v. Bank of America, N.A.*, No. 21-cv-00743 (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 29, 2021); *Cajas v. Bank of America, N.A.*, No. 21-cv-00869 (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 3, 2021); *Smith v. Bank of America, N.A.*, No. 21-cv-01466 (N.D. Cal. filed Mar. 1, 2021).

1 identity-verification process. At the same time, the Bank sent some Accountholders
2 form letters dated March 18, 2021, informing them about this new policy. However,
3 the Bank still does not provide Cardholders advance notice of the intended block
4 (which, like a “freeze,” denies the Cardholder access to all funds in their Account),
5 and the Bank continues to block the Accounts of legitimate Cardholders based
6 solely on the results of the Bank’s Claim Fraud Filter, without any reasonable
7 investigation.

8 108. On April 1, 2021, Plaintiffs in the nine consolidated *Yick* class action
9 cases filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Provisional Class Certification
10 under Rule 23(b)(2), seeking to enjoin the Bank’s practices described herein. In
11 opposing the motion, Bank of America confirmed that since October 2020, the Bank
12 had maintained a policy and practice of (a) subjecting every EDD Debit Cardholder
13 who submitted a claim of unauthorized transaction to an initial “Claim Fraud
14 Filter,” (b) automatically and without investigation denying the fraud claim of any
15 EDD Debit Cardholder flagged by the Claim Fraud Filter, and (c) automatically and
16 without investigation freezing or blocking the Account of any EDD Debit
17 Cardholder flagged by the Claim Fraud Filter. The Bank further confirmed that
18 between October 2020 and March 2021, it denied the fraud claims and froze or
19 blocked the Accounts of tens of thousands of legitimate EDD Debit Cardholders
20 based solely on the erroneous results of its Claim Fraud Filter. The Bank’s Claim
21 Fraud Filter has an extremely high false positive rate, and erroneously flagged tens
22 of thousands of claimants as criminals using stolen identities when they were in fact
23 legitimate EDD Debit Cardholders entitled to EDD benefits and who were
24 wrongfully deprived of those statutory benefits as a result of the Bank’s unlawful
25 policies and practices.

26 109. On May 17, 2021, the district court in *Yick* issued an Order Re
27 Preliminary Injunction, holding that Plaintiffs “have demonstrated a strong
28 likelihood of success” on claims for violations of the federal Electronic Fund

1 Transfers Act, for violations of California's Unfair Competition Law, and for
2 breach of contract; and that Plaintiffs had shown irreparable injury. The district
3 court provisionally certified a Rule 23(b)(2) class of all EDD Debit Cardholders
4 who call the Bank to report unauthorized charges to their Accounts and ordered the
5 parties to meet and confer regarding the appropriate scope of a preliminary
6 injunction. *Yick*, Dkt. No. 89 (**Exhibit A**).

7 110. On June 1, 2021, after the *Yick* parties engaged in an extensive meet-
8 and-confer process, including a two-day settlement conference before U.S.
9 Magistrate Judge Sallie Kim, the district court entered the parties' joint submission
10 as a Preliminary Injunction. *Id.*, Dkt. No. 103 (**Exhibit B**). Among other things, the
11 Preliminary Injunction: (a) prohibits the Bank from considering the results of the
12 Bank's Claim Fraud Filter in investigating or resolving unauthorized transaction
13 error claims ("Claims"); (b) prohibits the Bank from denying or closing Claims or
14 denying provisional or permanent credit to claimants' Accounts without conducting
15 and concluding an investigation into the alleged unauthorized transaction pursuant
16 to EFTA and Regulation E; (c) prohibits the Bank from denying or closing Claims
17 without providing the claimant a written explanation of the findings of its
18 investigation, pursuant to EFTA and Regulation E; (d) prohibits the Bank from
19 considering the results of the Bank's Claim Fraud Filter as a basis for freezing any
20 Class Member's Account; (e) requires the Bank to reopen any Claim that it closed
21 or denied based solely on the results of the Claim Fraud Filter and that it has not
22 previously paid or previously reopened and investigated; (f) requires the Bank to
23 investigate and resolve all such previously closed claims within specified time
24 periods after the Class Member authenticates their identity with the Bank, and to
25 issue provisional credit in the amount of the alleged error if the Bank's investigation
26 is not completed within specified time limits; and (g) requires the Bank to establish
27 dedicated toll-free numbers for Class Members seeking assistance with fraud claims
28 (Claims Initiation Call Center) or frozen and blocked Accounts (Fraud Call Center),

1 to expand its Claims Initiation Call Center and Fraud Call Center hours to 24 hours
 2 per day, 7 days per week, to provide specified training to its Customer Service
 3 Representatives, and to staff its Claims Initiation Call Center and Fraud Call Centers
 4 to ensure an average speed to answer of no more than five minutes, 90 percent of
 5 the time.

6 **7. The Bank's Policies and Practices Continue to Harm** 7 **Cardholders**

8 111. Notwithstanding the Preliminary Injunction prohibiting the Bank from
 9 considering the results of the Claim Fraud Filter as a basis for denying or closing
 10 unauthorized transaction claims or as a basis for "freezing" any Class Member's
 11 Account, the Bank continues to apply the Claim Fraud Filter to every Class Member
 12 who reports an unauthorized transaction and continues to rely on the results of the
 13 Claim Fraud Filter as a basis for "blocking" those Class Members' Accounts. Just
 14 as Class Members whose Accounts are "frozen" are denied access to funds in their
 15 Accounts, Class Members whose Accounts are "blocked" are likewise unable to
 16 access any EDD benefits still remaining in their Account and are unable to access
 17 any continuing EDD benefits that EDD deposits into their Account while their
 18 Account is blocked.

19 112. On information and belief, the Bank continues to block the Accounts
 20 of thousands if not tens of thousands of Class Members *each month* based solely on
 21 the results of the Bank's highly flawed and unreliable Claim Fraud Filter, thus
 22 depriving Class Members of access to critical unemployment and other public
 23 benefits to which the EDD has found they are entitled and on which they and their
 24 families depend for food, shelter, and other basic life necessities.

25 113. Moreover, Class Members continue to experience unauthorized
 26 transactions on their EDD Debit Card Accounts.

G. Class Representative Plaintiffs' Allegations

1. Jennifer Yick

114. In late November 2020, Yick was surprised when her EDD Debit Card was declined at a grocery store in the San Francisco Bay Area. She subsequently viewed her Account online and discovered that her Account balance, which she knew should have been over \$400, had been drained to 70 cents due to four unauthorized transactions with DoorDash, a food delivery service, for what appeared to be orders from restaurants located in Texas, New York, and Southern California totaling over \$400. The transactions posted to Yick's Account on November 2, 5, 8, and 16. Yick does not have a DoorDash account and did not make or authorize these transactions. Yick had never authorized anyone to use her Card, and she had never disclosed her Card PIN to anyone.

115. Yick is a long-time San Francisco resident. She did not travel to Texas, New York, Southern California, or anywhere else outside the San Francisco Bay Area during or around the period in November 2020 when the unauthorized transactions occurred, and during which time there was a nationwide surge of COVID-19 cases and related California and federal government restrictions on travel. Indeed, Yick used her EDD Debit Card for in-person transactions at stores in the San Francisco Bay Area on the same day or within one day of three of the unauthorized transactions. Additionally, Yick had never used her EDD Debit Card for transactions from DoorDash or restaurants, and had never used her Card to make an online transaction. Rather, she had always used her Card for purchasing necessities from brick-and-mortar stores located in or around the San Francisco Bay Area, such as gas stations, grocery stores, and retail stores like Target and Costco.

116. Bank of America knew or should have known about Yick's EDD Debit Card transaction history, that she appeared to be in the San Francisco Bay Area at the time of the unauthorized transactions, and that the COVID-19 pandemic and related fears and travel restrictions made it highly unlikely that Yick would have

1 been in Texas, New York, and Southern California at the time of the unauthorized
2 transactions. Given this, Bank of America should have detected and flagged the
3 unauthorized transactions as highly suspicious, stopped them, and notified Yick
4 about them, but the Bank did none of these things. Instead, it just allowed the
5 unauthorized transactions to happen.

6 117. Over the course of more than a month, Yick repeatedly sought
7 assistance through Bank of America's customer service phone lines, to no avail.
8 She repeatedly waited on hold before being disconnected from the line; waited to
9 speak to someone only to be told to call back later; was transferred to various
10 departments without receiving any information; was sent to voicemail; was forced
11 to deal with unhelpful automated agents; and unsuccessfully attempted to reach
12 Bank of America by email. To date, Yick has not been reimbursed for the
13 unauthorized transactions on her EDD Debit Card, nor has Bank of America
14 provisionally credited her Account.

15 118. Yick's experience seeking reimbursement from the Bank for the
16 unauthorized transactions on her Account demonstrates the futility of EDD Debit
17 Cardholders turning to Bank of America's customer service department for
18 assistance. After discovering the fraudulent charges on her EDD Debit Card on
19 December 1, 2020, Yick tried for days to contact a Bank of America agent who
20 would assist her with the fraud on her Card. After calling the number on the back
21 of her EDD Debit Card and waiting on hold, Yick eventually reached an agent who
22 told her that her call needed to go to "claims." Despite Bank of America's
23 representations of "24/7" customer service, the agent informed Yick that she would
24 need to call back during business hours and provided her with a number to call.
25 Yick called that number three times the following day, December 2, 2020, waiting
26 on hold each time, only to have the system repeatedly hang up on her.

27 119. Yick found another Bank of America customer service number and
28 called it, only to again wait on hold before the system hung up on her. Calling this

1 number led Yick to an automated customer service agent which asked Yick for her
2 Card number. Even though Yick provided her Card number when asked, the
3 automated agent continued to repeat its request for Yick's Card number, without
4 offering any sort of assistance.

5 120. On December 3, 2020, Yick tried once again to contact Bank of
6 America by calling the number on the back of her EDD Debit Card. This time she
7 reached a live customer service agent, who stated that she was adding notes to
8 Yick's file to indicate that Yick was disputing the four DoorDash transactions and
9 advised Yick to describe her claim in an email to a long email address involving a
10 string of abbreviated words, which the agent read to her over the phone.

11 121. This email address does not appear in Yick's Cardholder Agreement,
12 the "Quick Reference Guide" which accompanied her Card, or the Bank's EDD
13 Debit Card FAQ webpage. Nevertheless, when Yick finally reached a live customer
14 service representative, she was advised that sending an email to this previously
15 undisclosed email address represented her best chance of recovering the funds
16 stolen from her EDD Debit Card Account.

17 122. On December 6, 2020, Yick sent an email to that address, providing
18 Bank of America with her name, address, partial Card number, and a summary of
19 the disputed charges. The following evening, Yick's email provider (Gmail) sent
20 her an email stating there was trouble delivering her email to that address, and that
21 the system would attempt to deliver it for 45 more hours before sending a
22 notification that delivery had failed.

23 123. On December 8, 2020, concerned with Bank of America's failures to
24 respond, Yick filed a police report at her neighborhood precinct in San Francisco
25 concerning the fraudulent charges on her EDD Debit Card Account.

26 124. On December 9, 2020, Gmail sent Yick a message reading: "Message
27 not delivered The recipient server did not accept our requests to connect."
28

1 125. On December 22, 2020, when Yick had not received further assistance
2 or communication from Bank of America, she again attempted to email a summary
3 of her claim to the same email address. She was notified three days later that her
4 email was not delivered and that “[t]he recipient server did not accept our requests
5 to connect.”

6 126. In short, Yick has followed the instructions in her Cardholder
7 Agreement, and made consistent, diligent efforts to recover the funds stolen from
8 her EDD Debit Card Account by multiple telephone calls and emails. Despite this,
9 Bank of America’s customer service department never offered Yick any meaningful
10 response or assistance, but rather stymied her efforts at every turn. The Bank has
11 never reimbursed Yick for any of the unauthorized transactions, never provided her
12 provisional credit, and never conducted a reasonable investigation of the
13 unauthorized transactions.

14 **2. Vanessa Rivera**

15 127. Rivera received her EDD Debit Card in January 2020. It was her
16 lifeline—she used it to buy essentials like gas and food for her and her young son.

17 128. On January 29, 2021, someone fraudulently withdrew \$800 from
18 Rivera’s EDD Debit Card Account at a Bank of America ATM. She received a
19 message that the balance in her Account was \$4.17, when she knew she should have
20 had over \$800 in the Account. She only received this message because she had set
21 up her Account settings to automatically notify her if her Account balance fell
22 below \$30—it was not an alert from the Bank about suspected fraud. Rivera’s Card
23 was in her possession when the fraudulent withdrawal occurred, and she had never
24 authorized anyone to use her Card or disclosed her Card PIN to anyone.

25 129. That same day, Rivera logged into her Account online to see if there
26 might have been a mistake and found that someone had conducted a balance inquiry
27 from an ATM about an hour away from where she lives and then withdrew the
28 \$800. She immediately called Bank of America to submit a claim disputing the

1 transaction. The Bank representative she spoke with gave her a claim number, and
2 Rivera assumed the claim would be investigated.

3 130. On February 4, 2021, Rivera called Bank of America again and was
4 surprised to learn that the representative she had spoken with on January 29 never
5 actually submitted her fraud claim and, instead, just put a “note” in her Account and
6 mailed her a new Card. The Bank representative that Rivera spoke with on February
7 4 told Rivera that she (the February 4 representative) successfully submitted her
8 fraud claim for investigation. The next week Rivera received in the mail a letter
9 from the Bank stating that her claim was closed. The letter was dated February 5,
10 2021, just one day after her claim was submitted for investigation. On information
11 and belief, the Bank failed to conduct a good-faith investigation of Rivera’s fraud
12 claim and did not have a reasonable basis for its determination that Rivera had
13 authorized or benefitted from the transaction.

14 131. On February 6, 2021, Rivera received her replacement Card in the
15 mail. She tried activating it online, but Bank of America’s website indicated she
16 was not allowed access to her Account. Rivera then called the number on the back
17 of the Card to activate it and a Bank representative told her that her Account had
18 been frozen due to fraudulent charges.

19 132. On March 3, 2021, Rivera received a letter from Bank of America
20 stating that there had been fraud on her Account and informing her that her Account
21 would remain frozen. This letter did not provide her with any useful information as
22 to why her Account would remain frozen, but only stated that fraud is what had
23 caused her Account to be frozen initially.

24 133. Rivera has spent at least 30 hours on the phone with Bank of America
25 customer service about her \$800 unauthorized transaction claim and trying to get
26 her Account unfrozen. During these phone calls, she has felt belittled and treated
27 like a criminal by Bank representatives, who have stated or implied that she was
28 responsible for the fraud. On one occasion, a Bank of America representative told

1 her that she had done nothing wrong, but that her Account was frozen because of a
2 Bank policy or protocol that requires Bank employees or agents to freeze an
3 Account when an unauthorized transaction occurs on the Account.

4 134. Bank of America's summary denial of Rivera's unauthorized
5 transaction claim and freezing of her Account caused Rivera extreme financial
6 hardship and desperation. She went days without eating a full meal or eating only
7 once a day. She had to break her young son's piggy bank so that she could have
8 money to buy them food. She had her phone disconnected because she could not
9 pay the bill, and did not have money for gas or public transportation, making it
10 impossible for her to go to a job interview or to have a job requiring that she
11 commute to and from work.

12 135. On April 1, 2021, Rivera became a class representative plaintiff in the
13 *Yick* action (pursuant to an Amended Consolidated Complaint filed in that case) and
14 submitted a declaration in support of the consolidated *Yick* plaintiffs' Motion for
15 Preliminary Injunction and Provisional Class Certification. Only then did Bank of
16 America finally "reconsider" her months-old fraud claim, reimburse her the \$800
17 at issue, and unfreeze her Account.

18 **3. Candace Koole**

19 136. Koole started receiving EDD unemployment benefits through a Bank
20 of America EDD Debit Card during the COVID-19 pandemic. She generally used
21 her Card to pay for essentials like food, rent, medicine, and toiletries. She also used
22 it to pay for hospital visits and dental work.

23 137. On December 30, 2020, Koole tried to use her EDD Debit Card at a
24 grocery store to buy food for her and her young son, and the Card was repeatedly
25 declined at the checkout stand. She left the groceries at the store and went home to
26 check her Account balance. She was shocked to find her Account had just \$7 in it,
27 down from approximately \$9,000 the week before. Her online Account statement
28 showed that \$8,760 had been fraudulent taken out of her Account by ATM

1 withdrawals—mostly withdrawals of the daily maximum of \$1,000 per day at
2 several different ATM locations around Southern California until her Account was
3 nearly empty. She did not authorize these withdrawals, and her Card was in her
4 possession when they occurred. She also had never disclosed her Card PIN to
5 anyone and had never authorized anyone to use her Card.

6 138. The same day, Koole called the Bank and submitted a claim disputing
7 the fraudulent transactions. During that call, a Bank representative told Koole that
8 her EDD Debit Card Account would be frozen as a result of her reporting fraud,
9 and Koole’s Account was frozen that day. The Bank representative told Koole that
10 she was responsible for proving that she had not committed the fraud on her
11 Account and advised her to file a police report in support of her fraud claim.

12 139. Immediately after speaking with the Bank, Koole attempted to file a
13 police report with the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department. She could not
14 complete the report, however, because she did not know the “terminal ID numbers”
15 corresponding to the ATMs where money had been fraudulently withdrawn from
16 her Account. And because Koole’s Account was frozen, she could not access her
17 Account online and, thus, could not access any details about the fraudulent
18 transactions, including the information necessary to complete the police report.

19 140. In early January 2021, Koole received a letter from the Bank dated
20 December 31, 2020—just one day after she submitted her claim disputing the
21 fraudulent transactions—denying her claim. The only explanation in the letter for
22 why the Bank had denied her claim was the same generic explanation that the Bank
23 sent numerous other Plaintiffs and Class Members upon denying their claims:
24 “Your claim has been closed because we believe the account or the claim have been
25 the subject of fraud or suspicious activity.” On information and belief, the Bank
26 failed to conduct a good-faith investigation of Koole’s fraud claim and did not have
27 a reasonable basis for its determination that Koole had authorized or benefitted from
28 the transaction.

1 141. In the months after the Bank rejected Koole's fraud claim and froze
2 her Account, Koole repeatedly called the Bank about addressing these issues. Some
3 Bank representatives said the status of her claim was pending, others that she needs
4 to communicate with EDD, and others that her Account is completely closed. Many
5 times, Bank representatives have told Koole that she needs to contact EDD to tell
6 the agency to communicate with the Bank to unfreeze her Account. But she has
7 called EDD and been told by EDD that their system does not show any issues with
8 her Account. Koole has spent approximately 100 hours on the phone trying to
9 resolve the issues relating to her Account.

10 142. As a result of Bank of America's acts and failures to act, Koole's life
11 changed drastically. Koole is a single mother with a young son. She was forced to
12 live week to week, rationing out food for her child. She also had no way to get a job
13 because of the COVID-19 pandemic, and every day she wondered if she would soon
14 be homeless.

15 143. On April 1, 2021, Koole became a class representative plaintiff in the
16 *Yick* action (pursuant to an Amended Consolidated Complaint filed in that case) and
17 submitted a declaration in support of the consolidated *Yick* plaintiffs' Motion for
18 Preliminary Injunction and Provisional Class Certification. Only then did Bank of
19 America finally "reconsider" her months-old fraud claim. By letter dated April 6,
20 2021, the Bank informed Koole that it was granting her \$8,760 fraud claim and that
21 her Account would be permanently credited in that amount. Approximately one
22 month after that, in or about early May 2021, the Bank finally restored Koole's
23 access to her Account.

24 **4. Azuri Moon**

25 144. On or around October 20, 2020, when Moon tried to buy lunch at a
26 restaurant, he was informed that his Bank Debit Card had insufficient funds.
27 Knowing he should have had around two thousand dollars in his Account, he
28 immediately checked his Account online and saw two separate ATM withdrawals

1 totaling \$1,800, leaving him with virtually no money in his Account. Moon had
2 never disclosed his Card PIN to anyone, and had never authorized anyone to use his
3 Card, and did not authorize these ATM withdrawals.

4 145. On October 21, 2020, Moon called Bank of America to report these
5 unauthorized transactions. He spent 11 hours on the phone before he was able to
6 get through to the claims department. Moon then submitted a fraud claim and a
7 Bank of America representative told him that a decision would be made on his case
8 in 30 days or so.

9 146. In or about mid-November 2020, nearly a month after making his
10 claim, Moon had not received any communication from the Bank, and so he
11 contacted the Bank to get an update on his claim. Moon was shocked when a Bank
12 of America representative told him that he was liable for the disputed transactions,
13 and the Bank would not be returning the money. On information and belief, the
14 Bank failed to conduct a good-faith investigation of Moon's fraud claim and did not
15 have a reasonable basis for its determination that Moon had authorized or benefitted
16 from the transaction. During that same phone call, the Bank representative told
17 Moon that he could file a police report, write a detailed description of what
18 happened, and fax it to Bank of America with his name, case number, and Card
19 number. Having received no written communications from Bank of America, and
20 thus forced to rely only on his personal notes, it was extremely difficult for him to
21 file a police report. But he ultimately compiled everything that the Bank had asked
22 for and faxed it to the Bank.

23 147. From approximately November 15 to December 15, 2020, Moon was
24 forced to live in his car because the funds he would have used to pay rent were
25 stolen from his Account and not reimbursed by the Bank. He had to rely on the
26 generosity of others to begin sleeping in a bed again. He routinely had to choose
27 which bills to pay and which ones not to, resulting in significant late fees and
28 interest charges.

1 148. In or about mid-December 2020, nearly a month after faxing the Bank
2 the police report and other documents that the Bank had requested, and having
3 received no communication from the Bank, Moon called the Bank again to get an
4 update. A representative told him that the Bank never received his fax. It turned out
5 that a Bank representative had provided Moon with his *claim* number but
6 mistakenly told him it was his *case* number, and the information in his fax reflected
7 this mistake, derailing his fraud claim. Moon was told the Bank would not be able
8 to process his claim until this was corrected. He then re-faxed everything with the
9 information they requested.

10 149. In late December 2020 or early January 2021, with his claim still
11 unresolved, the Bank froze Moon's Account with no explanation. He called the
12 Bank, and was informed that, as a result of the freeze, the Bank could not do
13 anything to address his fraud claim.

14 150. From the time he made his fraud claim in late October 2020 through
15 late March 2021, Moon spent at least 50–60 hours on the phone with Bank of
16 America trying to resolve the issues with his claim and the freezing of his Account,
17 to no avail.

18 151. On April 1, 2021, Moon became a class representative plaintiff in the
19 *Yick* action (pursuant to an Amended Consolidated Complaint filed in that case) and
20 submitted a declaration in support of the consolidated *Yick* plaintiffs' Motion for
21 Preliminary Injunction and Provisional Class Certification. Only then did Bank of
22 America finally "reconsider" his fraud claim, reimburse his Account the \$1,800,
23 and unfreeze his Account.

24 **5. Roland Oosthuizen**

25 152. Every day from September 24 to 28, 2020, an unauthorized third party
26 or parties withdrew \$1,000 from Oosthuizen's EDD Debit Card Account, using
27 Bank of America ATMs in the Los Angeles area. Oosthuizen did not make the
28 withdrawals himself, did not authorize the withdrawals, and only learned about the

1 withdrawals when he logged into his EDD Debit Card Account on Bank of
2 America's website to find that \$5,000 was missing.

3 153. Oosthuizen has always kept his original EDD Debit Card in his wallet.
4 He does not know how unauthorized third parties gained access to his EDD Debit
5 Card Account, but he believes his EDD Debit Card was fraudulently cloned.

6 154. The Bank never notified Oosthuizen of this fraud, notwithstanding the
7 highly suspicious withdrawal of the maximum daily ATM limit under the
8 Cardholder Agreement of \$1,000 per day for five straight days at different ATMs,
9 which was a completely different pattern of withdrawal than Oosthuizen himself
10 had ever undertaken.

11 155. After discovering the fraudulent withdrawals from his EDD Debit
12 Card Account on September 29, 2020, Oosthuizen promptly suspended his EDD
13 Debit Card using the Bank of America online portal. The next day, Oosthuizen
14 called Bank of America and—after waiting on hold for three hours—made a fraud
15 claim concerning the missing \$5,000. A Bank of America representative named
16 Kaitlyn told Oosthuizen he should wait to hear back from Bank of America
17 concerning his claim.

18 156. Approximately two weeks later, Oosthuizen received a letter in the
19 mail from Bank of America dated October 1, 2020—just two days after Oosthuizen
20 had reported the fraud—which summarily closed his claim and failed to provide
21 any substantive information concerning what Bank of America did to investigate
22 his claim or its reason for closing the claim. On information and belief, the Bank
23 failed to conduct a good-faith investigation of Oosthuizen's fraud claim and did not
24 have a reasonable basis for its determination that Oosthuizen had authorized or
25 benefitted from the transactions.

26 157. Over the following months, Oosthuizen called Bank of America
27 multiple times, typically waiting on hold for hours before, on occasion, reaching a
28 live person. Oosthuizen spoke with a Bank representative named Tara on October

1 14, 2020. He requested that Bank of America re-open his case. Tara assured him
2 during that call that his claim would be “escalated.” Tara also requested that
3 Oosthuizen fax the Bank documentation supporting his claim.

4 158. On November 5, 2020, Oosthuizen faxed Bank of America a written
5 statement regarding the theft, a police report information statement from when he
6 made a report of the theft to the Los Angeles Sherriff’s Department, and other
7 documentation. In his fax, Oosthuizen specifically requested that Bank of America
8 provide him with whatever documentation the Bank had relied upon when it denied
9 his fraud claim. He did not receive a response to his fax. At no time during this
10 process did the Bank provide him any provisional credit, causing him severe
11 hardship. On information and belief, the Bank failed to a conduct good-faith
12 investigation of Oosthuizen’s fraud claim and did not have a reasonable basis for
13 its determination that Oosthuizen had authorized or benefitted from the
14 transactions.

15 159. Only after Oosthuizen filed a class action lawsuit against Bank of
16 America on January 26, 2021 did he receive a letter from the Bank dated January
17 27, 2021, stating that the Bank had performed an additional review of his claim and
18 had credited him for the \$5,000 that had been stolen from his EDD Debit Card
19 Account. The Bank did not pay him any interest on the \$5,000.

20 **6. Rosemary Mathews**

21 160. On October 12, 2020, an unauthorized third party or parties withdrew
22 \$1,000 from Mathews’ EDD Debit Card Account, using a Bank of America ATM
23 that Mathews has never herself used, leaving her with less than \$500 in her Account.

24 161. Mathews has always kept her EDD Debit Card with her, never let
25 anyone borrow her Card, and has not disclosed her Card PIN to anyone. Mathews
26 does not know how unauthorized third parties gained access to her EDD Debit Card
27 Account, but she believes her Card was fraudulently cloned.

28 162. The Bank never notified Mathews of the unauthorized withdrawal

1 from her Account. She only realized that the theft occurred when she checked her
2 Account balance on October 18, 2020, and found it was below \$500. She was
3 horrified because she did not have enough money left to cover basic necessities.

4 163. After discovering the fraudulent withdrawal of \$1,000 from her
5 Account, Mathews on October 18, 2020 telephoned Bank of America at the number
6 on the back of her EDD Debit Card, only to be told that the claims department was
7 not open that day. The next day, she called and, after waiting on hold, made a claim.

8 164. Approximately two weeks passed before Mathews received a letter in
9 the mail from Bank of America summarily closing her claim while failing to provide
10 any other information. On information and belief, the Bank failed to conduct a
11 good-faith investigation of Mathew's fraud claim and did not have a reasonable
12 basis for its determination that Mathews had authorized or benefitted from the
13 transactions.

14 165. Over the following months, Mathews called Bank of America multiple
15 times, typically waiting on hold for hours before, on occasion, reaching a live
16 representative.

17 166. On November 5, 2020, Mathews faxed to Bank of America a written
18 statement regarding the theft, a police report information statement from when she
19 made a report of the theft to the Los Angeles Sherriff's Department, and other
20 documentation. Mathews specifically requested that Bank of America provide her
21 with the documentation that the Bank purportedly relied upon when it denied her
22 fraud claim. She did not receive a response to her November 5, 2020 fax, and at no
23 time during this process did the Bank provide her any provisional credit, causing
24 her severe hardship.

25 167. On or about December 22, 2020, Mathews realized that her EDD Debit
26 Card Account was frozen. She called the Bank, which told her that it had frozen her
27 Account on or about December 17, 2020.

28

1 168. Only after Mathews filed a class action lawsuit against Bank of
2 America on January 26, 2021, did she finally receive a letter from the Bank dated
3 January 27, 2021 stating that the Bank had performed an additional review of her
4 claim and had credited her with the \$1,000 that had been fraudulently stolen from
5 her EDD Debit Card Account.

6 169. Even after receiving the Bank's letter dated January 27, 2021,
7 Mathews was still unable to access those credited funds because her EDD Debit
8 Card Account remained frozen. Although her Account had been frozen since
9 December 2020, she did not receive a written notice from the Bank regarding the
10 freeze until February 1, 2021. The notice did not provide her any details or
11 information specific to her as to why her Account had been frozen. Sometime
12 thereafter, without notification, the Bank unfroze her Account, which allowed her
13 to withdraw the \$1,000 from her Account. The Bank never credited her any interest
14 on the \$1,000. Mathews estimates she spent more than 100 hours calling the Bank
15 in her attempts to recover the \$1,000 or have her Account unfrozen.

16 170. It was an extreme hardship for Mathews not to have access to her
17 unemployment benefits. She had to borrow money from her son and other family
18 members and suffered great stress trying to pay her bills each month. She began
19 seeing a counselor because of depression and stress due to not receiving the
20 unemployment benefits to which she was entitled.

21 **7. Carlos Rodriguez**

22 171. Plaintiff Carlos Rodriguez received \$900 on his EDD Debit Card every
23 two weeks after being found eligible for unemployment benefits during the
24 COVID-19 pandemic.

25 172. On or about December 17, 2020, Rodriguez started calling Bank of
26 America to inquire about EDD benefits that should have already been, but did not
27 appear to have been, deposited into his EDD Debit Card Account. For the previous
28 couple of days, Rodriguez had been checking his Account to confirm receipt of the

1 deposit, but the funds were not there. Concerned about the whereabouts of those
2 funds, Rodriguez researched his Account transaction history and noticed a \$230
3 ATM withdrawal on December 10, 2020, and a \$900 ATM withdrawal on
4 December 17, 2020. Neither withdrawal was made or authorized by Rodriguez. The
5 withdrawals were made at one or more ATMs in Los Angeles, while Rodriguez was
6 in San Diego. Rodriguez further noticed that some unidentified person or persons
7 had checked his Account balance without his authorization on November 30, 2020,
8 and many times throughout December 2020.

9 173. Alarmed by these transactions and the missing funds, Rodriguez
10 promptly called Bank of America. The Bank replied that it had never received funds
11 for his Account from the EDD. Rodriguez then called the EDD, which stated that it
12 had deposited the \$900 to his EDD Debit Card Account as scheduled. When
13 Rodriguez followed up with the Bank, the Bank froze his Account and told him that
14 22,000 other individuals who receive their EDD unemployment benefits through
15 EDD Debit Cards had also had funds stolen from their EDD Debit Card Accounts.

16 174. In or about mid-February 2021, Rodriguez started receiving, at his
17 request, bi-weekly EDD benefits payments in the form of paper checks that EDD
18 mailed to him. EDD also paid Rodriguez via check for EDD benefits that were owed
19 to him from the time that Bank of America froze his EDD Debit Card Account until
20 the time he started receiving paper checks from EDD. He did not receive any
21 interest on those funds.

22 175. After Rodriguez filed a class action lawsuit against Bank of America
23 in the Northern District of California in January 2021, and shortly after the
24 Northern District Plaintiffs put the Bank on notice of their intent to move for a
25 preliminary injunction, Rodriguez received a letter from Bank of America dated
26 March 18, 2021, informing him of a new way to remove the hold (i.e., remove the
27 freeze or block) on his EDD Debit Card Account. In April 2021, while the parties
28 were briefing the Northern District Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction

1 and Provisional Class Certification, the Bank finally unfroze or unblocked
2 Rodriguez's Account, thereby restoring his access to his Account for the first time
3 since it was frozen many months earlier.

4 176. Also in April 2021, the Bank sent Rodriguez a letter dated April 20,
5 2021—i.e., just one day before the Bank filed its opposition to the motion for
6 preliminary injunction on April 21 (*see Yick*, Dkt. No. 72)—informing him that the
7 Bank was issuing him a temporary credit for the funds that had been fraudulently
8 withdrawn from his Account. On April 22, the Bank made the credit permanent,
9 which it reported to the Court when it re-filed its opposition to the motion for
10 preliminary injunction on April 23 (*Yick*, Dkt. No. 76-16 at 5).

11 **8. J. Michael Willrich**

12 177. In late September or early October 2020, Willrich discovered that
13 \$4,000 to \$5,000 was missing from his EDD Debit Card Account. Bank of America
14 did not notify him of the fraud. Willrich had never disclosed his PIN to anyone and
15 had never authorized another person to his Card.

16 178. Upon learning of the fraud, Willrich immediately went to a Bank of
17 America branch and reported it to a Bank representative. The Bank representative
18 told him that the Bank only “sponsors” the EDD Debit Card and that he should call
19 the phone number on the back of his Card for assistance.

20 179. Over the course of months, Willrich repeatedly sought assistance
21 through Bank of America's customer service phone lines, but to no avail. When
22 Willrich was able to get through to a customer service representative, he was
23 informed that he needed to speak with the Claims Department. He asked if he could
24 file a claim online but was told by the representative that he could not. He was then
25 transferred to the Bank's Claims Department, where he waited on hold for three-
26 and-a-half hours before the system hung up on him. The day after that, Willrich
27 waited on hold for another hour before he had to terminate the call due to time
28 constraints.

1 180. On the fourth day after discovering the fraud, Willrich awoke at 5:00
2 A.M. PST to call the Claims Department and was finally able to reach a Bank
3 representative and submit a fraud claim regarding the unauthorized transactions.
4 Willrich and the Bank representative spent approximately one hour going through
5 every charge during a three-month period to ensure all fraudulent activity was
6 accounted for.

7 181. Approximately 3–4 days after submitting his claim, Willrich received
8 a letter from Bank of America stating that his claim had been denied due to
9 suspected fraud. On information and belief, the Bank failed to conduct a good-faith
10 investigation of Willrich’s fraud claim and did not have a reasonable basis for its
11 determination that Willrich had authorized or benefitted from the transactions.

12 182. In early November 2020, Willrich again got up at 5:00 A.M. PST to
13 call the Bank of America Claims Department. He spoke with a Bank representative
14 and explained that he had submitted a fraud claim that had been denied by Bank of
15 America. He asked the representative to explain why his claim had been denied.
16 The representative told Willrich that the letter that was sent to him was the result of
17 a “glitch” and that many people were calling about the same issue. The
18 representative then re-opened Willrich’s initial claim and told Willrich to wait and
19 see what happened.

20 183. Willrich waited as instructed, but he received no communication from
21 the Bank.

22 184. It was not until approximately January 12, 2021, when Willrich
23 attempted to withdraw money from his EDD Debit Card Account, that Willrich
24 learned that money had been credited to his Account. At no point between the early
25 November 2020 phone call and January 2021 did Willrich receive any
26 communication from Bank of America regarding the status of his fraud claim, such
27 as the status of the Bank’s investigation or its determination.
28

1 185. In or around January and February 2021, there were at least three
2 occasions when Willrich attempted to use his EDD Debit Card to withdraw money
3 from a Bank of America ATM and was denied. On these occasions, the ATM
4 displayed the following message: “Your transaction has been cancelled.” On at least
5 one of these occasions, Willrich then went into the Bank of America branch where
6 the ATM was located and asked a Bank employee for assistance. The employee told
7 Willrich that his EDD Debit Card Account had been frozen again and that he needed
8 to call the number on the back of his EDD Debit Card to receive assistance. Willrich
9 called the phone number as instructed and, after a lengthy process, a Bank
10 representative told him that the issue that had caused his Account to be frozen had
11 been fixed. However, when Willrich returned to an ATM and attempted to use his
12 EDD Debit Card to withdraw money from his Account, he was again denied, and
13 the ATM displayed the same error message as it had before. After spending two
14 days on the phone with Bank of America and numerous representatives, Willrich
15 finally secured the ability to make electronic transfers from his Account. To the
16 extent Willrich was able to obtain funds from his Account, it was only by
17 transferring them out of his Account electronically.

18 186. After Willrich filed a class action lawsuit against Bank of America on
19 January 22, 2021, the Bank finally unfroze his Account.

20 **9. Lindsay McClure**

21 187. McClure experienced \$1,003 in fraudulent charges on her EDD Debit
22 Card Account on or around December 1, 2020, after her Card was skimmed, she
23 believes, at a gas station where she had used her Card, and where reports indicated
24 that other debit and/or credit cards had been skimmed. After becoming aware of the
25 fraudulent and unauthorized charges on her Account, McClure repeatedly called to
26 seek assistance through Bank of America’s customer service, to no avail.

27 188. McClure first called the Bank on December 1, 2020, as soon as
28 possible after discovering the unauthorized transactions to report them as

1 fraudulent. She presented evidence over the phone regarding the unauthorized
2 transactions, which the Bank representative acknowledged was indicative of fraud.
3 The representative told her that a fraud investigation would take place over the
4 following 30–45 days. Yet shortly thereafter, she received a letter from Bank of
5 America dated December 2, 2020, indicating that the Bank had closed her fraud
6 claim the day after she submitted it. On information and belief, the Bank failed to
7 conduct a good-faith investigation of McClure’s fraud claim and did not have a
8 reasonable basis for its determination that McClure had authorized or benefitted
9 from the transactions.

10 189. She then followed up with the Bank to inquire about her fraud claim,
11 and a Bank representative told her that Bank of America was investigating it. When
12 she asked how that was possible considering the Bank’s letter stating the claim had
13 been closed, the Bank representative hung up on her.

14 190. Several weeks later, without reaching any resolution regarding her
15 fraud claim, Bank of America froze McClure’s Account without any notice.
16 McClure did not find out her Account was frozen until December 20, 2020, when
17 she tried to use her Card at a drive-through and discovered that she could not access
18 her funds. When McClure called Bank of America to inquire about this, a Bank
19 representative told her that EDD had frozen her Account due to fraud on the
20 Account. On information and belief, this statement was false. When McClure then
21 contacted EDD, an EDD representative told her that the agency had no evidence of
22 any fraud on her Account. McClure subsequently phoned Bank of America to
23 convey to the Bank what EDD had told her, but her Account remained frozen.

24 191. Only after McClure filed a class action lawsuit against Bank of
25 America on January 25, 2021, did she finally receive a letter from the Bank dated
26 January 27, 2021, stating that the Bank had performed an “additional review” of her
27 claim and had credited her the \$1,003 stolen from her Account; however, her
28 Account remained frozen. At some time before the end of March 2021, the Bank

1 finally unfroze her Account, at which point McClure was finally able to regain
2 access to the funds in her Account.

3 **10. Robert L. Wilson**

4 192. Wilson was approved by the EDD for unemployment benefits in or
5 around April 2020, and he received an EDD Debit Card with a magnetic stripe (but
6 no EMV chip) soon thereafter. In or about September 2020, \$2,547.78 was stolen
7 from his EDD Debit Card Account through unauthorized transactions. On or around
8 October 3, 2020, the Bank froze Wilson's Account without any notice or
9 explanation. Upon discovering that he could not access his Account, Wilson
10 promptly contacted Bank of America and was informed that unauthorized
11 transactions had occurred on his Account in Southern California. Wilson, who
12 resides in Stockton, informed the Bank representative that he had not used his Card
13 in Southern California. The representative told Wilson that the Bank would
14 investigate the unauthorized transactions and, in the meantime, would provide him
15 with provisional credit.

16 193. Within a week or two, the Bank reversed that provisional credit and
17 closed the investigation into his fraud claim, all without warning or explanation.
18 Wilson subsequently attempted to contact the Bank to resolve these issues
19 approximately 30 to 40 times without success. Eventually, he was able to get the
20 Bank to unfreeze his Account.

21 194. But the Bank continued to deprive Wilson of the stolen funds. After
22 Wilson filed a class action against Bank of America and was one of the consolidated
23 *Yick* plaintiffs who moved for a preliminary injunction against the Bank on April 1,
24 2021, however, Wilson contacted the Bank on April 17 to request that it reopen its
25 investigation into his fraud claim. On April 29, the Bank finally granted his claim
26 and credited his Account the full \$2,547.78 at issue.

1 **11. Clara Cajas**

2 195. On or about January 12, 2021, an unauthorized ATM cash withdrawal
3 in the amount of \$700 was made from Cajas's EDD Debit Card Account. Cajas had
4 never disclosed her Card PIN to anyone and had never authorized anyone to use her
5 Card. Cajas reported the fraudulent withdrawal to the Bank within 24 hours of its
6 occurrence. The Bank responded that it would send her a new EDD Debit Card
7 within 24 hours.

8 196. When Cajas did not receive the new Card, she called the Bank to
9 inquire about the status of the new Card and was told that she would not receive a
10 new Card because her Account had been frozen. Cajas subsequently received a
11 letter from the Bank, dated January 14, 2021, informing her that her fraud claim
12 related to the \$700 ATM withdrawal had been closed. On information and belief,
13 the Bank failed to conduct a good-faith investigation of Cajas's fraud claim and did
14 not have a reasonable basis for its determination that Cajas had authorized or
15 benefitted from the transactions.

16 197. Cajas did not understand how Bank of America could have concluded
17 its investigation within 48 hours of the fraudulent ATM withdrawal. She called the
18 Bank and was told by another Bank agent that the agent could not talk to her because
19 her Account was frozen.

20 198. Following the unauthorized ATM withdrawal, and the freezing of her
21 Account, Cajas repeatedly sought assistance through Bank of America's customer
22 service phone lines, to no avail. Each time Cajas called the Bank, she spoke to a
23 different agent. Even though she fully documented her claim, each call was treated
24 as if she were calling for the first time. The agents were either unable or unwilling
25 to assist Cajas in any meaningful way regarding her \$700 fraud claim or helping
26 her regain access to any of the remaining balance in her Account. She repeatedly
27 waited on hold for extended periods; was repeatedly disconnected from the line;
28 waited to speak to someone only to be told to call back later; was transferred to

1 various departments without being provided any meaningful assistance or helpful
2 information; was sent to voicemail; dealt with unhelpful automated agents; and
3 unsuccessfully attempted to sort out the issues with her Account in person at Bank
4 of America branches.

5 199. On April 1, 2021, Cajas and the other plaintiffs in the consolidated
6 *Yick* action filed their Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Provisional Class
7 Certification. Only then did Bank of America “reconsider” Cajas’s fraud claim. On
8 or about April 28, 2021, Bank of America finally issued Cajas a permanent credit
9 for the \$700 at issue and unfroze her Account, thereby allowing Cajas to access her
10 Account for the first time in more than three months.

11 **12. Stephanie Smith**

12 200. Smith received her EDD Debit Card in or about June 2020 and
13 activated it on Bank of America’s website the same day that she received it.
14 Immediately after activating the Card, she locked the Card in a safe inside her home,
15 and she did not subsequently take the Card out of the safe or use it in any way. Her
16 only activity on her EDD Debit Card Account thereafter was to use Bank of
17 America’s website to transfer funds from her EDD Debit Card Account to her
18 personal consumer bank account (also with Bank of America). She never used the
19 Card at an ATM, for an online purchase, at a retail store, or for any other transaction.
20 She also never disclosed her Card number or PIN to anyone and never authorized
21 anyone to use her Card. Despite all this, an unknown person or persons used the
22 Cardholder Information associated with her EDD Debit Card and/or Account to
23 make three unauthorized transactions with DoorDash on or about November 23, 27,
24 and 30, 2020, totaling \$225.84.

25 201. On or about December 22, 2020, Smith discovered the three
26 unauthorized transactions and promptly called Bank of America. During the phone
27 call, she informed a Bank representative that she did not authorize the transactions,
28 and she submitted unauthorized transaction claims. During the phone call, a Bank

1 representative asked Smith various questions to verify her identity, including asking
2 Smith to provide her full social security number, all of which Smith answered to
3 the representative's satisfaction. After the phone call, Smith did not receive any
4 information from the Bank to track her claims or any communication confirming
5 that the Bank would investigate her claims. Ever since, Smith's claims have
6 languished for months at the Bank without being resolved.

7 202. To date, Smith has not received any communication from the Bank
8 regarding her unauthorized transaction claims, has received no provisional credits
9 from the Bank, and has not been reimbursed for the unauthorized transactions. On
10 information and belief, the Bank failed to conduct a good-faith investigation of
11 Smith's fraud claim and has no reasonable basis for a determination that Smith had
12 authorized or benefitted from the transactions.

13 **13. Alan Karam**

14 203. In or around June 2020, Karam began receiving EDD benefits via a
15 Bank of America EDD Debit Card. During the next two months or so, he used the
16 Card to make small in-person purchases (primarily food and groceries) and to
17 withdraw cash from ATMs, all within the State the California. All or virtually all
18 the transactions that Karam made using his Card and Account from June 2020
19 through August 2020 were for \$100 or less. He never disclosed his Card PIN to
20 anyone and never authorized anyone to use his Card.

21 204. On or around August 21, 2020, Karam checked his Account balance
22 online and was shocked to discover that over \$2,000 in fraudulent transactions had
23 occurred on his Account. His online Account statement showed two purchases from
24 Target for \$954 each, another purchase from Target for \$442.69, and one purchase
25 from McDonald's for \$4.34. All of these unauthorized transactions had been made
26 in New York while Karam was in California with his Card in his possession.

27 205. Karam is a life-long California resident. He did not travel to New York
28 or anywhere else outside California at any time since the COVID-19 pandemic

1 began in March 2020, and during which time there were significant California and
2 federal government restrictions on travel.

3 206. Bank of America knew or should have known about Karam's EDD
4 Debit Card transaction history, that he appeared to be in California at the time of
5 the unauthorized transactions, that the size of the transactions were significantly
6 and suspiciously higher than his past transactions, and that the COVID-19 pandemic
7 and related fears and travel restrictions made it highly unlikely that Karam or
8 anyone authorized by him were making these transactions in New York. Given this,
9 Bank of America should have detected and flagged the unauthorized transactions
10 on Karam's account as highly suspicious, stopped them, and notified Karam about
11 them, but the Bank did none of these things.

12 207. On August 21, 2020, the same day that he discovered the unauthorized
13 transactions on his Account, Karam called the Bank's customer service department
14 and submitted by phone a fraud claim disputing the unauthorized transactions. By
15 August 24, the fraudulent charges had been credited back to his Account. Karam
16 understood those to be permanent credits. To the extent the Bank considered them
17 to be provisional credits under EFTA and Regulation E, those credits became
18 permanent on October 6, 2021, after the Bank's 45-day period to investigation
19 Karam's claims expired under those same laws.

20 208. On November 17, 2020, however, Bank of America—without notice
21 or explanation—debited the previously reimbursed funds from Karam's Account,
22 causing his Account balance to go negative, and closed the investigation into his
23 fraud claim.

24 209. Upon discovering this, Karam immediately called Bank of America.
25 Despite the Bank's promises of "24/7" customer service in its Cardholder
26 Agreement and EDD-Bank Contract, the Bank representative with whom Karam
27 spoke informed him that he would need to speak with the claims department, but
28 that the claims department was closed and he would need to call back the next day.

1 210. The next morning at 6:30 A.M. PST, Karam called the Bank again and
2 was placed on hold for 45 minutes before being connected to a claims
3 representative, who told Karam that there was nothing she could do for him and she
4 would transfer him to someone else. Karam was then transferred to a mailbox
5 requiring a code, which he did not know. The call then disconnected.

6 211. Karam immediately called back and waited on hold for another 45
7 minutes before speaking with another Bank of America representative. This time
8 Karam asked for the representative's extension in case the call was disconnected.
9 The representative responded that he did not have one. Karam then asked for the
10 representative's identification number, and the representative said that he did not
11 have one of those either. When Karam asked for his name, the representative hung
12 up.

13 212. After being hung up on, Karam called back a third time. After waiting
14 on hold for another extended period, he spoke with a representative named Delijah,
15 who transferred him to a representative named Jane, who transferred him to a
16 representative named Brandon, who transferred him to a female supervisor whose
17 name Karam does not remember. At this point, this third phone call alone had lasted
18 multiple hours. The female supervisor advised Karam to file a police report
19 regarding the fraudulent transactions on his Account, and to submit written
20 statements about each of the fraudulent transactions, both of which he did.

21 213. In December 2020, Bank of America "reopened" one of Karam's fraud
22 claims only to close it again without reimbursing him. On information and belief,
23 the Bank failed to conduct a good-faith investigation of Karam's fraud claim during
24 this "reopened" investigation and did not have a reasonable basis for its
25 determination that Karam had authorized or benefitted from the transaction. The
26 Bank did not provide Karam with provisional credit in connection with this
27 reopened investigation or indeed in connection with any of his fraud claims after
28 the Bank, in November 2020, summarily reversed its prior credits to Karam's

1 Account. For weeks, Karam continued to call Bank of America and ask why his
2 fraud claims had been closed, but he was never given a clear answer.

3 214. In January 2021, frustrated with Bank of America, Karam sought out
4 and obtained legal counsel. On January 25, 2021, Karam's counsel sent Bank of
5 America a letter on behalf of Karam, co-Plaintiff Stephanie Smith, and all other
6 similarly situated persons, notifying the Bank of its violations of the California
7 Consumer Privacy Act, Cal. Civ. Code §1798.150(a), and demanding that the Bank
8 cure those violations by taking specific actions within 30 days. That letter was
9 delivered to the Bank by FedEx the following morning, on January 26.

10 215. On or about January 28, 2021, the Bank finally credited Karam's
11 Account for the funds stolen from his Account in August 2020. The credits did not
12 include any interest for the time during which the Bank had deprived Karam of
13 access to those funds.

14 **14. Luis Perez**

15 216. In October 2020, Perez logged into his Bank of America EDD Debit
16 Card Account online to check his Account balance. He saw that EDD had deposited
17 \$516 into his Account on October 15, 2020, and that, on the very same day,
18 someone had made an unauthorized withdrawal of \$500 from an ATM at an
19 Albertson's. Perez had not been to an Albertson's that day. Perez had also never
20 disclosed his Card PIN to anyone and had never authorized anyone to use his Card.

21 217. Perez immediately called Bank of America to report the unauthorized
22 transaction. He opened a fraud claim with a Bank of America customer service
23 representative on or around October 24, 2020.

24 218. About a week or two later, Perez received a letter from the Bank dated
25 October 28, 2020, stating without explanation that his fraud claim had been denied.
26 The letter did not describe what efforts Bank of America had undertaken, if any, to
27 investigate Perez's claim, nor did the letter explain the basis for Bank of America's
28 decision not to refund Perez the funds stolen from his Account. On information and

1 belief, the Bank failed to conduct a good-faith investigation of Perez's fraud claim
2 and did not have a reasonable basis for its determination that Perez had authorized
3 or benefitted from the ATM withdrawal.

4 219. Shortly after Perez received this letter from Bank of America
5 summarily denying his claim, Perez called the Bank again to request that his claim
6 be reopened and investigated. A Bank of America customer service representative
7 told him that his claim would be investigated within 30 to 90 days.

8 220. Sometime in December 2020, Perez discovered that his Bank of
9 America EDD Debit Card Account had been frozen. He did not receive any notice
10 that his Account had been frozen prior to him discovering the freeze.

11 221. Upon discovering that his Account had been frozen, Perez again
12 contacted Bank of America to regain access to his Account. Bank of America told
13 Perez that they could do nothing about the freeze and that Perez would need to
14 contact EDD. As instructed, Perez contacted EDD, and he was eventually able to
15 re-verify his identity both online and by physically mailing verification documents
16 to EDD. Despite these efforts, Perez's Bank of America Account remained frozen
17 for months, during which time Bank of America continued to blame EDD for the
18 freeze, and Perez continued to be denied access to the benefits that EDD had
19 determined he was entitled to receive.

20 222. On or around February 10, 2021, Perez again called Bank of America
21 about the still unresolved \$500 fraud claim and the freeze on his Account. A Bank
22 of America representative told Perez that the Bank could not provide him any
23 information about his fraud claim due to the freeze on his Account.

24 223. On or around March 13, 2021, Perez finally received a check from
25 EDD for all the benefits to which he had been entitled but had not been paid between
26 December 2020 and March 2021. However, his Bank of America EDD Debit Card
27 Account still remained frozen, and he still did not receive provisional or permanent
28 credit for the \$500 that had been stolen from his Account in October 2020.

1 224. On April 1, 2021, Perez became a class representative plaintiff in the
2 *Yick* action (pursuant to an Amended Consolidated Complaint filed in that case) and
3 submitted a declaration in support of the consolidated *Yick* plaintiffs' Motion for
4 Preliminary Injunction and Provisional Class Certification. Only then did Bank of
5 America finally "reconsider" his fraud claim, reimburse Perez for the \$500 at issue,
6 and unfreeze his Account.

7 **15. Brian Wiggins**

8 225. In November 2020, Wiggins discovered unauthorized ATM
9 withdrawals from his EDD Debit Card Account, totaling \$1,512, which were made
10 in Santa Rosa, California, and Atlanta, Georgia.

11 226. Wiggins promptly reported the fraud to Bank of America, but rather
12 than the Bank investigating his unauthorized transaction claims and crediting his
13 Account, the Bank froze his Account due to the fraud. A Bank of America customer
14 service representative told him that EDD was responsible for freezing his account,
15 but an EDD representative later told Wiggins that was not true. On information and
16 belief, it was not EDD but Bank of America who made the decision to freeze
17 Wiggins's Account. While his Account was frozen, Wiggins had no access to his
18 unemployment benefits.

19 227. Wiggins received no written or formal communication from Bank of
20 America over the many months that his Account was frozen. In the meantime, his
21 numerous attempts to resolve his issues through Bank of America's customer
22 service were unsuccessful. He spent hours on hold trying to reach a live agent and
23 was hung up on. On the occasions when he managed to reach a live agent, they
24 consistently failed to give clear answers to his questions or to otherwise provide any
25 meaningful assistance.

26 228. Only after Wiggins filed a class action lawsuit against Bank of
27 America in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California were his
28 Account issues finally resolved. On or about May 26, 2021, Wiggins received a

1 letter from Bank of America stating that the Bank was issuing a permanent \$1,512
2 credit to his Account.

3 **16. Jonathan Smith**

4 229. Smith became unemployed as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and
5 applied for unemployment benefits from the EDD. The EDD approved his
6 application, and Bank of America issued him an EDD Debit Card.

7 230. Sometime in the fall of 2020, Smith attempted to use his Card at a
8 Bank of America ATM and was surprised to learn that his EDD Debit Card Account
9 displayed a negative balance. Smith quickly realized that he had been the victim of
10 two unauthorized withdrawals totaling \$1,721.78 in July 2020. Bank of America
11 did not notify Smith of the unauthorized withdrawals; he made the unsettling
12 discovery himself only after the ATM displayed an Account balance far lower than
13 he expected.

14 231. Smith promptly reported the fraud to Bank of America. The Bank
15 temporarily credited the disputed amount to his Account. After later determining
16 that Smith had been the victim of fraud and had not authorized the withdrawals, the
17 Bank made the credit permanent.

18 232. Approximately one month later, however, Bank of America reversed
19 the \$1,721.78 “permanent” credit, without any notice or explanation. On
20 information and belief, the Bank’s reversal of the credit was not the result of a
21 reasonable investigation, and the Bank had no reasonable basis for believing that
22 Smith had authorized or benefitted from the transactions. As with the fraudulent
23 withdrawals, Smith discovered the credit reversal himself, only after his Card was
24 declined for insufficient funds.

25 233. The Bank’s reversal of the credit caused Smith’s Account balance to
26 go negative. Subsequent deposits into Smith’s Account were applied against the
27 negative balance, depriving him of hundreds of dollars in critical benefits.
28

1 234. Besides reversing the “permanent” credit, Bank of America also froze
2 Smith’s Account—once again, without any notice or explanation. Smith repeatedly
3 contacted Bank of America’s EDD customer service phone number for assistance
4 with the matter. Like many other EDD Debit Cardholders, Smith was subjected to
5 inordinately long wait times and dropped calls. On the rare occasion that Smith
6 managed to get into contact with a live customer service representative, the
7 representatives often treated him rudely and unprofessionally, including accusing
8 him of lying without any reasonable basis for the accusation.

9 235. With his EDD Debit Card Account frozen, Smith was unable to access
10 his unemployment benefits, causing him severe stress and anxiety about how he
11 would be able to pay for basic necessities, such as rent, groceries, and therapy.
12 Smith was ultimately forced to borrow money from friends and family to cover
13 these costs.

14 236. Although Bank of America ultimately re-issued Smith a permanent
15 credit for the amount of the unauthorized transaction, significant damage was done.
16 He suffered needlessly for months as a direct result of Bank of America’s decisions
17 to leave EDD Debit Cards susceptible to fraud and unauthorized use, to deprive him
18 of the \$1,721.78 associated with his unauthorized transaction claims, to freeze his
19 Account without providing any clear process or recourse for Smith to regain access
20 to his Account, and to commit the other unlawful acts and omissions alleged herein.

21 **17. Alex Yuan**

22 237. Yuan became unemployed as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and
23 applied for unemployment benefits from the EDD. The EDD approved his
24 application, and Bank of America issued him an EDD Debit Card.

25 238. In or around August 2020, two separate \$900 unauthorized ATM
26 withdrawals were made from Yuan’s EDD Debit Card Account in Los Angeles,
27 California.

28

1 239. Yuan promptly reported the fraud to Bank of America. In September
2 2020, the Bank temporarily credited \$1,800 to his Account. In October 2020, the
3 Bank determined that Yuan had been the victim of fraud and had not authorized the
4 two \$900 withdrawals, and the Bank made the \$1,800 credit permanent.

5 240. Shortly thereafter, however, Bank of America reversed the \$1,800
6 “permanent” credit, without any notice or explanation. On information and belief,
7 the Bank’s reversal of the \$1,800 credit was not the result of a reasonable
8 investigation, and the Bank had no reasonable basis for believing that Yuan had
9 authorized or benefitted from the transactions. As with the fraudulent \$1,800
10 withdrawal, Yuan discovered the credit reversal himself.

11 241. The Bank’s reversal of the credit caused Yuan’s Account balance to
12 go negative. Subsequent deposits by the EDD into Smith’s Account were applied
13 against the negative balance, depriving him of hundreds of dollars in critical
14 unemployment benefits.

15 242. Yuan repeatedly contacted Bank of America’s EDD Debit Card
16 customer service phone number for assistance with the matter. Like many other
17 EDD Debit Cardholders, Yuan experienced long wait times, dropped calls, and
18 elusive answers as to why the purportedly “permanent” credit had been reversed
19 and when and how the matter would be resolved.

20 243. While continuing to deal with the impact of the first two fraudulent
21 withdrawals, Yuan’s Account experienced yet another \$900 unauthorized
22 withdrawal, which he also promptly reported to the Bank, bringing the total amount
23 of fraudulent withdrawals from his Account to \$2,700. Because Bank of America
24 was failing to adequately safeguard his Account, Yuan then set up automated
25 transfers, so that any unemployment benefits deposited into his Account would be
26 transferred to a different, more secure bank account.

27 244. In December 2020, Bank of America notified Yuan by mail that it had
28 frozen his Account due to fraud. Thereafter, Bank of America—without any notice

1 to Yuan—unfroze his Account, at which point EDD resumed making deposits of
2 unemployment benefits to his Account, though without Yuan being aware of it.

3 245. The Bank still has not reimbursed Yuan for any of his three
4 unauthorized transaction claims, totaling \$2,700. On information and belief, the
5 Bank did not conduct reasonable good-faith investigations of these claims, and the
6 Bank had no reasonable basis for believing that Yuan had authorized or benefitted
7 from the transactions.

8 **18. Jory Zoelle**

9 246. In or about June or July 2020, Zoelle was the victim of an unauthorized
10 transaction on her EDD Debit Card Account, which was a charge for approximately
11 \$1,300 from a Target store in New Jersey. Zoelle reported the fraudulent transaction
12 to the Bank, which reimbursed her by crediting her Account for the amount of the
13 transaction in or about September 2020. That same month, however, the Bank froze
14 her Account for several weeks, depriving her of access to the funds in her Account.
15 On information and belief, the Bank lacked a reasonable basis to freeze her
16 Account.

17 247. In or about October 2020, after having frozen Zoelle's Account, the
18 Bank took back its previous credit by debiting her Account for the amount of the
19 unauthorized transaction, causing her Account balance to go negative. This left her
20 without much needed EDD benefits because the Bank applied EDD's subsequent
21 deposits of benefits into her Account against the negative balance.

22 248. This began Zoelle's ordeal of repeatedly calling Bank of America to
23 get the credit reinstated, often spending three to four hours on the phone waiting to
24 speak to a Bank representative, and not getting clear answers to her questions. On
25 approximately Zoelle's fifth or sixth such call, one Bank representative stated her
26 belief that Zoelle's unauthorized transaction claim appeared to be completely
27 legitimate, and further stated that she would do everything in her power to get the
28

1 credit reinstated to Zoelle's Account. Months later, however, Zoelle received a
2 letter from the Bank denying her claim.

3 249. To date, the Bank has refused or failed to reinstate the credit to Zoelle's
4 Account. On information and belief, the Bank's denial of her unauthorized
5 transaction claim was not the result of a reasonable investigation, and the Bank had
6 no reasonable basis for believing that she had authorized or benefitted from the
7 transaction.

8 **19. Cindy Baker**

9 250. On or about February 9 and 10, 2021, Baker was the victim of two
10 consecutive unauthorized transactions on her EDD Debit Card Account, both of
11 which were fraudulent ATM withdrawals of \$1,000 (i.e., the EDD Debit Card's
12 daily limit for ATM withdrawals), for a total of \$2,000. She promptly reported the
13 unauthorized transactions to Bank of America. On February 10, 2021, Bank of
14 America froze her Account.

15 251. This began Baker's ordeal of repeatedly calling Bank of America to
16 try to resolve these issues with her Account. She spent at least 30 hours on the phone
17 with Bank of America, regularly receiving information from Bank of America
18 representatives that conflicted with what other representatives had told her and with
19 the information contained in letters she received from Bank of America.

20 252. The Bank initially denied her unauthorized transaction claims. On
21 information and belief, the Bank's denial of her unauthorized transaction claim was
22 not the result of a reasonable investigation, and the Bank had no reasonable basis
23 for believing that she had authorized or benefitted from the transaction.

24 253. It was not until approximately June 2, 2021, after Baker had continued
25 to maintain her class action lawsuit against Bank of America, that the Bank reversed
26 its prior decision and finally credited her Account for the \$2,000 that had been
27 stolen nearly four months earlier.

1 **20. Ursula Auburn**

2 254. On July 31, 2020, Auburn was the victim of six unauthorized
3 transactions on her EDD Debit Card Account, all of which were transactions from
4 what appears (based on her Account statement) to be a single Walgreens store in
5 New York. The individual transactions were in the amounts of \$507.03, \$511.38,
6 \$455.95, \$505.95, \$505.95, and \$505.95. She promptly reported the unauthorized
7 transactions to Bank of America.

8 255. On August 13, 2020, the Bank provisionally credited Auburn's
9 Account for the amount of each of the unauthorized transactions. On October 9,
10 2020, however, the Bank reversed those provisional credits, creating a negative
11 balance in her Account. This left her without much needed EDD benefits because
12 the Bank applied EDD's subsequent deposits of benefits into her Account against
13 the negative balance.

14 256. On information and belief, the Bank's denial of her unauthorized
15 transaction claim was not the result of a reasonable investigation, and the Bank had
16 no reasonable basis for believing that she had authorized or benefitted from the
17 transaction. Indeed, on October 10, 202, the day after the Bank reversed the prior
18 credits to her Account, Auburn called the Walgreens in New York where the fraud
19 had occurred and spoke with a manager, who informed her that the store had video
20 surveillance footage of the unauthorized transactions, and that those transactions
21 had consisted of person using a physical card in the store to purchase gift cards. The
22 manager told Auburn that neither Bank of America nor anyone else had contacted
23 the store to ask about or investigate the transactions, and that Auburn's phone call
24 to the store was the first communication that the manager had received about the
25 transactions.

26 257. On October 27, 2020, after speaking with Auburn, a reporter with
27 ABC 7 (Los Angeles) contacted Bank of America to inquire about the unauthorized
28

1 transactions on Auburn's Account. That very same day, Bank of America credited
2 Auburn's Account in the amounts of the unauthorized transactions.

3 **21. Julie Hicks**

4 258. On September 3, 2020, an unauthorized third party made a \$1,000
5 withdrawal (i.e., the EDD Debit Card's maximum daily ATM withdrawal amount)
6 from Hicks' EDD Debit Card Account. In the next week, seven more \$1,000
7 fraudulent withdrawals were made from Hicks's Account, such that the
8 unauthorized withdrawals on Hicks's Account totaled \$8,000. On September 11,
9 2020, Bank of America froze Hick's Account.

10 259. Hicks timely reported the unauthorized withdrawals to Bank of
11 America and subsequently verified her identity with the Bank and with EDD.
12 Nonetheless, the Bank refused to reimburse her for the fraudulent withdrawals, and
13 it refused to unfreeze her Account. On information and belief, the Bank's denial of
14 her unauthorized transaction claims was not the result of a reasonable investigation,
15 and the Bank had no reasonable basis for believing that Hicks had authorized or
16 benefitted from any of the transactions.

17 260. On July 20, 2021, Hicks filed a class action lawsuit against Bank of
18 America in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. Only after
19 that, in or around August 2021, did Bank of America finally unfreeze her Account.
20 However, the Bank has never credited her Account for the \$8,000 at issue in her
21 unauthorized transaction claim.

22 **22. Kuang Ting Chong**

23 261. On or about July 20, 2020, an unknown person used a cloned debit
24 card to steal \$1,000 in unemployment benefits from Chong's EDD Debit Card
25 Account. Chong discovered the fraud on his Account and contacted Bank of
26 America to report the fraud that same day.

1 262. On July 21, 2020, Chong filed a police report with the Alhambra police
2 department. The officer Chong spoke to initially confused him with another EDD
3 Debit Cardholder who had also just had funds stolen from his Account.

4 263. On July 31, 2020, Bank of America credited the \$1,000 at issue to
5 Chong's EDD Debit Card Account. On September 2, 2020, Chong received a notice
6 from the Bank that it had completed its investigation, and that the \$1,000 credit to
7 his Account was now permanent.

8 264. Despite having issued Chong a permanent credit, however, Bank of
9 America subsequently sent a letter to Chong dated October 2, 2020, stating that the
10 Bank was rescinding the \$1,000 credit. The Bank rescinded the credit on October
11 4, 2020, creating a negative balance in his Account. While Chong continued
12 receiving EDD direct deposits into his Account thereafter, he was denied access to
13 some of these funds because they were applied against the negative Account
14 balance created by Bank of America.

15 265. With respect to the \$1,000 debit that occurred on October 4, the
16 transaction description in Chong's online Account on Bank of America's website
17 claimed that the debit was made by "State of CA EDD Unemployment." On
18 information and belief, this transaction description was false and misleading, as the
19 debit was made by and at the direction of Bank of America.

20 266. Chong repeatedly contacted the Bank and EDD in an effort to obtain
21 access to his \$1,000 in unemployment benefits that had been stolen out of his
22 Account and was now being withheld by Bank of America. In an October 15, 2020
23 phone call with the Bank's claims department, Chong was told his issue would be
24 resolved "in the order it was received."

25 267. Only after Chong filed a class action lawsuit against Bank of America
26 in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California in November 2020
27 were his Account issues finally resolved. The following month, in December 2020,
28

1 the Bank finally granted his unauthorized transaction claim and re-issued him a
2 permanent credit for the \$1,000 at issue.

3 **23. Stephanie Moore**

4 268. On July 18, 2020, Moore was the victim of a fraudulent \$1,000
5 withdrawal from an ATM machine and a separate fraudulent transaction of \$482 at
6 a Target retail store. These transactions depleted all the funds from her EDD Debit
7 Card Account. Moore did not authorize these transactions and received no benefit
8 from them. Moore discovered the fraud on July 18, 2020, when she tried to use her
9 EDD Debit Card to make a purchase and her Card was declined.

10 269. That same day, within minutes of discovering that unknown persons
11 had depleted the funds in her Account, Moore reported the fraudulent withdrawal
12 to Bank of America. On or about July 30, 2020, the Bank provisionally credited
13 \$1,482 to Moore's Account. On or about August 7 or 8, 2020, the Bank informed
14 Moore in writing that it had made the \$1,482 credit permanent.

15 270. On September 30, 2020, Moore attempted to use her EDD Debit Card
16 to purchase a tire for her vehicle. The transaction was declined. Moore attempted to
17 check the balance of her Account but was unable to log into her Account. On
18 information and belief, Bank of America froze Moore's Account on or about
19 September 30, 2020, without providing notice to Moore.

20 271. Despite having received a permanent \$1,482 credit from the Bank in
21 August 2020, Moore received a letter from the Bank on or about October 2, 2020,
22 stating that the Bank was rescinding the \$1,482 credit. The Bank rescinded the
23 credit on October 4, 2020, creating a negative balance in her Account.

24 272. The transaction description for the October 4 debit in Moore's online
25 Account on Bank of America's website claimed that the debit was made by "State
26 of CA EDD Unemployment." On information and belief, this transaction
27 description was false and misleading, as the debit was made by and at the direction
28 of Bank of America. Indeed, on October 12, 2020, Moore spoke with Bank of

1 America representative, who stated that it was Bank of America who debited the
2 \$1,482 from her Account.

3 273. Only after Moore filed a class action lawsuit against Bank of America
4 in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California in November 2020
5 were her Account issues finally resolved. The following month, on or about
6 December 1, 2020, the Bank finally granted her unauthorized transaction claim and
7 re-issued her a permanent credit for the \$1,482 at issue.

8 **24. Zinaida Petrova**

9 274. On May 30, 2021, Petrova viewed her monthly Account statement and
10 was surprised to see two transfers from her Account totaling \$9,500: (1) a \$5,000
11 transfer on May 16, 2021, and (2) a \$4,500 transfer on May 23, 2021. Petrova did
12 not authorize or benefit from either of these transactions. On or information and
13 belief, these were online transfers by which an unauthorized third-party transferred
14 money from Petrova's Account to an unknown non-EDD Debit Card bank account.
15 Petrova has made online transfers from her EDD Debit Card into a consumer
16 checking account she has at Union Bank, but the unauthorized transactions were
17 not transferred to her Union Bank checking account and do not appear on her Union
18 Bank account statements.

19 275. Upon discovering the two unauthorized transactions, Petrova promptly
20 called the phone number on the back of her EDD Debit Card to dispute the
21 transactions. She spoke with a Bank representative and submitted a fraud claim.
22 The representative told her the Bank would contact her regarding the findings of its
23 investigation. On June 10, 14, 15, 17, 24 and July 6 and 7, 2021, Petrova called the
24 Bank's customer service line for an update about the status of her claim. Bank
25 representatives told her that they either could not locate her claim or that her claim
26 was still pending. At no point was Petrova's Account provisionally credited for the
27 amount of disputed transactions, or indeed for any amount.

28 276. On or about July 13, 2021, Petrova received a letter from Bank of

1 America dated July 6, 2021, stating that the Bank was denying her claim. The
2 letter's explanation for the denial was as follows: "We confirmed that the transfers
3 posted to the account you requested. We recommend you contact the person you
4 sent the funds to directly for further assistance." This is impossible, however,
5 because Petrova never transferred the funds, and because the Bank's representatives
6 could not, did not know how, or refused to provide Petrova with the details of the
7 transactions.

8 277. On information and belief, the Bank's denial of her unauthorized
9 transaction claims was not the result of a reasonable investigation, and the Bank
10 had no reasonable basis for believing that Petrova had authorized or benefitted from
11 any of the transactions.

12 278. Petrova still has not been reimbursed for the \$9,500 in fraudulent
13 transactions on her Account.

14 **25. Claire Blankenship**

15 279. On or about July 23, 2021, Blankenship went to a local Bank of
16 America branch and tried to use her EDD Debit Card to withdraw unemployment
17 benefits deposited into her Account, but the Bank teller informed her that she had
18 no money left in the Account.

19 280. Confused, Blankenship promptly called the phone number on the back
20 of her Card. A Bank of America customer service representative informed
21 Blankenship that her Account was empty. The representative read aloud to
22 Blankenship recent transactions on her Account, and she was able to identify six
23 fraudulent transactions totaling \$2,750: (1) a \$190 transaction on June 14, 2021; (2)
24 a \$400 transaction on June 27, 2021; (3) a \$60 transaction on July 6, 2021; (4) a
25 \$1,000 transaction on July 19, 2021; (5) a \$1,000 transaction on July 20, 2021; and
26 (6) a \$100 transaction on July 21, 2021. Blankenship did not authorize or receive
27 any benefit from any of these transactions.
28

1 281. On the same phone call, Blankenship submitted a claim disputing the
2 fraudulent transactions. The Bank representative told Blankenship that her EDD
3 Debit Card would be blocked as a result of her reporting the fraud, and her Card
4 was blocked that same day. The Bank representative told Blankenship that the Bank
5 would send her a new Card, would investigate the fraudulent transactions, and
6 would contact her when its investigation was complete.

7 282. On July 28, 2021, Blankenship received and activated her new Bank
8 of America EDD Debit Card. Like her original Card, her new Card does not have
9 an EMV chip.

10 283. Also on July 28, 2021, Blankenship received a form letter from Bank
11 of America dated Monday, July 26, 2021—just one business day after she reported
12 the unauthorized transactions—denying her claim. The letter’s entire explanation
13 for why her claim was denied is as follows: “We’ve completed our review of the
14 above referenced claim and have determined that no error has occurred in this
15 instance. We now consider your claim resolved. [¶] What you need to know [¶] The
16 transaction activity in question was authorized and posted correctly to your
17 account.” The letter also states that Blankenship may call a Bank of America
18 customer service line to request copies of the documents that the Bank relied in on
19 reaching its decision. Blankenship immediately called the phone number and
20 requested copies of the documents on which the Bank had relied. A Bank
21 representative stated that the Bank would send her copies of the documents.

22 284. More than three weeks later, Blankenship still has not received (over
23 three weeks after requesting them) any documents from the Bank on which it relied
24 in denying her claim, and the Bank still has not reimbursed her for any of the
25 fraudulent transactions that occurred on her Account in June and July 2021.

26 * * *

27 285. In addition to the Class Representative Plaintiffs, countless other Class
28 Members have similarly reported not receiving any notification or communication

from Bank of America regarding fraudulent transactions in their EDD Debit Card Accounts, and instead discovered it themselves. Bank of America's fraud monitoring and controls have proven to be completely inadequate and ineffectual, in direct contradiction to the Bank's representations to Plaintiffs, Class Members, and the State. Instead of resolving Class Representative Plaintiffs' claims for these unauthorized transactions, as it is required to do by law, the Bank summarily closed the claims, failed to provide provisional credit, and froze and blocked their Accounts for indefinite periods of time. As a result of the conduct and omissions alleged herein, and despite the Bank's "Zero Liability" policy, Plaintiffs and Class Members have been deprived of unemployment benefits and other public benefits to which they are entitled by law, for weeks or months, causing them great, immediate, and irreparable harm.

H. Individual Plaintiffs' Allegations¹⁶

286. Paul Abarr is a California resident. In May 2020, he began receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In June 2020, he experienced fraudulent transactions on his Account totaling approximately \$8,000. In June 2020, he discovered the fraud. In June 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America said they would investigate the claim. In June 2020, Bank of America illegally froze his Account. In May 2021, Bank of America unfroze his Account. Since May 2020, Bank of America has not credited him any money. Due to Bank of America withholding his funds, he was evicted from several places because he has not been able to pay rent for twelve months, had several pre-paid phones shut off because he cannot afford to pay them, and was forced to beg for food.

¹⁶ The substance of Individual Plaintiffs' allegations are presented here as set forth in each of their complaints, after meeting and conferring with Individual Plaintiffs' liaison counsel. Unless otherwise indicated below, each Individual Plaintiff referenced herein (*see infra* ¶¶286–526) is a plaintiff in *Abarr v. Bank of America, N.A.*, No. 3:21-cv-01203-LAB-MSB ("*Abarr*").

1 287. Kobe Abbott is a California resident. In August 2020, he applied to
2 receive EDD benefits through Bank of America; however, Bank of America never
3 sent him a Card to access his Account. Between August 2020 to March 2021, he
4 experienced fraud on his Account. In March 2021, he discovered the fraud when he
5 was finally able to access his online Account. In March 2021, he attempted to report
6 the fraud to Bank of America; however, Bank of America has never answered a
7 single call. Since August 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit him any money.
8 Due to Bank of America's actions, he could not pay his \$1,000 rent from August
9 2020 to May 2021, leading to his move out in May 2021. He has not been able to
10 afford his \$900 monthly car payment since August 2020. He has not been able to
11 afford his \$40 monthly phone bill since August 2020. He struggles to buy food, gas,
12 and clothing.

13 288. Jordan Aders is a California resident. In August 2020, he began
14 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In December 2020, he
15 experienced fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$1,164. In December
16 2020, he discovered fraudulent transactions on his Account. In December 2020,
17 he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America
18 told him he needed to speak with EDD regarding his issue and refused to credit his
19 Account. In December 2020, Bank of America froze his Account. Since December
20 2020, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze his Account. Since December 2020,
21 Bank of America has yet to credit him any money. Due to Bank of America
22 withholding his funds, he lost his vehicle (the vehicle in which he used to live), lost
23 all personal belongings inside the vehicle, including clothing, a 33" television,
24 PlayStation, and other personal items. He missed three months of phone bills:
25 December 2020–February 2021 at \$60 per month, and could not afford to pay for
26 food.

289. Michael Adams¹⁷ is a natural person residing in Los Angeles County, State of California. Adams has an EDD banking Account which Bank of America maintains supervision and control over per its contractual relationship with the State of California. Over the course of this relationship, Adams provided Bank of America with various pieces of personal identifiable information related to Adams, such as his personal finances. Such information includes, but is not limited to, Adams' name, address, social security number, date of birth, income level, and banking information (amounts and accounts). Upon receipt of this information, Bank of America stored or otherwise archived said information in some library, digital file, computer-based system or other technique, and thus at all times was entrusted with and maintained control of Adams highly sensitive information. At some point in 2020, a hacker was able to access Bank of America's technical system—presumably via a misconfiguration of a firewall (presuming Bank of America had a firewall in place). As such, this hacker was able to gain access to banking account information for tens of thousands of EDD Debit Card Accounts which Bank of America maintains, supervises and controls per its contract with the State of California. In November of 2020, Adams checked his Account and discovered he had funds missing. Adams reviewed his Account activity and determined he had been a victim of fraud and made all reasonable attempts to notify Bank of America of this fraudulent activity. After Adams submitted his claim for fraud regarding the ATM withdrawal(s) at issue, Bank of America canceled or froze Adams' EDD Debit Card as a result of submitting his fraud claim. To Adams' shock and dismay, some unknown individual had made ATM withdrawal(s), in the amount of \$2,303. Adams did not make these withdrawals himself, did not authorize anyone to make the withdrawal on his behalf, and was still in possession of his Card

¹⁷ Adams is the plaintiff in *Adams v. Bank of America, N.A.*, No. 2:21-cv-05521-LAB-MSB, originally filed in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California (No. 2:21-cv-05521-FMO-JPR) ("*Adams*").

1 despite said withdrawals taking place. Adams submitted a fraud claim to Bank of
2 America regarding the missing/stolen funds in June 2021. Bank of America did not
3 provide a temporary credit/refund, so pursuant to EFTA, Bank of America had ten
4 (10) days to properly investigate and remedy the fraud claim. Bank of America did
5 neither. Bank of America sent Adams written correspondence dated June 4, 2021
6 denying his fraud claim, after allegedly performing a “reasonable” investigation.
7 The basis for Bank of America’s denial of Adams’ claim is scant at best but
8 nonetheless refused to refund or credit Adams the \$2,303 sum. Despite Bank of
9 America’s efforts, Bank of America refused to perform any reasonable
10 investigation regarding Adams’ dispute and instead flatly denied Adams’ claim.
11 Bank of America’s alleged “investigation” into Adams’ dispute was clearly
12 inadequate, not reasonable, not diligent, and failed to properly address Adams’
13 issues regarding the \$2,303 fraudulent withdrawal. Further evidencing Bank of
14 America’s woefully inadequate investigation is the fact that Bank of America has
15 access to data, film, and other resources given that the fraudulent transaction took
16 place at one of Bank of America’s own financial centers (i.e., not a third-party ATM
17 at convenience store, for example). Bank of America could have reasonably, easily
18 and swiftly confirmed the \$2,303 transaction as fraudulent and refunded or credited
19 the funds over to Adams’s Account. Instead, Bank of America failed to investigate
20 properly, refused to credit or refund the transaction, while still nonetheless
21 confirming that the withdrawal was subject to fraudulent activity.

22 290. Jonathan Aguirre is a California resident. In December 2019, he began
23 receiving EDD Benefits through Bank of America. In May 2020, he experienced
24 fraud on his Account totaling approximately \$806. In May 2020, he discovered the
25 fraud when he attempted to withdraw money from the Account but had insufficient
26 funds. In May 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In
27 response, Bank of America told him he needed to speak with EDD regarding his
28 dispute. In May 2020, Bank of America froze his Account. The Account remained

1 frozen with no refund or credit for an entire year. In May 2021, Bank of America
2 credited \$403 to his Account. Due to Bank of America withholding his funds, he
3 missed his rent payment in June 2020 and July 2020, missed his phone bill, missed
4 his credit card bill, and missed insurance payments. Bank of America also caused
5 him to not be able to purchase food or gas.

6 291. Christopher Allison is a California resident. In July 2020, he began
7 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In January 2021, Bank of
8 America froze him out of his Account due to alleged fraudulent activity. However,
9 there had been no such fraud on the Account. In January 2021, he discovered the
10 freeze when he tried to use his Card but was declined. In January 2021, he called
11 Bank of America to report the problem. In response, Bank of America told him to
12 talk to EDD regarding his dispute. In January 2021, Bank of America froze his
13 Account. Since January 2021, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze his Account.
14 Since January 2021, Bank of America has yet to credit him any money. Due to Bank
15 of America withholding his funds, he missed three \$600 rent payments, only
16 avoiding eviction because he worked something out with his landlord. He cannot
17 pay his \$300 PG&E monthly bill due since January 2021. He also has struggled
18 with depression due to Bank of America's conduct and has had suicidal thoughts.

19 292. Kevin Alvarez is a California resident. In July 2020, he began
20 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. Between July 2020 and
21 November 2020, he experienced fraud on his Account, totaling approximately
22 \$10,000. In September 2020, he discovered the fraud and immediately reported it
23 to Bank of America by phone. In response, Bank of America told him he needed to
24 resolve his issue with EDD. In November 2020, Bank of America froze his
25 Account. Since July 2020, Bank of America has not credited him any of the stolen
26 money. Due to Bank of America withholding his funds, he was forced out of his
27 home after not being able to afford his rent at \$950 per month for two months, he
28 was forced to live on the streets (in the back of his car), he has missed every phone

1 payment since November 2020 at \$130 per month, and he cannot afford to buy food
2 or gas.

3 293. Courtney Alvarez is a California resident. In January 2020, she began
4 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In February 2020, she
5 experienced fraud on her Account, totaling between \$1200-\$1300. In March 2020,
6 she discovered the fraudulent transactions on her Account. In March 2020, she
7 reported the fraudulent transactions to Bank of America. In response, Bank of
8 America told her that they were not certain where the money went and that they
9 would open a claim. In March 2020, Bank of America froze her Account. Since
10 March 2020, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze her Account. Since March 2020,
11 Bank of America has yet to credit her any of the stolen funds. Due to Bank of
12 America withholding her funds, she missed her rent payment for the months of
13 March, April, and May at \$250 per month and, as a result of missed rent, she was
14 evicted. She missed paying her phone bill for the months of March, April, and May
15 at \$60 per month. She missed paying her gas bill for the months of March, April,
16 and May at \$45 per month. She also missed paying her electric bill for the months
17 of March, April, and May at \$75 per month. She was unable to pay the necessities
18 of life including money to buy food and put fuel in her vehicle. She was pregnant
19 and was unable to purchase the necessary maternity clothes during this period.

20 294. Rosa Alvarez¹⁸ is, and at all times relevant to the allegations below
21 was, a natural person residing in the Los Angeles, California. Beginning in April
22 1996, she worked as a Course Materials Manager at the Follet Bookstore at Cerritos
23 College. As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, she was laid off just two weeks
24 shy of her 24th anniversary of working there. Unable to get another job, she began
25 receiving unemployment benefits, which were paid directly from the State of
26

27 ¹⁸ Rosa Alvarez is the plaintiff in *Alvarez v. Bank of America, N.A.*, No. 3:21-
28 cv-01176-LAB-MSB, originally filed in the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California (No. 2:21-cv-04643-DOC-PLA) (“*Alvarez*”).

1 California onto her Bank of America EDD Debit Card Account. On or about
2 Saturday, June 13, 2020, she was shopping and intended to pay for her purchase
3 using her Bank of American EDD Debit Card. After she ran her EDD Debit Card,
4 only \$8.75 could be charged to her Card. She was not initially alarmed, believing it
5 was a mistake with the vendor. On Monday, June 15, 2020, she called Bank of
6 America to ensure that there were no problems with her Card. When she called, she
7 learned that her Account balance was zero. During the call, she was told that \$160
8 was withdrawn from her Card from an ATM in Corona, California. She
9 immediately knew that the transaction was unauthorized because she had not been
10 to Corona. When she informed Bank of America that the withdrawal was an
11 unauthorized transaction, Bank of America instructed her to contact the Claims
12 department and provided her with claim #200615300845. She immediately
13 reviewed her Account statements from the Internet and highlighted all the
14 fraudulent transactions, which were all ATM cash withdrawals beginning on May
15 17, 2020. She called Bank of America back, provided claim #200615300845, and
16 notified the Bank about all the additional transactions that were fraudulent. Bank of
17 America told her that she would be notified about the results of the Bank's
18 investigation in 45 days. She called Bank of America on the week of July 6, 2020,
19 to inquire about the status of the investigation. During that call, she spoke with
20 Jester of Bank of America, who stated that the Bank had not done an investigation
21 because she had not returned to the Bank the form that the Bank had sent her. She
22 told Jester that she had not received anything in the mail from Bank of America.
23 Jester told her that she was supposed to return the form to Bank of America within
24 10 days and that Jester was unable to resend the form. On or about July 10, 2020,
25 she drove to the Bank of America branch in the city of Cerritos to see if she could
26 complete the form in the Bank branch to process her identity theft claim. She was
27 informed, however, that issues concerning EDD Debit Car Accounts cannot be
28 handled in the branch, and that she could only resolve her issues by telephone. She

1 asked if she could be provided a copy of the form that needed to be completed to
2 process her identity theft claim, and she was told No, not in the branch. On or about
3 July 11, 2020, she called the Los Angeles Police Department and reported the theft
4 of money from her EDD Debit Card Account. After she received a copy of the
5 police report, she completed an Identity Theft Affidavit and attached all the
6 requested documents (copy of the police report, her state identification card, proof
7 of residency) to the Affidavit. She then mailed the Affidavit to Bank of America by
8 certified mail, return receipt requested, on August 14, 2020. She never received a
9 response to her Identity Theft Affidavit. On or about December 2, 2020, she sent
10 Bank of America a letter by certified mail, return receipt requested, informing the
11 Bank that she had not received a response to her Identity Theft Affidavit. She asked
12 Bank of America to inform her if Bank of America needed any other documents to
13 complete its investigation. In that same letter, she also asked the Bank to send her
14 a copy of its investigation results and the documents used to reach the result, if its
15 investigation was completed. She never received a response to her December 2,
16 2020 letter. As a result of Bank of America's unlawful acts and omissions as stated
17 above, she suffered actual damages as described above.

18 295. David Anderson is a California resident. In April 2020, he began
19 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In July 2020, he started
20 experiencing fraudulent transactions on his Account, totaling approximately
21 \$1,500. In July 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone call. Since
22 July 2020, Bank of America's response to him was to tell him to talk to EDD about
23 his problem. Bank of America also told him that a bank supervisor would call him
24 but then nobody called. In August 2020, Bank of America credited him \$1,500;
25 however, Bank of America then reversed the credit and made his Account balance
26 negative \$1,500. Due to Bank of America's actions, he lost his place to live after
27 not being able to pay his \$900 rent and was forced to live in his friend's car. He lost
28 all his belongings when they were stolen out of the car. He could not afford to buy

1 food or gas, or clothing. He also cannot afford to pay child support, which means
2 he has not been able to see his children in six months.

3 296. Rebekah Anderson is a California resident. In April 2020, she began
4 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In September 2020, she began
5 experiencing fraud on her Account. In September 2020, she discovered the fraud
6 when she attempted to withdraw money out of an ATM but could not access the
7 funds. In October 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In
8 response, Bank of America told her she needed to resolve her issue with EDD. In
9 December 2020, Bank of America froze or closed her Account without notice. In
10 April 2021, she received a letter from Bank of America stating her Account was
11 unfrozen or reopened. Due to Bank of America's actions, she could not pay her rent
12 at \$330 per week, could not pay her phone bill at \$135 per month, and could not
13 afford to fix her truck which led to her losing a new part-time job in January 2021.

14 297. Amanda Andrade is a California resident. In March 2020, she began
15 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In August 2020, she experienced
16 fraud on her Account. In September 2020, she discovered the fraud. In September
17 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of
18 America told her to contact EDD to resolve her issue. In September 2020, Bank of
19 America froze her Account, which had \$19,000 in it at the time. In February 2021,
20 Bank of America unfroze her Account. Since September 2020, Bank of America
21 has yet to credit her any of the stolen funds. Due to Bank of America's actions, she
22 was evicted from her home after not being able to pay her rent from September
23 2020 to January 2021 at \$1,500 per month. She also could not afford to pay her
24 phone bill, car insurance, and gas bill because of Bank of America's actions.

25 298. Samuel de los Angeles, Sr. is a California resident. In March 2020,
26 he began receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In April 2021, he
27 experienced fraud on his Account. In May 2021, he discovered the fraud. In May
28 2021, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of

1 America told him they would try and figure out his issue. In May 2021, Bank of
2 America froze his Account, which had \$0 in the Account at the time. Since May
3 2021, Bank of America has not lifted the freeze on his Account. Since May 2021,
4 Bank of America has yet to credit him any of the stolen money. Due to Bank of
5 America's actions, he was three weeks late on his \$1,300 rent payment in June 2021,
6 which carried a \$100 penalty. He had to borrow money to pay his \$105 cell phone
7 bill. He could not afford food and gas.

8 299. Sheila Anistik is a California resident. In March 2020, she began
9 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In March 2020, there was fraud
10 on her Account. The fraud was an unauthorized international transaction totaling
11 \$4,000. In March 2020, she discovered the fraud by checking her Account balance.
12 In March 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of America, both by email and by
13 phone. In response, Bank of America told her she needed to speak to EDD to resolve
14 her issue. In March 2020, Bank of America froze her Account, which had \$9,000
15 in it at the time. In March 2020, Bank of America credited her the \$4,000; however,
16 Bank of America did not unfreeze her Account for her to access the funds. Due to
17 Bank of America's actions, she missed her \$1,200 mortgage payment between April
18 and June of 2020, eventually selling her home instead of losing it to eviction. She
19 was unable to pay her electric bill at \$230 per month, her gas bill at \$175 per month,
20 her water bill at \$215 per month, and her cell phone at \$45 per month, all between
21 April and June of 2020. She was unable to buy medical necessities for her elderly
22 mother. She also was unable to buy food and gas.

23 300. Robert Arnoldstarr is a California resident. In July 2020, he began
24 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In December 2020, he
25 experienced fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$5,000. In December
26 2020, he discovered the fraud when he checked his Account balance. In December
27 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of
28 America told him that his issue was with EDD, and that Bank of America could not

1 help him. In December 2020, Bank of America froze his Account. In April 2021,
2 Bank of America unfroze his Account. Since December 2020, Bank of America has
3 yet to credit the stolen money to his Account. Due to Bank of America's actions, he
4 missed five \$2,100 rent payments starting in January 2021 and was promptly
5 evicted. He is now homeless. In April 2021, his car was repossessed after missing
6 five car payments totaling \$4,000. He could not pay his credit card bills for five
7 months starting in January 2021. He could not pay his \$130 phone bill since January
8 2021. He cannot afford to pay for food or gas. He also cannot pay for doctor's bills.

9 301. Vanessa Arrey is a California resident. In June 2020, she began
10 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. Between October 2020 to
11 February 2021, she experienced fraud on her Account, totaling approximately
12 \$6,500. In April 2021, after certifying her claim with EDD, she discovered the fraud
13 after she logged onto her Account. In April 2021, she reported the fraud to Bank of
14 America via phone. In response, Bank of America told her she needed to verify her
15 identification, only after Bank of America transferred her from department to
16 department. In April 2021, Bank of America illegally froze her Account. In late
17 April or early May 2021, Bank of America unfroze her Account. Since April 2021,
18 Bank of America has yet to credit her any money. Due to Bank of America's
19 actions, she missed five \$500 rent payments, leading to eviction and subsequent
20 homelessness. She missed five \$200 utility bills. She missed three \$75 phone bills.
21 She suffers from emotional distress.

22 302. Christal Ayala is a California resident. On February 2, 2020, she began
23 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. On March 1, 2021, Bank of
24 America illegally froze her Account. Since March 2021, Bank of America has yet
25 to unfreeze her Account. Since March 2021, Bank of America has yet to credit her
26 any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, she missed her \$1,050 rent payment
27 in March 2021, leading to eviction and subsequent homelessness for her and her
28 children. She struggles to pay for motels for her children to have some sort of living

1 condition. She has been unable to afford her car payments since March 2021. She
2 is unable to afford her car registration. She struggles to buy food, gas, and clothing
3 for herself and her children.

4 303. Celina Back is a California resident. In November 2020, she applied
5 to receive EDD benefits through Bank of America; however, Bank of America did
6 not send her a Card with access to her funds until March 2021. In March 2021, Bank
7 of America illegally froze her Account, after she reported someone was fraudulently
8 ordering new Cards from her Account. In late May 2021, Bank of America unfroze
9 her Account. In May 2021, she experienced fraud on her Account, totaling
10 approximately \$17,000. In May 2021, she discovered the fraud when she logged
11 into her Account. In May 2021, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via
12 phone. In response, Bank of America opened a claim to investigate. In May 2021,
13 Bank of America again illegally froze her Account. Since May 2021, Bank of
14 America has yet to unfreeze her Account. Since May 2021, Bank of America has
15 yet to credit her any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, she has missed her
16 \$700 rent payment from April 2021 to present, her \$236 car payments from April
17 2021 to present, her \$100 monthly electric bill from April 2021 to present, and her
18 \$60 phone bill from April 2021 to present. She struggles to obtain food, gas, and
19 clothing.

20 304. Mark Barnette is a California resident. In June 2020, he began
21 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In June 2020, he experienced
22 fraud on his Account. The fraudulent transactions were withdrawals totaling
23 \$8,000. In September 2020, he discovered the fraud. In September 2020, he
24 contacted Bank of America to report the fraud. In response, Bank of America did
25 not believe him, even when he physically went into a bank branch to prove his
26 identification. In September 2020, Bank of America froze his Account. In May
27 2021, Bank of America unfroze his Account. In February 2021, Bank of America
28 credited him \$6,200. Due to Bank of America's actions, he was evicted from his

1 apartment in July 2020 and was forced to live on the streets in a tent. He missed
2 seeing his daughter for the first time in seven years. He cannot afford food or gas.
3 He has had to make two hospital visits as a result of living on the streets. His fiancé
4 left him. He suffers from extreme emotional distress.

5 305. Douglas Beckham is a California resident. In May 2020, he began
6 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In February 2021, he began
7 experiencing fraud on his Account. The fraudulent transactions totaled \$924. In
8 February 2021, he discovered the fraud when he checked his Account balance. In
9 February 2021, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response,
10 Bank of America said he needed to speak with EDD to resolve the issue. In February
11 2021, Bank of America froze his Account, which had \$934 in it at the time. Since
12 February 2021, Bank of America has yet to credit him any of the stolen money. Due
13 to Bank of America's actions, he could not afford his \$550 rent payment from
14 February 2021 to May 2021, forcing him to be evicted and live with his friend. He
15 could not afford to pay his \$200 utility bills from February 2021 to May 2021. He
16 has not been able to pay his \$60 monthly phone bill since February 2021. He had
17 seven credit card accounts default because he could not pay his credit card bills. He
18 cannot pay for food or gas.

19 306. Sky Beehler is a California resident. In February 2020, she applied to
20 receive EDD benefits through Bank of America; however, Bank of America did not
21 send her a Card to access her Account. Between February 2020 and June 2020, she
22 experienced fraud on her Account, totaling approximately \$14,134. In June 2020,
23 she discovered the fraud when she called Bank of America to inquire why Bank of
24 America had not sent her a Card. In June 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of
25 America via phone. In response, Bank of America froze her Account until they
26 could conduct an investigation. In June 2020, Bank of America froze her Account.
27 Since June 2020, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze her Account, and has in fact
28 closed her Account. Since June 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit her any

1 money. Due to Bank of America's actions, she missed paying her \$1,300 rent
2 payment from June 2020 to October 2020, and her landlord threatened eviction. She
3 missed her \$494 monthly car payment from June 2020 to October 2020, leading her
4 to sell the car. She struggles to pay for her phone payments and her PG&E
5 payments. She struggles to obtain food, gas, and clothing.

6 307. Amber Bennett is a California resident. In March 2020, she began
7 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In July 2020, she experienced
8 fraud on her Account, totaling approximately \$300. In July 2020, she discovered
9 the fraud when she checked her Account transaction history. In July 2020, she
10 reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America
11 told her they would open a claim and investigate. In late July or early August 2020,
12 Bank of America illegally froze her Account. In late July or early August 2020,
13 Bank of America unfroze her Account. In late July or early August 2020, Bank of
14 America credited \$300 to her Account; however, Bank of America reversed the
15 credit, putting her Account into a balance of negative \$300. Since August 2020,
16 Bank of America has yet to re-credit her the fraudulently stolen money. Due to Bank
17 of America's actions, she missed a \$650 rent payment. She missed a \$400 car
18 payment which led to a \$45 late fee. She struggles to buy food, gas, and clothing.
19 She suffers from emotional distress.

20 308. Forrest Berlt is a California resident. In October 2019, he began
21 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In October 2019, he began
22 experiencing fraud. In October 2019, he discovered the fraud when he called Bank
23 of America to see why he had not received any of his funds. In October 2019, he
24 reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America
25 told him he needed to verify his ID and to talk to EDD to resolve his issue. In
26 October 2019, Bank of America froze his Account. In May 2020, he received a
27 letter from Bank of America telling him his Account was unfrozen. Since October
28 2019, Bank of America has yet to credit him the funds he was due from EDD. In

1 May 2020, Bank of America credited him \$5,000 from the fraudulent transactions.
2 Due to Bank of America's actions, he missed rent payments between \$400–\$500
3 and was forced to live with friends and family. From October to December 2019,
4 he was late on two car payments for \$495/month. His car was impounded in
5 December 2019. He had already made 28 of the 36 payments for the car at the time
6 of the impounding. He struggled to obtain food, gas, and clothing.

7 309. Stone Blacksands is a California resident. In April 2020, he began
8 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In April 2020, Bank of America
9 illegally froze his Account. Between April 2020 and September 2020, he called
10 Bank of America, who told him he needed to verify his identification with EDD.
11 Since April 2020, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze his Account. Since April
12 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit him any money. Due to Bank of America's
13 actions, he could not pay his \$600 rent payments from April 2020 to July 2020,
14 forcing him to find other housing options. He cannot afford to fix his recreational
15 vehicle (RV), which he now lives in. He could not afford his \$150 monthly phone
16 bill, leading to a phone shut off. He cannot afford \$5,000 for a clinical study
17 program in which he is enrolled. He struggles to pay for food, gas, and clothing.

18 310. Dean Bommel is a California resident. In June 2020, he began
19 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In August 2020, he experienced
20 fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$5,000 of overseas transactions. In
21 August 2020, he discovered the fraud after he checked his Account history online.
22 In August 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response,
23 the Bank said they would freeze his Account and investigate. In August 2020, the
24 Bank froze his Account. In August 2020, the Bank credited him money to his
25 Account, yet did not credit him the international fees associated with the first
26 fraudulent transactions on his Account. In December 2020, the Bank unfroze his
27 Account. In January 2021, he again experienced fraud on his Account involving the
28 same international companies. In January 2021, he discovered the fraud when he

1 checked his online Account. In January 2021, he reported the fraud to Bank of
2 America via phone. In response, the Bank blamed him for the fraud and refused to
3 credit him for the fraudulently stolen money. In January 2021, the Bank again froze
4 his Account. In April 2021, the Bank unfroze his Account. Bank of America has
5 yet to credit him for the second set of fraudulent transactions. Due to the Bank's
6 actions, he missed his \$1,100 rent payments from January 2021 to May 2021. He
7 also missed electric bills totaling \$6,000 and gas bills totaling \$1,800. He struggles
8 to obtain food and clothing.

9 311. Nicholas Brady is a California resident. In June 2020, he began
10 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In June 2020, he began
11 experiencing fraud on his Account. The fraudulent transactions totaled \$2,000 from
12 ATM cash withdrawals. In June 2020, he discovered the fraud. In June 2020, he
13 contacted Bank of America to report the fraud via phone. In response, Bank of
14 America told him to talk to EDD to resolve his issue. In October 2020, Bank of
15 America froze his Account. In October 2020, Bank of America unfroze his Account.
16 In December 2020, Bank of America again froze his Account. In January 2021,
17 Bank of America unfroze his Account, for a second time. In July 2020, Bank of
18 America credited him the \$2,000 that was fraudulently taken from his Account;
19 however, the reversed the credit and put his Account into a negative balance. Since
20 July 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit him the stolen money. Due to Bank of
21 America's actions, he was evicted from his home in November 2020. He could not
22 pay his cell phone bill with Verizon at \$60 per month since September 2020, and
23 as a result, went into default where Verizon turned him into collections. He had his
24 child support licensed suspended because he had no funds to pay. He cannot buy
25 food and had to go to a homeless shelter just to eat dinner. He also suffers from
26 depression and extreme humiliation.

27 312. James Brooks is a California resident. In May 2020, he applied to
28 receive EDD benefits through Bank of America; however, Bank of America did not

1 send him a Card with access to his Account until July 2020. Between June 2020 to
2 July 2020, he experienced fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$11,529.06.
3 In January 2021, he discovered the fraud when Bank of America told him a
4 fraudulent person had been accessing his Account. In January 2021, he reported the
5 fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America took one day to
6 investigate the claim before Bank of America denied the claim, finding no fraud. In
7 January 2021, Bank of America froze his Account. In March 2021, Bank of
8 America unfroze his Account. Since January 2021, Bank of America has yet to
9 credit him any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, he missed his \$800 rent
10 payments from March 2021 to February 2021. He missed his phone bill, electric
11 bill, and water bill from March 2021 to February 2021, totaling approximately \$600.
12 He struggles to buy food, gas, and clothing.

13 313. Adam Brotman¹⁹ resides in San Diego County, California. He became
14 out of work during the COVID-19 pandemic. He then applied for and was found
15 eligible by EDD to receive unemployment benefits. He received a Bank of America
16 EDD Debit Card with a magnetic stripe (but no EMV chip) to access EDD benefits.
17 He was then the victim of unauthorized transactions on his EDD Debit Card
18 Account. He promptly reported the unauthorized transaction(s) to Bank of America,
19 which failed to comply with its legal obligations as alleged herein, causing him to
20 suffer immediate and irreparable injury. On October 22, 2020, two transactions
21 were charged to his Account; (1) A transaction that he made at an ARCO gas station
22 in San Diego, California and (2) a transaction at an ATM in Birmingham, England
23 for \$990.50 that he did not authorize. Brotman, in dire need of his funds to help
24 bridge the gap between employment during the pandemic, was confused why Bank
25 of America approved the ATM transaction in England that occurred on the same
26 day as his transaction in California. The fraudulent transaction of \$990.50 in

27 ¹⁹ Brotman is the plaintiff in *Brotman v. Bank of America, N.A.*, No. 3:21-cv-
28 00520-LAB-MSB ("*Brotman*").

1 England drained his Account to \$170.81 after the Bank's international transaction
2 fees. The fraudster stole \$990.50 from him which is a great deal of money to him.
3 He intended to use the money to buy food and gasoline. Inexplicably, he did not
4 receive a notification about the highly unusual transaction in England, indicating
5 that Bank of America failed to detect the fraud. On October 27, 2020, after
6 discovering the fraudulent \$990.50 transaction made in England on his Account, he
7 immediately called Bank of America and filed a fraud claim. Bank of America told
8 him to wait for a few days while it investigated the claim and stated it would get
9 back to him. On October 28, 2020, just one day after his fraud report, the Bank sent
10 him a letter that read in part: "Your claim has been closed because we believe the
11 account or the claim have been the subject of fraud or suspicious activity. Any
12 temporary credit that was applied to your account related to this claim, including
13 any related reimbursement of fees, has been or will be debited from your account
14 and reflected in your available balance, if any." The Bank's letter dated October 28,
15 2020 admits that Brotman's Account had been "the subject of fraud" and an error
16 did occur. It was required to correct the error within one business day under 15
17 U.S.C. §1693f(b). Not only was the Bank required to recredit the \$990.50 resulting
18 from the error, it should have refunded the \$20.81 of international transaction fees
19 it charged stemming from the error. To date, this has not occurred. Brotman was
20 shocked the claim was denied only one day after he informed Bank of America of
21 the error on his Account, which was made at an ATM thousands of miles away from
22 his home in San Diego, CA. He believed he would be protected and covered by
23 Bank of America and was utterly disappointed when the Bank did not return or
24 recredit the money to him so he could provide for himself during the pandemic
25 while it conducted a good faith investigation. His initial notice to the Bank occurred
26 well-within the sixty-day time limit imposed by 15 U.S.C. §1693f(a). He reported
27 the unauthorized transfer to the Bank many more times within sixty-days as outlined
28 below. The Bank continued to send him periodic statements, as required by 15

1 U.S.C. §1693f(a). The statements confirmed and showed the unauthorized transfer.
2 Brotman called Bank of America routinely to report the fraud and request a refund.
3 He would sit on hold for extended periods of time. Sometimes the call would
4 become disconnected after being on hold for hours. Each time he reported the
5 unauthorized transfer to agents at the Bank, he provided his name and other
6 identifying information as required by 15 U.S.C. §1693f(a)(1). The agents were
7 able to locate his Account, but they would not help him. He indicated to the Bank
8 that he believed his Account contained errors in the form of an unauthorized
9 electronic fund transfer under 15 U.S.C. §1693f(f)(1) and provided the amount and
10 date of the transfer per 15 U.S.C. §1693f(a)(2). When he reported the fraud, he
11 explained that the transfer occurred in England while he was in California. He set
12 forth the reasons for his belief that the transfer was unauthorized error on the Bank's
13 part and was fraudulent per 15 U.S.C. §1693f(a)(3). Upon information and belief,
14 the Bank did not conduct any investigation when he reported the error. The Bank
15 may have mailed him the alleged results of an "investigation" and determination
16 within ten business days of notice, in an attempt to satisfy 15 U.S.C. §1693f(a)(3),
17 but the letter the Bank sent him the next day after fraud notice was a form letter
18 with no substantive information. The Bank did not conduct a good faith
19 investigation and did not provisionally recredit his Account within ten business
20 days after receiving notice of the unauthorized transfer as required by 15 U.S.C.
21 §1693f(c). Around November 2020, Brotman reached another agent by phone and
22 again reported the fraud and asked for help in the form of a recredit or refund. The
23 agent told him that the call needed to go to "claims." Despite Bank of America's
24 representations of "24/7" customer service, the agent informed him that he needed
25 to call back during business hours and provided him with a number to call. Brotman
26 called that number only to be put on hold for hours, and then hung up on. He was
27 transferred to various departments to no apparent end, sent to voicemail, dealt with
28 unhelpful automated agents, with no meaningful response. In December 2020, he

1 was able to speak with another Bank of America agent. He went through the
2 transactions with the agent and reported the fraudulent \$990.50 charge made in
3 England again. The agent told him that his Account was frozen on December 17,
4 2020, and the Bank should have sent him a letter informing him. Unfortunately, he
5 did not receive any such letter. The agent transferred him to the Claims Department
6 who hung up on him without answering the phone. At no point did Brotman receive
7 warning via mail, email, text, call or otherwise from Bank of America regarding the
8 fraud on his Account or the ongoing widespread fraud affecting EDD Debit Cards
9 or how defrauded EDD recipients should proceed. There was no notice even after
10 the Bank had frozen hundreds of thousands of EDD Debit Card Accounts in a
11 desperate and heavy-handed effort to stem the effects of the fraud. In his numerous
12 calls to the Bank going back to October 2020, Brotman repeatedly requested
13 additional information, clarification and documentation concerning the
14 unauthorized transfers, but the Bank refused to provide it as required under 15
15 U.S.C. §1693f(f)(6). Assuming the Bank had a valid reason for the freeze and
16 needed to conduct an investigation, Brotman should have been able to access his
17 funds, including the stolen \$990.50, after ten days under the EFTA. But that was
18 not the reality for him. He was held hostage by the Bank with the only option of
19 calling the Bank repeatedly and being placed on hold for hours and hours. In late
20 January 2021, he called Bank of America's Claims Department again. A
21 representative named Chris answered the phone and informed Brotman that on
22 January 19, 2021, his claim shifted from "closed" to "pending maintenance."
23 Brotman received no correspondence about the shift in status of his claim. On
24 February 1, 2021, the Bank mailed Brotman an additional letter informing him that
25 his Account had been frozen due to suspicious activity. On February 3, 2021, the
26 Bank mailed him a letter stating his \$990.50 had finally been returned and his
27 Account was not frozen. The information was directly contrary to the letter the Bank
28 had sent him two days before. The Bank did not return the \$20.81 of international

1 transaction fees it charged him in connection with the fraudulent transaction and
2 did not credit him for interest as required by 15 U.S.C. §1693f(b). Brotman reported
3 the unauthorized transaction to the Bank in October 2020. A good faith
4 investigation by the Bank was required to be completed forty-five days later under
5 15 U.S.C. §1693f(c). If the Bank determined in a good faith investigation during
6 the forty-five period that an error did not occur, it was required to deliver or mail
7 him an explanation of its findings within three business days after the conclusion of
8 that good faith investigation under 15 U.S.C. §1693f(c). Instead, the Bank sent him
9 a form letter the next day after he reported the fraud. This indicates the Bank had
10 not performed any sort of investigation, much less a good faith investigation. The
11 letter seemed to be an attempt to shield the Bank from liability. In its letter dated
12 October 28, 2020, Bank of America failed to enclose any supporting documents to
13 support its position that Brotman had committed the fraud. The Bank did not make
14 a good faith investigation of the error. It did not have a reasonable basis for
15 believing that his Account was not in error per 15 U.S.C. §1693f(e)(1). Initially,
16 and then again well after the forty-five-day investigation period allowed, the Bank
17 concluded that his Account was not in error when such a conclusion could not
18 reasonably have been drawn from the evidence available to it at the time of its
19 investigation per 15 U.S.C. §1693f(e)(2). Brotman upheld his end of the Cardholder
20 Agreement and the requirements of the EFTA and made consistent diligent efforts
21 to report and recover the funds stolen from the Account. He made many telephone
22 calls reporting the fraud. In spite of this, Bank of America's customer service
23 department never offered him any meaningful response or assistance, but rather
24 stymied his efforts at every turn.

25 314. James Bruno is a California resident. In July 2020, he began receiving
26 EDD benefits through Bank of America. In December 2020, he began experiencing
27 fraud on the Account. The fraudulent transactions totaled \$895. In December 2020,
28 he discovered the fraud when he attempted to pay rent but was unable to do so. In

1 December 2020, he contacted Bank of America via phone to report the fraud. In
2 response, Bank of America told him to wait to process his claim and to talk to EDD
3 to resolve his issue. In December 2020, Bank of America froze his Account. In May
4 2021, Bank of America unfroze his Account. In May 2021, Bank of America
5 credited him the \$895 that was stolen. Due to Bank of America's actions, he missed
6 rent of \$1,600. He was forced to ask for an extension on paying his phone bill of
7 \$100. He also suffered from emotional distress.

8 315. Beth Burns is a California resident. In March 2020, she began
9 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In April 2021, she experienced
10 fraud on her Account. The fraudulent transaction was an ATM cash withdrawal of
11 \$980. In April 2021, Burns discovered the fraud when she attempted to use her Card
12 but was declined and called Bank of America to understand why. In April 2021, she
13 reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone, during the same call when she
14 discovered the fraud. In response, Bank of America told her there was nothing they
15 could do except send her a new Card, which Bank of America did on five separate
16 occasions. In April 2021, Bank of America froze her Account. Since April 2021,
17 Bank of America has yet to unfreeze her Account. Since April 2021, Bank of
18 America has not credited her any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, she
19 missed insurance payment of \$60, missed phone bills of \$70. She cannot buy food
20 or gas and she also suffers from emotional distress.

21 316. Dwight Burrow is a California resident. In July 2020, he began
22 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In December 2020, Bank of
23 America illegally froze his Account, citing suspected fraudulent activity. In March
24 2021, Bank of America unfroze his Account. In March 2021, he experienced fraud
25 on his Account, totaling approximately \$200. In March 2021, he discovered the
26 fraud after he checked his transaction history after reactivating his Account. In
27 March 2021, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank
28 of America said they would investigate and open a claim. In March 2021, Bank of

1 America again froze his Account. In April 2021, Bank of America unfroze his
 2 Account. In March 2021, Bank of America credited him the fraudulently stolen
 3 money; however, Bank of America reversed the credit one week later. Due to Bank
 4 of America's actions, he missed two \$500 rent payments, leading to eviction. He
 5 struggled to pay for food, gas, clothing, and other basic life necessities, such as
 6 medication. He suffers from emotional distress.

7 317. Mario Bynum is a California resident. In July 2020, he began receiving
 8 EDD benefits through Bank of America. Between August 2020 and September
 9 2020, he experienced fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$3,900.
 10 Between August 2020 and September 2020, he would discover and report the fraud
 11 to Bank of America; however, fraud would occur after each report. On October 4,
 12 2021, \$7,000 was taken from his Account, putting his Account balance at negative
 13 \$2,000. In October 2020, Bank of America froze his Account. In January 2021,
 14 Bank of America unfroze his Account. In March 2021, Bank of America credited
 15 \$3,777 to his Account. Due to Bank of America's actions, he missed his \$1,000 rent
 16 from August 2020 to May 2021, leading to eviction in May 2021. He has struggled
 17 to make his \$900 car payments since August 2020. He has struggled to pay his \$40
 18 phone bill since August 2020. He struggles to pay for food, gas, and clothing.

19 318. Daniel Byrn is a California resident. In June 2020, he began receiving
 20 EDD benefits through Bank of America. In November 2020, he began experiencing
 21 fraud on his Account. The fraudulent transaction was an ATM cash withdraw
 22 totaling \$400. In November 2020, he discovered the fraud when he attempted to
 23 pull money out of an ATM. In November 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of
 24 America via phone. In response, Bank of America told him his issue was with EDD
 25 and that EDD was responsible for freezing his Account. In November 2020, Bank
 26 of America froze his Account. In May 2021, Bank of America unfroze his Account.
 27 Since November 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit him any money. Due to
 28 Bank of America's actions, he was forced to live with a family member. His cell

1 phone bill was \$50 per month, which he could not pay for three months from
2 January 2021 to April 2021. He could barely afford to pay for gas, which he needed
3 to deposit the paper checks EDD began sending him. He had to borrow money from
4 a friend in order to help with bills. He also is a recent burn victim and Bank of
5 America caused his recovery to flare because of the stress it induced upon him.

6 319. Joseph Calzado is a California resident. In February 2020, he began
7 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In February 2021, he
8 experienced fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$400. In February 2021,
9 he discovered the fraud when he checked his bank statements. In February 2021, he
10 reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America
11 said they would send him a new Card within a few days. In February 2021, Bank
12 of America froze his Account. In March 2021, Bank of America unfroze his
13 Account. Since February 2021, Bank of America has yet to credit him any money.
14 Due to Bank of America's actions, he missed two \$370 rent payments, leading to
15 eviction and subsequent homelessness. He missed two \$98 cell phone bills. He
16 missed two \$80 credit card bills, leading to a drop in credit score. He cannot afford
17 his car insurance or vehicle registration. He owes \$1,500 to family members. He
18 lost personal items of value during the eviction. He suffers from emotional distress.

19 320. Stacey Camberos is a California resident. In May 2020, she began
20 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In February 2021, she began
21 experiencing fraud on her Account. The fraudulent transactions were purchases at
22 a store totaling \$439.61. In February 2021, she discovered the fraud on her Account.
23 In February 2021, she reported the fraud to Bank of America by phone. In response,
24 Bank of America told her to call them back in a few weeks to resolve her issue. In
25 February 2021, Bank of America froze her Account which had \$32 in the Account
26 at the time. In May 2021, Bank of America unfroze her Account. Due to Bank of
27 America's actions, she has missed every rent payment since February 2021, at \$500
28 per month. She cannot afford to pay to fix her car at \$355, forcing her to borrow her

1 brother's car for transportation. She has been dropped by two cell phone carriers
2 because she could not pay her phone bill. She can barely afford to buy food for her
3 kids.

4 321. Kimberly Carpenter is a California resident. In June 2020, she began
5 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In October 2020, she
6 experienced fraud on her Account, totaling \$200. In October 2020, she discovered
7 the fraud. In October 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of America. In response,
8 Bank of America said they would investigate the claim. In July 2020, Bank of
9 America illegally froze her Account. Since July 2020, Bank of America has
10 unfrozen and then illegally re-frozen her Account six times. Since June 2020, Bank
11 of America has yet to unfreeze her Account. In 2020, Bank of America credited
12 \$200 to her Account. Due to Bank of America's actions, she missed two phone
13 payments resulting in a phone shut off. She has missed two electrical bill payments.
14 She has missed two water bill payments. She struggles to afford food and clothing.
15 She also suffers from strokes, and Bank of America's actions has added extra stress
16 onto her condition.

17 322. Patricia Castillo is a California resident. In early 2020, she began
18 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In August 2020, she experienced
19 fraud on her Account. In August 2020, she discovered the fraud on her Account
20 when her Card was declined. In August 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of
21 America via phone. In response, Bank of America transferred her between
22 departments and often dropped her call altogether. In July 2020, Bank of America
23 froze her Account. In March 2021, Bank of America unfroze her Account. In March
24 2021, Bank of America credited her \$4,000. In May 2021, Bank of America credited
25 her an additional \$900. Due to Bank of America's actions, she had her car
26 repossessed in February 2021. She has missed rent payments and had her phone
27 service ended after failing to pay her bill. She also cannot afford to buy food. She
28 also experiences extreme stress and anxiety.

1 323. Richard Caton is a California resident. In April 2020, he began
2 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In March 2021, he experienced
3 fraud on his Account. The fraudulent transactions totaled \$4,500. In March 2021,
4 he discovered the fraud when he checked his Account online. In March 2021, he
5 reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America
6 said they would investigate the claim and send him a new Card in the meantime.
7 Bank of America also told him he needed to submit a new claim. In March 2021,
8 Bank of America froze his Account. In May 2021, Bank of America unfroze his
9 Account. Since March 2021, Bank of America has yet to credit him the stolen
10 money. Due to Bank of America's actions, he could only pay \$500 of his \$800
11 monthly rent between March 2021 and May 2021. He struggled with food, clothing,
12 and phone bills. He also struggled with extreme emotional distress.

13 324. Susan Chapple is a California resident. In April 2020, she began
14 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In May 2020, she began
15 experiencing fraud on her Account. The fraudulent transactions totaled \$400. In
16 May 2020, she discovered the fraud when she tried to withdraw money but was
17 declined. In May 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In
18 response, Bank of America told her they would send her papers to fill out to verify
19 her identity. In April 2021, she again experienced fraud on her Account. The
20 fraudulent transactions totaled \$500. In April 2021, she discovered the fraud when
21 she checked her online Account balance. In April 2021, she reported the fraud to
22 Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America told her they would file
23 another claim. In June 2020, Bank of America froze her Account. In August 2020,
24 Bank of America unfroze her Account. In June 2020, Bank of America credited
25 \$200 to her Account. In October 2020, Bank of America again froze her Account.
26 In December 2020, Bank of America unfroze her Account. In June 2020, Bank of
27 America credited \$200 to her Account for the first fraudulent transactions. In April
28 2021, Bank of America credited \$115 to her Account for the second fraudulent

1 transactions. Due to Bank of America's actions, she missed three rent payments of
2 \$400. She missed three storage facility payments of \$176. She lost personal
3 property from that storage unit. She missed four insurance payments of \$226. She
4 had her vehicle repossessed. She suffered medically as she is handicapped and
5 cannot make doctor's appointments to verify collection of disability. She cannot
6 transport herself to and from rehab. She also suffers from emotional distress.

7 325. Randy Chase is a California resident. In April 2020, he was approved
8 to receive EDD benefits through Bank of America. On December 19, 2020, Bank
9 of America froze his Account, which had \$13,600 in it at the time. Since December
10 2020, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze his Account. On January 28, 2021, Bank
11 of America gave him \$2,000 in cash and a cashier's check for \$11,000. Due to Bank
12 of America's actions, he is homeless and forced to live in a car in Denver, Colorado.
13 He cannot repair his vehicle. He is forced to beg for money and cannot pay for food.
14 He also suffers from emotional distress.

15 326. Angela Chavez is a California resident. In March 2020, she began
16 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. Between March 2020 and July
17 2020, she experienced fraud on her Account, totaling approximately \$8,500. In
18 March 2020, she discovered the fraud. In March 2020, she reported the fraud to
19 Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America told her to resolve her
20 issue with EDD. In December 2020, Bank of America illegally froze her Account.
21 In March 2021, Bank of America unfroze her Account. Since March 2020, Bank of
22 America has yet to credit her any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, she
23 missed three rent payments at \$725 per month. She missed her light bill three times
24 at \$100 per month. She missed her cell phone bill three times at \$180 per month.
25 She missed her \$10 monthly WIFI bill three times. She struggles to buy food, gas,
26 and clothing for herself, and her children.

27 327. Phillip Chavez is a California resident. In June 2020, he began
28 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In May 2021, he began to

1 experience fraud on the Account. The fraudulent transactions totaled \$760. In May
2 2021, he discovered the fraud when he checked his Account after his Card was
3 declined attempting to order a ride share. In May 2021, he contacted Bank of
4 America to report the fraud via phone. In response, Bank of America told him they
5 would conduct an investigation into his claim, and he needed to wait for the results.
6 In May 2021, Bank of America froze his Account, which had \$30 in it at the time.
7 In May 2021, Bank of America unfroze his Account and told him they credited
8 money into his Account; however, when he checked his Account, the balance
9 remained at \$30. Since May 2021, Bank of America has yet to credit any money to
10 his Account. Due to Bank of America's actions, he could not afford food, cannot
11 afford to pay to get his car from the auto shop, and missed two phone bills at \$100
12 each. He also suffers from emotional distress.

13 328. Tiffany Cochran is a California resident. In February 2020, she began
14 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In August 2020 and September
15 2020, she began experiencing fraud on her Account. The fraudulent transactions
16 totaled \$30,000. In August 2020, she discovered the fraud when she failed to receive
17 her EDD benefits. In August 2020, she contacted Bank of America and reported the
18 fraud via phone. In response, Bank of America said they would send her a new Card
19 with \$15,000 credit; however, she never received the Card. This process happened
20 two more times where Bank of America said would send her a Card with the
21 \$15,000 loaded onto it, however, she never received any of the Cards. In October
22 2020, Bank of America froze her Account, which had \$16,055 in it at the time. On
23 October 4, 2020, Cochran logged into her Account and found her Account was over-
24 drawn approximately \$44,000. She again called Bank of America who informed her
25 to call California EDD. On October 5, 2020, her Account had \$300 deposited into
26 it. The \$300 deposits continued weekly for the month of October until Cochran
27 called and requested paper checks so that she could actually use the money as
28 opposed to it going towards the overdrawn amount in her Account. Since August

1 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit her any of the money stolen from her
2 Account. Due to Bank of America's actions, she has been unable to pay rent since
3 September 2020. She is unable to pay bills including internet, power, car insurance,
4 and medical. She has been unable to provide for her son. She is forced to go days
5 without eating. She cannot pay medical bills. She suffers from severe emotional
6 distress.

7 329. LaMar Collins is a California resident. In February 2020, he began
8 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In June 2020, he discovered
9 fraud on his Account when he checked his transaction history. In June 2020, he
10 reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America
11 told him they would investigate his claims. In June 2020, Bank of America froze
12 his Account. In July 2020, Bank of America unfroze his Account. Between October
13 2020 and December 2020, he again experienced fraud on his Account, totaling
14 approximately \$400. In December 2020, he discovered the fraud. In December
15 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of
16 America said they would investigate. In December 2020, Bank of America froze
17 his Account. In December 2020, Bank of America credited him \$250 but denied
18 another claim for \$160. In February 2021, Bank of America unfroze his Account.
19 Due to Bank of America's actions, he missed his \$1,000 monthly rent payments
20 from August 2020 to May 2021, leading to eviction in May 2021. He missed his car
21 payments since August 2020. He missed his \$40 phone bill since August 2020. He
22 struggled to pay for food, gas, and clothing.

23 330. Jennifer Contreras is a California resident. In May 2020, she began
24 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In June 2020, she experienced
25 fraud on her Account. The fraudulent transaction totaled \$5,000. In June 2020, she
26 discovered the fraud when she checked her Account. In June 2020, she reported the
27 fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America cancelled her
28 EDD Debit Card. In October 2020, Bank of America froze her Account. In

1 December 2020, Bank of America unfroze her Account. However, Bank of America
2 made her Account balance negative \$5,000. In May 2021, Bank of America credited
3 \$7,200 to her Account. Due to Bank of America's actions, she missed three
4 payments, leading to her eviction and leaving her currently homeless. She had her
5 car repossessed. She could not afford to pay her phone bill or to pay for food. She
6 is unable to get a job due to her current living conditions.

7 331. Jose Contreras is a California resident. In March 2020, he began
8 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In October 2020, he experienced
9 fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$1,200. In October 2020, he
10 discovered the fraud when he checked his online Account transactions. In
11 November 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response,
12 Bank of America said they would send him a new Card and contact him within a
13 few weeks regarding its investigation. In December 2020, Bank of America froze
14 his Account. Since December 2020, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze his
15 Account. Since November 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit him any money.
16 Due to Bank of America's actions, he missed five \$3,500 rent payments. He missed
17 six \$200 storage payments. He was late on a car insurance payment, leading to a
18 \$120 fee. He struggles to pay for food, gas, and clothing. He suffers from emotional
19 distress.

20 332. Donmonique Corella is a California resident. In June 2020, she began
21 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. Between June 2020 and August
22 2020, she experienced fraud on her Account, totaling approximately \$12,000,
23 putting her Account in a balance of negative \$6,000. In August 2020, she discovered
24 the fraud when she attempted to use her Card, but it was declined. In August 2020,
25 she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America
26 said they would open a claim and investigate. In August 2020, Bank of America
27 froze her Account. In February 2021, Bank of America unfroze her Account;
28 however, Bank of America immediately re-froze her Account. In October 2020,

1 Bank of America credited \$6,000 to her Account; however, Bank of America
2 reversed the credit in December 2020, and even took an additional \$3,000 from her
3 Account, putting her Account at a balance of negative \$9,000. Since December
4 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit her any money. Due to Bank of America's
5 actions, she missed her \$1,600 rent payments from November 2020 to May 2021,
6 leading to eviction. She missed her car payments from November 2020 to January
7 2021, leading to car repossession. She has struggled to pay her phone bills since
8 November 2020, totaling \$1,000. She has struggled to pay cable and internet bills
9 from November 2020 to present, totaling over \$600 owed. She struggles to pay for
10 food and clothing.

11 333. Victor Cardenas Cortez is a California resident. In March 2020, he
12 began receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In September 2020, Bank
13 of America illegally froze his Account. In September 2020, Bank of America
14 unfroze his Account. In October 2020, he experienced fraud on his Account,
15 totaling approximately \$120. In October 2020, he discovered the fraud when he
16 logged into his Bank of America app and noticed the charges. In October 2020, he
17 reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America
18 told him he needed to file a claim; however, Bank of America disconnected his call
19 before he could do so. In December 2020, Bank of America again illegally froze his
20 Account. Since December 2020, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze his Account.
21 Since October 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit him any money. Due to
22 Bank of America's actions, he missed a rent payment of \$600, leading to eviction.
23 He is unable to afford basic childcare products for his child. He suffers from
24 emotional distress.

25 334. Crystal Cortez-Gonzalez is a California resident. In May 2020, she
26 began receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In November 2020, she
27 began experiencing fraud on her Account. In November 2020, she discovered the
28 fraud when she checked her Account after her Card was declined. In November

1 2020, she contacted Bank of America and reported the fraud via phone. In response,
2 Bank of America told her they would open a claim and to file a police report and
3 that she needed to verify her ID. In December 2020, Bank of America froze her
4 Account. Since December 2020, Bank of America has not unfrozen her Account.
5 Since December 2020, Bank of America has not credited her any money. Due to
6 Bank of America's actions, she has had no income since November 2020. She has
7 been unable to pay for her cell phone bills (\$100/month) since November 2020. She
8 became homeless in January 2021 after not being able to pay rent on her father's
9 house after her father passed away. She cannot afford money for food or gas. She
10 also experiences emotional distress.

11 335. Teresa D'Agostino Criado is a California resident. In August 2020, she
12 began receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In October 2020, she
13 experienced fraud on her Account when someone tried to change the address
14 associated with the Account. In October 2020, she discovered the fraud when Bank
15 of America sent her an email. In October 2020, she called Bank of America to report
16 the fraud. In response, Bank of America told her she needed to verify her
17 identification. In October 2020, Bank of America froze her Account. Since October
18 2020, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze her Account. Since October 2020, Bank
19 of America has not credited any money to her Account. Due to Bank of America's
20 actions, she has had no income since October 2020. She was unable to pay her motel
21 fees from October 2020 to January 2021 at \$480 per week, resulting in
22 homelessness. She struggles to buy food and gas.

23 336. Heather Dale is a California resident. At the beginning of 2020, she
24 began receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In 2020, she began
25 experiencing fraud on her Account when someone tried to fraudulently change her
26 address to her Account. In 2020, she discovered the fraud when she checked her
27 online Account. In 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In
28 response, Bank of America told her that her issue was with EDD, and she needed

1 to talk to them to resolve the problem. At the end of 2020, Bank of America froze
2 her Account with \$324 in it at the time. To date, Bank of America has yet to credit
3 her any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, she was unable to pay her phone
4 bill of \$80 for two months and eventually had her line cancelled. She experienced
5 overdraft fees on her personal Bank of America account. She had a loan with Bank
6 of the West, and she was unable to pay her loan and it became delinquent and now
7 is terminated. She also struggles to buy food on a day-to-day basis.

8 337. Michell de Vera is a California resident. In February 2020, she began
9 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. Between February 2020 and July
10 2020, and then again between September 2020 and January 2021, she experienced
11 fraud on her Account. In February 2020, she discovered the fraud when Bank of
12 America's fraud department contacted her. In February 2020 and again September
13 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of
14 America would either tell her to resolve her issue with EDD or would not answer
15 her questions, hanging up on her mid call. Since February 2020, Bank of America
16 has yet to credit any money to her Account. Due to Bank of America's actions, she
17 missed rent payments from February 2020 to July 2020 and then again from
18 September 2020 to January 2021. She had to beg her landlord not to evict her. She
19 missed car payments from February 2020 to July 2020 and then again from
20 September 2020 to January 2021, at \$220 per month. She missed car insurance
21 payments from February 2020 to July 2020 and then again from September 2020 to
22 January 2021, at \$120 per month. She missed her cell phone bill from February
23 2020 to July 2020 and then again from September 2020 to January 2021, at \$208
24 per month. She missed her PG&E bill from February 2020 to July 2020 and then
25 again from September 2020 to January 2021, at \$125 per month. She missed her
26 furniture bill from February 2020 to July 2020 and then again from September 2020
27 to January 2021, at \$112.47 per month. She also ended up in the emergency room
28 due to the stress Bank of America caused her.

1 338. Timothy Deasy is a California resident. In September 2020, he began
2 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In November 2020, he
3 experienced fraud on his Account. The fraudulent transaction was an ATM
4 withdrawal totaling \$640. In November 2020, he discovered the fraud when he
5 checked his Account after having insufficient funds for a purchase. In November
6 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of
7 America denied his claim. In December 2020, Bank of America froze his Account.
8 Since December 2020, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze his Account. Since
9 December 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit him any of the stolen money.
10 Due to Bank of America's actions, he missed a rent payment at \$1,500, missed a
11 phone bill at \$200, and missed an insurance bill at \$130. He also cannot afford food
12 and suffers from extreme emotional distress.

13 339. Luis Delariva is a California resident. In August 2020, he began
14 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In August 2020, he experienced
15 fraud on his Account. The fraudulent transactions were all online purchases from
16 stores such as Nike and Bed Bath & Beyond, totaling \$6,000. In September 2020,
17 he discovered the fraud when he checked his Account online. In September 2020,
18 he contacted Bank of America to report the fraud via phone. In response, Bank of
19 America told him to resolve his problem with EDD. In November 2020, Bank of
20 America froze his Account when he could not verify himself and reversed the credit
21 they gave him. After reversing the credit, Bank of America reported his Account at
22 negative \$6,511. Since November 2020, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze his
23 Account. Since November 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit him any funds.
24 Due to Bank of America's actions, he could not pay his rent of \$450 per month and
25 was forced to be homeless in June 2020. He was dropped from his credit card
26 because he was unable to make a payment since September 2020. He cannot even
27 pay for his own food, relying on friends and family to provide. He also is suffering
28 from serious depression.

1 340. Delbert Delgado is a California resident. In March 2020, he began
2 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In March 2020, he experienced
3 fraud on his Account when Bank of America sent his debit Card to the wrong
4 address. The fraudulent transactions totaled a little over \$10,000. In April 2020, he
5 discovered the fraud when he called Bank of America trying to seek information
6 regarding his Card. In April 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via
7 phone. In response, Bank of America told him they are unable to help him with his
8 issue. In December 2020, Bank of America froze his Account. In May 2021, Bank
9 of America unfroze his Account. In April 2020, Bank of America credited him back
10 \$9,000; however, Bank of America reversed the credit and put his Account into a
11 negative balance of \$9,000. Due to Bank of America's actions, he was forced out
12 of his home after not being able to pay his \$1,300 rent since December 2020. He is
13 forced to live on the streets, and on the back of his neighbor's porch. He has missed
14 every phone payment to date since December 2020 at \$65 per month. He had his
15 car repossessed in December 2020 after not being able to pay his \$350 per month
16 payment. He is also the source of income for his mother and brother. His brother
17 has down syndrome and now has no place to live because of Bank of America.

18 341. Selena Delgado is a California resident. In June 2020, she began
19 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In June 2020, she experienced
20 fraud on her Account. The fraudulent transactions were ATM withdrawals totaling
21 \$6,543. In June 2020, she discovered the fraud while making purchases that were
22 declined due to insufficient funds. In June 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of
23 America via phone. In June 2021, she again experienced fraud on her Account. The
24 fraudulent transactions totaled \$14,000. In June 2021, she discovered the fraud
25 when she checked her online Account balance. In June 2021, she reported the fraud
26 to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America claimed her issue was
27 with EDD, after transferring her from department to department, claiming the next
28 would solve her issue for her. In August 2020, Bank of America froze her Account,

1 which had approximately \$10,584 in it at the time. Since August 2020, Bank of
2 America has yet to unfreeze her Account. In August 2020, Bank of America
3 provisionally credited her Account for the stolen money for four payments of
4 \$1,512, for a total of \$6,048. On February 28, 2021, Bank of America removed the
5 provisional credit for the stolen money that they originally provided from August
6 2020. Due to Bank of America's actions, from August 2020 to June 2021, she had
7 difficulty paying rent, which was \$475 per month, for a total of \$5,225. From July
8 2020 to December 2020, she had missed car payments of \$500 per month for a total
9 of \$3,000. Her car was repossessed in December 2020. From July 2020 to
10 December 2020, she had difficulty paying her Boost cell phone bill of \$110 per
11 month for a total of \$660. She struggles to buy food, gas, and clothing.

12 342. Nickolaus Dirickson is a California resident. In October 2020, he
13 began receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In November of 2020,
14 Dirickson started experiencing fraud on his Account. The fraudulent transactions
15 were withdrawals, totaling approximately \$12,000. In January 2021, he discovered
16 the fraud after he checked his online Account. In January 2021, he reported the
17 fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America told him this
18 was an EDD issue, and he needed to verify his identification. In November 2020,
19 Bank of America froze his Account. At the time Bank of America froze his
20 Account, he had \$4,200 in the Account. In March 2021, Bank of America unfroze
21 his Account. In February 2021, Bank of America credited \$4,600 to his Account
22 due to Bank of America's actions, his credit score dropped 188 points within the
23 last six months to which there are now marks on his credit. He was unable to
24 purchase a car because of the low credit. He missed his rent payment in August
25 2020 through January 2021 at \$1,800 per month, and as a result, became homeless.
26 He was unable to pay car payments from November 2020 to January 2021, leading
27 to repossession of his car. He was behind on cell phone payments with Verizon of
28 a total of \$1,800 beginning in November 2020.

1 343. Lorina Dones is a California resident. In April 2020, she applied for
2 EDD benefits through Bank of America; however, she was not approved to start
3 receiving the benefits until September 2020. In September 2020, she experienced
4 fraud on her Account. In September 2020, she discovered the fraud when Bank of
5 America told her an Account had already been opened in her name. In September
6 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of
7 America kept telling her she needed to resolve her problem with EDD. In September
8 2020, Bank of America froze her Account. In May 2021, Bank of America unfroze
9 her Account. Since April 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit her any money.
10 Due to Bank of America's actions, she missed out on an entire year of rent, from
11 April 2020 to April 2021, and would have been evicted if not for an eviction ban.
12 She had to borrow money from her family to feed her kids.

13 344. Anthony Douglas is a California resident. In February 2021, he began
14 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In April 2021, Bank of America
15 froze his Account and stopped adding benefit funds. In April 2021, he contacted
16 Bank of America to report the issue. In response, Bank of America told him they
17 were waiting on instructions from EDD. In April 2021, Bank of America updated
18 his Account stating six missing payments were all "paid," however, there were no
19 funds in his Account. Since April 2021, Bank of America has yet to release the six
20 missing payments to his Account. Due to Bank of America's actions, he has missed
21 utility bills since April 2021 totaling \$800. He has missed rent since April 2021 at
22 \$1,750 per month. He has missed every phone payment to date since April 2020 at
23 \$100 per month. He has missed every insurance bill since April 2021 at \$464 per
24 month.

25 345. Benjamin Douglass is a California resident. In January 2020, he began
26 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In April 2020, he experienced
27 fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$4,000. In April 2020, he discovered
28 the fraud when he received an alert on his phone that his Account was under \$10.

1 In April 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response,
2 Bank of America told him they would investigate the claim. In April 2020, Bank of
3 America froze his Account. In June 2020, Bank of America unfroze his Account.
4 In June 2020, Bank of America credited \$4,000 to his Account. Due to Bank of
5 America's actions, he struggled to pay his \$1,000 rent in April and May 2020. He
6 struggled to pay his \$100 monthly phone bill in April and May 2020. He struggles
7 to pay for food and clothing.

8 346. Kayli Duey is a California resident. In May 2020, she applied to
9 receive EDD benefits through Bank of America. In April 2020, she experienced
10 fraud on her Account when a fraudulent individual applied for benefits in her name,
11 who had taken out \$5,430 in her name. In June 2020, she discovered the fraud when
12 EDD told her someone applied for the benefits in her name. In June 2020, she
13 reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America
14 said there was nothing they could do and that they needed to wait until EDD handled
15 an appeals process. In June 2020, Bank of America froze her Account. In May 2021,
16 Bank of America unfroze her Account. Due to Bank of America's actions, she has
17 been unable to pay the \$1,000 needed to get her car back that was impounded in
18 October 2020. She was unable to make rental payments from November 2020 to
19 January 2021, totaling \$3,000 and was ultimately forced to give up her home and
20 move in with a friend. She was unable to pay PG&E bills from November 2020 to
21 January 2021 which totaled \$1,500.

22 347. Roxanne Eason is a California resident. In July 2020, she began
23 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In November 2020, she
24 experienced fraud on her Account, totaling \$9,000. In November 2020, she
25 discovered the fraud when she checked her online Account. In November 2020, she
26 reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America
27 said they would open a claim and reimburse her for fraudulently stolen money. In
28 December 2020, Bank of America froze her Account. In January 2021, Bank of

1 America unfroze her Account, for one day, and promptly froze the Account again.
2 Since January 2021, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze her Account. In January
3 2021, Bank of America credited her \$1,000. Due to Bank of America's actions, she
4 was unable to afford to fix her car when it broke down, so she was forced to take
5 out a loan of \$5,000 to repair the car. She accumulated countless medical bills
6 during this period that she has been unable to pay. She was evicted from her home
7 and forced to depend on her daughter. She lost relationships due to emotional
8 turmoil. She also was forced to borrow money from her six siblings, her neighbor,
9 her children and other personal friends leading her to extreme guilt and
10 embarrassment.

11 348. Peter Echeverria is a California resident. In June 2020, he applied to
12 receive EDD benefits through Bank of America. In June 2020, he experienced fraud
13 on his Account when a fraudulent person filed under his name with Bank of
14 America. In June 2020, he discovered the fraud when he called Bank of America.
15 In June 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of America. In response, Bank of
16 America said they would cancel the fraudulent Account and send him a new Card.
17 In late August or early September 2020, Bank of America froze his Account. In
18 May 2021, Bank of America unfroze his Account. Since June 2020, Bank of
19 America has not credited any money to his Account. Due to Bank of America's
20 actions, he missed three rent payments of \$1,200 leading to his eviction. He missed
21 four car insurance bills at \$120 each. He struggles to buy food and gas. He also
22 suffers from emotional distress.

23 349. Linda Edwards is a California resident. In August 2020, she began
24 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In September 2020, she
25 experienced fraud on her Account. In September 2020, she discovered the fraud
26 when she checked her online transactions. In September 2020, she reported the
27 fraud to Bank of America. In response, Bank of America told her they needed to
28 freeze her Account due to a high level of suspicious activity. In September 2020,

1 Bank of America froze her Account. Since September 2020, Bank of America has
2 yet to credit her any stolen money. Due to Bank of America's actions, she missed
3 her rent payment in September 2020 at \$650. She missed her car payment on six
4 occasions at \$349, leading to repossession in March 2021. She missed her car
5 insurance payment on six occasions at \$72.99. Her phone and cable have been off
6 since November 2020 after missing monthly payments at \$189. She struggles to
7 buy food and gas.

8 350. Maritza Escalante is a California resident. In March 2020, she began
9 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In March 2021, she experienced
10 fraud on her Account, totaling approximately \$2,000. In March 2021, she
11 discovered the fraud while checking her Account online. In March 2021, she
12 reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America
13 told her the issue was with EDD and she needed to call them to resolve it. In April
14 2021 Bank of America froze her Account. In June 2021, Bank of America unfroze
15 her Account. In June 2021, Bank of America credited her \$2,000. Due to Bank of
16 America's actions, she missed rent payments, missed phone bills, cannot afford to
17 pay for food or gas. She also suffers from emotional distress.

18 351. Marley Espalin is a California resident. In July 2020, she began
19 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In July 2020, she experienced
20 fraud on her Account. In July 2020, she discovered the fraud when she logged into
21 her online Account. In July 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via
22 phone. In response, Bank of America said they needed to freeze her Account but
23 would send her \$300. Bank of America also told her she needed to talk to EDD. In
24 July 2020, Bank of America froze her Account. Since July 2020, Bank of America
25 has yet to unfreeze her Account. Since July 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit
26 her any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, she missed two rent payments
27 at \$900 leading to her eviction, forcing her to be homeless. She missed four phone
28 bills at \$138. She missed five storage payments of \$100. She cannot provide for her

1 children who now must live with other family. She suffers from emotional distress.

2 352. Juan Estrada is a California resident. In June 2020, he began receiving
3 EDD benefits through Bank of America. In November 2020, he experienced fraud
4 on his Account totaling \$5,780. In November 2020, he discovered the fraud when
5 he was on a phone call with Bank of America. In November 2020, he reported the
6 fraud to Bank of America. In response, Bank of America told him they would
7 investigate his problem, with no further information. In November 2020, Bank of
8 America froze his Account. In February 2021, Bank of America unfroze his
9 Account. In February 2021, Bank of America credited \$2,860 to his Account. Due
10 to Bank of America's actions, he suffers from emotional distress and cannot afford
11 to buy food or other daily personal necessities.

12 353. Dawn Farina is a California resident. In June 2020, she began receiving
13 EDD benefits through Bank of America. In February 2021, she experienced fraud
14 on her Account, totaling approximately \$856.72. On February 2, 2021, she
15 discovered the fraud when she checked her Account history. On February 2, 2021,
16 she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America
17 said they needed a few days to investigate the claim and would eventually get back
18 to her. On February 3, 2021, Bank of America froze her Account. On June 7, 2021,
19 Bank of America unfroze her Account. In April 2021, Bank of America credited
20 \$856 to her Account. Due to Bank of America's actions, she missed two \$500 rent
21 payments, leading to eviction and subsequent homelessness. She cannot pay her
22 \$300 credit card bill, negatively affecting her credit score. She missed two \$76
23 phone bills. She owes friends and family \$3,000. She cannot pay her \$500 vehicle
24 registration. She cannot afford to pay \$2,000 in tickets from her invalid vehicle
25 registration. She missed her \$87 car insurance payment. She cannot afford to
26 support her children. She suffers from emotional distress.

27 354. Cody Ferraro is a California resident. In February 2020, he began
28 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In May 2021, he experienced

1 fraud on his Account. In May 2021, he discovered the fraud when he attempted to
2 withdraw cash from an ATM but had insufficient funds. In May 2021, he reported
3 the fraud to Bank of America via phone, but Bank of America refuses to help him
4 with his claim, often times dropping his calls. In May 2021, Bank of America froze
5 his Account. Since May 2021, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze his Account.
6 Since May 2021, Bank of America has yet to credit his Account, even after stating
7 it was going to do so in June 2021. Due to Bank of America's actions, he missed a
8 \$200 storage payment. He is unable to pay his phone bill. He missed a rent payment
9 of \$800. He cannot pay for his car service or car insurance.

10 355. Jacob Flores is a California resident. In October 2020, he began
11 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In November 2020, he
12 experienced fraud on his Account. In November 2020, he discovered the fraud when
13 he called Bank of America to check on his funds in his Account. In November 2020,
14 he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America
15 told him the issue was with EDD and he needed to contact them. In November 2020,
16 Bank of America froze his Account. Since November 2020, Bank of America has
17 yet to unfreeze his Account. Since November 2020, Bank of America has yet to
18 credit him any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, he was late on \$1,500
19 rental payments and fell behind from December 2020 through March 2021. He was
20 late on car payments, missing January and February 2021. He was unable to timely
21 pay his cell phone bill, cable bill and electric bill due to the frozen Account. His
22 phone was turned off between January 2021 and March 2021 because he could not
23 make the \$200 monthly payments. He struggled to buy food and gas.

24 356. Arnold Flores is a California resident. In June 2020, he began receiving
25 EDD benefits through Bank of America. In August 2020, he experienced fraud on
26 his Account. In August 2020, he discovered the fraud when he checked his Account.
27 In August 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response,
28 Bank of America told him that he needed to speak to EDD to resolve his issue. In

1 August 2020, Bank of America froze his Account. Since August 2020, Bank of
2 America has yet to unfreeze his Account. Due to Bank of America's actions, he has
3 missed out on \$1,000 rent payments since August 2020. From August 2020 to
4 November 2020, he could not pay his \$320 car payments leading to repossession in
5 November 2020. From August 2020 to May 2021, he could not pay his \$60 phone
6 bills. He struggles to buy food and gas. He also suffers from emotional distress.

7 357. Stephanie Flores is a California resident. In August 2020, she began
8 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In August 2020, Bank of
9 America froze her Account and refused to send her a Card to access her Account.
10 Since August 2020, she contacted Bank of America many times to resolve the issue.
11 In response, Bank of America told her she needed to speak with EDD. Since August
12 2020, Bank of America has refused her access to her funds or her Account. Due to
13 Bank of America's actions, she was evicted from her apartment and struggles to
14 provide for her children. She is unable to obtain loans or credit because of the
15 eviction. She is not eligible for other Benefits because her file still reads that she is
16 receiving Benefits, even though she has never seen any of those EDD funds.

17 358. Anthony Franks is a California resident. In August 2020, he began
18 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In October 2020, he experienced
19 fraud on his Account. In October 2020, he discovered the fraud when he checked
20 his Account and noticed he had not received his funds. In October 2020, he reported
21 the fraud to Bank of America. In response, Bank of America told him he needed to
22 re-verify his identity to access his funds. In October 2020, Bank of America froze
23 his Account. Since October 2020, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze his Account.
24 Since October 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit him any money. Due to bank
25 of America's actions, he missed two \$450 rent payments in November and
26 December 2020, forcing him to live on the streets. He has missed every \$100
27 monthly phone bill since October 2020. His car was repossessed in May 2021.

28 359. Meredith Friday is a California resident. In April 2020, she began

1 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In February 2021, she
2 experienced fraud on her Account, totaling \$740. In February 2021, she discovered
3 the fraud. In February 2021, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone.
4 In response, Bank of America would either tell her they would send her a
5 replacement Card or tell her to talk to EDD to resolve her issue. In February 2021,
6 Bank of America froze her Account. Since February 2021, Bank of America has
7 yet to unfreeze her Account. In April 2021, Bank of America credit her \$740. Due
8 to Bank of America's actions, she could not pay her \$1,900 monthly rent payment.
9 She missed two car payments at \$496 per month. She also suffers from severe
10 depression and anxiety. She already sees a therapist due to the amount of anxiety,
11 stress, depression, and other health issues Bank of America has caused her to
12 endure. She now takes anti-depressants.

13 360. Joseph Friend is a California resident. In February 2020, he applied to
14 receive EDD benefits through Bank of America. In August 2020, he finally began
15 receiving the EDD benefits, after months of Bank of America telling him to verify
16 his identification, even though he had done so numerous times. In August 2020, he
17 experienced fraud on his Account, totaling \$800. In August 2020, he discovered the
18 fraud when he attempted to withdraw money and checked his Account balance. In
19 August 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response,
20 Bank of America told him they would investigate. In August 2020, Bank of America
21 froze his Account. In December 2020, Bank of America unfroze his Account. In
22 December 2020, Bank of America credited him \$206. Due to Bank of America's
23 actions, he missed out on four weeks of motel payments of \$634 per week starting
24 in December 2020. He missed a car payment of \$215 in December 2020 which led
25 to his car being repossessed. He was unable to pay his phone bill of \$71 in
26 December 2020. He struggles to pay for gas.

27 361. Abigail Galicia is a California resident. In April 2020, she began
28 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In November 2020, she

1 experienced fraud on her Account, totaling \$300. In November 2020, she
2 discovered the fraud when she checked her balance online. In November 2020, she
3 reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America
4 would at times tell her to talk to EDD, and other times would say the investigation
5 on her Account was still ongoing. In November 2020, Bank of America froze her
6 Account. Since November 2020, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze her Account.
7 Since November 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit her any money. Due to
8 Bank of America's actions, she missed \$375 monthly rent payments from
9 November 2020 to January 2021 and from March 2021 to present. She missed \$308
10 monthly car payments from November 2020 to January 2021 and from March 2021
11 to present. She missed \$45 monthly phone bills from November 2020 to January
12 2021 and from March 2021 to present. She is unable to afford food and gas. She
13 also suffers from emotional distress.

14 362. Latisha Gage is a California resident. In March 2020, she began
15 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In September 2020, she
16 experienced fraud on her Account, totaling \$3,000. In September 2020, she
17 discovered the fraud after checking her Account when her Card was declined. In
18 September 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via fraud. In response,
19 Bank of America told her they would open a claim and that she needed to call EDD
20 to resolve her issue. In September 2020, Bank of America froze her Account. Since
21 September 2020, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze her Account. Since
22 September 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit her any money. Due to Bank of
23 America's actions, she could not pay her \$1,334 monthly rent payments from March
24 2021 to April 2021. She could not pay her \$657 monthly car payment from March
25 2021 to April 2021. She could not pay her \$300 monthly phone bill from March
26 2021 to April 2021. She struggles to afford food. She also suffers from emotional
27 distress.

28 363. Monica Garcia is a California resident. In March 2020, she began

1 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In February 2021, she
2 experienced fraud on her Account, totaling approximately \$2,896. In February
3 2021, she discovered the fraud when she checked her Account after attempting to
4 withdraw money from an ATM. In February 2021, she reported the fraud to Bank
5 of America via phone. In response, Bank of America said they would open a claim
6 and that she should contact EDD to resolve her issue. In February 2021, Bank of
7 America froze her Account. In May 2021, Bank of America unfroze her Account.
8 Since February 2021, Bank of America has yet to credit her any money. Due to
9 Bank of America's actions, she was forced to move out of her apartment in May
10 2021 after not being able to afford rent. She also has fallen behind on phone bills,
11 credit card bills, and car payments. She struggles to pay for food or gas.

12 364. Glynda Gaynor is a California resident. In August 2020, she began
13 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In August 2020, she experienced
14 fraud on her Account, totaling approximately \$6,000. In August 2020, she
15 discovered the fraud when she checked her Account transaction history. In August
16 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of
17 America told her they would send her a new Card; however, each time Bank of
18 America sent her a new Card, she could never access her funds. In November 2020,
19 Bank of America illegally froze her Account. In March 2021, Bank of America
20 unfroze her Account. In March 2021, Bank of America credited her a measly \$200.
21 Due to Bank of America's actions, she was unable to pay her \$750 rent from
22 November 2020 to present day. She missed her \$750 monthly car payment from
23 August 2020 to September 2020, leading to car repossession in September 2020.
24 She missed her \$99 storage fee, leading to an auction of her storage. She missed her
25 \$63 phone bill in June 2021, leading to a phone shut off. She struggles to pay for
26 food, gas, and clothing.

27 365. Laquitta George is a California resident. In February 2020, he began
28 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In August 2020, he experienced

1 fraud on his Account, totaling \$7,000. In August 2020, he discovered the fraud after
2 Bank of America reached out to him. In August 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank
3 of America via phone. In response, Bank of America would open a claim and
4 investigate, however they have made no other response since then. In September
5 2020, Bank of America froze his Account. In October 2020, Bank of America
6 unfroze his Account. Since September 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit him
7 any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, he has not been able to pay his
8 \$2,600 rent since October 2020, only keeping his lease because his landlord is
9 experiencing the same problems with Bank of America. He has not been able to pay
10 for his water, gas, and electric bill since October 2020, totaling \$4,101. He had his
11 car repossessed in October 2020. He has not been able to pay his full \$418 phone
12 payment since October 2020. He was unable to pay for a funeral for his mother who
13 passed away in May 2021. He cannot afford to buy food for him or his children. He
14 also suffers from extreme depression.

15 366. Elizabeth Giddens is a California resident. In March 2020, she applied
16 to receive EDD benefits through Bank of America; however, she could not access
17 her Account until August 2020. In August 2020, she experienced fraud on her
18 Account, totaling \$18,000. In August 2020, she discovered the fraud when she
19 checked her Account balance after finally gaining access to the Account. In August
20 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of
21 America told her they would open a claim and provisionally credit her Account. In
22 August 2020, Bank of America froze her Account. In September 2020, Bank of
23 America unfroze her Account. In October 2020, Bank of America again froze her
24 Account. In April 2021, Bank of America unfroze her Account. In August 2020,
25 Bank of America credited her \$18,000. In October 2020, Bank of America reversed
26 the credit, putting her Account into a balance of negative \$18,000. In April 2021,
27 Bank of America credited her back the \$18,000 again, plus an additional \$5,000 to
28 make up for the benefits that went to paying off the negative balance Due to Bank

1 of America's actions, she missed rent payments totaling \$4,500 from October 2020
2 to April 2021, leading to her eventual eviction and forcing her to live in her car. She
3 missed her \$508 car payments from October 2020 to April 2021, leading to her car
4 repossession in December 2020. She could not afford to provide for her children
5 and was forced to send them away. She struggles to buy food and gas.

6 367. Seante Glassflowers is a California resident. In April 2020, she began
7 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In November 2020, she
8 experienced fraud on her Account, totaling \$543. In November 2020, she
9 discovered the fraud when she got a notification that money had been withdrawn
10 from her Account. In November 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of America.
11 In response, Bank of America told her they would open a claim, but the claim could
12 take months to investigate. In November 2020, Bank of America froze her Account.
13 In May 2021, Bank of America unfroze her Account. In May 2021, Bank of
14 America credited her \$543. Due to Bank of America's actions, she could not pay
15 her credit card or phone bill from November 2020 to May 2021. She could not
16 afford food for herself or her children. She could not afford to pay her daughter's
17 dentist bill. She could not afford to clean her children's clothes.

18 368. Angela Gonzalez is a California resident. In April 2020, she applied to
19 receive EDD benefits through Bank of America; however, Bank of America did not
20 send her a Card with access to her funds until June 2020. In September 2020, she
21 experienced fraud on her Account, totaling \$739. In September 2020, she
22 discovered the fraud when she tried to withdraw funds and was declined. In
23 September 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response,
24 Bank of America told her they would send her a new debit Card and would start a
25 claim for her. Bank of America further told her to resolve her issue with EDD. In
26 September 2020, Bank of America froze her Account. In May 2021, Bank of
27 America unfroze her Account and sent her a new Card. Since September 2020, Bank
28 of America has yet to credit her any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, she

1 missed three \$1,200 monthly rent payments leading to her eviction and subsequent
2 homelessness. She was unable to pay car insurance bills and had her car
3 repossessed. She could not afford to pay her storage facility fees, leading to a loss
4 of personal items. She struggles to buy food and gas. She suffers from emotional
5 distress.

6 369. Barton Gonzalez is a California resident. In March 2020, he applied to
7 receive EDD benefits through Bank of America. However, he did not gain access
8 to his Account until August 2020. Between March 2020 and August 2020, he
9 experienced fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$15,000. In August 2020,
10 he discovered the fraud when he checked his Account transaction history. In August
11 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of
12 America told him they would send a new Card to access his Account. In August
13 2020, Bank of America froze his Account. In December 2020, Bank of America
14 unfroze his Account. In June 2021, Bank of America finally credited \$15,000 to his
15 Account. Due to Bank of America's actions, he lost his property in December 2020,
16 forcing him to live out of his car. He missed his \$300 monthly car payments from
17 October 2019 to January 2020, leading to car repossession in January 2020. He
18 struggles to buy food and clothing.

19 370. Lizet Gonzalez is a California resident. In September 2020, she began
20 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In October 2020, she
21 experienced fraud on her Account, totaling \$900. In October 2020, she discovered
22 the fraud when she received a text stating her Account had a balance of \$0. In
23 October 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response,
24 Bank of America told her they would investigate the claim. They further told her
25 that she needed to talk to EDD regarding her issue. In October 2020, Bank of
26 America froze her Account. In late October or early November 2020, Bank of
27 America unfroze her Account. Since October 2020, Bank of America has yet to
28 credit her any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, she missed two months

1 of rent payments totaling \$800. She has a phone bill debt of \$1,400. She missed
2 credit card payments totaling \$460, leading to a credit score drop of 280 points. She
3 cannot afford food or gas. She suffers from emotional distress.

4 371. Lainie Ann Graham is a California resident. In July 2020, she began
5 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In November 2020, she
6 experienced fraud on her Account. In November 2020, she discovered the fraud
7 when she tried to use her Card but was declined. In November 2020, she reported
8 the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America told her this
9 was an EDD issue and to call them to resolve. In November 2020, Bank of America
10 froze her Account. Since November 2020, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze her
11 Account. Since November 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit her any money.
12 Due to Bank of America's actions, she missed her \$1,600 rent payment in
13 November 2020. She missed her \$420 car payment in November and December
14 2020. Her Wells Fargo bank account was terminated, and she owes \$204 in
15 overdraft fees. She missed her \$64 phone bill in November and December 2020.
16 She struggles to pay for food, gas, and clothing.

17 372. Audrey Grant is a California resident. In October 2020, she began
18 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In June 2021, she experienced
19 fraud on her Account, totaling approximately \$1,000. On June 7, 2021, she
20 discovered the fraud when she attempted to withdraw money but was declined. On
21 June 7, 2021, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response,
22 Bank of America said Bank of America would send her a new Card. Since June 7,
23 2021, Bank of America has yet to credit her any money. Due to Bank of America's
24 actions, she was unable to pay her \$3,000 monthly rent in June 2021.

25 373. Willie Gray is a California resident. He receives EDD benefits through
26 Bank of America. In April 2021, he experienced fraud on his Account, totaling
27 \$180. In April 2021, he discovered the fraud when he checked his Account online.
28 In April 2021, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response,

1 Bank of America told him the transactions looked accurate to them. Since April
2 2021, Bank of America has yet to credit him any money. Due to Bank of America's
3 actions, he was unable to pay \$900 monthly rent from April 2021 to June 2021. He
4 was unable to pay his \$45 monthly insurance bill from April 2021 to June 2021. He
5 was unable to pay his \$45 monthly gas bill from April 2021 to June 2021. He was
6 unable to pay his \$200 monthly electric bill from April 2021 to June 2021. He can
7 barely afford to buy food and gas.

8 374. Sean Grimes is a California resident. In January 2021, he began
9 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In January 2021, he experienced
10 fraud on his Account. In January 2021, he discovered the fraud when he checked
11 his Account balance online which read a balance of \$0. In January 2021, he reported
12 the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America kept sending
13 him a new Card, however, each time a new Card was sent, more fraud would occur.
14 From January 2021 to April 2021, Bank of America would freeze his Account every
15 time he reported fraud. From January 2021 to April 2021, Bank of America would
16 unfreeze his Account every time they sent him a new Card. Since January 2021,
17 Bank of America has yet to credit him any money. Due to Bank of America's
18 actions, he missed two \$800 monthly rent payments. He missed his car insurance
19 and electricity bill totaling \$1,000 per month. He struggles to pay for food and gas.
20 He struggles with emotional distress.

21 375. Jeffrey Guadalajara is a California resident. In March 2020, he began
22 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In August 2020, he experienced
23 fraud on his Account, totaling \$10,401. In August 2020, he discovered the fraud
24 when he checked his Account and realized he was unable to access funds. In August
25 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of America. In response, Bank of America said
26 he needed to contact EDD and verify himself. In August 2020, Bank of America
27 froze his Account. Since August 2020, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze his
28 Account. Since August 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit him any money.

1 Due to Bank of America's actions, he was unable to pay his mortgage, leading to
2 eviction and living on the streets for two months. He was diagnosed with Bell's
3 Palsy caused by the stress Bank of America put him through.

4 376. Noah Guirguis is a California resident. In July 2020, he began
5 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In September 2020, Bank of
6 America illegally froze his Account, after he reported to them someone had stolen
7 his Card. In June 2021, Bank of America unfroze his Account. Since September
8 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit him any money. Due to Bank of America's
9 actions, he could not make his \$800 rent payments from September 2020 to January
10 2021. He could not make his \$60 monthly car payments from September 2020 to
11 January 2021. He could not make his \$80 phone payments from September 2020 to
12 January 2021. He could not pay his \$40 monthly water and electric bill from
13 September 2020 to January 2021. He struggled to buy food, gas, and clothing.

14 377. Lyndsey Gutcher is a California resident. In May 2020, she began
15 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In May 2020, she experienced
16 fraud on her Account, totaling \$5,430. In June 2020, she discovered the fraud when
17 she checked her Account balance online. In June 2020, she reported the fraud to
18 Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America told her they could not
19 send her a new Card until she verified her ID with EDD and that she should also
20 file a police report. In June 2020, Bank of America froze her Account. In late
21 January 2021 or early February 2021, Bank of America unfroze her Account. Since
22 June 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit her any money. Due to Bank of
23 America's actions, she missed seven \$1,000 rent payments, leading to eviction and
24 subsequent homelessness. She missed three \$111 car insurance payments. She
25 struggles to buy food and gas. She suffers from emotional distress.

26 378. Andres Gutierrez is a California resident. In August 2020, he began
27 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In August 2020, he experienced
28 fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$1,000. In August 2020, he discovered

1 the fraud when he checked his transaction history In August 2020, he reported the
2 fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America first told him
3 they would investigate him claim, then for the following weeks, Bank of America
4 blamed his issue on EDD. In August 2020, Bank of America illegally froze his
5 Account. In February 2021, Bank of America unfroze his Account. In March 2021,
6 Bank of America again illegally froze his Account. Since March 2021, Bank of
7 America has yet to unfreeze his Account. Since August 2020, Bank of America has
8 yet to credit him any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, he missed his \$750
9 monthly rent payments from August 2020 to March 2021, leading to eviction in
10 March 2021. He is struggling to pay his new \$400 rent payment and is on the brink
11 of eviction again. He could not afford his \$60 car payment, leading to car
12 repossession in April 2021. He struggled to pay his phone bills and to obtain food
13 and clothing.

14 379. Angelica Gutierrez is a California resident In July 2020, she began
15 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In August 2020, she experienced
16 fraud on her Account. In August 2020, she discovered the fraud when she checked
17 her Account balance after attempting to withdraw funds. In August 2020, she
18 reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America
19 said they would credit her the money back. In August 2020, Bank of America froze
20 her Account. In April 2021, Bank of America unfroze her Account. Since August
21 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit her any money. Due to Bank of America's
22 actions, she missed her \$800 rent payment from December 2020 to April 2021, only
23 avoiding eviction by borrowing money. She could not pay her \$268 car insurance
24 from December 2020 to April 2021. She could not pay her \$60 phone bill from
25 December 2020 to April 2021. She also had to borrow money just to buy life
26 necessities. She also suffers from extreme stress and has been in and out of the
27 hospital as a result.

28 380. Crystal Gutierrez is a California resident. In late July or early August

2020, she began receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In August 2020, she experienced fraud on her Account, totaling \$4,000. In August 2020, she discovered the fraud when she checked her transactions online. In August 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America told her to talk to EDD and verify her ID so they could resolve her issue. In November 2020, Bank of America froze her Account. In April 2021, Bank of America unfroze her Account. In August 2020, Bank of America credited \$1,200 to her Account. Due to Bank of America's actions, she failed to make rent payments for five months and was then evicted from her home and forced to live in her car. She was unable to pay bills such as her car insurance and phone bill which led her to lose her cell phone entirely. She is deprived of having a relationship with her son. She struggles to buy food and gas.

381. Shant Hakopian is a California resident. In March or April 2020, he began receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In October 2020, he experienced fraud on his Account. In October 2020, he discovered the fraud when he attempted to make a purchase and his Card was declined, leading him to call Bank of America. In October 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America said they would freeze his Account while they investigated. In October 2020, Bank of America froze his Account. In October 2020, Bank of America unfroze his Account. Since October 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit him any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, he missed a \$1,000 car payment. He struggles to buy food and gas.

382. James Hanes is a California resident. In September 2020, he began receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. On December 4, 2020, he experienced fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$65. On December 4, 2020, he discovered the fraud when he received a text alert. On December 4, 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America told him they would investigate the claim. In December 2020, Bank of America

1 froze his Account. In June 2021, Bank of America unfroze his Account. In June
2 2021, Bank of America credited \$65 to his Account. Due to Bank of America's
3 actions, he missed a \$400 rent payment in June 2021. He struggles to pay for food.
4 He suffers from emotional distress.

5 383. Micah Haney is a California resident. In August 2020, he applied to
6 receive EDD benefits through Bank of America; however, a fraudulent person had
7 already used his information to receive the benefits. In the months leading up to
8 August 2020, he experienced fraud, totaling \$14,240. In August 2020, he
9 discovered the fraud when he attempted to apply for benefits but was rejected. In
10 August 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response,
11 Bank of America told him he needed to speak to EDD to resolve his issue. In August
12 2020, Bank of America froze his Account. Since August 2020, Bank of America
13 has yet to unfreeze his Account. Since August 2020, Bank of America has yet to
14 credit him any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, he has not been able to
15 pay his \$400 monthly rent since August 2020, leaving him homeless when he was
16 evicted in April 2021. He has not been able to pay his \$500 monthly car payments
17 since August 2020, leading to car repossession in April 2021. He has been forced
18 to borrow money to pay his \$90 monthly phone bill. He struggles to buy food, gas,
19 and clothing.

20 384. Preston Hanna is a California resident. In April 2020, he began
21 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In February 2021, he
22 experienced fraud on his Account, totaling \$383. In February 2021, he discovered
23 the fraud when he checked his Account balance and saw the missing funds. In
24 February 2021, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response,
25 Bank of America said they would open a claim, but after that Bank of America said
26 there was nothing they could do to resolve his issue. In February 2021, Bank of
27 America froze his Account. In April 2021, Bank of America unfroze his Account.
28 In April 2021, Bank of America credited him \$383. Due to Bank of America's

1 actions, he missed his \$300 monthly rent payments from March 2021 to June 2021.
2 He missed his \$200 phone bill from March 2021 to June 2021. He was unable to
3 pay \$2,500 to fix his truck. He struggles to buy food, gas, and clothing.

4 385. Rebecca Harden is a California resident. In January 2021, she began
5 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In January 2021, she experienced
6 fraud on her Account, totaling \$5,000. In January 2021, she discovered the fraud
7 when she checked her Account balance and saw the fraudulent transfer. In January
8 2021, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of
9 America said they would reimburse her the stolen money while they investigated.
10 Since January 2021, Bank of America has yet to credit her any money. Due to Bank
11 of America's actions, she was unable to pay her \$875 monthly rent payment from
12 February 2021 to April 2021.

13 386. Johnny Harper is a California resident. In May 2020, he began
14 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In February 2021, he
15 experienced fraud on his Account, totaling \$1,100. In March 2021, he discovered
16 the fraud when he checked his balance online. In March 2021, he reported the fraud
17 to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America said they would
18 investigate, but gave no further information in the coming months. In February
19 2021, Bank of America froze his Account. In April 2021, Bank of America unfroze
20 his Account. Since February 2021, Bank of America has yet to credit him any
21 money. Due to Bank of America's actions, he missed payments on his property tax.
22 He missed a \$595 car payment. He missed a \$400 credit card payment. He missed
23 a \$186 cable bill.

24 387. Ivan Harris is a California resident. In late April or early May 2020, he
25 began receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In September 2020, Bank
26 of America froze his Account. In November 2020, Bank of America unfroze his
27 Account. Since September 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit him any money.
28 Due to Bank of America's actions, he missed his \$600 monthly rent payment from

1 September 2020 to November 2020. He could not pay his \$273 monthly car rent,
2 his \$264 monthly cell phone bill, and his photography insurance.

3 388. Markee Harris is a California resident. In April 2020, he began
4 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In late May or early June 2020,
5 he experienced fraud on his Account, totaling \$700. In June 2020, he discovered
6 the fraud. In June 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In
7 December 2020, he again experienced fraud on his Account, totaling \$350. In
8 December 2020, he discovered the fraud when he received a text alert, stating a
9 fraudulent person withdrew money from his Account. In December 2020, he
10 reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America
11 told him that it was EDD who in fact withdrew the funds from his Account and he
12 needed to call EDD to fix the problem. In December 2020, Bank of America froze
13 his Account. In February 2021, Bank of America unfroze his Account. In February
14 2021, Bank of America credited \$1,450 to his Account. Due to Bank of America's
15 actions, he missed rent payments totaling \$1,100, leading to his eviction. He missed
16 phone bills totaling \$165, leading to a cancelled phone. He was unable to pay child
17 support payments. He suffers from emotional distress.

18 389. Steven Hart²⁰ is a natural person residing in Los Angeles County, State
19 of California. Hart has an EDD Debit Card Account which Bank of America
20 maintains supervision and control over per its contractual relationship with the State
21 of California. Over the course of this relationship, Hart provided Bank of America
22 with various pieces of personal identifiable information related to Hart, such as his
23 personal finances. Such information includes, but is not limited to, Hart's name,
24 address, social security number, date of birth, income level, and banking
25 information (amounts and accounts). Upon receipt of this information, Bank of
26

27 ²⁰ Hart is the plaintiff in *Hart v. Bank of America, N.A.*, No. 3:21-cv-01175-
28 LAB-MSB, originally filed in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California (No. 2:21-cv-04678-GW-JC) ("*Hart*").

1 America stored or otherwise archived said information in some library, digital file,
2 computer-based system, or other storage medium, and thus at all times was
3 entrusted with and maintained control of Hart's highly sensitive information. At
4 some point in 2020, a hacker was able to access Bank of America's technical
5 system—presumably via a misconfiguration of a firewall (presuming Bank of
6 America had a firewall in place). As such, this hacker was able to gain access to
7 banking Account information for tens of thousands of EDD Debit Card Accounts
8 which Bank of America maintains, supervises, and controls per its contract with the
9 State of California. In April of 2021, Hart checked his Account and discovered he
10 had funds missing. Hart reviewed his Account activity and determined he had been
11 a victim of fraud and made all reasonable attempts to notify Bank of America of
12 this fraudulent activity. After Hart submitted his claim for fraud regarding the ATM
13 withdrawal(s) at issue. Bank of America canceled or froze Hart's Card as a result
14 of submitting his fraud claim. To Hart's shock and dismay, some unknown
15 individual had made ATM withdrawal(s) in the amount of \$853. Hart did not make
16 these withdrawals himself, did not authorize anyone to make the withdrawal on his
17 behalf, and was still in possession of his Card despite said withdrawals taking place.
18 Hart submitted a fraud claim to Bank of America regarding the missing/stolen funds
19 on April 7, 2021. Bank of America did not provide a temporary credit/refund, so
20 pursuant to EFTA, Bank of America had ten (10) days to properly investigate and
21 remedy the fraud claim. Bank of America did neither. After allegedly performing
22 an investigation into Hart's fraudulent activity, Bank of America sent Hart written
23 correspondence denying Hart's fraud claim. Bank of America's denial letter was
24 dated April 8, 2021—one (1) day after Bank of America allegedly performed a
25 "reasonable" investigation. The basis for Bank of America's denial of Hart's claim
26 is scant at best. However, Bank of America does indeed confirm that fraudulent or
27 suspicious activity took place in regard to the fraudulent withdrawal, but
28 nonetheless refused to refund or credit Hart the \$853 sum. Despite Hart's efforts,

1 Bank of America refused to perform any reasonable investigation regarding Hart's
2 dispute and instead flatly denied Hart's claim one (1) day after he submitted said
3 claim. Bank of America's alleged "investigation" into Hart's dispute was clearly
4 inadequate, not reasonable, not diligent, and failed to properly address Hart's issues
5 regarding the \$853 fraudulent withdrawal. Further evidencing Bank of America's
6 woefully inadequate investigation is the fact that Bank of America has access to
7 data, film, and other resources given that the fraudulent transaction took place at
8 one of Bank of America's own financial centers (i.e., not a third-party ATM at a
9 convenience store, for example). Bank of America could have reasonably, easily
10 and swiftly confirmed the \$853 transaction as fraudulent and refunded or credited
11 the funds over to Hart's Account. Instead, Bank of America failed to investigate
12 properly, refused to credit or refund the transaction, while still nonetheless
13 confirming that the withdrawal was subject to fraudulent activity. What is more,
14 Bank of America actually reversed its own decision and credited Hart the stolen
15 funds on or about May 10, 2021. This further evidences that Bank of America did
16 not perform a reasonable investigation within the requisite ten (10) days in violation
17 of EFTA.

18 390. Bahram Hassanshahi is a California resident. In September 2020, he
19 applied to receive EDD benefits through Bank of America. Between August 2020
20 to September 2020, he experienced fraud on his Account, when a fraudulent person
21 received benefits under his name, totaling approximately \$22,500. In September
22 2020, he discovered the fraud when he called Bank of America who told him
23 someone was already receiving benefits under his name. In September 2020, he
24 reported the fraud to Bank of America. In response, Bank of America told him they
25 would freeze the Account and report the fraud to EDD. In February 2021, he
26 reapplied to receive EDD benefits but was denied, because Bank of America failed
27 to inform EDD about the earlier fraud on the Account. Since September 2020, Bank
28 of America has yet to unfreeze his Account. Since September 2020, Bank of

1 America has yet to credit him any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, he
2 struggled to pay his \$2,200 rent in September and November 2020, leading to his
3 eviction. He struggles to pay for food, gas, and clothing.

4 391. Kaytricia Hayden is a California resident. In August 2020, she began
5 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In October 2020, she
6 experienced fraud on her Account, totaling \$500. In October 2020, she discovered
7 the fraud when she checked her transaction history online. In October 2020, she
8 reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America
9 told her to speak to the bank where the money was fraudulently sent. Since October
10 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit her any money.

11 392. Gretchen Heinz is a California resident. In March 2020, she began
12 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. On September 29, 2020, Bank
13 of America illegally froze her Account. On September 29, 2020, she called Bank of
14 America who reported they froze her Account due to suspicious activity; however,
15 she states there was no fraud on her Account. On October 25, 2020, Bank of
16 America unfroze her Account. On October 25, 2020, Bank of America credited her
17 \$1,317. Due to Bank of America's actions, she missed a \$500 rent payment. She
18 missed a \$70 phone bill. She acquired a \$2,000 debt owed to friends and family.
19 She suffers from emotional distress.

20 393. Ronnie Hernandez is a California resident. In March 2020, he began
21 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In November 2020, he
22 experienced fraud on his Account, totaling \$600. In November 2020, he discovered
23 the fraud when he attempted to withdraw funds from his Account. In November
24 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of America by going into the bank and speaking
25 with a representative. In response, the Bank of America representative told him he
26 needed to speak with EDD to resolve his issue. In November 2020, Bank of
27 America froze his Account. Since November 2020, Bank of America has yet to
28 unfreeze his Account. Since November 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit him

1 any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, he missed a \$500 rent payment. He
2 also suffers from emotional distress.

3 394. Ruben Hernandez is a California resident. In August 2020, he applied
4 to receive EDD benefits through Bank of America; however, Bank of America did
5 not send him access to his Account until November 2020. In November 2020, Bank
6 of America illegally froze his Account. In January 2021, Bank of America unfroze
7 his Account. Since November 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit him any
8 money. Due to Bank of America's actions, he missed his \$400 rent payment from
9 August to September 2020, leading to eviction and subsequent homelessness. He
10 cannot afford to maintain a phone each month. He struggles to obtain food and
11 clothing. He suffers from emotional distress.

12 395. Vanessa Hernandez is a California resident. In August 2020, she
13 applied to receive EDD benefits through Bank of America; however, Bank of
14 America never sent her a Card with access to her Account. Between August 2020
15 and November 2020, she experienced fraud on her Account, totaling approximately
16 \$7,000. In November 2020, she discovered the fraud when she called Bank of
17 America to inquire why Bank of America had not yet sent her a Card. In November
18 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of
19 America refused to help her and send her a new Card, leading to her calling Bank
20 of America for months. In November 2020, Bank of America froze her Account. In
21 June 2021, Bank of America unfroze her Account. Since November 2020, Bank of
22 America has yet to credit her any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, she
23 was evicted from her home in January of 2021 and owes \$9,000 in rent for missing
24 payments from July 2020 to January 2021 of \$1,650 per month. She has missed car
25 payments for three months, for a total of \$864, and had her car repossessed in
26 February 2021. She is behind on her credit card payments, totaling thousands of
27 dollars. She was forced to sign over full custody of her children to her children's
28 father, as she could no longer provide for them. She been unable to afford her

1 medication since November 2020. She suffers from emotional distress.

2 396. Anthony Hollingsworth is a California resident. In March 2020, he
3 began receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In February 2021, he
4 experienced fraud on his Account, totaling \$620. In February 2021, he discovered
5 the fraud while checking his Account balance online. In February 2021, he reported
6 the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America said they
7 would provisionally credit him the money. In March 2021, Bank of America froze
8 his Account. Since March 2021, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze his Account.
9 In March 2021, Bank of America credited money back to his Account. Due to Bank
10 of America's actions, he missed all of his car mechanic payments, totaling \$1,800,
11 leading to car repossession. He missed his \$1,760 monthly rent payment from
12 December 2020 to March 2021, leading to eviction and subsequent homelessness.
13 He was unable to pay his \$90 monthly phone bill from April 2021 to present. He
14 struggles to buy food and gas.

15 397. Lindsie Holloway is a California resident. In May 2020, he began
16 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In July 2020, he experienced
17 fraud on his Account, which left his Account with a balance of negative \$13,000.
18 In July 2020, he discovered the fraud when he checked his Account and noticed the
19 balance. In July 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of America. In response, Bank
20 of America said they would send out a replacement Card; however, Bank of
21 America sent the Card to an incorrect address, even after he told Bank of America
22 the address on file was fraudulent. In July 2020, Bank of America froze his Account.
23 In March 2021, Bank of America unfroze his Account. Since July 2020, Bank of
24 America has yet to credit him any of the stolen money. Due to Bank of America's
25 actions, he was evicted from his home in June of 2020 and is forced to live in the
26 back of his car. He has missed every phone payment to date since July 2020. He
27 cannot afford food or gas. He also suffers from a recent Traumatic Brain Injury
28 (TBI) and Bank of America's actions have worsened his condition.

1 398. Crystal Horath is a California resident. In January or February 2020,
2 she began receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In November 2020,
3 she experienced fraud on her Account, totaling \$300. In November 2020, she
4 discovered the fraud when she checked her Account balance online. In November
5 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of
6 America said there was nothing they could do regarding reimbursement, but they
7 would send her a replacement Card. In December 2020, she again experienced fraud
8 on her Account, totaling \$200. In December 2020, she again discovered the fraud
9 by checking her Account balance. In December 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank
10 of America via phone. In response, Bank of America told her they would freeze the
11 Account until she verified her identification. In December 2020, Bank of America
12 froze her Account. In May 2021, Bank of America unfroze her Account. In May
13 2021, Bank of America credited her \$268. Due to Bank of America's actions, she
14 missed two rent payments leading to her eviction. She missed car insurance bills,
15 leading to her inability to utilize the car. She suffers from emotional distress.

16 399. Terrance Howze is a California resident. In May 2020, he began
17 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In January 2021, Bank of
18 America illegally froze his Account. Since January 2021, Bank of America has yet
19 to unfreeze his Account. Since January 2021, Bank of America has yet to credit him
20 any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, he missed his \$875 rent payments
21 from January 2021 to May 2021, leading to eviction. He missed his \$800 monthly
22 utility bills from January 2021 to May 2021.

23 400. Marcus De Hoyos is a California resident. In March 2020, he began
24 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In April 2020, he experienced
25 fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$400. In May 2020, he discovered the
26 fraud when he checked his Account balance online. In May 2020, he reported the
27 fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America refused to help
28 him, as they would send him from department to department every time he called.

1 In May 2020, Bank of America froze his Account. In June 2021, Bank of America
2 unfroze his Account. Since May 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit him any
3 money. Due to Bank of America's actions, he missed his rent payment beginning
4 in May 2020. He was unable to pay his car registration fee of \$125 in February
5 2021. He was behind on cell phone payments with Verizon of a total of \$110 in
6 May and June of 2020. He struggles to buy food and gas. He suffers from anxiety
7 and seeks medical help now.

8 401. Sharonna Hutchins is a California resident. In July 2020, she began
9 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In late July or early August 2020,
10 she experienced fraud on her Account, totaling approximately \$3,000. In late July
11 or early August 2020, she discovered the fraud when she attempted to use her Card
12 but was declined due to insufficient funds. In late July or early August 2020, she
13 reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America
14 said they would send her a new Card to access her Account. In December 2020, she
15 again experienced fraud on her Account, totaling \$1,000. In December 2020, she
16 discovered the fraud when she again tried to use her Card and was declined. In
17 December 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of America. In response, Bank of
18 America told her they would send her a new Card, like they had done numerous
19 times before. In September 2020, Bank of America froze her Account. In December
20 2020, Bank of America unfroze her Account. Since July 2020, Bank of America
21 has yet to credit her any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, she missed three
22 \$2,000 rent payments, leading to her eviction. She missed four \$90 phone bills. She
23 struggles to buy food, gas, and clothing.

24 402. Quoc Huynh is a California resident. In April 2020, he applied and
25 began to receive EDD benefits through Bank of America. However, he was not sent
26 a Card and was unable to access his funds. In September 2020, he was able to speak
27 with a Bank of America agent who informed him that his Account had been placed
28 in the fraud department and was frozen. In October 2020, Bank of America unfroze

1 his Account and sent him a new Card. Bank of America has yet to credit him any
2 money from when he began receiving benefits in April 2020 until his Account was
3 un-frozen in October 2020 which he estimates to be thousands of dollars. Due to
4 Bank of America's actions, he missed his \$900 rent payments from June 2020 to
5 August 2020, leading to his eviction in August 2020 and subsequent homelessness.
6 He missed his electric bill, water bill, and gas bill from June 2020 to August 2020,
7 totaling \$3,000.

8 403. John Idemudia is a California resident. In May 2020, he began
9 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In September 2020, he
10 experienced fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$1,700 from two separate
11 transactions. In September 2020, he discovered the fraud when he received an email
12 that a fraudulent person withdrew the funds. In September 2020, he reported the
13 fraud to Bank of America. In response, Bank of America told him they would
14 investigate and open a claim. In September 2020, Bank of America froze his
15 Account. In September or October 2020, Bank of America unfroze his Account.
16 Since September 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit him any money. Due to
17 Bank of America's actions, he was unable to pay his \$60 phone bill twice. He was
18 unable to afford his \$64 auto insurance twice. He was unable to pay his \$800 rent
19 for two months. He struggles to buy food, gas, and clothing.

20 404. Juanita Isles is a California resident. In April 2020, she began receiving
21 EDD benefits through Bank of America. In October 2020, she experienced fraud on
22 the Account, totaling approximately \$1,700. In October 2020, she discovered the
23 fraud when she was on the phone with Bank of America. In October 2020, she
24 reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America
25 told her there were many people experiencing issues and she needed to be patient
26 to resolve her issue. In October 2020, Bank of America froze her Account. In
27 January 2021, Bank of America unfroze her Account. Due to Bank of America's
28 actions, she was late paying her cell phone bill and can barely afford to buy food,

1 gas, and clothing.

2 405. Derrick Jabara is a California resident. In February 2020, he began
3 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In March 2021, he experienced
4 fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$3,600. In March 2021, he discovered
5 the fraud when he checked his Account after his Card was declined. In March 2021,
6 he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America
7 told him he needed to resolve his issue with EDD. In March 2021, Bank of America
8 froze his Account. Since March 2021, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze his
9 Account. Since March 2021, Bank of America has yet to credit him any money.
10 Due to Bank of America, he was required to turn his phone into the finance
11 company after failing to pay his phone bill. He missed two \$350 car payments in
12 April and May of 2021. He missed two \$1,200 rent payments. He struggles to buy
13 food, gas, and clothing.

14 406. Shreel Jackson is a California resident. In April 2020, she began
15 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In February 2021, she
16 experienced fraud on her Account, totaling \$880. In February 2021, she discovered
17 the fraud when she checked her Account balance online. In February 2021, she
18 reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America
19 proceeded to blame EDD and told her she needed to talk to EDD to resolve her
20 issue. In February 2021, Bank of America froze her Account. In April 2021, Bank
21 of America unfroze her Account. In April 2021, Bank of America credited her for
22 the stolen money. Due to Bank of America's actions, she was late on her \$500
23 weekly payment between February 2021 to April 2021. She was late on her \$457
24 car payment between February 2021 to April 2021. She was late on her \$89 car
25 insurance payment between February 2021 to April 2021. She was late on her \$230
26 phone bill between February 2021 to April 2021, leading to cancellation. She
27 missed her \$89 storage payment between February 2021 to April 2021. She
28 struggles to buy food, gas, and clothing. She suffers from emotional distress.

1 407. Robert Jaurigue Jr. is a California resident. In March 2020, he began
2 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In December 2020, Bank of
3 America froze his Account after he attempted to withdraw funds from an ATM.
4 Since December 2020, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze his Account. Since
5 December 2020, Bank of America has yet to disperse his funds. Due to Bank of
6 America's actions, he suffers from emotional distress.

7 408. Anthony Jeff is a California resident. In June 2020, he applied to
8 receive EDD benefits through Bank of America; however, Bank of America never
9 sent him his Card. Between June 2020 and August 2020, he experienced fraud on
10 his Account, totaling approximately \$17,000. In August 2020, he discovered the
11 fraud. In August 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In
12 response, Bank of America told him they would open a claim. In September 2020,
13 Bank of America froze his Account. In October 2020, Bank of America unfroze his
14 Account. Since June 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit him any money. Due
15 to Bank of America's actions, he missed his rent payment from December 2020 to
16 May 2021 at \$950 per month, leading to his eviction. He missed his phone bill from
17 December 2020 to May 2021 at \$50 per month. He missed his utility bills from
18 December 2020 to May 2021 at \$200 per month. He struggles to buy food, gas, and
19 clothing.

20 409. Evett Johnson is a California resident. In June 2020, she began
21 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In December 2020, she
22 experienced fraud on her Account, totaling approximately \$460. In December 2020,
23 she discovered the fraud when she checked her Account balance online. In
24 December 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of America. In response, Bank of
25 America transferred her from department to department and refused to give her a
26 straight answer. In December 2020, Bank of America froze her Account. In April
27 2021, Bank of America unfroze her Account. In April 2021, Bank of America
28 credited \$463 to her Account. Due to Bank of America's actions, she was unable to

1 see her daughter. She struggles to buy food, gas, and clothing. She also suffers from
2 emotional distress and depression.

3 410. Lester Johnson is a California resident. In January 2020, he began
4 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In March 2021, he experienced
5 fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$800. In March 2021, he discovered
6 the fraud when he called Bank of America to check on his Account balance. In
7 March 2021, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank
8 of America told him he needed to talk to EDD to resolve his issue. In May 2021, he
9 again experienced fraud on his Account, totaling \$680. In May 2021, he discovered
10 the fraud when he attempted to buy groceries, but his Card was declined. In May
11 2021, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of
12 America said they would need to freeze the Account once again. In March 2021,
13 Bank of America froze his Account. In May 2021, Bank of America unfroze the
14 Account. In May 2021, Bank of America again froze the Account. Since May 2021,
15 Bank of America has yet to unfreeze his Account. In May 2021, Bank of America
16 credited him money from the first fraudulent transaction; however, Bank of
17 America has yet to credit him the money from the second fraudulent transactions.
18 Due to Bank of America's actions, he missed his rent payment three times. He
19 missed three car insurance payments. He was unable to pay his cable bill, phone
20 bill, and electric bill. He struggles to buy food, gas, and clothing.

21 411. Terrell Johnson is a California resident. In February 2020, he applied
22 to receive EDD benefits through Bank of America; however, he did not receive his
23 Bank of America Card until August 2020. Between February 2020 to August 2020,
24 he experienced fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$10,000. In August
25 2020, he discovered the fraud when he logged into his Account. In August 2020, he
26 reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America
27 told him he needed to file a claim and Bank of America would send him a new Card
28 to access his Account. In August 2020, Bank of America illegally froze his Account.

1 In June 2021, Bank of America unfroze his Account; however, approximately
2 \$14,000 was missing from the time Bank of America originally froze his Account.
3 Since August 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit him any money. Due to Bank
4 of America's actions, he missed three \$1,200 rent payments, leading to eviction. He
5 struggles to provide basic needs for his child. He struggles to afford food, gas, and
6 clothing. He suffers from emotional distress.

7 412. Brian Jones is a California resident. In June 2020, he began receiving
8 EDD benefits through Bank of America. In November 2020, he experienced fraud
9 on his Account, totaling approximately \$6,000. In November 2020, he discovered
10 the fraud when he checked his Account balance online. In November 2020, he
11 reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America
12 told him he should suspend his Card to avoid more fraudulent transactions. In
13 December 2020, Bank of America froze his Account. Since December 2020, Bank
14 of America has yet to unfreeze his Account. Since November 2020, Bank of
15 America has yet to credit him any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, he
16 has been unable to pay \$600 to repair his car. He struggles to purchase food, gas,
17 and clothing.

18 413. Victoria Jones is a California resident. In August 2019, she began
19 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In December 2020, Bank of
20 America froze and closed her Account. In December 2020, she contacted Bank of
21 America who told her the Account was closed due to fraudulent activity. Since
22 December 2020, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze her Account. Due to Bank of
23 America's actions, she missed her \$1,900 rent payment in February 2021 and March
24 2021. She struggles to buy food, gas, and clothing.

25 414. Olivia Kelly is a California resident. In March 2020, she began
26 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In August 2020, she experienced
27 fraud on her Account, which led to Bank of America reporting a balance on her
28 Account of negative \$18,000. In August 2020, she discovered the fraud when she

1 checked her online Account. In August 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of
2 America via phone. In response, Bank of America said they could not do anything
3 and that she needed to call back in a week. In October 2020, Bank of America froze
4 her Account and then unfroze her Account. Since August 2020, Bank of America
5 has yet to credit her any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, she cannot
6 afford her car registration which has led to her receiving traffic tickets, which she
7 also cannot afford. She lost access to her phone, internet and cable in January 2021
8 after failing to pay the bills.

9 415. Erick Kessler is a California resident. In March 2020, he began
10 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In June 2020, he experienced
11 fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$7,000. In June 2020, he discovered
12 the fraud when he checked his Account balance. In June 2020, he reported the fraud
13 to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America told him they would
14 investigate and open a claim and to resolve his issue with EDD. In September 2020,
15 Bank of America froze his Account. In October 2020, Bank of America unfroze his
16 Account. In September 2020, Bank of America credited \$7,000 to his Account;
17 however, Bank of America reversed the credit, putting his Account into a balance
18 of negative \$7,000. Since September 2020, Bank of America has yet to recredit him
19 any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, he could not afford to pay his storage
20 unit since August 2020, meaning he lost thousands of dollars' worth of personal
21 items, including furniture. He could not afford to pay rent since August 2020 at
22 \$1,550 per month, leading to eviction in October 2020. He has not paid his cell
23 phone bill since August 2020 at \$90 per month. He has missed every credit card
24 payment since August 2020 and has had four accounts closed as a result. He has
25 had to borrow thousands of dollars from family.

26 416. Deandre Knight is a California resident. In February 2020, he began
27 receiving EDD disability benefits through Bank of America. In July 2020, he began
28 receiving EDD unemployment benefits through Bank of America. In July 2020,

1 October 2020, and January 2021, he experienced fraud on his Account totaling
2 approximately \$4,000. On each occasion, he discovered the fraud by checking his
3 online Account balance. On each occasion, he reported the fraud to Bank of
4 America via phone. In response, Bank of America would freeze his Account. In
5 July 2020, October 2020, and January 2021, Bank of America froze his Account.
6 On each occasion, Bank of America unfroze his Account. Since July 2020, Bank of
7 America has yet to credit him any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, he
8 missed phone bills and car payments which combined for a total of \$5,000. He
9 struggles to obtain food, gas, and clothing.

10 417. Corey Lawson is a California resident. In March 2020, he began
11 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In January 2021, he experienced
12 fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$4,000. In January 2021, he
13 discovered the fraud when he checked his Account history. In January 2021, he
14 reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America
15 would either tell him to wait for the investigation to finish or to contact EDD to
16 resolve his issue. In January 2021, Bank of America froze his Account. In June
17 2021, Bank of America unfroze his Account. In May 2021, Bank of America
18 credited \$4,000 to his Account. Due to Bank of America's actions, he could not pay
19 his \$700 rent in January 2021, leading to eviction and subsequent homelessness. He
20 could not pay his \$100 utilities payment in January 2021. He has been unable to
21 pay his \$161 car insurance from January 2021 to present. He has not been able to
22 afford to pay his \$62 phone bill from January 2021 to present. He struggles to buy
23 food, gas, and clothing.

24 418. Sabrina Laxton is a California resident. In February 2020, she began
25 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In August 2020, Bank of
26 America froze her Account. In September 2020, she discovered the frozen Account
27 when her Card was declined. In September 2020, she contacted Bank of America
28 who told her the Account was frozen due to suspected fraud; however, there had

1 been no fraud on her Account. Since September 2020, Bank of America has yet to
2 unfreeze her Account. Since September 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit her
3 any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, she was evicted from her home and
4 is now homeless. She was forced to sell her car just to afford food and other
5 necessities. She has missed phone bills. She suffers from emotional distress.

6 419. Tonya Lind is a California resident. In March 2020, she applied to
7 receive EDD benefits through Bank of America; however, Bank of America never
8 sent her a Card to access her Account until August 2020. In October 2020, Bank of
9 America unexpectedly froze her Account. In October 2020, she contacted Bank of
10 America regarding her frozen Account. In response, Bank of America told her they
11 did not know why Bank of America froze her Account and they would investigate.
12 In October 2020, Bank of America reported her Account at a balance of negative
13 \$13,000. In January 2021, Bank of America unfroze her Account. Since October
14 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit any money to her Account. Due to Bank
15 of America's actions, she missed two \$400 rent payments leading to eviction and
16 subsequent homelessness. She missed car insurance bills and phone bills. She
17 struggles to buy food, gas, and clothing. She suffers from emotional distress.

18 420. Limmie Littles is a California resident. In May 2020, he began
19 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In March 2021, Bank of America
20 unexpectedly froze his Account. In March 2021, he called Bank of America who
21 said Bank of America froze his Account due to suspected fraudulent activity. He
22 confirmed that no activity on his Account was fraudulent. In response, Bank of
23 America told him he needed to verify his identification through EDD. Since March
24 2021, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze his Account. In March 2021, Bank of
25 America deactivated his Account. Due to Bank of America's actions, he missed two
26 \$600 rent payments leading to eviction and subsequent homelessness. He missed
27 his \$68 cable bills. He suffers from emotional distress.

28 421. Ronda Lopez is a California resident. In March 2019, she began

1 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America; she began PUA benefits in July
2 2020 through Bank of America. In February 2021, she experienced fraud on her
3 Account, totaling approximately \$1,500. In February 2021, she discovered the fraud
4 when she checked her Account. In February 2021, she reported the fraud to Bank
5 of America via phone. In response, Bank of America told her they could not help
6 her and she needed to talk to EDD to resolve her issue. In February 2021, Bank of
7 America illegally froze her Account. Since February 2021, Bank of America has
8 yet to unfreeze her Account. Since February 2021, Bank of America has yet to credit
9 her any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, she missed her \$495 rent
10 payments from February 2021 to May 2021, leading to her eviction in May 2021
11 and subsequent homelessness. She cannot afford to repair her broken down car. She
12 missed her \$60 monthly phone bill from February 2021 to May 2021. She could not
13 afford her \$60 monthly WIFI bill from February 2021 to May 2021. She struggles
14 to afford food, gas, and clothing. She now owes money to family and friends.

15 422. Ernie Loreda is a California resident. In April 2020, he began receiving
16 EDD benefits through Bank of America. In June 2020, he experienced fraud on his
17 Account, totaling approximately \$1,500. In March 2021, he discovered the fraud
18 when he logged into his Account and looked at the transaction history. In March
19 2021, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of
20 America told him to resolve his issue with EDD. In March 2021, Bank of America
21 froze his Account. In May 2021, Bank of America informed him his Account was
22 no longer frozen; however, he was unable to log in and thus did not have access to
23 his Account. In May 2021, Bank of America credited \$457 to his Account. Due to
24 Bank of America's actions, he missed his \$700 rent payment between March and
25 May 2021, leading to eviction in May 2021. He missed his \$65 monthly car
26 insurance payment between March and May 2021. He missed his \$60 monthly
27 phone bill between March and May 2021. She could not pay his utilities bill at \$200.
28 He struggles to buy food, gas, and clothing.

1 423. Raina Madrid is a California resident. In April 2020, she began
2 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In February 2021, she
3 experienced fraud on her Account. In February 2021, she discovered the fraud when
4 her phone, which had access to her Account information, was stolen. In February
5 2021, she reported the fraud to Bank of America. In response, Bank of America sent
6 her a new Card. In February 2021, Bank of America froze her Account. Since
7 February 2021, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze her Account. Since February
8 2021, Bank of America has yet to credit her any money. Due to Bank of America's
9 actions, she has been unable to pay her \$700 rent since February 2021, leading to
10 her eviction and subsequent homelessness. She has been unable to pay her \$80
11 utility bill since February 2021. She has been unable to pay her \$270 car insurance,
12 resulting in her car being impounded. She could not afford to pay her \$130 storage
13 fee, and as a result, has lost approximately \$6,000 worth of personal items. She is
14 unable to pay her \$300 monthly phone bill, resulting in her phone cancellation.

15 424. Mario Madrid is a California resident. In April 2020, he began
16 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In November 2020, he
17 experienced fraud on his Account, when a fraudulent person began receiving
18 benefits under his name. The fraud totaled approximately \$24,000 to \$28,000. In
19 November 2020, he discovered the fraud on his Account. In November 2020, he
20 reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America
21 told him he needed to resolve his issue with EDD. In November 2020, Bank of
22 America froze his Account. Since November 2020, Bank of America has yet to
23 unfreeze his Account. Since November 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit him
24 any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, he is unable to pay for car repair
25 payments totaling \$1,200. He is unable to pay for his wife's medical bills, which
26 are currently at \$1,100. He had to borrow money and was continually late on his
27 rent payment, which was \$950 per month, which he has struggled to pay for the past
28 ten months. He is currently having to live in the backyard of a friend's house. He

1 struggles to pay for food, gas, and clothes.

2 425. Joseph Magallan is a California resident. In July 2020, he began
3 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In December 2020, he
4 experienced fraud on his Account, totaling \$80. In December 2020, he discovered
5 the fraud when he checked his online Account. In December 2020, he reported the
6 fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America said they would
7 open an investigation on the claim and get back to him in forty-five days. In
8 December 2020, Bank of America froze his Account. In February 2021, Bank of
9 America unfroze his Account. Since December 2020, Bank of America has yet to
10 credit him any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, he missed four \$1,200
11 rent payments, leading to eviction and subsequent homelessness. He has missed his
12 phone bills. He suffers from emotional distress.

13 426. Joseph Main is a California resident. In February 2020, he began
14 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In July 2020, he experienced
15 fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$5,000. In July 2020, he discovered
16 the fraud when he checked his transaction history on his Account. In July 2020, he
17 reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America
18 would often tell him to talk to EDD to resolve his issue or would just drop his call
19 altogether. In October 2020, Bank of America froze his Account. Since October
20 2020, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze his Account. In October 2020, Bank of
21 America credited him \$5,000; however, Bank of America immediately reversed the
22 credit, sending his balance to negative \$5,000. Due to Bank of America's actions,
23 he missed two rent payments in July and August 2020 at \$1,200, leading to eviction
24 in September 2020. He missed two car payments at \$480 per month in July and
25 August 2020, leading to repossession of the car in September 2020. He missed cell
26 phone bill payments at \$90 in July and August 2020. He missed credit card
27 payments. He struggles to buy food, gas, and clothing.

28 427. Danela Martinez is a California resident. In March 2020, she began

1 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In January 2021, Bank of
2 America froze her Account. In January 2021, she called Bank of America to
3 understand why, yet Bank of America only told her she needed to speak to EDD
4 and verify her identity with EDD before Bank of America could do anything. In
5 March 2021, Bank of America unfroze her Account. Since January 2021, Bank of
6 America has yet to credit her any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, she
7 missed eight \$510 weekly rent payments. She missed two \$60 monthly phone bills.
8 She struggles to pay for food.

9 428. Russell Matson Jr. is a California resident. In March 2020, he began
10 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In January 2021, he experienced
11 fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$560. In January 2021, he discovered
12 the fraud when he checked his transaction history. In January 2021, he reported the
13 fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America, after
14 transferring him between departments, told him to talk to EDD to resolve his issue.
15 In January 2021, Bank of America froze his Account. In March 2021, Bank of
16 America unfroze his Account. Since January 2021, Bank of America has yet to
17 credit him any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, he missed two \$2,250
18 rent payments in February and March 2021. He missed two electricity bill payments
19 in February and March 2021 at \$100. He missed two cell phone bills at \$100,
20 leading to Verizon cancelling his Account. He struggles to buy food, gas, and
21 clothing.

22 429. Vernon Matthews is a California resident. In March 2020, he began
23 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. Between December 2020 and
24 April 2021, he experienced fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$6,600. In
25 March 2021, he discovered the fraud when he checked his online statements while
26 waiting for his next deposit. In March 2021, he reported the fraud to Bank of
27 America via phone. In response, Bank of America said they would take the transfer
28 of Accounts off his charges to prevent further fraud, however, Bank of America

1 failed to do so, as more fraud occurred. In March 2021, Bank of America froze his
2 Account. Since March 2021, Bank of America has yet to credit him any money. In
3 April 2021, Bank of America credited \$1,984 to his Account. Due to Bank of
4 America's actions, he had difficulty paying his water bill of about \$120-\$138 a
5 month between March 2021 and June 2021. He had difficulty paying his power bill
6 of about \$100 a month between March 2021 and June 2021. He was unable to pay
7 for his storage unit of \$67 a month between March 2021 and June 2021. He had
8 difficulty paying his T-Mobile cell phone bill of \$20 per month between March
9 2021 and June 2021. He struggles to pay for food, gas, and clothing.

10 430. Janelle Maurer is a California resident. In February 2020, she began
11 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In April 2021, she experienced
12 fraud on her Account, totaling approximately \$1,000. In April 2021, she discovered
13 the fraud when she was unable to access any of the funds in her Account. In April
14 2021, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of
15 America said she needed to talk to EDD to resolve her issue. In April 2021, Bank
16 of America froze her Account. Since April 2021, Bank of America has yet to
17 unfreeze her Account. Since April 2021, Bank of America has yet to credit her any
18 money. Due to Bank of America's actions, she missed rent payments leading to
19 eviction and subsequent homelessness. She is unable to pay her monthly phone bill.
20 She is unable to pay for an advanced loan she acquired.

21 431. Christina McCafferty is a California resident. In May 2020, she began
22 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In June or July of 2020, she
23 experienced fraud on her Account, totaling approximately \$1,500 to \$2,500. In June
24 or July 2020, she discovered the fraud when her Card and phone was stolen. In June
25 or July 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of America. In response, Bank of
26 America said they would investigate the claim and that she should also contact EDD
27 to resolve the issue. In August 2020, Bank of America credited her money;
28 however, they subsequently reversed the credit leaving her Account balance at

1 negative \$1,500. Her EDD benefits then began to pay off the negative balance. In
 2 December 2020, Bank of America credited her \$1,500. Due to Bank of America's
 3 actions, she missed her \$600 monthly rent payment between October 2020 and
 4 December 2020. She missed her \$100 monthly phone bill between October 2020
 5 and December 2020. She was unable to pay her credit card bill. She struggles to
 6 buy food, gas, and clothing.

7 432. Brenda McCann is a California resident. In October 2020, she began
 8 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In October 2020, she
 9 experienced fraud on her Account, totaling approximately \$25,000. In October
 10 2020, she discovered the fraud when she checked her Account transaction history.
 11 In October 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response,
 12 Bank of America told her to contact Nevada EDD, as that was a location she
 13 previously applied for benefits. In November 2020, Bank of America froze her
 14 Account. Since November 2020, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze her Account.
 15 Since October 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit her any money. Due to Bank
 16 of America's actions, she could not pay her \$975 monthly rent payment from
 17 September 2020 to November 2020, leading to her eviction. She was unable to pay
 18 her \$275 monthly car payment from October 2020 to December 2020, leading to
 19 her car being repossessed in January 2021. She has been unable to pay her \$75
 20 monthly phone bill. She struggles to buy food, gas, and clothing.

21 433. Jennifer Meza²¹ resides in Imperial County, California. Meza found
 22 herself out of work during the COVID-19 pandemic. Meza then applied for and was
 23 found eligible by EDD to receive unemployment benefits. Meza received a Bank of
 24 America EDD Debit Card with a magnetic stripe (but no EMV chip) to access EDD
 25 benefits. She was then the victim of unauthorized transactions on her EDD Debit
 26 Card Account. Meza promptly reported the unauthorized transactions to Bank of

27 _____
 28 ²¹ Meza is the plaintiff in *Meza v. Bank of America, N.A.*, No. 3:21-cv-00484-LAB-MSB ("*Meza*").

1 America, which failed to comply with its legal obligations as alleged herein, causing
2 Meza to suffer immediate and irreparable injury. In mid-2020, Meza applied for
3 and began receiving unemployment benefits through EDD. Around September
4 2020, Meza was surprised when her Card was declined at an ATM due to
5 insufficient funds. Meza subsequently viewed her Account and discovered that the
6 balance, which should have been approximately \$7,000, had been drained to \$2.67
7 as a result of numerous unauthorized transactions with ride share companies and
8 luxury stores such as Coach. These transactions were executed in multiple states
9 including New York. Meza, a single mother living in Calexico, was in awe that
10 Bank of America would not flag her Account or notify her of these unusual
11 purchases. These fraudulent charges totaling \$6,904.83 were approved by Bank of
12 America, prior to Meza learning of her Account's depletion. Inexplicably, Meza did
13 not receive a notification about these highly unusual transactions, indicating that
14 Bank of America failed to detect the instances of fraud. In September 2020, right
15 after Meza discovered the fraudulent charges on her Account, Meza called Bank of
16 America to report the unauthorized transfers. Around that same day, Meza visited
17 the El Centro branch of Bank of America in-person and reported the unauthorized
18 transfers. At the branch, the tellers and bankers refused to assist Meza. Meza was
19 merely directed to call the Bank's EDD phone line while inside the branch. No Bank
20 of America employee in the branch would answer Meza's questions or help her. An
21 employee at the branch instructed Meza to enter an unoccupied office to use their
22 phone to call the Bank's EDD phone line. The employee left Meza in the office
23 alone to fend for herself. Not surprisingly, Meza's call was unproductive, so Meza
24 begged for help from the bank's employees at the branch. The employees stated
25 there was nothing they could do for Meza. Meza believed she would be protected
26 and covered by Bank of America and was utterly disappointed when the Bank did
27 not return or recredit the money to Meza so that she could provide for her child.
28 Meza's initial notices to the Bank occurred well-within the sixty-day time limit

1 imposed by 15 U.S.C. §1693f(a). Meza reported the unauthorized transfers to the
2 Bank many more times within sixty-days as outlined below. In response, all the
3 Bank did was to continue to send Meza periodic statements, as required by 15
4 U.S.C. §1693f(a). The statements confirmed and showed the unauthorized transfers.
5 From September 2020 to October 2020, Meza called Bank of America daily to
6 report the fraud and request a refund. Meza would sit on hold for hours a day.
7 Sometimes the call would become disconnected after being on hold for hours. Each
8 time Meza reported the unauthorized transfers to agents at the Bank, she would
9 provide her name and other identifying information as required by 15 U.S.C.
10 §1693f(a)(1). The agents were able to locate Meza's Account, but they would not
11 help her. Meza indicated to the Bank that she believed her Account contained errors
12 in the form of unauthorized electronic fund transfers under 15 U.S.C. §1693f(f)(1)
13 and provided the amount and dates of the transfers per 15 U.S.C. §1693f(a)(2).
14 When Meza reported the fraud, she set forth the reasons for her belief that the
15 transfers were unauthorized errors on the Bank's part and were fraudulent per 15
16 U.S.C. §1693f(a)(3). Upon information and belief, the Bank did not conduct any
17 investigation when Meza reported the errors. The Bank certainly did not report or
18 mail Meza the results of any such investigation and determination within ten
19 business days of notice as required by 15 U.S.C. §1693f(a)(3). The Bank did not
20 provisionally recredit Meza's Account within ten business days after receiving
21 notice of the unauthorized transfers as required by 15 U.S.C. §1693f(c). Around
22 October 2020, Meza reached another agent and again reported the fraud and asked
23 for help in the form of a recredit or refund. The agent told Meza that her call needed
24 to go to "claims." Despite Bank of America's representations of "24/7" customer
25 service, the agent informed Meza that she would need to call back during business
26 hours and provided Meza with a number to call. Meza called that number only to
27 be put on hold over two hours, and then hung up on. Meza was transferred to various
28 departments to no apparent end, sent to voicemail, dealt with unhelpful automated

1 agents, and sent Bank of America emails notifying the Bank of the fraud with no
2 response. Around October 2020, Meza was able to speak with another Bank of
3 America representative. Meza went through the transactions with the agent and
4 reported a total of \$6,904.83 fraudulent charges again. The agent told Meza that
5 these funds would be flagged as fraudulent and the funds would be returned to
6 Meza, but that did not happen. At no point did Meza receive communication via
7 mail, email, text, call or otherwise from Bank of America regarding the fraud on
8 her Account or the ongoing widespread fraud affecting EDD Debit Cards or how
9 defrauded EDD recipients should proceed. There was no warning even after the
10 Bank had frozen hundreds of thousands of EDD Debit Card Accounts in a desperate
11 and heavy-handed effort to stem the effects of the fraud. In her numerous calls to
12 the Bank going back to September 2020, Meza repeatedly requested additional
13 information, clarification and documentation concerning the unauthorized transfers,
14 but the Bank refused to provide it re 15 U.S.C. §1693f(f)(6). Meza asked Bank of
15 America for the written transaction history for her Account during the timeframe
16 when the fraudulent transactions occurred, but the Bank denied Meza access to
17 those records and refused to help Meza. To date, Bank of America still has not
18 returned Meza's stolen funds totaling \$6,904.83. Apart from the stolen funds,
19 Meza's was receiving EDD benefits of \$167 a week deposited into her Account
20 because that was the only option. Around January 6, 2021, Bank of America
21 completely froze Meza's Account without warning. This denied Meza access to her
22 benefits, even though EDD was still depositing \$167 a week (distributed biweekly)
23 into Meza's Account. When Meza inquired about the freeze, Bank of America
24 falsely told Meza that it was EDD who was not authorizing the funds to be
25 withdrawn. Meza called EDD only to find that her Account was 100% compliant
26 with EDD. It was in fact Bank of America that had frozen the Account unilaterally
27 without EDD's knowledge. Even assuming the Bank had a valid reason for the
28 freeze and needed to conduct an investigation, Meza should have been able to

1 access her funds after ten days under the EFTA. But that was not the reality for
2 Meza, who was left without any recourse. Meza was held hostage by Bank of
3 America with the only option of calling the Bank repeatedly and being placed on
4 hold for hours and hours. In early March 2021, the Bank unfroze Meza's Account
5 and she was finally able to access some of her funds. Unfortunately, around March
6 15, 2021, Bank of America froze Meza's entire Account again without notice. There
7 was roughly \$900 of EDD benefits in the Account. Bank of America instructed
8 Meza to re-verify her identity in order to unfreeze the Account. Meza had no choice
9 but to comply and is now receiving her benefits by paper checks mailed to her by
10 EDD. Meza is forced to cash the checks at a Bank of America branch because she
11 does not have any other bank accounts. Bank of America charges Meza \$8.00 to
12 cash her checks at the branch, in addition to the huge hassle of having to drive to
13 the branch through traffic and wait in line. This is all a result of the Bank's handling
14 of Meza's Account. Around May 19, 2021, Meza received a devastating letter from
15 Bank of America saying the \$6,904.86 stolen from her will never be returned. In
16 the letter, Bank of America stated: "we've completed an additional review of your
17 case and concluded that our original decision was correct." This was the only letter
18 or notice Meza ever received from the Bank related to the fraud. Meza reported the
19 unauthorized transactions to the Bank in September 2020. Any investigation by the
20 Bank was required to be completed forty-five days later under 15 U.S.C. §1693f(c).
21 If the Bank determined in its investigation that an error did not occur, it was required
22 to deliver or mail Meza an explanation of its findings within three business days
23 after the conclusion of its investigation under 15 U.S.C. §1693f(c). In its letter,
24 Bank of America failed to enclose any supporting documents to support its findings.
25 In its letter, the Bank stated; "we relied on the enclosed documents to make our
26 decision." But there were no enclosed documents with the letter. In its letter, the
27 Bank stated; "based on this information, we're unable to credit your account and
28 we now consider this dispute closed." But there was no information included or

1 cited in the letter. In its letter, there was nothing to support Bank of America's
2 decision to withhold Meza's \$6,904.83. All Meza received was a single piece of
3 paper stating that her Claim number 200918303156 was closed. The Bank did not
4 make a good faith investigation of the errors. It did not have a reasonable basis for
5 believing that Meza's Account was not in error per 15 U.S.C. §1693f(e)(1). Bank
6 of America knowingly and willfully concluded that Meza's Account was not in
7 error when such a conclusion could not reasonably have been drawn from the
8 evidence available to it at the time of its investigation per 15 U.S.C. §1693f(e)(2).
9 Meza has now lost all hope of recovering her stolen funds. Meza has accepted that
10 she and her daughter are homeless and reduced to begging family to take them in.
11 Meza could really use the \$6,904.83 Bank of America refuses to return to her.
12 Instead, Meza must attempt to provide for her daughter with the reduced EDD funds
13 she receives after the Bank charges its check cashing fees. Meza upheld her end of
14 the Cardholder Agreement and the requirements of the EFTA and made consistent
15 diligent efforts to report and recover the funds stolen from her Account. She made
16 many telephone calls and sent numerous emails reporting the fraud. In spite of this,
17 Bank of America's customer service department never offered Meza any
18 meaningful response or assistance, but rather stymied her efforts at every turn.

19 434. Michael McCrary is a California resident. In March 2020, he began
20 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In February 2021, he
21 experienced fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$900. In February 2021,
22 he discovered the fraud after he tried to use his Card, but the Card was declined. In
23 February 2021, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response,
24 Bank of America repeatedly told him he needed to resolve his issues with EDD. In
25 February 2021, Bank of America froze his Account. In April 2021, Bank of
26 America unfroze his Account. In May 2021, Bank of America credited \$900 to his
27 Account. Due to Bank of America's actions, he missed his \$1,000 rent payment
28 twice in March 2021 and April 2021. He could not pay his phone bill in March and

1 April 2021 at \$90. He could not pay his light bill in March and April 2021 at \$110.
2 He could not pay his water bill in March and April 2021 at \$111. He could not pay
3 his cable bill in March and April 2021 at \$69.99. He could not pay his credit card
4 bill in March and April 2021 between \$40 to \$110. He could not pay his trash bill
5 in March and April 2021 at \$88. He struggles to buy food, gas, and clothing.

6 435. Travis Middleton is a California resident. In April 2020, he began
7 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In April 2020, he experienced
8 fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$12,000. In December 2020, he
9 discovered the fraud when he checked his Account online transactions after failing
10 to help his aunt pay taxes. In December 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of
11 America via phone. In response, Bank of America told him they would investigate
12 the claim, nothing more. In January 2021, Bank of America froze his Account. In
13 June 2021, Bank of America unfroze his Account. Since December 2020, Bank of
14 America has yet to credit him any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, he
15 could not afford to pay for an apartment for him and his girlfriend. He could not
16 uphold other financial obligations to family members. He struggles to buy food,
17 gas, and clothing.

18 436. Linda Miller is a California resident. In October 2020, she began
19 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In October 2020, she
20 experienced fraud on the Account, totaling approximately \$2,000. In October 2020,
21 she discovered the fraud when she checked her Account transactions online. In
22 October 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response,
23 Bank of America continuously told her to talk to EDD to resolve her issue. In
24 October 2020, Bank of America froze her Account. In May 2021, Bank of America
25 unfroze her Account. In May 2021, Bank of America credited \$2,000 to her
26 Account. Due to Bank of America's actions, she missed her rent payment of \$1,100
27 per month in October and November of 2020. She missed her car payment of \$200
28 per month in October and November of 2020. She missed her cell phone payment

1 of \$130 per month in October and November of 2020. She missed her cable
2 payment of \$120 per month in October and November of 2020. She struggles to
3 buy food, gas, and clothing.

4 437. Lavell Moore is a California resident. In September 2020, he began
5 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. Between December 2020 and
6 January 2021, he experienced several fraudulent transactions on his Account,
7 totaling approximately \$500. In December 2020, he discovered the fraud. In
8 December 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response,
9 Bank of America said they would investigate the claim. In March 2021, Bank of
10 America illegally froze his Account. Since March 2021, Bank of America has yet
11 to unfreeze his Account. In January 2021, Bank of America credited him for the
12 first fraud claim, well after thirty days had passed since Bank of America opened
13 its investigation. Since March 2021, Bank of America has yet to credit him for the
14 frozen Account. Due to Bank of America's actions, he missed his \$300 rent
15 payment in January 2021 through June 2021. He was unable to afford \$600 to repair
16 his vehicle. He was unable to afford \$62 for his monthly insurance bill. He struggles
17 to buy food, gas, and clothing.

18 438. Sara Morales is a California resident. In July 2020, she began receiving
19 EDD benefits through Bank of America. In September 2020, she experienced fraud
20 on her Account, totaling approximately \$1,900. In September 2020, she discovered
21 the fraud when Bank of America sent her a copy of her monthly transaction history.
22 In September 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In
23 response, Bank of America said she would be sent a new Card and given provisional
24 credit. In December 2020, Bank of America froze her Account. In April 2021, Bank
25 of America unfroze her Account. In November 2020, Bank of America credited
26 \$934.58 to her Account. Due to Bank of America's actions, she was evicted from
27 her home. She could not afford her phone bills totaling \$260. She suffers from
28 emotional and physical distress. She struggles to pay for food, gas, and clothing.

1 439. Albert Morales is a California resident. In March 2020, he began
2 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In July 2020, he experienced
3 fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$9,000. In July 2020, he discovered
4 the fraud when he checked his Account balance online. In July 2020, he reported
5 the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America repeatedly
6 tells her she needs to resolve her issue with EDD. In December 2020, Bank of
7 America froze his Account. Since December 2020, Bank of America has yet to
8 unfreeze his Account. Since July 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit him any
9 money. Due to Bank of America's actions, he missed his rent payment twice in
10 December 2020 and January 2021 at \$850 per month leading to eviction in February
11 2021. He missed two car payments in December 2020 and January 2021, at \$350
12 per month leading to car repossession in March 2021. He cannot afford his PG&E
13 bill at \$1,500. He missed his phone bill in December 2020 and January 2021 at \$90
14 per month. He struggles to pay for food, gas, and clothing.

15 440. Sharise Morgan is a California resident. In late June or early July 2020,
16 she began receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In December 2020,
17 she experienced fraud on her Account, when a fraudulent person attempted to
18 register under her name in two different states. In December 2020, she discovered
19 the fraud when EDD contacted her and notified her of the fraudulent activity. In
20 December 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of America. In response, Bank of
21 America told her there was nothing they could do and that she needed to resolve her
22 issue with EDD. In January 2021, Bank of America froze her Account. In May
23 2021, Bank of America unfroze her Account. Since December 2020, Bank of
24 America has yet to credit her any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, she
25 missed her \$1,400 monthly rent payment from December 2020 to April 2021, her
26 \$80 monthly PG&E bill from December 2020 to April 2021, and her \$100 monthly
27 water and trash bill from December 2020 to April 2021.
28

1 441. Tiffiany Morrell is a person residing in San Diego County.²² Morrell
2 became out of work and was unable to secure employment because of the COVID-
3 19 pandemic. Morrell applied for and received EDD unemployment benefits in
4 October 2020. Soon thereafter, Morrell received a Bank of America EDD Debit
5 Card with a magnetic stripe (no EMV chip) to access Morrell's benefits; shortly
6 thereafter Morrell was the victim of numerous unauthorized transactions on
7 Morrell's Card; and despite its "Zero Liability" policy, and Morrell's repeated
8 requests for help, Bank of America has been either unwilling or unable to return the
9 funds fraudulently taken from Morrell's Account, nor remove the "Administrative
10 Hold" on Morrell's Account. Morrell began collecting EDD benefits in March of
11 2020 when she was in need of funds to bridge the gap between employment during
12 the pandemic. On or around October 17, 2020, Morrell went to a Bank of America
13 ATM with the intention to take out funds in order to pay her credit card bill. Morrell
14 was shocked to discover that her Account, which should have had \$507, had been
15 drained to \$4.00. Morrell immediately called Bank of America's Customer Service
16 number in attempt find out what happened to her Account. However, the Bank of
17 America employee told Morrell to call that the claims department was closed and
18 call back Monday, during business hours, 8:00 A.M. to 8:00 P.M. EST. Morrell
19 called the Bank of America's claims department at 5:00 A.M. PST the following
20 Monday to be first in line when Bank of America opened. Morrell was able to speak
21 with a Bank of America representative that day who informed her that a fraudster
22 had stolen funds out of her Account at a Citibank ATM in Grand Rapids, Illinois.
23 The Bank of America employee told Morrell that a provisional credit for the stolen
24 \$503 would be disbursed to Morrell within a week along with a new Bank of
25 America EDD Debit Card. After the conversation, Morrell was under the
26 impression that the situation had been resolved and she would receive a new Card

27
28 ²² Morrell is the plaintiff in *Morrell v. Bank of America, N.A.*, No. 3:21-cv-00542-LAB-MSB ("*Morrell*").

1 with replacement funds shortly. On or around October 26, 2020, Morrell received
2 two envelopes in the mail from Bank of America. The first was the Card she was
3 expecting—a new EDD Debit Card to replace the Card that had been compromised.
4 The second was a letter dated October 20, 2020, one day after Morrell spoke on the
5 phone with Bank of America’s claim department. The letter informed Morrell that
6 she was responsible for the stolen \$503 taken out of her Account in Illinois and
7 Bank of America would not reimburse her for the stolen money. Morrell
8 immediately went to the Bank of America ATM because she was confused as to
9 whether the stolen funds had been replaced. To her disappointment they had not.
10 Faced with extreme stress, fear, anxiety and frustration, Morrell again called Bank
11 of America’s claims department to figure out the reason Bank of America
12 determined the stolen funds were Morrell’s responsibility. On or around October
13 26, 2020, Morrell spoke with another Bank of America’s claims department
14 employee who told Morrell a glitch in the system triggered the letter to be sent to
15 her. Therefore, the stolen funds were not deposited on her new Card and in order
16 for Bank of America to reimburse the stolen funds, Morrell would have to restart
17 the claims process. Morrell filed another fraud claim for the stolen \$503 and was
18 instructed to wait for her claim to be investigated. On or around November 2, 2020,
19 approximately a week since Morrell had submitted her second claim to have the
20 stolen funds reimbursed, Morrell began to grow anxious that Bank of America
21 would force Morrell to restart the claims process again, or that Bank of America
22 would not distribute the funds she needed in a timely manner or worse not at all.
23 Therefore, Morrell decided to call Bank of America again in an attempt to get
24 answers regarding the status of her fraud claim and when she could expect to receive
25 her reimbursement for the stolen \$503. That day Morrell waited on hold for six
26 hours. While on hold Bank of America hung up on her multiple times, forcing
27 Morrell to call back and be placed at the back of the line. That day, Morrell did not
28 get through to any Bank of America representative. Little did Morrell know, this

1 experience would summarize her life for the next month. Morrell was aware that
2 Bank of America's claims department was open only Monday through Friday from
3 8:00 A.M to 8:00 P.M. EST. Morrell would wake up at 5:00 A.M. PST in attempt
4 to be the first in line. Despite Morrell's efforts, Morrell would spend nearly the
5 entire day on hold with Bank of America. Eventually, Morrell did get through to a
6 Bank of America employee. Morrell inquired into the status of her claim and was
7 advised that it was being processed and to wait two business days, so Morrell did
8 exactly that. By this time, Morrell was not surprised when two business days later
9 the funds had not been distributed to her Account. Morrell was faced with the reality
10 that she would again have to spend days on hold in order to get more information
11 regarding her claim. Eventually, Morrell made contact with Bank of America again,
12 and was advised that her claim would be processed in three to five business days.
13 Morrell waited again and at the end of the 5th business day, her reimbursement was
14 nowhere to be found. Morrell continued to wake up at 5:00 A.M. PST determined
15 to track down the status of her claim and the stolen \$503 out of her Account.
16 Morrell, again after days of waiting on hold, reached a Bank of America employee
17 who this time advised her that the funds would be disbursed to her in seven to ten
18 business days. By this time, Morrell had little hope that the funds would be in her
19 Account within the time frame, but Morrell did the only thing she could do and
20 waited the 10 business days. Morrell was disappointed again when on the tenth day
21 she had not been reimbursed for the money stolen out of her Account. The next day,
22 Morrell started calling Bank of America again. On December 17, 2020, after days
23 on hold, she reached a Bank of America employee who rudely told Morrell that
24 Bank of America had no estimate as to when the funds would be distributed because
25 Morrell needed to allow Bank of America time to thoroughly investigate her claim.
26 Morrell submitted her first claim on October 19, 2020, for funds stolen out of her
27 Account in Illinois while Morrell was in San Diego County. Bank of America had
28 not reimbursed those funds by December 17, 2020, nearly two months later and

1 after Morrell had called more than 80 times. After the December 17, 2020 call,
2 Morrell was extremely stressed, frustrated, and anxious. She had spent the past two
3 months on the phone. Morrell has an ill 10-year-old daughter who requires
4 Morrell's attention and regular medical treatment. Morrell decided to give up on
5 her claim because she could no longer waste her days attempting to track down her
6 stolen \$503. On or around January 4, 2021, Morrell received two letters in the mail
7 from Bank of America, both dated December 30, 2020. The first letter informed
8 Morrell that Bank of America would be disbursing a temporary credit of \$503
9 within two days while it conducts its investigation. The second letter informed
10 Morrell that Bank of America had concluded its investigation and the \$503
11 disbursement would be permanent. Morrell did in fact receive the stolen \$503 on or
12 around January 1, 2020. However, it was too little too late. This horrendous
13 experience occurred after leaving funds in the Account for the first time. Now
14 Morrell receives notifications when EDD her funds are deposited into her Account
15 and no matter the time of the disbursement, Morrell immediately drives to a Bank
16 of America ATM and pulls out as much as she can then goes to the Bank as soon
17 as it opens to extract whatever is left to avoid going through a similar experience in
18 the future. Bank of America's misconduct resulted in Morrell's inability to give her
19 10-year-old daughter the Christmas she deserved, and the attention she requires due
20 to her condition. Morrell was late on rent and has only recently caught up with
21 payments. Morrell, six months later, is still behind on her car note due to Bank of
22 America's misconduct. Morrell followed the instructions on Morrell's Account
23 agreement, and made consistent, diligent efforts to recover the funds stolen from
24 Morrell's Account by making multiple telephone calls. Despite this, Bank of
25 America's customer service department offered Morrell no meaningful response or
26 assistance, and indeed has stymied Morrell's efforts at nearly every turn. At no point
27 did Morrell received communication via mail, email, text, or otherwise from Bank
28 of America regarding the ongoing widespread fraud affecting EDD Debit Cards or

1 how defrauded EDD recipients should proceed, even after Bank of America had
2 frozen hundreds of thousands of EDD Debit Card Accounts in a desperate and
3 heavy-handed effort to stem the effects of the fraud. The only option presented to
4 individuals like Morrell has been to follow Bank of America's instructions to call
5 the number on the debit Card in reliance on its representations of a "Zero Liability"
6 policy and "24/7" customer service. Unfortunately, as Morrell has learned, Bank of
7 America's representations are false. Proceeding in accordance with Bank of
8 America's policies and recommendations offers scant hope of recovering lost funds
9 timely. Per Bank of America's "Zero Liability" policy Morrell should have been
10 able to access Morrell's funds after ten (10) days, even if there was an investigation
11 that Bank of America deemed necessary. But that was not the reality for Morrell,
12 who was left without recourse or other options. Morrell was held hostage by Bank
13 of America with the only option of calling and being placed on hold repeatedly.
14 Morrell was the victim of fraud resulting from Bank of America's lax security
15 measures implemented to save money. Morrell followed all of Bank of America's
16 designated procedures while attempting to recover stolen funds. Morrell cooperated
17 with Bank of America by adhering to all its requests, which it said would allow
18 Morrell to recover the money. Did it take ten days as promised? No, it took over
19 four months.

20 442. Heather Morris is a California resident. In June 2020, she began
21 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In December 2020, she
22 experienced fraud on her Account, totaling approximately \$900. In December 2020,
23 she discovered the fraud when her Card was declined for insufficient funds. In
24 December 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response,
25 Bank of America told her they would open a claim and investigate the fraud. In
26 December 2020, Bank of America illegally froze her Account. In February 2021,
27 Bank of America unfroze her Account. In June 2021, Bank of America credited
28 \$468 to her Account. Due to Bank of America's actions, she missed three \$750 rent

1 payments, forcing her to move out. She missed three \$250 car payments, leading to
2 vehicle repossession. She could not pay her credit card bill, leading to a ninety-three
3 (93) point reduction of her credit score. She owes friends and family over \$4,000.
4 She suffers from emotional distress.

5 443. Janette Mouck is a California resident. In March or April 2020, she
6 began receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In December 2020, she
7 experienced fraud on her Account, totaling approximately \$900. In December 2020,
8 she discovered the fraud when she attempted to use her Card for groceries and was
9 declined. In December 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone.
10 In response, Bank of America said they would open an investigation. Other times
11 Bank of America said she needed to talk to EDD as there was nothing Bank of
12 America could do. In December 2020, Bank of America froze her Account. In May
13 2021, Bank of America unfroze her Account. In May 2021, Bank of America
14 credited \$200 to her Account. In June 2021, Bank of America again credited \$200
15 to her Account. Due to Bank of America's actions, she missed three rent payments
16 of \$1,050. She missed three car lease payments of \$400, leading to car repossession.
17 She in turn lost her job because she had no car to get to work. She missed three cell
18 phone bills of \$100. She lost valuable personal items, including a wedding ring. She
19 suffers from emotional distress. She struggles to purchase food and clothing.

20 444. Robert Murphy is a California resident. In March 2020, he began
21 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In December 2020, he
22 experienced fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$350. In December 2020,
23 he discovered the fraud when he checked his online Account transactions. In
24 December 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response,
25 Bank of America would transfer him between departments, eventually leading to a
26 dropped call. In December 2020, Bank of America froze his Account. In early 2021,
27 Bank of America unfroze his Account. In early 2021, Bank of America credited
28 money to his Account. Due to Bank of America's actions, he missed three rent

1 payments, avoiding eviction by borrowing money from his grandparents. He missed
2 his phone bills, leading to a shut off on his phone. He struggles to buy food, gas,
3 and clothing.

4 445. Sarah Murphy is a California resident. In March 2020, she began
5 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In April 2020, she experienced
6 fraud on her Account, totaling approximately \$5,000. In April 2020, she discovered
7 the fraud when she was unable to sign into her Account. In April 2020, she reported
8 the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America told her she
9 needed to resolve her issue with EDD. In April 2020, Bank of America froze her
10 Account. Since April 2020, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze her Account. Since
11 April 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit her any money. Due to Bank of
12 America's actions, she missed her \$2,069 monthly rent in November 2020. She
13 could not pay her \$60 phone bill in November 2020. She could not pay her \$100
14 car payment in November 2020. She struggles to buy food, gas, and clothing

15 446. Kimberly Nicholson is a California resident. In May 2020, she applied
16 to receive EDD benefits through Bank of America; however, she did not receive the
17 benefits until October 2020. Bank of America told her she needed to verify her
18 identification, which she had done numerous times, yet Bank of America never
19 discharged her the funds. In December 2020, she experienced fraud on her Account,
20 totaling approximately \$2,000. In December 2020, she discovered the fraud when
21 she looked at her transaction history online. In December 2020, she reported the
22 fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America told her she did
23 not have enough proof regarding her claims. In December 2020, Bank of America
24 froze her Account. In April 2021, Bank of America unfroze her Account. Since
25 December 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit her any money. Due to Bank of
26 America's actions, she missed her \$800 monthly rent payments from December
27 2020 to March 2021. She missed her phone bill, electric bill, and water bill, totaling
28 \$200 per month from December 2020 to March 2021. She struggles to buy food and

1 clothing.

2 447. Lelanya Ojeda is a California resident. In May 2020, she began
3 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In July 2020 and August 2020,
4 she experienced fraud on the Account, totaling approximately \$2,000. In July 2020,
5 she discovered the fraud when she checked her Account transaction history. In July
6 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of
7 America told her she needed to contact EDD to resolve her issue, even when she
8 physically went into the bank. In January 2021, Bank of America froze her Account.
9 In January 2021, Bank of America unfroze her Account. Since July 2020, Bank of
10 America has yet to credit her any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, she
11 missed gas bills, electricity bills, and phone bills, leading to a phone shut off. She
12 was unable to buy her children clothes for school.

13 448. Frank Ortiz Jr. is a California resident. In April 2020, he began
14 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In December 2020, Bank of
15 America froze his Account. In December 2020, he called Bank of America which
16 told him that is had frozen the Account due to suspected fraud, even though Ortiz
17 stated there was never any fraud on the Account. Since December 2020, Bank of
18 America has yet to unfreeze his Account. Since December 2020, Bank of America
19 has yet to credit him any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, he cannot pay
20 his rent payment at \$800 per month, from January 2021 to present. He cannot pay
21 his car insurance at \$700 for a period of six months. He cannot pay his utility bill at
22 \$350 per month, from January 2021 to present. He could not pay his \$100 cell phone
23 bill in January 2021, resulting in a shut off. He struggles to buy food, gas, and
24 clothing

25 449. Kelly Owen is a California resident. In April 2020, she began receiving
26 EDD benefits through Bank of America. In December 2020, she experienced fraud
27 on her Account, totaling approximately \$300. In December 2020, she discovered
28 the fraud when she checked her Account transaction history. In December 2020,

1 she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America
2 said they would send her a new Card; however, Bank of America sent her an
3 Arizona EDD card. In December 2020, Bank of America froze her Account. Since
4 December 2020, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze her Account. Since December
5 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit her any money. Due to Bank of America's
6 actions, she was evicted from her home in February 2021 after not being able to pay
7 the \$650 rent. She had her car repossessed in February 2021 when she could not
8 pay the \$252 monthly bill. She has missed every phone payment to date since
9 February 2021 after not being able to pay \$40 per month. She must rely on friends
10 and family to obtain daily life necessities.

11 450. Mark Owensby is a California resident. In January 2021, he began
12 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In January 2021, he experienced
13 fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$1,600. In January 2021, he
14 discovered the fraud when he checked his Account transaction history. In January
15 2021, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of
16 America told him to talk to EDD to resolve his issue. In February 2021, Bank of
17 America froze his Account. Since February 2021, Bank of America has yet to
18 unfreeze his Account. In May 2021, Bank of America credited him \$1,600. Due to
19 Bank of America's actions, he missed two rent payments at \$1,500 each. He missed
20 his cell phone bill at \$300 per month. He has \$700 in late credit card fees. He missed
21 his cable bill at \$140 per month. He struggles to buy food, gas, and clothing for his
22 family.

23 451. Flouzel Paningbatan is a California resident. In February 2020, she
24 began receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. Between May 2020 to
25 October 2020, she experienced fraud on her Account, totaling approximately \$600.
26 In December 2020, she discovered the fraud when she checked her Account
27 transaction history. In December 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of America
28 via phone. In response, Bank of America told her to open claims, and they would

1 investigate. In December 2020, Bank of America illegally froze her Account. In
2 April 2021, Bank of America unfroze her Account. In April 2021, Bank of America
3 credited \$441 to her Account; however, in May 2021, Bank of America reversed
4 the credit, sending her Account into a negative balance. In May 2021, Bank of
5 America credited \$500 to her Account. Due to Bank of America's actions, she
6 missed her \$500 rent payments from December 2020 to February 2021, leading to
7 eviction. She missed her car payment in December 2020, leading to repossession.

8 452. Laura Payton²³ is a person residing in San Diego County, California.
9 Payton found herself out of work during, and unable to secure employment because
10 of, the COVID-19 pandemic. Payton applied for and received EDD unemployment
11 benefits in March 2020; soon thereafter, she received a Bank of America EDD Debit
12 Card with a magnetic stripe (no EMV chip) to access Payton's benefits. Shortly
13 thereafter Payton was the victim of unauthorized transactions on her Card; and
14 despite its "Zero Liability" policy, and Payton's repeated requests for help, Bank of
15 America has been either unwilling or unable to return the funds fraudulently taken
16 from Payton's Account, nor remove the "Administrative Hold" on Payton's
17 Account. In March of 2020, Payton began receiving EDD benefits when she needed
18 funds to bridge the gap between employment during the pandemic. On November
19 16, 2020, Payton received a payment of unemployment funds. Payton transferred
20 \$200 to Payton's Wells Fargo account, leaving \$683 in Payton's Bank of America
21 EDD Debit Card Account. On the same day, when Payton attempted to withdraw
22 the remaining balance of Payton's Bank of America Account from an ATM, the
23 ATM showed that the Account had zero funds. Immediately after noticing
24 fraudulent activity on her Account, Payton began her tireless quest to recover her
25 money from Bank of America. Payton promptly called Bank of America and
26 notified them about the fraudulent activity. Payton was transferred to the claims

27
28 ²³ Payton is the plaintiff in *Payton v. Bank of America, N.A.*, No. 3:21-cv-00644-LAB-MSB ("*Payton*").

1 department and was put on hold for hours and never connected with a person. The
2 next day, November 17, 2020, Payton continued to attempt to file a fraud claim with
3 Bank of America over the phone. Payton was met with seemingly endless wait
4 times, spanning anywhere from two to five hours, only to have Bank of America
5 unceremoniously hang up on Payton several times. After spending hours on the
6 phone, Payton was able to open a claim with Bank of America. Bank of America
7 informed Payton that a balance inquiry was made on her Account and her funds
8 were withdrawn from the ATM in Chula Vista. Payton informed Bank of America
9 that these activities did not correspond to Payton's normal activities, because
10 Payton never made this type of inquiry and Payton does not live in Chula Vista.
11 Payton persistently contacted Bank of America along with EDD and spent many
12 hours on the phone attempting to have her benefits restored. However, Bank of
13 America did not issue any sort of refund or credit for the funds it allowed to be
14 stolen from Payton. Payton faced further difficulties from Bank of America in her
15 attempt to recover her money. Bank of America repeatedly told Payton that it would
16 not proceed with her claim until her ID had been verified with EDD. However,
17 when contacting EDD, Payton was told that Payton's ID had already been verified.
18 Bank of America continued to deny that Payton's ID had been verified, delaying
19 Payton's ability to regain her benefits. Prior to November 30, 2020, Payton was able
20 to obtain a new Card from Bank of America to receive her EDD benefits. On
21 November 30, 2020, Payton received an EDD payment on the new Card. In
22 December 2020, Payton received another EDD payment on the new Card.
23 Following the December payment, Bank of America froze her Account without
24 notice. Bank of America froze the funds in the Account and Payton's future EDD
25 deposits and prevented Payton from accessing her desperately needed money for
26 almost three months. Bank of America has no reasonable method to identify and
27 prevent fraud. The Bank froze Payton's Account and provided no notice, reason, or
28 justification to Payton. Bank of America's draconian method of dealing with this

1 alleged “fraud” was to totally freeze Payton’s Account without giving any sort of
2 credit Payton could use to buy food. Payton was again forced to repeatedly contact
3 Bank of America to recover her benefits. When Payton contacted the Bank, the
4 Bank explained that Payton’s Account was frozen due to fraudulent activity. Payton
5 informed Bank of America that the fraud occurred on Payton’s previous Card in
6 November and asked Bank of America to unfreeze the Card. Bank of America
7 refused to unfreeze Payton’s Account and instead, put the fault and responsibility
8 of the freeze on EDD, who do not have control over Bank of America’s debit cards.
9 Payton had to re-start her exhausting pursuit of recovering her money from Bank of
10 America, contacting Bank of American and EDD, back and forth, in order to have
11 her ID verified and her Account unfrozen spending hours and hours on the phone.
12 On February 1, 2021, Bank of American mailed Payton a letter informing Payton
13 that a freeze was placed on Payton’s Account. Due to this, Payton was unaware
14 when she would be able to receive her seriously needed EDD benefits and was
15 forced to cover her expenses in alternative ways (borrowing money from family,
16 selling her car, etc.). Later, Payton was transitioned from electronic deposits to
17 paper checks for EDD benefits. This further complicated Payton’s situation as she
18 now receives her benefits weeks later than expected, harming her ability to cover
19 her expenses even more—all because Bank of America could not perform its
20 obligations. On March 18, 2021, Bank of America mailed Payton another letter, this
21 time informing her that it had changed its process affecting Accounts that it had
22 frozen and that it could work with Payton through a phone call to see if it could
23 release the hold on her Card. Payton once again was forced to repeatedly contact
24 Bank of America to unfreeze her Account and recover her benefits. Again, Payton
25 had to spend hours of her day trying to contact Bank of America. To Bank of
26 America, \$683 might seem insignificant; however, for Payton that money was
27 helping her pay rent, put food on the table, and stay afloat through the pandemic.
28 Payton followed the instructions on Bank of America’s Account agreement, and

1 made consistent, diligent efforts to recover the funds stolen from Payton's Account
2 by making multiple telephone calls. Despite this, Bank of America's customer
3 service department offered Payton no meaningful response or assistance for almost
4 four months, and indeed has stymied Payton's efforts at nearly every turn. In
5 addition, at no point did Payton receive communication via mail, email, text, or
6 otherwise from Bank of America regarding the ongoing widespread fraud affecting
7 EDD Debit Cards or how defrauded EDD recipients should proceed, even after
8 Bank of America had frozen hundreds of thousands of EDD Debit Card Accounts
9 in a desperate and heavy-handed effort to stem the effects of the fraud. The only
10 option presented to individuals like Payton has been to follow Bank of America's
11 instructions to call the number on the Card in reliance on its representations of a
12 "Zero Liability" policy and "24/7" customer service. Unfortunately, as Payton has
13 learned, Bank of America's representations are false. Proceeding in accordance with
14 Bank of America's policies and recommendations offers scant hope of recovering
15 lost funds timely. Per Bank of America's "Zero Liability" policy Payton should
16 have been able to access Payton's funds after ten (10) days, even if there was an
17 investigation that Bank of America deemed necessary. But that was not the reality
18 for Payton, who was left without recourse or other options. Payton was held hostage
19 by Bank of America with the only option of calling and being placed on hold
20 repeatedly. Payton was the victim of fraud resulting from Bank of America's lax
21 security measures implemented to save money. Payton followed all of Bank of
22 America's designated procedures while attempting to recover stolen funds. Payton
23 cooperated with Bank of America by adhering to all its requests it said would allow
24 Payton to recover the money. Did it take ten days as promised? No, it took over four
25 months.

26 453. Ismael Pena, Jr. is a California resident. In July 2020, he began
27 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In September 2020, he
28 experienced fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$2,400. In September

2020, he discovered the fraud when he checked his online Account history. In September 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America said he needed to resolve his issue with EDD. In September 2020, Bank of America illegally froze his Account. Since September 2020, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze his Account. Since September 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit him any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, he missed his \$475 rent payments between September 2020 to April 2021, meaning he was charged an additional \$200 in late fees. He missed her phone bill from September 2020 to April 2021. He missed his cable bill between September 2020 to April 2021. He missed his electricity bill from September 2020 to April 2021.

454. Ann Perez is a California resident. In March 2020, she applied to receive EDD benefits through Bank of America. Between March 2020 and September 2020, she experienced fraud on her Account, totaling approximately \$14,000. In September 2020, she discovered the fraud when she called Bank of America to explain she had never received her EDD Debit Card. In September 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America rejected her claim and stated Bank of America would not credit her any money. In September 2020, Bank of America froze her Account. In April 2021, Bank of America unfroze her Account. Since September 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit her any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, she missed her rent payment for December 2020 to March 2021 at \$600 per month. She missed her car payment in October, November, and December of 2020 at \$325.

455. Paul Perez is a California resident. In February 2020, he began receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In January 2021, he experienced fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$570. In January 2021, he discovered the fraud when he checked his Account transaction history. In January 2021, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America continuously drops his calls and refuses to provide a clear answer to his problem.

1 In January 2021, Bank of America froze his Account. In April 2021, Bank of
2 America unfroze his Account. Since January 2021, Bank of America has yet to
3 credit him any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, he was evicted from his
4 home after not paying his \$900 rent for two months in January and February 2021,
5 forcing him to live out of his car. He cannot afford to buy food, gas, or clothing. He
6 suffers from severe depression.

7 456. Kenyon Perkins is a California resident. In April 2020, he applied to
8 receive EDD benefits through Bank of America; however, Bank of America did not
9 send him a Card with access to his funds until September 2020. Between April 2020
10 and September 2020, he experienced fraud on his Account, totaling approximately
11 \$13,000. In December 2020, he discovered the fraud when he was on the phone
12 with Bank of America who told him he had been using his benefits between April
13 and September 2020. In December 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of America
14 via phone. In response, Bank of America continuously told him to contact EDD to
15 resolve his issue. In December 2020, Bank of America froze his Account. In
16 February 2021, Bank of America unfroze his Account. Since December 2020, Bank
17 of America has yet to credit him any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, he
18 missed his \$1,750 monthly rent payments from December 2020 to February 2021.
19 He missed his \$469 monthly car payments from December 2020 to May 2021. He
20 struggles to buy food, gas, and clothing.

21 457. Melanie Piette is a California resident. In March 2020, she applied to
22 receive EDD benefits through Bank of America and received her Card in July 2020.
23 In July 2020, Bank of America illegally froze her Account. In November 2020,
24 Bank of America unfroze her Account. In November 2020, she experienced fraud
25 on her Account, totaling approximately \$600. In November 2020, she discovered
26 the fraud when she checked her Account transaction history. In November 2020,
27 she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America
28 said to contact EDD to resolve her issue. In February 2021, Bank of America

1 credited her for the fraudulent money that was taken. Due to Bank of America's
2 actions, she could not pay her \$700 monthly rent in July 2020 and was forced to
3 move out. She now lives in her car or motels. She cannot afford the \$4,500 to repair
4 her car. She struggles to pay for food, gas, and clothing.

5 458. Ryan Pita is a California resident. In February 2020, he began
6 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In November 2020, he
7 experienced fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$800. In November 2020,
8 he discovered the fraud when he checked his Account balance. In November 2020,
9 he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America
10 said they would provisionally credit him the fraudulently stolen money. In
11 December 2020, Bank of America froze his Account. In April 2021, Bank of
12 America unfroze his Account. In November 2020, Bank of America credited \$250
13 to his Account. Due to Bank of America's actions, he missed four \$600 rent
14 payments. He missed cell phone bills and could not use his vehicle. He struggles to
15 buy food, gas, and clothing.

16 459. Darnell Pitts is a California resident. In May 2020, he began receiving
17 EDD benefits through Bank of America. In July 2020, he experienced fraud on his
18 Account, totaling approximately \$500. In July 2020, he discovered the fraud. In
19 July 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank
20 of America said Bank of America would credit him the full amount taken from him.
21 Bank of America did not credit him the full amount. In August 2020, he experienced
22 fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$30. In August 2020, he discovered
23 the fraud when he attempted to use his Card and it was declined. In August 2020,
24 he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America
25 told him they would not credit him any money because Bank of America did not
26 believe the transactions were fraud. In October 2020, he experienced fraud on his
27 Account totaling approximately \$600. In October 2020, he discovered the fraud. In
28 October 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response,

1 Bank of America said they would investigate the claim. In April 2021, he
2 experienced fraud for the last time, totaling approximately \$430. In April 2021, he
3 discovered the fraud. In April 2021, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via
4 phone. In response, Bank of America said Bank of America would freeze his
5 Account and send him a new Card. In December 2020, Bank of America froze his
6 Account. In January 2021, Bank of America unfroze his Account. In April 2021,
7 Bank of America again froze his Account. In May 2021, Bank of America unfroze
8 his Account. In July 2020 and again in May 2021, Bank of America credited money
9 to his Account. Bank of America only credited him \$80 total. Due to Bank of
10 America's actions, he missed six \$300 rent payments, leading to eviction. He
11 missed three \$180 cable bills. He missed five \$80 phone bills. He missed two
12 infrastructure payments, totaling \$525. He struggles to pay for food. He suffers from
13 emotional distress.

14 460. Vannessa Pitts is a California resident. In July 2020, she began
15 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In July 2020, she experienced
16 fraud on her Account, totaling approximately \$1,800. In July 2020, she discovered
17 the fraud when she checked her Account transaction history. In July 2020, she
18 reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America
19 said the Bank of America fraud investigation team would investigate her claim. In
20 September 2020, Bank of America froze her Account. In January 2021, Bank of
21 America unfroze her Account. In August 2020, Bank of America credited \$1,525.22
22 to her Account. Due to Bank of America's actions, she had to borrow money to pay
23 rent from August 2020 to February 2021. She could not pay her \$650 renter's
24 insurance in August 2020. She could not pay her \$100 cell phone bill from August
25 2020 to February 2021. She struggled to buy food, gas, and clothing.

26 461. Misty Pointer is a California resident. In January 2021, she began
27 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In May 2021, she experienced
28 fraud on her Account, totaling \$500. On May 12, 2021, she discovered the fraud

1 when she checked her transaction history. On May 12, 2021, she reported the fraud
2 to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America told her they would
3 investigate and give her provisional credit. On May 24, 2021, Bank of America
4 credited her money to her Account. Due to Bank of America's actions, she was
5 unable to make two car payments since May 2021, totaling \$1,720. She was unable
6 to pay her phone bill at \$400 per month since May 2021. She struggles to obtain
7 food, gas, and clothing.

8 462. Tina Pomeroy is a California resident. In March 2020, she began
9 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In June 2020, she experienced
10 fraud on her Account, totaling approximately \$1,600. In June 2020, she reported
11 the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America would either
12 tell her to talk to EDD or would abruptly end the call without giving an answer. In
13 August 2020, October 2020, and December 2020, Bank of America froze her
14 Account. In March 2021, Bank of America unfroze her Account for the final time.
15 In August 2020, Bank of America credited \$524 to her Account. Due to Bank of
16 America's actions, she missed her rent payment in September 2020 and October
17 2020 at \$500 per month. She missed her car payment in September 2020 and
18 October 2020 at \$348 leading to repossession in February 2021. She could not pay
19 her storage fee at \$78, meaning she lost personal items in the storage. She missed
20 her phone payment in September 2020 and October 2020 at \$65. She struggles to
21 pay for food, gas, and clothing.

22 463. Randle Posten is a California resident. In April 2020, he began
23 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In October 2020, he experienced
24 fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$1,000. In October 2020, he
25 discovered the fraud when he checked his Account transaction history. In October
26 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of
27 America told him to talk to EDD to resolve his issue. In October 2020, Bank of
28 America froze his Account. In January 2021, Bank of America had yet to unfreeze

1 his Account, so he cancelled his Account with Bank of America and started
2 receiving paper checks from EDD. Since October 2020, Bank of America has yet
3 to credit him any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, he could not afford his
4 rent payment in October 2020 and November 2020 at \$1,800 per month. He could
5 not pay his insurance in October 2020 and November 2020 at \$146 per month. He
6 could not pay his phone bill in October 2020 and November 2020 at \$60 per month,
7 sometimes resulting in the phone being shut off. He could not pay his cable in
8 October 2020 and November 2020 at \$113 per month. He could not afford his gas
9 and electricity bill at \$200. He struggles to buy food, gas, and clothing for him and
10 his family.

11 464. Joshua Pummill is a California resident. In June 2020, he applied to
12 receive EDD benefits through Bank of America. In June 2020, he experienced fraud
13 on his Account, totaling approximately \$1,300. In June 2020, he discovered the
14 fraud when he called Bank of America to inquire on the whereabouts about his EDD
15 Debit Card. In June 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In
16 response, Bank of America told him Bank of America would send him a new Card
17 to access his funds. In January 2021, Bank of America closed his Account. Since
18 June 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit him any money. Due to Bank of
19 America, he missed two \$300 rent payments. He missed two \$100 phone bills. He
20 struggles to buy food and keep up with personal hygiene.

21 465. Andrea Quesada is a California resident. In November 2020, she began
22 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In December 2020, she
23 experienced fraud on her Account, totaling approximately \$600. In December 2020,
24 she discovered the fraud when her Card was declined. In December 2020, she
25 reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America
26 said they would freeze her Account and send her new papers to fill out followed by
27 a new Card. In December 2020, Bank of America froze her Account. In May 2021,
28 Bank of America unfroze her Account. In May 2021, Bank of America credited her

1 \$600. Due to Bank of America's actions, she could not afford her electric bill from
2 December 2020 to June 2021, owing a total of \$600. She could not afford her \$120
3 monthly phone bill from December 2020 to June 2021. She struggles to pay for
4 food, gas, and clothing.

5 466. Maurilio Quiroz is a California resident. In June 2020, he began
6 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In September 2020, he
7 experienced fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$2,000. In September
8 2020, he discovered the fraud when he checked his Account transaction history. In
9 September 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response,
10 Bank of America told him to talk to EDD to resolve his issue or Bank of America
11 would disconnect his call. In September 2020, Bank of America froze his Account.
12 Since September 2020, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze his Account. Since
13 September 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit him any money. Due to Bank
14 of America's actions, he has missed two rent payments and missed all utility bills.

15 467. Mykela Raiff is a California resident. In March 2020, she applied to
16 receive EDD benefits through Bank of America; however, Bank of America did not
17 send her a Card until June 2020 and did not receive the EDD benefits until August
18 2020. In December 2020, Bank of America froze her Account. In February 2021,
19 Bank of America unfroze her Account. In February 2021, Bank of America credited
20 her approximately \$3,000 to her Account. Due to Bank of America's actions, she
21 missed four \$800 rent payments, resulting in eviction. She missed four \$60 phone
22 bills. She struggles to buy food, gas, and clothing.

23 468. Moaney Ray is a California resident. In March or April 2020, he began
24 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In October 2020, he experienced
25 fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$1,000. In October 2020, he
26 discovered the fraud when he checked his transaction history. In October 2020, he
27 reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America
28 refused to help him, as they continuously transferred him between departments, and

1 often would disconnect his call. In October 2020, Bank of America froze his
2 Account. Since October 2020, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze his Account.
3 Since October 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit him any money. Due to
4 Bank of America's actions, he struggles to pay rent and his phone bill. He cannot
5 afford the \$5,000 to retain his car. He struggles to pay for food and clothing.

6 469. Kawana Reed is a California resident. In February 2020, she began
7 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In January 2021, she experienced
8 fraud on her Account, totaling approximately \$6,500. In January 2021, she
9 discovered the fraud. In January 2021, she reported the fraud to Bank of America
10 via phone. In response, Bank of America transferred her between departments
11 without giving her a resolution. In January 2021, Bank of America froze her
12 Account. In May 2021, Bank of America unfroze her Account. In June 2021, Bank
13 of America credited her the entire amount that was fraudulently stolen. Due to Bank
14 of America's actions, she missed her phone bill at \$60 per month, to the point the
15 phone was shut off. She missed her wireless bill at \$70 per month. She missed her
16 utility bill at \$143. She struggles to buy food and cannot afford to wash her clothes

17 470. Nehemiah Rima-Fleurima is a California resident. In April 2020, he
18 began receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In April 2021, Bank of
19 America froze his Account. Since April 2021, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze
20 his Account. Since April 2021, Bank of America has yet to credit him any money.
21 Due to Bank of America's actions, he has been unable to pay his \$70 monthly phone
22 bill since April 2021. He has been unable to pay his \$150 monthly storage bill. He
23 has been unable to pay his \$70 parking ticket. He struggles to obtain food, gas, and
24 clothing.

25 471. Rhonda Ritchey is a California resident. In December 2020, she began
26 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In January 2021, she experienced
27 fraud on her Account, totaling approximately \$8,000. In January 2021, she
28 discovered the fraud when she logged into her Bank of America application on her

1 phone. In January 2021, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In
2 response, Bank of America said Bank of America would send her a new Card and
3 paperwork to fill out that would fix her issue. Bank of America never sent the Card
4 or the papers. In January 2021, Bank of America froze her Account. In February
5 2021, Bank of America deactivated her Account. Since January 2021, Bank of
6 America has yet to unfreeze her Account. Since January 2021, Bank of America
7 has yet to credit her any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, she missed four
8 \$700 rent payments, leading to eviction and subsequent homelessness. She missed
9 phone bills totaling \$100. She missed her vehicle registration payment and car
10 insurance payments. She lost her life insurance. Her credit score decreased as she
11 was unable to pay her credit card payment. She struggles to keep up with personal
12 hygiene and pay for food.

13 472. Israel Rivera is a California resident. He began receiving EDD benefits
14 through Bank of America. In August 2020, he experienced fraud on his Account,
15 totaling approximately \$4,000. In August 2020, he discovered the fraud when he
16 checked his Account transaction history. In August 2020, he attempted to report the
17 fraud to Bank of America via phone. Bank of America has yet to respond to a single
18 phone call. In August 2020, Bank of America froze his Account. In June 2021, Bank
19 of America unfroze his Account. In June 2021, Bank of America credited \$5,000 to
20 his Account. Due to Bank of America's actions, he was evicted from his home,
21 forcing him to live in motels. His car was repossessed in August 2020 after missing
22 four car payments. He cannot afford his \$140 phone bill, leading to a shut-off. He
23 could not afford his medication for his high blood pressure.

24 473. Miguel Roa is a California resident. In May 2020, he began receiving
25 EDD benefits through Bank of America. In January 2021, Bank of America froze
26 his Account. In January 2021, every time EDD released his funds to Bank of
27 America, Bank of America would freeze his Account due to suspected fraud. Since
28 January 2021, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze his Account. Since January

1 2021, Bank of America has yet to credit him any money. Due to Bank of America's
2 actions, he missed two rental payments. He was unable to pay his phone bill, cable
3 bill, or electric bill.

4 474. Carmen Robinson is a California resident. In August 2020, she began
5 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In September 2020, Bank of
6 America froze her Account. Since September 2020, Bank of America has yet to
7 unfreeze her Account. Since September 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit her
8 any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, she has missed all phone payments.
9 She was forced to sell her vehicle and other personal items to afford food and
10 clothing for her and her children.

11 475. Stanley Robinson²⁴ is a person residing in San Diego County. He
12 applied for and received EDD unemployment Benefits in October 2020. Soon
13 thereafter, he received a Bank of America EDD Debit Card with a magnetic stripe
14 (no EMV chip) to access his benefits; shortly thereafter he was the victim of
15 numerous unauthorized transactions on his Card; and despite its "Zero Liability"
16 policy, and Robinson's repeated requests for help, Bank of America has been either
17 unwilling or unable to return the funds fraudulently taken from his Account, nor
18 remove the "Administrative Hold" on his Account. In the worst unemployment
19 crisis in California's history, during an unprecedented pandemic, Bank of America
20 left Robinson and hundreds of thousands of EDD benefit recipients stranded. On
21 January 26, 2021, for example two transactions were fraudulently made by
22 unknown individuals: (1) \$900 was taken out of an ATM; and (2) a \$60 point-of-
23 sale transaction was made, both in Los Angeles, California. Neither of these
24 transactions were authorized by Robinson. These fraudulent transactions totaling
25 \$960 left Robinson with only \$98 in his Account. To make matters worse, Bank of
26 America froze his Account and locked him out from accessing his desperately

27
28 ²⁴ Robinson is the plaintiff in *Robinson v. Bank of America, N.A.*, No. 3:21-cv-
00541-LAB-MSB ("*Robinson*").

1 needed funds. In total, Bank of America actions cost him \$1,058 of his \$1,146 EDD
2 benefits within a matter of hours. On January 2, 2021, he began his tireless quest to
3 recover his money from Bank of America. He religiously called Bank of America
4 every morning, afternoon, and evening for weeks. He spent hours daily on the phone
5 attempting to have his benefits restored. Daily, he was met with hostility from Bank
6 of America employees, accusations from Bank of America employees alluding that
7 he had made these fraudulent transactions, or lackluster responses from Bank of
8 America employees to his desperate pleas of help. Countless times Bank of America
9 employees told him that there was nothing they could do for him. Robinson was
10 met with seemingly endless wait times, only to be punctuated by automated
11 recordings telling him that Bank of America was too busy for him, and he should
12 call back later, then Bank of America unceremoniously would hang up on him. He
13 followed this routine for a month. He has all but given up trying to recoup his \$1,058
14 from Bank of America. He can log into his Account, see that it is still frozen, see
15 his \$98 that is rightfully his, but cannot access it. As of February 17, 2021, EDD
16 gave up on Bank of America too, Robinson now receives his \$1,146 benefit checks
17 from EDD in the mail. As of March 25, 2021, Bank of America still has not returned
18 the \$960 which was fraudulently taken from his Account, nor have they unfrozen
19 his Account. In total Bank of America has kept \$1,058 from Robinson. To Bank of
20 America, \$1,058 might seem insignificant; however, for Robinson that money was
21 helping him put food on the table, gas in his car, to stay afloat through the pandemic.
22 Robinson followed the instructions on his Account agreement, and made consistent,
23 diligent efforts to recover the funds stolen from his Account by making multiple
24 telephone calls. Despite this, Bank of America's customer service department
25 offered Robinson no meaningful response or assistance, and indeed has stymied his
26 efforts at nearly every turn. At no point did Robinson receive communication via
27 mail, email, text, or otherwise from Bank of America regarding the ongoing
28 widespread fraud affecting EDD Debit Cards or how defrauded EDD recipients

1 should proceed, even after Bank of America had frozen hundreds of thousands of
2 EDD Debit Card Accounts in a desperate and heavy-handed effort to stem the
3 effects of the fraud. The only option presented to individuals like Robinson has been
4 to follow Bank of America's instructions to call the number on the debit Card in
5 reliance on its representations of a "Zero Liability" policy and "24/7" customer
6 service. Unfortunately, as Robinson has learned, Bank of America's representations
7 are false. Proceeding in accordance with Bank of America's policies and
8 recommendations offers scant hope of recovering lost funds timely. Per Bank of
9 America's "Zero Liability" policy Robinson should have been able to access
10 Robinson's funds after ten (10) days, even if there was an investigation that Bank
11 of America deemed necessary. But that was not the reality for Robinson, who was
12 left without recourse or other options. Robinson was held hostage by Bank of
13 America with the only option of calling and being placed on hold repeatedly.
14 Robinson was the victim of fraud resulting from Bank of America's lax security
15 measures implemented to save money. Robinson followed all of Bank of America's
16 designated procedures while attempting to recover stolen funds. Robinson
17 cooperated with Bank of America by adhering to all its requests it said would allow
18 Robinson to recover the money. Did it take ten days as promised? No, it took over
19 four months.

20 476. Joe Robles is a California resident. In May 2020, he applied to receive
21 EDD benefits through Bank of America; however, he began receiving benefits in
22 September 2020. Between October 2020 and December 2020, he experienced fraud
23 on his Account, totaling approximately \$1,609. In December 2020, he discovered
24 the fraud after Bank of America sent him a letter stating there was fraudulent
25 activity on his Account. In December 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of
26 America via phone. In response, Bank of America told him they would investigate
27 the issue. In January 2021, Bank of America froze his Account. Since January 2021,
28 Bank of America unfroze his Account. Since December 2020, Bank of America has

1 yet to credit him any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, he missed three
 2 \$450 rent payments, leading to eviction and forcing him to live in the back on his
 3 car for three months. He missed three child support payments, totaling \$1,104.
 4 Struggles to buy food, gas, and clothing.

5 477. Catrina Rodriguez is a California resident. In May 2020, she began
 6 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In January 2021, she experienced
 7 fraud on her Account, totaling approximately \$6,000. In January 2021, she
 8 discovered the fraud when she logged onto her Account after failing to receive a
 9 Card from Bank of America. In January 2021, she reported the fraud to Bank of
 10 America via phone. In response, Bank of America told her she needed to call EDD
 11 because Bank of America told her Bank of America was not in charge of freezing
 12 and unfreezing EDD Debit Card Accounts. In January 2021, Bank of America
 13 illegally froze her Account. In April 2021, Bank of America unfroze her Account.
 14 In April 2021, Bank of America credited \$800 to her Account; however, Bank of
 15 America reversed the charge, putting her Account into a balance of negative
 16 \$797.13. In June 2021, Bank of America credited \$2.85 to her Account. Due to
 17 Bank of America's actions, she missed three \$1,600 rent payments, leading to
 18 eviction and subsequent homelessness. She could not afford her \$1,700 settlement
 19 fees. She had to borrow \$3,000 from friends and family. She cannot afford her \$250
 20 storage fee, leading to her losing the storage and all personal items. She lost her
 21 children to the State. She cannot afford daily necessities. She suffers from emotional
 22 distress.

23 478. Elana Martina Rojas de Charolet²⁵ is and at all times herein mentioned
 24 was a natural person residing in the City of Chula Vista, in the County of San Diego,
 25 in the United States of America. Rojas de Charolet is married to her husband,
 26 Marco, who suffers from Parkinson's Disease. Prior to the pandemic, Rojas de

27 ²⁵ Rojas de Charolet is the plaintiff in *Rojas de Charolet v. Bank of America,*
 28 *N.A.*, No. 3:21-cv-00925-LAB-MSB ("*Rojas de Charolet*").

1 Charolet was a chef working at the Hyatt Hotel in Downtown San Diego. Rojas de
2 Charolet's duties included cooking thousands of meals a day for the various
3 conventions held at the Hyatt. Before his Parkinson's Disease became advanced,
4 Marco Charolet was a structural engineer that worked on numerous projects in the
5 San Diego County area. After, Marco's income was reduced to government
6 disability only. As a result of Marco's illness, Rojas de Charolet became the only
7 breadwinner of the family, supplemented only by Marco's disability income. In
8 addition to being the sole earner of the family, Rojas de Charolet was also Marco's
9 only caregiver. As a result of COVID-19, Mrs. Rojas de Charolet was laid off from
10 her job as a chef at the Hyatt Hotel in Downtown San Diego. Rojas de Charolet was
11 instructed by her employer to apply for unemployment through the State of
12 California, and that she would be called back to work when operations at the Hotel
13 resumed. Rojas de Charolet applied for and began receiving unemployment from
14 the State of California. She received a Bank of America branded EDD Debit Card
15 with instructions to activate the Card to receive her EDD benefits, which were to be
16 loaded onto a Bank of America EDD Debit Card. Rojas de Charolet activated the
17 Account but did not take any money from the Account. Instead, she intended to first
18 utilize her savings before she accessed the income provided through unemployment
19 insurance. As a result, Rojas de Charolet stored her Bank of America EDD Debit
20 Card in her home, and did not initially use it—instead letting her the amount in the
21 Account increase. Finally, on May 21, 2020, Rojas de Charolet withdrew \$700 from
22 her Card for the first time. On May 30, 2020, some unknown person withdrew \$983
23 from Rojas de Charolet's Card using a Wells Fargo ATM. At the time of the May
24 30, 2020 withdrawal, Rojas de Charolet had her Card in her possession and had not
25 given anyone the PIN number. On May 31, 2020, some unknown person then
26 withdrew another \$1,000 from a Bank of America ATM. At the time of the May
27 31, 2020 withdrawal, Rojas de Charolet had her Card in her possession and had not
28 given anyone the PIN number. On June 1, 2020, some unknown person withdrew

1 another \$1,000 from a Bank of America ATM. At the time of the June 1, 2020
2 withdrawal, Rojas de Charolet had her Card in her possession and had not given
3 anyone the PIN number. On June 2, 2020, some unknown person withdrew another
4 \$483 from a Citibank ATM. At the time of the June 2, 2020 withdrawal, Rojas de
5 Charolet had her Card in her possession and had not given anyone the PIN number.
6 Then, on June 2, 2020, Rojas de Charolet withdrew \$500 from her EDD Debit Card
7 from a Bank of America ATM. When Rojas de Charolet withdrew her money, she
8 realized that her Account balance was \$3,466 lower than it should be. This was the
9 first time she learned of the fraud. Rojas de Charolet immediately called and
10 notified Bank of America of the identity theft on the same day she learned of the
11 theft. Bank of America acknowledged that high numbers of theft were being
12 reported, but that Rojas de Charolet needed to call another number to process her
13 ID theft claim. Rojas de Charolet called the number Bank of America told her to
14 and spent more than six hours waiting on hold for someone to answer. Finally, the
15 call was disconnected without anyone answering the call. The following day, and
16 less than 24 hours after learning of the fraud, Rojas de Charolet called Bank of
17 America's fraud department again, and waited four hours on hold, but no one
18 answered the phone. Rojas de Charolet called the Bank of America customer service
19 number for EDD Debit Card Accounts again and, again, reported the theft. Rojas
20 de Charolet reported to Bank of America that she had waited on hold two days in a
21 row, for six and four hours respectively, and the customer service agent told Rojas
22 de Charolet that she had been getting reports of long hold times. She then told Rojas
23 de Charolet she needed to keep trying. Rojas de Charolet asked the customer service
24 representative to freeze the Card due to the theft, and the representative locked the
25 Card. Rojas de Charolet made numerous other attempts to contact the fraud
26 department, but never could reach an operator. On or about July 13, 2020, Rojas de
27 Charolet mailed an FTC fraud affidavit concerning the ID theft to Bank of America,
28 via certified mail. Rojas de Charolet waited for a response from Bank of America,

1 which could have been in the form of a credit of the stolen money to her Account
2 or even a call from Bank of America to discuss the issue with her. Bank of America
3 did nothing. It did not return the money stolen from the Account of Charolet de
4 Rojas and it never contacted her in response to her an FTC fraud affidavit. On or
5 about September 24, 2020, Rojas de Charolet wrote a letter to Bank of America to
6 inquire about the results of the investigation of her stolen money. In that letter,
7 Rojas de Charolet asked Bank of America to let her know if it needed any other
8 documents to complete its investigation. Rojas de Charolet also stated that if its
9 investigation was completed, she wanted to know the result thereof, and she
10 requested a copy of the documents used to reach that result. Bank of America never
11 responded to Rojas de Charolet's September 24, 2020 letter.

12 479. Jose Rodriguez Romo is a California resident. In February 2021, he
13 began receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In March 2021, he
14 experienced fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$1,000. In March 2021,
15 he discovered the fraud when he tried to withdraw money from his Account. In
16 March 2021, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank
17 of America said they were unable to help him, and he needed to contact EDD to
18 resolve his issue. In March 2021, Bank of America froze his Account. In April 2021,
19 Bank of America unfroze his Account. In April 2021, Bank of America credited
20 \$1,003 to his Account. Due to Bank of America's actions, he was unable to pay his
21 \$650 rent in March 2021. He was unable to pay his car insurance, cell phone bill,
22 or repair his vehicle.

23 480. Melissa Royston is a California resident. In March 2020, she began
24 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In September 2020, she
25 experienced fraud on her Account, totaling approximately \$1,400. In September
26 2020, she discovered the fraud when she checked her Account transaction history.
27 In September 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In
28 response, Bank of America told her she would receive the credit for the fraudulently

1 stolen money. In October 2020, Bank of America froze her Account. Since October
2 2020, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze her Account. In September 2020, Bank
3 of America credited \$1,300 - \$1,400 to her Account; however, Bank of America
4 reversed the credit and took the money back. Due to Bank of America's actions, she
5 was unable to pay her \$350 monthly rent from September 2020 to December 2020.
6 She was unable to pay her \$350 water and electric bill from September 2020 to
7 December 2020. Her credit score dropped as a result of not paying her credit card
8 bill. She struggles to pay for food for her children.

9 481. Raylene Salaz is a California resident. In June 2020, she was approved
10 to receive EDD benefits through Bank of America; however, Bank of America
11 never sent her a Card to access her funds. Between June 2020 and August 2020, she
12 experienced fraud on her Account, totaling approximately \$11,000. In August 2020,
13 she discovered the fraud when she tried to access her Account. In August 2020, she
14 reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America
15 told her the debt would be wiped off until an investigation was completed. In
16 September 2020, Bank of America froze her Account. In October 2020, Bank of
17 America unfroze her Account. Since August 2020, Bank of America has yet to
18 credit her any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, she missed her rent
19 payments from November 2020 to January 2021, totaling \$6,000, leading to her
20 eviction in January 2021. She missed her car payments from November 2020 to
21 January 2021, totaling \$750, leading to car repossession in December 2020. She
22 could not pay her cell phone bill or electric bill, totaling \$475, She struggled to pay
23 for food

24 482. Miguel Salazar is a California resident. In March 2020, he began
25 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In December 2020, he
26 experienced fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$4,000. In December
27 2020, he discovered the fraud when he checked his Account attempting to withdraw
28 money. In December 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In

1 response, Bank of America said he needed to resolve his issue with EDD, or Bank
2 of America would disconnect his call. In December 2020, Bank of America froze
3 his Account. Since December 2020, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze his
4 Account. In April 2021, Bank of America credited \$5,000 to his Account. Due to
5 Bank of America's actions, he could not afford his phone bill, leading to a phone
6 shut off. He could not afford to pay for his medication. He suffers from severe
7 distress and mental health issues.

8 483. Frankie Saldate is a California resident. In June 2020, he began
9 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In November 2020, Bank of
10 America illegally froze his Account. In May 2021, Bank of America unfroze his
11 Account. Since November 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit him any money.
12 Due to Bank of America's actions, he missed his \$400 rent payments from
13 November 2020 to March 2021. He was unable to pay his \$85 monthly phone bill
14 from November 2020 to January 2021. He was then unable to pay his \$100 phone
15 bill from February 2021 to April 2021. He has been unable to get a job as a result.
16 He struggles to pay for medication for his son. He struggles to buy food, gas, and
17 clothing.

18 484. Michael Schmidt is a California resident. In February 2020, he began
19 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In October 2020, he experienced
20 fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$400. In October 2020, he discovered
21 the fraud when he checked his Account balance. In October 2020, he reported the
22 fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America said Bank of
23 America would send him a new Card. In April 2021, Bank of America credited
24 \$1,000 to his Account. Due to Bank of America's actions, he owes \$3,000 to family
25 members. He missed two \$1,200 rent payments. He missed two \$50 phone bills.
26 She suffers from emotional distress.

27 485. Timothy Schmitz is a California resident. In May 2020, he began
28 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. Between May 2020 and June

2021, Bank of America froze his Account on three separate occasions. In 2021, Bank of America credited his funds. Due to Bank of America's actions, he struggled to pay his bills. He suffers from emotional distress and severe anxiety.

486. Melissa Serrato is a California resident. In March 2020, she began receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In October 2020, she experienced fraud on her Account, totaling approximately \$2,500. In October 2020, she discovered the fraud when she attempted to make an online purchase. In October 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America told her that it was EDD who was taking the money out of her Account. In December 2020, she again experienced fraud on her Account, totaling approximately \$2,500. In December 2020, she discovered the fraud when she checked her online Account. In December 2020, she again reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America could not give her a straight answer, sometimes telling her the Account was closed, other times telling her the Account was open and accessible. In December 2020, Bank of America froze her Account. Since December 2020, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze her Account. Since October 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit her any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, she could not afford her \$755 rent in October 2020. She missed her \$215 car payment in December 2020. She struggles to buy food for her kids.

487. Arminda Sevilla is a California resident. In January 2021, she began receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In February 2021, she experienced fraud on her Account, totaling approximately \$2,500. In February 2021, she discovered the fraud when she checked her Account after her Card was declined. In February 2021, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America transfers her between departments until Bank of America abruptly ends the call. Since February 2021, Bank of America has yet to credit her any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, she missed four \$1,500

1 rent payments. She missed three \$500 car payments. She is behind on her phone
2 bill, totaling \$4,000. She is late on her utility bill at \$400. She is late on her light
3 bill at \$3,000. She owes money to friends and family who lent her money.

4 488. Jenna Silva is a California resident. In April 2020, she began receiving
5 EDD benefits through Bank of America. In March 2021, Bank of America froze her
6 Account. In March 2021, Bank of America told her they deactivated and froze her
7 Account due to suspected fraudulent activity; however, she proclaims no fraud ever
8 occurred on her Account. In April 2021, Bank of America unfroze her Account.
9 Since March 2021, Bank of America has yet to credit her any money. Due to Bank
10 of America's actions, she missed her \$500 rent payment in February 2021. She
11 missed her \$130 phone bill in February 2021. She missed her \$15 storage bill in
12 February 2021.

13 489. Jessica Simpson is a California resident. In May 2020, she began
14 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In May 2020, she experienced
15 fraud on her Account, totaling approximately \$1,500. In July 2020, she discovered
16 the fraud when she checked her online transaction history. In July 2020, she
17 reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America
18 told her to contact EDD to resolve her issue. In November 2020, Bank of America
19 froze her Account. In February 2021, Bank of America unfroze her Account. Since
20 July 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit her any money. Due to Bank of
21 America's actions, she missed her \$975 rent payments from November 2020 to
22 February 2021. She missed her utilities bills from November 2020 to February
23 2021, totaling \$800. She missed her \$500 car payments between November 2020
24 to February 2021, leading to car repossession. She struggled to buy clothes for her
25 children.

26 490. Michael Sims II is a resident of California. In February 2020, he began
27 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. Between August 2020 to
28 September 2020, he experienced fraud on his Account, totaling approximately

1 \$2,000. In September 2020, he discovered the fraud. In September 2020, he reported
2 the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America refused to
3 give him an answer, more often than not abruptly dropping his call. In September
4 2020, Bank of America froze his Account. In March 2021, Bank of America unfroze
5 his Account. Since September 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit him any
6 money. Due to Bank of America's actions, he was evicted from his apartment in
7 November 2020 after not being able to pay his \$950 rent payment for two months.
8 He had his vehicle repossessed in January 2021 after missing three monthly
9 payments of \$350. He cannot pay off his credit card bill which is now at \$3,000. He
10 cannot pay his phone bill at \$100 per month. He struggles to buy food, gas, and
11 clothing.

12 491. Denise Smith is a California resident. In March 2020, she began
13 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In November 2020, she
14 experienced fraud on her Account, totaling approximately \$1,283. In May 2021,
15 she discovered the fraud after her Card was declined. In May 2021, she reported the
16 fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America told her they
17 would investigate the claim. On June 1, 2021, Bank of America credited \$1,200 to
18 her Account; however, Bank of America reversed the credit immediately after,
19 putting her Account balance at negative \$60. Since May 2021, Bank of America
20 has yet to credit her any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, she could not
21 pay her life insurance premium of \$25. She could not pay \$47 for her electric bill.
22 She could not pay her renter's insurance at \$12.

23 492. Nicole Smith is a California resident. In January 2020, she began
24 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In November 2020, she
25 experienced fraud on her Account, totaling approximately \$7,000. In November
26 2020, she discovered the fraud when she checked her Account online. In November
27 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of
28 America told her to resolve her issue with EDD. In February 2021, Bank of America

1 froze her Account. In April 2021, Bank of America unfroze her Account. Since
2 November 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit her any money. Due to Bank of
3 America's actions, she could not afford her \$550 rent payment from February 2021
4 to April 2021, leading to eviction in April 2021. She missed three \$450 car
5 payments, leading to car repossession in April. She cannot afford her \$175 monthly
6 WIFI bill. She struggles to buy food, gas, and clothing for herself and her children.

7 493. Jonathan Sparks is a California resident. In February 2021, he began
8 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In February 2021, he
9 experienced fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$1,500. In February
10 2021, he discovered the fraud when he checked his Account online. In February
11 2021, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of
12 America told him he needed to talk to EDD to resolve his issue. In February 2021,
13 Bank of America froze his Account. In May 2021, Bank of America unfroze his
14 Account. Since February 2021, Bank of America has yet to credit him any money.
15 Due to Bank of America's actions, he missed three rent payments from April 2021
16 to June 2021 at \$3,000 each, leading him to be homeless for a week. He missed
17 three phone payments from April 2021 to June 2021 at \$48 per month. He also
18 could not pay his child support payments, meaning he has not been able to see his
19 daughter.

20 494. Amy Stanfill is a California resident. In July 2020, she began receiving
21 EDD benefits through Bank of America. In July 2020, she experienced fraud on her
22 Account, totaling \$5,000. In July 2020, she discovered this fraudulent transaction
23 when she was purchasing food and her Card was declined. In July 2020, she
24 reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America
25 told her they would investigate the claim. In August 2020, Bank of America credited
26 \$3,133 to her Account; however, Bank of America reversed this credit in June 2021.
27 Due to Bank of America's actions, she was unable to pay her \$900 rent in August
28 2020 and September 2020, leading to eviction. She was forced to live in her car or

1 pay for motels, which has totaled \$400. She could not pay her \$90 phone bill in
2 August and September 2020. She could not afford to pay her \$73 storage fee in
3 August and September 2020.

4 495. Lucas Stephens is a California resident. In April 2019, he began
5 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In June or July 2020, he
6 experienced fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$10,000. In June or July
7 2020, he discovered the fraud when he checked his Account balance. In June or July
8 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of
9 America told him Bank of America would open a claim and he would receive a new
10 Card to access his funds. In August 2020, Bank of America froze his Account. Since
11 August 2020, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze his Account. Since August 2020,
12 Bank of America has yet to credit him any money. Due to Bank of America's
13 actions, he missed his \$1,550 rent payments in July 2020 and then from December
14 2020 to February 2021, leading to eviction. He was unable to pay his PG&E bill
15 from November 2020 to February 2021. He has missed his \$647 monthly car
16 payment since December 2020. He has missed his credit card bills. He struggles to
17 obtain food, gas, and clothing. He struggles from emotional distress.

18 496. Crystal Stidham is a California resident. In March 2020, she began
19 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In October 2020, she
20 experienced fraud on her Account, totaling approximately \$19,000. In October
21 2020, she discovered the fraud when she checked her Account balance. In October
22 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of
23 America told her to resolve her issue with EDD. Due to Bank of America's actions,
24 she was evicted in October 2020 after not being able to afford her \$575 monthly
25 rent payment. She could not afford to pay to get her car out of a tow yard, a car
26 which she purchased the week before for \$4,400. She missed her cell phone bill
27 three times from October 2020 to December 2020 at \$62 per month. She struggles
28 to buy food and clothing.

1 497. Danny Talia²⁶ is a person residing in San Diego County, California.
2 Talia became out of work because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Talia applied for
3 and received EDD unemployment benefits. Soon thereafter, Talia received a Bank
4 of America EDD Debit Card with a magnetic stripe (no EMV chip) to access Talia's
5 benefits. Around mid-2020, Talia sought EDD benefits when Talia needed funds to
6 bridge the gap between employment and pay living expenses during the pandemic.
7 Initially, Talia's unemployment claim was denied. But Talia won an appeal and
8 received a lump sum payment of back-unemployment from EDD. The funds were
9 deposited by EDD into a Bank of America Debit Card Account for Talia and Bank
10 of America issued Talia a Card to access the funds. Notably, the Card did not have
11 an EVM chip. Around August of 2020, Talia had roughly \$11,000 of unemployment
12 benefits in the Account. Talia was taking care to protect and safeguard the valuable
13 funds. Talia did not perform any strange or suspicious transactions such as going to
14 multiple ATM machines on the same day or purchasing goods overseas. Talia began
15 to persistently call Bank of America day after day and spent many hours on the
16 phone attempting to have the funds returned. Bank of America refused to issue any
17 sort of refund or credit for the frozen funds so that Talia could buy food, gasoline
18 etc. At one point, Bank of America told Talia it was EDD's fault the funds were
19 frozen and to call EDD. But calling EDD was no easy task either. When Talia was
20 finally able to connect, EDD informed Talia it was entirely Bank of America's
21 decision and fault. Talia began calling Bank of America again. On one of the calls
22 an agent told Talia the funds would be returned in two days and Talia was ecstatic.
23 Since Bank of America had frozen Talia's funds, Talia had borrowed money from
24 friends and family and was late on rent. Talia was exuberant believing that the funds
25 would be unfrozen in two days and began informing his friends, family etc. that he
26 would pay them back in two days. But Bank of America did not keep its word. The

27 ²⁶ Talia is the plaintiff in *Talia v. Bank of America, N.A.*, No. 3:21-cv-00676-
28 LAB-MSB ("*Talia*").

1 funds were not released after the two days passed. Talia was extremely sad,
2 embarrassed, and depressed when he had to tell his friends and family that he
3 needed more time to pay them. Talia began calling Bank of America again.
4 Eventually an agent told Talia the funds would be released in a week. Talia
5 hesitantly told his friends and family he would pay them back in a week. A week
6 passed and Bank of America did not return the funds. Talia was even more sad,
7 embarrassed, and depressed when he had to tell his friends and family that he would
8 not be paying them on the day he promised. This pattern happened several times.
9 Bank of America promised to return the funds, Talia told his friends and family he
10 would pay them soon, then it never happened. Talia lost all credibility with the
11 people that lent him money. They simply did not believe him when he assured them
12 that he would pay them back. This caused even more depression. The emotional
13 roller coaster of thinking the money would be returned, then having it fall through,
14 then happening again and again, coupled with losing all credibility with his friends
15 and family was extremely draining on Talia. Around late 2020, Talia contracted
16 COVID-19 and became very ill. He was tired and felt horrible. All he wanted was
17 for Bank of America to return his money, but it refused. Talia was forced to take
18 out high interest short term loans until even that option was no longer available. At
19 this point things really began to go downhill for Talia. He had exhausted all his
20 resources. He had no money, and no one would lend him any money. Talia became
21 late on his car payment and other bills like his cell phone bill etc. Worst of all, Talia
22 could not pay rent and his worst fear came true—Talia became homeless. Talia
23 estimates he called Bank of America over one hundred (100) times since September
24 of 2020. He spent hours on hold day after day speaking with unhelpful agents and
25 estimates over one hundred (100) hours spent on the phone. As of April 13, 2021,
26 Bank of America still has not returned the \$11,000 it unlawfully confiscated from
27 Talia. Talia followed the instructions on Bank of America's Account agreement and
28 made consistent, diligent efforts to recover the funds by making multiple telephone

1 calls. Despite this, Bank of America's customer service department offered no
2 meaningful response or assistance and has stymied Talia's efforts at every turn. At
3 no point did Talia receive communication via mail, email, call, text, or otherwise
4 from Bank of America regarding the ongoing widespread fraud affecting EDD
5 Debit Cards or how defrauded EDD recipients should proceed, even after Bank of
6 America had frozen hundreds of thousands of EDD Debit Card Accounts in a
7 desperate and heavy-handed effort to stem the effects of the fraud. The only option
8 presented to individuals like Talia has been to follow Bank of America's instructions
9 to call the number on the Card in reliance on its representations of a "Zero Liability"
10 policy and "24/7" customer service. Unfortunately, as Talia has learned, Bank of
11 America's representations are false. Proceeding in accordance with Bank of
12 America's policies and recommendations offers scant hope of recovering frozen
13 funds timely. Per Bank of America's "Zero Liability" policy Talia should have been
14 able to access Talia's funds after ten (10) days, even if there was an investigation
15 that Bank of America deemed necessary. But that was not the reality for Talia, who
16 was left without recourse or other options. Talia was held hostage by Bank of
17 America with the only option of calling over and over. Talia is a victim of Bank of
18 America's weak security measures implemented to save money. Talia followed all
19 of Bank of America's designated procedures while attempting to recover the funds,
20 which still have not been returned.

21 498. Cesar Tamayo is a California resident. In December 2019, he began
22 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In December 2020, he
23 experienced fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$160. In December 2020,
24 he discovered the fraud when he checked his Account transaction history. In
25 December 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response,
26 Bank of America transferred him between departments, and would eventually drop
27 his call. In December 2020, Bank of America froze his Account. In January 2021,
28 Bank of America unfroze his Account. In January 2021, Bank of America credited

1 \$1,800 to his Account. Due to Bank of America's actions, he fell behind on his
2 cable bills, light bills, and utility bills.

3 499. Michelle Taylor is a California resident. In February 2021, she began
4 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In February 2021, she
5 experienced fraud on her Account, totaling approximately \$1,000. In February
6 2021, she discovered the fraud when she checked her transaction history. In
7 February 2021, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response,
8 Bank of America told her to resolve her issue with EDD. In February 2021, Bank
9 of America illegally froze her Account. In May 2021, Bank of America unfroze her
10 Account. In June 2021, Bank of America credited \$1,000 to her Account. Due to
11 Bank of America's actions, she missed her \$1,450 rent payment between February
12 and June 2021. She missed her \$365 car payment between February and June 2021.
13 She missed her \$225 car insurance payment in February 2021, leading to a loss of
14 insurance. She was unable to pay her \$254 cell phone bill in February and March
15 2021. She could not pay her \$300 electric bill between February and June 2021. She
16 could not pay her \$300 internet bill from between February and June 2021. She
17 struggles to buy food, gas, and clothing.

18 500. Tonya Taylor is a California resident. In August 2020, she began
19 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In December 2020, she
20 experienced fraud on her Account, totaling approximately \$500. In December 2020,
21 she discovered the fraud when she received a fraud alert text message. In December
22 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of
23 America told her to contact EDD to resolve her issue. In December 2020, Bank of
24 America froze her Account. In May 2021, Bank of America unfroze her Account.
25 Since December 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit her any money. Due to
26 Bank of America's actions, she missed three rent payments. She has missed four
27 car payments. She could not afford her cable which was shut off in January 2021.
28 She struggles to buy food, gas, and clothing. She also suffers from emotional

1 distress and severe depression.

2 501. Nicholas Tonna is a California resident. In March 2020, he began
3 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. Between March 2020 and
4 October 2020, he experienced fraud on his Account, totaling approximately
5 \$25,000. In October 2020, he discovered the fraud after checking his Account
6 balance. In October 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In
7 response, Bank of America would either tell him they would investigate his claim
8 or that he should resolve his issue with EDD. In December 2020, Bank of America
9 illegally froze his Account. In April 2021, Bank of America unfroze his Account.
10 Since October 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit him any money. Due to
11 Bank of America's actions, he is homeless and forced to live on the streets with his
12 emotional support dog. He is a diabetic and cannot afford the proper medication.
13 He cannot afford to pay \$5,000 to get his car engine fixed so that he can go to work.
14 He missed four cell phone bill payments at \$45 per month. He struggles to pay for
15 food, gas, and clothing.

16 502. Tasha Trammel is a California resident. In April 2020, she began
17 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In March 2021, she experienced
18 fraud on her Account, totaling approximately \$825. On March 8, 2021, she
19 discovered the fraud when she attempted to use her Card at an ATM. On March 8,
20 2021, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of
21 America told her to call back in a few days to apply for provisional credit. In March
22 2021, Bank of America froze her Account. In May 2021, Bank of America unfroze
23 her Account. In May 2021, Bank of America credited money to her Account. Due
24 to Bank of America's actions, she could not pay her full \$1,100 rent payment in
25 April and May 2021. She was late on her \$377 car payment in April and May 2021.
26 She could not afford to pay her cable bill, electric bill, and credit card bill. She
27 struggles to pay for food, gas, and clothing.

28 503. Jimmy Tressler is a California resident. In March 2020, he began

1 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In May 2020, he experienced
2 fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$7,000. In May 2020, he discovered
3 the fraud when he checked his online Account. In May 2020, he reported the fraud
4 to Bank of America. In response, Bank of America repeatedly tells him to resolve
5 his issue with EDD. In September 2020, Bank of America illegally froze his
6 Account. In June 2021, Bank of America unfroze his Account. In June 2021, Bank
7 of America credited \$180 to his Account. Due to Bank of America's actions, he
8 missed his \$1,184 rent payment between September 2020 to November 2020,
9 leading to his eviction in November 2020, forcing him to live in a motel for the next
10 three months at \$95 per day. He could not afford his \$360 car payment leading to
11 car repossession in December 2020. He had another car repossessed in March 2021,
12 after failing to pay his \$245 monthly payment. He struggles to pay his \$55 monthly
13 phone bill. He suffered two hospital visits due to the stress of missing bills. He
14 struggles to buy food, gas, and clothing.

15 504. Jason Turnbull is a California resident. In March 2020, he began
16 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In February 2021, he
17 experienced fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$1,500. In February
18 2021, he discovered the fraud when he logged onto his Bank of America app. In
19 February 2021, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response,
20 Bank of America told him they would perform an investigation. In February 2021,
21 Bank of America froze his Account. Since February 2021, Bank of America has yet
22 to unfreeze his Account. Since February 2021, Bank of America has yet to credit
23 him any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, he missed rent payments
24 totaling \$3,600, leading to eviction and subsequent homelessness. He missed his
25 phone bills totaling \$2,000, leading to late fees totaling \$6,000. He missed his
26 renter's insurance payments, totaling \$160. He was forced to borrow \$3,000 from
27 friends and family. He lost personal items, including thousands of dollars' worth of
28 clothing. He struggles to pay for food and clothing. He suffers from emotional

1 distress.

2 505. Thomas Turner is a California resident. In March 2021, he began
3 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In March 2021, Bank of America
4 illegally froze his Account. In March 2021, he contacted Bank of America to
5 understand why Bank of America froze his Account; however, Bank of America
6 never gave him an answer. Since March 2021, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze
7 his Account. Since March 2021, Bank of America has yet to credit him any money.
8 Due to Bank of America's actions, he is homeless and is forced to live in the back
9 of his car, starting in June 2021. He struggles to buy food and clothing. She suffers
10 from emotional distress and anxiety.

11 506. Reina Valadez is a California resident. In August 2020, she attempted
12 to apply for EDD benefits; however, she was unable to as a fraudulent person
13 already received benefits in her name. Between August 2020 and November 2020,
14 she experienced fraud on her Account, totaling \$19,596. In November 2020, she
15 discovered the fraud when she was on the phone with Bank of America. In
16 November 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response,
17 Bank of America told her she needed to file two claims, one for \$3,200 and one for
18 \$16,396; however, Bank of America denied the second claim because the fraud
19 occurred too far in the past. In January 2021, Bank of America froze her Account.
20 In April 2021, Bank of America unfroze her Account. In May 2021, Bank of
21 America credited \$3,200 to her Account. Due to Bank of America's actions, she
22 missed three \$1,250 rent payments, leading to her homelessness. She struggles to
23 buy food and clothing and keep up basic personal hygiene. She suffers from
24 emotional distress.

25 507. Juan Valenzuela is a California resident. In October 2020, he began
26 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In October 2020, he experienced
27 fraud on his Account. In October 2020, he discovered the fraud when he checked
28 his transaction history. In October 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of America

1 via phone. In response, Bank of America told him he needed to resolve his issue
2 with EDD. In October 2020, Bank of America froze his Account. In December
3 2020, Bank of America unfroze his Account. Since October 2020, Bank of America
4 has yet to provisionally credit him any money. Due to Bank of America's actions,
5 he struggles to buy food, clothing, and gas, having to borrow money for these daily
6 necessities.

7 508. David Vasquez is a California resident. In April 2020, he began
8 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In late November or early
9 December 2020, he experienced fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$886.
10 In late November or early December 2020, he discovered the fraud when he
11 attempted to use his Card, but his Account had insufficient funds. In late November
12 or early December 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In
13 response, Bank of America told him they would freeze his Account and he needed
14 to go into a branch to verify his identification. In December 2020, Bank of America
15 froze his Account. In January 2021, Bank of America unfroze his Account. In
16 January 2021, Bank of America credited \$357 to his Account; however, Bank of
17 America has not credited any other money to his Account and stopped applying his
18 benefits to his Account. Due to Bank of America's actions, he missed his rent
19 payment from December 2020 to March 2021, leading to his eviction and
20 subsequent homelessness. He is unable to afford the fee to remove his car from a
21 tow yard. He lost nearly all person belongings during the eviction. He struggles to
22 buy food and clothing. He suffers from emotional distress.

23 509. Jessie Verdun²⁷ is and at all times herein mentioned was a natural
24 person residing in the City of Santa Paula, in the County of Ventura, in the United
25 States of America. In 2020, as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, Verdun became
26

27 ²⁷ Verdun is the plaintiff in *Verdun v. Bank of America, N.A.*, No. 3:21-cv-
28 01196-LAB-MSB, originally filed in the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California (No. 2:21-cv-04494-AS) ("*Verdun*").

1 eligible for pandemic assistance income, and began receiving unemployment
2 benefits from the State of California, which were directly loaded onto Verdun's
3 Bank of America EDD Debit Card. On or about June 6, 2020, Verdun attempted to
4 purchase food using his Bank of America EDD Debit Card, but the purchase was
5 declined. After his purchase was declined, Verdun went home and accessed this
6 Bank of America EDD website, but he was locked out. On June 6, 2020, minutes
7 after learning he could not access his online Account, Verdun called Bank of
8 America and was told by the person answering the phone that \$4,100 was missing
9 from his Account. During the June 6, 2020 call, the Bank of America representative
10 told Verdun that Verdun had previously called Bank of America and requested that
11 \$4,100 to be transferred to his savings account. Verdun told Bank of America that
12 he never called Bank of America to make any such request. Bank of America
13 responded that its notes on the Account stated that someone called in, attempted the
14 transfer money from Verdun's Account, but did not have the information to confirm
15 the Account belonged to Verdun. The person pretending to be Verdun then called
16 back, verified the Account, and requested a transfer of money from the Account.
17 Verdun informed Bank of America that the caller was not him. He further asked
18 Bank of America why it would transfer the money when the caller could not verify
19 the Account on the first call. In response, Bank of America indicated it would only
20 freeze the Account, but could not process any type of fraud claim. The operator
21 stated that Verdun would have to call the claims department Monday to make a
22 claim. On or about June 8, 2020, Verdun called Bank of America in order to make
23 a claim in order to have his money returned to his Account. After waiting on hold
24 for 8 hours, he was able to provide Bank of America with information relating to
25 the fraud. However, all Bank of America would do was close his Account and open
26 a new one. In order to have his EDD Debit Card reissued, Bank of America required
27 that Verdun call a different number. Verdun called this number, and after waiting
28 hours on hold, he was able to request the replacement Card. And then, in order to

1 actually lodge a fraud claim with Bank of America that it would investigate, he had
2 to call a third number. Verdun called this number, and despite being on hold for
3 more than 8 hours, Bank of America never accepted his call. On June 8, 2020,
4 Verdun called back and waited on hold the entire day, but no one answered the
5 phone. On June 9, 2020, Verdun called and again waited on hold for hours, but no
6 one answered the phone. While waiting on hold, Verdun also called the Ventura
7 Police Department and filed an identity theft police report. On August 24, 2020,
8 Verdun was able to get a copy of the police report (which was delayed due to
9 COVID-19) and sent the report along with a completed FTC fraud affidavit to Bank
10 of America. On September 22, 2020, after receiving no response from Bank of
11 America, Verdun mailed the documents to Bank of America a second time, via
12 certified mail, and further wrote that he had not heard any results from Bank of
13 America regarding his request for an investigation to his claim of identity theft.
14 Bank of America has not responded to either of the two letters seeking information
15 about the status of his fraud investigation, and has not otherwise contacted Verdun
16 about the fraud or requested any additional information. And Bank of America has
17 not returned the disputed amount to Verdun. As a result of Bank of America's
18 unlawful acts and omissions as stated above, Verdun suffered actual damages as
19 described above.

20 510. Manuel Villagomez is a California resident. In April 2020, he began
21 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In November 2020, he
22 experienced fraud on the Account, totaling approximately \$300. In November 2020,
23 he discovered the fraud when he attempted to withdraw money from his Account.
24 In November 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In
25 response, Bank of America said Bank of America would open a claim and would
26 send him a new Card. In December 2020, Bank of America illegally froze his
27 Account. Since December 2020, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze his Account.
28 Since November 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit him any money. Due to

1 Bank of America's actions, he missed his \$350 rent payments from November 2020
2 to March 2021. He could not afford his \$346 car insurance for six months. He could
3 not pay his \$60 monthly phone bill from December 2020 to January 2021 and again
4 in March and April of 2021. He suffers emotional distress.

5 511. Luis Viramontes is a California resident. In March 2020, he began
6 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In May 2020, and then again in
7 September 2020, he experienced fraud on his Account, totaling approximately
8 \$2,900. In May 2020, he discovered the fraud when he attempted to use his Card,
9 but he had insufficient funds. In May 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of
10 America via phone. In response, Bank of America told him Bank of America
11 experienced technical issues with regards to his Account. In May 2020, Bank of
12 America froze his Account. In February 2021, Bank of America unfroze his
13 Account. In February 2021, Bank of America credited \$2,300 to his Account. Due
14 to Bank of America's actions, he was evicted in September 2020 after failing to pay
15 rent, forcing him to live in the back of his car. He missed car payments leading to
16 car repossession. He could not afford his phone payments, leading to a phone shut
17 off. He struggles to pay for food, gas, and clothing. He also suffers from extreme
18 stress and anxiety.

19 512. Norman Walker is a California resident. In November 2020, he applied
20 to receive EDD benefits through Bank of America; however, Bank of America did
21 not send him a Card until January 2021. In January 2021, Bank of America illegally
22 froze his Account. In April 2021, Bank of America unfroze his Account. In May
23 2021, he discovered fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$9,736. The fraud
24 occurred in May and June of 2021, as a fraudulent person began receiving benefits
25 under his name. In May 2021, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone.
26 In response, Bank of America denied his claim and stated he would not receive any
27 money. Since January 2021, Bank of America has yet to credit him any money. Due
28 to Bank of America's actions, he missed four \$550 rent payments, leading to

1 eviction, and subsequent homelessness. He missed two \$380 car payments. He lost
2 most of his personal belongings during the eviction. He owes \$1,300 to friends and
3 family. He struggles to buy food, gas, and clothing. He suffers from emotional
4 distress.

5 513. Jason Wallace is a California resident. In April 2020, he began
6 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In February and March 2021, he
7 experienced fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$7,400. In February
8 2021, he discovered the fraud when he checked his Account transaction history. In
9 February 2021, he reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response,
10 Bank of America told him he needed to wait the ten-day period to receive his funds
11 and they would send him a new Card with access to his Account. In March 2021,
12 Bank of America froze his Account. Since March 2021, Bank of America has yet
13 to unfreeze his Account. Since March 2021, Bank of America has yet to credit him
14 any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, he missed three \$1,500 rent
15 payments, leading to eviction. He was unable to pay his \$500 phone bill, leading to
16 a shut off. He is unable to pay his credit card bills, leading to overdraft fees of \$648.
17 He struggles to pay for food, gas, and clothing.

18 514. Cameren Wilburn is a California resident. In March 2020, he started
19 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In December 2020, Bank of
20 America froze his Account for no reason. In December 2020, he contacted Bank of
21 America about the issue. Since December 2020, Bank of America has yet to
22 unfreeze his Account. Due to Bank of America's actions, he was forced out of his
23 housing and cannot pay his car insurance. He suffers from extreme mental health
24 issues.

25 515. Denise Wilds is a California resident. In March 2020, she began
26 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. On March 9, 2021, she
27 experienced fraud on her Account, totaling approximately \$200. On March 11,
28 2021, she discovered the fraud when she checked her Account history. On March

1 11, 2021, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank
2 of America said they would open a claim and investigate. In March 2021, Bank of
3 America froze her Account. On April 15, 2021, Bank of America unfroze her
4 Account. On April 27, 2021, Bank of America credited her \$200. On May 25, 2021,
5 Bank of America again illegally froze her Account. On May 31, 2021, Bank of
6 America unfroze her Account. Due to Bank of America's actions, she missed a
7 \$2,480 rent payment. She missed a \$553 car payment. She struggles to afford
8 clothes for her children for school.

9 516. Terrence Wilkins is a California resident. In March 2020, he began
10 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In July 2020, Bank of America
11 illegally froze his Account. In July 2020, he contacted Bank of America, who told
12 him he needed to contact EDD to gain access to his Account. Since July 2020, Bank
13 of America has yet to unfreeze his Account. Since July 2020, Bank of America has
14 yet to credit him any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, he has not been
15 able to pay his \$103 phone bill, approximately ten times. He has not been able to
16 pay his \$1,000 rent payment since July 2020. He has not been able to pay his \$249
17 monthly car insurance since July 2020. He struggles to pay for food, gas, and
18 clothing.

19 517. Zacharia Williams is a California resident. In January 2021, he applied
20 to receive EDD benefits through Bank of America. In February 2021, Bank of
21 America froze his Account and refused to send him a debit Card to access his funds.
22 In February 2021, Bank of America told him he needed to contact EDD to resolve
23 the issue. Since February 2021, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze his Account
24 or allow him access to his funds. Due to Bank of America's actions, he cannot pay
25 his \$400 car insurance since February 2021. He cannot pay his \$200 phone bill since
26 February 2021. He struggles to buy food, gas, and clothing.

27 518. Tyrisha Williams is a California resident. In 2020, she was entitled to
28 EDD benefits, but she was not able to receive the benefits because a fraudster had

1 already filed for benefits in her name. In July 2020, she discovered someone stole
2 her identity and utilized her personal information to receive EDD benefits through
3 Bank of America. In July 2020, she discovered the fraud when the City of Los
4 Angeles sent her a letter stating her food stamps would soon end. In July 2020, she
5 reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America
6 refused to listen to her, and continued to allow the fraudulent person to access the
7 Account. The fraudster drained the Account to \$0. In August 2020, Bank of
8 America gave her access to the Account and credited \$12,000 to the Account. She
9 used that money for living expenses. However, Bank of America later reversed the
10 credit, sending her Account into a balance of negative \$12,000. In October 2020,
11 Bank of America froze the Account. In January 2021, Bank of America unfroze the
12 Account. Bank of America has yet to credit her any of the stolen money. Due to
13 Bank of America's actions, she was evicted from her home in July 2020, after not
14 being able to afford her \$750 rent for three months. She was forced to let her
15 children go and live with their father, because Williams could not afford to provide
16 for them.

17 519. Willie Williams is a California resident. In April 2020, he began
18 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. At the end of July 2020 or early
19 August 2020, he experienced fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$10,000.
20 In August 2020, he discovered the fraud when he attempted to make a purchase
21 with his Card, yet the Card was declined. In August 2020, he reported the fraud to
22 Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America told him he needed to
23 wait ninety (90) days to receive a response from the Bank regarding its
24 investigation. In August 2020, Bank of America froze his Account. In April 2021,
25 Bank of America unfroze his Account. Since August 2020, Bank of America has
26 yet to credit him any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, he missed four
27 months of rent payment, leading to his eviction. His car was repossessed after he
28 was unable to pay for the car payments. He was unable to pay his cable and

1 electricity bill. He was unable to pay his phone bill, leading to his phone shut off.
2 He struggles to pay for food, clothing, and gas for his family.

3 520. Latasha Williamson is a California resident. In February 2020, she
4 began receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In December 2020, she
5 experienced fraud on her Account, totaling approximately \$4,700. In December
6 2020, she discovered the fraud when she logged into her online Account. In
7 December 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response,
8 Bank of America told her to resolve her issue with EDD. In December 2020, Bank
9 of America froze her Account. In April 2021, Bank of America unfroze her
10 Account. In April 2021, Bank of America credited \$2,600 to her Account; and then
11 in June 2021, Bank of America credited \$900 to her Account. Due to Bank of
12 America's actions, she missed her \$1,625 rent payment in December 2020 and
13 January 2021, leading to eviction in January 2021. She could not pay her \$60
14 water bill in December 2020 and January 2021. She could not pay her \$125
15 electricity bill in December 2020 and January 2021. She could not pay her \$62
16 cable bill in December 2020 and January 2021. She could not pay her \$100 phone
17 bill in December 2020 and January 2021. She struggled to pay for food, gas, and
18 clothing for her and her children. She suffers from emotional distress.

19 521. Leanna Willis is a California resident. In June 2020, she began
20 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In August 2020, she experienced
21 fraud on her Account, totaling approximately \$15,000. In August 2020, she
22 discovered the fraud when her Card was declined, and she checked her Account
23 after. In August 2020, she reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In
24 response, Bank of America would either tell her to resolve her issue with EDD or
25 would transfer her between departments. In August 2020, Bank of America froze
26 her Account. In October 2020, Bank of America unfroze her Account. In August
27 2020, Bank of America credited \$15,000 to her Account; however, Bank of
28 America reversed the credit, putting her Account into a balance of negative \$15,000.

1 Due to Bank of America's actions, she is homeless because she was in the middle
2 of moving into a new apartment, for which she could not pay. She could not afford
3 her car insurance at \$300, leading to car repossession in August 2020. She fell
4 behind on credit card payments. She struggles to buy food, gas, and clothing for
5 herself and her child.

6 522. Lacey Wise is a California resident. In April 2020, she began receiving
7 EDD benefits through Bank of America. In June 2020, she experienced fraud on
8 her Account, totaling approximately \$15,000. In June 2020, she discovered the
9 fraud when she attempted to use the Card but was declined. In June 2020, she
10 reported the fraud to Bank of America via phone. In response, Bank of America
11 told her to resolve her issue with EDD. In August 2020, Bank of America froze her
12 Account. In April 2021, Bank of America unfroze her Account. Since June 2020,
13 Bank of America has yet to credit her any money. Due to Bank of America's
14 actions, she missed her \$1,950 rent payments from October 2020 to March 2021,
15 leading to her eviction in March 2021. She was unable to pay her \$384 car payment
16 from August 2020 to September 2020, leading to car repossession in September
17 2020. She cannot afford her \$320 car registration. From August 2020 to the present,
18 she has not been able to afford her \$300 car payments, her \$67 monthly phone bill,
19 her \$120 monthly WIFI bill, or her \$146 monthly electricity bill. She lost her son
20 to foster care after failing to pay for his schooling. She struggles to buy food, gas,
21 and clothing.

22 523. Colton Wood is a California resident. In April 2020, he began
23 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In December 2020, Bank of
24 America illegally froze his Account. In December 2020, he contacted Bank of
25 America, who told him the freeze was due to suspected fraudulent activity;
26 however, he never experienced any fraud on the Account. In December 2020, Bank
27 of America unfroze his Account; however, Bank of America immediately froze the
28 Account again. Since December 2020, Bank of America has yet to unfreeze his

1 Account. Since December 2020, Bank of America has yet to credit him any money.
2 Due to Bank of America's actions, he missed his \$680 rent payment, leading to
3 eviction and subsequent homelessness. He cannot afford his \$92 monthly phone
4 bill. He struggles to buy food, gas, and clothing. He suffers from emotional distress.

5 524. Matthew Yeats is a California resident. In March 2020, he began
6 receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In December 2020, he
7 experienced fraud on his Account, totaling approximately \$2,800. In December
8 2020, he discovered the fraud. In December 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of
9 America via phone. In response, Bank of America transferred him between
10 departments, refusing to give an answer, and often dropping his call altogether. In
11 December 2020, Bank of America illegally froze his Account. In February 2021,
12 Bank of America unfroze his Account. Since December 2020, Bank of America has
13 yet to credit him any money. Due to Bank of America's actions, he missed rent
14 twice, totaling \$1,600 in December 2020 and January 2021. He was late on two cell
15 phone payments at \$90 per month. He has missed three child support payments at
16 \$300 per month between December 2020 and February 2021.

17 525. Glen Young is a California resident. In June 2020, he began receiving
18 EDD benefits through Bank of America. In June 2020, he experienced fraud on his
19 Account, totaling approximately \$7,500. In June 2020, he discovered the fraud
20 when he contacted Bank of America since Bank of America had not sent him a Card
21 with access to his funds. In June 2020, he reported the fraud to Bank of America
22 via phone. In response, Bank of America blamed him for the fraud on his Account,
23 stating he was responsible for the fraud. In October 2020, Bank of America credited
24 \$7,000 to his Account; however, Bank of America reversed the credit, reporting his
25 Account at a balance of negative \$7,000. Since October 2020, Bank of America has
26 yet to credit his Account. Due to Bank of America's actions, he had his car
27 repossessed. He could not pay his rent at \$500 per month and was forced to be
28 homeless and live out of his car with his wife and four dogs. He cannot pay his

1 insurance registration at \$400. He cannot afford to pay for his car insurance at \$70
 2 per month. He cannot afford to buy food, gas, other daily necessity items, or to keep
 3 up his personal hygiene, meaning he cannot get a job, as no one will hire him.

4 526. Christopher Zettlemoyer is a California resident. In May 2020, he
 5 began receiving EDD benefits through Bank of America. In April 2021, he
 6 experienced fraud on his Account. In April 2021, he discovered the fraud when he
 7 checked his Account balance. In July 2020, Bank of America froze his Account. In
 8 October 2020, Bank of America unfroze his Account. Since October 2020, Bank of
 9 America has yet to credit him any money to his Account. Due to Bank of America's
 10 actions, he missed two rent payments. He missed his car insurance. He was unable
 11 to afford medication for his diabetic aunt. He missed two car payments. He was late
 12 on phone bills and credit card bills. He struggles buying food, gas, and clothing.

13 V. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

14 527. Class Representative Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit individually and as a
 15 class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, seeking declaratory and
 16 injunctive relief and damages on behalf of a class defined as follows (the "Class"):

17 All persons who were Bank of America EDD Debit Cardholders at any time
 18 between January 1, 2020 and the present ("Class Period"), and whose
 19 eligibility for benefits EDD has not revoked for failure to establish valid
 20 identity.

21 528. Plaintiffs further seek declaratory and injunctive relief, restitution,
 22 disgorgement, and statutory and actual damages on behalf of the following
 23 Subclasses:

24 **Claim Denial Subclass:** All Class Members who, during the Class Period,
 25 gave the Bank notice of a claim that an unauthorized transaction had occurred
 26 on their Account ("Claim") and whose Claim the Bank closed or denied
 27 based on application of the Claim Fraud Filter.
 28

Credit Rescission Subclass: All Class Members who, during the Class Period, received provisional or permanent credit from the Bank in connection with their Claim, which the Bank rescinded more than 45 days after the Class Member gave notice of the Claim.

Account Freeze Subclass: All Class Members whose EDD Debit Card Account the Bank froze during the Class Period based on application of the Claim Fraud Filter and later unfroze or later converted from frozen to blocked status and then unblocked.

Account Block Subclass: All Class Members whose EDD Debit Card Account the Bank blocked during the Class Period based on application of the Claim Fraud Filter and later unblocked.

Failure to Unfreeze Subclass: All Class Members whose EDD Debit Card Account the Bank froze or blocked during the Class Period and did not unfreeze or unblock after EDD instructed the Bank to unfreeze the Class Member's Account or informed the Bank that EDD had verified the Class Member's identity.

Security Breach Subclass: All Class Members whose Card, Account, or other personal information in the possession of the Bank or its agents was, during the Class Period, accessed or taken by a third party without the Class Member's consent.

EMV Chip Subclass: All Class Members whose EDD Debit Card, during the Class Period, did not include an EMV chip, and whose Card, Account, or other personal information was accessed or taken from the Card by a third party without the Class Member's consent.

529. Plaintiffs reserve the right under Rule 23 to amend or modify the Class and Subclass descriptions and/or add one or more subclasses based on information obtained in the course of this litigation.

530. All Class Members have suffered or are threatened with imminent injury during the Class Period, caused by Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, as alleged herein.

1 531. This action has been brought and may properly be maintained as a class
2 action against Defendants pursuant to the following provisions of Rule 23.

3 a. **Numerosity (Rule 23(a)(1)):** The members of the Class and
4 each Subclass are so numerous that their individual joinder is impracticable. Bank
5 of America provided millions of EDD benefits recipients with EDD Debit Cards
6 that used only outdated magnetic stripe technology (no EMV chip) and subjected
7 these individuals to an undue risk of experiencing fraudulent transactions on their
8 EDD Debit Cards and Accounts. The identities of, and contact information for,
9 those individuals may readily be obtained through the Bank's business records or
10 the business records of its affiliated entities. Tens of thousands of EDD Debit
11 Cardholders reported unauthorized transactions to the Bank and had their
12 unauthorized transaction claims summarily closed or denied by the Bank without
13 explanation and without issuance of provisional or permanent credit. Of those
14 unauthorized transaction claims, at least 29,000 claims have since been
15 reconsidered and paid, including under the Preliminary Injunction procedures. In
16 addition, tens of thousands of EDD Debit Cardholders have had their Cards and
17 Accounts frozen or blocked by the Bank.

18 b. **Commonality and Predominance (Rule 23(a)(2) and**
19 **23(b)(3)):** Many questions of law and fact are common to the Class and Subclasses.
20 These questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class
21 Members. These common legal and factual issues include, but are not limited to:

22 i. Whether the Bank had or has a policy and/or practice of denying
23 EDD Debit Cardholders' unauthorized transaction claims
24 without having conducted a good-faith investigation that results
25 in the Bank having a reasonable basis for believing that the
26 Cardholder authorized or benefitted from the transaction,
27 including denying claims based solely on the results of the
28 Claim Fraud Filter.

- 1 ii. Whether the Bank had or has a policy and/or practice of denying
2 EDD Debit Cardholders' unauthorized transaction claims
3 without providing the Cardholder with a report of the results of
4 the Bank's investigation of the claim that includes a written
5 explanation of the Bank's findings.
- 6 iii. Whether the Bank had or has a policy and/or practice of not
7 provisionally or permanently crediting the Accounts of EDD
8 Debit Cardholders in the amount of an unauthorized transaction
9 claim within 10 business days of the Bank receiving notice of
10 the claim, and without having conducted a good-faith
11 investigation that results in the Bank having a reasonable basis
12 for believing that the Cardholder authorized or benefitted from
13 the transaction.
- 14 iv. Whether the Bank had or has a policy and/or practice of
15 knowingly and willfully denying EDD Debit Cardholders'
16 unauthorized transaction claims.
- 17 v. Whether the Bank had or has a policy and/or practice of
18 automatically freezing the EDD Debit Card Accounts of
19 Cardholders who report unauthorized transactions, including
20 based solely on the results of the Claim Fraud Filter.
- 21 vi. Whether the Bank had or has a policy and/or practice of failing
22 to provide its customer service representatives with the training,
23 tools, or authority necessary to reasonably assist EDD Debit
24 Cardholders who call about resolving their unauthorized
25 transaction claims or unfreezing their Accounts.
- 26 vii. Whether the Bank violated or is violating EFTA and Regulation
27 E by having a policy and/or practice of denying EDD Debit
28 Cardholders' unauthorized transaction claims without having

1 conducted a good-faith investigation that results in the Bank
2 having a reasonable basis for believing that the Cardholder
3 authorized or benefitted from the transaction, including denying
4 claims based solely on the results of the Claim Fraud Filter.

5 viii. Whether the Bank violated or is violating EFTA and Regulation
6 E by having a policy and/or practice of denying EDD Debit
7 Cardholders' unauthorized transaction claims without providing
8 the Cardholder with a report of the results of the Bank's
9 investigation of the claim that includes a written explanation of
10 the Bank's findings.

11 ix. Whether the Bank is violating or violated EFTA and Regulation
12 E by having a policy and/or practice of not provisionally or
13 permanently crediting the Accounts of EDD Debit Cardholders
14 in the amount of an unauthorized transaction claim within 10
15 business days of the Bank receiving notice of the claim, and
16 without having conducted a good-faith investigation that results
17 in the Bank having a reasonable basis for believing that the
18 Cardholder authorized or benefitted from the transaction.

19 x. Whether the Bank is a state actor under the "public function"
20 test, the "joint action" test, or any other test for state action
21 status.

22 xi. Whether the Bank violated Plaintiffs' and Class Members'
23 federal or state due process rights by having a policy and/or
24 practice of automatically and indefinitely freezing and/or
25 blocking their EDD Debit Card Accounts, without providing
26 them with adequate notice or an opportunity to be heard, when
27 they report unauthorized transactions on their Accounts.
28

- 1 xii. Whether the Bank owed a duty of care to Plaintiffs and Class
2 Members, including because of the fiduciary relationship
3 between the Bank and its EDD Debit Cardholders, under the
4 EDD–Bank Contract, under the Cardholder Agreement, or
5 under any other contract between the Bank and Cardholders.
- 6 xiii. Whether Plaintiffs and Class Members are third-party
7 beneficiaries of the EDD–Bank Contract.
- 8 xiv. Whether the Bank breached its duties to Plaintiffs and Class
9 Members, including by using outdated fraud-prevention
10 technology in its EDD Debit Cards and Accounts, by not
11 adequately monitoring EDD Debit Cards and Accounts for
12 suspicious activity, by not conducting appropriate follow-up or
13 investigation when unauthorized transaction claims were made,
14 by failing to comply with EFTA and its own “Zero Liability”
15 policy, and by otherwise failing to make Plaintiffs and Class
16 Members whole for unauthorized transactions on their
17 Accounts.
- 18 xv. Whether the Bank acted negligently in its hiring, supervision,
19 and retention of TTEC and other subcontractors and agents who
20 have access to Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ sensitive
21 Cardholder Information.
- 22 xvi. Whether TTEC was the Bank’s actual, apparent, or ostensible
23 agent in its negligent hiring, supervision, and retention of
24 employees who mishandled or misappropriated Plaintiffs’ and
25 Class Members’ sensitive Cardholder Information.
- 26 xvii. Whether the Bank should be enjoined from freezing EDD Debit
27 Card Accounts or from failing to take the reasonable steps
28 necessary to avoid causing additional future harm to Plaintiffs

1 and Class Members as the result of the Bank's acts and
 2 omissions alleged herein.

3 xviii. Whether the Bank should pay damages and interest or provide
 4 restitution, reimbursement, and/or other relief to Plaintiffs and
 5 Class Members.

6 c. **Typicality (Rule 23(a)(3)):** Class Representative Plaintiffs'
 7 claims are typical of the claims of the members of the putative Class. Class
 8 Representative Plaintiffs, like all other members of the putative Class, sustained
 9 economic and other damages as a result of the Bank's wrongful acts and omissions
 10 as alleged herein. Class Representative Plaintiffs and members of the putative Class
 11 were and are similarly or identically harmed by the Bank's same unlawful,
 12 deceptive, unfair, systematic, and pervasive pattern of misconduct as alleged herein.

13 d. **Adequacy of Representation (Rule 23(a)(4)):** Class
 14 Representative Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the
 15 interests of the putative Class Members and have retained competent and qualified
 16 counsel with extensive experience in complex litigation and class action litigation.
 17 There are no material conflicts between the claims of the Class Representative
 18 Plaintiffs and the members of the putative Class that would make class certification
 19 inappropriate. Counsel for the putative Class will vigorously prosecute the claims
 20 of all putative Class Members.

21 532. This action is properly maintained as a class action pursuant to Rule
 22 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the following reasons:

23 a. **Class Action Status (Rule 23(b)(1)):** Class action status is
 24 appropriate under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) because prosecution of separate actions by each
 25 of the thousands of putative Class Members would create a risk of establishing
 26 incompatible standards of conduct for the Bank and inconsistent results for Class
 27 Members. Class action status is also appropriate under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) because
 28 prosecution of separate actions by putative Class Members would create a risk of

1 adjudication with respect to individual members of the Class that, as a practical
2 matter, would be dispositive of the interests of other members not parties to this
3 action or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.

4 **b. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Rule 23(b)(2)):**
5 Certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate because the Bank acted or refused
6 to act on grounds generally applicable to the putative Class, thereby making
7 appropriate final injunctive, declaratory, or other appropriate equitable relief with
8 respect to the putative Class as a whole.

9 **c. Predominance and Superiority (Rule 23(b)(3)):** Certification
10 of the Subclasses under Rule 23(b)(3) is appropriate because questions of law or
11 fact common to putative Subclass Members predominate over any questions
12 affecting only individual members, and because class action treatment is superior
13 to the other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this
14 controversy.

15 **d. Issue Certification (Rule 23(c)(4)):** Certification of issues of
16 liability and statutory and treble damages under Rule 23(c)(4) is appropriate
17 because these issues are common to putative Class Members and resolution of these
18 common issues on a classwide basis will materially advance the disposition of the
19 litigation as a whole.

20 **e.** The Class and each Subclass is ascertainable from the Bank's
21 own records, and there is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of
22 law or fact alleged herein since the rights of each Class Member and each Subclass
23 Member were infringed or violated in the same or similar fashion.

1 **VI. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF²⁸**

2 **FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

3 **VIOLATIONS OF THE ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFERS ACT**

4 **15 U.S.C. §§1693 et seq.; 12 C.F.R. §§1005.1 et seq.**

5 (Brought by All Plaintiffs)

6 533. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation
7 set forth above, as though fully set forth here.

8 534. Plaintiffs bring this cause of action pursuant to the Electronic Fund
9 Transfers Act (“EFTA”), 15 U.S.C. §§1693 et seq., and Regulation E of EFTA, 12
10 C.F.R. §§1005.1–1005.20.

11 535. Plaintiffs and Class Members provided notice to Bank of America
12 within 60 days after Bank of America sent a period statement reflecting an
13 unauthorized transaction (which is an “error” under Regulation E) consistent with
14 15 U.S.C. §1693f and 12 C.F.R. §1005.11. As reflected (or should be reflected in
15 Bank of America’s own records, absent the customer service failures alleged
16 herein), Plaintiffs and Class Members provided sufficient information to identify
17 the unauthorized transaction and reasons for their belief that the transaction was
18 unauthorized.

19 536. Bank of America violated 15 U.S.C. §1693f and 12 C.F.R. §1005.11,
20 including but not limited to through its implementation of each of the following
21 policies and/or practices:

22 a. Adopting and implementing policies and practices designed to
23 circumvent the Bank’s statutory and regulatory obligations under 15 U.S.C. §1693f
24 and Regulation E, including by frustrating and obstructing Plaintiffs’ and Class
25 Members’ efforts to submit unauthorized transaction claims and by denying their

26
27 ²⁸ Class Representative Plaintiffs do not incorporate the Individual Plaintiffs’
28 Allegations (appearing *supra* at ¶¶286–526) into any of the Claims for Relief
brought by Class Representative Plaintiffs.

1 claims without having conducted a reasonable investigation or having a reasonable
2 basis for believing that the Cardholder had authorized or benefitted from the
3 transaction in question;

4 b. Failing to provide provisional credit to Plaintiffs and Class
5 Members relating to error investigations that could not be resolved within 10
6 business days;

7 c. Not issuing provisional credit to Plaintiffs and Class Members
8 within 10 business days of the Bank receiving notice the Plaintiff's or Class
9 Member's unauthorized transaction claim, despite the Bank having no intention of
10 conducting a good-faith investigation of the claim within 10 business days, and
11 despite not completing a good-faith investigation of the claim within 10 business
12 days;

13 d. Failing to conduct good-faith investigations into alleged errors
14 or unauthorized transactions that Plaintiffs and Class Members timely reported to
15 the Bank;

16 e. Failing to conduct good-faith investigations into the alleged
17 errors or unauthorized transactions within 45 days of the date that the Plaintiff or
18 Class Member timely reported the alleged error or unauthorized transaction;

19 f. Denying Plaintiffs' and Class Members' claims of error without
20 having conducted a good-faith investigation, including by denying claims based
21 solely on the results of the Bank's automated and highly unreliable and inaccurate
22 Claim Fraud Filter;

23 g. Denying Plaintiffs' and Class Members' claims of error without
24 having a reasonable basis for concluding that their Accounts were not in error, and
25 where the Bank could not reasonably have drawn its conclusion that no error
26 occurred based on the evidence available to the Bank at the time;

27 h. Denying Plaintiffs' and Class Members' claims of error without
28 providing a report of the results of the Bank's investigation of the claim that

1 includes a written explanation of the Bank's findings.

2 i. Failing to credit Plaintiffs' and Class Members' EDD Debit
3 Card Accounts with interest on the amounts of unauthorized transactions that Bank
4 wrongly denied, for the period during which Plaintiffs and Class Members were
5 without access to those funds;

6 j. Freezing Plaintiffs' and Class Members' EDD Debit Card
7 Accounts in order to avoid the Bank's legal obligations and to prevent Plaintiffs and
8 Class Members from accessing their funds; and

9 k. Unilaterally reopening claims of error long after they had
10 already been resolved in the EDD Debit Cardholders' favor and debiting the
11 amounts previously credited to the Cardholder's Account, without basis to do so.

12 537. In situations where Bank of America has violated Regulation E by
13 failing to provisionally credit Plaintiffs' and Class Members' EDD Debit Card
14 Accounts within 10 business days of the reported error, the Bank has neither
15 conducted a good faith investigation nor had a reasonable basis for believing that
16 the Account was not in error. Plaintiffs and Class Members are therefore entitled to
17 treble damages under 15 U.S.C. §1693f(e).

18 538. Bank of America knowingly and willfully concluded that Plaintiffs'
19 and Class Members' EDD Debit Card Accounts were not in error when such
20 conclusion could not reasonably have been drawn from the evidence available to
21 the Bank at the time of its investigation. Plaintiffs and Class Members are therefore
22 entitled to treble damages under 15 U.S.C. §1693f(e).

23 539. Bank of America violated EFTA and Regulation E by failing to limit
24 Plaintiffs' and Class Members' liability as required by 15 U.S.C. §1693m and 12
25 C.F.R. §1005.6(b).

26 540. Plaintiffs provided notice to Bank of America less than two business
27 days after learning of the fraudulent transactions that occurred in their EDD Debit
28 Card Accounts. Under 12 C.F.R. §1005.6(b)(1), Plaintiffs' and Class Members'

1 liability is capped at \$50 in these circumstances. Bank of America has subjected
2 Plaintiffs and Class Members to far greater than \$50 in liability through its wrongful
3 conduct as alleged herein.

4 541. Under 12 C.F.R. §1005.6(b)(2), \$500 is the maximum liability that
5 may be imposed on an accountholder who does not provide notice to the financial
6 institution within two business days after learning of a suspected unauthorized
7 transaction. Bank of America has subjected Plaintiffs and Class Members to far
8 greater than \$500 in liability through its wrongful conduct as alleged herein.

9 542. Regarding any Class Members who did not provide Bank of America
10 with actual notice within two business days of learning of a suspected unauthorized
11 transaction, the Bank was on constructive notice, under 12 C.F.R.
12 §1005.6(b)(5)(iii), of widespread unauthorized electronic fund transfers from EDD
13 Debit Card Accounts since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. Since that
14 time, countless unauthorized fund transfers have occurred and continue to occur
15 from those Accounts. The volume of calls from EDD Debit Cardholders to the
16 Bank's customer service to report unauthorized transactions has been, and
17 continues to be, so great, and the Bank's customer service department is so
18 understaffed, that the Bank routinely causes EDD Debit Cardholders to wait on hold
19 for multiple hours. The widespread fraud specifically targeting EDD Debit
20 Cardholders has been widely reported in the media and has been the subject of
21 significant attention from California legislators.

22 543. In no event should any Class Member be liable for over \$500 of
23 damages under 12 C.F.R. §1005.6. Bank of America has violated 12 C.F.R. §1005.6
24 by imposing hundreds and thousands of dollars of liability on unemployed
25 Californians.

26 544. As a direct and proximate result of Bank of America violations of
27 Regulation E, Plaintiffs and Class Members have lost money.

28 545. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Class, seek an injunction

barring Bank of America from denying provisional credit and denying fraud claims without having timely conducted a good faith investigation of the alleged fraud and without a reasonable basis for believing that the transaction was authorized, and barring Bank of America from otherwise violating EFTA and Regulation E. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the applicable Subclasses, further seek the following relief: (a) actual damages with interest; (b) restitution of all EDD benefits funds improperly debited by Bank of America; (c) statutory damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1693m; (d) treble damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1693f(e); and (e) incidental and consequential damages suffered due to their inability to pay bills or otherwise use their unemployment funds.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF

VIOLATIONS OF THE CALIFORNIA CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT

Cal. Civ. Code §§1798.100 et seq.

(Brought by Class Representative Plaintiffs and Individual Plaintiffs in the *Abarr, Alvarez, Brotman, Meza, Morrell, Payton, Robinson, Rojas de Charolet, Talia, and Verdun* Actions)

546. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation set forth above, as though fully set forth here.

547. The California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”), Cal. Civ. Code §§1798.100 et seq., imposes a duty on businesses to take reasonable steps to protect consumers’ nonencrypted and nonredacted personal information, and provides a private right of action to consumers whose nonencrypted and nonredacted personal information has been subjected to unauthorized access and exfiltration, theft, or disclosure as a result of a defendant business’s breach of its duty to take reasonable steps to protect that information.

548. Plaintiffs and Class Members are “consumers” as defined in the CCPA.

549. Bank of America is a “business” as defined in the CCPA.

1 550. Bank of America directly or indirectly collected Plaintiffs' and Class
2 Members' personal information as defined in Cal. Civ. Code §1798.81.5(d)(1)(A),
3 including but not limited to Plaintiffs' and Class Member's first names or first
4 initials, last names, and account numbers or credit or debit card numbers (including
5 but not limited to Plaintiffs' and Class Members' EDD Debit Card and Account
6 numbers), in combination with any required security codes, access codes, or
7 passwords that would permit access to Plaintiffs' and Class Members' financial
8 accounts.

9 551. On information and belief, Bank of America collected, stored, and/or
10 transmitted Plaintiffs' and Class Members' personal information in a nonencrypted
11 and nonredacted form or in some other form that permitted unauthorized third
12 parties to access that information in violation of the CCPA.

13 552. Bank of America had a duty under the CCPA to implement and
14 maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of
15 Plaintiffs' and Class Members' personal information.

16 553. Bank of America breached its duty to implement and maintain
17 reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of Plaintiffs'
18 and Class Members' personal information by, among other things: (a) issuing EDD
19 Debit Cards to Plaintiffs and Class Members with magnetic stripes but without
20 EMV chip technology; (b) collecting Plaintiffs' and Class Members' personal
21 information in an unsecure manner; (c) transmitting Plaintiffs' and Class Members'
22 personal information in unencrypted or otherwise inadequately secured form or
23 channels; (d) storing Plaintiffs' and Class Members' personal information, or
24 permitting said information to be stored on unsecured or inadequately secured data
25 storage devices, including at EDD; and (e) failing to take reasonable steps to ensure
26 that its subcontractors and their employees and agents, including CSRs and other
27 Call Center agents, maintained the confidentiality of Cardholders' personal
28 information, including by failing to ensure that all such agents were subject to

1 background checks before or after being hired and failing to provide such agents
2 proper training and supervision regarding their handling and maintaining the
3 confidentiality of Cardholders' personal information, and by failing to secure
4 Cardholders' personal information from unnecessary and unauthorized access by
5 subcontractors' employees and others.

6 554. Bank of America further failed to implement and maintain reasonable
7 security measures by transmitting information regarding Plaintiffs' and Class
8 Members' EDD Debit Cards to, and storing it on, unsecured or inadequately secured
9 data storage devices, including at EDD.

10 555. As a direct and proximate result of Bank of America's failure to
11 implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate
12 to the nature of Plaintiffs' and Class Members' personal information, Plaintiffs and
13 Class Members suffered unauthorized access and exfiltration, theft, or disclosure of
14 their nonencrypted and nonredacted personal information. Plaintiffs and Class
15 Members never authorized such disclosure of their personal information.

16 556. Bank of America knew or should have known that issuing EDD Debit
17 Cards with magnetic stripes but without EMV chip technology was not a reasonable
18 security procedure or practice appropriate to the nature of Plaintiffs' and Class
19 Members' personal information and that a data breach resulting in the unauthorized
20 access and exfiltration, theft, or disclosure of Plaintiffs' and Class Members'
21 personal information was clearly foreseeable.

22 557. As a direct and proximate result of the unauthorized access and
23 exfiltration, theft, or disclosure of Plaintiffs' and Class Members' nonencrypted and
24 nonredacted personal information, Plaintiffs and Class Members were injured and
25 lost and continue to lose money or property, including but not limited to the
26 monetary value of unauthorized transactions on the EDD Debit Cards issued by the
27 Bank, the loss of Plaintiffs' and Class Members' protected privacy interests in the
28

1 confidentiality and privacy of their personal information, nominal damages, and
2 additional losses as described above.

3 558. Plaintiffs and Class Members seek relief under Cal. Civ. Code
4 §1798.150(a), including but not limited to recovery of actual damages, injunctive
5 relief, declaratory relief, its costs of suit, attorney's fees pursuant to Cal. Code Civ.
6 Proc. §1021.5 or other applicable law, and any other relief the Court deems proper.

7 559. On January 25, 2021, Class Representative Plaintiffs Smith and
8 Karam, through their undersigned counsel, on behalf of themselves and all others
9 similarly situated, sent a letter to Bank of America's registered agent for service of
10 process via FedEx, notifying Bank of America of its violations of Cal. Civ. Code
11 §1798.150(a) and demanding that the Bank cure them. That letter was delivered by
12 FedEx the following morning, on January 26, 2021. Bank of America did not
13 respond to the letter, and did not cure the noticed violations or provide Plaintiffs
14 with an express written statement that the violations had been cured and that no
15 further violations would occur, within 30 days after receiving the letter. Thereafter,
16 on March 1, 2021, Smith and Karam filed their Class Action Complaint in an action
17 that has now been consolidated into this matter. As a result, class-wide statutory
18 damages may be initiated against the Bank pursuant to Civ. Code §1798.150(b).

19 560. On or about January 26, 2021, Plaintiffs Oosthuizen and Mathews,
20 through their undersigned counsel, each submitted a notice to Bank of America
21 pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code §1798.150(b) on behalf of themselves and all others
22 similarly situated, informing the Bank of its violations of the CCPA. The Bank did
23 not cure those violations or provide Plaintiffs with an express written statement that
24 the violations had been cured and that no further violations shall occur, as required
25 by the CCPA within 30 days after such notice. As a result, class-wide statutory
26 damages may be initiated against the Bank pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code
27 §1798.150(b).

28

561. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Class and applicable Subclasses, seek relief under Cal. Civ. Code §1798.150(a), including but not limited to recovery of actual damages, statutory damages, injunctive relief, declaratory relief, its costs of suit, attorney's fees pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §1021.5 or other applicable law, and any other relief the Court deems proper.

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF

VIOLATIONS OF THE CALIFORNIA CUSTOMER RECORDS ACT

Cal. Civ. Code §§1798.80 et seq.

(Brought by Class Representative Plaintiffs and Individual Plaintiffs in the *Abarr, Brotman, Meza, Morrell, Payton, and Robinson* Actions)

562. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation set forth above, as though fully set forth here.

563. To ensure that personal information about California residents is protected, the California Legislature enacted the California Customer Records Act, which requires businesses suffering a data breach to promptly notify all persons whose "unencrypted personal information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person." Cal. Civ. Code §1798.82.

564. Bank of America is a "business" within the meaning of Cal. Civ. Code §1798.80(a).

565. Plaintiffs and Class Members are "individual[s]" within the meaning of Cal. Civ. Code §1798.80(d). Pursuant to Civ. Code §§1798.80(e) and 1798.82(h), "personal information" includes an individual's name, social security number, driver's license or state identification card number, and debit card and credit card information. "Personal information" under Civ. Code §1798.80(e) also includes address, telephone number, employment, and employment history.

566. Bank of America maintains computerized data that includes personal information of Plaintiffs and Class Members. The security of that data was breached, resulting in unauthorized third parties fraudulently accessing Plaintiffs'

1 and Class Members' EDD Debit Card Accounts.

2 567. The notification of such a breach required by Cal. Civ. Code §1798.82
3 must be made "immediately following discovery."

4 568. By failing to promptly notify all affected Plaintiffs and Class Members
5 that their unencrypted personal information had been acquired (or was reasonably
6 believed to have been acquired) by unauthorized persons, Bank of America violated
7 Cal. Civ. Code §1798.82.

8 569. The notification required by Cal. Civ. Code §1798.82 must be made in
9 plain language, list the information that was or is reasonably believed to have been
10 compromised, identify the date and time of the breach, state whether law
11 enforcement delayed the notice, provide a "general description of the breach
12 incident," and provide the "toll-free telephone numbers and addresses of the major
13 credit reporting agencies if the breach exposed a social security number or a driver's
14 license or California identification card number."

15 570. Bank of America was required to provide the notification required by
16 Cal. Civ. Code §1798.82 to over 500 persons and was required to provide a sample
17 copy of its notification to the California Attorney General.

18 571. Bank of America did not provide such notice, and thus did not provide
19 notice "in the most expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay," as
20 required by Cal. Civ. Code §1798.82.

21 572. Bank of America's conduct as alleged herein was reckless and/or
22 deliberate.

23 573. Plaintiffs and Class Members were injured by Bank of America's
24 violations of Cal. Civ. Code §1798.82. Bank of America's exposure of Plaintiffs'
25 and Class Members' personal information to unauthorized third parties resulted in
26 Plaintiffs and Class Members losing access to EDD benefits to which they are
27 entitled; exposed Plaintiffs and Class Members to increased risk of identity theft;
28 and reduced the value of Plaintiffs' and Class Members' personal information. Bank

1 of America's failure promptly to notify Plaintiffs and Class Members of the
 2 exposure of their personal information to unauthorized third parties as required by
 3 §1798.82 prevented Plaintiffs and Class Members from taking measures to prevent
 4 or mitigate these harms, including but not limited to by withdrawing or transferring
 5 funds from their Accounts before those funds were fraudulently removed or before
 6 those Accounts were frozen by Bank of America, and by closing Accounts and
 7 placing credit alerts on their Accounts to reduce the risk of identity theft.

8 574. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Class and applicable
 9 Subclasses, seek all remedies available under Cal. Civ. Code §1798.84, including,
 10 but not limited to, actual damages and injunctive relief.

11 **FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

12 **VIOLATIONS OF THE CALIFORNIA UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW**

13 **Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§17200 et seq.**

14 (Brought by Class Representative Plaintiffs and Individual Plaintiffs in the
 15 *Abarr, Alvarez, Brotman, Meza, Morrell, Payton, Robinson, Rojas de Charolet,*
 16 *Talia, and Verdun Actions*)

17 575. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation
 18 set forth above, as though fully set forth here.

19 576. California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL") prohibits any
 20 "unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice." Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
 21 §§17200 et seq.

22 577. Bank of America's "unfair" acts and business practices include, among
 23 other things, the Bank's actions or inactions in: (a) failing to maintain, store, share,
 24 transmit, or otherwise use Plaintiffs' and Class Members' personal information (as
 25 defined under the CCPA) and Cardholder Information in a secure manner; (b)
 26 failing to issue EDD Debit Cards with EMV chips, despite having for years been
 27 aware of the risks associated with magnetic stripe technology and despite knowing
 28 the heightened vulnerability of EDD Debit Cardholders and their Accounts and

1 those Cardholders' heightened interest in securely, reliably, and timely accessing
2 their EDD benefits; (c) failing to respond to the rise in demand for EDD benefits
3 caused by or related to the COVID-19 pandemic by issuing chip cards; (d) falsely
4 representing to Plaintiffs, Class Members, and EDD that it would provide "best-in-
5 class" fraud monitoring and that it would remain "at the forefront of fraud and data
6 security strategies benefiting the EDD and [EDD's] claimants"; (e) failing to protect
7 Plaintiffs and Class Members from unauthorized transactions, including by failing
8 to use readily available EMV chip technology in its EDD Debit Cards rather than
9 outdated magnetic stripe technology that the Bank knew was susceptible to fraud;
10 (f) failing to employ reasonable practices and procedures to monitor for, detect,
11 stop, and promptly notify Plaintiffs and Class Members about suspicious
12 transactions involving their Cards and Accounts, including but not limited to
13 transactions that were highly suspicious because they were made during the
14 pandemic at a significant distance from where the Plaintiff or Class Member
15 resided, were made close in time but geographically far apart, or were significantly
16 inconsistent with the Plaintiff or Class Member's Card and Account transaction
17 history and past Account access behaviors; (g) failing to provide reasonable or
18 adequate customer service assistance to Plaintiffs and other Class Members who
19 complained of fraud, despite representing to them that such assistance would be
20 available "24/7," and despite the Bank's awareness of rampant third-party fraud on
21 EDD Debit Cards and Accounts; (h) establishing "customer service" procedures
22 designed to frustrate and obstruct efforts by Plaintiffs and Class Members to file
23 their fraud claims; (i) failing to adequately investigate and resolve Plaintiffs' and
24 Class Members' claims of unauthorized transactions in a timely manner despite the
25 Bank's promised "Zero Liability" policy for unauthorized transactions; (j) failing
26 to extend provisional credit to Plaintiffs and Class Members in cases where the
27 Bank was unable to timely investigate and resolve fraud claims; (k) automatically
28 denying Plaintiffs' and Class Members' claims of unauthorized transactions

1 without investigation, explanation, or reasonable basis, including based solely on
 2 the results of a highly unreliable “fraud filter”; (l) rescinding, without explanation
 3 or legitimate basis, “permanent” credits the Bank had previously paid to EDD Debit
 4 Cardholders upon determining fraud had occurred in their Account; (m) freezing
 5 and/or blocking EDD Debit Card Accounts without a reasonable basis for believing
 6 that the Cardholders themselves had committed fraud, including based solely on the
 7 results of a highly unreliable “fraud filter,” and for longer than it would reasonably
 8 take to investigate any such belief, all while failing to provide Cardholders any
 9 advance notice, prompt post-freeze notice, or any reasonable means of contesting
 10 the purported basis for the Account freeze; (n) freezing and/or blocking EDD Debit
 11 Card Accounts not to protect the Cardholders but to protect the Bank’s own
 12 interests; and (o) failing to provide reasonable or adequate customer service to
 13 Plaintiffs and other Class Members seeking assistance in obtaining reimbursement
 14 for third-party fraud on their Accounts or in accessing their frozen Accounts, despite
 15 the Bank’s representation in its 2015 RFP Response that “[u]nemployment and
 16 disability payments are critical, often times providing claimants the ability to secure
 17 housing or purchase necessary medical prescriptions.”

18 578. Bank of America’s acts, omissions, and conduct as alleged herein are
 19 “unfair” under the UCL because those acts, omissions, and conduct offend public
 20 policy and constitute immoral, unethical, oppressive, and unscrupulous activities
 21 that caused substantial injury, including to Plaintiffs and Class Members. The harm
 22 caused by Bank of America’s conduct outweighs any potential benefits attributable
 23 to such conduct. There were reasonably available alternatives to further the Bank’s
 24 legitimate business interests, including issuing EDD Debit Cards with EMV chips
 25 and creating and implementing procedures and resources adequate to timely
 26 conduct good-faith investigations into reported unauthorized transactions and to
 27 otherwise timely resolve reports of fraudulent activity on EDD Debit Card
 28 Accounts.

1 579. Bank of America has engaged in “unlawful” acts and business
2 practices by, as set forth herein, violating the Electronic Fund Transfers Act, 15
3 U.S.C. §1693, and Regulation E; the California Consumer Privacy Act, Cal. Civ.
4 Code §§1798.100 et seq.; the California Consumer Records Act, Cal. Civ. Code
5 §§1798.80 et seq.; the Due Process Clauses of the U.S. and California Constitutions;
6 and its common law obligations. Bank of America has further engaged in
7 “unlawful” acts and business practices by violating the (a) the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
8 Act (“GLBA”), 15 U.S.C. §§6801 et seq., and regulations promulgated thereunder
9 (*see, e.g.*, 16 C.F.R. Parts 313, 314), which prohibit the Bank from disclosing its
10 customers’ nonpublic personal information to a nonaffiliated third party and require
11 the Bank to take reasonable steps to protect the security and confidentiality of its
12 customers’ nonpublic personal information against anticipated security threats or
13 hazards and unauthorized access or use (*see infra* ¶¶580–581), and (b) the
14 California Financial Information Privacy Act (“CFIPA”), Cal. Fin. Code §§4050 et
15 seq., which prohibits the Bank from negligently disclosing or sharing a consumer’s
16 nonpublic personal information with nonaffiliated third parties without the
17 consumer’s explicit prior consent (*see infra* ¶582).

18 580. The Bank is subject to the GLBA because it is a financial institution
19 as defined under 15 U.S.C. §6809(3)(A), and is subject to the GLBA Safeguards
20 Rule, 16 C.F.R. Part 314, because it is a financial institution that handles and
21 maintains nonpublic personal information, as defined by 16 C.F.R. §313.3(n),
22 including Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ nonpublic personal information. The
23 Safeguards Rule, which implements Section 501(b) of the GLBA, 15 U.S.C.
24 §6801(b), requires financial institutions such as the Bank to protect the security,
25 confidentiality, and integrity of customer information by developing,
26 implementing, and maintaining a written comprehensive information security
27 program that contains administrative, technical, and physical safeguards that are
28 appropriate to the financial institution’s size and complexity, the nature and scope

1 of its activities, and the sensitivity of the customer information at issue, including
2 by (a) identifying reasonably foreseeable internal and external risks to the security,
3 confidentiality, and integrity of customer information, and assessing the sufficiency
4 of any safeguards in place to control those risks; (b) designing and implementing
5 information safeguards to control the risks identified through risk assessment, and
6 regularly testing or otherwise monitoring the effectiveness of the safeguards' key
7 controls, systems, and procedures; (c) overseeing service providers by taking
8 reasonable steps to select and retain service providers that are capable of
9 maintaining appropriate safeguards for customer information, and requiring service
10 providers by contract to implement such safeguards; and (d) evaluating and
11 adjusting the information security program in light of the results of testing and
12 monitoring, changes to the business operation, and other relevant circumstances. 16
13 C.F.R. §§314.3, 314.4.

14 581. Throughout the Class Period, the Bank has violated each of the above
15 requirements of the Safeguard Rule by failing to adequately secure Plaintiffs' and
16 Class Members' nonpublic personal information, including when the Bank
17 transferred that information to EDD and to the Bank's service providers, including
18 but not limited to TTEC, and by failing to oversee its service providers' compliance
19 with Safeguards Rule in connection with Plaintiffs' and Class Members' nonpublic
20 personal information. Specifically, the Bank failed to take adequate steps to
21 evaluate whether its service providers, including but not limited to TTEC, were
22 capable of and actually were reasonably protecting Cardholders' nonpublic
23 personal information. This failure violated the Safeguards Rule. On information and
24 belief, the Bank also failed to identify reasonably foreseeable internal and external
25 risks to the security, confidentiality, and integrity of customer information, and
26 failed to assess the sufficiency of any its own and its service providers' safeguards
27 in place to control those risks. These failures also violated the Safeguards Rule.

28 582. The Bank is subject to the CFIPA because it is a financial institution

1 as defined under Cal. Fin. Code §4052(c). The CFIPA prohibits from Bank from
2 selling, sharing, transferring, or otherwise disclosing a consumer's nonpublic
3 personal information to third parties without the consumer's explicit prior consent.
4 *Id.* §§4052–4052.5, 4057. Nonpublic personal information under CFIPA is defined
5 broadly to include any nonpublic personal financial information about the consumer
6 that the Bank obtains from any source, including from the consumer, from
7 transacting with the consumer, or from performing a service for the consumer. *Id.*
8 §4052(a). Throughout the Class Period, the Bank violated the CFIPA because it
9 disclosed Plaintiffs' and Class Members' nonpublic personal information to third
10 parties without Plaintiffs' and Class Members' prior consent. As a result of the
11 Bank's violations, their nonpublic personal information fell into criminal hands,
12 depriving Plaintiffs and Class Members of the EDD benefits to which they were
13 lawfully entitled.

14 583. As a result of Bank of America's violations of the UCL, Plaintiffs and
15 Class Members have suffered injury in fact and lost money or property, including
16 but not limited to the funds lost to fraud that have not been reimbursed, the lost time
17 value of money not timely reimbursed by Bank of America, fees paid to Bank of
18 America, and lost interest that would have accrued on funds during the period of
19 time when the funds were unavailable due to Bank of America's failure to timely
20 and adequately investigate claims of unauthorized transactions and other violations
21 of the UCL.

22 584. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Class and applicable
23 Subclasses, seek restitution, disgorgement, and other equitable relief, including
24 injunctive relief (a) prohibiting the Bank from continuing its unfair and unlawful
25 business practices, and (b) requiring the Bank to take reasonable measures to
26 prevent future unauthorized use of EDD Debit Cards and Accounts, and
27 (c) requiring the Bank to ensure timely and adequate processing of Cardholders'
28 claims regarding unauthorized or fraudulent use of their Cards or Accounts.

FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

NEGLIGENCE AND NEGLIGENCE PER SE

(Brought by Class Representative Plaintiffs and Individual Plaintiffs in the
Abarr, Alvarez, Brotman, Meza, Morrell, Payton, Robinson, Rojas de Charolet,
Talia, and Verdun Actions)

585. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation set forth above, as though fully set forth here.

586. Plaintiffs and Bank of America have a special relationship that gives rise to the Bank's duties to Plaintiffs and Class Members to act reasonably to: (a) safeguard their UI and other EDD benefits; (b) protect their Cards and Accounts from fraudulent access by unauthorized third parties, including by employing reasonable practices and procedures to protect the confidentiality and security of their Cardholder Information and by employing reasonable practices and procedures to monitor for, detect, stop, and promptly notify Cardholders about suspicious transactions involving their Cards and Accounts; (c) provide them reasonable and adequate notice that their EDD Debit Cards and Accounts were at risk of being subject to unauthorized use or had been subjected to unauthorized use; (d) protect them from unreasonable interference with their right and ability to continue to collect, receive, and access the EDD benefits to which they were entitled; (e) ensure that the Bank's customer service staffing levels, technology, and operations were capable of providing Plaintiffs and Class Members reasonably timely and effective customer service, including to address those customers' concerns about fraudulent or unauthorized transactions related to their EDD Debit Cards or Accounts; (f) timely and adequately investigate and resolve Plaintiffs' and Class Members' claims regarding unauthorized or fraudulent transactions; and (g) extend to Plaintiffs and Class Members provisional credit in cases where the Bank failed to timely resolve their fraud-related claims.

1 587. Bank of America breached its duty to Plaintiffs and Class Members
2 by, among other things: (a) failing to maintain, store, share, transmit, or otherwise
3 use their personal information (as defined under the CCPA) and Cardholder
4 Information in a secure manner; (b) failing to issue them EDD Debit Cards with
5 EMV chips, despite having been well aware for years of the risks associated with
6 magnetic stripe technology; (c) failing to protect their Accounts from fraudulent
7 access by unauthorized third parties; (d) failing to employ reasonable practices and
8 procedures to monitor for, detect, stop, and promptly notify them about suspicious
9 transactions involving their Cards and Accounts, including but not limited to
10 transactions that were highly suspicious because they were made during the
11 pandemic at a significant distance from where the Plaintiff or Class Member
12 resided, were made close in time but geographically far apart, or were significantly
13 inconsistent with the Plaintiff or Class Member's Card and Account transaction
14 history and past Account access behaviors; (e) failing to give them reasonable and
15 adequate notice that their EDD benefits were and remain at risk of being vulnerable
16 to fraudulent and unauthorized transactions; (f) failing to respond to the dramatic
17 increase in EDD benefits and EDD benefits recipients caused by or related to the
18 COVID-19 pandemic by issuing EDD Debit Cards with EMV chips to all new and
19 existing EDD Debit Cardholders and by taking other reasonably prudent security
20 measures to prevent fraudulent and unauthorized transactions; (g) failing to ensure
21 its customer service operation was capable of providing reasonably timely and
22 effective assistance to Plaintiffs and Class Members, including when they were
23 victims of fraudulent or unauthorized transactions; (h) failing to process Plaintiffs'
24 and Class Members' claims regarding fraudulent or unauthorized transactions in a
25 reasonably timely and adequate manner, including by unreasonably automatically
26 freezing EDD Debit Card Accounts without prior notice, reasonable investigation,
27 or an opportunity to be heard; and (i) failing to extend provisional credit to Plaintiffs
28 and Class Members when Bank of America failed to resolve their claims regarding

1 fraudulent or unauthorized transactions in a reasonably timely and adequate
2 manner. Bank of America's misconduct was intended to adversely affect Plaintiffs
3 and Class Members, who rely on Bank of America to access their UI and other EDD
4 benefits through their EDD Debit Cardholder Accounts managed exclusively by
5 Bank of America.

6 588. Bank of America's misconduct concerning its failure to safeguard
7 EDD Debit Cardholders' funds is contrary to industry standards, which include
8 prescribing use of EMV chip technology in debit cards, as well as its own policies
9 and procedures for its *non*-EDD debit and credit cards and accounts, each of which
10 are secured through EMV chip technology.

11 589. Bank of America's misconduct concerning its failure to adequately
12 protect Plaintiffs' and Class Members' data also violates, as set forth in more detail,
13 its obligations under the California Consumer Privacy Act, Cal. Civ. Code
14 §§1798.100 et seq.; the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§6801 et seq.; the
15 California Financial Information Privacy Act, Cal. Fin. Code §§4050 et seq.; and
16 the California Consumer Records Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§1798.80 et seq. Plaintiffs
17 and Class Members are within the classes of persons that each of these statutes are
18 designed to protect, and Bank of America's conduct caused the precise harm to
19 Plaintiffs and Class Members that each of these statutes was designed to prevent.

20 590. Bank of America's failure to comply with the California Consumer
21 Privacy Act, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the California Financial Information
22 Privacy Act, and the California Consumer Records Act constitutes negligence
23 per se.

24 591. The harms inflicted upon Plaintiffs and other Class Members were
25 reasonably foreseeable because the Bank was and is well aware of the security risks
26 associated with magnetic stripe technology, and knew or should have known that
27 its customer service resources and/or procedures were insufficient to consider,
28 evaluate, and appropriately resolve issues stemming from the significant increase

1 in EDD benefits and EDD benefits recipients due to the sharp rise in unemployment
 2 in the State of California caused by or related to the COVID-19 pandemic, as well
 3 as the sharp, well-publicized rise in financial fraud during the COVID-19 pandemic,
 4 both of which would foreseeably lead to an increased demand for customer service
 5 by Plaintiffs and Class Members for all purposes, including for the purposes of
 6 reporting and attempting to resolve claims of fraudulent or unauthorized
 7 transactions. It was a near certainty, which the Bank knew or should have known,
 8 that Plaintiffs and Class Members would suffer significant and irreparable harm as
 9 a result of the Bank's morally blameworthy actions that caused tens of thousands
 10 of unemployed Californians to lose access to past, present, and future EDD benefits
 11 for which they had been found eligible and on which they relied for their survival
 12 during the pandemic.

13 592. As a direct and proximate result of Bank of America's misconduct,
 14 Plaintiffs and Class Members have been deprived of their EDD benefits and have
 15 failed to receive accrued interest thereon.

16 593. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Class and applicable
 17 Subclasses, seek declaratory and injunctive relief and damages and interest thereon.

18 **SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

19 **NEGLIGENT HIRING, SUPERVISION, AND RETENTION**

20 (Brought by Class Representative Plaintiffs and Individual Plaintiffs in the
 21 *Alvarez, Rojas de Charolet, and Verdun* Actions)

22 594. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation
 23 set forth above, as though fully set forth here.

24 595. Bank of America hired various subcontractors, including but not
 25 limited to TTEC Holdings, Inc. ("TTEC"), to provide customer service, call center
 26 operations, and other services for the Bank and to perform various functions and
 27 services under the terms of the EDD-Bank Contract. These subcontractors and their
 28 employees and agents, including Customer Service Representatives, have access to

1 highly sensitive and confidential EDD Debit Cardholder Information, including
2 Plaintiffs' and Class Members' personally identifiable information, Card and
3 Account data, and other financial data and information.

4 596. Acting as the Bank's agent, TTEC negligently hired hundreds if not
5 thousands of employees *en masse* to perform services for the Bank without ever
6 conducting a background check on these individuals. Bank of America granted
7 these unvetted agents access to EDD Debit Cardholders' highly sensitive and
8 confidential Cardholder Information, and further failed to take reasonable steps to
9 secure Cardholder Information from unnecessary or unauthorized access,
10 disclosure, and exfiltration, including by its subcontractors' agents and employees.
11 Neither Bank of America itself nor TTEC provided proper training or supervision
12 to these agents regarding handling and maintaining the confidentiality of
13 Cardholder Information.

14 597. Given the Bank's and TTEC's failure to conduct background checks
15 or to take other reasonable security measures in hiring employees *en masse* to serve
16 as Bank of America Customer Service Representatives and other Bank agents, it
17 was reasonably foreseeable that such unvetted agents would compromise the
18 security of Plaintiffs' and Class Members' confidential Cardholder Information.

19 598. Bank of America's and its subcontractors' negligent hiring, training,
20 supervision, and retention of Customer Service Representatives and other agents
21 who have access to highly confidential Cardholder Information harmed and
22 continues to harm Plaintiffs and Class Members by subjecting them to unreasonable
23 risk of fraud and exfiltration of their Cardholder Information and enabled a series
24 of internal data breaches committed by TTEC employees within the scope of their
25 employment, which harmed the Class Members whose information was
26 compromised.

27 599. Under the terms of the EDD-Bank Contract, Bank of America is
28 required to track and report all incidents or security breach exposures of confidential

1 information that may have compromised an EDD Debit Cardholder's confidential
 2 Cardholder Information or the integrity and secure delivery of EDD benefits to the
 3 Cardholder. Bank of America thus knew or should have known that TTEC was or
 4 became unfit or incompetent to perform the work for which it was hired, including
 5 as a result of its negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention of agents with
 6 access to confidential Cardholder Information, yet Bank of America continued to
 7 retain TTEC as a subcontractor to perform services under the EDD-Bank Contract.

8 600. TTEC at all relevant times has been the actual, apparent, and ostensible
 9 agent of Bank of America, who has ratified TTEC's actions.

10 601. As a direct and proximate result of Bank of America's and its agents'
 11 misconduct, Plaintiffs and Class Members have been deprived of their EDD
 12 benefits and have failed to receive accrued interest thereon.

13 602. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Class and applicable
 14 Subclasses, seek declaratory and injunctive relief and damages and interest thereon.

15 **SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

16 **BREACH OF CONTRACT**

17 (Brought by Class Representative Plaintiffs and Individual Plaintiffs in the
 18 *Abarr, Brotman, Meza, Morrell, Payton, Robinson, and Talia* Actions)

19 603. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation
 20 set forth above, as though fully set forth here.

21 604. Each Plaintiff and Class Member entered into a Cardholder Agreement
 22 with the Bank that requires the Bank to administer EDD benefits to them through
 23 prepaid debit cards.

24 605. The Cardholder Agreement provides, among other things: "Under the
 25 Bank of America 'zero liability' policy, you may incur no liability for unauthorized
 26 use of your Card up to the amount of the transaction, provided you notify us within
 27 a reasonable time of the loss or theft of your Card, Card number or PIN or its
 28 unauthorized use, subject to the following terms and conditions." The Cardholder

1 Agreement further provides: “We will determine whether an error occurred within
2 10 business days after we hear from you — and will correct any error promptly. If
3 we need more time, however, we may take up to 45 days to investigate your
4 complaint or question. If we decide to do this, we will credit your Account within
5 10 business days for the amount you think is in error, so that you will have the
6 money during the time it takes us to complete our investigation.”

7 606. The Cardholder Agreement also provides that the Bank “will add funds
8 to your Account . . . in accordance with instructions from the EDD” and that
9 “[f]unds are available for your use on the day we have been instructed by the EDD
10 to fund your Account.” Those also limit the circumstances under which the Bank
11 may deprive EDD Debit Cardholders of access to their funds by freezing their EDD
12 Debit Card Accounts. As relevant here, the Cardholder Agreement provides that if
13 the Bank “suspect[s] irregular, unauthorized, or unlawful activities may be
14 involved” with the Account, it may freeze the Account, but only “pending an
15 investigation of such suspected activities.”

16 607. Plaintiffs and Class Members performed all or substantially all of the
17 material requirements that their Cardholder Agreement with Bank of America
18 imposed on them, and they fulfilled all conditions precedent to Bank of America’s
19 performance, including, among other things, by contacting or attempting to contact
20 Bank of America to reimburse them for fraudulently appropriated funds within the
21 time specified in the Cardholder Agreement.

22 608. Bank of America breached its promises to Plaintiffs and Class
23 Members in its Cardholder Agreement by, among other things: (a) failing to timely
24 and reasonably investigate and resolve their fraud claims; (b) failing to reimburse
25 them for unauthorized transactions; (c) failing to provide them with provisional
26 credit when the Bank’s investigation into their fraud claims exceeds 10 business
27 days; (d) failing to limit their liability for unauthorized transactions; (e) freezing or
28 blocking their EDD Debit Card Accounts without a reasonable basis for suspecting

1 irregular, unauthorized, or unlawful activities in the Account, and beyond the length
 2 of time necessary for a reasonable investigation; (f) freezing or blocking their EDD
 3 Debit Card Accounts for reasons other than those specified in the Cardholder
 4 Agreement; (g) failing to make funds available to them for their use on the day the
 5 Bank has been instructed by the EDD to fund their Accounts; and (h) otherwise
 6 failing to make funds available to them in accordance with EDD's instructions.

7 609. Plaintiffs and Class Members were harmed by Bank of America's
 8 conduct and have suffered actual damages in an amount equal to the difference in
 9 the value of the banking services for which they provided valuable consideration
 10 and the banking services they received.

11 610. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Class and applicable
 12 Subclasses, seek declaratory and injunctive relief and damages and interest thereon.

13 **EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

14 **BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT**

15 (Brought by Class Representative Plaintiffs and Individual Plaintiffs in the
 16 *Abarr, Brotman, Meza, Morrell, Payton, Robinson, and Talia* Actions)

17 611. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation
 18 set forth above, as though fully set forth here.

19 612. Bank of America agreed to and was obligated to take reasonable steps
 20 to ensure that Bank's EDD Debit Card Accounts were secure against unauthorized
 21 transactions and that any claims regarding unauthorized transactions were
 22 adequately investigated and resolved.

23 613. All parties understood that such protections and customer service
 24 obligations were integral and essential to Bank of America's business.

25 614. Bank of America was obligated to provide Plaintiffs and Class
 26 Members with EDD Debit Card services that were suitable for their intended
 27 purpose of preserving and accessing EDD benefits as needed, rather than providing
 28 debit card services that failed to take reasonable steps to safeguard their money,

1 failed to warn or notify them in the event that their EDD Debit Cards or Accounts
2 were at risk of unauthorized use, or failed to adequately investigate or resolve
3 claims regarding unauthorized transactions.

4 615. Bank of America did not take reasonable steps to protect Plaintiffs'
5 and Class Members' deposited funds from unauthorized transactions or to
6 adequately investigate or resolve claims regarding unauthorized transactions. In
7 fact, Bank of America willfully violated those interests by choosing to issue EDD
8 Debit Cards with cheaper, outdated magnetic stripe technology, which it knew to
9 be uniquely vulnerable to fraud, rather than using the same EMV chip technology
10 that the Bank has included in all of its consumer credit cards and debit cards for
11 more than six years, for the express purpose of protecting against fraud.

12 616. Because Bank of America failed to take reasonable steps to protect
13 EDD Debit Cardholders' funds from being appropriated through unauthorized
14 transactions and failed to take reasonable steps to timely or adequately respond to
15 claims regarding unauthorized transactions, Bank of America breached its implied
16 contracts with Plaintiffs and Class Members.

17 617. Bank of America's failure to fulfill its obligations to take reasonable
18 steps to protect its EDD Debit Cardholders' funds from being appropriated through
19 unauthorized transactions, and its failure to take reasonable steps to timely or
20 adequately respond to claims regarding unauthorized transactions resulted in
21 Plaintiffs and Class Members receiving banking services that were of less value
22 than they provided consideration for.

23 618. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Class and applicable
24 Subclasses, seek declaratory and injunctive relief and damages and interest thereon.
25
26
27
28

NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

BREACH OF IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING

(Brought by Class Representative Plaintiffs and Individual Plaintiffs in the
Abarr, Brotman, Meza, Morrell, Payton, Robinson, and Talia Actions)

619. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation set forth above, as though fully set forth here.

620. There is a covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract and every implied contract. This implied covenant requires each contracting party to refrain from doing anything to injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement. To fulfill its covenant, a party must give at least as much consideration to the interests of the other party as it gives to its own interests.

621. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in the Bank's Cardholder Agreement with Plaintiffs and Class Members obligated the Bank, at a minimum: (a) to take reasonable and necessary steps to safeguard Plaintiffs' and Class Members' EDD benefits, including in light of the foreseeable and actual rise in the number of EDD Debit Cardholders and the amount of financial fraud caused by or related to the COVID-19 pandemic; (b) to ensure that its customer service operation was capable of providing reasonably adequate and effective assistance to EDD Debit Cardholders who experienced or claimed to have experienced fraud on their EDD Debit Cards or Accounts; (c) to warn or notify Plaintiffs and Class Members if their public benefit funds were subject to, or at risk of being subject to, actual or suspected unauthorized use; (d) to timely and adequately investigate and resolve claims of unauthorized transactions involving Plaintiffs' and Class Members' EDD Debit Cards or Accounts; (e) to extend provisional credit to Plaintiffs and Class Members in cases where their fraud claims are not timely resolved; (f) to freeze or block EDD Debit Card Accounts only to protect them from third-party fraud and only for the period necessary to conduct a reasonable

1 investigation into whether third-party fraud occurred; (g) to make EDD benefits
2 deposited into EDD Debit Card Accounts immediately available to Cardholders and
3 not to freeze or block Accounts without a reasonable basis for believing that the
4 Cardholders themselves have committed fraud; and (h) to not freeze or block
5 Accounts out of concern for the Bank's own potential liability for third-party fraud.

6 622. Bank of America breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair
7 dealing by, among other things: (a) failing to take reasonable and necessary steps
8 to safeguard Plaintiffs' and Class Members' EDD benefits, including but not limited
9 to (i) failing to issue EDD Debit Cards with EMV chip technology, (ii) failing to
10 employ reasonable practices and procedures to secure Plaintiffs' and Class
11 Members' Cardholder Information and other sensitive personal information that
12 could be used by third parties to effect unauthorized transactions, (iii) failing to
13 employ reasonable practices and procedures to monitor for, detect, stop, and
14 promptly notify Plaintiffs and Class Members about suspicious transactions
15 involving their Cards and Accounts (including but not limited to transactions that
16 were highly suspicious because they were made during the pandemic at a significant
17 distance from where the Plaintiff or Class Member resided, were made close in time
18 but geographically far apart, or were significantly inconsistent with the Plaintiff or
19 Class Member's Card and Account transaction history and past Account access
20 behaviors), and (iv) failing to promptly issue EDD Debit Cards with EMV chips
21 and to increase its efforts with respect to securing personal information, fraud
22 monitoring, and otherwise safeguarding benefits in light of the foreseeable and
23 actual rise in the number of EDD Debit Cardholders and the amount of financial
24 fraud caused by or related to the COVID-19 pandemic; (b) failing to ensure its
25 customer service operations were capable of providing effective assistance to EDD
26 Debit Cardholders who experienced fraud on their EDD Debit Card or Account,
27 including during the COVID-19 pandemic; (c) failing to warn or notify EDD Debit
28 Cardholders that their EDD benefits were and remain subject to, or at risk of being

1 subject to, actual or suspected unauthorized use; (d) failing to timely or adequately
 2 process and investigate EDD Debit Cardholders' claims regarding unauthorized
 3 transactions; (e) failing to extend provisional credit in cases where EDD Debit
 4 Cardholders' fraud claims are not timely resolved; (f) freezing or blocking EDD
 5 Debit Card Accounts without a reasonable basis for believing that the Cardholders
 6 themselves had committed fraud, and for longer than it would reasonably take to
 7 investigate any such belief; (g) failing to provide EDD Debit Cardholders any
 8 reasonable means of contesting the Bank's purported basis for freezing their EDD
 9 Debit Card Accounts or for otherwise getting their Accounts unfrozen; and (h)
 10 freezing or blocking EDD Debit Card Accounts not to protect the Cardholders, but
 11 rather to protect the Bank itself, from liability for third-party fraud.

12 623. As a direct and proximate result of Bank of America's breaches of the
 13 implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Plaintiffs and Class Members have
 14 suffered actual losses and damages.

15 624. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Class and applicable
 16 Subclasses, seek declaratory and injunctive relief and damages and interest thereon.

17 **TENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

18 **BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY**

19 (Brought by Class Representative Plaintiffs and Individual Plaintiffs in the
 20 *Abarr, Brotman, Meza, Morrell, Payton, and Robinson* Actions)

21 625. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation
 22 set forth above, as though fully set forth here.

23 626. Bank of America knows and at all relevant times has known that
 24 Plaintiffs and Class Members, as public benefits recipients, are members of a
 25 uniquely vulnerable segment of the population, who depend on the prompt and
 26 accurate payment of the unemployment benefits and other EDD benefits to obtain
 27 their basic necessities of life, including food and shelter.
 28

1 627. When Plaintiffs and Class Members submitted their claims for
2 unemployment and other EDD benefits to EDD and were found eligible to receive
3 those benefits, they were not given the choice of receiving those benefits through
4 debit cards issued by any financial institution other than Bank of America. Bank of
5 America holds the exclusive contract to implement and administer EDD's public
6 benefits programs and is the only financial institution authorized to pay EDD
7 benefits to program beneficiaries through the use of prepaid debit cards.

8 628. In order to obtain the Bank-issued EDD Debit Cards needed to access
9 their EDD Debit Card Accounts, which is the default way of receiving EDD
10 benefits, Plaintiffs and Class Members were required to provide the Bank with
11 private and confidential personal and financial information, including information
12 pertaining to their income, public benefits, employment status, finances, social
13 security numbers, addresses, emails, telephone numbers, and all debit card account
14 information.

15 629. The Bank, in turn, was provided access to all such personal,
16 confidential, and financial information from Plaintiffs and Class Members, which
17 the Bank stored and maintained, purportedly in confidence, and which the Bank
18 was required to strictly maintain in confidence without public access or other
19 disclosure absent the EDD Debit Cardholders' written consent. The Bank was also
20 delegated the responsibility and authority to determine when, why, and how to deny
21 Plaintiffs and Class Members access to EDD benefits to which they are entitled by
22 freezing EDD Debit Card Accounts.

23 630. Plaintiffs and Class Members, as EDD benefits recipients who did not
24 opt out of the default option of receiving their EDD benefits payments through EDD
25 Debit Cards, were repeatedly assured that a EDD Debit Card was a "[f]aster, easier
26 and more secure" way to receive their benefit payments and that the EDD Debit
27 Cards and Accounts were secure from fraud. They reposed their trust and
28 confidence in the Bank at all material times, including with respect to all of their

1 personal, confidential, and financial information and with respect to the Bank's
2 ongoing maintenance of that information in confidence, without secretion or
3 divulgence absent Plaintiffs' and Class Members' express written consent.
4 Plaintiffs and Class Members entered into a contractual relationship with Bank of
5 America solely to secure their peace of mind in accessing the subsistence EDD
6 benefits to which they had been found eligible and on which they relied to pay for
7 housing, food, and other daily necessities.

8 631. Bank of America owes and continues to owe a fiduciary duty to
9 Plaintiffs and Class Members. By virtue of its unequal bargaining power and its
10 position as the financial institution charged with implementing EDD benefits
11 programs, which gave the Bank delegated authority to determine when, why, and
12 how to deny Plaintiffs and Class Members access to EDD benefits to which they
13 are entitled by freezing EDD Debit Card Accounts, as well as unbridled access to
14 Plaintiffs' and Class Members' personal, confidential, and financial information,
15 and because of the Bank's superior knowledge, business responsibilities and
16 duties—including those provided by law or statute—and its absolute ability to
17 control or otherwise manipulate Plaintiffs' and Class Members' EDD Debit Card
18 Account data in its system, the Bank assumed a fiduciary duty to Plaintiffs and
19 Class Members not to deny them access to their Account funds without reasonable
20 basis, and to secure and maintain the personal, confidential, and financial
21 information that it received from Plaintiffs and Class Members, free from
22 unauthorized intrusion, theft, or other disclosure.

23 632. As a result of this relationship of trust and confidence, the unique
24 nature of the EDD Debit Card Accounts that contain only EDD benefits, and the
25 highly confidential nature of the records and data pertaining to Plaintiffs' and Class
26 Members' EDD Debit Cards Accounts, and the Bank's duties to maintain the
27 privacy of such information, the Bank owed Plaintiffs and Class Members the
28 highest degree of loyalty, honesty, fidelity, trust, and due care in its fiduciary

1 obligations with respect to ensuring legitimate benefits recipients are not denied
2 access to their Account funds, and with respect to securing and maintaining the
3 privacy of their personal, confidential, and financial data in the Bank's possession.
4 In order to comply with such duty, the Bank was required to use its utmost ability
5 to ensure that legitimate benefits recipients are not denied access to their Account
6 funds, and to protect, preserve, and secure Plaintiffs' and Class Members' private
7 data and confidential information from unauthorized access, fraud, or theft and to
8 take all necessary steps in order to do so, including encrypting such information and
9 deploying sufficient data access security controls, EMV chips, and other measures,
10 to frustrate and disable hackers, skimmers, cloners, or others from accessing such
11 information for their personal profit or unlawful goals.

12 633. Based on the acts or omissions alleged above, Bank of America
13 breached its fiduciary duties to Plaintiffs and Class Members by failing to take all
14 adequate and necessary steps to ensure legitimate benefits recipients are not denied
15 access to their Account funds without reasonable basis, and to preserve, secure, and
16 maintain the confidentiality and privacy of their EDD Debit Cards and Accounts
17 and their personal, confidential, and financial information. The Bank independently
18 breached its fiduciary duties to Plaintiffs and Class Members by failing to timely,
19 fully, and adequately disclose that it had not taken the necessary steps to protect
20 such information from unauthorized or fraudulent access and theft and that such
21 information was at a heightened risk of breach by virtue of the Bank's data security
22 failings and policies. The Bank also independently breached its fiduciary duties to
23 Plaintiffs and Class Members by failing to timely, fully, and adequately disclose
24 that it had not taken the necessary steps to monitor for, detect, stop, and promptly
25 notify Plaintiffs and Class Members about suspicious transactions involving their
26 Cards and Accounts.

27 634. Bank of America recklessly or knowingly breached its fiduciary duty
28 and consciously denied legitimate EDD benefits recipients' access to their EDD

Debit Card Account funds without reasonable basis, and it created an environment that made its data systems and Plaintiffs' and Class Members' EDD Debit Card Accounts and their access to EDD benefits prey to criminal hackers and thieves. Alternatively, and without prejudice to the foregoing, the Bank also breached its fiduciary duty by placing its own desire to achieve greater profits ahead of the financial security, privacy, and data security interests of Plaintiffs and Class Members.

635. As a direct and proximate result of the Bank's violations of its fiduciary duty, Plaintiffs and Class Members have been injured and have suffered and will continue to suffer economic and non-economic losses in an amount to be determined according to proof at trial, and a constructive trust has been formed in which the Bank is an involuntary trustee for the benefit of Plaintiffs and Class Members concerning the Account funds that Plaintiffs and Class Members have lost or been unable to access.

636. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Class and applicable Subclasses, seek declaratory and injunctive relief and damages and interest thereon.

ELEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

BREACH OF CONTRACT (THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARIES)

(Brought by Class Representative Plaintiffs and Individual Plaintiffs in the *Abarr, Brotman, Meza, Morrell, Payton, Robinson, and Talia* Actions)

637. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation set forth above, as though fully set forth here.

638. Bank of America and the State of California EDD entered into the EDD-Bank Contract, which is a valid and legally enforceable contract that requires Bank of America to administer EDD benefits to Plaintiffs and Class Members through EDD Debit Cards and Accounts.

639. In seeking to obtain the EDD-Bank Contract and as a material term of that contract, the Bank represented to EDD that the Bank would protect the EDD

1 benefits deposited into EDD Debit Card Accounts by implementing strict and
2 secure anti-fraud measures, and that it would provide reasonable and adequate
3 customer service to EDD Debit Cardholders sufficient to ensure that any claims of
4 fraud would be promptly considered, fully and fairly investigated, and timely
5 resolved without hardship or cost to blameless Cardholders, including Plaintiffs and
6 Class Members.

7 640. As EDD benefits recipients and EDD Debit Cardholders, Plaintiffs and
8 Class Members are intended third-party beneficiaries of the EDD–Bank Contract.
9 Plaintiffs and Class Members would benefit from performance of the contract,
10 providing that benefit was a motivating purpose of the contracting parties entering
11 into the contract, and permitting Plaintiffs and Class Members to pursue a claim for
12 breach of the contract seeking specific performance is consistent with the contract’s
13 objectives and the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties at the time of
14 contracting.

15 641. Plaintiff, Class Members, and the EDD performed all or substantially
16 all of the material conditions imposed on them by the EDD–Bank Contract and
17 fulfilled any and all conditions precedent to Bank of America’s performance.

18 642. Bank of America failed to perform as promised in the EDD– Bank
19 Contract by, among other things: (a) failing to take adequate steps to prevent fraud
20 on EDD Debit Cards and Accounts, including but not limited to failing to issue
21 EDD Debit Cards that incorporate EMV chip technology and failing to employ
22 reasonable practices and procedures to monitor for, detect, stop, and promptly
23 notify Cardholders about suspicious transactions involving their Cards and
24 Accounts (including but not limited to transactions that were highly suspicious
25 because they were made during the pandemic at a significant distance from where
26 the Cardholder resided, were made close in time but geographically far apart, or
27 were significantly inconsistent with the Cardholder’s Card and Account transaction
28 history and past Account access behaviors); (b) failing to timely perform good-faith

1 investigations of unauthorized transactions involving EDD Debit Cards and
 2 Accounts; (c) failing to timely resolve claims of unauthorized transactions
 3 involving EDD Debit Cards and Accounts, including failing to have a reasonable
 4 basis for its determinations that challenged transactions were in fact authorized by
 5 the relevant EDD Debit Cardholder; (d) failing to timely reimburse Plaintiffs and
 6 Class Members for unauthorized transactions on their EDD Debit Cards and
 7 Accounts; (e) failing to timely provide provisional credit to Plaintiffs and Class
 8 Members when the Bank's investigation of fraud claims exceeds 10 business days;
 9 (f) failing to provide EDD Debit Cardholders with the kinds, levels, amount, and
 10 quality of customer service specified in the EDD-Bank Contract; and (g) failing to
 11 make commercially reasonable efforts in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic to
 12 provide the kinds, levels, amount, and quality of customer service to EDD Debit
 13 Cardholders that reasonably should have been provided to them in the context of
 14 the COVID-19 pandemic.

15 643. Plaintiffs and Class Members were harmed by Bank of America's
 16 conduct in breaching the EDD-Bank Contract and have suffered actual damages in
 17 an amount equal to the difference in the value of the banking services that EDD
 18 Debit Cardholders were contractually entitled to receive and the value of banking
 19 services that EDD Debit Cardholders actually received.

20 644. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Class and applicable
 21 Subclasses, seek declaratory and injunctive relief and damages and interest thereon.

22 **TWELFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

23 **BREACH OF IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING**
 24 **(THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARIES)**

25 (Brought by Class Representative Plaintiffs and Individual Plaintiffs in the
 26 *Abarr, Brotman, Meza, Morrell, Payton, and Robinson* Actions)

27 645. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation
 28 set forth above, as though fully set forth here.

1 646. There is a covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in every
2 contract and every implied contract. This implied covenant requires each
3 contracting party to refrain from doing anything to injure the right of the other party
4 or intended third-party beneficiaries to receive the benefits of the agreement. To
5 fulfill its covenant, a party must give at least as much consideration to the interests
6 of the other party as it gives to its own interests.

7 647. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in the EDD–Bank
8 Contract obligated the Bank, at a minimum: (a) to take reasonable and necessary
9 steps to safeguard Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ EDD benefits, including in light
10 of the foreseeable and actual rise in the number of EDD Debit Cardholders and the
11 amount of financial fraud caused by or related to the COVID-19 pandemic; (b) to
12 ensure that its customer service operation was capable of providing reasonably
13 adequate and effective assistance to EDD Debit Cardholders who experienced or
14 claimed to have experienced fraud on their EDD Debit Cards or Accounts; (c) to
15 warn or notify Plaintiffs and Class Members if their EDD benefit funds were subject
16 to, or at risk of being subject to, actual or suspected unauthorized use; (d) to timely
17 and adequately investigate and resolve claims of unauthorized transactions
18 involving Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ EDD Debit Cards or Accounts; (e) to
19 extend provisional credit to Plaintiffs and Class Members in cases where their fraud
20 claims are not timely resolved; (f) to freeze or block EDD Debit Card Accounts
21 only to protect them from third-party fraud and only for the period necessary to
22 conduct a reasonable investigation into whether third-party fraud occurred; (g) to
23 make EDD benefits deposited into EDD Debit Card Accounts immediately
24 available to Cardholders and not to freeze Accounts without a reasonable basis for
25 believing that the Cardholders themselves have committed fraud; and (h) to not
26 freeze or block Accounts out of concern for the Bank’s own potential liability for
27 third-party fraud.

648. Bank of America breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by, among other things: (a) failing to take reasonable and necessary steps to safeguard Plaintiffs' and Class Members' EDD benefits, including but not limited to (i) failing to issue EDD Debit Cards with EMV chip technology, (ii) failing to employ reasonable practices and procedures to secure Plaintiffs' and Class Members' Cardholder Information and other sensitive personal information that could be used by third parties to effect unauthorized transactions, (iii) failing to employ reasonable practices and procedures to monitor for, detect, stop, and promptly notify Plaintiffs and Class Members about suspicious transactions involving their Cards and Accounts (including but not limited to transactions that were highly suspicious because they were made during the pandemic at a significant distance from where the Plaintiff or Class Member resided, were made close in time but geographically far apart, or were significantly inconsistent with the Plaintiff or Class Member's Card and Account transaction history and past Account access behaviors), and (iv) failing to promptly issue EDD Debit Cards with EMV chips and to increase its efforts with respect to securing personal information, fraud monitoring, and otherwise safeguarding benefits in light of the foreseeable and actual rise in the number of EDD Debit Cardholders and the amount of financial fraud caused by or related to the COVID-19 pandemic; (b) failing to ensure its customer service operation was capable of providing effective assistance to EDD Debit Cardholders who experience fraud on their EDD Debit Card or Account, including during the COVID-19 pandemic; (c) failing to warn or notify EDD Debit Cardholders that their EDD benefits were and remain subject to, or at risk of being subject to, actual or suspected unauthorized use; (d) failing to timely or adequately process and investigate EDD Debit Cardholders' claims regarding unauthorized transactions; (e) failing to extend provisional credit in cases where EDD Debit Cardholders' fraud claims are not timely resolved; (f) freezing or blocking EDD Debit Card Accounts without a reasonable basis for believing that the Cardholders

1 themselves had committed fraud, and for longer than it would reasonably take to
 2 investigate any such belief, (g) failing to provide EDD Debit Cardholders any
 3 reasonable means of contesting the Bank's purported basis for freezing their EDD
 4 Debit Card Accounts or for otherwise getting their Accounts unfrozen; and (h)
 5 freezing or blocking EDD Debit Card Accounts not to protect the Cardholders, but
 6 rather to protect the Bank itself, from liability for third-party fraud.

7 649. As a direct and proximate result of Bank of America's breaches of the
 8 implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Plaintiffs and other Class Members
 9 have suffered actual losses and damages.

10 650. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Class and applicable
 11 Subclasses, seek declaratory and injunctive relief and damages and interest thereon.

12 **THIRTEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

13 **VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL DUE PROCESS UNDER THE 14TH AMENDMENT**

14 **42 U.S.C. §1983**

15 (Brought by Class Representative Plaintiffs and Individual Plaintiffs in the
 16 *Abarr, Brotman, Meza, Morrell, Payton, and Robinson* Actions)

17 651. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every
 18 allegation set forth above, as though fully set forth here.

19 652. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendments prohibits any
 20 state actor from "depriv[ing] any person of . . . property, without due process of
 21 law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV.

22 653. "Every person who, under color of [law], subjects, or causes to be
 23 subjected, any . . . person . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
 24 immunities secured by the Constitution and laws," is "liable to the party injured in
 25 an action as law [or] suit in equity." 42 U.S.C. §1983.

26 654. For purposes of the actions alleged herein, Bank of America is a state
 27 actor and acted "under color" of law because it is engaged in a joint undertaking
 28 with the State to provide and administer UI and other EDD benefits under a

1 mutually beneficial relationship and because it performs a function that is both
2 traditionally and exclusively governmental.

3 655. Plaintiffs' and Class Members' unemployment benefits and other EDD
4 benefits are constitutionally protected property interests.

5 656. By freezing Plaintiffs' and Class Members' EDD Debit Card
6 Accounts, Bank of America (a) cuts off their access to EDD benefits already
7 deposited to their Accounts and (b) suspends their receipt of any future EDD
8 benefits to which they may be entitled.

9 657. By blocking Plaintiffs' and Class Members' EDD Debit Card
10 Accounts, Bank of America cuts off their access to EDD benefits already deposited
11 to their Accounts as well as their access to any continuing EDD benefits EDD
12 subsequently deposits into their Account.

13 658. The Bank claims to have a policy and practice of notifying EDD when
14 the Bank independently freezes a Cardholder's Account without having received
15 authorization or direction from EDD to do so, and a policy and practice of
16 requesting EDD to review to review and to verify the eligibility for EDD benefits
17 of Cardholders whose Accounts the Bank has independently frozen.

18 659. The Bank performs a traditional and exclusively governmental
19 function in administering the EDD benefits payments programs as alleged herein
20 pursuant to contractual authority generally delegated to it by EDD, including when
21 it blocks or freezes Cardholder Accounts without specific authorization from EDD
22 to do so and in violation of Cardholders' rights.

23 660. Bank of America's policy and/or practice of automatically freezing or
24 blocking the Plaintiffs' and Class Members' EDD Debit Card Accounts when they
25 report unauthorized transactions without affording them any prior notice or pre-
26 deprivation hearing, or any prompt and meaningful post-deprivation opportunity to
27 be heard, violates Plaintiffs' and Class Members' due process rights under the
28 Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

661. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Class, seek an injunction barring Bank of America from freezing or blocking EDD Debit Card Accounts without prior notice and a pre-deprivation hearing. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the applicable Subclasses, further seek the following relief: (a) actual damages; (b) nominal damages; (c) restitution of all EDD benefits funds improperly frozen or blocked by Bank of America; and (d) incidental and consequential damages suffered due to their inability to pay bills or otherwise use their unemployment funds.

FOURTEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

VIOLATIONS OF THE CALIFORNIA DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

Cal. Const. art. I, §7(a)

(Brought by Class Representative Plaintiffs and Individual Plaintiffs in the
Abarr, Brotman, Meza, Morrell, Payton, and Robinson Actions)

662. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation set forth above, as though fully set forth here.

663. The California Constitution's due process clause provides: "A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or denied equal protection of the laws." Cal. Const. art. I, §7(a).

664. Plaintiffs' and Class Members' EDD benefits are constitutionally protected property interests.

665. Bank of America's policy and/or practice of automatically and indefinitely freezing or blocking Plaintiffs' and Class Members' EDD Debit Card Accounts when they report unauthorized transactions without affording them any prior notice or pre-deprivation hearing, or any prompt and meaningful post-deprivation opportunity to be heard, violates Plaintiffs' and Class Members' due process rights under the California Constitution.

666. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Class, seek an injunction barring Bank of America from freezing or blocking EDD Debit Card Accounts

1 without prior notice and a pre-deprivation hearing. Plaintiffs, on behalf of
2 themselves and the applicable Subclasses, further seek the following relief:
3 (a) actual damages; (b) nominal damages; (c) restitution of all EDD benefits funds
4 improperly frozen or blocked by Bank of America; and (d) incidental and
5 consequential damages suffered due to their inability to pay bills or otherwise use
6 their unemployment funds.

7 **VII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

8 WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, on their own behalf and on behalf of the Class,
9 pray for the following relief:

10 (1) For an order certifying the Class and Subclasses as defined above and
11 such additional subclasses as may be appropriate, appointing Plaintiffs as
12 representative for the Class, and appointing Plaintiffs' counsel as counsel for the
13 Class;

14 (2) For declaratory and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief
15 prohibiting Bank of America from engaging in the wrongful conduct alleged herein,
16 including but not limited to an order making the existing Preliminary Injunction
17 permanent and such other preliminary and permanent injunctive relief as necessary
18 to remedy the violations alleged herein;

19 (3) For an award of all recoverable compensatory, statutory, and other
20 damages sustained by Plaintiffs and the Class Members, including treble damages
21 where authorized by law, disgorgement, unjust enrichment, restitution, a
22 declaration that the Bank holds the Account funds in constructive trust for the
23 benefit of Plaintiffs and the Class Members, and all other available relief under
24 applicable law, including but not limited to accrued interest for the periods during
25 which Plaintiffs and Class Members were deprived of funds in their EDD Debit
26 Card Accounts due to unauthorized transactions;

27 (4) For an award of punitive damages pursuant to applicable law;

28 (5) For reasonable attorney's fees and expenses as permitted by

California Code of Civil Procedure §1021.5, 42 U.S.C. §1988, and any other applicable statute or law;

(6) For taxable costs;

(7) For pre- and post-judgment interest as allowed by law; and

(8) For any other relief the Court deems just.

VIII. JURY TRIAL DEMAND

Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury on all issues so triable.

Dated: August 17, 2021

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2 **SIGNATURE ATTESTATION**

3 Pursuant to section 2(f)(4) of the Electronic Case Filing Administrative
4 Policies and Procedures Manual, I, Brian Danitz, attest that the other signatories
5 listed, and on whose behalf this filing is submitted, concur in the filing content and
6 have authorized this filing.

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8 By: /s/ Brian Danitz
9 Brian Danitz
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EXHIBIT A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JENNIFER YICK, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.,

Defendant.

Case No. [21-cv-00376-VC](#)

**ORDER RE PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION**

Re: Dkt. No. 64

Because of the time-sensitivity involved, this ruling assumes that the reader is familiar with the applicable legal standards, the parties' arguments, the evidence in the record, and the discussion that took place at the preliminary injunction hearing on May 13, 2021.

1. The plaintiffs have demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on their claims that Bank of America (BofA) has violated, and continues to violate, the Electronic Fund Transfers Act by failing to conduct an adequate, good faith investigation when cardholders report unauthorized charges, and often simply freezing cardholder accounts based on a faulty screening process. 15 U.S.C. § 1693f. This has resulted (and will likely continue to result) in the improper denial of cardholders' reimbursement claims for unauthorized charges, the unlawful deprivation of provisional credits for such charges, and the inability to access benefits to which cardholders are entitled. For similar reasons, the plaintiffs have demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on their claims that BofA is systematically breaching its contracts with cardholders and violating California's Unfair Competition Law.

2. Provisional certification of a class of all cardholders who call to report unauthorized charges to their accounts is warranted for purposes of a preliminary injunction. *See, e.g., Zepeda*

Rivas v. Jennings, 445 F. Supp. 3d 36, 39 (N.D. Cal. 2020); *Saravia v. Sessions*, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1201-05 (N.D. Cal. 2017), *affirmed as Saravia for A.H. v. Sessions*, 905 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2018).

3. BofA is wrong to argue that the named plaintiffs or the class are categorically barred from obtaining interim relief. There is Article III standing because many of the named plaintiffs were being injured by the conduct described in Section 1 at the time they filed their lawsuits, and some of the named plaintiffs continue to suffer injury today. *Buckeye Tree Lodge v. Expedia, Inc.*, 2020 WL 5372246, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2020); *see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.*, 528 U.S. 167, 184 (2000). And the evidence presented by BofA in response to this preliminary injunction motion does not refute the plaintiffs' strong showing that class members are likely to suffer similar violations in the future.

4. The harm being suffered by the class members is irreparable. The class is comprised of people who depend on unemployment benefits to get through the pandemic. As the plaintiffs' evidence shows, continued denial of these benefits will seriously hinder the ability of many class members to feed their families and keep a roof over their heads. Thus, although the general rule is that financial harm is not "irreparable" (because plaintiffs can generally recoup the money if they ultimately prevail), this is precisely the type of case where the exception to the general rule applies. Just as companies can establish irreparable harm by showing that losing money will likely cause them to shut down, human beings can establish irreparable harm by showing that losing wages or benefits will likely cause them to be evicted, go hungry, or be denied necessary medical care. *Cf. Carrillo v. Schneider Logistics, Inc.*, 823 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1045 (C.D. Cal. 2011) ("Because plaintiffs are low-wage workers, and lost wages or delays in compensation threaten or impair their ability to meet basic needs, such harms are irreparable."); *see also United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. Fort Pitt Steel Casting, Division of Conval-Penn, Division of Conval Corp.*, 598 F.2d 1273, 1280 (3d Cir. 1979).¹

¹ In some cases involving wages or benefits, courts have intoned the general rule about financial injury without acknowledging the exception, perhaps because the exception did not apply on

5. The balance of hardships and the public interest almost certainly support some form of preliminary injunctive relief. *See, e.g., Golden Gate Restaurant Association v. City & County of San Francisco*, 512 F.3d 1112, 1126 (9th Cir. 2008) (“‘Faced with . . . a conflict between financial concerns and preventable human suffering, we have little difficulty concluding that the balance of hardships tips decidedly’ in favor of the latter.” (quoting *Lopez v. Heckler*, 713 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1983))). But it ultimately depends on the nature of the relief sought. At the hearing, the Court suggested that the parties participate in a settlement conference with a Magistrate Judge to carefully review and discuss the plaintiffs’ proposed preliminary injunction to ensure that it does not interfere with BofA’s operations more than is necessary to sufficiently minimize the risk of innocent cardholders being improperly deprived of their benefits, and also to carefully review and discuss the proposed injunction to ensure that it does not unduly hinder BofA from freezing the accounts of people who are likely to have obtained their cards through fraud. Both sides accepted this invitation. Accordingly, the case is referred to Judge Sallie Kim for a settlement conference to take place on May 26 and May 27, 2021. The parties are ordered to work as much as possible before the conference, including with one another, to maximize the chances of coming out of the conference with a joint proposal. A joint proposal or competing proposals should be filed with the Court no later than May 28. As stated at the hearing, BofA’s participation in this conference, which is designed primarily to ensure that any relief ordered is not overbroad, does not constitute a waiver of its right to challenge the validity any preliminary injunction that is ultimately issued.

those facts. *See, e.g., Hale v. Wood*, 89 F.3d 840 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Hale failed to establish a threat of irreparable harm because the injuries he alleged as the basis for his claim for relief—wrongfully withheld wages, statutorily inadequate wages, and termination of his work assignment—were compensable through his section 1983 claim for money damages.”); *Johnson v. City of San Francisco*, 2010 WL 3078635, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2010) (“Lost wages alone do not constitute a claim for irreparable harm as money damages would be sufficient to remedy the wrong should one ultimately be found to have been committed.”); *see also Ahuruonye v. U.S. Department of Interior*, 312 F. Supp. 3d 1, 23-24 (D.D.C. 2018). But those cases should not be read to suggest that the loss of wages or benefits can never constitute irreparable harm. When a case involves the deprivation of wages or benefits to low-income people living hand to mouth, a preliminary injunction may well be warranted (depending, of course, upon the strength of the plaintiffs’ claims on the merits and other factors).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 17, 2021



VINCE CHHABRIA
United States District Judge

EXHIBIT B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JENNIFER YICK, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.,

Defendant.

Case No. 21-cv-00376-VC

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Re: Dkt. Nos. 64, 100

With the assistance of Magistrate Judge Kim, the plaintiffs and defendants worked together to craft preliminary injunction language that is designed to protect the class members from future harm while minimizing disruption to the defendant's operations. This language is an improvement over what was presented by the plaintiffs in support of their motion. The hardship to the defendant from this injunction is outweighed by its benefits to the class members. The injunction is also in the public interest. Accordingly, in accordance with the language submitted by the parties, and for the reasons discussed in the order issued on May 17, 2021:

Bank of America, N.A. (the "Bank"), and the Bank's officers, directors, agents, employees, representatives, and all persons acting under, in concert or participation with, or for them ("Defendant") are preliminarily enjoined in the administration of prepaid debit cards for Employment Development Department ("EDD") unemployment or disability benefits issued by Defendant to members of the certified class as follows:

(1) Defendant shall be prohibited from considering the results of the Bank's initial automated claims fraud filter (Claim Fraud Filter) in investigating or resolving unauthorized transaction error claims (*see* 12 C.F.R. 1005.11) (Claims).

(2) a. Defendant shall be prohibited from denying or closing Claims or denying provisional or permanent credit to claimants' accounts without conducting and concluding an investigation into the alleged unauthorized transaction, pursuant to EFTA and Regulation E.

b. Defendant shall be prohibited from denying or closing claims without providing the claimant a written explanation of the findings of its investigation, pursuant to EFTA and Regulation E.

(3) Defendant shall not consider the results of the Bank's Claim Fraud Filter as a basis for freezing card accounts of any Class Member.

(4) a. Beginning ten (10) days after the entry of this Order, Defendant shall reopen any Claim that it closed or denied based solely upon the results of its Claim Fraud Filter and that it has not previously paid or previously reopened and investigated (Previously Closed Claim). Defendant may stagger the reopening of such Claims in roughly equal amounts over thirty (30) additional days.

b. For Previously Closed Claims filed by a class member who has not yet authenticated their identity through either EDD (in the knowledge of the Bank) or the Bank, Defendant shall, within ten (10) days of reopening, and thereafter at least weekly for five weeks, send the class member a written notice (by mail and email, if available) explaining the basis for the original denial; that the claim has been reopened; what steps they need to take to authenticate their identity (which may include presenting identification at a Bank branch or by calling the dedicated toll free number for the Fraud Call Center referred to in paragraph 9); that if they do not authenticate their identity within 45 calendar days of the original notice, the claim will be denied; and that if they authenticate their identity, the Bank will commence and complete the investigation and resolve the claim within 45 calendar days of the authentication and, if such claim has not been resolved within 10 business days of the authentication, provide provisional credit in the amount of the alleged error(s) to the account. Persons subject to this Paragraph 4(b) are subject to Paragraph 5(a) if they authenticate.

(5) a. For Previously Closed Claims that were filed by a class member who has

authenticated their identity through either EDD (in the knowledge of the Bank) or the Bank, Defendant shall complete the investigation and resolve the claim within 45 calendar days of the entry of this Order (or of the date the class member authenticates their identity, if later) and, if the claim has not been resolved within 10 business days of the entry of this Order (or of the date the class member authenticates their identity, if later), provide provisional credit in the amount of the alleged error(s).

b. For any Previously Closed Claims that were filed by a class member who has authenticated their identity through either EDD (in the knowledge of the Bank) or the Bank, but the Claim has never been reopened, Defendant shall reopen such Claim within ten (10) days of the entry of this Order and Defendant shall complete the investigation and resolve the claim within 45 calendar days of reopening and, if the claim has not been resolved within 10 business days of reopening, provide provisional credit in the amount of the alleged error(s).

(6) In addition to Claims that Defendant reopens pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5(b), Defendant shall, upon request from the affected cardholder, reopen any Claim that it closed or denied on or after January 1, 2020.

(7) Within 10 days of the entry of this Order (by mail and email, if available) or after the date of the blocking (by mail, within three (3) business days, and email, if available, within one (1) business day), whichever is later, Defendant shall give written notice to class members whose accounts are blocked solely based upon its Claims Fraud Filter that explains that the Bank will promptly unblock their account if the class member authenticates their identity. The written notice shall explain: the basis for the previous block; what steps the class member needs to take to authenticate their identity (which may include presenting identification at a Bank branch or by calling the dedicated toll free number at the Fraud Call Center referred to in paragraph 9); that if they do not authenticate their identity, their account will remain blocked or will be closed; and that they have the right to ask EDD to issue future benefits payments by paper check instead of by the Bank Debit Card.

(8) Defendant shall:

a. As soon as practicable, and in no event later than twenty (20) days of the entry of this Order, establish a dedicated toll-free number to enable class members to directly reach the Claims Initiation Call Center, which shall be staffed by customer service representatives (CSRs) who are trained to handle Claims intake;

b. Within thirty (30) days of the entry of this Order, the Claims Initiation Call Center hours to receive calls shall consist of at least fourteen (14) hours on weekdays and ten (10) hours on Saturdays, which shall be expanded within forty-five days of the entry of this Order to include ten (10) hours on Sundays, and expanded within sixty days of the entry of this Order to include 24 hours per day, 7 days per week coverage; and

c. As soon as practicable after the establishment and successful testing of the dedicated toll-free number for the Claims Initiation Call Center, but in no event later than ten (10) days thereafter, and at least monthly thereafter, provide written notices (by mail and email, if available) to all class members regarding the available toll free number and providing the information in paragraphs 6, and (8)(a) and (b).

(9) Defendant shall:

a. As soon as practicable, and in no event later than twenty (20) days after the entry of this Order, establish a dedicated toll-free number to enable class members to directly reach the Fraud Call Center, which shall be available 24 hours per day, 7 days per week, and which shall be staffed by CSRs who are trained to authenticate identity and resolve challenges to blocked accounts.

b. As soon as practicable after the establishment and successful testing of the dedicated toll-free number for the Fraud Call Center, but in no event later than ten (10) days thereafter, and thereafter at least weekly, provide written notice (by mail and email, if available) to all class members whose accounts are blocked of the availability of this dedicated toll-free number.

(10) Defendant shall, within 20 days of the entry of this Order:

a. Staff the Claims Initiation Call Center and Fraud Call Centers, such that the average speed to answer calls from Class Members for these centers is no more than five minutes, 90% of

the time, separately measured for the Claims Initiation and Fraud Call Centers and based on all callers to such centers (rather than just calls by Class Members).

b. Train and require CSRs in the Claims Initiation Call Center to request email contact information from a claimant at the time a claim is filed (if email is not already available for that claimant), so that the Bank may use that information to contact the claimant regarding authentication, if and to the extent this is consented to by EDD.

c. Train and require CSRs in the Fraud Call Center to immediately inform cardholders who are unable to authenticate their identity by phone that they have the option of authenticating their identity at a Bank branch.

(11) Within 10 business days of the entry of this Order, Defendants shall provide email and mail notice to all Class Members of their rights under paragraphs (1) through (7) of this Order.

(12) Paragraphs 2 and 4 of this Order shall not apply to,

a. Claims made with respect to accounts that EDD has found to be disqualified or not entitled to benefits, or has requested an account freeze; or

b. Claims made with respect to accounts that Defendant has frozen or blocked based on (i) receipt of legal process or (ii) information provided or made available by law enforcement, or (iii) the outcome of an investigation of suspicious facts and circumstances related to an individual cardholder developed independent of the Claim (if such cardholder has been sent a notice that the action has occurred and a statement of what the cardholder can do in response).

Defendant shall implement the requirement of paragraph 1 as soon as practicable but in no event more than seven (7) days from the entry of this Order.

There shall be no bond required.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 2, 2021



VINCE CHHABRIA
United States District Judge