

1 TRACY L. WILKISON
Acting United States Attorney
2 SCOTT M. GARRINGER
Assistant United States Attorney
3 Chief, Criminal Division
SCOTT PAETTY (Cal. Bar No. 274719)
4 CATHERINE AHN (Cal. Bar No. 248286)
BRIAN FAERSTEIN (Cal. Bar No. 274850)
5 Assistant United States Attorneys
Major Frauds/Environmental and Community Safety Crimes Sections
6 1100/1300 United States Courthouse
312 North Spring Street
7 Los Angeles, California 90012
Telephone: (213) 894-6527/2424/3819
8 Facsimile: (213) 894-6269/0141
E-mail: Scott.Paetty@usdoj.gov
9 Catherine.S.Ahn@usdoj.gov
Brian.Faerstein@usdoj.gov

10 DANIEL S. KAHN
Acting Chief, Fraud Section
11 Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice
CHRISTOPHER FENTON
12 Trial Attorney, Fraud Section
Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice
13 1400 New York Avenue NW, 3rd Floor
Washington, DC 20530
14 Telephone: (202) 320-0539
Facsimile: (202) 514-0152
15 E-mail: Christopher.Fenton@usdoj.gov

16 Attorneys for Plaintiff
17 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

18 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

19 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

20 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

21 Plaintiff,

22 v.

23 RICHARD AYVAZYAN,
aka "Richard Avazian" and
24 "Iuliia Zhadko,"
MARIETTA TERABELIAN,
25 aka "Marietta Abelian" and
"Viktoria Kauichko,"
26 ARTUR AYVAZYAN,
aka "Arthur Ayvazyan," and
27 TAMARA DADYAN,
MANUK GRIGORYAN,
28 aka "Mike Grigoryan," and

No. CR 20-579 (A) -SVW

GOVERNMENT'S MOTION IN LIMINE #2
TO ADMIT EVIDENCE INEXTRICABLY
INTERTWINED WITH THE CHARGED
OFFENSES; DECLARATION OF CATHERINE
AHN; AND EXHIBITS 1-4 (FILED UNDER
SEAL)

Hearing Date: June 14, 2021
Hearing Time: 11:00 a.m.
Trial Date: June 15, 2021
Location: Courtroom of the
Hon. Stephen V.
Wilson

1 "Anton Kudiumov,"
2 ARMAN HAYRAPETYAN,
3 EDVARD PARONYAN,
4 aka "Edvard Paronian" and
5 "Edward Paronyan," and
6 VAHE DADYAN,
7
8 Defendants.

9 Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel
10 of record, the Acting United States Attorney for the Central
11 District of California, Assistant United States Attorneys Scott
12 Paetty, Catherine Ahn, and Brian Faerstein, and Department of
13 Justice Trial Attorney Christopher Fenton, hereby files this motion
14 in limine seeking admission of evidence inextricably intertwined
15 with the bank fraud and wire fraud and money laundering conspiracies
16 and schemes charged in the First Superseding Indictment.

17 This motion is based upon the attached memorandum of points and
18 authorities, the attached declaration and exhibits, the files and
19 records in this case, and such further evidence and argument as the
20 Court may permit.

21 Dated: May 31, 2021

Respectfully submitted,

22 TRACY L. WILKISON
23 Acting United States Attorney

24 SCOTT M. GARRINGER
25 Assistant United States Attorney
26 Chief, Criminal Division

27 /s/
28 CATHERINE AHN
SCOTT PAETTY
BRIAN FAERSTEIN
Assistant United States Attorneys
CHRISTOPHER FENTON
Department of Justice Trial Attorney

Attorneys for Plaintiff
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.....	ii
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES.....	1
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY.....	2
A. The Charged Conduct.....	2
B. Defendants' Possession of Fraudulent Identification Documents, Credit and Debit Cards, Account Information, Notary Stamps, Business Information, and Cash.....	5
III. ARGUMENT.....	7
A. Evidence of Defendants' Possession of Reserve Identities and Supporting Instruments of Fraud is Inextricably Intertwined with the Charged Offenses..	7
1. The Reserve Identity Evidence is Inextricably Intertwined with the Fraud Conspiracy and Schemes.....	7
2. The Reserve Evidence is Inextricably Intertwined with the Money Laundering Conspiracy and Scheme	17
3. The Approximately \$450,000 in Cash Found at R. Ayvazyan and Terabelian's Residence Is Admissible.....	21
B. The Reserve Evidence Is Inextricably Intertwined with the Charged Offenses Even If They Could be Used for Other, Uncharged Crimes.....	22
C. Even if Rule 404(b) Applied, the Evidence Would be Admissible.....	23
IV. CONCLUSION.....	24

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

<u>United States v. Bailey</u> , 696 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2012).....	24
<u>United States v. Daly</u> , 974 F.2d 1215 (9th Cir. 1992).....	22
<u>United States v. Dorsey</u> , 677 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2012).....	21
<u>United States v. Lague</u> , 971 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2020).....	24
<u>United States v. Lillard</u> , 354 F.3d 850 (9th Cir.2003).....	16
<u>United States v. Lo</u> , 839 F.3d 777 (9th Cir. 2016).....	17
<u>United States v. Loftis</u> , 843 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2016)....	16, 17, 21
<u>United States v. Montgomery</u> , 384 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2004).....	15
<u>United States v. Vizcarra-Martinez</u> , 66 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1995).....	16
<u>United States v. Ward</u> , 197 F.3d 1076 (11th Cir. 1999).....	23
<u>United States v. Williams</u> , 989 F.2d 1061 (9th Cir. 1993).....	16, 23

STATUTES

Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).....	passim
---------------------------	--------

OTHER AUTHORITIES

U.S. Small Businesses Adminsitration, “Paycheck Protection Program Frequently Asked Questions,” (June 25, 2020).....	4
--	---

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

The government respectfully moves this Court for a finding that evidence of defendants' possession and creation of stolen or synthetic identities, which were collocated with stolen or synthetic identities directly used to obtain fraudulent COVID-19 disaster relief loans, are inextricably intertwined with the charged offenses. As evidenced by the conconspirators' own text message conversations, such evidence is not within the scope of Fed. R. Evid. ("Rule") 404(b) and may be used by the government to prove the charged fraud and money laundering conspiracies and schemes.¹

On November 5, 2020, federal agents searched a residence that proved to be the headquarters of a massive criminal conspiracy. The home - which belonged to defendants Tamara Dadyan ("T. Dadyan") and Artur Ayvazyan ("A. Ayvazyan") - contained all the parts for an assembly line to produce fraudulent loan applications and then conceal and spend the fraudulently obtained proceeds. These parts include physical and digital evidence of identification documents, social security cards, credit and debit cards, email and online account information, checks/checkbooks, notary stamps and official seals belonging to individuals other than the defendants, all found in and around the same location within the home. Similar and related evidence was also found on the iPhones belonging to defendants T. Dadyan, A. Ayvazyan, Richard Ayvazyan ("R. Ayvazyan"), and Marietta Terabelian ("Terabelian"), as well as at other

¹ In light of the increased safety concerns associated with COVID-19, the government is seeking to anticipate and resolve evidentiary issues before trial so as to avoid lengthy sidebars with counsel for the defendants proceeding to trial.

1 residences used by other defendants who participated in the
2 conspiracies, demonstrating that the defendants shared these tools
3 and worked together towards common criminal objectives.

4 At trial, the government seeks to introduce evidence of this
5 assembly line for fraud, including both the evidence of identities
6 directly used to fraudulently obtain and use the loan proceeds
7 described in the FSI ("directly used identities") and evidence
8 relating to additional stolen or synthetic identities and their
9 supporting instruments of fraud, to include fraudulent
10 identification documents, checks/checkbooks, credit and debit cards,
11 purported official records or certifying instruments, and related
12 email and online accounts ("reserve identities"). These identities
13 were interchangeable components of the fraudulent schemes and
14 conspiracies. The government respectfully moves this Court to find
15 that defendants' possession and use of these reserve identities and
16 supporting instruments of fraud are inextricably intertwined with
17 the charged offenses and are not subject to Rule 404(b). As such,
18 this evidence is admissible during the government's case-in-chief,
19 even if it relates to an identity that was not directly used to
20 apply for a fraudulent COVID-19 disaster relief loan.

21 **II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

22 **A. The Charged Conduct**

23 Defendants are charged with conspiracy to commit bank fraud and
24 wire fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, bank fraud and
25 attempted bank fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, and - for
26 certain defendants - aggravated identity theft, concealment money
27 laundering, and committing an offense while on pre-trial release.
28 (See FSI, generally (ECF 154).) The government alleged that the

1 conspiracy began no later than in or around March 2020 and continued
2 until at least in or around August 2020 in Los Angeles County.

3 Specifically, defendants are charged with: (1) conspiring to
4 use, or cause the use, of stolen or fictitious individual and
5 business information to (2) submit materially false and misleading
6 information to the U.S. Small Business Administration, banks, and
7 lenders regarding (3) the business' eligibility for a COVID-19
8 disaster relief loan. Defendants lied or caused other defendants to
9 lie about the applying business' monthly payroll expenses,
10 employees, and even the names, status, and contact information for
11 the businesses and their purported owners or representatives. (See
12 e.g., FSI at ¶¶ 31, 33 (manner and means and overt acts of the bank
13 and wire fraud conspiracy).) Defendants submitted this information
14 through fraudulent PPP and EIDL applications using, among other
15 things, fraudulent identification cards, fraudulent social security
16 numbers, false or fictitious payroll reports, false or fictitious
17 federal employer tax identification numbers ("EINs"), and fraudulent
18 IRS tax forms. (Id.) By combining stolen and fictitious names,
19 dates of birth, and social security numbers, defendants were able to
20 create synthetic identities that could be used to create false
21 business names and entities. (Id. ¶ 1.)

22 Defendants further conspired to: (1) use, or cause the use, of
23 financial accounts, sometimes in the names of stolen or synthetic
24 identities and businesses, to (2) send and receive fraudulent loan
25 proceeds, and (3) use those proceeds for expenses prohibited by the
26 COVID-19 disaster relief loan programs. This conduct forms the
27 basis of the charged money laundering and money laundering
28 conspiracy counts. (Id. ¶¶ 53-54 (conspiracy) and 55-58 (individual

1 counts).) These expenses included the purchase of at least three
2 residential properties in Tarzana, Glendale, and Palm Desert using
3 fraudulent loan proceeds. (Id. ¶ 33 (Overt Acts 16, 24, 36, 41, 44,
4 49 and 53).)

5 Through this alleged conduct, defendants are charged with
6 conspiring to and committing bank fraud (Counts 1-12) and wire fraud
7 (Counts 1, 13-20), money laundering conspiracy (Count 26) and, for
8 certain defendants, aggravated identity theft (Counts 21-25),
9 concealment money laundering (Count 27), and money laundering
10 (Counts 28-32) and attempted bank fraud (Count 33) while on pre-
11 trial release. (See FSI, generally.)

12 As alleged in the FSI, defendants conspired to obtain COVID-19
13 disaster relief funds intended to help workers stay employed and
14 small businesses stay open through the pandemic. (Id. ¶ 10.) The
15 U.S. Small Business Administration ("SBA") distributed these funds
16 through the Paycheck Protection Program ("PPP"), which relied on
17 third-party lenders and processors to accept, review, and fund PPP
18 loans, as well as the Economic Injury Disaster Loan ("EIDL")
19 program, which was directly administered by the SBA. (Id. ¶¶ 10-18,
20 33, 53.) Business applicants were expected to provide their monthly
21 payroll and operational expenses, number of employees, and proof of
22 those expenses through a payroll report or relevant tax forms, such
23 as an IRS Schedule C, Form 940, or Form 941. (See SBA, "Paycheck
24 Protection Program Frequently Asked Questions," Q1 and 10 (June 25,
25 2020) (available at [https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2020-
26 06/Paycheck-Protection-Program-Frequently-Asked-Questions%20062520-
27 508.pdf](https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2020-06/Paycheck-Protection-Program-Frequently-Asked-Questions%20062520-508.pdf).) The amount of money a business was eligible to receive
28 depended on these self-reported expenses, and businesses were

1 required to use that money towards business, and not personal,
2 expenses. (FSI ¶¶ 11, 13, 17-18.)

3 **B. Defendants' Possession of Fraudulent Identification**
4 **Documents, Credit and Debit Cards, Account Information,**
5 **Notary Stamps, Business Information, and Cash**

6 In November 2020, the government executed residential search
7 warrants and seized several categories of evidence² related to the
8 charged offenses, examples of which are described below:

- 9 1) Fraudulent California Driver's Licenses ("CADLs"), social
10 security cards, and debit and credit cards in the names of
11 individuals other than defendants, including multiple CADLs
12 bearing the same name but different photos (see e.g.,
13 Fenton Decl. (ECF 207) Exh. 8 and Fenton Decl. (ECF 188)
14 Exh. 12);
- 15 2) Blank checks and checkbooks, including checks printed on
16 the wrong side of check paper, indicating manufacture (see
17 e.g., Exh. 1 (filed under seal) (see also Decl. of
18 Catherine Ahn); see also Fenton Decl. (ECF 207) Exh. 12);
- 19 3) Lists of email addresses and user account information with
20 associated passwords, including a page titled, "TAMMY INFO
21 FOR MLS ECT" (sic) with login information for "Tloxp.com"³
22 and "Secureline tax ID" (See Fenton Decl. (ECF 207), Exh.
23 10; see also Exh. 2 (filed under seal));

24 ² See Gov't Opposition to R. Ayvazyan and M. Terabelian's Motion
25 to Suppress (ECF 188) at 2-4, 6, 10-11 and Exh. 8 - 12 attached to
26 Fenton Decl. (filed under seal); Gov't. Opposition to A. Ayvazyan
and T. Dadyan's Motion to Suppress (ECF 207) at 2-4, 6, 11 and Exh.
8 and 10-13 attached to Fenton Decl. (filed under seal).

27 ³ TLOxp is an online subscription database that provides "an
28 efficient way to uncover, locate and verify information on
individuals and businesses . . ." (TransUnion, Products, TLOxp
(available at <https://www.transunion.com/product/tloxp>).)

1 4) Seals for various state and federal agencies and notary
2 stamps in the names of individuals other than defendants
3 (See Fenton Decl. (ECF 207), Exh. 13); and
4 5) Approximately \$450,000 in cash found in a bush outside
5 R. Ayvazyan and Terabelian's residence (see Fenton Decl.
6 (ECF 188) Exh. 8);
7 (collectively, the "seized evidence").

8 In addition to the above categories of seized evidence, the
9 government also seized digital devices during the November 2020
10 residential searches. This includes an Apple iPhone X found at
11 A. Ayvazyan and T. Dadyan's residence with an Apple ID that included
12 T. Dadyan's name (the "T.D. iPhone").⁴ The T.D. iPhone contained
13 photos, internet history, and files, as well as text messages from
14 "tammy" to "Rich New." T-Mobile subscriber records identified the
15 subscriber of the "Rich New" telephone number as "Iulia Zhadko," a
16 synthetic identity defendant R. Ayvazyan is alleged to have used on
17 PPP and EIDL applications, bank accounts, digital currency accounts,
18 and to purchase a residential property in Glendale. (See FSI, ¶¶ 1,
19 2, 22, 33 (Overt Acts 19, 41, 42, 53, 59-61), and 58.)

20 These messages include, among other things, explicit
21 discussions of how to submit PPP and EIDL applications; using
22 databases, websites, and coached explanations to obtain Employer
23 Identification Numbers ("EINs") for businesses; changing those EINs
24 by one digit when submitting an application; "fixing" bank
25 statements to match claimed payroll expenses; creating payroll
26

27
28 ⁴ A forensic copy of the T.D. iPhone and a searchable report of
its readable contents, post-filter review, were produced to
defendants with Bates no. DOJ_PROD_0000160626.

1 reports allegedly produced by payroll service provider Gusto; and
2 the use of dead individuals' names and credit scores to meet lender
3 requirements. (See T.D. iPhone Excerpts 1-8, infra.⁵) The messages
4 further show how coconspirators convinced banks and lenders to
5 release frozen accounts or funds; contain discussions regarding who
6 should receive money from accounts into which fraudulent proceeds
7 had been deposited; and how much each should receive. (Id.)

8 **III. ARGUMENT**

9 **A. Evidence of Defendants' Possession of Reserve Identities** 10 **and Supporting Instruments of Fraud is Inextricably** 11 **Intertwined with the Charged Offenses**

12 1. The Reserve Identity Evidence is Inextricably 13 Intertwined with the Fraud Conspiracy and Schemes

14 a. *The T.D. iPhone Messages Reveal the* 15 *Coconspirators' Reliance on Reserve Identities* 16 *and Instruments of Fraud to Maintain the Fraud* 17 *Conspiracy and Schemes*

18 Defendants used a plethora of names, identification cards,
19 identification numbers, and business identifiers - some real, some
20 fake, and some a synthetic combination of the two - to execute the
21 charged conspiracies and schemes. (See FSI, generally.) The
22 diversity of identities used in the PPP and EIDL fraud evince a
23 ready supply of information and tools to manufacture and validate
24 synthetic identities. The plethora of fraudulent identification
25 cards, credit and debit cards, checks/checkbooks, seals, and notary
26 stamps in names of individuals other than defendants' found in one
27 of their homes confirms this. Furthermore, as revealed by the T.D.
28 iPhone text messages, the defendants needed access to a ready supply

⁵ The government has only provided selected excerpts relevant to this motion and will identify the messages it intends to introduce by the Court's June 1, 2021 trial exhibit deadline.

1 of personal and business information to execute the fraud schemes
2 and conspiracy. This information was further needed to open new
3 bank accounts when previous accounts were flagged for fraud. These
4 fake, stolen, and synthetic identities were all fungible: to the
5 extent one identity did not work, defendants simply grabbed the next
6 available one. As such, even when they weren't directly used, the
7 evidence found during the residential searches is inextricably
8 intertwined with the charged offenses. They are therefore not
9 subject to analysis or exclusion under Rule 404(b) and should be
10 deemed admissible, subject to other evidentiary rules.⁶

11 Although the FSI focuses on the use and submission of stolen
12 and synthetic identities and fraudulent documentation, possession of
13 such personal and business information is a factual and logical
14 predicate to their use and submission, as charged. Furthermore, the
15 common possession and sharing of such information ties different
16 members of the conspiracy together. Similarities between
17 purportedly different PPP and EIDL applications show a common hand
18 in their preparation; the text messages retrieved from the T.D.
19 iPhone confirm it. These messages show that coconspirators relied
20 on a ready supply of preexisting identities, businesses, and
21 accounts to submit or cause the submission of fraudulent PPP and
22 EIDL applications, and then receive and transfer the proceeds. Text
23 messages between "tammy" and "Rich New" discussing submissions to
24 Bluevine, an SBA-authorized PPP lender, reveal this approach:

25
26 ⁶ To be clear, the government is not seeking a ruling on the
27 admissibility of evidence with identities directly used in the PPP
28 or EIDL fraud and related transactions (the directly used
identities). Such evidence is already intrinsic to the charged
offenses and therefore not evidence of other acts. This includes
defendants' communications in furtherance of the charged offenses.

T.D. iPhone Excerpt 1 (May 1, 2020⁷) :

#	From	Body
2487	+17473334170 Rich New	Go to bluevine.com right now and apply they are approving and closing within 24 hours
2488	+18184145533 tammy	With same info
2489	+17473334170 Rich New	Ya just change your EIN by one number
2490	+18184145533 tammy	Ohh and then they will come favk say they dint gave it
2491	+17473334170 Rich New	I did 7 apps last night and 4 of them got email that it's funded
2492	+18184145533 tammy	So I just change the last digit of tax I'd only while applying what about when I have to uplaod
2493	+18184145533 tammy	940 941 keep it sane
2494	+17473334170 Rich New	Ya change that too and give different account
2495	+17473334170 Rich New	I didn't sleep all night I was working 24 hours straight
2498	+18184145533 tammy	Wants statements
2499	+18184145533 tammy	February
2500	+18184145533 tammy	I don't have that's much activity there
2501	+18184145533 tammy	Should I upload
2502	+17473334170 Rich New	So fix it
2503	+17473334170 Rich New	Actually ya upload it
2504	+18184145533 tammy	Like fix it to match the payroll

Within minutes, the parties discussed how to obtain more business EINs through password-protected databases and websites:

T.D. iPhone Excerpt 2 (May 1, 2020) :

#	From	Body
2515	+17473334170 Rich New	Tam is there any way we can get EIN number for business on Tlo
2516	+18184145533 tammy	Tax Id
2517	+17473334170 Rich New	Ya
2518	+18184145533 tammy	Yah even with sole proprietor
2519	+17473334170 Rich New	U serious
2520	+17473334170 Rich New	How do I search
2521	+18184145533 tammy	Hesa I'll send u
2522	+18184145533 tammy	But listen
2523	+18184145533 tammy	I have 4 total accounts 2 for abc 2 for secureline
2524	+18184145533 tammy	And Commerica is a smaller bank no than wells ? And they email me to apply but I have no money in that account

⁷ Dates/Times are based on Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), which is approximately eight hours ahead of Pacific Standard Time. The columns show, from left to right, the internal number assigned to the text message, the sender of the text, and its content.

1	2525	+18184145533 tammy	rye925 - PIN
2			TLOxp Online
3			Reply HELP for help, Reply STOP to cancel.
4			Msg&data rates may apply.
5	2526	+17473334170 Rich New	It doesn't matter you can be running payroll from different accounts
6	2527	+18184145533 tammy	So
7			Then why do I have to fix statements for
8			This idiot blue what ever
9	2528	+17473334170 Rich New	You don't I just did it anyway. They ask for statements to verify your bank account
10	2532	+18184145533 tammy	[TAX ID ON JUST THE NAME.pdf] ⁸
11	2533	+18184145533 tammy	https://irs-taxid-numbers.com/
12	2534	+17473334170 Rich New	I don't need to file I need to check
13	2537	+17473334170 Rich New	Like I need the number
14	2538	+17473334170 Rich New	I have the business name
15	2539	+18184145533 tammy	Ohhhhh Jesus u can call them if u have all their info
16	2540	+18184145533 tammy	Let me ask ara hold on
17	2541	+18184145533 tammy	Rich best way is to tlo the business name then call franchise tax or wherever gives u the tax I'd say my cpa is not working I need to verify my tax if
18	2542	+18184145533 tammy	Id
19	2543	+17473334170 Rich New	Ya I did it didn't show
20	2544	+18184145533 tammy	I'll know morning from cpa
21	2545	+18184145533 tammy	Don't forget send me the statement from ur payroll
22	2546	+17473334170 Rich New	Use the bank statement I gave you for iuliia
23	2547	+17473334170 Rich New	I gave you 3 months there is February in there. Use that
24	2548	+17473334170 Rich New	The one I send you you is wells
25	2549	+17473334170 Rich New	They don't check for shit Tam. It's all automated. They request the statement to verify the account exists

Not only did "Rich New" expressly mention "iuliia," R. Ayvazyan's alleged alias, the shared use of fraudulent payroll records created using preexisting synthetic identities and accounts is further evidence of the conspiracy. Defendants R. Ayvazyan and T. Dadyan shared such information with the other defendants, as well. For example, the government intends to prove at trial that

⁸ The names of images or files sent by text are identified in red bracketed font.

fraudulent loan applications associated with defendants R. Ayvazyan, Terabelian, T. Dadyan, and A. Ayvazyan: (1) reported the same payroll and/or unemployment tax numbers, down to the penny; (2) used the same types of fraudulent payroll reports and/or federal tax forms as fraudulent loan applications associated with defendants Manuk Grigoryan, Edvard Paronyan, and Vahe Dadyan; and (3) sought the same amounts from the same banks around the same time period, and then shared the proceeds. Such coordination is the hallmark of conspiracy.

Defendants' reliance on pre-existing accounts to develop fraudulent PPP or EIDL applications was not limited to business identities. As shown below, they also drew from a preexisting supply of individual identities, including those of the dead, to meet lender criteria. Exchanges like the below demonstrate that defendants viewed these many identities as fungible:

T.D. iPhone Excerpt 3 (May 28, 2020):

#	From	Body
2943	+17473334170 Rich New	Btw I got one today on a personal account
2944	+18184145533 tammy	From ? Bluevibe ?
2945	+17473334170 Rich New	No from Liberty SBF to a guys US bank personal
2946	+18184145533 tammy	How long it took
2947	+18184145533 tammy	I have 3 million ending with bluevine no response
2948	+18184145533 tammy	Since 5/8 I reapplied Nd still nothing
2949	+17473334170 Rich New	This one took probably 2 weeks
2950	+18184145533 tammy	[2019 Form 940 TQ.pdf]
2951	+18184145533 tammy	[Form 941 (Rev. January 2019)TQ.pdf]
2952	+18184145533 tammy	Is this a dude's face one u used
2953	+18184145533 tammy	I didn't use this one the one I have is the same one this guy changed the numbers on I don't want to give all same exact numbers
2954	+17473334170 Rich New	Ya don't use all same
2955	+17473334170 Rich New	I have like 3 different ones
2956	+18184145533 tammy	On that one what's the payroll amount

2957	+17473334170 Rich New	But honestly I'm not doing those anymore. The getting hard to do now
2958	+17473334170 Rich New	That one is like 180k loan
2959	+17473334170 Rich New	I applied yesterday
2960	+18184145533 tammy	Should I redo this so with osbaldo or alak name then do it ? [IMG_5307.PNG] [IMG_5308.PNG]
2961	+17473334170 Rich New	Ya but this is credit based remember. Put it on someone that has at least like 640 fico
2962	+18184145533 tammy	I have alak
2963	+18184145533 tammy	High fico
2964	+18184145533 tammy	I think
2965	+17473334170 Rich New	Call me
2966	+18184145533 tammy	[Credit sesame screenshot.jpg]
2967	+17473334170 Rich New	Your good
2968	+18184145533 tammy	That's alak not me 😊
2969	+17473334170 Rich New	You can do 2 on this guy
2970	+18184145533 tammy	Let's go the fool is dead on armo land
2971	+17473334170 Rich New	Ok he has personal accounts?
2972	+18184145533 tammy	Yes wells
2973	+18184145533 tammy	Can't u check see if rojellio account open wut is we have his account checks here from us bank

Furthermore, as indicated in the last message above, defendants used checks, check images, and bank statements in their possession to help transfer funds as part of the overall scheme and conspiracy. Defendants used check images to help wire money to coconspirators after an account received PPP or EIDL funds. (See T.D. iPhone Excerpts 7 and 8, infra at 18-20; see also Exh. 1 and 4 (filed under seal).) Defendants even discussed how to print checks, when needed:

T.D. iPhone Excerpt 4 (July 28, 2020):

#	From	Body
3986	+18184145533 tammy	Rich u have a check from this [Fw Welcome to the Brighter Side of Banking.png]
3987	+17473334170 Rich New	Who's is that
3988	+18184145533 tammy	Some one I did but I need to make a voided check
3989	+18184145533 tammy	I don't have any I'll look in my office but If you find a check can u send me pic
3990	+17473334170 Rich New	Go to checkkeeper.com. Put the info and print one

1 Evidence found during the residential searches includes checks
2 printed on the wrong side of check paper. (See Exh. 1 at 2.)

3 The seized evidence from T. Dadyan and A. Ayvazyan's residence
4 also includes notary stamps and seals that were located in the same
5 room as fake identification documents, credit and debit cards,
6 fraudulent loan applications, and checks and checkbooks. As with so
7 many of the other instruments of fraud found at defendants' houses,
8 these notary stamps displayed names other than those of defendants.
9 Two of these names were used in fraudulent PPP or EIDL applications.
10 This includes a Bank of America PPP application for \$117,938
11 submitted by "Arsen Dadyan,"⁹ the supposed business representative of
12 ABC Realty Advisors, Inc., with a supposed average monthly payroll
13 of \$49,135.25 -- despite having no records of relevant IRS tax
14 filings in 2019.

15 Notary stamps and seals are used to indicate authenticity; they
16 verify the validity of a transaction or a public record that may be
17 relied on by third-parties. The T.D. iPhone messages reveal the
18 importance of using businesses with an ostensibly clean record. The
19 messages below show how the coconspirators reacted when it was
20 discovered that Secureline Realty and Funding, Inc. - a company that
21 T. Dadyan is alleged to have used to submit fraudulent PPP loans
22 (FSI ¶ 33 (Overt Acts 8-16)) - had been suspended by the Secretary
23 of State ("SOS"):

24 **T.D. iPhone Excerpt 5 (August 4, 2020):**

#	From	Body
4097	+17473334170 Rich New	Tam what's the password for Tlo
4098	+18184145533 tammy	Not working hold on

28 ⁹ This application was produced to defense as Bates no.
DOJ_PROD_000000005.pdf - DOJ_PROD_000000007.pdf

4099	+17473334170 Rich New	I put Arturo2020\$
4100	+17473334170 Rich New	But it's not working
4101	+18184145533 tammy	It's not babe they found Secureline sos suspended
4102	+17473334170 Rich New	U serious, so we can't run TLO
4103	+18184145533 tammy	U have a payroll report redacted or not for 11 people
4104	+17473334170 Rich New	Whatever I have you have aziz

The evidence shows that the coconspirators understood that lenders and retail banks required official-looking records to verify the coconspirators' relationship to a business, particularly when opening bank accounts. So the coconspirators created them. On or about September 16, 2020, "tammy" texted "Rich New" that a check she had written from Bank of the West to "abc really" [sic] was rejected and she had been on hold 60 minutes. She then described providing altered documentation of ownership to open an account at a new bank:

T.D. iPhone Excerpt 6 (Sept. 16-17, 2020):

#	From	Body
4708	+18184145533 tammy	His emailing me the one now am and am financial
4709	+18184145533 tammy	U get this he opened the account with my name
4710	+18184145533 tammy	But the Corp online everything belongs to Alak
4711	+18184145533 tammy	Public record no where me
4712	+17473334170 Rich New	So you just gave the articles?
4713	+18184145533 tammy	Nope I did stock purchase agreement
4714	+18184145533 tammy	And the papers showing I changed online the statement of info but I didn't
4715	+18184145533 tammy	It's only printout
4716	+18184145533 tammy	And email from them says ur email received allow 72 hours or something to update
4721	+18184145533 tammy	Rich I Have the other ones
4722	+18184145533 tammy	U want to check
4723	+18184145533 tammy	The shit load I gave u befor to old cell
4724	+18184145533 tammy	Should I email
4725	+18184145533 tammy	Rich is my
4726	+18184145533 tammy	I opened 3 accounts

The above conversation is an explicit example of how, when one account or identity can no longer be used, the coconspirators used

1 preexisting business and individual identities to continue the
2 fraud. This is because these identities are interchangeable. As
3 such, their possession of reserve identities and related instruments
4 of fraud (checks/checkbooks, email accounts, etc.) are inextricably
5 intertwined with the conspiracy.

6 The T.D. iPhone messages further reveal the coconspirators'
7 reliance on shared access to email accounts in the names of stolen
8 or synthetic identities to further the conspiracy. Not only were
9 emails useful for verifying new accounts, the mere existence of an
10 email account could help validate a false or stolen identity.

11 For example, on or about July 28, 2020, "tammy" and "Rich New"
12 discussed what supporting documentation to use for "LK Designs," a
13 business purportedly owned by L.K. During that discussion, "tammy"
14 sent "Rich New" a modified payroll report bearing numerous names,
15 dates of birth, social security numbers, and associated email
16 accounts with the telling message, "See if better I fixed the
17 socials that were the same" (sic). (See Exh. 3 (filed under seal).)
18 As indicated by that message, the information contained in that
19 payroll report was fake, but doctoring the information to create
20 the appearance of real people was key to executing the fraud scheme
21 and conspiracy.

22 *b. The Reserve Identity Evidence is Admissible*
23 *under Ninth Circuit Precedent*

24 Under well-established Ninth Circuit precedent, offenses or
25 acts that form the basis of a conspiracy are "inextricably
26 intertwined" with that conspiracy and are therefore admissible,
27 without regard to Rule 404(b). See United States v. Montgomery, 384
28 F.3d 1050, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 2004) (summary exhibit admissible

1 because it detailed acts that were inextricably intertwined with the
2 conspiracy) (citing United States v. Williams, 989 F.2d 1061 (9th
3 Cir. 1993), United States v. Lillard, 354 F.3d 850 (9th Cir.2003),
4 and United States v. Vizcarra-Martinez, 66 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir.
5 1995)). As described above, defendants' possession of reserve
6 identities and their related instruments of fraud is inextricably
7 intertwined with the charged conspiracy and schemes. They each form
8 a part of the synthetic identity assembly line that enabled
9 defendants to conspire to, and commit, PPP and EIDL fraud. It
10 further enabled them to access and/or open accounts necessary to
11 receive and transfer the proceeds of that fraud. This is true even
12 if the evidence relates to specific names that were not directly
13 used in PPP or EIDL applications because it is proof of the manner
14 and means of the conspiracy, the relationship between the
15 coconspirators, and their respective roles in that conspiracy.

16 Such evidence would be admissible even when analyzed through
17 the lens of a charged fraud scheme, rather than a fraud conspiracy.
18 In United States v. Loftis, the Ninth Circuit applied the concept of
19 inextricably intertwined evidence to wire fraud. 843 F.3d 1173,
20 1177 (9th Cir. 2016). Before trial, the government indicated its
21 intent to present evidence from investor victims, wires, and
22 geographic locations that were not specifically referenced in the
23 indictment. Id. at 1175-76. The district court partially granted
24 defendant's motion to exclude on the basis that these were "other
25 wire frauds" not charged in the indictment. Id. at 1175-76. The
26 Ninth Circuit reversed, extending to wire fraud the principle that
27 "direct evidence of the ongoing conspiracy charged in the
28 indictment" was not subject to Rule 404(b). Id. at 1176-77.

1 Instead, the Ninth Circuit pointed to its holding in United States
2 v. Lo, 839 F.3d 777, 793 (9th Cir. 2016), to state that since the
3 commission of wire fraud “necessarily includes a fraudulent scheme
4 as a whole,” the additional evidence simply encompassed “additional
5 executions of the scheme that were not specifically charged.” The
6 government was not precluded from “introducing evidence of uncharged
7 transactions to prove the first element of wire fraud—the existence
8 of a scheme to defraud.” Loftis, 843 F.3d at 1176-77.

9 Similarly, defendants’ possession of the seized evidence is
10 encompassed in the charged fraud schemes and conspiracy. The
11 colocation of evidence with directly used and reserve identities
12 shows they were all part of the coconspirator’s approach to
13 manufacturing the evidence necessary to commit the charged offenses.
14 It proves the first element of wire fraud – the existence of the
15 coconspirators’ scheme to defraud by using an assembly line of false
16 and synthetic identities, businesses, supporting records and
17 certifying tools, and their access to related financial and online
18 accounts. The products of this assembly line were used in
19 furtherance of their conspiracy to obtain COVID-19 disaster relief
20 funds for their own personal expenses.

21 2. The Reserve Evidence is Inextricably Intertwined with
22 the Money Laundering Conspiracy and Scheme

23 Defendants are also charged with money laundering and money
24 laundering conspiracy. Specifically, they are charged with, among
25 other things, conducting and attempting to conduct financial
26 transactions involving the proceeds of the wire fraud and bank fraud
27 conspiracy; namely, the fraudulent proceeds of the PPP and EIDL
28 applications described above. (See FSI ¶¶ 51-58.) As such,

evidence inextricably intertwined with the fraud and fraud conspiracy must also form an inextricably intertwined basis for the money laundering charges.

The seized evidence is also admissible to prove the alleged money laundering offenses, separate and apart from the money laundering conspiracy's dependence on the EIDL and PPP fraud. The government found checks, checkbooks, credit and debit cards and other financial records during the November 2020 residential searches. Photographs of checks, checkbooks, and credit and debit cards were also sent between coconspirators in text messages found on the T.D. iPhone. The text messages reveal that checks and account records were not only used to support fraudulent PPP and EIDL applications; photos of these documents were used to direct the receipt and transfer of the fraudulent proceeds in furtherance of the charged offenses to pay individual coconspirators. (FSI ¶ 53.)

For example, bank records show that on or about July 3, 2021, a New Acre Farm Produce account in the name of T.T. received \$210,000 from "Crb Bluevine Sba Loan."¹⁰ That same day, "tammy" sent "Rich New" a photo of the Runyan Tax Bank 2 account statement (see Exh. 4 at 1 (filed under seal)) with the following message:

T.D. iPhone Excerpt 7 (July 3, 2020):

#	From	Body
3504	+18184145533 tammy	I'm expecting a wire for Art for \$73500 [IMG_5861.jpg] (<u>See</u> Exh. 4 at 1.)
3505	+18184145533 tammy	And for me \$157
3506	+18184145533 tammy	How many times can people apple for the sister relief I feel like u can apply with different emails and different information
3507	+17473334170 Rich New	As many businesses as you have with different eins

¹⁰ Law enforcement agents found pre-signed copies of New Acre Farm Produce checks in T. Dadyan and A. Ayvazyan's residence. (See Fenton Decl. (ECF 207) Exh. 12.)

3508 +17473334170 Rich New Sorry, I can't talk right now.
 3509 +18184145533 tammy Send me the routing number for the Vahe wire
 3510 +18184145533 tammy [IMG_2124.jpeg] (See Exh. 4 at 2.)

The last image sent by "tammy" in the above conversation was of a wiring form showing the transfer of \$73,500 from T.T. of New Acre Farm Produce Inc. to Runyan Tax Service, Inc. (see Exh. 4 at 2). The form identified "Payroll New Acre Farm Produce" as its purpose, despite the text stating that the wire was expected for Art. Notably, on the day before this wire "tammy" told "Rich New" that someone was coming over and that, "I told art show him the decline letter from the eidl and it's simple its 35 percent for ppp." The \$73,500 "wire for Art" is 35% of the \$210,000 in SBA funds that had been deposited into the New Acre account. Bank records confirm that the wire was sent and received.

A similar discussion occurred on July 10, 2020, in which the parties sent images of checks to identify which accounts to use for wires and further discussed using checks as an alternative method by which the money could be transferred through "Art" (defendant T. Dadyan's husband and co-defendant is Artur Ayvazyan). (See T.D. iPhone Excerpt 8, below.)

T.D. iPhone Excerpt 8 (July 10, 2020):

#	From	Body
3639	+17473334170 Rich New	Oh ok. I wanna wire now
3640	+17473334170 Rich New	For Vahe
3641	+18184145533 tammy	Ok 👍
3642	+18184145533 tammy	U have info
3643	+17473334170 Rich New	It's that check right u send me
3644	+18184145533 tammy	[IMG_6569.jpeg]
3645	+17473334170 Rich New	This one [IMG_6512.jpg] (See Exh. 4 at 3.)
3646	+18184145533 tammy	I
3647	+17473334170 Rich New	What email should I put for him

3648	+18184145533 tammy	Vahe314@yahoo.com
3649	+17473334170 Rich New	It allows me only 25. So I sent 25
3650	+17473334170 Rich New	Do you want me to send from other place or he can wait we can send another 25 Monday
3651	+18184145533 tammy	Ok Monday or u can give check art will deport for him
3652	+18184145533 tammy	Or what's ever
3653	+17473334170 Rich New	Ok

Vahe Dadyan is a charged coconspirator who, among other things, is alleged to have submitted a fraudulent PPP loan that caused \$157,000 in fraudulent proceeds to be deposited into an account, from which approximately \$155,000 was transferred into the Runyan Tax Bank 2 account. (FSI ¶ 33 (Overt Acts 37 - 40).) This transfer occurred on or about July 3, 2020. (Id.) On or about July 23, 2020, funds in the Runyan Tax Bank 2 Account were transferred to Escrow Company 2 to help purchase Residential Property 2 in the name of defendant R. Ayvazyan's alleged alias, "Iulia Zhadko." (FSI ¶ 33 (Overt Act 41).)

As these messages show, the coconspirators used a ready supply of financial accounts, including preexisting accounts owned or controlled by other members of the conspiracy, to send, receive, or cause the sending or receiving of funds, as needed. Like the identities used to fraudulently apply for PPP and EIDL loans, the bank accounts used to launder the proceeds were also fungible. When one method of payment failed, they moved to another. When one account could no longer be used, they opened a new one using a synthetic identity. (See T.D. iPhone Excerpt 6, infra at 14-15.) As such, evidence of defendants' possession, control, and access to reserve identities and the tools necessary to verify them is inextricably intertwined with the money laundering conspiracy. Without the ability to create and support these synthetic

1 identities, the coconspirators would not have been able to access,
2 open, or otherwise control the accounts through which the tainted
3 funds flowed.

4
5 3. The Approximately \$450,000 in Cash Found at
6 R. Ayvazyan and Terabelian's Residence Is Admissible

7 In Loftis, the Ninth Circuit relied on its prior precedent in
8 United States v. Dorsey, 677 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2012), to highlight
9 "two general categories of other act evidence [that] may be
10 inextricably intertwined and thus exempted from the requirements of
11 Rule 404(b). First, other act evidence may constitute a part of the
12 transaction that serves as the basis for the criminal charge.
13 Second, admission of the other act evidence may be necessary to
14 permit the prosecutor to offer a coherent and comprehensible story
15 regarding the commission of the crime." Loftis, 843 F.3d at 1177-78
(internal quotations and citations omitted).

16 The cash found at defendant R. Ayvazyan and Terabelian's
17 residence is inextricably intertwined with the charged fraud scheme
18 and conspiracy. The primary purpose of financial fraud is not the
19 fraud itself; it is the money. Bank records show that, in addition
20 to moving fraudulently obtained PPP and EIDL funds through the use
21 of wires and checks, defendants also took possession of money from
22 tainted accounts in cash. (See Fenton Decl. (ECF 188), Exh. 8 and
23 15 (showing numerous checks made out to "CASH" using the Mod
24 Interiors Bank 7 account); see also FSI ¶¶ 22(d), 23(c), and 33
25 (Overt Acts 54-58).) As such, the presence of nearly half-a-million
26 dollars in cash on defendants R. Ayvazyan's and Terabelian's
27 property is part and parcel of the story of their criminal conduct.
28 Money is the purpose for the fraudulent transactions discussed

1 above, and defendants' possession of significant amounts of bundled
2 cash - particularly when found hidden in the bushes of their
3 property during the search - permits the government to present the
4 jury with a complete story of the charged offenses and prove its
5 case. (See Fenton Decl. (ECF 188), Exh. 8.) Similarly, the bundled
6 stacks of cash are inextricably intertwined with the charged money
7 laundering conspiracy. Cash is the ultimate fungible asset --
8 unlike wire or bank-based transfers, it can exchange hands numerous
9 times without leaving an audit trail.

10 **B. The Reserve Evidence Is Inextricably Intertwined with the**
11 **Charged Offenses Even If They Could be Used for Other,**
Uncharged Crimes

12 It is possible that defendants used the above-described
13 instruments of fraud and money laundering to pursue other crimes.
14 Defendants have also been charged by the California Attorney
15 General's Office with a years-long mortgage fraud scheme and
16 defendants R. Ayvazyan and Terabelian were previously convicted in
17 this district for a loan-related bank fraud scheme. (See ECF 334,
18 340, and 357.) However, as indicated by the Ninth Circuit's ruling
19 in United States v. Daly, the mere fact that an instrument of crime
20 can be used to commit other crimes does not subject it to Rule
21 404(b). 974 F.2d 1215, 1216 (9th Cir. 1992) (government permitted
22 to present inextricably intertwined evidence of shoot-out during
23 which defendant possessed a firearm to prove felon-in-possession
24 charge).

25 The use of a check, fake social security number, or a dead
26 person's identity for multiple types of fraud does not remove its
27 inextricable connection to the charged offense, just as the
28 commingling of funds does not remove the taint of unlawful activity.

1 See United States v. Ward, 197 F.3d 1076, 1083 (11th Cir. 1999). It
2 would be nonsensical for defendants to exclude evidence of the
3 manner and means by which they committed fraud and money laundering
4 simply by using them to commit additional, uncharged crimes. The
5 Ninth Circuit recognized this reality in United States v. Williams,
6 when it affirmed the district court's decision to admit evidence of
7 defendant's sale of drugs other than the charged cocaine. 989 F.2d
8 1061, 1071 (9th Cir. 1993). "The policies underlying rule 404(b)
9 are inapplicable when offenses committed as part of a single
10 criminal episode become other acts simply because the defendant is
11 indicted for less than all of his actions." Id.

12
13 **C. Even if Rule 404(b) Applied, the Evidence Would be Admissible**

14 As discussed above, the government does not believe evidence of
15 defendants' possession of reserve identities and related instruments
16 of fraud fall under the scope of Rule 404(b) because they are
17 inextricably intertwined with the charged conspiracies and schemes.
18 However, even if Rule 404(b) did apply, the evidence would be
19 admissible as proof of opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
20 knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, and lack of accident. For
21 the reasons presented, defendants' possession of, and access to, a
22 ready supply of individual and business information, combined with
23 the tools to manufacture and verify synthetic identities, enabled
24 them to commit the charged crimes. Defendants' possession of these
25 instruments of fraud and money laundering reveal that their receipt
26 of fraudulent PPP and EIDL proceeds was no accident. It was all
27 part of a deliberate plan to submit fraudulent loan applications and
28 enjoy the fruits of their labor by using the tools they had before,

1 and further developed during, the COVID-19 pandemic.

2 The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that "Rule 404(b) is one
3 of inclusion--not exclusion[.]" See e.g., United States v. Lague,
4 971 F.3d 1032, 1040 (9th Cir. 2020) and United States v. Bailey, 696
5 F.3d 794, 806 (9th Cir. 2012). Under the Ninth Circuit's "low
6 threshold test of sufficiency," defendants' possession of additional
7 fictitious and synthetic identities and the instruments of fraud are
8 admissible for purposes of proving opportunity, intent, preparation,
9 plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, and lack of accident.
10 Lague, 971 F.3d at 1040 (citations and quotations omitted).

11 In Lague, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court
12 properly admitted evidence of a medical professional's "uncharged
13 prescriptions of controlled substances in enormous quantities"
14 because they supported a "reasonable inference" that the charged
15 controlled substance prescriptions were issued unlawfully. Id.
16 Similarly, defendants' possession of synthetic identities in names
17 that were directly used in fraudulent loan applications and related
18 accounts, as well as those that were not, combined with their
19 possession of the instruments of fraud (stamps, seals, account
20 passwords, checks, credit and debit cards in names not their own),
21 all support a reasonable inference that defendants knowingly and
22 intentionally used synthetic identities in furtherance of the
23 charged offenses. As such, the evidence is admissible under the low
24 threshold requirements of Rule 404(b).

25 **IV. CONCLUSION**

26 For the aforementioned reasons, evidence of defendants'
27 possession of and access to interchangeable reserve identities,
28 along with instruments of fraud directly referenced in coconspirator

1 communications, is admissible as being inextricably intertwined with
2 the charged fraud and money laundering conspiracies and schemes.
3 The government respectfully requests that the Court find such
4 evidence admissible as inextricably intertwined with the charged
5 offenses or, in the alternative, admissible under the permissive
6 standards of Rule 404(b).